DE102012103532A1 - Method for encrypting telecommunication connection data for secure access to data, involves transferring generated double encrypted data for storage in storage device located outside secured area - Google Patents

Abstract

The method involves generating first cryptographic key having first encryption key among several encryption keys (15) in secure environment. The first encryption key data is encrypted in secured area with second encryption key to generate double encrypted data. The second encryption and signature keys are generated outside secure environment and accepted by secure environment through secure communication channel. The generated data are transferred for storage in memory device (100) located outside secured area. The first decryption key is stored in memory within secured environment. Independent claims are included for the following: (1) method of decrypting encrypted data; (2) method for securing of cryptographic keys; (3) device for encrypting and/or decrypting data; and (4) device for securing cryptographic keys.

Description

Field of the invention

The invention relates to a system and a method for secure access to data in order to prevent unauthorized access to the data and misuse of the data as far as possible. More particularly, the invention relates to a system and method for secure event-based access to telecommunications connection data.

Background of the invention

In the Federal Republic of Germany, in the case of data retention, personal data are stored by or for all offices without the data being currently required. The purpose of data retention is to improve the ability to prevent and prosecute crimes. In the case of data retention, telecommunications providers should be required to provide traffic data, i. To store their customers' telecommunications connection data for a specified period of time, currently for a minimum of six months, in order for this data to be available for law enforcement purposes.

Data retention advocates call for this six-month retention period so that the stored data will be available for a long time to enable them to investigate violations of the law.

Opponents of data retention reject the six-month retention period as a whole, as many of the telecommunication link data reveal disproportionate details, including personal data on respectable citizens, and threaten the freedom of citizens in the long run.

A data retention with a six-month retention period has the advantage that sufficiently good investigation options are available because the data are available for evaluation over a relatively long period of time. The disadvantage here, however, is the lack of data protection, because especially due to the long storage period particularly simple dragnets can be performed and personality profiles can be created. Furthermore, the telecommunications service providers have at all times access to the data stored by them.

According to a compromise proposal of the opponents of data retention, the data should only be stored for a maximum of one week and then deleted in good faith. The advantage of this solution is that data protection against data retention is improved with a six-month retention period because the data are available for evaluation purposes for a shorter period of time. The disadvantage, however, that due to the relatively short retention period of one week, the investigation possibilities, such as for law enforcement purposes, are limited. The compromise proposal also has the disadvantage that the telecommunications service providers have access to the stored data at all times.

Both data retention with a six-month retention period and the compromise proposal, also called "quick-freeze", can not preclude misuse of the data because the data-storing entity, i. the telecommunications service providers have access to the data at all times. Likewise, in both variants a dragnet search is technically possible at any time, even if it is considered by the legislature to be inadmissible.

Object of the invention

The object of the invention is therefore to provide a system and a method for secure access to stored data, in particular telecommunications connection data, which in particular prevent misuse of the stored data and a systematic evaluation (dragnet) of the data efficiently, without the disadvantages of the prior Technique known method exhibit.

Inventive solution

This object is achieved by the methods and systems or devices according to the independent claims. Advantageous developments are specified in the respective dependent claims.

• – Es erfolgt keine herkömmliche Speicherung der Daten. Alle Daten werden zunächst erhoben, sind aber nicht wie üblich unbeschränkt les- und auswertbar (auch nicht, wenn die Entschlüsselungsschlüssel bekannt sind).
• – Alle ermittlungsrelevanten Daten lassen sich durch einen unbestechlichen, autonom agierenden versiegelten Schlüsselserver (nachfolgend versiegelte Infrastruktur genannt) auslesen – sogar über ausgedehnte Zeiträume hinweg. Vorrausetzung dafür kann ein festgelegtes Mengenkontingent sein.
• – Das Konzept der Dauer- und Mengenkontrolle setzt den Ermittlungen enge quantitative Grenzen: Daher ist es notwendig, das zur Verfügung stehende Datenvolumen rational, das bedeutet anlassbezogen, einzusetzen.
• – Die Versiegelung gewährleistet zusätzlich, dass nur Ermittler Einsicht nehmen können. Die Mitarbeiter und Manager der Netzbetreiber bleiben ausgeschlossen.

