CN1815456A - Intelligent playing device and its self-protecting method - Google Patents
Intelligent playing device and its self-protecting method Download PDFInfo
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- CN1815456A CN1815456A CN 200510007404 CN200510007404A CN1815456A CN 1815456 A CN1815456 A CN 1815456A CN 200510007404 CN200510007404 CN 200510007404 CN 200510007404 A CN200510007404 A CN 200510007404A CN 1815456 A CN1815456 A CN 1815456A
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Abstract
The disclosed playing device includes playing terminals, which are connected to one or multiple intelligence keys. At least one intelligence key unable to be replicated completely is in use for security module. At least one intelligence key is user's intelligence key in use for expressing user ID. Playing terminals is enable to play data of programs under condition of intelligence key takes part in. first, the method validates legal validity of user's intelligence key. Playing terminals can be operated only the legal validity of user's intelligence key is validated. The invention guarantees capability of guarding against false so as to realize self-protection.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of playing device, particularly a kind of intelligent playing device that can carry out safeguard protection to playing device itself by Intelligent key also relates to above playing device method.
Background technology
Common playing device (playback terminal); specifically; as: multi-media player, the public playback terminal of multimedia, itself does not have safety protection function player; because the program of playback terminal itself is to exist among the open FLASH (FLASH is a kind of storer that can read) usually; can arbitrarily read, this makes playback terminal itself can't prevent that piracy from duplicating, and just uses under the prerequisite of same circuits in imitation; as long as duplicate the FLASH chip, be placed on the circuit board and get final product.
Summary of the invention
The invention solves the defective that exists in the prior art, a kind of intelligent playing device that can utilize Intelligent key protective device itself is provided, also provide above-mentioned intelligent playing device to carry out the method for self-protection.
In order to achieve the above object, a kind of intelligent playing device of the present invention, be provided with playback terminal, playback terminal is connected with one or more Intelligent key, have at least in the described Intelligent key one be can not complete copy the safe and secret security component that is used for, have at least one to be user's Intelligent key of expression user identity in described Intelligent key, described playback terminal will move in the presence of Intelligent key, is used for the broadcast program data.
The method of the self-protection of intelligent playing device of the present invention, described playback terminal are at first verified the legitimacy of connected user's Intelligent key in when operation, verify and just can continue operation when legal.
Intelligent playing device of the present invention utilizes not reproducible Intelligent key, participates in the operation of playback terminal, makes playing device have non-reproduction, thereby has guaranteed the imitative pseudo-ability of playing device.
The method of the self-protection of intelligent playing device of the present invention; legitimacy to Intelligent key in playing process is verified; Intelligent key is participated in the program of broadcast, thereby guaranteed to have only legal users could use this intelligent playing device, realized its self-protection.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 represents the exemplary block diagram of smart card in the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 2 (a) (b) represents the basic operation block scheme of smart card in the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 3 represents the equipment structure chart block scheme of playback terminal in the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 4 represents that category-A user Intelligent key and playback terminal are verified process flow diagram mutually in the embodiment of the invention.
Embodiment
With reference to accompanying drawing, will be described in detail the specific embodiment of the present invention.
The intelligent playing device that is provided with Intelligent key of the present invention, the HDV Intelligent key) and playback terminal comprise that Intelligent key (also claims:, described Intelligent key is its software, hardware or/and internal data can not be read or can not be read fully, that is: not reproducible or security component that can not complete copy, the method that realizes described function is a lot, and meeting of the present invention describes in detail in following embodiment.
Described playback terminal makes self to possess the part non-reproduction by using Intelligent key, has ensured the legitimacy of actuating unit, according to dissimilar HDV Intelligent key, the protection of playing device is had different modes:
1.＜Intelligent key of intelligent playing device 〉
1.1A class HDV Intelligent key: such HDV Intelligent key possesses CPU (software realization security function) or enciphering/deciphering arithmetic processor (hardware realization security function), and have the Intelligent key of the storer (as: nonvolatile memory) of not reproducible but updatable data, it is a kind of more perfect privacy device:
Described category-A HDV Intelligent key can be a smart card, also claim IC-card, described smart card contains the integrated circuit (IC) chip of storage, encryption and data-handling capacity, such as: the CPU card, PKI card of band coprocessor or the like, the profile of this smart card can be that described integrated circuit (IC) chip is encapsulated on the plastic cards, also can be by other interface shape inputs, output datas such as USB.
