CN1722656B - A digital signature method and digital signature tool - Google Patents
A digital signature method and digital signature tool Download PDFInfo
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- CN1722656B CN1722656B CN 200410026787 CN200410026787A CN1722656B CN 1722656 B CN1722656 B CN 1722656B CN 200410026787 CN200410026787 CN 200410026787 CN 200410026787 A CN200410026787 A CN 200410026787A CN 1722656 B CN1722656 B CN 1722656B
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Abstract
This invention discloses a digital sign method and a sign instrument, which comprises the following steps: a) sorting the documents which to be signed to several data groups, sending them to the sign hardware batch by batch, wherein two private keys inside the hardware will encipher the mixed data, then sending to software separately; b) the software will combine the data to a new sign document, wherein the new sign document comprises two parts: one part is cryptogram enciphered by the private key 1, while the other part is cryptogram enciphered by the private key 2. By such invention, people who have legitimate authority can know the information of the sign document clearly; besides, any signed data document all have unicity, and any change to the document can be known.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to digital signature technology, be specifically related to a kind of digital signature method, the invention still further relates to the digital signature instrument of this method of employing.
Background technology
Continuous progress along with science and technology, along with popularizing of computer and the Internet for disconnected, increasing manual documentation is replaced by digital document, so how to determine the identity of a digital document, legal source, the author of file, the signature time that file is last? how to guarantee that digital document is after being signed, just has uniqueness? do you how to guarantee the digital document of having been signed is done any modification of being done all as can be known? this just presses for a kind of instrument and method, goes to realize above function.Simultaneously, we also will make the last signature time of content, identity, source, author, file that can be known clearly this signature file by any people who has lawful authority by the digital document behind the visa.Key here is the last signature time of file and author's identity, and the last signature time of file and author's identity can guarantee that each file of being signed all is unique.
Summary of the invention
A main purpose of the present invention is, a kind of digital signature method is provided, and adopts this method to make:
One, the digital document of being signed can be known clearly the last signature time of content, identity, source, author, file of this signature file by any people who has lawful authority.
Two, any digital document of being signed all has uniqueness, and promptly neither one is identical by the file after signing.
Three, any modification that the digital document of being signed is done all is as can be known.
Another object of the present invention provides a kind of digital signature instrument that adopts above-mentioned endorsement method, adopts this instrument, can realize the function of above-mentioned digital signature method.
Digital signature method provided by the invention is as follows:
Signature step:
Generate signature file: the file that software will be signed is divided into a plurality of packets, then these packets is sent in batches in the signature hardware, sends encrypted instruction then.At first mix with hardware ID and current time the data of input hardware inside according to certain rule, use two privately owned secret keys of hardware inside respectively mixed data to be encrypted then, export to software then respectively, after software receives this two set of encrypted data, these data are reorganized into a new signature file again.This signature file comprises two parts, and a part is by a pair of original text encrypted ciphertext of privately owned secret key, and another part is by two pairs of original text encrypted ciphertext of privately owned secret key.Like this, this newly-generated signature file just has the uniqueness based on hardware identity and time on the basis of original text, also have encryption feature simultaneously.
The certifying signature step:
One, use self secret key to verify:
The part of being encrypted by privately owned secret key one of the file that software will be signed is sent in the hardware, sends decryption instructions then, requires hardware to use a pair of its of privately owned secret key of self to be decrypted.Hardware inside will use privately owned secret key one that the data of sending into are decrypted, and the data after will deciphering then return to software.Then, the part of being encrypted by privately owned secret key two of the file that software will be signed is sent in the hardware, sends decryption instructions then, requires hardware to use the privately owned secret key two of self that it is decrypted.Hardware inside will use privately owned secret key two that the data of sending into are decrypted, and the data after will deciphering then return to software.
Software compares the result of twice deciphering in front and back, if inequality, the expression file is modified, at this moment can point out mistake, and different places is shown.If it is identical, file behind the expression signature is not modified, time and original textual content during owing to ID that includes hardware in the data of reducing after the deciphering and signature, at this moment software just can come out these data separating, generate the original text copy of this signature file, the time when showing signer identity and signature simultaneously.
Two, use the cryptographic keys of exporting by signature hardware on any one signature instrument, to verify (not comprising self):
When carrying out the certifying signature file, the signature instrument that generates signature file must be exported the privately owned secret key (using publicly-owned secret key that two privately owned secret keys in the hardware are encrypted, then output) of its encryption after generating signature file.
