CN1780413A - Packet broadcasting service key controlling method - Google Patents
Packet broadcasting service key controlling method Download PDFInfo
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- CN1780413A CN1780413A CN200410097285.1A CN200410097285A CN1780413A CN 1780413 A CN1780413 A CN 1780413A CN 200410097285 A CN200410097285 A CN 200410097285A CN 1780413 A CN1780413 A CN 1780413A
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Abstract
The method includes following steps: setting public key for mobile station and its relevant private key; with the public key the multicast service delivery server encrypts the cipher key for multicast service, and sends it to mobile station; with the private key, the mobile station receives the cipher key of multicast service; the private key is stored in a module set for preventing illegally decoding the cipher, and is used to decrypt the received key message of multicast service; to secure the safely acquirement for public key, the following method can be adopted: the user id and its corresponding public key are registered in security center, or a digital certificate of public key is issued by mobile station.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to multicast broadcast service, relate in particular to a kind of packet broadcasting service key controlling method.
Background technology
Multicast and broadcasting are a kind of technology that transmits data from a data source to a plurality of targets, in traditional mobile network, cell broadcaste service (CBS:Cell Broadcast Service) allows low bit rate data to share broadcast channel to all users' transmissions by the sub-district, belongs to information series business.Now, people no longer are satisfied with phone and messaging service to the demand of mobile communication, fast development along with the Internet, a large amount of multimedia services emerge, the some of them applied business requires a plurality of users can receive identical data simultaneously, as video request program, television broadcasting, video conference, online education, interactive game etc.These mobile multi-media services are compared with general data, have characteristics such as data volume is big, longer duration, delay sensitive.Present IP multicasting technology only is applicable to wired IP network, is not suitable for the mobile network, because the mobile network has particular network structure, functional entity and wave point, these are all different with wired IP network.
In order to effectively utilize mobile network resource, on the one hand, the global standardsization of broadband CDMA system (WCDMA:Wide-band Code Division Multiple Addressing)/global system for mobile communications (GSM:Global System for Mobile communications) organize 3GPP to propose multimedia multicast and broadcasting service (MBMS:Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service); On the other hand, also introduced multicast broadcast service (MBS:Multicast and Broadcast Service) in the up-to-date agreement IEEE802.16e/D5 of IEEE802.16, these business send data by a data source to a plurality of users in the mobile network.In the mobile network, send the point-to-multipoint service of data to a plurality of users, realized that Internet resources share, improved Internet resources, the utilance of the interface resource of especially eating dishes without rice or wine by a data source.MBMS that newly provides or MBS can not only realize the classes of messages multicast and the broadcasting of plain text low rate, and can also realize the multicast and the broadcasting of high-speed multimedia business, and this has complied with the trend of following mobile data development undoubtedly.
The network configuration of MBS business as shown in Figure 1, in order to support the MBS business, increased the mobile network functional entity newly---multicast broadcast service Distributor (MBS server), on the one hand, it is content provider's a inlet, on the other hand, it will plan the transmission of the multicast and broadcast data of subordinate base station (BS:Base Station), and distribution multicast broadcast data is to subordinate's BS, in addition, functional entity such as MSS, BS strengthens, and has increased the professional relevant function with MBS.
The MBS business operation mainly comprises following components: MBS service lists information is obtained, MBS service authentication and encryption key obtains, MBS is professional normal receives.
As shown in Figure 2, MBS service lists information is obtained and is mainly comprised step 1～3:
1, relevant content server is sought in travelling carriage (MSS:Mobile Subscribe Station) decision inquiry MBS business tine tabulation;
2, MSS sends [HTTP] Request for one or more MBS servers (MBS server);
3, MBS server (MBS server) sends [HTTP] Response, comprising MBS contents list, multicast ip address/port numbers etc.;
As shown in Figure 3, MBS service authentication and encryption key obtain and mainly comprise step 4～8:
4, after obtaining the contents list information of MBS business, MSS sends DSA-REQ message to BS, comprising the multicast ip address/port numbers of the selected MBS business that receives;
5, BS sends DSX-RVD message, carries out the authentication process that the MBS business tine receives simultaneously;
6, through after the successful authentication and licensing process, BS transmission DSA-RSP message is comprising MBS downlink business parameter (for example MBS SA-ID etc.);
7, MSS sends PKM-REQ message to BS, obtaining the MBS key, and the MBS business datum that receives with this secret key decryption;
8, BS sends PKM-RSP message to MSS, comprising the MBS business cipher key;
After obtaining MBS downlink business parameter and MBS key, MSS utilizes the relevant MAC PDU of the message pick-up that obtains, and enters the professional accepting state of normal MBS.MBS is professional normal to be received and mainly refers to MBS downlink business parameter that utilization the receives receiving course to the MBS business tine.In present draft standard, MBS downlink business parameter mainly comprises MBS zone identifier, Multicast CID.
