DE102020206803A1 - Electrical component for the method of manufacturing the same - Google Patents

Abstract

An electronic component comprises an electronic component and a transponder element. The transponder element has a cryptography module, the cryptography module having stored a secret that enables authentication of the electronic component or the electrical component, the transponder element being designed to wirelessly provide information derived from the secret for reading.

Description

Embodiments of the present invention relate to an electrical component and to a corresponding manufacturing method. Preferred exemplary embodiments relate to a concept for authenticity identification and testing of electrical circuits by means of transponders with a cryptography function.

• • Alte ICs (z.B. aus Recyclingrückläufern) werden in neue Gehäuse verpackt
• • Alte Schaltkreise werden mit Bauteilbeschriftungen aktueller Schaltkreise versehen
• • Kopierte integrierte Schaltungen (z.B. durch reverse engineering gewonnen) werden als Originalteile verkauft
• • Ähnliche Funktionalität wird umgesetzt und als Originalteile gekennzeichnet
• • Weiterverkauf von Überproduktion durch Fertigungsdienstleister

The counterfeiting of integrated circuits (ICs), electronic components and assemblies has meanwhile become a serious economic problem for the manufacturers of original components. Counterfeiters do not invest in the research, development and quality assurance of the original manufacturers and unjustifiably benefit from their services. A large number of counterfeiting methods exist, especially in the field of integrated circuits:

• • Old ICs (eg from recycling returns) are packed in new housings
• • Old circuits are provided with component labels for current circuits
• • Copied integrated circuits (eg obtained through reverse engineering) are sold as original parts
• • Similar functionality is implemented and marked as original parts
• • Resale of overproduction by manufacturing service providers

For this, the component identification is usually copied or manipulated.

The situation in the supply chain for electronics production can be very complex and is shaped by many participants (manufacturers, manufacturers, AVT service providers, distributors, brokers, etc.). As a rule, the distributor has to be trusted that the circuit is original - the "identification" is often only based on the component identification.

The targeted verification of authenticity, at least for valuable circuit components, is generally not feasible for electronics manufacturers. The tests are complex (setup of test circuits and measuring systems, electronic characterization, comparison with specifications) and very time-consuming. Therefore, an individual check of the authenticity of all installed components is out of the question. A maximum of random checks can be used here.

The counterfeit components built in this way are of lower quality (do not correspond to the technical / electrical specification), have a short lifespan (especially if old components are sold as new) or simply do not work.

This means that the original manufacturer loses sales, there is a loss of reputation due to the delivery of supposedly inferior quality products, losses due to unjustified warranty claims or claims for damages. In addition, there are the costs for the complex analyzes by the original manufacturer to prove the forgeries.

• • Beschriftung auf Gehäusen / Package (ink marking, laser marking, Gravur, etc.). Diese Kennzeichnung ist jedoch nicht direkt elektrisch auslesbar. Die Inspektion erfolgt optisch (manuell oder automatisch). Dabei handelt es sich jedoch nicht um eine echte Authentifizierung.

• • Die-Marking: Individuelle Kennzeichnung einzelner Dies (z.B. durch Laser). Dabei handelt es sich jedoch nicht um eine echte Authentifizierung. Weiterhin ist die Überprüfung aufwändig und teuer (z.B. Röntgen) und damit nur für individuelle Stichproben oder im Schadensfall wirtschaftlich sinnvoll.
• • Kennzeichnung der Verpackung von Schaltkreisen durch Label, Bar-Codes, QR-Codes, Echtheitssiegel, Spezialdrucke, RFID-Label. Diese sind bei entsprechendem Aufwand leicht zu kopieren (nicht kryptographisch gesichert) und kein Echtheitsnachweis für jeden individuellen Schaltkreis. Damit entsteht das bekannte Katz und Maus Spiel zwischen neuen Sicherungsmerkmalen der Herstellern und den Kopien der Fälschern. Weiterhin sind die Dimensionen dieser Lösungen hoch (im Bereich von Zentimetern), was die Integration in Produkte bzw. Schaltkreise erschwert.
• • Schaltkreisinterne Maßnahmen zur Erkennung von Fälschungen (Messung von schaltkreisspezifischen Parametern wie Verzögerungen, Schaltzeiten, etc.) durch interne Baugruppen. Diese ist jedoch sehr aufwendig umzusetzen (erfordert individuelle Messungen/Kalibrierungen) und ist nur im System mit Energieversorgung funktional.
• • Chip ID:
  • ◯ eindeutige Identifikationsnummer für jeden Schaltkreis - entspricht einer Seriennummer, kann auch zufällig erzeugt werden
  • ◯ Umsetzung beispielsweise auf Basis interner PUFs (Physical Unclonable Functions). Zum Auslesen ist jedoch ein (Minimal-)Beschaltung sowie die Spannungsversorgung der Schaltkreise notwendig
  • ◯ Die ID wird dabei in Kombination mit Fertigungs- und/oder Zustandsdaten in Datenbanken gespeichert. Zur Prüfung der Echtheit erfolgt ein Vergleich gegen Datenbanken. Dies stellt keine echte Authentifikation dar.
• • Physikalische Gegenmaßnahmen zum Erschweren des Kopierens von IP (Obfuscation, Dummy-Schaltungsteile)