Software at first obtains the privately owned secret key after the encryption of signature instrument (being called for short former signature instrument) of this signature file, privately owned secret key after will encrypting is then sent into the signature instrument (simply claiming verification tool) that will verify, use of the cryptographic keys deciphering of publicly-owned secret key by verification tool to input, generate two privately owned secret keys of former signature instrument, like this, verification tool just can use the privately owned secret key of former signature instrument that the file of being signed by former signature instrument has been verified, verification method is the same, is not repeated here.
Three, use the secret key of exporting by signature hardware on the signature instrument of appointment, to verify by random number encryption:
Maximum different being of this verification method and a last verification method, the signature instrument that does not have to authorize can't be verified it, so just increased the safety of files of signature, just can not reason be stolen and cause signature file to be checked by uncommitted people in the cryptographic keys of output.
1, the signature instrument (abbreviation is authorized to instrument) that is authorized at first will generate a random number, then this random number is mixed by certain rule with self ID, uses publicly-owned secret key that it is encrypted then, then data encrypted is exported.
2, software is sent to former signature instrument with the data encrypted of output, former signature instrument uses publicly-owned secret key that these data are decrypted, be reduced into random number and be authorized to appliance id, use random number that the privately owned secret key in the former signature instrument is encrypted then, privately owned secret key after will encrypting then and be authorized to appliance id output, in the time of privately owned secret key after software to be encrypted, will be authorized to appliance id and be shown to the user, to verify its identity.
3, software will be sent into by the cryptographic keys behind the random number encryption and be authorized to instrument, being authorized to instrument uses the random number of its generation that cryptographic keys is decrypted, generate two privately owned secret keys of former signature instrument, like this, verification tool just can use the privately owned secret key of former signature instrument that the file of being signed by former signature instrument has been verified that verification method is the same.
A kind of digital signature instrument that adopts above-mentioned digital signature method is provided, comprise the instrument box body, be arranged on the single-chip microcomputer in the box body, in box body, also be provided with described single-chip microcomputer exchange message as lower unit: hardware encipher algorithm unit and decipherment algorithm unit, unique ID generating unit, at least one publicly-owned secret key unit, at least two privately owned secret keys, randomizer unit, unit, random number storage area, clock counter unit also are provided with the peripheral interface and the long-term electric supply installation that are used for carrying out with ancillary equipment communication on box body.
Signature instrument provided by the invention has following advantage:
One, have non-reproduction, promptly hardware can't intactly be duplicated (removing issuer), has so just guaranteed the uniqueness of hardware on hardware view.
Two, hardware is a flight data recorder, can form by the device of similar smart card or single-chip microcomputer.
Three, hardware can built in hardware be encrypted and decipherment algorithm, can also use software cryptography and decipherment algorithm.
Four, a unique ID number is arranged in the hardware, this ID number proof of identification as this hardware.
Five, one or more publicly-owned secret key is arranged in the hardware.
Six, two or many privately owned secret keys are arranged in the hardware
Seven, hardware has a peripheral interface to carry out communication with ancillary equipment.
Eight, hardware has a long-term electric power system (for example powered battery) and an emergency electric system, and an electric weight indicating device can be arranged.
Nine, the clock in the hardware cannot be modified or be provided with (except that issuer), and this clock is arranged to and international time synchronized with regard to released mechanism when dispatching from the factory.
Ten, hardware will lose efficacy immediately once power down, promptly can't carry out any operation to it, even it is re-powered, also can't operate on it, thereby guarantee can not being illegally modified of hardware clock.
11, there is a randomizer hardware inside, is used to generate random number.
12, there is a random number storage area hardware inside, is used to store the random number of some generations recently.
The hardware built-in system also has following function:
When the enciphered data instruction is sent in the outside, at first current hardware clock and hardware ID and input wanted ciphered data to mix the back according to certain rule to generate one group of new ciphered data of wanting, use the privately owned secret key one and the privately owned secret key two of hardware internal respectively this newly-generated blended data to be encrypted then, generate two parts of different data encrypted, export to ancillary equipment again.Be exemplified below: suppose that encrypt packets of data is 128, supposing to want ciphered data is 0 * 01,0 * 02,0 * 03,0 * 04,0 * 05,0 * 06,0 * 07,0 * 08, the hardware built-in system is at first with system clock (with respect to the millisecond number of a certain set time process): be assumed to be 0 * 45,0 * 67,0 * 89,0 * 10, the inner unique ID of hardware: be assumed to be 0 * 01,0 * 02,0 * 03,0 * 04, form one 128 grouping, with privately owned secret key one pkey1 and privately owned secret key two pkey2 this grouped data is encrypted respectively then, generate the data behind two group encryptions, the data behind this two group encryption are by after the correct deciphering respectively like this, the time when all including hardware ID and visa.