The invention has the following advantages in particular:

• - There is no conventional storage of data. All data is initially collected, but not as usual unlimited readable and evaluable (not even if the decryption keys are known).
• - All data relevant to investigation can be read out by an incorruptible, autonomously acting sealed key server (hereinafter referred to as sealed infrastructure) - even over extended periods of time. The prerequisite for this can be a fixed quantity quota.
• - The concept of continuous and volume control sets the investigation narrow quantitative limits: therefore, it is necessary that available Ranging volume of data rationally, that means on a case-by-case basis.
• - The seal also ensures that only investigators can inspect. The employees and managers of the network operators remain excluded.

The invention is not a compromise solution between conventional data retention and the Quick Freeze approach. On the one hand, data protection compared to Quick Freeze is implemented more consistently, on the other hand, the investigation options can improve compared to the conventional 6-month data storage.

Brief description of the figures

Details and features of the invention and specific embodiments of the invention will become apparent from the following description taken in conjunction with the drawings. It shows:

1 a block diagram of a system according to the invention for explaining a secure access to stored connection data according to the invention;

2 a block diagram of a platform for securely encrypting data and for securely storing the encryption keys used;

3 a block diagram of a platform for storing encryption and decryption key;

4 a sequence diagram for the request of an encryption key of the telecommunications service provider in a simplified UML notation;

5 a sequence diagram for requesting a decryption key of the telecommunications service provider in a simplified UML notation;

6 a block diagram of a system according to the invention for the secure storage of encryption keys;

7 a sequence diagram for triggering a data deletion for maintenance in a simplified UML notation;

8th a sequence diagram for triggering a data erasure in an alarm in a simplified UML notation;

9 a flow diagram of an encryption method according to the invention; and

10 a flowchart of a decryption method according to the invention;

Detailed description of the invention

With the systems and devices according to the invention and the method according to the invention, both an adequate data protection and sufficiently good possibilities for data evaluation, for example for investigative purposes, are made possible. Abuse of the stored data, such as connection data from telecommunications service providers is effectively avoided. With the systems and methods according to the invention both the needs of the proponents of data storage and the opponent of data storage are satisfied.

1 shows a system according to the invention for securely storing data, in particular telecommunications connection data, for explaining the method according to the invention.

A telecommunications service provider 10 collects customer connection data stored in a storage device 100 should be stored to prevent unauthorized access to the memory device 100 stored connection data is prevented, the connection data before storage in the memory device 100 to encrypt. To encrypt the connection data, encryption keys are needed, which are in a sealed infrastructure 20 generated, stored and managed. The sealed infrastructure 20 Prevents neither the infrastructure manager nor the telecommunications service provider or any other third party from accessing the unencrypted connection data collected during processing. Furthermore, the sealed infrastructure prevents 20 that on in the infrastructure 20 stored encryption key can be accessed in an unauthorized manner. This achieves a particularly high degree of security during encryption and the encryption keys.

The sealed infrastructure 20 includes a device 25 for generating so-called operator keys. An operator key consists of a key pair consisting of a public and a private key. The operator key according to the invention is the telecommunications service provider 10 assigned. The private key of the operator key is used to encrypt the collected connection data, using encryption within the sealed infrastructure 20 is guaranteed that the private key of the operator key not outside the sealed infrastructure 20 can get.

The private key of the operator key is also referred to below as the encryption key of the operator or of the operator key. The public key of the operator key is hereinafter also called the decryption key of the operator or the operator key. The public key of the operator key or the decryption key of the operator key is necessary in order to be able to decrypt the data encrypted with the private operator key if required.

To prevent that from the telecommunications service provider 10 encrypted connection data can be easily decrypted from this with the help of the decryption key of the operator, it is provided according to the invention that in the memory device 100 encrypted stored connection data additionally signed or encrypted with another encryption key again. The thus encrypted unsigned or doubly encrypted data are then stored in the memory device 100 stored.

The signature with which the encrypted data is signed or the additional encryption key is a trustworthy entity 15 , such as a notary. The trusted instance 15 associated signature or associated additional encryption keys are in a device 40 generated for generating signatures or key pairs. The public key of the facility 40 generated key pair or required for the signature signature key is the sealed infrastructure 20 provided for the purpose of signature or re-encryption of encrypted with the encryption key of the operator data. The one in the institution 40 generated private key remains with the trusted instance 15 , That in the facility 40 (Key generator) generated key pair consists of a public and a private key. That in the facility 40 generated key pair is also called notary key below. The public key of the notary key is also referred to below as the encryption key of the notary key. The private key of the notary key is also referred to below as the decryption key of the notary key.

Thus, with the method described above, the connection data collected by the telecommunication service provider is encrypted with the encryption key of the operator and additionally signed with the signature key of the trusted entity or encrypted with the encryption key of the notary key, ensuring that the Encryption key of the operator not outside the sealed infrastructure 20 arrives.