The public key cryptography system is called the asymmetric cryptography system again, and promptly encryption key is different with decruption key.Can be called PKI by disclosed key, the key of need to be keep secret is called private key, is difficult to derive private key by PKI.Data with public key encryption can be deciphered with private key, otherwise, also can decipher with the data of encrypted private key with PKI.Utilize public key cryptosystem, the digital signature service can be provided.Digital signature is meant that transmit leg encrypts information with oneself private key, any people who has the PKI corresponding with this private key can be with it deciphering, because private key has only transmit leg to have, and keep secret, other entities can not be copied the signature of transmit leg, so can be regarded as the signature of transmit leg to information.
Kohnfelder in 1978 have introduced the notion of public key certificate in his scholar's paper, promptly by certificate PKI is passed to a PKI user.Public key certificate is is generally signed and issued by authoritative institution (as security authentication center (CA:Certification Authority)), adopts name and other personally identifiable information and the PKI binding of digital signature technology with entity.At present, certificate commonly used has the different type of many kinds, as certificate X.509 etc.
The tamper crypto module is a kind of common technique of using in the key management, generally is applied in the smart card business.The tamper crypto module is by certain special fabrication processes, important informations such as key are encapsulated in the module, can not from this module, read these key informations by reading instruction, simultaneously, can not obtain internal storage information by this module of dismounting, if attempt to dismantle this module, this module can be removed the key information of module memory storage automatically.
The MBS business sends on wireless broadcast channel, each MSS can both collect these data on broadcast channel, but because data are encrypted, registered the professional MSS of certain MBS and could be decrypted and receive this MBS business to the data of this MBS business so have only.
Because MBS business broadcast transmission in certain MBS territory (Zone), the MSS that requires in this MBS Zone all to register this MBS business can both be seamless reception MBS business, therefore same MBS business datum uses same key to encrypt in same MBS Zone.In order to make the MSS that has registered certain MBS business can correctly receive the broadcast data of this business, when MSS certain MBS service that its is registered to the MBS server requests, the MBS server is distributed the encryption key of this MBS business to the MSS through authentication by key exchange process.
Because the data of same MBS business are by broadcasting on wireless channel after the identical encryption keys, so just there is a problem, how to guarantee the safety in the encryption key process of transmitting, and the user who has prevented to register certain MBS business can deliberately not reveal the MBS business cipher key that obtains or anonymous the distribution given other non-registered users, with regard to above problem, the management of MBS business cipher key does not provide any assurance mechanism.
Summary of the invention
This method provides a kind of control method of safe distributing service key for multicast broadcast service, and to guarantee the safety of business cipher key, described packet broadcasting service key controlling method is realized through the following steps:
A: for travelling carriage is provided with PKI and corresponding private key thereof;
B: the multicast broadcast service Distributor utilizes described public key encryption packet broadcasting service key, and sends to travelling carriage;
C: the packet broadcasting service key that travelling carriage utilizes described private key deciphering to receive.
Described travelling carriage is provided with the tamper crypto module and preserves described private key; Packet broadcasting service key and preservation that described tamper crypto module utilizes described private key deciphering travelling carriage to receive, the group broadcasting broadcast business data that utilizes described packet broadcasting service key deciphering travelling carriage to receive.
Described PKI and private key are provided with by security centre independently, and by described security centre the private key of travelling carriage are saved in its tamper crypto module.
Also comprise step: A1 between described steps A and the B: described security centre sets up the identification information and the corresponding PKI thereof of PKI storehouse registration travelling carriage.
Travelling carriage sends its identification information to the multicast broadcast service Distributor;
The multicast broadcast service Distributor is searched corresponding PKI according to the identification information of travelling carriage by escape way from security centre.
By described security centre is that travelling carriage is signed and issued digital certificate, and described digital certificate comprises the identification information and the PKI of travelling carriage.
