DE102019103495A1 - Object to protect confidential information from being spied on - Google Patents

Abstract

An object (30), in particular a label (40) or document (50) to protect confidential information from being spied on, is proposed, the object (30) having at least the following: an inscription field (35) or some other surface area in which conceals confidential information (5), in particular confidential information (5) made up of alphanumeric characters (6), - a layer composite (20) formed in the inscription field (35) or in the other surface area, which stores the confidential information (5) in conceals, and- at least one black, dark and / or otherwise optically dense printed layer (1), characterized in that the confidential information (5) and / or an interference pattern (25), the inner contour (25a) of which corresponds to an outer contour (5a) corresponds to the confidential information (5) or whose outer contour corresponds to an inner contour of the confidential information (5) by opening and / or damaging the Sch ichtverbunds (20) can be formed from the printing layer (1) and / or separable from the printing layer (1).

Description

The present application relates to an article for protecting confidential information from being spied on. Such an object can be, for example, a label, in particular a spy protection label, or some other printed or still printable document; for example a cover letter or other printed matter. Furthermore, ID cards or other authorization documents such as Admission tickets, be it in document form or in card form, are considered, on which confidential information is securely spied out, i.e. are to be transmitted with the best possible confidentiality. Banks, telecommunications providers, IT companies, insurance companies and other service providers and providers also often need specially designed documents, for example in order to use them for account numbers or bank details (bank code or IBAN and SWIFT / BIC number), insurance numbers, membership numbers, subscriber numbers, passwords, To communicate passwords or other access codes or personal identification codes (Personal Identification Number, PIN) to the intended recipient by post or in any case in written or printed form. The document sent must be designed in such a way that such personal and / or application-related confidential data cannot be spied on by unauthorized persons.

The spying methods practiced with fraudulent intent to gain knowledge of confidential data include, for example, examining, photographing and / or scanning documents, in particular using strong light sources such as the flash of a digital camera or even a laser beam, whereby a laser pointer is practically sufficient . Then the unprocessed, often unreadable fluoroscopic image or other image of the document is post-processed with the help of a computer and suitable image processing software with the aim of spying out the confidential information contained therein or making it visible on the monitor and isolating it from other image components; for example by varying the brightness, contrast or saturation or by other image processing steps on the fluoroscopic image of the document.

Even if several pages or sheets of a document with different text content have in common, i.e. are x-rayed lying one on top of the other, the confidential information can often be isolated computationally from the other text components of the document, even if the object is provided with an interference pattern, for example a contrast pattern or a concealment pattern. There is a need to make such fraudulent spying attempts more difficult.

It is known, for example, to make spying out by means of transmitted light more difficult by varying the shape, size, orientation, etc. of the information-bearing characters and placing an interference pattern above or below them in the form of a large number of characters that are intended to represent the characters of confidential information visually overlay ( 3 , EP 3 284 611 A1 ). However, if such an interference pattern is produced from just a single print layer, which also has a uniform brightness or optical density, then from the optical density of the overlay of the confidential information with this interference pattern it can be read off which symbols belong to the print layer of the confidential information.

It is the object of the present application to provide an object for protecting confidential information from being spied on, which offers increased security against spying attempts, in particular those based on fluoroscopy and subsequent image processing.

This object is achieved by the subject matter according to claim 1; some of the preferred embodiments are the subject of the further claims.

The object according to the application has, in a labeling field or some other surface area, a layer composite that contains the confidential information, wherein the layers of the layer composite can lie loosely on top of one another - at least in a central surface area that is protected by surrounding edge areas - or also (all of them or at least some of them) can be connected to one another, for example glued together. The layer composite comprises at least one optically dense layer for forming the confidential information and / or a disruptive pattern serving to conceal it. Two optically dense layers can also be provided; in particular layers of black or colored printing varnish, i.e. Ink layers. (Plastic) foils or other films or paper can also be used as layers.

According to this application, the layer composite is designed so that the confidential information and an interference pattern, the contour of which comprises a contour inverted to a contour of the confidential information, in particular a brightness-inverted or otherwise contrast-inverted contour, in the layer composite is formed and / or can be formed and / or separated by opening and / or damaging the layer composite as intended.