In the prior art, too, there are already approaches as to how the authenticity of integrated circuits can be checked. This includes:

• • Labeling on housings / packages (ink marking, laser marking, engraving, etc.). However, this identification cannot be read out directly electrically. The inspection is carried out optically (manually or automatically). However, this is not a real authentication.

• • Die-Marking: Individual marking of individual dies (eg by laser). However, this is not a real authentication. Furthermore, the check is time-consuming and expensive (e.g. X-ray) and therefore only makes economic sense for individual spot checks or in the event of damage.
• • Identification of the packaging of circuits using labels, bar codes, QR codes, authenticity seals, special prints, RFID labels. These can be easily copied (not cryptographically secured) with the appropriate effort and there is no proof of authenticity for each individual circuit. This creates the well-known game of cat and mouse between the manufacturers 'new security features and the counterfeiters' copies. Furthermore, the dimensions of these solutions are high (in the range of centimeters), which makes integration in products or circuits difficult.
• • Internal circuit measures to detect counterfeits (measurement of circuit-specific parameters such as delays, switching times, etc.) by internal assemblies. However, this is very complex to implement (requires individual measurements / calibrations) and is only functional in the system with power supply.
• • Chip ID:
  • ◯ unique identification number for each circuit - corresponds to a serial number, can also be generated randomly
  • ◯ Implementation, for example, based on internal PUFs (Physical Unclonable Functions). However, a (minimum) wiring is required for reading as well as the power supply for the circuits
  • ◯ The ID is stored in databases in combination with production and / or status data. To check the authenticity, a comparison is made against databases. This is not a real authentication.
• • Physical countermeasures to make copying of IP more difficult (obfuscation, dummy circuit parts)

Furthermore, a large number of organizational measures (documentation, inspections, certification of distributors, etc.) are carried out to reduce counterfeiting. The corresponding implementations are very complex and more regulation than real no technology for the detection of forgeries.

Based on the disadvantages explained above, there is a need for an improved concept.

The object of the present invention is to create a concept for the secure authentication of electrical components which offers an improved compromise between security against forgery, manufacturability and ergonomics.

The problem is solved by independent patent claims.

An embodiment of the present invention provides an electrical component with an electronic component, such as. B. an integrated circuit or a printed circuit board or generally an electronics module, as well as a (passive) transponder component. This transponder component has a cryptography module, a secret being stored on the cryptography module. The secret enables authentication of the electrical component or the electronic component and is, for example, by performing an encryption operation with the secret and the result can be transmitted / read out externally. Here, an ID or random number stored on the transponder, which is combined with the secret, for example, can be output. In this respect, information derived from the secret, such as information encrypted with the secret (e.g. a unique ID) can be read out.

Corresponding exemplary embodiments, a private, electronic key is stored as a secret on the cryptography module. This can be stored irreversibly in accordance with further exemplary embodiments. The storage can take place, for example, during manufacture. The irreversibly stored secret is assigned to the electrical component or the electronic component, for example. This gives the option of authentication.

