DE102009013606B4 - A storage device for preventing unauthorized use of data and methods for operating the same - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention provides a storage device, a key carrier device, a storage system and a method for preventing unauthorized use of data so that unauthorized third parties can not access stored data and the security of the data is not compromised. The memory device comprises a semiconductor memory having electronic circuits for storing data, a control unit for controlling input of data into the semiconductor memory and reading data from the semiconductor memory, and a destruction device having an energy storage element configured to unauthorized access to stored data supply electrical energy from the energy storage element to the semiconductor memory or the control unit for destroying electronic circuits of the semiconductor memory or the control unit in order to prevent read-out of the stored data.

Description

Technical area

The present invention relates to a storage device for preventing unauthorized use of data and a method for operating the storage device, and to a key carrier device, and more particularly to a storage device having a semiconductor memory for storing data.

State of the art

Due to the increasing electronic communication and the slow realization of a paperless office, the number of electronically stored documents is steadily increasing, and with ever larger amounts of data, data security can easily be compromised as an overview of the stored data and its importance is lost. For example, CD-ROMs can easily be mixed with important data and unimportant data. However, as electronic communications are affecting more and more areas of privacy and business, electronically stored data is also becoming more and more important. H. Documents are stored electronically that used to be stored on paper in a locked safe. Economic espionage and data theft lead to billions in damages each year in Germany alone.

Since information can be stored on the smallest data carriers, this facilitates unauthorized removal of information and removal from the company. This has already led some companies to restrict or disable the use of the USB port on their computers.

Many memory devices and encryption methods that can be used to encrypt data to be stored are known. For example, sensitive data can be stored encrypted in a data store, so that this data can not be read immediately by unauthorized persons. However, this often does not prevent the copying of the data or the direct stealing of the data memory. With the right equipment and a little time, for example, repeated attempts "brute force method", an encryption so that the data can fall into the hands of unauthorized third parties.

The safest way to prevent unauthorized access to data is to permanently erase data on a disk. Such a procedure is described in the WO 02/095550 A2 described, wherein a destruction mechanism may include an explosive element or mechanical means to destroy a hard disk and the data thereon. However, in chemical processes such as acid etching or explosive destruction, safety issues are raised for the user. Furthermore, an uncontrolled or unwanted leakage of an acid or an uncontrolled explosion not only endangers the user but also leads to a loss of data, even if unauthorized access has not occurred.

US 2008/0112300 A1 describes a method and system for protecting data. By this system, data is to be protected within a portable storage device with a self-destruct unit associated with the storage device that can be triggered by a self-destruct signal. As shown in this document, a storage device includes an RFID tag with security key for encrypting / decrypting data in the storage device. A data processing system comprises a processor unit and is connected to the storage devices via radio.

JP 11-354731 A describes a self-destruct semiconductor device. This device contains destructive capacitors for storing charges for self-destruction by a destruction circuit.

US 2007/0297610 A1 concerns data security in a mobile device. A network-based data security method uses encryption techniques and a key server that stores keys for the mobile device.

WO 2008/103778 A2 relates to a password security system and method. If one or more passwords are entered incorrectly, a predetermined action may be taken, such as. B. a self-destruction of the computer.

US 2008/0263363 A1 relates to a portable data encryption device with a configurable security function and method for file encryption. The portable encryption device has a cryptographic processor for encryption. Furthermore, the device is provided with a removable memory and the proximity of a user of the device can be confirmed by means of an RFID tag.

The article from Ari Juel's "RFID Security and Privacy: A Research Survey" in the IEEE Journal Selected Areas in Communications, Vol. 24, No. 2, February 2006, reviews research on security issues radio frequency identification for RFID tags. For example, tags for symmetric keys are described.

Summary of the invention

Thus, it is an object of the present invention to provide a storage device and corresponding key carrier device and method for operating the storage device with a simple mechanism to protect data from unauthorized access.

This is achieved by a memory system having the features of patent claim 1 and a method for operating a memory device having the features of patent claim 10.

According to one embodiment, the memory device comprises a semiconductor memory having electronic circuits for storing data and a control unit for controlling input of data into the semiconductor memory and reading data from the semiconductor memory. The memory device further comprises a destruction device with an energy storage element, which is designed for an unauthorized access attempt to stored data to supply electrical energy from the energy storage element to the semiconductor memory or the control unit for destroying electronic circuits of the semiconductor memory or the control unit to read the stored Prevent data. Thus, the data itself or the means for accessing it can be cleanly and easily destroyed in an unauthorized access attempt and the storage device rendered unusable for others.