In a first basic embodiment it is provided that a printing layer serves as a material layer for the formation of both the confidential information and the interference pattern, whereby an adjacent structured layer of comparatively lower optical density is used to influence which surface areas of the printing layer are used to form the confidential information and which of their surface areas are used to form the interference pattern. In a second basic embodiment, instead of a single one, two (eg print, lacquer, film or foil) layers are provided, both of which have a certain optical density (ie in particular colored layers, for example in black or one preferably dark, at least but opaque color), which are also both structured, ie are not designed over the entire surface or without gaps, but are provided with gaps. Both printing layers lie one on top of the other and therefore visually overlap, one structured printing layer forming the confidential information and the other structured printing layer forming an interference pattern which e.g. includes a negative image of the confidential information. In both basic variants, the confidential information is more difficult to spy out by x-raying than with conventional anti-spying labels and documents, because confidential information and interference patterns visually merge into a uniform total area of approximately uniform x-ray brightness.

• 1 ein Etikett mit einem Schichtverbund, dargestellt in Draufsicht, als Beispiel eines Gegenstandes zum Schutz einer vertraulichen Information vor Ausspähung,
• 2 den Aufbau eines Schichtverbunds bei einem herkömmlichen Etikett, dargestellt in perspektivischer Ansicht,
• 3 den Aufbau eines Schichtverbunds bei einem herkömmlichen Etikett, das zusätzlich ein Störmuster beinhaltet, dargestellt in perspektivischer Ansicht,
• 4 den Aufbau des Schichtverbunds gemäß der ersten Ausführungsform mit einer VOID-Schichtenfolge,
• 5A den Aufbau des Schichtverbunds aus 4 mit einer VOID-Schichtenfolge, dargestellt in nicht-perspektivischer Seitenansicht,
• 5B eine weitere Variante der ersten Ausführungsform des Etiketts oder Gegenstands; hier als Schichtverbund eines Rubbeletiketts,
• 5C eine weitere Variante der ersten Ausführungsform mit gegenüber 5A eingesparter Klebeschicht,
• 5D eine weitere Variante der ersten Ausführungsform mit gegenüber 5B eingesparter Transferfolie und Klebeschicht,
• die 6A bis 6C eine zweite Ausführungsform mit zwei strukturierten, optisch dichten und einander visuell ergänzenden Schichten,
• die 7A bis 7C eine Weiterbildung eines Störmusters zum Erschweren der Zurordnung von Ziffern,
• 8 einen Schichtverbund zur Realisierung eines Störmusters gemäß den 7A bis 7C,
• 9 einen Schichtverbund 20 mit zusätzlicher spiegelnder oder heller, reflektierender Schicht und
• 10A in schematischer Darstellung die Reflexion elektromagnetischer Strahlung an einem Schichtverbund mit einer zusätzlichen spiegelnden oder reflektierenden Schicht auf der äußeren Abdeckschicht und
• 10B die Reflexion elektromagnetischer Strahlung bei Anordnung der zusätzlichen spiegelnden oder reflektierenden Schicht unterhalb der äußeren Abdeckschicht.

Some exemplary embodiments are described below with reference to the figures. Show it:

• 1 a label with a layer composite, shown in plan view, as an example of an object to protect confidential information from spying,
• 2 the structure of a layer composite in a conventional label, shown in perspective view,
• 3 the structure of a layer composite in a conventional label, which also contains an interference pattern, shown in perspective view,
• 4th the structure of the layer composite according to the first embodiment with a VOID layer sequence,
• 5A the structure of the layer composite 4th with a VOID layer sequence, shown in a non-perspective side view,
• 5B another variant of the first embodiment of the label or object; here as a layer composite of a scratch-off label,
• 5C another variant of the first embodiment with opposite 5A saved adhesive layer,
• 5D another variant of the first embodiment with opposite 5B saved transfer film and adhesive layer,
• the 6A to 6C a second embodiment with two structured, optically dense and visually complementary layers,
• the 7A to 7C a further development of a disturbance pattern to make it difficult to assign digits,
• 8th a layer composite for realizing a disturbance pattern according to FIGS 7A to 7C ,
• 9 a layer composite 20th with additional specular or light, reflective layer and
• 10A in a schematic representation the reflection of electromagnetic radiation on a layer composite with an additional specular or reflective layer on the outer cover layer and
• 10B the reflection of electromagnetic radiation when the additional specular or reflective layer is arranged below the outer cover layer.

