CN201203867Y - Credible computing system - Google Patents

Credible computing system Download PDF

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Publication number
CN201203867Y
CN201203867Y CNU2008201080997U CN200820108099U CN201203867Y CN 201203867 Y CN201203867 Y CN 201203867Y CN U2008201080997 U CNU2008201080997 U CN U2008201080997U CN 200820108099 U CN200820108099 U CN 200820108099U CN 201203867 Y CN201203867 Y CN 201203867Y
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China
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credible
bus
safety governor
mainboard
secure module
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Inventor
张兴
毛军捷
姜广智
刘贤刚
孙瑜
庄俊玺
李萌萌
李瑜
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Beijing University of Technology
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Beijing University of Technology
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Abstract

A dependable computing system belongs to an information safe domain. A safe controller is connected with a system mainboard south-bridge controller by the communication line and a BOOT ROM is connected with the safe controller by the communication line. The safety controller is respectively connected with a credible safe module and the mainboard peripheral equipment by the communication line. The safe controller is composed of a bus address mapping unit, a safety partition unit, a strategy execution unit, a solidification strategy unit and a dynamic strategy unit. The credible safe module assists with the safe controller, therefore an access control strategy for mainboard peripheral equipment is provided and a realtime protection method for BIOS code management operation is provided, at the same time the realtime virus detection function of the mainboard peripheral equipment communication data is provided.

Description

A kind of credible accounting system
Technical field
The utility model relates to information security field, relates in particular to a kind of credible accounting system hardware platform and realizes reaching the method that the hardware platform secure and trusted is protected.
Background technology
Trusted Computing had become new developing direction of information security field in the last few years, more and more caused the attention of correlative study unit.Credible accounting system mainly based on credible and secure chip, set up the secured computing environment that a user can expect, guarantee calculating software and hardware resources can be maliciously tampered.
(Trusted Computing Group TCG) proposes and has specified the Trusted Computing industry standard to the Trusted Computing tissue the earliest.By on mainboard, introducing the safety chip chain that breaks the wall of mistrust step by step, and guarantee the safety of trust chain, on computer hardware system, make up a safe and reliable working environment at last.
TCG organizes the Trusted Computing standard of two versions that released one after another, and has stipulated that wherein the hardware of credible and secure chip is formed structure, chip internal function, chip instruction interface, chip hardware interface, chip links to the mode of mainboard, the related contents such as use-pattern of chip.
In the existing credible accounting system platform, TPM, mainboard peripherals and BOOT ROM are positioned on the bus of system equipment controller, as slave unit, by this system equipment controller function.Therefore, TPM can't be after CPU carries out bios code, by the system equipment controller mainboard peripherals and BOOT ROM are protected, also just can't be provided believable computing environment startup of this system equipment controller chip self and the action before this start-up operation; And, only provide operating system layer following credible conveying flow in the TCG standard, but do not provide the specific implementation method of trust transmitting, and to the safety requirements and the specific implementation method of system hardware platform, and believable computing environment can't be provided for the calculating more than the OS layer.
Before this, the method for two kinds of protection bios codes is arranged at present, the one, the BIOS start-up code is put into TPM inside modules, the 2nd, bios code is cured in the read-only memory bank of ROM.Method one: benefit is the safety that has guaranteed bios code and system platform.Shortcoming does not consider that in fact the capacity of bios code is big, accomplishes that TPM chip internal expense can't accept; Method two: benefit is the safety that has guaranteed bios code and system platform.Shortcoming is not considered the in fact needs of the real-time update of bios code.
The utility model content
The purpose of this utility model is to provide a kind of credible accounting system hardware platform to realize and to the access control of mainboard peripherals with to the safeguard protection strategy of bios code.