Embodiments of the present invention are based on the knowledge that it is technically easily possible, in the production of an electronic component, such as. B. an electronic component with an integrated circuit as an electronic component, a transponder component, such. B. embed a passive transponder component, which then enables the authentication of the entire electronic component. A secret is integrated into the transponder component via a crypto module so that this or information processed with it can be read out externally. When this information is read out, the electronic component can be authenticated. The transponder component is integrated inexpensively and independently of the electronic component and thus enables the same to be authenticated. The externally readable information can be, for example, an ID that is then authenticated via a cloud infrastructure, e.g. B. by comparing the read ID with the existing component; here, for example, the corresponding assignment would be stored in the cloud infrastructure.

According to exemplary embodiments, the electronic component can be an integrated circuit. The transponder module is then, for example, integrated in the same planes, that is to say in the integrated circuit. The integration can, however, take place independently, so that there are no electrical connections between the integrated circuit and the transponder component. An antenna or the one or more antenna elements of the transponder component is advantageously embedded in one of the metal layers of the integrated circuit, in particular one of the upper metal layers of the integrated circuit. According to embodiments, the transponder circuit is small enough, e.g. B. 1 mm x 1 mm x 150 microns, so that a good integration into the integrated circuit is possible. According to the exemplary embodiment, the antenna dimension can also be so small that the antenna is also manufactured directly during chip production. For example, the antenna is implemented as part of a metallization. If, in accordance with further exemplary embodiments, it is assumed that the transponder circuit is a passive system, it does not require its own power supply in the form of batteries. The energy is provided by the transponder system for operating the transponder as an electromagnetic field of the reader. In this respect, no energy supply from the circuit to be secured is necessary. This also has the further advantage that the system also works if the circuit to be protected is not yet installed or has no current. This enables the authenticity to be authenticated, for example, in placement machines and for incoming goods inspections.

Corresponding to alternative exemplary embodiments, it would also be conceivable for the transponder component to be integrated into the common package of the integrated circuit.

Even if it was assumed in the above exemplary embodiments that the transponder module is independent of the integrated circuit, it should be noted at this point that an electrical connection would also be possible in accordance with further exemplary embodiments, so that information stored in the transponder can then be accessed ..

According to further exemplary embodiments, it would also be conceivable that the electronic component is a printed circuit board or an electronic module. The small transponder size of approximately 1 mm × 1 mm × 150 μm is also advantageous in such an application. In this exemplary embodiment, it would be conceivable, for example, for the transponder component to be integrated with the electronic component in a common package.

According to exemplary embodiments, it would be conceivable both in the exemplary embodiment with the printed circuit board / the electronic module and in the exemplary embodiment of the integrated circuit that a type of cavity or dedicated area or dedicated volume is kept in the electrical component or the electronic component, in which then integration can take place here. The integration takes place, for example, in a mold or package.

According to exemplary embodiments, the transponder component can have an external antenna. This can, for example, also be integrated into the mold or the electronic component (see exemplary embodiments with the metallization plane as an antenna).

At this point it should be noted that one or more electronic components can be authenticated with the one passive transponder component. According to further exemplary embodiments, it would also be conceivable that a separate transponder is provided for each electronic component.

As explained above, the cryptography module is designed to use a cryptographic method, e.g. B. the stored information to perform and accelerate. In this case, an ID of the component to be protected or, in general, an identification that cannot be falsified or is difficult to falsify is stored. This means that, according to the corresponding exemplary embodiments, each circuit, electronic module, printed circuit board supplied has an individual, non-forgery / difficult to forge identification identifier which can be read electronically and wirelessly. This enables integrated product authentication at the circuit level.

Another exemplary embodiment relates to a method of manufacturing an electrical component. In this case, the electrical components are authenticated during assembly or by the assembly machine.

• 1 eine schematische Darstellung einer Basisvariante des Transponders mit integrierter Antenne gemäß einem Basisausführungsbeispiel;
• 2a, 2b schematische Darstellung der Integration des Transponders als IP-Block/Black-Box in das Design/Layout einer zu schützenden integrierten Schaltung (z. B. mittels Einbettung) entsprechend Ausführungsbeispielen;
• 3a, 3b schematische Darstellung eines Krypto-Transponder-Dies mit integrierter Antenne und Schutzhülle gemäß weiteren Ausführungsbeispielen;
• 4a, 4b schematische Darstellung eines Krypto-Transponders in Schutzhülle mit externer Antenne gemäß weiteren Ausführungsbeispielen;
• 5 eine schematische Darstellung einer direkten Integration von zu schützendem Schaltkreis und Krypto-Transponder in einem Bauteilgehäuse gemäß einem weiterem Ausführungsbeispiel;
• 6 eine schematische Darstellung einer direkten Integration von zu schützendem Schaltkreis und Krypto-Transponder mit externer Antenne in einem Bauteilgehäuse gemäß weiterem Ausführungsbeispiel; und
• 7 eine schematische Darstellung einer Systemübersicht zur Erläuterung der Funktionalität des Authentifizierungskonzepts.