1 shows an example of a label 40 (Anti-spy label) as an example of an object 30th with which confidential information is protected from being spied on. Such an item can also be a printed matter 50 or an ID etc. (see above). Regardless of other open text messages not specifically protected from spying 23 on or on the object is in a surface area, the labeling field here as an example 35 is called a layer composite 20th designed to protect the confidential information (usually a sequence of letters and / or numbers) from being spied on in the unopened state, e.g. during shipping.

2 shows a conventional structure of such a layer composite; comprising, for example, a rear or lower cover layer 42 and an outer or upper cover layer 32 . The intermediate level for confidential information 5 is designated here with 33 (first layer level); it should not be understood as a physical layer, but only as a level in which, for example - as here in 2 - a structured print layer 2 is arranged to keep the confidential information 5 to embody.

3 additionally shows a second layer level 34 , which represents a structured interference pattern, which is usually made up of alphanumeric digits or other irregular, printed elements made of black or dark printing ink. When x-rayed, the contours of the digits of confidential information merge 5 visually with those of the disturbance pattern 25 . Nonetheless, when attempting to spy out a number of information 5 one digit of the disturbance pattern 25 superimposed, a locally particularly low fluoroscopic brightness, whereby the digits of the confidential information 5 recognizable as such due to local fluctuations in brightness and digits of the interference pattern distinguishable. The signal obtained through the different fluoroscopic brightnesses often still has a signal-to-noise ratio that is too high to successfully thwart such spying.

The digits of the confidential information 5 form the structured layer 2 ; this ink layer designed according to the confidential digits 2 that often only imprints the layer 42 is, is in the layer or height plane 33 arranged. With a conventional structure as in 2 owns the printing ink layer in the layer plane 33 a comparably high optical density in relation to the cover layer 32 This creates the often dangerously high signal-to-noise ratio when attempting to spy.

4th shows a first embodiment that prevents this, namely that in the layer composite 20th of the label 40 or subject 30th the digits of the confidential information 5 just not, as with the interference pattern 25 are realized from printing ink, but as structured (for example lacquered or printed), but colorless or at least largely transparent surface areas of far lower optical density D than if this is a readable text as in 2 or 3 should represent. As indicated by the outlines of the sequence of digits “1812” in 4th (instead of the black lettering in 2 or 3 ) is indicated, these digits are preferably painted transparent; because the signal from the optical density of the information-carrying layer 5 As can be seen, the signal-to-noise ratio is significantly reduced.

This double layer sequence in 4th from the print layer 1 (black all over) and the structured layer underneath 2 , 5 , 33 The optical density is lower, for example, than the VOID layer sequence 3 formed so that when the two layers are pulled apart 42 and 32 for the structured layer 2 , 33 selectively either only the surface areas of the printing layer that are covered by the digits “1812” 1 (ie digits of the same shape and size; but now from the black ink from the layer 1 ) or only the remaining, surrounding surface areas of the printing layer 1 on the layer below 42 stick. Such a VOID effect is well known, but so far it has never been applied to the confidential information itself, but always only to other meaningless sequences of digits (mostly precisely this sequence of letters “VOID”), which at best serve as proof of first opening. According to 4th occurs when the foils or layers are torn apart 42 and 32 however, the confidential information itself in or out of the ink layer 1 although this information was previously only available as a colorless varnish on the structured layer 2 was present, the optical density of which is much lower than that of the layer 1 .

For producing a label according to 4th is on the layer 42 a so-called release layer as a structured layer 2 applied in the form of confidential information 5 is structured and has the task, where it is placed, the adhesion at the border to (by means of the cover layer 32 removable) optically denser layer 1 to reduce. For the production of the layer composite according to 4th a transfer label can be used. The structured release layer 2 itself is to be made as transparent as possible; an opaque printing ink is applied over the entire surface of this release layer as a layer 1 imprinted. The layer structure thus formed from the layers 1 , 34 and 2 , 33 (as well as the cover layers on both sides 42 , 32 ) appears completely homogeneous even when x-rayed in the original, unopened state, because the transparent release layer 2 in the plane 33 a practically negligible optical density compared to the optically denser layer 1 in the plane 34 having. However, once the cover layer 32 including selective areas of the printing layer 1 is removed, along with this in the areas where there is no release layer 2 is present, the printing ink is lifted from the background everywhere to the side outside the confidential information. There where the release layer 2 in the form of the sequence of digits 5 has been applied, the printing ink remains on the layer 1 however, on the substrate or on the lower cover layer 42 . In this open state, the confidential information 5 can be read with the naked eye. As with any other void effect, the ink is 1 printed all over. The motif, which is conventionally printed in dark color, is used here as a transparent release layer 2 printed; the motif only becomes visible when part of the printing ink is lifted off when the upper material and the background material are separated. Where the transparent release layer is 2 the adhesive force between the ink layer 1 and the layer 42 has decreased locally, the ink layer remains 1 selective on the layer 32 . Depending on whether a positive font (dark font on a light background) or a If light-inverted negative writing is to be implemented, the printing color can optionally be used in the area of the sequence of digits 5 or alternatively outside thereof on the structured release layer 2 remain.