One, when encryption pkey1 and the order of pkey2 secret key were sent in the outside, the hardware built-in system used publicly-owned secret key ckey1 respectively to pkey1, and pkey2 encrypts and outputs to peripheral system then.
Two, give an order when requiring hardware output random number when the outside, the hardware built-in system uses publicly-owned secret key ckey1 that the random number that produces is encrypted back and output.
Three, when use random data encryption pkey1 and the order of pkey2 secret key are sent in the outside, the hardware built-in system uses public secret key ckey1 respectively to pkey1, pkey2 encrypts, generate a set of encrypted data, the random data that re-uses input is encrypted the encryption number that generates just now again, outputs to peripheral system then.
Four, send when require using self secret key data decryption when the outside, hardware system uses privately owned secret key one pkey1 and privately owned secret key two pkey2 that two component group data of this input are decrypted respectively, and two groups of data after will deciphering then compare and export.
Five, when the cryptographic keys data decryption that requires the use input is sent in the outside, the hardware built-in system uses public secret key that the privately owned secret key one and the privately owned secret key two of the encryption of input are decrypted earlier, use these two privately owned secret keys that two component set of encrypted data of input are decrypted then, two groups of data after will deciphering then compare and export.
Six, when the cryptographic keys data decryption of the random data that require to use in the hardware and input is sent in the outside, secret key at random after the hardware built-in system uses earlier public secret key in the hardware to the encryption of input is decrypted, use this random data that the cryptographic keys of input is decrypted then, and then use public secret key that the privately owned secret key one and the privately owned secret key two of the encryption of input are decrypted, use these two privately owned secret keys that two component set of encrypted data of input are decrypted then, two groups of data after will deciphering then compare and export.
Seven, when external demand hardware output self ID, the hardware built-in system outputs to peripheral system with the ID of self.
Nine, abused signature in order to prevent loss or stolen signature instrument by others, can be when using the signature instrument, just hardware requirement input password is verified or other checking work.
Except hardware, also have a software to be used for hardware is handled.This software must be achieved as follows function:
1, give an order require hardware to the input data encrypt, then to output two groups of data handle.
2, give an order and require hardware that the privately owned secret key in the hardware is encrypted, then the data of output are handled.
3, give an order and require secret key at random after hardware output is encrypted.
4, give an order and require hardware to use random data to encrypt pkey1 and pkey2 secret key, then the data of output are handled.
5, give an order and require hardware to use self secret key data decryption, two groups of data will exporting are then handled.
6, the cryptographic keys data decryption of giving an order and requiring use to import, two groups of data will exporting are then handled.
7, give an order and require to use the random data in the hardware and the cryptographic keys data decryption of input, two groups of data will exporting are then handled.
8, read the inner unique ID of hardware.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the composition block diagram of digital signature instrument of the present invention;
Fig. 2 is the circuit theory diagrams of digital signature instrument;
The workflow block diagram of Fig. 3 digital signature method of the present invention.
Embodiment
The structure of digital signature instrument as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, in the instrument box body, be provided with single-chip microcomputer, in box body, also be provided with the single-chip microcomputer exchange message as lower unit: hardware encipher algorithm unit and decipherment algorithm unit, unique ID generating unit, one or more publicly-owned secret key unit, two or many privately owned secret keys, randomizer unit, unit, random number storage area, clock counter unit also are provided with the peripheral interface and the long-term electric supply installation that are used for carrying out with ancillary equipment communication on box body.
Further specify the operation principle of digital signature method of the present invention below in conjunction with Fig. 3:
The signature flow process:
Generate signature file: the file that software will be signed is divided into a plurality of packets, then these packets is sent in batches in the signature hardware, sends encrypted instruction then.At first mix with hardware ID and current time the data of input hardware inside according to certain rule, use two privately owned secret keys of hardware inside respectively mixed data to be encrypted then, export to software then respectively, after software receives this two set of encrypted data, these data are reorganized into a new signature file again.This signature file comprises two parts, and a part is by a pair of original text encrypted ciphertext of privately owned secret key, and another part is by two pairs of original text encrypted ciphertext of privately owned secret key.Like this, this newly-generated signature file just has the uniqueness based on hardware identity and time on the basis of original text, also have encryption feature simultaneously.