Smart card has very strong confidentiality, physically depends on not reproducible storer, the identification system the when encryption system of the use when making card that then places one's entire reliance upon in logic and identification card.
The typical structure of described smart card as shown in Figure 1, the hardware inner structure of smart card is composed as follows: comprising CPU and/or encryption logic, RAM, FLASH/ROM, EEPROM and I/O five parts, is a complete computer security system.User data is placed among the EEPROM of encrypted virtual protection (also can use inner high reliability FLASH, FERAM or other non-volatile memory technology to substitute EEPROM), has the security of height, can't be read out or duplicate.Card operating system and program mask are at ROM or download among the FLASH.The process key that uses in the transaction is placed in the ram space after generating, and loses automatically after the power down, guarantees application security.Smart card needs the developer to develop its operating system and program when being applied to different aspect.
Basic operation mode for smart card is: receive an order from interfacing equipment, give interfacing equipment through handling echo reply information then, every process of commands all will be passed through delivery manager, the cryptographic calculation device, four modules of command interpreter and file manager all will be returned corresponding error message if any one module is wherein found mistake in processing.Its command process is shown in Fig. 2 (a), and its command response process is shown in Fig. 2 (b).Below several modules are elaborated:
(1) data transmission
Delivery manager is responsible for the data communication between HDV smart card and the interfacing equipment, will handle the buffering to the input data in the receiving course, the transmission of response process control data.The agreement that communication is used is the asynchronous half-duplex character transmission agreement of the T=0 of ISO7816-3 defined.
After interfacing equipment powers on to card, at first send a reset answer information (ATR) and give interfacing equipment by card, interfacing equipment transmission command header is come the startup command processing procedure then.Delivery manager is given next functional module and is handled after correctly receiving order, also will return to interfacing equipment to the execution result of this order at last.
(2) secret communication
Data have three types on transmission mode: clear-text way, plaintext verification mode and ciphertext verification mode.Directly give command processing module to the data of transmitting with clear-text way by delivery manager.When transmitting with verification or ciphertext verification mode, data need the cryptographic calculation device that data are processed.
(3) command interpretation
Command interpreter is done grammatical analysis to every order of outside input, and whether analysis and inspection command parameter be correct, carries out corresponding functional modules according to the implication of command parameter then.If find that parameter is wrong, will directly return error message from this module.
(4) file manager
File management control is to the operation and the visit of file.To before the data operations, manager will be according to the safe condition of the security attribute inspection card of file, to determine the feasibility of operation.The security attribute of file and file structure promptly are under the control of manager after security system starts.
As from the foregoing, described smart card is a kind of HDV Intelligent key of perfect in shape and function, can store, renewal, deal with data.
Other can realize the assembly with the smart card identical function, possess CPU that is:, can realize security function (encryption/decryption functionality) by corresponding software, and have storer not reproducible but updatable data, can be category-A HDV Intelligent key of the present invention.
Category-A HDV Intelligent key of the present invention can be following structure also: the single-chip microcomputer or the embedded chip that possess CPU, destroy data by programming and read interface, or use external sensor to start self-destroying function, make its hardware possess non-reproduction, can realize security function (encryption/decryption functionality) by corresponding software, and add not reproducible but renewable storer, more than several aspects combine, also can be the category-A HDV Intelligent key of a perfect in shape and function.Wherein to write all be to write by certain data port to the object code of single-chip microcomputer or embedded chip, usually for verification, also can read, if after correctly writing, after applying high voltage or grind off physical damage such as pin by docking port, read routine reaches not reproducible purpose again.The example that uses external sensor to start self-destruction has: simple method, crust of the device itself have metal wire to connect, open shell after, tinsel disconnects, chip detection starts self-destruction to dropout; Complicated method, the chip exterior circuit makes chip interface possess specific electric parameter by using certain sensor (as resistance, electric capacity, infrared microwave, ultrasonic transmission/reception pipe), when changing, external condition (is removed circuit board as chip, external circuit change etc.), chip detection changes to the specific electric parameter of interface, starts self-destruction.