Travelling carriage sends described digital certificate to the multicast broadcast service Distributor;
The multicast broadcast service Distributor is verified described digital certificate and is extracted the identification information and the PKI of this travelling carriage.
Described control method also comprises step D: travelling carriage receives the group broadcasting broadcast business data from the multicast broadcast service Distributor, and described group broadcasting broadcast business data is imported described tamper crypto module is decrypted.
Use packet broadcasting service key controlling method of the present invention, can prevent effectively that business cipher key is stolen in distribution process, and stop the registered user to obtain deliberately to reveal behind the business cipher key or anonymous the distribution given non-registered users.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the schematic network structure of MBS business;
Fig. 2 obtains the information interaction flow chart of MBS service lists for travelling carriage;
Fig. 3 obtains the information interaction flow chart of professional downstream parameter of MBS and encryption key for travelling carriage.
Fig. 4 is embodiment one flow chart.
Embodiment
For the correct MBS business datum that receives, the user who has registered certain MBS business must hold the MBS business cipher key, and these keys must be to obtain from the MBS server by authentication and cipher key change.In order to prevent that business cipher key is stolen in exchange process, utilize the public key cryptography system to generate a pair of PKI and private key for each travelling carriage by security centre independently, behind the MBS server by utilizing public key encryption MBS business cipher key, send it to travelling carriage again, utilize the private key deciphering to obtain the MBS business cipher key after travelling carriage is received.
Further, public key cryptography system and tamper crypto module are used in combination, user's private key and business cipher key are kept in the tamper crypto module, the registered user of the encryption key of the feasible like this MBS of acquisition business still has no idea to contact and scatter this business cipher key, thereby prevents that the registered user from can not reveal or scatter the business cipher key of business oneself.This scheme requires on each user's the MSS equipment tamper crypto module is arranged all, storing the private key of its public-key cryptography centering in this module, also integrated data ciphering and deciphering (comprising public key algorithm and symmetric key algorithm) module is specifically carried out the encryption and decryption operation in this module simultaneously.MSS and MBS server carry out in authentication and the key exchange process, the PKI that the private key that the approach of MBS server by safety obtains to store in the tamper crypto module with MSS equipment is complementary, the MBS server is with this public key encryption of the encryption key of MBS business, and sending to MSS, MSS must be input to this message of receiving to be decrypted just in the tamper crypto module and can obtain the MBS business cipher key.Also must deliver in the tamper crypto module behind the MBS group broadcasting broadcast business data that MSS receives and be decrypted.Like this, just stop user direct contact MBS business cipher key, effectively prevented the intentional leakage and anonymous distribution of key.
Adopt this scheme, the particular problem that need to solve is exactly to guarantee that the MBS server can be correctly and obtain the PKI of MSS safely, because it is right that user and assailant may oneself generate public-key cryptography, and the PKI of cipher key pair sent to the MBS server, if MBS can not judge PKI whether with the tamper crypto module of MSS equipment in the private key stored be complementary.When it with this public key encryption packet broadcasting service key and when sending to the user, the private key of the public-key cryptography centering that user or assailant just can oneself generate with it is untied message, obtains the MBS business cipher key.
Generally can be by following two kinds of methods, make the MBS server can be correctly and obtain safely with MSS equipment tamper crypto module in the PKI that is complementary of private key.
Embodiment one: the method that the PKI storehouse is set
MSS equipment need be registered in a MSS PKI storehouse (as KDC:Key DistributionCenter key distribution center) before dispatching from the factory, the information of registration comprises unique identification information and the PKI of this MSS, the PKI storehouse is by independently security centre's setting and maintenance, security centre is specifically responsible for and generates PKI and private key, and private key is loaded in the tamper crypto module of travelling carriage.MSS is when carrying out authentication and cipher key change with MBS, MSS sends its unique identification information to MBS, MBS is according to this unique identification, by and security centre between the passage of the safety set up, from MSS PKI storehouse, obtain the PKI of MSS, and the MBS business cipher key that its produces is encrypted with this PKI, key information after encrypting is sent to MSS, MSS must deliver to it in the crypto module of anti-dismounting to decipher with its private key and just can obtain the MBS traffic encryption key after receiving this MBS business cipher key information after encrypting.After the MBS business datum of MSS after receiving encryption, also must deliver in this crypto module and be decrypted.So just prevent user direct contact MBS business cipher key, effectively reduced the risk of intentional leakage of user or the anonymous MBS of distribution traffic encryption key.