Further developments are defined in the subclaims. Embodiments of the present invention are explained with reference to the accompanying drawings. Show it:

• 1 a schematic representation of a basic variant of the transponder with an integrated antenna according to a basic exemplary embodiment;
• 2a , 2 B Schematic representation of the integration of the transponder as an IP block / black box in the design / layout of an integrated circuit to be protected (e.g. by means of embedding) in accordance with exemplary embodiments;
• 3a , 3b schematic representation of a crypto-transponder die with integrated antenna and protective cover according to further exemplary embodiments;
• 4a , 4b schematic representation of a crypto-transponder in protective cover with external antenna according to further exemplary embodiments;
• 5 a schematic representation of a direct integration of the circuit to be protected and crypto-transponder in a component housing according to a further embodiment;
• 6th a schematic representation of a direct integration of the circuit to be protected and crypto-transponder with external antenna in a component housing according to a further embodiment; and
• 7th a schematic representation of a system overview to explain the functionality of the authentication concept.

Before exemplary embodiments of the present invention and the accompanying drawings are explained in the following, it should be pointed out that figures and structures with the same effect have the same effect the same reference numerals are provided, so that the description of these can be used or interchanged with one another.

1 shows a transponder module 10 . This includes the transponder circuit 12th itself as well as an antenna 14th .

The transponder itself includes, for example, CMOS circuits that have different functional blocks, such as. B. can have a power supply, a memory, a cryptography module and a transmitting and receiving module. By means of the energy supply, for example, energy is obtained from an alternating transmission field of a reader in order to supply the circuits with energy. A processor then regulates, for example, the reading out of information stored in the memory. This can be encrypted by means of the crypto module, ie that the information is a secret. The crypto module is thus designed to carry out a cryptographic process and to accelerate it. For example, the crypto module can have a private electronic key for this purpose. According to exemplary embodiments, the encryption mechanisms can e.g. B. on the basis of the PRESENT algorithm (block cipher); particularly energy-efficient process; suitable for passive, batteryless systems; default ISO / IEC 29167-11: 2014 ; Authentication procedure CIPURSE must be implemented.

The information or an item of information encrypted with the secret or an item of information derived from the information / the secret can then be sent externally by means of the transmitting and receiving module at the request of the reading device, for example. H. be transmitted to the reader, for example. According to exemplary embodiments, an individual key material (private electronic key, such as the private electronic key mentioned above) is programmed once and irreversibly into the cryptography module or the associated memory after the transponder has been manufactured. Furthermore, for example, a corresponding access option can be removed after programming, which makes it possible that the key can no longer be read after electronic contact. "Electronic contact" here means both direct electrical contact and contact via the air interface. It can be advantageous here for information processed by means of the key with the aid of the crypto module to be read out via the air interface, but not the key itself.

In the present exemplary embodiment, it is assumed that the antenna 14th An integrated antenna is involved, although an external antenna could of course also be used here. The antenna is connected to the transmitter and receiver module and enables communication with the reader. In addition, electrical energy is drawn from the alternating field via the antenna with the aid of the energy supply module.

Starting from the integrated antenna 14th can the transponder die 10 for example a dimension of 1 mm x 1 mm x 150 µm or generally a thickness dimension in the range from 50 to 500 µm and a surface dimension in the range from 0.1 x 0.1 mm to 5 x 5 mm. Such small transponders are easy to integrate, e.g. B. in an integrated circuit, an electronic assembly or a printed circuit board, as referred to below 2 will be shown.

2a shows an electronic component 1 to illustrate the integration of the authentication circuit 10 (Black Box / IP-Block) in an integrated circuit to be protected 16 . The integrated circuit to be protected 16 the composer 1 can, for example, have a corresponding free space in their lateral extent 16f (2D or cavity / 3D), in which then the transponder die 10 is integrated. It is assumed that the in 2 The variant shown is a plan view of the laterally extending integrated circuit 16 with the transponder die 10 represents. Of course, it would of course also be conceivable that the transponder die 10 is integrated in a recess on the surface that extends in the depth direction.