Category-A HDV Intelligent key of the present invention also can be following structure: realize security functions such as enciphering/deciphering calculation process by hardware, need not programme substantially, add storer not reproducible but updatable data again.
Above-mentioned category-A HDV Intelligent key can be exported the result again after encryption after the input data when verification.
1.2B class HDV Intelligent key: other conditions can be with last described identical, and just this Intelligent key is not provided with the storer of updatable data.It can realize security functions such as enciphering/deciphering calculation process by hardware; perhaps utilize the software encryption and decryption; and read interface in conjunction with destroying data by programming by the single-chip microcomputer or the embedded chip that possess CPU; or use external sensor to start measure such as self-destroying function to reach its non-reproduction; such HDV Intelligent key is by above protection to hardware; make its software, hardware reach function of keeping secret; such Intelligent key does not have memory function, so just by replying output signal behind the input signal enciphering/deciphering.
1.3C class HDV Intelligent key: such Intelligent key is not provided with CPU or enciphering/deciphering arithmetic processor, also not with the Intelligent key of renewable storer, but itself can not copy: such as anti-copy CD (this content is to have a detailed description in 200410096257.8 at the application number that the applicant proposed on November 29th, 2004) or its memory device, the ability that self does not have working procedure, but owing to can not copy, store the recognition data and the verification msg of this Intelligent key on it, can read recognition data and verification msg realizes simple and safe function by terminal.
C class HDV Intelligent key also can be to have the uniquely identified device, itself also can't duplicate, such as: the wireless telecommunications number of non-contact card, control by manufacturing process, each factory can only produce the number in certain section, in a single day each number was made, and just was stored in production equipment inside, did not allow to make the chip of same number again.Perhaps with the device of biology sensors such as fingerprint, because the singularity of individual human is equivalent to by sensor, the people promptly is a band uniquely identified device.
More than three class Intelligent key, also can make up mutually, on software, hardware and sign, simultaneously Intelligent key is encrypted, realize the structure of the Intelligent key that confidentiality is more powerful.Such as: on described category-A Intelligent key, add C class Intelligent key, can prevent that like this category-A Intelligent key from losing the loss that cause the user back.
HDV Intelligent key among the present invention; can or be used to data of verifying legitimacy etc. with plaintext, the ciphertext of multi-medium data; be stored in the storer that can not duplicate fully; can also add the parts of enciphering/deciphering processing capacity in addition; also can be provided for quickening the coprocessor (as having coprocessor of special algorithm such as PKI etc.) of specific enciphering/deciphering computing, can also possess the function of power down protection, promptly otherwise data do not upgrade; all correct the renewal do not have intermediateness.By loading different programs, Intelligent key can have different types.Typically can be divided into be used to represent user identity (also can participate in verifying the legitimacy of playback terminal) external type (external type also can be built-in or portable) promptly: user's Intelligent key and be used to represent the inside Intelligent key of the identity (also can participate in verifying user's legitimacy) of playback terminal.
2,＜self-protecting method of intelligent playing device 〉
Described playback terminal can be a local multimedia play terminal, after above-mentioned HDV Intelligent key is connected, form intelligent playing device of the present invention, playback terminal structurally is provided with the interface that uses one or more HDV Intelligent key, can handle multimedia functions such as literal, image, music, video, also have the processing capacity of certain enciphering/deciphering.Its detailed device structural drawing at first connects the user's Intelligent key that is used to represent user identity as shown in Figure 3 on existing multimedia playing apparatus, can also add the inside Intelligent key that is used to represent the playback terminal identity.User's Intelligent key here and inner Intelligent key can be above-mentioned category-As, the HDV Intelligent key that category-B, C class or its combine and form.Certainly, if only reach the basic protection of device by identifying user identity, inner Intelligent key also can with add accordingly, decryption software replaces.
Described multimedia play terminal adopts program and the complete playback terminal program of the common composition of the program in user's Intelligent key that exists in the inner FLASH chip.Because HDV Intelligent key itself is not reproducible, causes the playback terminal complete routine not reproducible.