According to an advantageous example, the control unit is designed to output a trigger signal to the destruction device upon detection of the unauthorized access attempt in order to initiate the supply of the electrical energy. Thus, the control unit decides whether an authorized or an unauthorized access attempt exists and determines whether the destruction device is to be activated. For example, it can be determined that if a password is repeatedly incorrectly entered for authentication or another key or after a deadline for authentication, the destruction mechanism is triggered. In addition, it is possible to connect sensors to the control unit, which detect the violent opening of the housing of the storage device.

According to a further advantageous example, the memory device comprises an encryption device for encrypting data to be stored, wherein the encryption device is arranged such that the data to be entered by the control unit into the semiconductor memory is encrypted before being stored in the semiconductor memory. Thus, the data can be stored encrypted in a first step, so that a first level of security is provided and the data is not lost immediately irrecoverable. In a second step, in the attempt to crack the encryption, then the semiconductor memory with the stored data or the control unit can be destroyed with the keys used, so that in the second case, a control without the appropriate key is no longer possible.

According to a further advantageous example, the memory device comprises a communication module for wirelessly receiving a key via radio for encrypting the data to be stored by the encryption device. Thus, stored data is additionally secured by the fact that a key for encryption can only be obtained via radio from, for example, an authorized key carrier device, which further complicates unauthorized access.

According to a further advantageous example, the destruction device has a circuit with capacitor as an energy storage element and is switchable such that upon discharge of the capacitor, an electric current is generated for destroying electronic circuits to prevent reading of the stored data. Thus, a simple electrical physical destruction mechanism is provided.

According to a further advantageous example, the destruction device has a battery which can charge the capacitor at least to a voltage which is large enough that an electric current is generated when the capacitor is discharged in order to destroy electronic circuits. Thus, a simple self-destructive device for a storage device can be provided, which is not different from other power supplies, such. B. a USB port depends.

According to a further advantageous example, the storage device comprises a location sensor for detecting a location of the storage device. Thus, it is possible to specify a location where the memory device grants access to the semiconductor memory. For example, it is thus also possible to determine that the storage device destroys itself when, for example, it is moved one kilometer away from a fixed location.

According to a further advantageous example, the storage device is designed as a portable storage device, in particular as a USB stick. Thus, a small memory device can be provided which, despite its size and ease of handling, provides a great deal of data security.

According to another embodiment, there is provided a memory system for preventing unauthorized use of data comprising at least some of the features of the memory devices described above, and a key carrier for sending a key to the memory device. Thus, the security of the data is increased by being able to access the data only in the presence of the key carrier device.

According to an advantageous example, the key carrier device of the storage system is designed to encrypt the key with another rotating key and to send the encrypted key to the storage device wirelessly. As a result, even when recording the transmission of the key, the identity of the key is not revealed. Even if the radio signal were to be replicated with the encrypted key, this results only in a copy of the old encrypted key already sent, but which is not up-to-date at a later date to enable the encryption or decryption of the stored data. Thus, the storage device can only be read out together with the key carrier device.

According to a further advantageous example, the key carrier device has a communication module for transmitting the key, preferably via radio, as well as a control unit for providing the key. Thus, a new key can be generated for each session.

According to a further advantageous example, the key carrier device comprises a destruction device, which is designed in an unauthorized attempt to access the key to supply electrical energy to the control unit for destroying the key. Thus, a manipulation of the key carrier device and a theft of the key can be prevented.

According to a further embodiment, a key carrier device is provided which, for example, cooperates with the memory device as described above. The key carrier device comprises a control unit for providing a key for encrypting data, a communication module for transmitting the key provided by the control unit, and a destruction device, which is designed for an unauthorized attempt to access the key to supply electrical energy to the control unit for destroying the key key. Thus, a key carrier device is provided which is protected against tampering attempts and key-use attempts.