The certifying signature flow process:
Use self secret key to verify:
The part of being encrypted by privately owned secret key one of the file that software will be signed is sent in the hardware, sends decryption instructions then, requires hardware to use a pair of its of privately owned secret key of self to be decrypted.Hardware inside will use privately owned secret key one that the data of sending into are decrypted, and the data after will deciphering then return to software.
Then, the part of being encrypted by privately owned secret key two of the file that software will be signed is sent in the hardware, sends decryption instructions then, requires hardware to use the privately owned secret key two of self that it is decrypted.Hardware inside will use privately owned secret key two that the data of sending into are decrypted, and the data after will deciphering then return to software.
Software compares the result of twice deciphering in front and back, if inequality, the expression file is modified, at this moment can point out mistake, and different places is shown.If it is identical, file behind the expression signature is not modified, time and original textual content during owing to ID that includes hardware in the data of reducing after the deciphering and signature, at this moment software just can come out these data separating, generate the original text copy of this signature file, the time when showing signer identity and signature simultaneously.
Use is verified (not comprising self) by the cryptographic keys of signature hardware output on any one signature instrument:
When carrying out the certifying signature file, the signature instrument that generates signature file must be exported the privately owned secret key (using publicly-owned secret key that two privately owned secret keys in the hardware are encrypted, then output) of its encryption after generating signature file.
Software at first obtains the privately owned secret key after the encryption of signature instrument (being called for short former signature instrument) of this signature file, privately owned secret key after will encrypting is then sent into the signature instrument (simply claiming verification tool) that will verify, use of the cryptographic keys deciphering of publicly-owned secret key by verification tool to input, generate two privately owned secret keys of former signature instrument, like this, verification tool just can use the privately owned secret key of former signature instrument that the file of being signed by former signature instrument has been verified, verification method is the same, is not repeated here.
Use is verified on the signature instrument of appointment by the secret key by random number encryption of signature hardware output:
Maximum different being of this verification method and a last verification method, the signature instrument that does not have to authorize can't be verified it, so just increased the safety of files of signature, just can not reason be stolen and cause signature file to be checked by uncommitted people in the cryptographic keys of output.
The signature instrument (abbreviation is authorized to instrument) that is authorized at first will generate a random number, then this random number is mixed by certain rule with self ID, uses publicly-owned secret key that it is encrypted then, then data encrypted is exported.
Software is sent to former signature instrument with the data encrypted of output, former signature instrument uses publicly-owned secret key that these data are decrypted, be reduced into random number and be authorized to appliance id, use random number that the privately owned secret key in the former signature instrument is encrypted then, privately owned secret key after will encrypting then and be authorized to appliance id output, in the time of privately owned secret key after software to be encrypted, will be authorized to appliance id and be shown to the user, to verify its identity.
Software will be sent into by the cryptographic keys behind the random number encryption and be authorized to instrument, being authorized to instrument uses the random number of its generation that cryptographic keys is decrypted, generate two privately owned secret keys of former signature instrument, like this, verification tool just can use the privately owned secret key of former signature instrument that the file of being signed by former signature instrument has been verified, verification method is the same, is not repeated here.
Privately owned secret key, hardware ID and hardware applicant's identity validation is distributed unitedly and is managed by an issuer, so just can guarantee the uniqueness of privately owned secret key, hardware ID.