Because described playback terminal is when power-on self-test, at first the calling party Intelligent key is verified the legitimacy of whole intelligent playing device by the legitimacy of checking user Intelligent key, if verify legally, then continues to play, otherwise will stop to play.If the inside Intelligent key of its identity of expression is installed on playback terminal, then can be simultaneously by user's Intelligent key checking playback terminal legitimacy, in all kinds of devices that the intelligent playing device function constantly strengthens, the present invention has designed with lower device:
2.1 when on described playback terminal, connecting when comprising above-mentioned category-A HDV user Intelligent key, the step that described playback terminal and category-A user Intelligent key are verified mutually as shown in Figure 4, concrete steps are as follows:
(1) whether after playback terminal powers on, at first checking has HDV user's Intelligent key to exist in its port;
(2), then arrive (3) as not existing; If there is user's Intelligent key, then arrive (4);
(3) can not verify the legitimacy of playback terminal, can not use playback terminal, finish;
(4) if user's Intelligent key internal counter is non-vanishing, then response external request is to (5); Otherwise user's Intelligent key not response external request arrives (3);
(5) playback terminal utilizes inner Intelligent key (category-A or category-B HDV Intelligent key), and the random number by the encrypting user Intelligent key is sent sends to the legitimacy that user's Intelligent key is verified playback terminal again, if legal then to (6); Otherwise successively decreasing, arrives behind the internal counter user's Intelligent key (3); Certainly, playback terminal also can not be provided with inner Intelligent key herein, and the encryption and decryption process can realize by the software of playback terminal, but from security standpoint, will add category-B HDV Intelligent key at least as its inside Intelligent key; If playback terminal is not verified, then this step can be omitted;
(6) user's Intelligent key sends to the legitimacy that playback terminal is verified user's Intelligent key again by encrypting the random number that playback terminal is sent, if legal then to (7); Otherwise to (3);
(7) after checking is finished, the normal playing flow that enters playback terminal, program that can form that normal play is supported.
Internal counter in the above flow process in (4) (5) step is arranged on the unit count device in the category-A user Intelligent key, this counter is arranged in the storer of not reproducible but updatable data, it is a preferred unit that is provided with on stream, described internal counter mainly is with the legal users Intelligent key illegal playback terminal to be carried out the multiple authentication trial in order to prevent, thereby further restriction is to the forgery of playback terminal.
In the above flow process (5) (6) step, it is the process of playback terminal (or inner Intelligent key) and the mutual probatio inspectionem pecuoarem of user's Intelligent key, its necessary condition be in the playing program of playback terminal or the method for encryption/decryption in the inner Intelligent key identical with method for encryption/decryption on user's Intelligent key, return the other side after utilizing random number encryption that the other side produces or deciphering, if the result is identical with the other side's result of calculation, it is legal then to assert, otherwise is illegal.Owing to verify mutually by the random number that both sides produce, owing to be at random fully in the enciphering/deciphering proof procedure on the described playback terminal, institute is so that the middle key of decoding also without any value, can play good privacy functions.No matter step what, all be the extension of said method as long as used both sides' random number or like variable to participate in the encryption and decryption computing with checking both sides identity.
2.2 when connecting the category-B user Intelligent key that uses on described playback terminal, the step that described playback terminal and category-B user Intelligent key are verified mutually is as follows:
(1) whether after playback terminal powers on, at first checking has user's Intelligent key to exist in its user's Intelligent key port;
(2), then arrive (3) as not existing; If there is user's Intelligent key, then arrive (4);
(3) can not verify the legitimacy of playback terminal, can not use playback terminal, finish.
(4) if the self check of user's Intelligent key is normal, then response external request is to (5); Otherwise user's Intelligent key not response external request arrives (3);
(5) random number sent by the encrypting user Intelligent key of playback terminal sends to the legitimacy that user's Intelligent key is verified playback terminal again, if legal then to (6); Otherwise to (3); This step also can omit;
(6) user's Intelligent key sends to the legitimacy that playback terminal is verified user's Intelligent key again by encrypting the random number that playback terminal is sent, if legal then to (7); Otherwise to (3);
(7) after checking is finished, the normal playing flow that enters playback terminal, program that can form that normal play is supported;
In above-mentioned flow process, because category-B user Intelligent key does not have renewable storer, so such user's Intelligent key can not be provided with internal counter, the method for checking is with identical described in 2.1 mutually.