According to a first variant, the integration can involve embedding, so that the transponder die is used accordingly and is then encapsulated with the housing compound or the mold material. As an alternative to this, it would also be conceivable that, together with the integrated circuit, the transponder die 10 will be produced. For example would be the antenna 14th can be implemented by a metallization layer of the transponder die, so that it would be fundamentally conceivable to also produce the corresponding circuits directly here. It should also be noted that it would be possible for the transponder die to be connected to the electrical circuit 14th is electrically connected, for example to be supplied with energy via this or to enable access to information stored in the transponder die. According to preferred exemplary embodiments, the transponder die 10 regardless of the integrated circuit 16 so that there are no electrical connections between them. The possibility of autonomous operation was related to 1 explained. By integrating the transponder die 10 in the herein integrated circuit shown 16 or through the mechanical connection of these two elements, it is possible to carry out an authenticity check of the component. This can be done, for example, while the component is being fitted. In this respect, the automatic placement machine can have a reading device for reading out the authenticity of the component 1 have indicating information.

In other words, this means that the embodiment from 2 the integration of the transponder 14th directly in the (integrated) circuit 10 as IP block / black box shows. The concept presented here on the basis of the integrated circuit can of course be transferred to every circuit, electronic module, printed circuit board supplied, so that they have an individual, non-falsifiable identification that can be read out electrically and wirelessly. A connection to the actual circuit is not necessary, although integrated product authentication at circuit level is advantageously made possible.

According to a further embodiment, as in 2a shown, the IP block 10 already in the layout process of developing the circuit to be protected 16 be provided as a black box. The transponder circuit 10 is then in its entirety part of the technology library of the semiconductor manufacturer. Production then takes place directly as part of the production of the circuit to be protected in the same semiconductor production process. An actual (subsequent) integration (in cavities or recesses) is then no longer necessary. The protective mechanism is created in the same process and at the same time with the circuit to be protected.

2 B shows a further development 1' the variant 1 the end 2a with the recess for the subsequent integration of the transponder or with the one in the layout of the circuit 16 reserved area on which the IP block (preferably together with the circuit 16 ) is trained. The circuit 16 is over with 2a comparable, with the transponder 10 ' here an antenna 14 ' uses that as part of the metallization level of the circuit to be protected 16 is shaped. The antenna 14 ' can be compared to the transponder, for example 14 ' or compared to the integrated antenna 14th the end 2a be designed larger in order to be able to collect more energy and thus to realize a greater range and / or better readability (directional dependencies). In addition, the CMOS part of the transponder could also be made smaller, which leads to a reduction in chip area and costs.

According to the exemplary embodiments, the transponder 14th provided for each technology as an individual IP black box, so that the production of the transponder 10 together with the production of the integrated circuit to be protected 16 can take place on the same technology node.

Reference is made below to 3 , 4th , 5 and 6th the mechanical connection of the two elements 10 and 16 explained. With the component 16 an integrated circuit or, in general, a circuit to be protected is assumed. Of course, this component can also be a printed circuit board or another electronic module.

3 shows one way of how the transponder die 10 with its integrated antenna 14th by means of a mold material 17th is encapsulated. This mold material 17th can for example be the same mold material in which the integrated circuit 16 the end 2 is embedded. Through this mold material 17th so then the two elements are connected to each other.

Referring to 4a becomes another transponder die 10 ' with an external antenna 14 ' connected with each other. The external antenna 14 ' protrudes from the transponder 10 ' out and is thereby encapsulated with the mold material 17th embedded or partially embedded. It should be noted here that not necessarily the entire antenna 14 ' is embedded with, but also a part, e.g. B. can be arranged on the surface of the mold material, such as in the sectional view 4b shown. It should also be noted that it does not necessarily have to be an antenna, but rather an antenna with several antenna elements, as shown here, would also be conceivable. This allows the antenna 14 ' also larger than the transponder die 10 be designed, which leads to the advantages mentioned above.

