EA046054B1 - METHOD FOR AUTHENTICATION OF TYFLOSPLAYER IN THE ONLINE LIBRARY OF "TALKING" BOOKS - Google Patents

Description

Field of technology to which the invention relates

The claimed invention relates to the field of information security, in particular to monitoring and managing device access to information, in particular, a method for authenticating a flash player in an online library of talking books for the visually impaired, blind and visually impaired.

Prior Art

A Tifloflash player is a device designed to play talking books, that is, books reproduced in an audio format, adapted for use by the visually impaired, blind and visually impaired. The format, definition and distribution of talking books in Russia are regulated by GOST R 59224-2020 Digital talking book for the blind and visually impaired. Technical requirements.

With the development of the Internet, flash players have become widespread, capable of playing talking books not only from local storage media, but also from online libraries of talking books. In this case, the claimed method of authentication and authentication of the tifloflashplayer in the online library of talking books is used to limit access to the online library of talking books and provide access only to legitimate devices/users.

Thus, a need arose to authenticate legitimate tifloflash players on the online library server and prevent illegitimate devices from accessing it.

The following methods and systems for authenticating a device on a target server, similar to the claimed invention, are known from the prior art.

Known for the KERBEROS NETWORK AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL

[https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/kxb5-latest/doc/basic/ccache_def.html], according to which paired keys are used that are exchanged between the user and the server for secure authentication and data encryption. In a known method, a user attempting to access a resource sends a request to an authentication server requesting an authentication ticket (TGT), the key server verifies the user's identity, and then creates a TGT containing encrypted data including a timestamp and a session key. The user receives the TGT and uses it to request a new ticket to access a specific target server, which is also encrypted using the user's session key. The target server verifies the ticket using a shared secret key with the authentication server and if the ticket is valid and correct, the server grants access to the user.

The Kerberos protocol has a number of advantages, but it also has disadvantages that reduce the security of the protocol, especially when compared to asymmetric encryption. Kerberos uses symmetric keys, which means that a shared secret key must be exchanged. This poses a serious problem since the key must be transferred or established before communication can begin. Consequently, this creates potential vulnerable points where attackers can intercept or compromise the key. Moreover, in the known method, each pair of parties must have a unique secret key for data exchange, which becomes complex and ineffective with a large number of users or devices, since managing all these keys becomes labor-intensive and inconvenient. In addition, the secret key in the known method must be known to both parties in order to decrypt the data, which creates risks associated with key leakage or compromise. Moreover, if the secret key is compromised, then all past and future messages encrypted with this key can also be compromised. Therefore, a new secret key needs to be exchanged, which can be difficult in real time. And finally, the known method is not suitable for use by visually impaired and blind people, since it involves entering text passwords.

Also known is the SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR DEVICE AUTHENTICATION [EA201990708, 2017.09.08], considered as the closest analogue. The known system and method uses temporary identifiers generated by each device using dynamic and static states. Temporary identifiers are exchanged and authenticated between devices, allowing a trusted relationship to be established. In some cases, the key server may generate a temporary identifier for the device, which is then sent or received by the device. Devices can also establish a trust relationship based on a previously used hash of data, created, for example, using an algorithm with a stored and shared one-time password.

The known system and method has several disadvantages. First, using static digital certificates poses a security risk. Because these certificates remain immutable, they can be compromised by attackers and used for unauthorized access. Secondly, the generation and exchange of temporary identifiers requires precise implementation and failure to adhere to secure methods for generating and storing temporary identifiers can lead to vulnerabilities in the system. In addition, the known system and method are difficult for use by visually impaired and blind people, as they require interaction with digital devices and complex technical processes, which may create barriers to their participation. It is important to consider that these shortcomings not only increase the security risk, but can also make it difficult for users of flash players, that is, visually impaired and blind people, to use the system.

The essence of the invention

Taking into account the shortcomings identified in the prior art, the present invention is aimed at solving a technical problem, which is to create a method for authenticating a flash player in an online library of talking books with increased security, accessible to users of flash players, that is, visually impaired and blind people.

When solving this technical problem, the achievement of a technical result is ensured, which is expressed in increasing the security of the method of authenticating the Tifloflash player in the online library of talking books.