In accordance with another embodiment, a method of operating a memory device to prevent unauthorized use of stored data is provided. The method comprises the steps of receiving a key via radio; Encrypting data in the storage device with the received key; Storing the encrypted data in a semiconductor memory with electronic circuits in the memory device; and in an unauthorized attempt to access the stored encrypted data, supply of electrical energy to the semiconductor memory or a control unit of the memory device for destroying electronic circuits to prevent reading of the stored data. Thereby, the stored data can be protected on several levels, for example first by encryption and in an attempt to circumvent or crack the encryption by physically destroying the semiconductor memory in which the data is stored.

It will be readily apparent that a combination of the features of the various embodiments and examples is possible. For example, the key carrier device features described with respect to the storage system may also be combined with the features of the key carrier device described in another embodiment.

Brief description of the drawings

1 schematically shows components of a memory device according to an embodiment of the invention.

2A schematically shows components of another memory device according to another embodiment of the invention.

2 B shows an example of a destruction device.

3 schematically shows a storage system with storage device and key carrier device according to another embodiment of the invention.

4 shows a flowchart illustrating the steps of a method of operating a Storage device according to another embodiment of the invention shows.

5 FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing the steps for encrypting the communication between the storage device and key carrier device. FIG.

Detailed description of preferred embodiments

Preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described below in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In this case, the same or corresponding components are denoted in each case by the same or similar reference numerals in different drawings.

The preferred embodiments of the invention, described in detail below, will be described in detail with reference to a storage device, a storage system and a key carrier. However, it is noted that the following description contains only examples and should not be taken as limiting the invention.

For example, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various modifications of the present invention can be made in the present invention 1 and 2 described storage devices can be used.

Although encryption of data and possibly a key for encryption provides good protection against unauthorized access, it has been recognized that ultimate security against unauthorized use of data can only be ensured if, in a final step, destruction of the data or security data is prevented of the key carrier or their control units.

1 schematically shows a storage device 100 , The storage device 100 includes a semiconductor memory 110 , a control unit 120 and a destruction device 130 , The semiconductor memory 110 and the control unit 120 are connected in such a way that a data exchange is made possible. The control unit 120 controls inputting data into the semiconductor memory 110 and a readout of data from the semiconductor memory 110 ,

The semiconductor memory 110 contains electronic circuits for storing data. As known in a conventional semiconductor memory, this has electronic circuits, which are designed for example as memory cells, as control and / or data lines or as control logic for selecting the memory cells for writing / reading data or information into the memory cells. For example, a memory cell can be realized even with a few transistors and capacitors.

As a semiconductor memory 110 For example, various storage media such as flash memories may be used, which may be provided as a simple microchip in the storage device. Flash memories are non-volatile memories in which several gigabytes of data can be stored today, with the flash memories being called NAND or NOR flash memory, depending on the circuitry of the memory cells. Flash memories are used, for example, in a solid state drive (SSD), also called an SSD hard disk, or in USB sticks. An SSD hard disk is a storage medium that can be installed and addressed like a conventional hard disk, but with no moving parts, but rather semiconductor memory devices. Since semiconductor memories are known in the art, a detailed description thereof will be omitted.

The control unit, which is at least partially by a processor, an integrated circuit such. For example, an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or software or a suitable combination of the above may be implemented has a function of managing incoming and outgoing data.

For example, the controller may be connected to an I / O interface (not shown) for inputting data to the memory device or outputting it from the memory device. Such an interface can, for example, as a USB port, Firewire, or wireless, z. B. be designed as a wireless transceiver. The control unit 120 Therefore, a flow of data in the storage device 100 will enter, so control that data in the semiconductor memory 110 can be given in which they can be stored in different memory cells. The electronic circuits of the memory cell may be electronic component such. B. integrated circuits with transistors and capacitors.

The destruction device 130 in the storage device 100 is equipped with an energy storage element in which an electrical energy can be stored. The destruction device is designed in such a way that, in the case of an unauthorized access attempt to data stored in the semiconductor memory, an electrical energy from the energy storage element to the semiconductor memory 110 or the control unit 120 is supplied or a voltage is applied. This electrical energy is at least in a short time Time window, ie the power, high enough at least some of the electronic circuits of the semiconductor memory 110 or the control unit 120 to destroy, for example, burn through, to prevent reading of the stored data. For example, the control logic in the semiconductor memory 110 or control and / or data lines are destroyed, so that the semiconductor memory 110 can not be read, or it can directly destroy the data storage cells are destroyed by the electrical energy. Furthermore, it may also satisfy the functionality of the control unit 120 destroy, if only this one access to the semiconductor memory 110 allows to prevent reading of the stored data.