The transparently designed information-carrying layer 2 its adhesion-reducing property ensures that when the second, upper cover layer is peeled off 32 from the first, lower layer 42 the confidential information 5 realized for the first time from printing ink (and otherwise accessible and visible), because outside the range of the digits of confidential information 5 that acts as the information-bearing release layer 2 are embodied, the printing ink layer 1 on the shift 42 remains, but in surface areas of the structured, information-carrying release layer 2 itself this printing ink layer 1 together with cover layer 32 is lifted.

Because when designing the confidential information in the form of a VOID effect, the printing color 1 the confidential information is applied over the entire surface 5 but only in the form of a transparent print layer or print varnish layer 2 is present, the achievable signal-to-noise ratio is significantly reduced when attempting to spy out. Conventionally, the optical density of a black printing ink used as an information-carrying layer is typically of the order of D = 1.5, which corresponds to a transmission of 3.2%. Under construction according to 4th however, a transparent release layer can be used 2 which has a transmission of 90% or more, which corresponds to an optical density of 0.05 or less. A cover layer 32 usually has an optical density greater than 2, preferably greater than 5. In the case of fluoroscopy in transmission, the signal to be detected (that is, the fluoroscopy of the cover layer 32 and the full-surface black printing ink, together D = 6.5) compared to the darker background (i.e. the transparency of the cover layer 32 , the information-carrying font 5 and the black ink 1 , together D = 6.55) has a signal-to-noise ratio of only 1.12. In a conventional structure according to 2 is the signal (i.e. fluoroscopy of the cover layer 32 , D = 5.0) compared to the substrate (i.e. the transparency of the cover layer 32 and the information layer 2 , together D = 6.5) has a signal-to-noise ratio of 31.6. Accordingly, the signal-to-noise ratio of a spying attempt in transmission was conventionally greater than 30.0 by the factor 28 to a value of 1 , 12th reduced, ie the signal-to-noise ratio was reduced by 96.5% to a level of 3.5% of the conventionally existing signal-to-noise ratio. In the 2 to 4th is the optically dense cover layer 32 shown in white; in reality it is opaque and black.

To make fluoroscopy more difficult, at least one of the two cover layers mentioned should be used 32 or. 42 have an optical density greater than 2, preferably greater than 5. The second cover layer does not have to have any particular optical density, which improves the economy.

5A shows a first variant of the basic first embodiment 4th with VOID layer sequence in a non-perspective side view. On the cover layer 32 there is a release liner 37 , which forms the basis for a transfer label, comprising at least the layers 1 , 2 , 32 and 37 . The VOID effect is triggered by peeling off the peel-off film 37 , being where the release layer is 2 is the print layer 1 with the release liner 37 is lifted off, but otherwise the print layer 1 remains in place. In 5A a transfer label is shown; an adhesive layer 36 after removing the liner 31 used the overlying layers on an object 30th or a document 50 to transfer, which then the function of the lower cover layer 42 takes over.

5B shows a second variant of the basic first embodiment of the label; here as a layer composite of a scratch-off label with a removable scratch-off layer 4th as an optically dense cover layer 32 . The transfer film 39 is from the full-surface rub-off layer 4th removable. Alone 5B layers shown, with only the liner 31 is excluded represent the transfer label. This transfer label has in 1 the dimensions of the labeling field 35 . This structure therefore has the advantage that the transfer label can be produced on its own and on an object provided independently of it 30th or document 50 can be applied. After this application, the transfer film 39 and the same layer structure remains as in 5A . Optionally, between the transfer film 39 and the rub-off layer 4th An anti-stick layer (not shown) may be present to prevent the transfer film from peeling off 39 to allow without the rub-off layer 4th to damage.