The specified technical problem is solved and the specified technical result is provided by the claimed method of authenticating a tifloflash player in an online library of talking books, which uses a tifloflash player containing a unique device identifier (ID) and the private key of the tifloflash player manufacturer (PrKP), a key issuing server containing the public key of the tifloflash player manufacturer ( PbKP), and at least one online library server, configured to exchange data, according to which: the flash player sends its UI to the key issuing server; in response to receiving the ID of the tifloflashplayer, the security server generates a pair of the private key of the tifloflashplayer (PrKT) and the public key of the tifloflashplayer (PbKT); the server encrypts the generated PrKT using PbKP and sends it to the flash player, and the generated PbKT sends it to the specified at least one online library server along with the UI; the tifloflash player decrypts the PrKT sent to him using PrKP; the tifloflash player sends the UI to the online library server in response to receiving the UI from the tifloflash player, the online library server generates the correct password for the received UI, encrypts it using PbKT and sends it to the tifloflash player, the tifloflash player decrypts the received password and sends the correct password to the online library server; the online library server checks the authenticity of the password; if it is determined that the password is invalid, the online library server regenerates the correct password, encrypts it using PbKT and sends it to the flash player; if it is determined that the password is reliable, then the online library server provides access to the tifloflash player to the resources of the online library and successfully completes the authentication of the tifloflash player in the online library.

In particular, the key issuing server generates a new pair of keys PrKT and PbKT at predetermined intervals and sends the new PrKT to the flash player in encrypted form, and the new PbKT to the online library server.

In particular, the key issuing server generates a new pair of keys PrKT and PbKT in response to the tifloflashplayer's request from the control unit for which a pair of keys has already been issued and sends the new PrKT to the tifloflashplayer in encrypted form, and the new PbKT to the online library server.

In particular, the online library server stores the hash sum of the correct password in memory, but not the password itself, and determines the reliability of the password received from the flash player by comparing its hash sum with the stored hash sum.

In particular, the online library server adds a salt to the generated password in the form of the current time, the TI of the flash player, or a predefined fragment of the PbKT.

In addition, the specified technical problem is solved and the specified technical result is provided by the claimed authentication system for the tifloflash player in the online library of talking books, which contains a tifloflash player containing the private key of the tifloflash player manufacturer (PrKP), a key issuing server containing the public key of the tifloflash player manufacturer (PbKP) and at least one online library server configured to communicate with each other and configured to implement the steps of the method described above.

List of drawing figures and other materials

In fig. Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the proposed method for authenticating a flash player in an online library of talking books.

In fig. 2 schematically shows a system for implementing the claimed method and the exchange of information between its components in an example implementation with one online library.

The figures indicate: 1 - tifloflashplayer; 2 - key issuance server; 3 - online library server.

Information confirming the possibility of implementing the invention

The claimed invention in its first aspect relates to a method for authenticating a flash player in an online library of talking books.

According to the claimed method, a flash player 1 is used, which contains in memory a unique device identifier (ID or DID from the English Device IDentification). The specified DI is assigned to the flash player 1 at the production stage and is installed in the memory of the flash player. The specified ID is preferably an alphanumeric code, which is then used as a login for authentication in the online library.

The PI is assigned to the device at the manufacturing stage and remains unchanged throughout

- 2 046054 device service life, which ensures the uniqueness and authenticity of the identifier and serves as protection against counterfeit devices and manipulation of identification information.

Since the UI is unique for each device, this provides a high level of authentication when using the UI as a login. Using a pre-installed UI as a login for authentication is of particular importance and value for blind and visually impaired people, since it saves them from having to enter a login themselves and interact with the screen.

Tifloflashplayer 1 also contains in memory the manufacturer's private key (PrKP), or the private key of the first pair of keys. The specified PrKP is preferably installed together with the software of the flash player. The specified PrKP is a private cryptographic key, which is available to the manufacturer of the flash player and which the manufacturer includes in the software installed in the flash player 1. In this case, the manufacturer’s public key (PbKP), or the public key of the first pair of keys, is stored on the key issuing server 2.

The advantages of a security configuration in which the flash player 1 contains the manufacturer's private key (PrKP) in memory, and the manufacturer's public key (PbKP) is stored on the key issuing server 2 are as follows. The specified configuration makes it possible to implement two-step authentication, in which the first factor is that the flash player 1 has (a unique UI and PrKP), and the second is that the flash player 1 knows (PbKP, located on the key issuing server 2 and transmitted by it to the target server 3 online libraries), which greatly increases security, since an attacker to access the server will need to know at least the UI, PrKP and PrKP, of which PrKP and PBKP are not transmitted on the network. Additionally, the public key on the server can be replaced or revoked, rendering a compromised device useless without access to the actual keys on the server. In addition, the presence of a key issuing server 2 allows for more flexible control of access to resources. A security administrator can easily revoke or change access for specific devices without affecting the software on users' devices. Thus, the configuration of storing the manufacturer's private key on the device and the public key on the security server provides higher levels of security, access control flexibility, and protection against device compromise, making it an attractive choice for securing flash players and other similar devices, as well as providing the ability to creating between the flash player 1 and the key issuing server 2 the first one-way secure data transmission channel from the key issuing server 2 to the flash player.