For achieving the above object, the technical solution of the utility model specifically is achieved in that
A kind of credible accounting system comprises mainboard and mainboard peripherals, and mainboard comprises credible and secure module, central processor CPU, mainboard south bridge device controller (think and refer to device controller under the AMD framework), BOOT ROM;
Described credible and secure module is used for, can not store the credible tolerance root of core, trusted storage root, credible report root with distorting, peripherals and BOOT ROM key code are carried out integrity measurement and read-write protection, to the control function of safety governor and peripherals;
Described CPU is used for, receive the indication that credible and secure module finishes BOOT ROM key code tolerance after, load and carry out initialization and start-up code among the BOOT ROM;
Mainboard peripherals is used for, accept the authority access control of safety governor and credible and secure module, provide different services at different users, also be used to accept special viral flag check, real-time communication data decryptor and the sampling of integrity feature value of safety governor and credible and secure module simultaneously;
Described BOOT ROM is used for, the initialization and the start-up code of storage credible accounting system;
It is characterized in that: safety governor is set, and this safety governor is connected on the system board south bridge controller by connection, by order wire BOOT ROM is connected on the safety governor again; This safety governor also connects credible and secure module and mainboard peripherals by connection respectively;
Described safety governor comprises bus address map unit, safe isolated location, strategy execution unit, solidifies policy unit and dynamic strategy unit composition;
Bus address map unit in the described safety governor is used to finish south bridge device address bus and mainboard peripherals
Map addresses between the bus;
Safe isolated location in the described safety governor is used for isolation computer south bridge bus and mainboard peripheral bus, also has the real-time sampling function to data on the bus simultaneously; Connect by two groups of buses between safe isolated location and the bus address map unit, be respectively applied for the south bridge bus port and the device bus port that is used to be connected each peripherals on the mainboard that connect computing machine;
Strategy execution unit in the described safety governor is used for realizing solidifying the device control of policy unit and the appointment of dynamic strategy unit and the security strategy of data monitoring;
Curing policy unit in the described safety governor, be used for solidifying storage provide producer to dispatch from the factory before predefined control strategy; Described curing policy unit is realized by hardware;
Dynamic strategy unit in the described safety governor: dynamic strategy is the auxiliary strategy of the predefined control strategy of producer; The policy update instruction that credible and secure module is sent is only accepted in the dynamic strategy unit; Dynamic strategy comprises code and parameter, from credible and secure module.
Described credible and secure module comprises: I/O bus interface, control strategy module, safe isolated location, policy execution engine;
The I/O bus interface of described credible and secure inside modules is used for transmitting control signal with the data communication between credible and secure module and the safety governor with to safety governor;
Described credible and secure inside modules provides the control strategy module, is used for providing to safety governor the safety control strategy of dynamic-configuration;
Described credible and secure inside modules provides policy execution engine, and the sample information that is used for peripherals communication bus that safety governor is obtained is handled; Also be used for simultaneously mainboard peripherals sent and enable and forbid control signal;
The safe isolated location of described credible and secure inside modules is used to prevent that credible and secure module-external rogue program from reading credible and secure inside modules storage unit confidential information;
The I/O bus of described credible and secure module comprises at least one group of lpc bus and one group of communication bus; Described output mode lpc bus, credible and secure module is by using lpc bus, and the equipment of being taken as is followed on the system equipment controller; Described output mode bus, credible and secure module is by using communication bus, as visit originating end, access security controller;
Further, also comprise the BIOS backup of memory that connects safety governor, be used for backup BOOT ROM bios code.
Further, also comprise identification apparatus, described identification apparatus is directly connected to credible and secure module by the identity device bus.
Described identification apparatus bus is a kind of in general input and output GPIO bus, usb bus, the ISO7816 bus.
Communication bus between described safety governor and the BOOT ROM is one of lpc bus, spi bus.
Between the control signal wire of mainboard south bridge device controller (think and referring to device controller under the AMD framework) and mainboard peripheral hardware equipment, a device access controller is set, be responsible for controlling this device access controller by credible and secure module, the control signal wire of blocking-up or connection system equipment controller and mainboard peripheral hardware equipment;
Described device access controller, the device access signal that system CPU sends sends to mainboard peripheral hardware equipment by this device access controller, reaches the access control to all hardware equipment on the mainboard;
The input signal cable of described device access controller comprises two at least, and wherein one is connected on the system equipment controller, on the I/O bus that is connected on the credible and secure module of described Trusted Computing control module.