In the above embodiments from the 3a , 3b , 4a and 4b it was assumed that it was the mold material 17th is the mold material by means of which the integrated circuit 16 and the transponder die 10 ' is embedded. However, according to further exemplary embodiments, it can also be the material from which the printed circuit board to be protected is made. In this respect, according to exemplary embodiments, the transponder die 10 with the integrated antenna 14th or the transponder die 10 ' with the external antenna 14 ' be integrated into a circuit board. This circuit board can have conductor tracks (not shown). These are made from metallization levels. By means of these metallization levels, it would also be conceivable that, for example, the external antenna 14 ' is realized.

The exemplary embodiments from 3 and 4th are described in such a way that here a transponder 10 respectively. 10 ' is integrated in a circuit board.

From a different perspective, the embodiment can be from 3 be described in such a way that the transponder circuit 10 with the integrated antenna 14th is completely enclosed in a molding process. This mold 17th offers protection against environmental influences, facilitates handling (e.g. in a pick-and-place machine or robot gripping) and enables the transponder circuit to be easily integrated into other products, packaging, circuit packages. For example, as in 2 shown integrated in a prefabricated cavity.

As in 4th shown, according to exemplary embodiments, an external antenna can be used as an alternative (or in addition) to the antenna integrated on the transponder circuit 14 ' used after the mold process on the package 17th is structured. This still offers easy handling and protection, as well as an increased range. Furthermore, the Die 10 ' be reduced accordingly (consequence: lower unit costs in production). The complete module is inserted into the component / circuit board / assembly in individual steps.

In relation to 5 it is now shown how the transponder die 10 not in the integrated circuit 16 , but next to a circuit to be protected 16 ' is embedded. The circuit 16 ' as well as the transponder die 10 are arranged next to each other and with a common housing or package 17 ' Mistake. The case 17 ' can for example also be formed from a mold or the like. Like here in 5 also recognizable are transponder dies 10 and the circuit to be protected 16 ' independent of each other, because they are separated. The same was in 2 also illustrated in this way.

In other words, this means that the embodiment from 5 the integration of a tiny additional circuit 14th in the package 17th shows. This would advantageously make you independent of the manufacturing technology of the component to be protected 16 ' .

6th shows an implementation of the transponder die 10 ' with an external antenna 14 ' which are analogous to the explanation of 5 next to the circuit to be protected 16 ' is arranged. The Elements 10 ' , 16 ' and 14 ' are in turn in a common package 17 ' potted, which then forms the housing. As shown here, the antenna protrudes 14 ' from the levels in which the elements 16 ' and 10 ' are located out. For example, the antenna 14 ' or part of the antenna 14 ' on the surface of the case 17 ' be arranged.

In other words, this means that this embodiment consists of 6th an external antenna 14 ' which is located in the circuit package 17 ' located and suitable with the transponder 10 ' is contacted.

Corresponding to alternative exemplary embodiments, when the transponder is integrated as an IP block in an integrated circuit, the antenna of the transponder can cover other circuit parts of the integrated circuit in the upper metal layers. This arrangement can increase the range, simplify the readout alignment or reduce the space required for the transponder in the integrated circuit.

Another embodiment creates an electrical component, wherein the transponder circuit can be glued to the circuit to be protected before the packaging process.

Alternatively, in accordance with further exemplary embodiments, a system in a package (SIP) consisting of chips can be provided with a transponder chip in a package.

Alternatively, according to further exemplary embodiments, each chiplet in a SIP can be provided with its own transponder chip (either integrated into the silicon or glued or bonded (e.g. thermal bonding) or attached using another method) to the silicon.

According to a further exemplary embodiment, several transponders can also be integrated in one package. This comes e.g. This is the case, for example, when several circuits can be protected separately. The readout then takes place in accordance with a multi-readout.

Reference is made below to 7th the readout process is explained.

7th shows an electrical component 1" with a chip to be protected 16 " and a transponder chip 10 " . In addition, there is a reader 22nd , optionally with a cloud infrastructure 24 is connected, shown. Using the reader 22nd is over an alternating field 22w1 information from the transponder 10 " read out, as based on the transmit / change field transmitted or influenced by the transponder 22w2 is shown.