Embodiment two: the method for signing and issuing the PKI digital certificate
Each MSS equipment all obtains a digital certificate of being signed and issued by equipment supplier or other security authentication center (CA:Certification Authority) mechanism after dispatching from the factory, the PKI that has comprised MSS in this certificate, can also comprise a public key verifications information, the MBS server carries out legitimate verification with this authorization information to PKI.MSS needs to send this digital certificate to the MBS server in process from the MBS business cipher key to the MBS server requests that obtain.The MBS server is verified this digital certificate after obtaining this digital certificate, obtains the PKI of MSS, and sends to MSS behind the public key encryption of MBS business cipher key with this MSS with this MSS registration.After MSS obtains encrypted service key information, it must be delivered in the crypto module of anti-dismounting to decipher and just can obtain the MBS traffic encryption key with its private key.After the MBS business datum of MSS after receiving encryption, also must deliver in this crypto module and be decrypted.So just prevent user direct contact MBS business cipher key, effectively reduced the risk of intentional leakage of user or the anonymous MBS of distribution traffic encryption key.
The invention provides a kind of control method and provide with the safety that guarantees the MSS business cipher key and prevent that it from deliberately being revealed or anonymous the distribution, this method is applicable to all MBS business.
Claims (10)
1, a kind of packet broadcasting service key controlling method is characterized in that, comprises the following steps:
A: for travelling carriage is provided with PKI and corresponding private key thereof;
B: the multicast broadcast service Distributor utilizes described public key encryption packet broadcasting service key, and sends to travelling carriage;
C: the packet broadcasting service key that travelling carriage utilizes described private key deciphering to receive.
2, control method as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that: described travelling carriage is provided with the tamper crypto module and preserves described private key.
3, control method as claimed in claim 2, it is characterized in that: packet broadcasting service key and preservation that described tamper crypto module utilizes described private key deciphering travelling carriage to receive, the group broadcasting broadcast business data that utilizes described packet broadcasting service key deciphering travelling carriage to receive.
4, control method as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that: described PKI and private key are provided with by security centre independently, and by described security centre private key are saved in the tamper crypto module of travelling carriage.
5, control method as claimed in claim 4 is characterized in that: also comprise step between described steps A and the B:
A1: described security centre sets up the identification information and the corresponding PKI thereof of PKI storehouse registration travelling carriage.
6, control method as claimed in claim 5 is characterized in that, also comprises the following steps: between described steps A 1 and the B
Travelling carriage sends its identification information to the multicast broadcast service Distributor;
The multicast broadcast service Distributor is searched corresponding PKI according to the identification information of travelling carriage by escape way from described PKI storehouse.
7, control method as claimed in claim 6 is characterized in that, described identification information sends to the multicast broadcast service Distributor with the packet broadcasting service key request message of travelling carriage.
8, control method as claimed in claim 4 is characterized in that, also comprises step between described steps A and the B:
A1: by described security centre is that travelling carriage is signed and issued digital certificate, and described digital certificate comprises the PKI of travelling carriage.
9, control method as claimed in claim 8 is characterized in that, also comprises the following steps: between described step a1 and the B
Travelling carriage sends described digital certificate to the multicast broadcast service Distributor;
The multicast broadcast service Distributor is verified described digital certificate and is obtained the PKI of this travelling carriage.
10, control method as claimed in claim 9 is characterized in that: described digital certificate sends to the multicast broadcast service Distributor with the packet broadcasting service key request message of travelling carriage.
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| CNB2004100972851A CN100403814C (en) | 2004-11-25 | 2004-11-25 | Packet broadcasting service key controlling method |
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| CNB2004100972851A CN100403814C (en) | 2004-11-25 | 2004-11-25 | Packet broadcasting service key controlling method |
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| WO2008040242A1 (en) * | 2006-09-20 | 2008-04-10 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | Method, network and terminal device for obtaining multicast broadcast service key |
| CN100463391C (en) * | 2006-09-23 | 2009-02-18 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信有限公司 | Network key management and session key updating method |
| CN101170404B (en) * | 2006-10-24 | 2010-05-19 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method for secret key configuration based on specified group |
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| CN1199394C (en) * | 2002-04-09 | 2005-04-27 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method for distributing key of multi-casting business |
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