To provide a high electrical energy, the energy storage element of the destruction device 130 be designed as a capacitor which is charged to a high voltage. The capacitor is in such a circuit of the destruction device 130 arranged that a discharge of the capacitor can be realized in a short time, so that an electric shock is generated which is large enough for destroying electronic circuits to prevent reading of stored data.

As in 1 shown is the destruction device 130 with the semiconductor memory 110 and / or the control unit 120 electrically connected, so that the generated electric current to the semiconductor memory 110 and / or the control unit 120 can be supplied to destroy their electronics. It may be sufficient that these connections are connected to the control and / or data lines of the semiconductor memory and / or the control unit, which conduct the current, so that they or other electronic components are destroyed. Of course, it is also possible to use multiple capacitors, for example, connected in series to increase a total voltage. The voltage or current required for destruction depends strongly on the type of memory cell used or on the lines to be burned.

Alternatively, as an energy storage element, any other electronic element can be used which can store electrical energy, such. B. a battery.

Preferably, a battery, for. B. a button cell, in the destruction device 130 can be used, which charges the capacitor to at least one voltage that is large enough that an electric current is generated when discharging the capacitor for destroying electronic circuits. This helps to ensure that a condenser that could discharge for a period of time will remain operational for a long time or independent of external power.

Alternatively or in addition to the battery, a capacitor or multiple capacitors may also be charged when the storage device is connected, for example, to a computer or directly to a power source. For example, a supply current could be used via a USB port to charge the capacitor and / or a rechargeable battery.

It should be noted in the destructor that the destructive mechanism is triggered only in the event of unauthorized access, as spurious firing may result in irrecoverable loss of data.

Different triggering possibilities, depending on the storage device and use of the same are conceivable. For example, the destruction mechanism may be triggered when attempting to access the semiconductor memory physically or electronically without authorization. Some examples are opening the housing of the storage device, removing the storage device from a predefined area, non-observance of a deadline for authentication with a password or other key, repeated incorrect entry of a password or a key, etc.

Furthermore, the control device 120 be formed such that upon detection of an unauthorized access attempt, a trigger signal is output to the destruction device to initiate the supply of electrical energy. For example, causes the trigger signal in the destruction device 130 in that a circuit is switched such that a capacitor is discharged quickly, resulting in a high current surge.

Various sensors may be provided to the control unit 120 or directly to the destruction facility 130 to report an unauthorized access attempt.

For example, a location sensor may detect the location of the storage device. The location sensor may consist of a GPS receiver, or a simple motion sensor may be used which detects that the storage device is being stolen. Many other sensors are possible to detect unauthorized access. For example, a sensor based on a piezoelectric effect may be installed on the housing which, when manipulated on the housing, outputs a current, which current could also be used to destroy electronic circuits. When opening the case For example, a current may be applied to the control lines of the semiconductor memory that is so large that its internal control logic is destroyed. Another example of a sensor for triggering the destruction mechanism is a photodiode that can measure a light that may fall on the photosensor upon breaking the housing of the storage device.

Next, with reference to 2A another embodiment of the memory device is described.

The storage device 200 from 2A includes a control unit 220 , an encryption device 225 , a semiconductor memory 110 , a destruction device 130 and a communication module 240 , As readily apparent from the following description of the storage device 200 It is also possible to understand the features, ie the various devices, units and sensors, with respect to the storage device 100 from 1 described with the storage device 200 be combined. In particular, the semiconductor memory 110 in 2A the same semiconductor memory used in 1 has been described in detail so that a repetition of the description thereof can be omitted. Similar to this is the destruction facility 130 already with respect to 1 have been described, so that here a more detailed description can be omitted.

In the storage device 200 of the 2A be in the semiconductor memory 110 data to be entered previously encrypted. In 2A is therefore the encryption device 225 provided for encrypting data to be stored, and which is arranged such that from the control unit 220 in the semiconductor memory 110 data to be entered before saving in the semiconductor memory 110 be encrypted. Conversely, the encryption device 225 also for decrypting encrypted data read from the Hedgeiterspeicher. The encryption device 225 can either be through appropriate software in the control unit 220 be realized or may be a separate individual device, with the control unit 220 connected is.