Credible and secure module and safety governor are to the safe access control of mainboard peripheral hardware equipment, read user identity identification equipment by credible and secure module, judge the user identity authority, by to other classification of user identity level, under the assistance of safety governor, the control user is to the rights of using of motherboard hardware equipment.
The utility model effect:
1) credible and secure inside modules is provided with the security that safe isolated location has improved credible and secure module self; Be provided with the control strategy module, improved dirigibility safety governor control; Be provided with supervisor engine and improved security control mainboard peripherals.
2) credible and secure module, BOOT ROM, BIOS backup of memory, identity equipment equipment, safety governor start prior to CPU; initiatively finish integrity detection to BIOS key code among the BOOT ROM; and realized the safeguard protection in the BIOS operating process; and then guaranteed in the trust chain transmittance process integrality of BIOS.
3) by the credible and secure module in this scheme and the assistance of safety governor; a kind of access control policy to mainboard peripherals is provided; for the bios code bookkeeping provides the method for real-time guard, also provide real-time viral measuring ability simultaneously to mainboard peripherals communication data.
4) use communication bus at a high speed between credible and secure module and the safety governor, improved request answer speed and data transmission period.
5) provide a kind of effective way that solves information leakage in the computer system, for concealed channel problem in the resolution system provides thinking.
The utility model is big slightly to the change of computer motherboard, has improved the mainboard production cost.But this scheme is compared with BIOS being accomplished the scheme in the Trusted Computing chip, the increase of cost or acceptable.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is credible mainboard wiring diagram
Fig. 2 safety governor structured flowchart
The credible and secure modular structure block diagram of Fig. 3
Embodiment
Computer hardware is transformed, as shown in Figure 1:
1) safety governor is set on computer hardware platforms, is connected to computer motherboard south bridge device controller by data line may command signal wire.
2) BOOT ROM and mainboard peripherals are connected to the output terminal of safety governor by data line and control signal wire.
3) credible and secure module is connected on the computing machine south bridge device controller by its LPC communication interface or USB communication interface as slave.
4) credible and secure module is connected with safety governor by communication bus as control end, is used for control and data transmission.
5) BOOT ROM, safety governor, BIOS redundant memory cell, identification apparatus and credible and secure module are used same power-supply system, and this power-supply system is independent and the power-supply system of other hardware devices of computer system.
6) the output control signal wire in the credible and secure module communication line 2 is directly connected to safety governor.
7) credible and secure module is finished access control, map addresses, data transmission, actual time safety inspection, integrality key value metric operations to peripherals by safety governor.
8) wherein comprise the redundant memory cell of that realize with FLASH and the equal big low capacity of BOOT ROM in the peripherals, be used for controlled storage BIOS backup information.
The using method summary:
1) during computer system power-on, computer power supply system is at first given credible and secure module, controller, BIOS redundant memory cell, identification apparatus and BOOT ROM power supply.
2) credible and secure module is passed through connection 1, communication between realization and the computing machine south bridge device controller.
3) credible and secure module sends the control signal that reads BIOS among the BOOT ROM by connection 2 to safety governor.
4) after credible and secure module receives BIOS information, BIOS is carried out the inspection of integrality standard value and the inspection of virus characteristic value.
5), power on for again CPU and other parts of system hardware platform if after the inspection of the inspection of integrity feature value and virus characteristic value is all passed through smoothly.
6) if not by the inspection of integrity feature value and the inspection of virus characteristic value, then should from the BIOS redundant memory cell, recover the BIOS Backup Data.
7) safety governor is realized and BIOS backup of memory, the communication of computer motherboard peripherals by connection 3
8) safety governor is realized and BOOT ROM communication by connection 4.
9) by after the safety governor map addresses, the BIOS redundant memory cell only responds the control signal that credible and secure module is sent.
