DE602004026787C5 - Sicherer datentransfer - Google Patents

Sicherer datentransfer Download PDF

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Publication number
DE602004026787C5
DE602004026787C5 DE602004026787.2T DE602004026787T DE602004026787C5 DE 602004026787 C5 DE602004026787 C5 DE 602004026787C5 DE 602004026787 T DE602004026787 T DE 602004026787T DE 602004026787 C5 DE602004026787 C5 DE 602004026787C5
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DE
Germany
Prior art keywords
radio communication
communication device
key
symmetric key
encrypted
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
DE602004026787.2T
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English (en)
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DE602004026787C9 (de
DE602004026787D1 (de
Inventor
Nadarajah Asokan
Timo Heikkinen
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Nokia Technologies Oy
Original Assignee
Nokia Technologies Oy
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Publication date
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Application filed by Nokia Technologies Oy filed Critical Nokia Technologies Oy
Publication of DE602004026787D1 publication Critical patent/DE602004026787D1/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of DE602004026787C5 publication Critical patent/DE602004026787C5/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Memory System Of A Hierarchy Structure (AREA)

Abstract

A method of providing secure data transfer from a first radio communication device of a first party to a second radio communication device, the data transfer to be overseen by a transfer device of a second party, the method comprising the steps of:
- generating randomly a first symmetric key at the first radio communication device, encrypting user data of the first radio communication device with the generated first symmetric key at the first radio communication device, characterized in that the method further comprises the steps of:
- encrypting at the first radio communication device the generated first symmetric key with a public key of a third party,
- sending the encrypted first symmetric key from the first radio communication device to the second radio communication device via the transfer device,
- decrypting at the second radio communication device the received encrypted first symmetric key by utilizing a secret key associated with the public key and comprised in a security device of the third party, the security device connected to the second radio communication device, sending the encrypted user data from the first radio communication device to the second radio communication device via the transfer device, and
- decrypting at the second radio communication device the received encrypted user data with the decrypted first symmetric key.

Description

  • Betreffend das am 21.04.2010 veröffentlichte europäische Patent EP 1 728 352 mit Wirkung für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (nationale Patentnummer 60 2004 026 787 ) hat das Deutsche Patent- und Markenamt am 08.07.2021 beschlossen:
  • Das Patent wird auf den am 01.06.2021 eingegangenen Antrag der Patentinhaberin gemäß § 64 des Patentgesetzes durch die am 16.06.2021 eingegangenen Patentansprüche Nr. 1 bis 13 beschränkt.

Claims (13)