In one embodiment of the invention, it can be provided that a new operator key is generated for each data record to be encrypted. In one embodiment of the invention, it can be provided that for each a predetermined number of connection data, a new operator key is generated. This can reduce the number of operator keys. In a further embodiment of the invention, it can be provided that a single operator key is used for all connection data to be encrypted. In order to ensure a high degree of security in the evaluation or in the decryption of the encrypted connection data and to minimize the possibility of abuse, it is advantageous if the connection data to be encrypted blockwise or with an encryption key of the operator only a certain Number of connection data are encrypted so that only a small number of connection data can be decrypted with the associated decryption key of the operator.

With the method described above, it is ensured that either two decryption keys (decryption key of the operator and decryption key of the notary) or one decryption key in combination with a decryption key for accessing the connection data or for decrypting the encrypted connection data Signature keys are necessary.

After obtaining a court order for the disclosure of connection data (Block 50 ), the legitimate interest in accessing the connection data can be checked (block 60 ). If there is a corresponding judicial decision and there is a legitimate interest in accessing certain connection data, the requested connection data becomes a decryption device 200 decrypted and a constitutional use of the connection data (block 70 ).

The decryption device 200 requires for the decryption of the respective connection data the decryption key of the operator and the signature key or the decryption key of the notary. Because both the trusted instance 15 as well as the Telecommunications service providers 10 the decryption key necessary for decryption together with the decryption device 200 must ensure that neither the telecommunications service provider 10 still the trusted instance 15 alone the decrypted stored in the storage device connection data can decrypt. The decryption device 200 To do this, the appropriate decryption key of the operator of the sealed infrastructure 20 Request. The decryption key of the notary key required for decryption can be obtained from the key generator 40 be requested, with the release of the respective decryption key from the results in block 50 and block 60 can be made dependent.

The sealed infrastructure 20 can be configured according to the invention, in the request for a decryption key of the operator by the decryption device 200 to check whether the request satisfies predetermined characteristics or whether the requested decryption key satisfies predetermined characteristics. This can be done in the sealed infrastructure 20 so-called reading guidelines are laid down in order to allow a corresponding examination of the properties. For example, a read policy may be that a particular connection date can only be read over a period of time. If the period has expired or exceeded, the release of the operator's decryption key can be rejected. Another reading policy may be the maximum reading speed, about 100 connections per day, to the sealed infrastructure. If the predetermined number of connections per day is exceeded, the issuance of a decryption key of the operator can be rejected. Another reading policy may be the maximum number of queries per period, about 0.001% of Internet traffic.

The read policy, which determines that connection data can only be decrypted and read for a certain period of time, can be associated with the connection data or decryption keys. The assignment of this read policy to the decryption keys of the operators has the advantage that when using different decryption keys for different data blocks different maximum read durations can be set. For example, for a first block of connection data, a maximum read duration of five months may be set, and for a second block of connection data, a maximum read duration of six months. The read policy, which sets a maximum read speed or a maximum number of queries per period, can be assigned to the entire system.

Be the read policy in a request of a decryption key of the operator by the decryption device 200 not satisfied, the request is rejected, with the result that the decryption facility 200 no decryption key is available for decrypting the encrypted connection data so that even when the decryption key of the notary key is provided, the data can not be decrypted.

Furthermore, provision may be made for the data and / or the decryption keys of the operator to be deleted after a maximum read duration has expired in accordance with the read policy. Of course, an encryption key of the operator key can only be deleted if this decryption key is not needed for other data for decryption.

The users of a telecommunications service no longer have to rely on an omission promise of misuse of the collected connection data and the deletion of the connection data in good faith, but on the technically enforced separation of powers and a hard limit on the possible reading time and the maximum reading amount through technical measures trust. Another advantage of the system according to the invention or of the method described above is that the above-mentioned reading guidelines can not be modified retrospectively for the past and that the duration and quantity control according to the reading guidelines the investigations or the evaluation of connection data so narrow quantitative limits implies that any form other than a case-based investigation no longer has a probability of success. This effectively prevents misuse of the connection data, in particular in the form of dragnet searches.