Wherein in (5) step, also can the inner Intelligent key of category-A or category-B be set on playback terminal, come to verify mutually with user's Intelligent key by this inside Intelligent key with the method in 2.1.2.3 when connecting the C class HDV user Intelligent key of user's use on described playback terminal, described playback terminal should be provided with category-A or the inner Intelligent key of category-B, the step of verifying with C class HDV user Intelligent key is as follows:
(1) whether after playback terminal powers on, at first checking has user's Intelligent key to exist in its user's Intelligent key port;
(2), then arrive (3) as not existing; If there is user's Intelligent key, then arrive (4);
(3) can not verify the legitimacy of Intelligent key, can not use playback terminal, finish.
(4) playback terminal reads the recognition data of user's Intelligent key, carries out computing by the inner Intelligent key of its category-A or category-B, the result of computing again with C class user Intelligent key in verification msg compare,, then arrive (5) if meet, otherwise arrive (3)
(5) after checking is finished, the normal playing flow that enters playback terminal, program that can form that normal play is supported.
In above-mentioned flow process, recognition data and verification msg can be the data that had on the anti-copy CD in (4) step, if C class HDV Intelligent key is to have the uniquely identified device, then (4) step will change playback terminal into and read in proprietary sign by interface or by sensor, compare with the sign that has prestored in playback terminal, perhaps playback terminal is compared with the result who prestores behind cryptographic calculation, if consistent, then legal, inconsistent then illegal.
Claims (13)
1, a kind of intelligent playing device, be provided with playback terminal, it is characterized in that, playback terminal is connected with one or more Intelligent key, have at least in the described Intelligent key one be can not complete copy the safe and secret security component that is used for, have at least one to be user's Intelligent key of expression user identity in described Intelligent key, described playback terminal will move in the presence of Intelligent key, is used for the broadcast program data.
2, intelligent playing device according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, comprise the inside Intelligent key that is used to represent the playback terminal identity in the described Intelligent key, perhaps described playback terminal is provided with the software of encryption and decryption functions, is used for verifying mutually with user's Intelligent key.
3, intelligent playing device according to claim 1 is characterized in that, described Intelligent key is not reproducible memory device or has the uniquely identified device, as user's Intelligent key.
4, intelligent playing device according to claim 1 and 2 is characterized in that, described Intelligent key is to possess the enciphering/deciphering function, and its software, hardware and/or internal data can not complete copy.
5, intelligent playing device according to claim 4 is characterized in that, described Intelligent key has storer not reproducible but updatable data, the data or the program that are used to store identifying user identity.
6, intelligent playing device according to claim 5 is characterized in that, described Intelligent key is the PKI card of CPU card or band coprocessor.
As the arbitrary described intelligent playing device self-protecting method of claim 1 to 6, it is characterized in that 7, described playback terminal is at first verified the legitimacy of connected user's Intelligent key in when operation, verify and just can continue operation when legal.
8, the self-protecting method of intelligent playing device according to claim 7, described playback terminal be in when operation, also will be by the legitimacy of user's Intelligent key checking playback terminal, and verify and just can continue operation when legal.
9, the self-protecting method of intelligent playing device according to claim 7; when the user's Intelligent key that uses is not reproducible memory device; the inside Intelligent key of playback terminal is to possess the enciphering/deciphering function; and its software, hardware or internal data can not complete copy Intelligent key, the verification method of described user's Intelligent key be may further comprise the steps:
(1) whether after playback terminal powers on, at first checking has user's Intelligent key to exist in its port;
(2), then arrive (3) as not existing; If there is user's Intelligent key, then arrive (4);
(3) can not verify the legitimacy of Intelligent key, can not use playback terminal, finish.
(4) playback terminal reads the recognition data of the expression user identity of Intelligent key, after inner Intelligent key carries out computing, the result of gained again with Intelligent key in verification msg compare,, then arrive (5) if meet, otherwise to (3)
(5) continue to play.
10, the self-protecting method of intelligent playing device according to claim 7; the user's Intelligent key that uses is when having the uniquely identified device; the inside Intelligent key of playback terminal is to have storer not reproducible but updatable data; and the Intelligent key that possesses the enciphering/deciphering function may further comprise the steps the verification method of described user's Intelligent key:
(1) whether after playback terminal powers on, at first checking has user's Intelligent key to exist in its user's Intelligent key port;
(2), then arrive (3) as not existing; If there is user's Intelligent key, then arrive (4);
(3) can not verify the legitimacy of user's Intelligent key, can not use playback terminal, finish.
