EP0112944B1 - Examen de la validité de codes d'identification - Google Patents

Examen de la validité de codes d'identification Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0112944B1
EP0112944B1 EP19820306989 EP82306989A EP0112944B1 EP 0112944 B1 EP0112944 B1 EP 0112944B1 EP 19820306989 EP19820306989 EP 19820306989 EP 82306989 A EP82306989 A EP 82306989A EP 0112944 B1 EP0112944 B1 EP 0112944B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
pin
location
message authentication
authentication code
data processing
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
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EP19820306989
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP0112944A1 (fr
Inventor
Christopher Holloway
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International Business Machines Corp
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International Business Machines Corp
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Priority to DE8282306989T priority Critical patent/DE3275604D1/de
Priority to EP19820306989 priority patent/EP0112944B1/fr
Priority to JP58154229A priority patent/JPS59123968A/ja
Publication of EP0112944A1 publication Critical patent/EP0112944A1/fr
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Publication of EP0112944B1 publication Critical patent/EP0112944B1/fr
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption

Definitions

  • This invention relates to methods of validating identification codes entered at locations connected in a communication network and in particular to methods of validating personal identification numbers (PIN) in an electronic funds transfer at the retail point of sale (E.F.T.) system.
  • PIN personal identification numbers
  • Electronic Funds Transfer is the name given to a system of directly debiting and crediting customer and service suppliers' accounts at the instant of confirmation of a transaction.
  • the accounts are held at a bank, or credit card company's central processing system, which is connected to a dedicated network of retailers or service suppliers' data processing equipment. In this way no cash or cheque processing is required for the transaction.
  • each bank or credit card company has its own network and each customer of the bank has a credit card which can only be used on that network, such a network is described in European Patent Publication 32193.
  • European Patent publication 32193 (IBM Corporation) describes a system in which each user and retailer has a key number - retailers key Kr and users key Kp - which is stored together with the user's identity number and retailer's business number in a data store at the host central processing unit (c.p.u.).
  • the retailer's key and the user key are used in the encryption of data sent between the retailer's transaction terminal and the host c.p.u.
  • Obviously only users or customers with their identity numbers and encryption keys stored at the host c.p.u. can make use of the system. As the number of users expands there is an optimum number beyond which the time taken to look up corresponding keys and identity numbers is unacceptable for on-line transaction processing.
  • European Patent Publication 18 129 (Motorola Inc.) describes a method of providing security of data on a communication path. Privacy and security of a dial-up data communications network are provided by means of either a user or terminal identification code together with a primary cipher key. A list of valid identification codes and primary cipher code pairs is maintained at the central processing unit. Identification code and cipher key pairs, sent to the c.p.u. are compared with the stored code pairs. A correct comparison is required before the c.p.u. will accept encoded data sent from the terminal. All data sent over the network is encrypted to prevent unauthorised access using the relevant user or terminal key.
  • UK Patent Application 2,020,513A (Atalla Tech- novations) describes a method and apparatus which avoids the need for transmitting user- identification information such as a personal identification number (PIN) in the clear from station to station in a network such as described in the two European Patent Publications mentioned above.
  • PIN personal identification number
  • the PIN is encoded using a randomly generated number at a user station and the encoded PIN and the random number are sent to the processing station.
  • a second PIN having generic application is encoded using the received random number and the received encoded PIN and the generic encoded PIN are compared to determine whether the received PIN is valid.
  • the EFT system made possible by the systems described in the above patent applications is limited to a single host c.p.u. holding the accounts of all users both retailers and customers.
  • PCT publication Wo 81/02655 (Marvin Sendrow) describes a multi-host, multi-user system in which the PIN is encrypted more than once at the entry terminal.
  • the data required to validate and authorise the transactions is transmitted to a host computer which access from its stored data base the data that is required to decrypt and validate the transaction, including the encrypted PIN.
  • a secret terminal master key must be maintained at each terminal.
  • a list of these master keys is,also maintained at the host computer.