2 shows a detailed block diagram of the in 1 shown sealed infrastructure 20 , The sealed infrastructure 20 includes a device 25 for generating and managing operator keys and a facility 27 for collecting connection data and for encrypting the collected connection data. The device 27 can be a number of data processing equipment 28 include. The data processing devices are provided for processing the encryption of the collected connection data. The data processing equipment 28 is supplied for the purpose of encryption of the encryption key of the notary key. Furthermore, the data processing equipment 28 of the Encryption key supplied to the operator. With both encryption keys, the appropriate data processing device 28 perform an encryption of the connection data according to the invention and the encrypted connection data to the memory device 100 to hand over. As an alternative to the encryption key of the notary key, the data processing device can 28 also a signature key of the notary or the trustworthy entity 15 to provide. Depending on whether the data processing equipment 28 a notary key encryption key or a trusted authority signature key 15 is supplied, the connection data is either encrypted twice or simply encrypted and then signed.

The device 25 for generating and managing operator keys comprises a number of so-called key machines 26 which are each responsible for generating the key pairs of the operator keys, for the application of the read policy in a key request and for the management of the generated key pairs. The sealed infrastructure 20 also has an interface through which the decryption facility 200 Decryption key the operator can query. The sealed infrastructure 20 is configured such that via the interface for providing the decryption key of the operator no encryption keys of the operator can get outside. This can be achieved, for example, by storing the decryption keys and the encryption keys of the operators in separate memory devices, the interface having access only to the memory device with the decryption key.

3 shows a detailed block diagram of a device 25 for creating and managing operator keys in a sealed infrastructure 20 , The device 25 has three key machines here 26 on which each a key server 26a , a key generator 26b , a policy instance 26c , a key vault 26d and a synchronization device 26e include. With the arrows between the individual components 26a to 26e of the key machine 26 the communication directions between the individual components are indicated. The key server 26a communicates via an interface with the in 2 shown data processing equipment 28 , whereby over this interface the key automaton 26 a data processing device 28 provides the encryption keys of the operator. Because also the device 27 or the data processing devices 28 within the sealed infrastructure 20 ensures that the encryption keys of the operator for the purpose of encryption of the connection data is not outside the sealed infrastructure 20 can reach.

The key server 26a is via a bidirectional data connection with the key generator 26b coupled. Receives the key server 26a from a data processing device 28 a request for an encryption key of an operator may be the key generator 26b create a new key pair for an operator key, the generated decryption key in the key vault 26d store and generate the generated encryption key to the key server 26a hand back. Instead of generating a new key pair, the key generator can also check, if any, an already generated encryption key to the key server 26a can be returned. If this is the case, the key generator can 26b the appropriate decryption key from the key vault 26d Requests.

The key server 26a is also a policy instance 26c coupled via a bidirectional data connection. In a request to the key server for a decryption key of the operator, the key server forwards 26a this request to the policy instance 26c Next, which checks if the request is in the sealed infrastructure 20 deposited guidelines. If one or more policies are not met, the policy instance reports 26c this the key server 26a with, which can then reject the request for the decryption key. If the request satisfies the stored policies, the policy instance can 26c the appropriate decryption key from the key vault 26c request, receive and the key server 26a for distribution to the decryption facility 200 the key server 26a handed over.

The key safe 26d is via a bidirectional data connection with a synchronization device 26e coupled. The synchronization device 26e is coupled via bidirectional data links to the synchronization devices of the other key machines. According to the invention, it is provided in the key vault 26d stored decryption key or key pairs of the operator of a first key machine to synchronize with the stored in the key safes of the other key machine decryption key or key pairs. For this purpose, the key pair or decryption key to be synchronized are from the key vault 26d to the synchronization device 26e passed, which then handles the synchronization. The Synchronization devices of the individual key automats are coupled to each other via a specially provided for the synchronization interface, so that it can be ensured that during the synchronization decryption key or key pair of the operator can not be read or intercepted. Preferably, the synchronization devices are coupled to each other via secure, approximately encrypted data connection. The synchronization devices can also be coupled to one another via dedicated data connection (eg leased lines).

In one embodiment of the invention, it is provided, at least some of the key machines 26 assign to one or more other dominions. For example, a first key machine 26 at a first telecommunications service provider, a second key machine 26 at a second telecommunications service provider and a third key machine 26 be provided at an external third party service provider, the third service provider does not have to be a telecommunications service provider. The three key machines are preferably housed at geographically different locations. The three key vending machines are coupled to each other via secured communication links, ie, the synchronization devices 26e are coupled with each other. By synchronizing the data, which can also be done in normal operation, it is ensured that in case of failure of one or more key machines, the decryption key still remain available. A compromise of one or more key machines then leads according to the invention (cf. 8th ) that all decryption keys on the compromised key machine are deleted but still remain available through the other key machines. Even if employees of a telecommunications service provider are deceitfully or by a criminal forced to delete all the keys of a key machine, the deleted keys are available on the other key machines.