(4) playback terminal reads in proprietary sign by interface or by sensor, with the not reproducible of the inside of playback terminal Intelligent key but the sign that has prestored on the storer of updatable data compare, perhaps playback terminal is compared with the result who prestores behind cryptographic calculation, if it is consistent, then arrive (5), otherwise to (3);
(5) after checking is finished, the normal playing flow that enters playback terminal, program that can form that normal play is supported.
11, the self-protecting method of intelligent playing device according to claim 7; it is characterized in that; user's Intelligent key is to possess the enciphering/deciphering function, and during the equipment that it is soft, hardware or internal data can not complete copy, and the verification method of described user's Intelligent key be may further comprise the steps:
(1) whether after playback terminal powers on, at first checking has user's Intelligent key to exist in its port;
(2), then arrive (3) as not existing; If there is user's Intelligent key, then arrive (4);
(3) can not verify the legitimacy of playback terminal, can not use playback terminal, finish.
(4) if the self check of user's Intelligent key is normal, then response external request is to (5); Otherwise Intelligent key not response external request arrives (3);
(5) user's Intelligent key sends to the legitimacy that playback terminal is verified user's Intelligent key again by encrypting the random number that playback terminal is sent, if legal then to (6); Otherwise to (3); (6) continue to play.
12, the self-protecting method of intelligent playing device according to claim 11, it is characterized in that, between above-mentioned (5) and (6), add following steps, be used to verify the legitimacy of playback terminal: (6.1) playback terminal is by inner Intelligent key or software, the random number that the encrypting user Intelligent key is sent, send to the legitimacy that user's Intelligent key is verified again, if legal then to (6); Otherwise to (3).
13, the self-protecting method of intelligent playing device according to claim 12; it is characterized in that; when described user's Intelligent key has the storer of not reproducible but updatable data; in described storer, be provided with internal counter; when utilizing the legitimacy of user's Intelligent key checking playback terminal,, after successively decreasing, then described internal counter stops to play if playback terminal is illegal; if internal counter is zero, then stop to play.
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| CNB2005100074044A CN100478921C (en) | 2005-02-05 | 2005-02-05 | Intelligent playing device and its self-protecting method |
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| CNB2005100074044A CN100478921C (en) | 2005-02-05 | 2005-02-05 | Intelligent playing device and its self-protecting method |
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| CN1815456A true CN1815456A (en) | 2006-08-09 |
| CN100478921C CN100478921C (en) | 2009-04-15 |
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Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102196317A (en) * | 2011-03-01 | 2011-09-21 | 深圳创维数字技术股份有限公司 | Set-top box protection method and set-top box |
| CN104123487A (en) * | 2014-07-18 | 2014-10-29 | Tcl集团股份有限公司 | Password input method, mobile device, password terminal and password input system |
| CN104883809A (en) * | 2015-05-15 | 2015-09-02 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | Protection method for PCB safety circuit |
| CN109389227A (en) * | 2018-09-25 | 2019-02-26 | 深圳市朗文科技实业有限公司 | A kind of management method of Intelligent supplemental lighting machine |
-
2005
- 2005-02-05 CN CNB2005100074044A patent/CN100478921C/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Cited By (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102196317A (en) * | 2011-03-01 | 2011-09-21 | 深圳创维数字技术股份有限公司 | Set-top box protection method and set-top box |
| CN104123487A (en) * | 2014-07-18 | 2014-10-29 | Tcl集团股份有限公司 | Password input method, mobile device, password terminal and password input system |
| CN104123487B (en) * | 2014-07-18 | 2018-03-27 | Tcl集团股份有限公司 | Cipher-code input method, mobile device, crypto terminal and password input system |
| CN104883809A (en) * | 2015-05-15 | 2015-09-02 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | Protection method for PCB safety circuit |
| CN104883809B (en) * | 2015-05-15 | 2018-01-30 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | A kind of guard method of pcb board secure line |
| CN109389227A (en) * | 2018-09-25 | 2019-02-26 | 深圳市朗文科技实业有限公司 | A kind of management method of Intelligent supplemental lighting machine |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN100478921C (en) | 2009-04-15 |
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