  • European Patent publication 55580 (Honeywell Informations systems) seeks to avoid the necessity of transmitting PIN information in the network. This is achieved by issuing each user with a card that has encoded in the magnetic strip the bank identification (BIN) the user's account number (ACCN) and a PIN offset number.
  • the PIN offset is calculated from the PIN, BIN and ACCN.
  • the user enters the PIN at a keyboard attached to the terminal, which also reads the PIN offset, BIN and ACCN from the card.
  • the terminal then recalculates a PIN offset from the user's entered PIN, the BIN and ACCN. If the recalculated PIN offset is the same as the PIN offset read from the card then validation of the PIN is assumed.
  • This system has the disadvantage in that the card issuer is not involved in the validation and that knowing that the PIN offset is calculated from the PIN, the BIN and ACCN, anyone having illicitly the process can manufacture fraudulent cards with valid PINS.
  • PCT Application WO 82/02446 (Transac-Alcatel (USA Patent 4,498,000)) describes both a method and the apparatus for exchanging data between a crediting means (smart-card) and a remote data processing centre.
  • the data produced by the smart card includes a secret PIN number and a card identification.
  • An encryption key stored on the card is used to encrypt the data which is then sent through a suitable terminal to the d.p. centre. Validation takes place at the d.p. centre.
  • This scheme can only work with a smart-card (i.e. a card with an embedded microprocessor and read only memory) and is not applicable to the majority of credit card schemes that already exist.
  • IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin Vol 16 No 8 Jan 1974 at pages 2539 and 2540 includes an article on "Cryptographic password management" by Cullum, Feistel and Smith.
  • the article is directed to securing a users password in a processing network by using cryptographic procedures.
  • a method of testing the validity of an identification code at a location connected over a communication network to a data processing centre at which valid identification codes are stored comprising the steps of:
  • An EFT network that is used by several card issuing agencies, banks, credit card companies, etc., and many retail outlets, from large department stores to single unit shops and garages many spread over a large geographical area. It is envisaged that for a country such as England then each card issuer's central processing site and each retail outlet will be connected to a telecommunication network such as the telephone network with direct lines to local exchanges. In such a system is it essential that each card issuing agency is involved in the authorisation of transactions and in the authentication of the card user's identity.
  • the number of retail point of sale locations are numbered in hundreds of thousands and there may be a hundred or more different card issuing agencies. In this situation the use of encryption keys that are known both to all card users and to all the point of sale locations become unmanageable and it is desirable to ensure that PIN's are not transmitted through the network.
  • the essence of the present invention is to generate an authentication parameter that relates to the PIN both from the number entered at the location and the valid number stored at the host and use this authorisation parameter to encode a variable which has no direct relationship with the PIN.
  • the variable can be generated at either or both the initiating location and the host processing centre.
  • the received encoded variable then called a message authentication code is compared with the locally derived encoded variable, a correct comparision indicating that the entered PIN is valid.
  • variable is generated in two parts, the first part at the location is transmitted to the central processor and the second part at the central processor, the two parts are logically combined at each location to give the complete variable.
  • variable parts are the messages sent between the two locations, this can include indexing numbers such as a personal account number (PAN) and the host identification (CIAID) and random numbers generated at each location.
  • PAN personal account number
  • CIAID host identification
  • random numbers generated at each location.
  • variable need only be a truly random number generated at the terminal and sent with index information to the host processing centre.
  • the variable is encoded using a valid authorisation parameter to derive a valid message authentication code (MAC).
  • the terminal encodes the variable using the locally derived authorisation parameter to generate a derived message authentication code (DMAC), and the DMAC and MAC are compared. The comparison could take place at either the host processing centre or the terminal depending upon processing and security factors built into each location. If the comparison is made at the host central processing centre then the DMAC is sent as part of the message and it is not necessary to transmit the MAC to the terminal.
  • MAC message authentication code