10) have only when credible and secure module by the output control signal wire in the connection 2, in the time of can signal when safety governor sends peripherals, the control signal that peripherals ability responsive computer south bridge bus controller sends to the computer external hardware device, and begin to carry out data transmission.
11) after safety governor shone upon the south bridge bus address, mainboard peripherals was still continued to use original map addresses space with respect to the south bridge bus.
12) safety governor is used to realize that the read-write control to BIOS information, anti-stop signal disturb, protection metrics process safety.
13) when peripherals carried out data communication by safety governor and computing machine south bridge device controller, safety governor can be monitored communication information in real time according to the predefine strategy.The monitoring content comprises communication data flow, hold facility time, whether contains the virus characteristic value, whether malicious attack is arranged.
Safety governor, as shown in Figure 2:
Hardware is formed:
1) safety governor is made up of bus address map unit, safe isolated location, strategy execution unit, curing policy unit and dynamic strategy unit.
2) bus address map unit: be used to finish the map addresses between south bridge device address bus and the mainboard peripheral bus.
3) safe isolated location: be used for isolation computer south bridge bus and mainboard peripheral bus, also have real-time sampling function simultaneously to data on the bus.Connect by two groups of buses between safe isolated location and the bus address map unit, be respectively applied for the south bridge bus port and the device bus port that is used to be connected each peripherals on the mainboard that connect computing machine.
4) strategy execution unit: be used for realizing solidifying the device control of policy unit and the appointment of dynamic strategy unit and the security strategy of data monitoring.
5) solidify policy unit: be used for solidifying storage provide producer to dispatch from the factory before predefined control strategy.Solidifying policy unit is realized by hardware.
6) dynamic strategy unit: dynamic strategy is the auxiliary strategy of the predefined control strategy of producer.The policy update instruction that credible and secure module is sent is only accepted in the dynamic strategy unit.Dynamic strategy comprises code and parameter, mainly from credible and secure module.
Hardware characteristics:
1) safety governor is connected on the computing machine south bridge device bus controller by system bus.
2) safety governor is connected with credible and secure module by the high speed communication bus.
3) safety governor is by the various device bus with enable control signal wire and be connected on mainboard peripherals and the BOOT ROM.
Using method:
1) is connected on the computing machine south bridge device bus controller, is used to finish bus address mapping computing machine south bridge device controller.
2) be connected on the credible and secure module, be used for accepting in real time the monitoring and the data transmission requirement of credible and secure module.
3) be connected on mainboard peripherals and the BOOT ROM, be used to finish data transmission and control operation mainboard peripherals and BOOT ROM.
4) provide the function that the data stream that flow into system from peripherals is carried out real-time sampling and inspection.
5) have data isolation and safety protection function simultaneously, prevent malicious data intrusion computer system.
6) in time respond credible and secure module to the sampling of real time data and the requirement of inspection.
7) provide curing policy unit and configurable Dynamic Control Strategy unit, store dispatch from the factory predefine safety control strategy that solidifies or the safety control strategy that dynamically arranges by credible and secure control module.
8) the credible and secure module of configurable control strategy unit matching realizes the access control to hardware device.
Credible and secure module, as shown in Figure 1: by I/O interface, safe isolated location, control strategy module, monitoring processing engine, password coprocessor, key generator, autonomous cipher engine, random number generator, execution unit, power supply detection, non-volatility memorizer, volatile storage and internal communication bus.
Method:
1) credible and secure inside modules provides one group of data bus interface that initiatively reads BOOT ROM, is used for initiatively reading and to the inspection work of BIOS information.
2) credible and secure inside modules provides the high speed communication bus controller, is used to connect safety governor, carries out mainboard peripherals that high-speed transfer BIOS information and safety governor the provide sample information by journey.
3) credible and secure control module inside provides safe isolated location, and I/O controller and each cell isolation of credible and secure inside modules of being used for chip internal are opened, and prevents that I/O interface malice from reading and writing credible and secure inside modules storage unit.
4) credible and secure inside modules provides the identification control unit interface, is used to connect identification apparatus.