The 5C or. 5D each shows a modification opposite 5A or. 5B . The layer structure is not like in the 5A and 5B as a label with an adhesive layer 36 and a liner 31 executed, but directly on a print carrier 43 upset. In this case, however, due to the omission of the adhesive layer, care must be taken that the adhesive force between the carrier and the printing ink layer is sufficiently small that there is no release layer material 2 the separation required for the VOID effect is actually located between the print carrier 42 and the ink layer 1 he follows. In layers from 5D can also use the transfer film 39 omitted (and with it of course also the non-stick layer), since in this case the print carrier 43 is available as a substrate.

In the above variants of the first basic embodiment ( 4th to 5D ) the layer composite is designed so that one from the optically dense layer 1 formed confidential information 5 in the layer composite 20th is formed or separated, namely by opening (pulling apart) and / or damaging (rubbing off) the layer composite as intended 20th .

The 6A to 6C show a second basic embodiment of the composite layer of a label, document or other object in which two structured layers 11 , 12th exist and lie one above the other in the layer composite. 6A shows a first structured layer (with a rectangular border; for clearer identification of the actually available area size in the layer composite) 11 that is structured in the form of a four-digit digital number "0101" (here distorted similar to a Captcha image), ie it is shaped and has four areas 13th includes each one digit of confidential information 5 ("0" or "1" respectively). The first structured layer is in the gaps 11 unavailable; the layer level remains there 33 (so empty.

In the layer level 34 (so) above (or alternatively below), as in 6B shown, a second structured layer 12th formed in the form of a disturbance pattern 25 is formed, the surface areas 14th , 18a individually to the confidential information 5 are adjusted. In particular, includes the inner contour 25a of the interference pattern 25 just the outside contour 5a of confidential information 5 , ie the interference pattern has the form of the negative image of the information .; the second areas 14th , 18a therefore fill complementary surface areas through the first surface areas 13th have not been filled out; at least directly on the contour 5a of confidential information 5 along. This in 6C fluoroscopic image shown 16 from both structured layers 11 , 12th therefore appears like a homogeneous, evenly black or optically dense surface. That in the fluoroscopic image 16 Nevertheless, slight brightness fringes occur, namely along border lines where the outer contour 5a of confidential information 5 and the inside contour 25a (the areas 14th the second structured layer 12th ) run or butt against each other, is due to printing manufacturing fluctuations, if the first and second layers 11 , 12th are not exactly on top of each other. Therefore, the interference pattern includes 25 or the second layer 12th preferably additional contours 19th acting as visual clutter pattern elements 18th serve and in the fluoroscopic image further digits of the confidential information 5 pretend that they do not exist there by varying the absolute value for the offset and the direction of the offset for each symbol independently of one another. In the same way, the offset of the contours of the interference pattern to the contours of the confidential information should be varied, so that it cannot be concluded on the basis of the otherwise occurring regularity that the characters with a regular offset are the characters 6 of confidential information 5 are.

The precisely fitting superimposition of the information-carrying layer 11 and the disturbance pattern 12th ; 25 then ideally results in the homogeneous full surface. In practice, the register offset within the printing plane is Gaussian in both the x and y directions around the perfect alignment; typically an offset of the order of 0-0.1 mm occurs. Even if all of the digits contained in positive or negative representation are represented by the first and / or second structured layer 11 , 12th are realized, can be spied out, their respective assignment, ie belonging to the first and / or second structured layer, remains 11 , 12th unknown. In the example of the 6A to 6C a total of n = 12 digits or symbols occur. With an information length of 4 symbols (r = 4) there are 495 possible combinations according to n! / (R! (Nr)!). If, for example, a four-digit numerical PIN is to be displayed, 5% of all originally 10,000 possible solutions remain for the correct PIN.

A layer composite 20th According to this second basic embodiment cannot be produced in a conventional, non-digital printing process, however, any interference patterns can be made at least so variable that in principle it has the same effect as the configuration of the information-bearing layer in the form of a void effect. For this, only the negative image has to be the interference pattern 15th of information 5 to be printed.

The 7A to 7C show a further development of a disturbance pattern (especially opposite 3 ), in which the correct assignment of spied digits to confidential information 5 or to the interference pattern 25 is made more difficult.

7A shows a first structured layer (with a rectangular border; for clearer identification of the actually available area size in the layer composite) 11 ; which is structured in the form of a four-digit number "1812" (here distorted similar to a Captcha image) and comprises four individual areas according to the respective confidential number. The first structured layer is in the gaps 11 unavailable; the layer level remains there 33 (so empty.