4 shows a sequence diagram of a request of an encryption key of the operator for encryption of the connection data. First, the data processing device 28 a request to connect to the key server 26a , which in turn requests authentication to the data processing device 28 provides. The data processing device 28 transmitted to the key server 26a a TPM-KEY (Trusted Platform Module). Upon successful authentication, the key server submits 26a the data processing device 28 an acknowledgment signal indicating the connection establishment between the data processing device 28 and the key server 26a is completed. Suggests the authentication of a key server 26a fails, the connection request is rejected, which in the sequence diagram in 4 not shown.

After a successful connection establishment, the data processing device 28 a request for an encryption key of the operator (private operator terminations) for a specific data block x. The request can also be made for a particular record to be encrypted. If a uniform encryption key is to be used for all connection data, the specification of the data block x or of the data set to be encrypted can also be omitted. Upon successful request, the key server 26a a key generator 26b a request for generating a key pair. Upon this request, the key generator generates 26b a key pair of the operator, ie a decryption key and the associated encryption key.

After successful generation of the key pair, the decryption key (private operator key) for the data block x or for the data set to be encrypted is sent to the data processing device 28 returned. At the same time, the decryption key (public operator key) for the data block x or for the record to be encrypted together with the creation time becomes the key vault 26d which stores the decryption key together with the other transferred data. In addition to the key vault 26d Passed decryption key may be the key generator 26b the key vault 26d also pass the generated encryption key so that the entire key pair is in the key vault 26b can be stored. If the entire key pair is stored in the key vault, the encryption key of the key pair can be reused for subsequent requests. For example. can be provided in one embodiment of the invention that over a period of time, such as over a period of five minutes for encrypting connection data always the same encryption key is used. This avoids that for each record to be encrypted, a new encryption key or a new key pair must be generated, which is disadvantageous especially for very large amounts of data, as is customary for connection data in the telecommunications sector.

5 shows a sequence diagram of a request for a decryption key (public operator key) for decrypting Connection data. A third party, such as the decryption facility 200 (see. 1 ) makes a request for a connection to the key server 26a who then requests a client certificate from third party j for authentication. The third party j then transmits the key server 26a the requested client certificate. The key server 26 evaluates the client certificate and confirms the third party j the connection establishment, if the evaluation of the client certificate was successful.

After a successful connection, the third party j sets the key server 26a a request for the publication of a decryption key (public operator key) for a data block x or for an encrypted data record. If all connection data has been encrypted with the same encryption key, the specification of the data block or of the data record in the request can be omitted.

Upon receiving the request for a decryption key, the key server 26a the request to the policy instance 26c which checks whether the request meets certain characteristics of the policies stored in the sealed infrastructure. If the request meets the guidelines, it represents the policy instance 26c to the key vault 26d a request to return the decryption key requested by the third party j and return it to the third party j. Determines the policy instance 26d that the request does not meet the required guidelines is shown by the policy instance 26c return the request and inform third party j.

6 shows an example of a concrete structure of a sealed infrastructure 20 ,

The sealed infrastructure 20 includes a number of redundant unallocated computational resources 21 , each of which includes a number of so-called trusted platform modules, circuit breakers for interrupting the power supply of the entire computer resource electromechanical locks, a number of sensors with which access to the computer resources can be monitored, such as cameras.

The computer resources have memory devices to store the generated key pairs or decryption keys. In one embodiment of the invention, storage for storage of the keys is dispensed with permanently and the keys are stored exclusively in volatile storage media, so that after an interruption of the power supply, the stored keys are (automatically) deleted.

Nevertheless, it may be provided to store the keys on permanent storage media. However, it must be ensured that the stored keys are reliably and reliably deleted when detecting an unauthorized access (or for maintenance purposes). "Safely and reliably deleted" means that the keys can not be restored after deletion (except by the synchronization of the keys according to the invention).

The deletion of the keys may be necessary, for example, if someone has unauthorized access or access to a computer resource 21 provides. In order that the keys nevertheless not irretrievably lost, it is provided according to the invention, as with reference to 3 explains, not stored in the respective key vault key via the synchronization devices 26e To synchronize, that is, to secure, so that the deletion of the keys stored in a computer resource, these are available in another computing resource.