  • Figure 1 is a block schematic of a point of sale or transaction terminal which includes a keyboard 10, a card reader 11 and display 12, which are connected to a common bus 13. Also connected to the bus 13 is random access memory (RAM) 14, a microprocessor 15, a line adapter 16 and encryption device 17 and a read only memory (ROM) 18. The line adapter is connected to a modem 19 which is connected directly to the EFT network.
  • RAM random access memory
  • ROM read only memory
  • FIG. 2 shows schematically a card issuing agency's processing system in which a processor 20 is connected to an encryption device 21, a main working store 22 and an input output channel controller 23 through a bus 24.
  • the main work store 22 is connected to a mass backup store 25 which may be a large capacity disc store or a similar device.
  • CIA card issuing agency
  • PAN user's account number
  • CIAID agency's identity
  • PIN secret personal number
  • the CIA maintains in its data bank 25 a list of all the PANs associated with the relevant valid authorisation parameters (VAPs) and of course the PANs are also used for the relevant financial information, although this aspect is not directly relevant to the present invention.
  • a transaction is initiated at the terminal when the user, or it may be a shop employee of a retail organisation, enters a card in the card reader 11.
  • the control unit 18 will detect that a card is to be read and control the transfer of the pan and CIAID to the RAM store 14.
  • the control unit then constructs a message (message A) to be sent through the line adapter 16 and modem 19 to the appropriate host processing unit identified by the CIAID.
  • the message contains the PAN or index number and routing information. It may also contain a random number, which because it does not have to be regenerated can be a truly random number without a known seed.
  • the message A is stored in a message buffer in the RAM store 14. The random number can be generated by a special unit or in the processor 15, by standard techniques.
  • the PAN or index number is used to identify the user's PIN held in the store 25.
  • the PIN need not be stored as such, but as a valid authorisation parameter (VAP) which is the combination of PIN and PAN, and other static card data.
  • VAP authorisation parameter
  • the other card data (generically termed a personal key) is combined with the PIN.
  • the resultant data is then used as an encipherment key to encipher the PAN to produce the VAP.
  • the processor 20 constructs a return message B, which in the preferred embodiment is regarded as the second half of the variable, as message A this may also contain a truly random number.
  • Messages A and B are then concatenated (Mess A: Mess B) by the processor 20 and the result (VAR) stored in the main store 22.
  • VAR is then encoded by the encryption device 21 using the VAP as the encryption key.
  • the result is a message authentication code (MAC).
  • MAC is then added to message B which is then transmitted to the originating terminal through the I/O channel control 23 and the EFT network.
  • the control unit will then cause an instruction to appear on the display 12 telling the card user to enter his or her PIN at the keyboard 10.
  • the terminal is used by the card user only for cash issuing then the card reader 11, keyboard 10 and display 12 can be close together, however if the terminal is used for point of sale transactions then the keyboard at which PINs are entered must be shielded from the retailers employees.
  • the user enters the PIN this is then stored in the RAM 14.
  • the next step at the terminal is to generate a locally derived authorisation parameter (DAP). This is done by using the processor 15 to perform the same function as that used to derive the VAP.
  • the DAP is then stored in the RAM 14.
  • the control unit and processor 15 now performs the identical concatenation operation on message A and message B as performed by the host processor.
  • the result should be the same as VAR, the variable generated at the host processor.
  • the encryption device 17 then encrypts VAR using the previously generated DAP as the encryption key, the result is a locally generated MAC (DMAC).
  • DMAC is stored in the RAM 14 and the processor 15 then compares the received MAC with DMAC. An incorrect comparison indicates that the PIN entered locally and used to generate the DAP was not correct and the transaction is aborted.
  • the control unit 18 will cause an appropriate message to appear on the display. If the comparison is satisfactory then the entered PIN is correct and the control 18 unit will allow the transaction to proceed.
  • the transaction terminal In an EFT system it is not necessary for the transaction terminal to store the PIN.
  • the PIN need only be entered at the keyboard when the MAC is received from the host and the calculation of the DAP can be started at that point.
  • a random number can be generated by using a continuously running microsecond clock and the timed intervals between key strokes at the keyboard as seed numbers.
  • control of the operations of the transaction terminal is by microcode stored in a read only memory in the control unit.
  • the operations of the terminalcould be controlled by a logic switching circuit embodied in a solid state logic device.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
  • Cash Registers Or Receiving Machines (AREA)