According to the claimed method, the flash player 1 contacts the key issuing server 2 and sends it a message containing the UI of the flash player.

For each ID, a second pair of keys is stored or, preferably, generated on the key issuing server 2 - a pair of the private key of the tifloflash player (PrKT) and the public key of the tifloflash player (PbKT).

This key pair security system is known in the art as asymmetric encryption. In a public/private key pair, the public key is used to encrypt information, particularly, as discussed in more detail below, on the side of the key issuing server 2 and the online library server 3, and the private key is used to decrypt information encrypted with the corresponding public key. These keys are mathematically related, but calculating the private key from the public key is computationally complex and impractical.

Next, the key issuing server 2 sends to all servers of the online libraries of talking books, the list of addresses of which is stored in the memory of the key issuing server 2, a message for the online library server containing the UI of the flash player and the generated PbKT. At the same time, the key issuing server 2 sends to the tifloflash player 1 a message for the tifloflash player, containing the generated PrKT, encrypted using the PbKP stored or generated on the key issuing server 2, that is, it sends the PbKT to the tifloflash player via the specified first one-way secure data transmission channel.

Direction to tifloflashplayer 1 PrKT and direction to the online library server PbKT provides the ability to create a second one-way secure data transmission channel between tifloflashplayer 1 and each online library server 3 from online library server 3 to tifloflashplayer 1.

After the tifloflash player receives a message for the tifloflash player from the server 2, the tifloflash player 1 decrypts the encrypted information about the PrKT contained in the specified message using the PrKP stored on the tifloflash player, and then saves it in the memory of the PrKT.

This security system, which uses two pairs of asymmetric keys to protect data transmission and ensure confidentiality, including protecting the transfer of the keys themselves, is not known from the prior art and therefore there is no generally accepted term that unambiguously characterizes it. This mechanism may be called a two-layer asymmetric encryption system or a cascaded asymmetric encryption system, which emphasizes the use of two layers or levels of asymmetric encryption, where one layer provides access to the second.

Using two key pairs adds an additional level of security to the system. The private key of the first pair is used to decrypt the message from the key issuing server 2, and the private key of the second pair will be used to decrypt the data sent to the online library server 3. This means that even if an attacker is able to access the private key of the first pair on the flash player, he will still not be able to decrypt the data transmitted to the target server without the private key of the second pair.

In addition, this system ensures a secure distribution of roles for participants in the authentication method, and tifloflashplayer 1 and server 3 of the online library can establish a one-way secure connection without transmitting the private key in unencrypted form, and also allows you to change the encryption keys for each session or user, which provides a higher security level and prevents the possibility of data interception by attackers.

In one optional example of implementation of the claimed method, the key issuing server 2 is configured to generate a new key pair PrKT and PbKT at predetermined intervals and send it to the flash player 1 (in encrypted form) and the online library server 3.

Regularly updating the key pair allows you to hide the patterns of encrypted data and prevent their detection. If an attacker is able to capture and analyze traffic, they may notice duplicate keys and try to use this for vulnerability analysis. Dynamic updating creates additional uncertainty and makes such analysis more difficult. In addition, a reduction in exposure time is ensured, that is, even if PrCT has been compromised, dynamic key updating limits the time during which an attacker can use this key and, for example, create an illegitimate copy of the flash player. Since the keys are updated at certain time intervals, even if compromised, the attacker can only have access to data encrypted using an outdated key, which generally increases the complexity and resource consumption of attacks, since for a successful attack the attacker must not only compromise the current PrKT+ key pair PbKT, but also monitor regular updates and adapt your attacks to new key pairs.

In another optional example of implementation of the claimed method, the key issuing server 2 is configured to generate a new pair of keys PrKT and PbKT in case of detection of the initial access of the flash player 1 to the control unit for which a pair of keys has already been issued. This event may indicate an attempt to authenticate an illegitimate copy of the flash player.

The flash player 1 establishes a connection with the online library server 3 and transmits a message to the online library server 3 containing its UI and a temporary password preset in the flash player. This password is not correct and is intended only to inform the online library that the correct password is not available on the flash player.