The computer resources 21 are connected to a so-called sealing control device which monitors the electromechanical components, such as the electromechanical locks and the sensors. Provides the seal monitor with unauthorized access to a computing resource 21 fixed, the control device causes the immediate synchronization of all key or key pairs stored in the computer resource and interrupts the power supply to the compromised computer resource after completion of the synchronization. This ensures that there are no decryption keys or key pairs left from a compromised computer resource.

The computer resources 21 can also be coupled with a so-called cloud control over which the data exchange is handled with one or more client devices. The cloud control may include a firewall, an intrusion detection device, and a load balancing device. The cloud control can also be coupled to the sealing monitoring device, so that the sealing monitoring device can initiate appropriate measures even if a break-in via the data network (intrusion detection) can initiate synchronization of the stored keys and a subsequent power interruption to the corresponding computer resource.

Furthermore, it can be provided for the operation of the computer resources and for the operation of sealed environment to use only trusted and certified software. In addition, it may be advantageous to provide so-called monitoring modules which monitor the operation of the software. For example, monitoring modules can be provided which monitor the memory required by the software, or monitor the traffic on the interfaces between the individual software modules and on the interfaces between the sealed infrastructure and the outside world. If irregularities are detected in such monitoring, an alarm may be triggered which initiates key deletion as described with reference to FIG 8th will be described in more detail.

7 shows sequence diagram for initiating a data deletion for maintenance purposes.

An access system 80 makes a request to a seal server 81 to open a section of the sealed infrastructure 20 after receiving the request, the seal server points 81 a traffic server 82 to synchronize the data of the corresponding section of the sealed infrastructure (such as a computing resource) and then delete it. The synchronization and the subsequent deletion of the data is performed by the corresponding synchronization device 26e the relevant section of the sealed infrastructure 20 accomplished.

After successfully synchronizing and deleting the data, the seal server points 81 a power switch of the corresponding portion of the sealed infrastructure to interrupt the power supply to the section or turn off the power and turn on the power after a predetermined time, about 20 seconds. During the period in which the sealed infrastructure section is not powered, the corresponding key machine does not participate in synchronization with the other key vending machines.

After the data has been successfully synchronized and deleted, or after the key machine is powered up again, the seal server points 81 the electromechanical locks of the corresponding section to release access to the corresponding section. After the access through the electromechanical locks 84 has been released send this to the access system 80 a corresponding confirmation signal. This ensures that even for maintenance purposes no decryption key or key pairs are stored in the respective key vending machine.

8th shows a sequence diagram for initiating a data erasure in an alarm, such as in an unauthorized access to a computational resource.

An alarm system 90 detects a physical or logical intrusion of a potential attacker. The detection or detection of intrusion can be done by means of a camera, sensors on the doors, the side walls, the floor or the lid, or logically by the in 6 shown intrusion detection.

Detects the alarm system 90 an unauthorized intrusion signals the alarm system 90 this the sealing server 81 , The sealing server 81 then indicates the traffic server 82 to synchronize the data and then delete it. After successful synchronization and deletion, the seal server points 81 the circuit breaker 83 on, the power supply to the compromised key machine or to the compromised computer resource 21 to interrupt and after a predetermined time, turn on again about 20 seconds. At the same time the sealing server informs 81 the alarm system 90 that the power supply has been interrupted and the power has been switched on again.

In the detection of unauthorized access, however, it may be advantageous to dispense with turning on the power to prevent participation of the compromised key machine in the synchronization. In case of an unauthorized intrusion into a key automation, it may be advantageous to restore the power supply to the compromised key machine only manually, for example after it is ensured that there is no longer any danger of unauthorized intrusion. Alternatively, it can also be provided that the power is indeed switched on again, but the participation of the compromised key machine to the synchronization must be manually released.

9 shows a flowchart of a method according to the invention for securing data, in particular telecommunications connection data.

In a first step S10, preferably within a sealed infrastructure for a data set to be encrypted or for a data block to be encrypted, a cryptographic key pair is generated, which comprises an encryption key and a decryption key.

In a next step S20, the data set to be encrypted or the data to be encrypted is encrypted Data block with the encryption key (also referred to above as the encryption key of the operator) of the cryptographic key pair generated in step S10 encrypted. Encryption also occurs within the sealed infrastructure, ensuring that no access to the data to be encrypted or to the encryption process itself is possible during the encryption process. Because the generation of the cryptographic key pair and the encryption of the data takes place within the sealed infrastructure, it is ensured that neither the cryptographic key pair nor the data to be encrypted or the encryption process can be accessed from the outside. This ensures a particularly high degree of security.