  1. A method of providing secure data transfer from a first radio communication device of a first party to a second radio communication device, the data transfer to be overseen by a transfer device of a second party, the method comprising the steps of: - generating randomly a first symmetric key at the first radio communication device, encrypting user data of the first radio communication device with the generated first symmetric key at the first radio communication device, characterized in that the method further comprises the steps of: - encrypting at the first radio communication device the generated first symmetric key with a public key of a third party, - sending the encrypted first symmetric key from the first radio communication device to the second radio communication device via the transfer device, - decrypting at the second radio communication device the received encrypted first symmetric key by utilizing a secret key associated with the public key and comprised in a security device of the third party, the security device connected to the second radio communication device, sending the encrypted user data from the first radio communication device to the second radio communication device via the transfer device, and - decrypting at the second radio communication device the received encrypted user data with the decrypted first symmetric key.
  2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the step of decrypting at the second radio communication device the received encrypted first symmetric key by utilizing a secret key associated with the public key and comprised in a security device of the third party further comprises the steps of: - generating randomly a second symmetric key at the second radio communication device, - generating at the second radio communication device a request message comprising the generated second symmetric key and the received encrypted first symmetric key, and the request message encrypted with the public key, - sending the request message from the second radio communication device to the security device, - decrypting at the security device the received request message with the secret key to obtain the second Symmetrie key and the encrypted first symmetric key, - further decrypting at the security device the obtained encrypted first symmetric key with the secret key to obtain the first symmetric key, - generating at the security device a response message comprising the obtained first symmetric key, and the response message encrypted with the obtained second Symmetrie key, - sending the response message from the security device to the second radio communication device, - decrypting at the second radio communication device the received response message with the generated second symmetric key to obtain the decrypted first symmetric key.
  3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that the method further comprises the steps of: - enclosing, at the first radio communication device, a first authorization information with the first symmetric key, - inclosing, at the second radio communication device, a second authorization information with the request message, and - verifying, at the security device, that the received first authorization information matches the received second authorization information before performing the step of generating the response message.
  4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that a password input by the first party is used as first and second authorization information.
  5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that an identity information associated with the first party is used as first and second authorization information.
  6. A system of providing secure data transfer between radio communication devices, comprising: - a first radio communication device (MS1) of a first party having user data to be transferred, and comprising a first key generator (KG1) for randomly generating a first symmetric key, and a user data encryption means (UD_ENC) for encrypting the user data with the generated first symmetric key, - a second radio communication device (MS2) for receiving the user data to be transferred, a transfer device (SERV) of a second party for linking the first and second radio communication devices to each other, and for overseeing the data transfer, characterized in that the first radio communication device (MS1) further comprises: - a key encryption means (K_ENC) for encrypting the first symmetric key with a public key of a third party, and in that the system further comprises: - a security device (SEC) of the third party connected to the second radio communication device (MS2), and comprising a secret key associated with the public key, and in that the second radio communication device (MS2) comprises: - key decryption means (K_DEC) for decrypting the encrypted first symmetric key by utilizing the secret key comprised in the security device (SEC), the encrypted first symmetric key having been received from the first radio communication device (MS1) via the transfer device (SERV), and a user data decryption means (UD_DEC) for decrypting the encrypted user data with the decrypted first symmetric key, the encrypted user data having been received from the first radio communication device (MS1) via the transfer device (SERV).
  7. The system according to claim 6, characterized in that the key decryption means (K_DEC) comprises: - a second key generator (KG2) for randomly generating a second symmetric key, and - a request message means (REQ_MSG) for generating a request message comprising the generated second symmetric key and the received encrypted first symmetric key, for encrypting the request message with the public key, and for sending the request message to the security device (SEC), and in that the security device (SEC) comprises: - a response message means (RESP_MSG) for decrypting the received request message with the secret key to obtain the second symmetric key and the encrypted first symmetric key, for further decrypting the obtained encrypted first symmetric key with the secret key to obtain the first Symmetrie key, for generating a response message comprising the obtained first symmetric key, for encrypting the response message with the obtained second symmetric key, and for sending the response message to the second radio communication device, and in that the key decryption means (K_DEC) further comprises: - a response message decryption means (RESP_MSG_DEC) for decrypting the received response message with the generated second symmetric key to obtain the first symmetric key.
  8. The system according to claim 7, characterized in that the first radio communication device (MS1) further comprises: - a first authorization means (AUTH1) for enclosing a first authorization information with the first symmetric key, and in that the second radio communication device (MS2) further comprises: - a second authorization means (AUTH2) for enclosing a second authorization information with the request message, and in that the security device (SEC) further comprises: - a verification means (VER) for verifying, before generating the response message, that the received first authorization information matches the received second authorization information.
  9. The system according to claim 6, 7 or 8, characterized in that the second radio communication device (MS2) is connected to the security device (SEC) via a mobile telecommunication network.
  10. A radio communication device (MS2), characterized in that the radio communication device (MS2) comprises: - key decryption means (K_DEC) for decrypting an encrypted first symmetric key by utilizing a secret key comprised in a security device (SEC) connected to the radio communication device (MS2), the secret key being a private key associated with a public key, the encrypted first symmetric key having been received from another radio communication device (MS1) via a transfer device (SERV), and - a user data decryption means (UD_DEC) for decrypting encrypted user data with the decrypted first symmetric key, the encrypted user data having been received from the another radio communication device (MS1) via the transfer device (SERV).
  11. A radio communication device (MS2) of a first party, characterized in that the radio communication device (MS2) comprises: - key decryption means (K_DEC) for decrypting an encrypted first symmetric key by utilizing a secret key comprised in a security device (SEC) of a third party connected to the radio communication device (MS2), the secret key only being available to the third party, the encrypted first symmetric key having been received from another radio communication device (MS1) of the first party via a transfer device (SERV), and - a user data decryption means (UD_DEC) for decrypting encrypted user data with the decrypted first symmetric key, the encrypted user data having been received from the another radio communication device (MS1) via the transfer device (SERV), wherein the user data are user data from the another radio communication device (MS1) that are to be recovered on the radio communication device (MS2), and wherein the user data comprise personal, private and highly sensitive data of the user of the radio communication device (MS2) such as saved messages, address book entries, calendar entries and credit card numbers.
  12. A radio communication device (MS2), characterized in that the radio communication device (MS2) comprises: - key decryption means (K_DEC) for decrypting an encrypted first symmetric key by utilizing a secret key comprised in a security device (SEC) connected to the radio communication device (MS2), the secret key being kept secret from the radio communication device, the encrypted first symmetric key having been received from another radio communication device (MS1) via a transfer device (SERV), and - a user data decryption means (UD_DEC) for decrypting encrypted user data with the decrypted first symmetric key, the encrypted user data having been received from the another radio communication device (MS1) via the transfer device (SERV).
  13. A security device (SEC), characterized in that the security device (SEC) comprises: - a response message means (RESP_MSG) for receiving from a radio communication device (MS2) a request message comprising a first symmetric key encrypted with a public key and a second symmetric key and the message encrypted with the public key, for decrypting the received request message with a secret key comprised in the security device (SEC) and associated with the public key to obtain the second symmetric key and the encrypted first symmetric key, for further decrypting the obtained encrypted first symmetric key with the secret key to obtain the first symmetric key, for generating a response message comprising the obtained first symmetric key, for encrypting the response message with the obtained second symmetric key, and for sending the response message to the radio communication device (MS2).
DE602004026787.2T 2004-03-22 2004-03-22 Sicherer datentransfer Expired - Lifetime DE602004026787C5 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/FI2004/000162 WO2005091553A1 (en) 2004-03-22 2004-03-22 Secure data transfer