In detail, from the storage device 200 received data, for example by the previously described I / O interface from the control unit 220 to the encryption device 225 which encrypts the data prior to storage with a key. The key can either be stored in the storage device or by the communication module 240 be received from outside. The reception of the key can be carried out by radio, ie wirelessly, wherein the communication module 240 then designed as a radio communication module. Through a connection with the control unit 220 can then be the key of the encryption device 225 be supplied. The encryption device 225 can in the semiconductor memory 110 decrypt stored encrypted data as it is read from memory, using the same key.

Preferably, the storage device is 200 designed for a particular key, so that after encryption or decryption of the data the key in the storage device 200 can be deleted, ie the key can only be active for a specific time window in the storage device. Activation or deactivation can also be carried out from the outside, for example by a key carrier device, which is connected to the communication module 240 communicates, controls, what with regard to 3 will be described in more detail. In particular, with reference to 3 explains that the key is encrypted to the communication module 240 can be sent, so spying by spotting is prevented, for example, a rotating key can be used to encrypt the key.

Unlike the storage device 100 are in the semiconductor memory 110 the storage device 200 the data is encrypted and stored by the encryption device 225 decrypted when reading out using the same key.

As with the storage device 100 can the destruction device 130 not just the semiconductor memory 110 destroy itself and stored encrypted data stored on it, but also the control unit 220 and / or optionally the encryption device 225 , By destruction of the control unit 220 or the encryption device 225 if this is provided as a separate device, such a key located there can be destroyed, as well as the mechanism for reading the semiconductor memory 110 is necessary, so that even the stored encrypted data can no longer be accessed.

An example of a destruction device is in 2 B shown. A capacitor is shown in the middle between data memory and step-up converter. If this z. B. 2200 μF and is charged with 20 V, the electrical energy is easily enough to a memory device such. B. destroy a semiconductor memory. The switch shown can trigger the destruction. The capacitor stores the energy so that a self-destruction even without a battery is still possible. The step-up converter is used to control the voltage, eg. B. from two series-connected button cells (6 V) hochzuregeln to 20V.

Preferably, the storage device is designed as a portable storage device. For example, the storage device may represent a USB stick, wherein this USB stick has a destruction mechanism as described above and possibly data encryption, so that data can be safely transported without being exposed to a security risk in the event of loss or theft of the USB stick ,

It is noted that according to the storage device 200 of the 2A a data encryption is performed directly in the memory device and non-encrypted data is externally stored encrypted in the semiconductor memory. Of course it is also possible already encoded data from outside in the storage device 200 to receive and in addition to encrypt.

The following is a storage system 300 regarding 3 described that a storage device 100 or a storage device 200 or modifications thereof.

The storage system 300 in 3 includes the storage device 200 and the key carrier device 250 , As shown in the figure, the memory device 200 with a terminal, such. B. a PC 260 via a data connection, such. As a USB bus connected.

As already mentioned, the storage device comprises 200 , a control unit 220 , a semiconductor memory 110 , a communication module 240 and a destruction device 130 , In this example, it is assumed that an encryption device in the control unit 220 is integrated, ie, for example software in the control unit 220 is provided for encrypting and / or decrypting data to be stored or data to be read. The storage device 200 in 3 is just one of many examples of a memory device, and it is immediately recognized that various modifications of a memory device, for example, with various combinations of the previously described features of the memory device, in the memory system 300 can be used.

The key carrier device 250 is mainly designed to send a key to the storage device. The key transmission is preferably performed wirelessly, so that it can not be recognized that it is in the memory device 200 is a special storage device with encryption and destruction device. Thus, a user secretly can push a button to operate the key carrier device 250 Press and third parties can not see that the storage device is a key carrier device 250 required for opening, so that in case of theft the thief can not begin with the storage device without key carrier device. Instead of actuating a button, a key may also be used at predetermined intervals, e.g. B. every 10 seconds, or only when a signal is received from the storage device, which can also be output at predetermined intervals and the key carrier device 250 indicates that the storage device is nearby.

As mentioned previously, key transmission is preferably performed wirelessly, but there is also a direct wired connection between key carrier means 250 and storage device 200 possible.

In order to prevent a recording of the radio traffic and thereby the identification of the key by an unauthorized third party, the key itself is preferably encrypted, so that a recording and replication of the radio signal between the key carrier device 250 and storage device 200 the semiconductor memory 110 not accessible. For example, a rotating key is used to encrypt the actual data key, as discussed below 5 will be described in more detail. It is noted that replicating the radio signal only results in an old or previously transmitted encrypted key, but for access to the semiconductor memory 110 can not be used at a later date.