In response to the establishment of the first connection, the online library server 3 generates the correct password for the received UI and stores its hash sum in memory, while the access password of the flash player 1 to the online library is not stored in the memory of the online library server 3.

To obtain the hash sum, a hashing algorithm known from the prior art is used: MD5, SHA-256, SHA-3, BCrypt, Argon2 or Scrypt.

To generate a password, the online library server 3 may use the generation of a random sequence of characters of a predetermined length.

Optionally, the online library server 3 is configured to add a salt, that is, a random unique string, to the generated password before hashing it. The salt can be the current time, the TIF Flash Player 1, or a predefined fragment of the PbCT, such as the first five characters of the PbCT, which provides an additional layer of security since attackers will need additional time and effort to attack each hash or knowledge of the PbCT.

The use of salt provides increased security by strengthening the password, in particular, salt makes each hash unique for a given time or for a given flash player 1 with a unique ID, even if the same password is generated for them, that is, password hashes are not repeated in the database data, which makes dictionary attacks less effective, while increasing the complexity of password calculation and increasing security in the event of a data leak.

In this case, the online library server 3 is configured to store in memory not the access password of the flash player 1, but the hash sum of the specified password, which it is configured to compare with the hash sum of the password received from the flash player 1 to determine the authenticity of the combination of ID and password. Optionally, the online library server 3 is configured to store a password encrypted using PbKT in memory.

Storing the password on the online library server 3 in the form of its hash sum, and not in its explicit form, helps to increase the security of the password and prevent their leakage in the event of a compromise of the online library server 3 or its database. In particular, this provides protection against compromise, since if attackers gain access to the server, they will only see an unreadable string (hash) that is difficult or practically impossible to convert back to the original password. In addition, it protects passwords from access by personnel maintaining the online library server 3, which reduces the risk of misuse or leakage of passwords.

In response to the online library server 3 receiving a message from the flash player 1 to the online library server 3, the latter verifies the authenticity of the received UI and password combination by comparing the hash sum of the received password with the hash sum stored in memory.

If the online library server 3 determines that the received password is not valid, the online library server 3 returns to the flash player a message for the flash player 1 with information about the correct password of the corresponding UI, encrypted using PbKT.

Password encryption provides an additional barrier to authentication so that attackers with access to the server or database cannot read the password directly, even if they have compromised the password store; reducing the risk of password interception; provides additional authentication of the client, since it requires for decryption PrKT installed on the flash player, which could be received by him only if he had previously successfully established the first one-way secure data transmission channel with the key issuing server 2.

Sending a password to the client (tifloflash player) from the target server (server 3 of the online library), access to which is requested by the client, is an extremely unobvious solution in the field of device authentication and is not used in the field of information security due to its obvious insecurity. Indeed, it is relatively easy for an attacker to impersonate a legitimate user and obtain from the target server the required password to access it, so this method is not used in security systems known from the prior art. However, this disadvantage of low security is completely eliminated in the described method through the use of the above-described cascade authentication system, in which only a legitimate Tifloflash player, possessing PrKP and PrKT corresponding to his unique ID, can decrypt the password from the server 3 of the online library. Taking into account the above disadvantage, sending the password to the client by the target server provides the following advantages:

Firstly, the server 3 sending the online library of the password relieves the user of the need to enter and remember the password and relieves him of the need to interact with the screen and graphical interface, which is especially preferable for visually impaired, blind and visually impaired people using flash players. Secondly, the server 3 sending an online password library increases password security by allowing the generation of strong complex passwords, for example, using salt, as well as the ability to dynamically change the password at predetermined intervals or in response to the occurrence of certain events, as described in more detail. disclosed below.

In response to the tifloflash player receiving a message from online library server 3 for tifloflash player 1, the latter decrypts the encrypted information about the correct password contained in the message using PrKT and replaces the temporary password in its memory with the correct password.

Tifloflash player 1 establishes a re-connection with the online library server 3 and sends a message to it for online library server 3 containing its UI and the correct password stored in the tifloflash player. In response to online library server 3 receiving a message from online library player 1 to online library server 3, the latter verifies the authenticity of the received UI and password combination. If the online library server 3 determines that the received password matches the correct password for a given UI, the online library server 3 grants access to the online library resources 3 to the flash player and successfully completes the authentication of the online library 1 to the online library. If the online library server 3 determines that the received combination of ID and password is unreliable, it generates a new password.