In the layer level 34 (so) is as in 7B shown, a disturbance pattern 25 formed from a plurality of digits of similar design; these are through the second surface areas 14th the second layer 12th embodied. There are always only either individually exempted single characters or single pairs of two overlapping single characters or single digits; in the case of the couples, these imitate the affiliation of one of their digits to the confidential information 5 , although actually both overlapping digits to the interference pattern 25 belong. The unpaired individual digits overlap when the two layers are merged 11 , 12th with respective digits of the confidential information 5 , only in pairs. This in 7C fluoroscopic image shown 16 from both structured, optically dense layers 11 , 12th no longer shows which of the digit pairs represents a digit of confidential information 5 contains, and which of the two digits it is. This must include the confidential information 5 and the interference pattern 25 Be designed so that each symbol represents confidential information 5 at most with one symbol of the disturbance pattern 25 overlaps, and that each symbol of the disturbance pattern 25 at most with a symbol of confidential information 5 overlaps.

The training according to the 7A to 7C can be used in two ways. On the one hand, labels with a cover layer and disruptive patterns can be produced in advance, in which the released positions for the information change according to a defined system. The final production of the information can then be carried out at a later point in time with a single print run using a digital printing process (e.g. inkjet printing) 5 take place, whereby only the positions to be used for the symbols of the information, which change systematically with each printing piece, have to be taken into account. Following this print run, the information layer can then be covered with a cover label that contains the matching pre-printed interference pattern 25 with the free positions just considered for the information symbols. On the other hand, a conventional cover without an interference pattern can be used in that the desired interference pattern is mirror-inverted on the cover from below and the desired information matching the interference pattern is applied to the actual print carrier and finally the cover is applied to the print carrier with the information becomes.

A disturbance pattern designed in this second way 25 for example, the in 8th Layer composite shown 20th be used. This is an adhesive layer 36 a transfer label 41 not over the entire surface, but only on the edge as a frame around the area in which the confidential information 5 lies. The confidential information 5 is applied to a print carrier in a conventional manner 42 upset. Then the appropriate disturbance pattern becomes 25 on the area of the transfer label that is kept free of adhesive 41 applied before this on the print carrier 42 is donated. This is feasible, among other things, because no particular accuracy of fit of the interference pattern with regard to the information is required.

Incidentally, in all exemplary embodiments of this application, the confidential information 5 If it is created by printing, it can optionally also be printed in plain text (in addition to the actual, possibly distorted typeface) so that, for example, a PIN number is available when linking to the bank account. It happens that the confidential information is first produced in advance (eg a 4-digit PIN by a label printing company) and is only linked to a specific customer by another company in a later production step; eg from a bank to a bank customer. Since with a 4-digit numeric PIN, the mere existence of this number combination is not confidential, but rather its association with a specific bank customer and / or his / her bank account, the presence of the PIN in plain text up to this association is also not critical to security. If, on the other hand, the confidential information is already critical in terms of security in advance, it can be identified in encrypted form or numbered so that the confidential information is available at least in this indirect way when it is linked later.

Furthermore, it can optionally be provided in each exemplary embodiment that the structured layer 2 or. 11 is formed from colorless and / or transparent, but luminescent, in particular fluorescent paint. Namely, to check whether the confidential information 5 in which the almost transparent release varnish was actually manufactured in the desired manner, a fluorescent substance, for example, can be added to this release varnish in the lowest possible but sufficient concentration. Immediately after printing, the print motif can therefore be checked by irradiation with UV light using the light emitted by the fluorescent ink in the visible spectral range. The security against being spied on is not reduced, since a fluorescent color does not increase the amount of light in a spying attempt with transmitted light and since UV light necessary to excite the fluorescent colors is usually absorbed even more strongly by materials than light in the visible spectral range.

For all exemplary embodiments, as in 9 shown, the layer composite 20th in addition to the previously mentioned layers an additional mirror layer 45 and / or a light or in any case sufficiently strongly reflective (eg white) additional layer 55 exhibit; for example adjacent to the cover layer 32 ; about above or outside of it (as shown) or below. This is in relation to an overall measurable reflected radiation intensity that occurs when the layer composite is irradiated 20th with electromagnetic radiation through the layer composite 20th is reflected, the portion of a usable fluoroscopic signal, which only after two passes through the confidential information 5 and the interference pattern 25 is reflected, and / or a maximum achievable signal-to-noise ratio can be reduced.