In the next step S30, the encrypted data is encrypted with a second encryption key (also referred to above as the notary's encryption key). Alternatively or additionally, the encrypted data can also be signed with a signature key. The second encryption or the signature of the encrypted data also takes place within the sealed infrastructure, so that this process can not be accessed from the outside either. The second encryption key, which may be part of a second cryptographic key pair, is generated by a key generator outside the sealed infrastructure. The encryption key of the second cryptographic key pair is transferred to the sealed infrastructure and stored there. Once the encryption key of the second cryptographic key pair has been handed over to the infrastructure, it is advantageous to delete it outside the sealed infrastructure so that the encryption key of the second cryptographic key pair exists only within the sealed infrastructure. The signature key can also be generated outside the sealed infrastructure and transferred to the sealed infrastructure and then deleted if necessary. The decryption key of the second cryptographic key pair or the signature key becomes a trustworthy entity 15 handed over to a notary.

Because the second encryption or the signing of encrypted with the first encryption key data within the sealed infrastructure, the security is again increased significantly.

After the data has been double-encrypted or encrypted and signed, these are stored in a step S40, wherein the storage of the double-encrypted or encrypted and signed data can also take place outside the sealed infrastructure. For this purpose, the encrypted data is transferred to a storage device and stored there. Due to the double encryption or encryption and signing is guaranteed that in the external storage device 100 stored encrypted data, in particular connection data without the associated decryption key can not be read. If the data has additionally been signed with a signature key, it can be provided that a decryption of the data stored in the memory device can only be carried out successfully if the signature key is present in addition to the required decryption key. In the decryption can be checked using the signature key, whether the encrypted data either before decryption or after decryption have a corresponding signature.

After storing the encrypted and / or signed data, in step S50 the decrypting key of the first cryptographic key pair, i. the operator's decryption key, stored within the sealed infrastructure, to ensure that the decryption key can not be accessed from the outside without proper authorization. The decryption key may also be stored immediately after the first cryptographic key pair is created in the sealed infrastructure. The decryption keys are preferably stored in volatile memory. Alternatively, the decryption keys can also be stored in a non-volatile memory, but it must be ensured that the stored keys are securely deleted after the detection of unauthorized access. "Safely deleted" in this context means that the deleted keys can not be restored except for the synchronization described above.

The encryption of the collected connection data is thus completed or terminated.

In order to be able to decrypt the data encrypted twice or encrypted and signed in the storage device, it is necessary to transfer the decryption key of the first cryptographic key pair necessary for the decryption to a decryption device. For this purpose, the decryption device may request the issuance of the corresponding decryption key from the sealed infrastructure. After a request to release a decryption key (step S60), the sealed infrastructure checks in a step S61 the read policy to be followed for issuing the decryption key.

The reading guidelines are stored for the decryption keys or for the respective encrypted data in the sealed infrastructure and are preferably no longer changeable. Examining the read policy in step S61 may include, for example, a maximum read duration check. This checks how long the encrypted connection data has already been stored. If the maximum read duration, about 6 months has already been exceeded, which is checked in step S62, the release of the requested decryption key is rejected in step S64. The decryption device, which has requested the decryption key, therefore has no way to decrypt the encrypted data.

The read policy may also provide that only a certain number of decryption keys can be requested within a predetermined period of time. If the maximum number of requests has been exceeded within a certain period, which is also checked in step S62, the issue of the requested key is also rejected in step S64.

The requesting decryption device can be informed of the reason for the refusal of the release, so that the decryption device can possibly carry out appropriate measures. For example. it can be provided if the publication has been refused due to exceeding the maximum reading time to delete the end-encrypted data in the storage device, because this data can no longer be decrypted anyway. In the event that only the number of allowed queries per unit of time has been exceeded, the data need not be deleted because it may be decrypted at a later time when a request is successful.

If it is determined in step S62 that the read policy is adhered to, the requested decryption key is issued to the requesting decryptor. The decryption device is designed in such a way that it can not store issued decryption keys in the decryption device in order to avoid that the reading guidelines stored in the sealed infrastructure can be bypassed. With the issued decryption key and with the second decryption key or the signature key of the trustworthy entity, the encrypted data can be decrypted and evaluated.

10 shows a flowchart of a method according to the invention for the decryption of encrypted data according to the invention.

In a first step S100, a decryption device receives a decryption request for decrypting data. It should be noted that different data sets or different data blocks may each have been encrypted with different encryption keys.