Access to all online library resources using Tifloflashplayer 1 is provided exclusively to registered readers of this library. To do this, the user of digital flash player 1 must go through the registration procedure in the library, indicating the UI of his digital flash player 1. Control of access of digital flash players to online libraries through the digital library is carried out by employees of these libraries.

Thus, according to the proposed authentication method, only a legitimate tifloflash player, who has both the private key of the PrKP manufacturer and the private key of the PrKT tifloflash player, can receive and decrypt the correct password.

The online library server 3 is configured to periodically update the password for a specific UI at a certain frequency, for example, every 5 hours, that is, to periodically generate a new correct password, which leads to the detection of the unreliability of the previous password and sending a new correct password to the flash player with a certain UI.

Dynamic password change helps to increase authentication security, in particular, it reduces the validity period of stolen passwords, and if an attacker becomes able to steal the password of the flash player, dynamic password change limits its effectiveness in time; protect

Claims (8)

Protects the password over time from brute-force attacks. The claimed invention in its second aspect relates to an authentication system for a flash player in an online library of talking books, designed to implement the method described above. As shown in FIG. 2, an authentication system for a digital flash player in an online library, designed to implement the method described above, includes a digital flash player 1 containing the private key of the digital flash player manufacturer (PrKP), a key issuing server 2 containing the public key of the digital flash player manufacturer (PbKP) and at least one online library server 3 , made with the ability to exchange data with each other, for example, via the global Internet. Tifloflashplayer is a device designed for playing audiobooks and other audio files, specially designed for use by visually impaired and blind people. For this reason, digital flash players are not equipped with screens and keyboards suitable for entering login and password. In the said system, the flash player 1, the key issuing server 2 and the online library server 3 are configured to carry out the steps of the above method. CLAIM 1. A method for authenticating a tifloflashplayer in an online library of talking books, which involves a tifloflash player configured to exchange data with each other, containing a unique device identifier (ID) and a private key of the tifloflash player manufacturer (PrKP), a key issuing server containing the public key of the tifloflash player manufacturer ( PbKP), and at least one online library server, and according to which: The tifloflash player sends its control unit to the key issuance server; in response to receiving the ID of the tifloflashplayer, the security server generates a pair of the private key of the tifloflashplayer (PrKT) and the public key of the tifloflashplayer (PbKT); the server encrypts the generated PrKT with the help of PbKP and sends it to the tifloflash player, and the generated PbKT sends it to the specified at least one online library server along with the UI of the tifloflash player; the tifloflash player decrypts the PrKT sent to him using PrKP; the tifloflash player sends the UI to the online library server; in response to receiving the ID from the tifloflash player, the online library server generates the correct password for the received ID, encrypts it using PbKT and sends it to the tifloflash player, the tifloflash player decrypts the received password using PrKT and sends it to the online library server with its own ID; the online library server checks the authenticity of the password; if it is determined that the password is invalid, the online library server regenerates the correct password, encrypts it using PbKT and sends it to the flash player; if it is determined that the password is reliable, then the online library server provides access to the tifloflash player to the resources of the online library and successfully completes the authentication of the tifloflash player in the online library. 2. The method according to claim 1, in which the key issuing server generates a new pair of keys PrKT and PbKT at predetermined intervals and sends the new PrKT to the flash player in encrypted form, and the new PbKT to the online library server. 3. The method according to claim 1, in which the key issuing server generates a new pair of keys PrKT and PbKT in response to the tifloflashplayer contacting the control unit, according to which a pair of keys has already been issued, and sends the new PrKT to the tifloflashplayer in encrypted form, and the new PbKT to the online server -libraries. 4. The method according to claim 1, in which the online library server stores the hash sum of the correct password in memory, but not the password itself, and determines the reliability of the password received from the flash player by comparing its hash sum with the stored hash sum. 5. The method according to claim 1, in which the online library server adds a salt to the generated password in the form of the current time, the TI of the flash player or a predefined fragment of the PbKT. 6. An authentication system for a tifloflash player in an online library of talking books, which contains a tifloflash player containing the private key of the tifloflash player manufacturer (PrKP), a key issuing server containing the public key of the tifloflash player manufacturer (PbKP) and at least one online library server, configured to exchange data with each other and configured to carry out the steps of the method according to claim 1. 7. The system according to claim 6, in which the key issuing server is configured to generate a new pair of keys PrKT and PbKT at predetermined intervals and sends the new PrKT to the flash player in encrypted form, and the new PbKT to the online library server. 8. The system of claim 6, wherein the key issuing server is configured to generate a new key pair -