The transponder 10 " with the cryptography module has a one-time, irreversibly stored, individual (in relation to the chip 16 " individual) feature. The reader 22nd is equipped with a special front end and antenna to the transponder 10 " to be supplied with energy (cf. 22w1 ). The reader also performs 22nd communication (cf. 22w1 until 22w2 ) with the chip 10 " according to a standardized protocol, such as B. analogous to RFID. Various software components support the reader here. This includes software components for controlling the reader 22nd who have favourited communication with cloud components 24 or generally an external interface or a user interface, etc. With the cloud infrastructure 24 it is possible to verify the authenticity check. For example, the read information, such as. B. an RFID of the transponder 10 " can be saved with the type of chip to be installed. The cloud infrastructure is also used 24 following functions: key storage, customer management, product management, authentication, APIs, etc.

According to exemplary embodiments, an extended level of protection can be achieved by the following procedure. The reader 22nd as well as the transponder 10 " authenticate each other so that reading out is only possible with mutual authentication. This allows unauthenticated readers 22nd no information from the transponder 10 " can read out. Conversely, unauthenticated transponders receive 10 " the identifier as a forgery. According to exemplary embodiments, a reading device 22nd can be integrated, for example, via a pick and place machine or during an incoming inspection of integrated circuits. Here z. B. the authenticity check of the circuit directly in the assembly process 16 " . When the reader 22nd is integrated in the pick and place machine, this is done directly when the circuit is installed 16 " or the electrical component 1" .

At this point it should be noted that, in accordance with further exemplary embodiments, the transponder 10 " or the component 1" a mark to align the reader's antenna 22nd may have. This marking can be arranged on the mold package, on the component housing or on the circuit board or another connected component. It is advantageous that the energy transfer is optimized and the range is thus increased.

Based on the integration of a reading device in an automatic placement machine, a manufacturing method can be characterized in that it includes reading out information about the component to be placed during placement.

Although some aspects have been described in connection with a device, it goes without saying that these aspects also represent a description of the corresponding method, so that a block or a component of a device is also to be understood as a corresponding method step or as a feature of a method step. Analogously to this, aspects that have been described in connection with or as a method step also represent a description of a corresponding block or details or features of a corresponding device. Some or all of the method steps can be carried out by a hardware apparatus (or using a hardware Apparatus), such as a microprocessor, a programmable computer or an electronic circuit. In some embodiments, some or more of the most important process steps can be performed by such an apparatus.

Depending on the specific implementation requirements, embodiments of the invention can be implemented in hardware or in software. The implementation can be carried out using a digital storage medium such as a floppy disk, a DVD, a Blu-ray disc, a CD, a ROM, a PROM, an EPROM, an EEPROM or a FLASH memory, a hard disk or other magnetic memory or optical memory are carried out on the electronically readable control signals are stored, which can interact with a programmable computer system or cooperate in such a way that the respective method is carried out. Therefore, the digital storage medium can be computer readable.

Some exemplary embodiments according to the invention thus comprise a data carrier which has electronically readable control signals which are able to interact with a programmable computer system in such a way that one of the methods described herein is carried out.

In general, exemplary embodiments of the present invention can be implemented as a computer program product with a program code, the program code being effective to carry out one of the methods when the computer program product runs on a computer.

The program code can, for example, also be stored on a machine-readable carrier.

Other exemplary embodiments include the computer program for performing one of the methods described herein, the computer program being stored on a machine-readable carrier.

In other words, an exemplary embodiment of the method according to the invention is thus a computer program which has a program code for performing one of the methods described herein when the computer program runs on a computer.

A further exemplary embodiment of the method according to the invention is thus a data carrier (or a digital storage medium or a computer-readable medium) on which the computer program for performing one of the methods described herein is recorded. The data carrier, the digital storage medium or the computer-readable medium are typically tangible and / or non-perishable or non-temporary.

A further exemplary embodiment of the method according to the invention is thus a data stream or a sequence of signals which represents or represents the computer program for performing one of the methods described herein. The data stream or the sequence of signals can, for example, be configured to be transferred via a data communication connection, for example via the Internet.

Another exemplary embodiment comprises a processing device, for example a computer or a programmable logic component, which is configured or adapted to carry out one of the methods described herein.

Another exemplary embodiment comprises a computer on which the computer program for performing one of the methods described herein is installed.

A further exemplary embodiment according to the invention comprises a device or a system which is designed to transmit a computer program for carrying out at least one of the methods described herein to a receiver. The transmission can take place electronically or optically, for example. The receiver can be, for example, a computer, a mobile device, a storage device or a similar device. The device or the system can, for example, comprise a file server for transmitting the computer program to the recipient.