To this end, the 10A and 10B in a schematic representation, reflected electromagnetic radiation L, which upon irradiation of the layer composite 20th would have to be measured for spying purposes; an additional mirror layer 45 and / or a light or reflective (eg white) additional layer 55 sets the portion of a useful signal that only occurs after the interference pattern has been traversed 25 and confidential information 5 is reflected, relative to the total reflected intensity. 10B also shows the to 9 correspond to the layer structure, but with the order of the layers reversed 32 and 45 ; 55 .

Also the relative relationship between reflected intensity components that were weakened by the confidential information when passing through the layer composite or part of its layers twice (by hitting and traversing one of its digits) or just not weakened (by traversing intermediate areas between the digits) can through such an additional layer 45 , 55 and ultimately the signal-to-noise ratio can also be reduced in order to make spying out with reflection measurement more difficult.

In contrast to spying with measurement of the transmitted radiation, spying attempts with measurement of the reflection are practicable if the signal path is not superimposed by any additional independent reflection that would render the signal-to-noise ratio unusable. For example, a spying attempt would be made by means of reflection from the layer 31 fail because the print carrier designed without special specifications 43 usually has a reflection of at least 50%. Compared to this reflection, however, the other signal path and the other background are much smaller, so that the entire signal or the entire background is dominated by this reflection and the signal-to-noise ratio is correspondingly small. A spying attempt by means of reflection from the layer 32 here, on the other hand, is often promising, because the signal-to-noise ratio is 1000, albeit with a low signal intensity. The signal-to-noise ratio is about twice as good as in transmission because the path of the underground runs twice through the information layer, i.e. twice as often as in the case of the attempted spying in transmission. It can therefore be provided either the cover layer 32 completely or partially (ie partially or completely) reflective or additionally between the upper cover layer 32 and the information-carrying layer 5 or to provide an additional reflective layer.

List of reference symbols

1

Print layer

2

structured layer

3

VOID layer sequence

4th

optically dense rub-off layer

5

confidential information

5a

Outer contour

6

alphanumeric character

7th

associated alphanumeric character

11

first structured layer

12th

second structured layer

13th

first area

14th

second area

15th

Negative image

16

Fluoroscopic image

18th

visual clutter pattern element

18a

Negative image of the information

19th

Additional contour

20th

Layer composite

23

open text message

25

Interference pattern

25a

Inner contour of the interference pattern

30th

object

31

Liner

32

upper cover layer

33

first layer level

34

second layer level

35

Labeling field

36

Adhesive layer

37

Release liner

39

Transfer film

40

label

41

Transfer label

42

lower cover layer

45

Mirror layer

50

document

55

reflective layer

L.

electromagnetic radiation

QUOTES INCLUDED IN THE DESCRIPTION

This list of the documents listed by the applicant was generated automatically and is included solely for the better information of the reader. The list is not part of the German patent or utility model application. The DPMA assumes no liability for any errors or omissions.

Patent literature cited

• EP 3284611 A1 [0004]

Claims (14)