5) credible and secure inside modules provides the control strategy module, is used for providing to safety governor the safety control strategy of dynamic-configuration.
6) user of credible accounting system can notify credible and secure module by instruction type, how to carry out the generation of safe may command strategy.
7) credible and secure inside modules provides the monitoring processing engine, and the sample information that is used for peripherals communication bus that safety governor is obtained is handled.Also be used for simultaneously mainboard peripherals sent and enable and forbid control signal.
One, workflow
1, starting up's stage workflow
1) computer booting, after the general supply energising, computer power supply system is at first given credible and secure module, controller, BIOS redundant memory cell, identification apparatus and BOOT ROM power supply.
2) at this moment, south bridge does not start, connection 1 no communication signal.If credible and secure functions of modules enables, then at first finish initial work.
3) safety governor is carried out the predefined computer starting process safety control strategy that dispatches from the factory.Only accept control command from credible and secure module.
4) the credible and secure module legitimacy by the identification apparatus authenticated and at first to the rights of using of computer system.
5) credible and secure module is sent the control command of reading BIOS among the BOOT ROM by after the authentication to the user to safety governor.
6) safety governor reads the data message on the assigned address among the BOOT ROM, and this information is carried out special virus checking, simultaneously BIOS information is transmitted to credible and secure resume module.
7) safety governor special virus checking that BIOS is carried out checks that object mainly is meant the malicious code to attacking at BIOS.
8) when credible and secure module and safety governor are checked BIOS, safety governor is answered the interference to whole process of isolation computer south bridge controller and mainboard peripheral hardware equipment.Mainly be meant isolation, prevent and crosstalk and extraneous malicious attack of sending external signal.
9) the credible and secure module BIOS key code that forwarding comes to safety governor carries out the inspection of integrity feature value.
10) when credible and secure module to the integrity feature value inspection of BIOS by and safety governor BIOS information carried out special virus checked, and after not finding viral code, just can other backup power supplies on credible calculating platform.If any one is not passed through in inspection of integrity feature value and the special virus checking, then should pass through the mode reporting system keeper of output signal immediately, and can carry out recovery operation bios code.
11) after credible and secure module receives the instruction of the recovery BIOS backup information that the keeper sends, should notify security control unit immediately, the bios code in the BIOS redundant memory cell is returned among the BOOT ROM.If system should restart computing machine after carrying out the recovery operation of BIOS Backup Data immediately.
12) after credible and secure module and safety governor are finished inspection to BIOS smoothly, should send the control command of miscellaneous part power supply immediately to general supply.
13) after total system was powered fully, CPU sent the order of reading BIOS, finished read operation to bios code by south bridge and safety governor, and carried out bios code, finished the computer system initialization operation.
14) CPU reads BIOS and when carrying out, safety governor is forbidden all the mainboard peripherals except that keyboard, mouse, display, BIOS redundant memory cell all the time.And safety governor is monitored the read process of CPU to BIOS all the time, prevents that whole process from receiving external disturbance, guarantees the secure and trusted of system starting process.
2, computer system shutdown process
1) after pressing the computer shutdown button or carrying out power-off operation by operating system command, credible and secure module should be able to receive shutdown immediately and interrupt, and by the mainboard peripherals of safety governor forbidding except that BIOS redundant memory cell and identification apparatus.
2) credible and secure module notice safety governor is finished jointly to the special virus checking of BIOS key code and the checked operation of integrity feature value.
3) if mistake appears in above-mentioned checked operation, then credible and secure module should be notified the keeper to carry out the recovery operation of BIOS immediately or continue to finish power-off operation.
4) the while safety governor also will be finished the inspection work to the integrity feature value of mainboard peripherals.If check and do not pass through, also should in time pass through hardware display mode apprizing system keeper, and operate by the system manager.
5) before the shutdown, safety governor is responsible for monitoring the data stream from the south bridge controller always, and the assurance system is noiseless to the BIOS checking process.