In particular, the key carrier device comprises 250 a control unit 254 for providing a key for encrypting data in the storage device 200 , a communication module 252 for transmitting the key provided by the control unit, preferably via radio, and a destruction device 256 which is designed for an unauthorized attempt to access the key in the key carrier device 250 , an electrical energy to the control unit 254 to be used to destroy the key.

The destruction device 256 the key carrier device can be just like the destruction device 130 be formed of the memory device, so that a more detailed description is omitted and reference is made to the previous description. The key carrier device may be a rechargeable battery for its operation and a capacitor and a button cell for the destruction device. Similar to the destruction device 130 For example, the key support means may comprise the button cell in addition to the rechargeable battery, and when the housing is opened, a current is generated which destroys the control unit by being given, for example, on control lines.

For example, in the key carrier, opening the case or removing the battery for more than 10 seconds would cause self-destruction.

The following is a method of operating the memory device, for example, in the memory system 300 , regarding 4 described.

In a first step 410 becomes a key from the key carrier device 250 received, which is preferably encrypted with a rotating key. Upon receipt of the key in the storage device 200 or after the encrypted key in the storage device 200 was decrypted, if a rotating key was used, the key can be used to encrypt data, which in step 420 is shown.

The encrypted data in step 430 in the semiconductor memory 110 stored with electronic circuits.

In one step 440 may in an unauthorized attempt to access the stored encrypted data electrical energy to the semiconductor memory 110 or the control unit 220 the storage device 200 supplied to destroy electronic circuits to prevent reading of the stored data. Various ways of detecting an unauthorized access attempt and triggering and destroying the semiconductor memory have been described above.

The encryption, in particular the encryption of the radio transmission between the storage device and the key carrier device with reference to FIG 5 described in more detail.

For hardware encryption in the storage device 100 or 200 The AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) -256 method can be used. The key used in the encryption device in the memory device for encryption and decryption is transmitted with the key carrier device, which is a kind of remote control or remote control, so that the memory device is opened "open" or for writing and reading data and after a certain time can be "closed" for safe storage. For example, a key that exists in the storage device for 1 minute is sent, so that data can be written in and read out at this time, or it can be a signal from the key carrier device 250 are sent to disable the key and so close the semiconductor memory.

For example, the key carrier device 250 a control button or knob, with the or a key exchange, as in 5 described, can be initiated. Alternatively, as mentioned above, the key carrier device 250 or the storage device 200 Send request signals for establishing a key exchange at certain time intervals, so that it can be made possible on the semiconductor memory 110 always accessible when the key holder device 250 in radio transmission proximity, ie 1 to 5 meters, is located. The key exchange between the key carrier device and the memory device is preferably carried out by an asymmetric encryption method (public-private-key method). In order that the radio traffic can not be intercepted and reproduced, the keys for the radio transmission are preferably regenerated during each closing process, whereby a disassembly process in 5 is shown.

In 5 gives the remote control device 250 an unlock request to the storage device 200 via radio. The storage device 200 generates a random AES key. In the next step, the random AES key is encrypted with a public PGP key.

Thereafter, the random AES key encrypted with the public PGP key is sent to the remote controller 250 transfer. For receiving and transmitting the radio communication, the communication modules 240 and 252 be used.

In the remote control device 250 then the encrypted random AES key is decrypted with the private PGP key. In a second step is in the remote control device 250 by the control unit, for example 254 encrypted a data AES key with the random AES key. This AES key encrypted with the random AES key is then sent to the storage device 200 transmitted, for example, by their control unit 220 , decrypts the AES key encrypted data AES key with the random AES key. Then, the data in the storage device with the data AES key can be decrypted and read out, or encrypted and written.

In particular, the keys, ie they change, rotate to encrypt the radio signal using the public-private-key method, but always the same data AES key can be used to encrypt or decrypt the data. For example, a rotating key generator, for example, in the control unit 220 can be realized in the storage device 200 generate the same key as that sent by the key carrier, ie the random AES key, to generate the actual key, ie the data AES key, from the data communication from the key carrier, so that the data is decrypted from the semiconductor memory can and are connected to the pc via a connection 260 can be sent.