Claims (10)

1. Procédé de vérification de la validité d'un code d'identification (PIN) dans une position (10-19) connectée par un réseau de communications à un centre de traitement de données (20-25) dans lequel des codes d'identification valides sont mémorisés, consistant:
a) à recevoir à la position, le code d'identification (PIN) et un numéro d'index (PAN)
b) à dériver du code d'identification (PIN) et du numéro d'index (PAN) un paramètre d'autorisation dérivé (DAF), et caractérisé en ce qu'il consiste à:
c) produire un nombre variable unique à chaque essai particulier de validation,
d) mémoriser le nombre variable dans une mémoire de position et transmettre le nombre variable avec le numéro d'index (PAN) au centre de traitement de données,
e) utiliser, au centre de traitement de données, le numéro d'index (PAN) pour identifier ou dériver un paramètre d'autorisation valide (VAP),
f) crypter le nombre variable en utilisant le paramètre d'autorisation valide (VAP) comme clé de cryptage et utiliser le résultat comme un code d'authentification de message valide (MAC),
g) crypter, à la position, le nombre variable en utilisant le paramètre d'autorisation dérivé (DAP) comme clé de cryptage et utiliser le résultat comme un code d'authentification de message dérivé (DMAC),
h) comparer le code d'authentification de message valide (MAC) avec le code d'authentification de message dérivé (DMAC) et utiliser le résultat de la comparaison comme une détermination de la validité du code d'identification (PIN).
2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel le nombre variable est un message contenant des informations pour chaque vérification de validation.
3. Procédé selon la revendication 2, dans lequel le nombre variable contient un nombre aléatoire.
4. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1, 2 et 3 dans lequel la phase (h) est exécutée à la position.
5. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1, 2, 3 et 4 dans lequel le nombre variable contient les informations de message produites par le centre de traitement de données, combinées logiquement avec des informations de message produites par la position.
6. Procédé selon la revendication 5, dans lequel les messages produits par la position et le centre de traitement de données sont assemblées.
7. Procédé de vérification selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, dans lequel la position est un terminal de transaction de système de transfert électronique de fonds, le code d'identification est un numéro d'identification personnel (PIN) et le nombre d'index est un numéro de compte personnel (PAN).
8. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, consistant en outre à effectuer un cryptage sous des messages clés de systèmes de réseau émis entre la position et le centre de traitement de données.
9. Terminal de transaction destiné à être connecté à un réseau de transmission de données dans lequel des numéros d'identification (PIN) introduits dans une position éloignée (10-19) connectée à un centre de traitement de données (20-25) sont vérifiées quant à leur validité, comportant un premier dispositif destiné à recevoir et à mémoriser des codes d'identification et des nombres d'index associés, un premier dispositif de traitement de position ayant pour fonction de dériver du code d'identification (PIN) et du numéro d'index (PAN), un paramètre d'autorisation dérivé (DAP) et caractérisé en ce qu'il comporte un second dispositif ayant pour fonction de produire un nombre variable pour chaque essai particulier de validation, un troisième dispositif ayant pour fonction d'émettre le nombre d'index (PAN) et le nombre variable vers le centre de traitement de données et de recevoir du centre de traitement de données un code d'authentification de message (MAC), un second dispositif de traitement comportant un dispositif de cryptage ayant pour fonction de dériver un code d'authentification de message dérivé (DMAC) en utilisant le paramètre d'autorisation dérivé (DAP) comme une clé de cryptage afin de coder le nombre variable et un dispositif de comparaison qui a pour fonction de comparer le code d'authentification de message reçu (MAC) avec le code d'authentification de message dérivé (DMAC) et utilisant le résultat de la comparaison pour déterminer la validité du numéro d'indentification (PIN).
10. Réseau de transmission de données comprenant plusieurs terminaux de transaction selon la revendication 9 et comportant, à chaque centre de traitement de données, un dispositif ayant pour fonction de produire un paramètre d'autorisation valide (VAP) en réponse à un numéro d'index reçu (PAN) d'un terminal d'origine, un dispositif ayant pour fonction de produire un code d'identification de message valide (MAC) en cryptant le nombre variable en utilisant le paramètre d'autorisation valide (VAP) comme clé de cryptage et produisant un code d'authentification de message (MAC), et un dispositif qui émet le code d'identification de message vers le terminal d'origine.
EP19820306989 1982-12-30 1982-12-30 Examen de la validité de codes d'identification Expired EP0112944B1 (fr)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE8282306989T DE3275604D1 (en) 1982-12-30 1982-12-30 Testing the validity of identification codes
EP19820306989 EP0112944B1 (fr) 1982-12-30 1982-12-30 Examen de la validité de codes d'identification
JP58154229A JPS59123968A (ja) 1982-12-30 1983-08-25 識別コードの妥当性試験方法