3, in the course of normal operation to the access control process of mainboard peripherals and BIOS
● to the access control process of mainboard peripherals
1) when computing machine south bridge controller sends control signal to mainboard peripheral hardware equipment, safety governor checks earlier whether the active user asks the equipment that responds to the south bridge controller, have rights of using, whether enabled and the rights of using grade.
2) if rights of using are arranged, and this external peripheral has been carried out enable operation, then can respond the request of access of south bridge controller, can normally use.Simultaneously safety governor also will to the data stream of communication just real-time sampling carry out analytical review or send credible and secure module to checking.If real-time inspection is pinpointed the problems, then should stop data immediately and transmit, and inform the active user.
3) if the active user does not have rights of using to this equipment, then the south bridge controller can not carry out normal access control to this equipment.Safety governor returns disabled response signal to south bridge.
4) if the active user has rights of using to this equipment, but current this equipment that do not enable, then safety governor should send the request that enables this equipment to credible and secure module earlier.If credible and secure module responds should request, and after by identification apparatus the active user being carried out authentication once more, then safety governor can enable this mainboard peripherals.
5) when credible and secure module received that administrator command is revised the user to mainboard peripherals rights of using, credible and secure module was at first sent control signal to safety governor, revises rights of using immediately, forbidding formulation equipment, and notify this user.Credible and secure module is being safeguarded the use information of user to mainboard peripherals, should forbid all the mainboard peripherals except that keyboard, mouse, display, BIOS backup of memory, identification apparatus before each shutdown, when computer booting, enable in succession according to user instruction again.
● to the access control process of BIOS
1) reads the BIOS process
A) at first, CPU thinks that by the south bridge controller safety governor sends the request of reading BIOS.
B) secondly, owing to entered into credible working environment, safety governor can directly read bios code and be transmitted to the south bridge controller, and then CPU carries out bios code.
C) once more, read in the of short duration process of BIOS at CPU, safety governor will should carry out the strictness division of communication channel to mainboard peripherals, the communication channel of mutual isolation is provided, the every trade of going forward side by side is monitoring, prevent that malicious code from distorting the bios code data stream of transmitting, prevent that simultaneously mainboard peripherals from monitoring the BIOS data transmission channel.
D) just reading in the process of BIOS, of short duration forbidding user does not ask the mainboard peripheral hardware equipment that uses, guarantees that communication process is not by external interference.Communication enables corresponding mainboard peripherals after finishing again.
2) upgrade the BIOS process
A) upgrade in the process of BIOS, forbid the use of active user all devices except that keyboard, mouse, display, identification apparatus, BIOS redundant memory cell.
B) when the user will upgrade BIOS, should send the request signal that upgrades BIOS to credible and secure module earlier, after BIOS receives this request signal, by identification apparatus the active user is carried out identity identifying and authenticating immediately, confirm the authority whether this user has couple BIOS to upgrade.If this authority is not then sent the refusal update request to this user.If the renewal authority of couple BIOS is arranged, then credible and secure module is sent the steering order that enables BOOT ROM to safety governor immediately, and receives more fresh code of BIOS that the south bridge controller sends.
C) in the process that bios code upgrades, credible and secure module is not asked all peripherals of using by the of short duration forbidding of safety governor active user, upgrade finish after, open once more.Simultaneously, safety governor is also opened up independently communication channel separately for the bios code data stream, and monitors the behavior of mainboard peripherals in real time, for the renewal process of BIOS provides escape way.
D) in the process that bios code upgrades, credible and secure module is carried out real-time sampling by safety governor to bios code, the recorded key characteristic, and carry out the integrity feature reference value and calculate, and this reference value is recorded in the credible and secure module standard value of checking as integrity measurement.
E) in the process that bios code upgrades, safety governor also will carry out the inspection of special virus to bios code.If finding has doubtful virus characteristic, should think that by credible and secure module the active user informs current bios code by virus infections immediately, and wait for that the active user carries out affirmation and judges.If the active user confirms as normal code, then continue to carry out and upgrade operation.When if the active user can't confirm or confirm that bios code may exist by the virus infections risk, safety governor should stop BIOS immediately to be upgraded, and sends the request that recovers BIOS and inform the user to credible and secure module.Whether carry out the operation that recovers BIOS by active user's decision.