For security, therefore, only data is stored if the key (data AES key) is present for encryption, i. H. if the storage device is enabled with encryption.

Here, the random key (Random Key) can be understood as a rolling code / key, wherein for each key transfer, a new random key is generated, for. By a pseudo-random number generator, which is referred to herein as a "rotating" key. For example, a rolling code can be a constantly changing 66-bit code, which can result in trillions of code combinations.

From the foregoing description, those skilled in the art will recognize that various modifications and variations of the memory device, the key carrier device, and the memory system and method may be made without departing from the scope of the invention.

Furthermore, the invention has been described with reference to specific examples, which are intended to serve only for a better understanding of the invention, and not to limit it. One skilled in the art will readily recognize that many different combinations of hardware, software, and firmware may be used to practice the present invention. Therefore, the true scope of the invention will be indicated by the following claims.

Claims (10)

Storage system ( 300 ) for preventing unauthorized use of data comprising a portable storage device ( 100 ; 200 ) for preventing unauthorized use of data, and a key carrier device ( 250 ), which is designed as a remote control for sending a data key to the storage device ( 100 ; 200 ), wherein the memory device ( 100 ; 200 ) contains: a semiconductor memory ( 110 electronic circuit for storing data of a terminal connected to the storage device via a data connection; a control unit ( 120 ; 220 ) for controlling input of data into the semiconductor memory ( 110 ) and reading data from the semiconductor memory ( 110 ); a self-destructive destruction facility ( 130 ) with an energy storage element which is not dependent on other power supplies and which is designed, upon detection of an unauthorized access attempt to data stored in the semiconductor memory, electrical energy from the energy storage element to the semiconductor memory ( 110 ) or the control unit ( 120 ; 220 ) for destroying electronic circuits of the semiconductor memory or the control unit to prevent reading of the stored data; a communication module ( 240 ) for wirelessly transmitting an encrypted random key and for receiving the data key encrypted with the random key by radio from the key carrier device ( 250 ); and an encryption device ( 225 ) for encrypting data to be stored, wherein the encryption device ( 225 ) formed by the control unit ( 220 ) in the semiconductor memory ( 110 ) data to be entered before being stored in the semiconductor memory ( 110 ) to encrypt with the data key received from outside through the communication module; the key carrier device ( 250 ) the data key with the wirelessly received, by the communication module ( 240 encrypted random key and the data key as an encrypted data key to the communication module ( 240 ) of the storage device. A memory system according to claim 1, wherein the control unit ( 120 ; 220 ) is formed upon detection of the unauthorized access attempt, a trigger signal to the destruction device ( 130 ) to initiate the supply of electrical energy. Storage system according to one of claims 1 to 2, wherein the destruction device ( 130 ) has a circuit with a capacitor as an energy storage element, which is designed switchable so that upon discharge of the capacitor, an electric current is generated to destroy electronic circuits to prevent reading of the stored data. Storage system according to claim 3, wherein the destruction device ( 130 ) has a battery configured to charge the capacitor at least to a voltage large enough to generate an electrical current upon discharge of the capacitor to destroy electronic circuits. A memory system according to any one of claims 1 to 4, further comprising a location sensor for detecting a location of the memory device. Memory system according to one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the memory device is designed as a USB stick. Storage system according to one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the key carrier device ( 250 ) is adapted to encrypt the data key with a rotating key and to send the encrypted data key wirelessly to the storage device. Storage system according to one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the key carrier device ( 250 ) further comprises a communication module for transmitting the data key and a control unit for providing the data key. A storage system according to any one of claims 1 to 8, wherein the key carrier means comprises a destruction device ( 256 ), which is formed in an unauthorized attempt to access the data key, an electrical energy to the control unit ( 254 ) to destroy the key. A method carried out by a system according to claim 1, comprising the steps of sending a random key encrypted in the storage device; Receiving, by radio, a data key encrypted with the first random key from the external key carrier; Decrypting the received encrypted data key; Receiving data from the terminal ( 260 ); Encrypting the data in the storage device with the received data key; Storing the encrypted data in the semiconductor memory with electronic circuits in the memory device; and in an unauthorized attempt to access the stored encrypted data, supplying electrical energy to the semiconductor memory ( 110 ) or the control unit ( 120 ; 220 ) of the memory device for destroying electronic circuits to prevent reading of the stored data.

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