Object (30), in particular label (40) or document (50) to protect confidential information from being spied on, the object (30) having at least the following: - a labeling field (35) or another surface area in which confidential information ( 5), in particular confidential information (5) is hidden from alphanumeric characters (6), - a layer composite (20) formed in the inscription field (35) or in the other surface area, which contains the confidential information (5), and - At least one black, dark and / or otherwise optically dense print layer (1), characterized in that the confidential information (5) and / or an interference pattern (25), the inner contour (25a) of which is an outer contour (5a) of the confidential information (5 ) corresponds or the outer contour of which corresponds to an inner contour of the confidential information (5) by opening and / or damaging the layer composite (20) from the intended purpose Printing layer (1) can be formed and / or can be separated from the printing layer (1). Item (30) after Claim 1 , characterized in that the layer composite (20) has a structured layer (2) adjoining the printing layer (1), - the structured layer (2) having a lower optical density than the printing layer (1) and according to the confidential information ( 5) or is structured according to the negative image (15) of the confidential information (5), - with surface pieces of the printing layer (1) adjoining the structured layer (2) by opening or damaging the layer composite (20) of other surface pieces of the printing layer ( 1) are separable. Item (30) after Claim 1 or 2 , characterized in that the structured layer (2) is structured according to the confidential information (5) or according to a negative image (15) of the confidential information (5), whereas the optically dense layer (1) is formed over the entire area within the labeling field (35) is. Object (30) according to one of the Claims 1 to 3 , characterized in that the layer composite (20) comprises a VOID layer sequence (3), the confidential information (5) itself or its negative image (15) being designed either as a structured, adhesion-reducing layer or as a structured, adhesive layer, which is adjacent to the printing layer (1). Object (30) according to one of the Claims 1 to 4th , characterized in that the layer composite (20) comprises a rub-off, scratch-off or otherwise selectively removable rub-off layer (4) in certain surface areas and the structured layer (2) is an adhesion-reducing layer whose according to the confidential information (5) or according to a negative image (15) of the confidential information (5), structured, adhesion-reducing surface areas reach up to surface areas of the optically dense, rub-off layer (4) and, when the layer composite (20) is opened and / or damaged as intended, the printing layer (1) is separated from the latter Underground prevented at these very places. Item (30) after Claim 1 , characterized in that the layer composite (20) has two structured layers (11, 12) which are arranged one above the other in the layer composite (20), whereby surface areas of the two structured layers (11, 12) visually overlap, - the first structured layer (11) corresponds to the confidential information (5) or the negative image (15) corresponds to the confidential information (5), whereas the contour of a second structured layer (12) is an inverted, in particular brightness-inverted or, to the first structured layer (11) is otherwise a contrast-inverted image, whereby the visual merging and / or superimposition of the two structured layers (11, 12) or at least their surface areas (13, 14) imitates a homogeneous, gapless layer. Item (30) after Claim 1 or 6 , characterized in that the first structured layer (11) is structured according to the confidential information (5), whereas the second structured layer (12) is structured according to a negative image (15) of the confidential information (5). Item (30) after Claim 1 , 6 or 7th , characterized in that the first structured layer (11) is structured according to the confidential information (5), whereas the second structured layer (12) is a negative image (15) of the confidential information (5) and other visual interference pattern elements (18) Includes additional contours (19). Object (30) according to one of the Claims 1 or 6 to 8th - characterized in , - that the confidential information (5) is made up of alphanumeric characters (6) which are each arranged at a distance from one another without overlapping and embodied by optically dense surface areas (13) of the first structured, optically dense layer (11), that through optically dense surface areas (14) of the second structured optically dense layer (12) alphanumeric characters (7) of a disturbance pattern (25) are embodied, which are each individually assigned to a respective alphanumeric character (6) of the confidential information (5), whereby the visual overlay of the confidential information (5) and the disturbance pattern (25) in one A plurality of spaced-apart pairs of alphanumeric characters (6, 7) are disintegrated, of which one (6) belongs to the confidential information (5) and the other (7) to the interference pattern (25). Object (30) according to one of the Claims 1 to 9 , characterized in that the printing layer (1), the structured layer (2) and / or at least one of the two structured layers (11, 12) is a printed lacquer layer, in particular a printing ink layer, the contour of which corresponds to the printed image of the individual confidential information ( 5) is. Object (30) according to one of the Claims 2 to 5 or 10 , characterized in that the structured layer (2) is formed from colorless and / or transparent, but luminescent, in particular fluorescent, lacquer. Object (30) according to one of the Claims 1 to 11 , characterized in that the layer composite (20) comprises at least one mirror layer (45) and / or a brightly reflective layer (55), which in relation to a total measurable reflected radiation intensity that occurs when the layer composite (20) is irradiated with electromagnetic radiation the layer composite (20) is reflected, the portion of a usable fluoroscopic signal which is only reflected after two passes through the confidential information (5) and the interference pattern (25), and / or reduces a maximum achievable signal-to-noise ratio. Object (30) according to one of the Claims 1 to 12th , characterized in that the confidential information (5) and the interference pattern (25) are complementary, brightness-inverted or otherwise contrast-inverted surface areas of the printing layer (1). A set of items comprising a plurality of items (30) according to any one of Claims 1 to 13th , each object inside the layer composite (20) with individual confidential information (5) and with an interference pattern (25) that is individually adapted to the contours (5a) of precisely this respective confidential information (5), its own contours (5b; 25a ) bring about and / or enable an individual visual merger with exclusively this confidential information (5), is provided, in particular is printed.

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