3) recover the BIOS process
A) operation of recovery BIOS is determined by the active user.After the user sends the instruction of upgrading BIOS to credible and secure module, credible and secure module is sent the control signal of recovering BIOS to safety governor immediately, safety governor should of short durationly immediately have been closed mainboard peripherals, for BIOS redundant memory cell and BOOT ROM set up independent communication channel, and in the assurance communication process, be not subjected to the interference of other mainboard peripherals and south bridge controller.
B) safety governor is monitored in real time to bios code stream in the rejuvenation of recovery BIOS.Credible and secure module is carried out real-time sampling by safety governor to bios code simultaneously, the recorded key characteristic, and carry out the integrity feature reference value and calculate, and this reference value is stored in the credible and secure module, as the standard value of integrity measurement inspection.
C) after BIOS finishes recovery operation, should recover the hardware device of of short duration forbidding, and inform that active user BIOS recovery operation finishes.
4) back-up BIOS process
A) active user who is authorized to or keeper can send the instruction of back-up BIOS to credible and secure module.
B) after credible and secure module is accepted the back-up BIOS instruction, answer control computer system general supply, restart computing machine.
C) restart computing machine after, have only credible and secure module, safety governor, BOOT ROM and BIOS backup of memory to work on power.
D) credible and secure module is carried out authentication by ID authentication device once more to the active user, determines that active user's identity has the authority of back-up BIOS.If this authority does not then provide prompting, and point out identity verification once more.Three times credible and secure module is sent the computer shutdown signal to general supply not by after the authentication, the computer system shutdown.
E) if by authentication, then credible and secure module confirms whether to have forbidden all peripherals of mainboard except that mouse, keyboard, display, BOOT ROM, identification apparatus, BIOS backup of memory by safety governor.If forbidding is not then carried out of short duration deactivation operation immediately.
F) behind the mainboard peripherals forbidding, safety governor should be carried out special viral flag check to bios code immediately, if do not find virus characteristic, then proceeds backup operation.If investigate and prosecute doubtful virus characteristic, then should notify the active user, and wait for that the user handles by credible and secure module.The user handles and comprises: stop to back up, shut down, restart computing machine, recover bios code.When carrying out virus checking, safety governor should send the sampling of BIOS integrity feature value to credible and secure module.By credible and secure module BIOS is carried out the integrality reference value and calculate, and store this canonical reference value into credible and secure inside modules.
If do not find virus characteristic, then safety governor is set up independently communication channel for BOOT ROM and BIOS storer immediately, any undesired signal that isolation computer south bridge controller and mainboard peripherals send, and carry out backup operation immediately to BIOS, the bios code among the BOOT ROM is read in the BIOS redundant memory cell.

Claims (5)

1. a credible accounting system comprises mainboard and mainboard peripherals, and mainboard comprises credible and secure module, central processor CPU, system equipment controller, BOOT ROM;
Described credible and secure module is used for, can not store the credible tolerance root of core, trusted storage root, credible report root with distorting, peripherals and BOOT ROM key code are carried out integrity measurement and read-write protection, to the control function of safety governor and peripherals;
Described CPU is used for, receive the indication that credible and secure module finishes BOOT ROM key code tolerance after, load and carry out initialization and start-up code among the BOOT ROM;
Mainboard peripherals is used for, accept the authority access control of safety governor and credible and secure module, provide different services at different users, also be used to accept special viral flag check, real-time communication data decryptor and the sampling of integrity feature value of safety governor and credible and secure module simultaneously;
Described BOOT ROM is used for, the initialization and the start-up code of storage credible accounting system;
It is characterized in that: safety governor is set, and this safety governor is connected on the system board south bridge controller by connection, by order wire BOOT ROM is connected on the safety governor again; This safety governor also connects credible and secure module and mainboard peripherals by connection respectively;
Described safety governor comprises bus address map unit, safe isolated location, strategy execution unit, solidifies policy unit and dynamic strategy unit composition;