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
DE602004026787D1 DE602004026787D1 (de) 2010-06-02
DE602004026787C5 true DE602004026787C5 (de) 2021-10-21

Family

ID=34994055

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
DE602004026787.2T Expired - Lifetime DE602004026787C5 (de) 2004-03-22 2004-03-22 Sicherer datentransfer
DE602004026787.2A Expired - Lifetime DE602004026787C9 (de) 2004-03-22 2004-03-22 Sicherer datentransfer

Family Applications After (1)

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DE602004026787.2A Expired - Lifetime DE602004026787C9 (de) 2004-03-22 2004-03-22 Sicherer datentransfer

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (1) US8145907B2 (de)
EP (1) EP1728352B1 (de)
CN (1) CN1926802B (de)
AT (1) ATE465572T1 (de)
DE (2) DE602004026787C5 (de)
WO (1) WO2005091553A1 (de)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US20070016781A1 (en) 2007-01-18
US8145907B2 (en) 2012-03-27
EP1728352A1 (de) 2006-12-06
DE602004026787C9 (de) 2023-09-21
CN1926802B (zh) 2010-06-02
ATE465572T1 (de) 2010-05-15
DE602004026787D1 (de) 2010-06-02
EP1728352B1 (de) 2010-04-21
CN1926802A (zh) 2007-03-07
WO2005091553A1 (en) 2005-09-29

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