In a further step S110, a first decryption key is requested from the sealed infrastructure. If the request succeeds, which is checked in step S120, a second decryption key or a signature key is next requested in another S130. Further, in step S120, the requested decryption key is received from the sealed infrastructure. As part of the request for the first decryption key, the sealed infrastructure checks to see if the read policy required for the decryption key is met, as related to step S60 in FIG 9 described. The second decryption key or signature key may be requested by a trusted entity such as a notary in step S30. The trusted entity transmits the second decryption key or signature key to the decryption device. In the further step S140, the data are decrypted with the two decryption keys or with the first decryption key and the signature key and the decrypted data is returned to the decryption request in the step S100.

The decryption device is configured to store neither the first decryption key nor the second decryption key or the signature key.

If it has been determined in step S120 that the request for the first decryption key has been rejected, then in step S150 the decryption request made in step S100 is rejected. A decryption is therefore not possible or is prevented due to the reader guidelines.

The invention has been described above by way of example for the encryption and decryption of telecommunications connection data. According to the invention, video surveillance data, e.g. of airports or public places, logins / passwords (user credentials), toll collection data (e.g., Toll Collect), or the like may be encrypted and decrypted using the methods of the invention.

Furthermore, the invention has been described above using asymmetric cryptographic keys. Symmetric keys can also be used according to the invention.

Claims (16)

Method for encrypting data for secure access to the data, wherein (a) a secure environment receives the data to be encrypted, (b) a first cryptographic key comprising a first encryption key is generated in the secure environment, (c) the data in the secure environment is encrypted with the first encryption key, (d) encrypting the data encrypted with the first encryption key in the secure environment with a second encryption key and / or signing it with a signature key to generate double encrypted data or encrypted and signed data or double encrypted and signed data, the second Encryption key and the signature key have been generated outside the secure environment and are received by the secure environment via a secure communication channel, (e) transferring the data generated in step (d) for storage to a storage device, which is preferably located outside the secure environment, and (F) the first decryption key is stored in a memory within the secure environment. The method of claim 1, wherein the first cryptographic key comprises a first decryption key. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the second encryption key is part of a second cryptographic key comprising the second encryption key and a second decryption key. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the memory is a volatile memory. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the secure environment receives a request for the release of the first decryption key, wherein before issuing the requested decryption key for the requested decryption key, reading guidelines are checked which indicate whether the requested decryption key may be issued. The method of claim 5, wherein the read policies are stored in the secure environment. A method for decrypting encrypted data, wherein a decryption device (a) receives a decryption request to decrypt the data, (b) at a first key issue instance, which is preferably configured as a secured environment, requests a first decryption key associated with the data to be decrypted and receives the first decryption key from the first key issuer, (c) at a second key issuing instance, requesting a second decrypting key and / or a signature key and receiving the second decrypting key and / or the signature key from the second key issuing entity, (d) decrypting the data using the first decryption key and the second decryption key and / or the signature key and, in response to the decryption request, returning the decrypted data, verifying with the signature key the authenticity of the decrypted or decrypted data. The method of claim 7, wherein the requested first decryption key and / or the requested second decryption key and / or the requested signature key are deleted after decryption. A method for securing cryptographic keys, wherein the cryptographic keys are stored in a key vault, which is part of a secure environment, wherein the secure environment further comprises a synchronization device, wherein in the key vault, the cryptographic keys are stored in a memory, wherein the synchronization means with at least one synchronization device is coupled to a further secure environment, and wherein upon detection of unauthorized access to the secure environment, the keys stored in the key safe are synchronized by means of the synchronization device with the keys of the keys stored in the further secure environment and after synchronization in the Key vault will be deleted. The method of claim 9, wherein the memory is a volatile memory. Method according to one of claims 9 to 10, wherein after synchronization, the power supply to the memory, preferably for at least 20 seconds is interrupted. Device for encrypting and / or decrypting data, the device being adapted to carry out a method according to one of Claims 1 to 6 and / or according to one of Claims 7 to 8. Apparatus according to claim 12, comprising volatile memory for storing said decryption keys. Device for securing cryptographic keys, the device having a secure environment, comprising a key vault and a synchronization device, wherein the synchronization device can be coupled to a synchronization device at least one further secure environment, and wherein the device adapted a method according to one of claims 9 to 11 execute. Apparatus according to claim 14, comprising a volatile memory for storing the decryption keys. Device according to one of claims 14 to 15, wherein it has a sensor system for detecting an unauthorized access to the stored keys and / or for detecting an unauthorized access to the secure environment.

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