In some exemplary embodiments, a programmable logic component (for example a field-programmable gate array, an FPGA) can be used to carry out some or all of the functionalities of the methods described herein. In some exemplary embodiments, a field-programmable gate array can interact with a microprocessor in order to carry out one of the methods described herein. In general, in some exemplary embodiments, the methods are performed by any hardware device. This can be universally applicable hardware such as a computer processor (CPU) or hardware specific to the method, such as an ASIC.

The devices described herein can be implemented, for example, using a hardware apparatus, or using a computer, or using a combination of a hardware apparatus and a computer.

The devices described herein, or any components of the devices described herein, can be implemented at least partially in hardware and / or in software (computer program).

For example, the methods described herein can be implemented using hardware apparatus, or using a computer, or using a combination of hardware apparatus and a computer.

The methods described herein, or any components of the methods described herein, can be carried out at least in part by hardware and / or by software.

The above-described embodiments are merely illustrative of the principles of the present invention. It is to be understood that modifications and variations of the arrangements and details described herein will be apparent to other skilled persons. It is therefore intended that the invention be limited only by the scope of protection of the following patent claims and not by the specific details presented herein on the basis of the description and the explanation of the exemplary embodiments.

QUOTES INCLUDED IN THE DESCRIPTION

This list of the documents listed by the applicant was generated automatically and is included solely for the better information of the reader. The list is not part of the German patent or utility model application. The DPMA assumes no liability for any errors or omissions.

Non-patent literature cited

• ISO / IEC 29167-11: 2014 [0028]

Claims (15)

Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 "), with the following features: an electronic component (16, 16 ', 16 "); and a transponder element (10, 10 ', 10 ") which has a cryptography module, wherein the cryptography module has stored a secret that enables authentication of the electronic component (16, 16', 16") or the electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 "), the transponder element (10, 10 ', 10") being designed to wirelessly provide information derived from the secret for reading. Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to Claim 1 , wherein the secret is encrypted by the cryptography module by means of a private, electronic key or the secret comprises a private, electronic key. Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the secret is stored irreversibly on the cryptography module or, during production, was stored irreversibly on the cryptography module and / or with the electrical component (1, 1', 1 ") is linked. Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic component (16, 16', 16") comprises an integrated circuit. Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to Claim 4 , wherein the transponder element is produced in the one or more layers of the integrated circuit. Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to Claim 4 or 5 , wherein the transponder element (10, 10 ', 10 ") comprises one or more antennas (14, 14'); or wherein the transponder element (10, 10 ', 10") comprises one or more antennas (14, 14'), which is integrated into a metal layer or upper metal layer of the integrated circuit. Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to one of the Claims 4 until 6th , wherein the transponder element (10, 10 ', 10 ") is integrated with the integrated circuit in a common package (17, 17'). Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to one of the Claims 4 until 7th , wherein the transponder element (10, 10 ', 10 ") is independent and / or separate from the integrated circuit, or wherein the transponder element (10, 10', 10") has an electrical connection to the integrated circuit, so that the integrated Circuit can access information derived from the secret. Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to one of the Claims 4 until 7th , wherein the transponder element (10, 10 ', 10 ") is a passive transponder element which is supplied with electrical energy by an alternating electromagnetic transmission field (22w1, 22w2). Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to one of the Claims 1 until 3 , wherein the electronic component (16, 16 ', 16 ") comprises a printed circuit board or an electronic module. Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to Claim 10 , wherein the transponder element is encapsulated with the circuit board or the electronics module in a common package (17, 17 '). Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic component (16, 16', 16") has an area, volume area or hollow volume area in which the transponder element is arranged or embedded. Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the transponder element has one or more external antennas (14, 14') which are embedded in a mold or a package (17, 17 ') of the electrical component or which are integrated into the electronic component (16, 16 ', 16 ") or which are integrated into the electronic component (16, 16', 16") as part of the metallization level. Electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to one of the preceding claims, wherein this has at least a second electronic component (16, 16', 16") and a second electronic component (16, 16 ', 16 ") assigned to it Includes transponder element. Method for producing an electrical component (1, 1 ', 1 ") according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the method comprises the step of checking the authentication of the electronic component (16, 16', 16") and / or the electrical component, wherein the step of checking is carried out during assembly or by the assembly machine.

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