Bus address map unit in the described safety governor is used to finish the map addresses between south bridge device address bus and the mainboard peripheral bus;
Safe isolated location in the described safety governor is used for isolation computer south bridge bus and mainboard peripheral bus, also has the real-time sampling function to data on the bus simultaneously; Connect by two groups of buses between safe isolated location and the bus address map unit, be respectively applied for the south bridge bus port and the device bus port that is used to be connected each peripherals on the mainboard that connect computing machine;
Strategy execution unit in the described safety governor is used for realizing solidifying the device control of policy unit and the appointment of dynamic strategy unit and the security strategy of data monitoring;
Curing policy unit in the described safety governor, be used for solidifying storage provide producer to dispatch from the factory before predefined control strategy; Described curing policy unit is realized by hardware;
Dynamic strategy unit in the described safety governor: dynamic strategy is the auxiliary strategy of the predefined control strategy of producer; The policy update instruction that credible and secure module is sent is only accepted in the dynamic strategy unit;
Described credible and secure module comprises: I/O bus interface, control strategy module, safe isolated location, policy execution engine;
The I/O bus interface of described credible and secure inside modules is used for transmitting control signal with the data communication between credible and secure module and the safety governor with to safety governor;
Described credible and secure inside modules provides the control strategy module, is used for providing to safety governor the safety control strategy of dynamic-configuration;
Described credible and secure inside modules provides policy execution engine, and the sample information that is used for peripherals communication bus that safety governor is obtained is handled; Also be used for simultaneously mainboard peripherals sent and enable and forbid control signal;
The safe isolated location of described credible and secure inside modules is used to prevent that credible and secure module-external rogue program from reading credible and secure inside modules storage unit confidential information;
The I/O bus of described credible and secure module comprises at least one group of lpc bus and one group of communication bus; Described output mode lpc bus, credible and secure module is by using lpc bus, and the equipment of being taken as is followed on the system equipment controller; Described output mode bus, credible and secure module is by using communication bus, as visit originating end, safety governor.
2. credible accounting system according to claim 1 is characterized in that, mainboard peripherals also comprises the BIOS backup of memory that connects safety governor, is used for the backup to BOOT ROM bios code.
3. credible accounting system according to claim 1 is characterized in that mainboard peripherals also comprises identification apparatus, and described identification apparatus is directly connected to credible and secure module by the identity device bus; Described identification apparatus bus is a kind of in general input and output GPIO bus, usb bus, the ISO7816 bus.
4. credible accounting system according to claim 1 is characterized in that, the communication bus between described safety governor and the BOOT ROM is one of lpc bus, spi bus.
5. credible accounting system according to claim 1 is characterized in that, is responsible for controlling described safety governor by credible and secure module, the control signal wire of blocking-up or connection system board device controller and mainboard peripheral hardware equipment;
Described safety control controller, the device access signal that system CPU sends sends to mainboard peripheral hardware equipment by described safety governor, reaches the access control to all hardware equipment on the mainboard;
The input signal cable of described safety governor comprises two at least, and wherein one is connected on the system board device controller, on the I/O bus that is connected on described credible and secure module.
CNU2008201080997U 2008-05-28 2008-05-28 Credible computing system Expired - Lifetime CN201203867Y (en)

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Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102063592A (en) * 2011-01-07 2011-05-18 北京工业大学 Credible platform and method for controlling hardware equipment by using same
CN102063591A (en) * 2011-01-07 2011-05-18 北京工业大学 Methods for updating PCR (Platform Configuration Register) reference values based on trusted platform

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102063592A (en) * 2011-01-07 2011-05-18 北京工业大学 Credible platform and method for controlling hardware equipment by using same
CN102063591A (en) * 2011-01-07 2011-05-18 北京工业大学 Methods for updating PCR (Platform Configuration Register) reference values based on trusted platform
CN102063591B (en) * 2011-01-07 2012-08-08 北京工业大学 Methods for updating PCR (Platform Configuration Register) reference values based on trusted platform

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