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP19820306989 EP0112944B1 (fr) 1982-12-30 1982-12-30 Examen de la validité de codes d'identification

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0112944A1 EP0112944A1 (fr) 1984-07-11
EP0112944B1 true EP0112944B1 (fr) 1987-03-04

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EP19820306989 Expired EP0112944B1 (fr) 1982-12-30 1982-12-30 Examen de la validité de codes d'identification

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EP (1) EP0112944B1 (fr)
JP (1) JPS59123968A (fr)
DE (1) DE3275604D1 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8881294B2 (en) * 2011-02-18 2014-11-04 Honeywell International Inc. Methods and systems for securely uploading files onto aircraft

Families Citing this family (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2146815A (en) * 1983-09-17 1985-04-24 Ibm Electronic fund transfer systems
GB2146814A (en) * 1983-09-17 1985-04-24 Ibm Electronic fund transfer systems
EP0168667B1 (fr) * 1984-07-19 1992-03-04 Tandem Computers Incorporated Système de transfert d'un message protégé, et procédé utilisant un code de session mis à jour
DE3877984D1 (de) * 1987-03-04 1993-03-18 Siemens Nixdorf Inf Syst Datenaustauschsystem.
GB2255664B (en) * 1991-04-09 1994-07-06 Frank Victor Haymann Preventing unauthorised usage of a credit card
US5544322A (en) * 1994-05-09 1996-08-06 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for policy-based inter-realm authentication within a distributed processing system
US5724423A (en) * 1995-09-18 1998-03-03 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson Method and apparatus for user authentication
JP4810098B2 (ja) * 2005-01-19 2011-11-09 株式会社東芝 紙葉類処理装置における処理データ転送方法および紙葉類処理装置

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4123747A (en) * 1977-05-20 1978-10-31 International Business Machines Corporation Identity verification method and apparatus
GB2099195B (en) * 1978-05-03 1983-05-18 Atalla Technovations Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions
US4223403A (en) * 1978-06-30 1980-09-16 International Business Machines Corporation Cryptographic architecture for use with a high security personal identification system
FR2469760A1 (fr) * 1979-11-09 1981-05-22 Cii Honeywell Bull Procede et systeme d'identification de personnes demandant l'acces a certains milieux
US4295039A (en) * 1979-12-03 1981-10-13 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for achieving secure password verification
DE3013211A1 (de) * 1980-04-03 1981-10-08 GAO Gesellschaft für Automation und Organisation mbH, 8000 München Verfahren zur handhabung einer persoenlichen indentifikationsnummer (pin) im zusammenhang mit einer ausweiskarte
US4390968A (en) * 1980-12-30 1983-06-28 Honeywell Information Systems Inc. Automated bank transaction security system
FR2497617B1 (fr) * 1981-01-07 1989-08-18 Transac Develop Transactions A Procede et dispositif de securite pour communication tripartie de donnees confidentielles

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8881294B2 (en) * 2011-02-18 2014-11-04 Honeywell International Inc. Methods and systems for securely uploading files onto aircraft

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE3275604D1 (en) 1987-04-09
EP0112944A1 (fr) 1984-07-11
JPH049355B2 (fr) 1992-02-19
JPS59123968A (ja) 1984-07-17

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