Claims (3)
1. a digital signature method is characterized in that, comprises the steps:
Signature step:
Generate signature file earlier: the file that software will be signed is divided into a plurality of packets, then these packets is sent in batches in the signature hardware, sends encrypted instruction then; At first mix with hardware ID and current time the data of input hardware inside according to certain rule, use two privately owned secret keys of hardware inside respectively mixed data to be encrypted then, export to software then respectively, after software receives this two set of encrypted data, these data are reorganized into a new signature file again; This signature file comprises two parts, and a part is by a pair of original text encrypted ciphertext of privately owned secret key, and another part is by two pairs of original text encrypted ciphertext of privately owned secret key; This newly-generated signature file just has the uniqueness based on hardware identity and time on the basis of original text, also have encryption feature simultaneously;
The certifying signature step: described signature verification step is chosen any one kind of them from following three kinds of verification steps:
1) use self secret key to verify:
The part of being encrypted by privately owned secret key one of the file that software will be signed is sent in the hardware, sends decryption instructions then, requires hardware to use a pair of its of privately owned secret key of self to be decrypted; Hardware inside will use privately owned secret key one that the data of sending into are decrypted, and the data after will deciphering then return to software;
The part that the file that software will be signed is encrypted by privately owned secret key two is sent in the hardware, sends decryption instructions then, requires hardware to use the privately owned secret key two of self that it is decrypted; Hardware is inner to use privately owned secret key two that the data of sending into are decrypted, and the data after will deciphering then return to software;
Software compares the result of twice deciphering in front and back, if inequality, the expression file is modified, and the prompting mistake shows different places; If it is identical, file behind the expression signature is not modified, decipher the time and the original textual content that include the ID of hardware in the back data of reducing and signing when, software comes out these data separating, generate the original text copy of this signature file, the time when showing signer identity and signature simultaneously;
2) use the cryptographic keys of exporting by signature hardware on any one signature instrument, to verify:
When carrying out the certifying signature file, the signature instrument that generates signature file must be exported the privately owned secret key of its encryption after generating signature file, use publicly-owned secret key that two privately owned secret keys in the hardware are encrypted, then output;
Privately owned secret key after the signature instrument that software at first obtains this signature file is encrypted, the signature instrument of this signature file is called for short former signature instrument, privately owned secret key after will encrypting is then sent into the signature instrument that will verify, use of the cryptographic keys deciphering of publicly-owned secret key by verification tool to input, generate two privately owned secret keys of former signature instrument, like this, verification tool just can use the privately owned secret key of former signature instrument that the file of being signed by former signature instrument is verified that verification method is the same;
3) use the secret key of being exported by signature hardware by random number encryption to verify on the signature instrument of appointment: the signature instrument that is authorized at first generates a random number, then this random number is mixed by certain rule with self ID, use publicly-owned secret key that it is encrypted then, then data encrypted is exported;
Software is sent to former signature instrument with the data encrypted of output, former signature instrument uses publicly-owned secret key that these data are decrypted, be reduced into random number and be authorized to appliance id, use random number that the privately owned secret key in the former signature instrument is encrypted then, privately owned secret key after will encrypting then and be authorized to appliance id output, in the time of privately owned secret key after software to be encrypted, will be authorized to appliance id and be shown to the user, to verify its identity;
Software will be sent into by the cryptographic keys behind the random number encryption and be authorized to instrument, being authorized to instrument uses the random number of its generation that cryptographic keys is decrypted, generate two privately owned secret keys of former signature instrument, verification tool is verified the file of being signed by former signature instrument with the privately owned secret key of using former signature instrument.
2. one kind is adopted the digital signature instrument of digital signature method according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, comprise the instrument box body, be arranged on the single-chip microcomputer in the box body, in box body, also be provided with following hardware cell: hardware encipher algorithm unit and decipherment algorithm unit with described single-chip microcomputer exchange message, unique ID generating unit, at least one publicly-owned secret key unit, article at least two, privately owned secret key unit, the randomizer unit, unit, random number storage area, the clock counter unit also is provided with the peripheral interface and the long-term electric supply installation that are used for carrying out with ancillary equipment communication on box body.
3. according to the described digital signature instrument of claim 2, it is characterized in that, in described box body, be provided with many publicly-owned secret key unit and many privately owned secret key unit.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN 200410026787 CN1722656B (en) | 2004-04-08 | 2004-04-08 | A digital signature method and digital signature tool |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN 200410026787 CN1722656B (en) | 2004-04-08 | 2004-04-08 | A digital signature method and digital signature tool |
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| CN1722656A CN1722656A (en) | 2006-01-18 |
| CN1722656B true CN1722656B (en) | 2010-05-26 |
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| CN 200410026787 Expired - Fee Related CN1722656B (en) | 2004-04-08 | 2004-04-08 | A digital signature method and digital signature tool |
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Families Citing this family (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN101364869B (en) * | 2007-08-09 | 2012-03-28 | 鸿富锦精密工业（深圳）有限公司 | Electronic document digital checking system and method |
| CN103237010B (en) * | 2010-10-25 | 2016-12-28 | 北京中科联众科技股份有限公司 | The server end of digital content is cryptographically provided |
| EP2792098B1 (en) * | 2011-12-15 | 2015-12-09 | Thomson Licensing | Group encryption methods and devices |
| CN106161037B (en) * | 2016-08-19 | 2019-05-10 | 北京小米移动软件有限公司 | Digital signature method and device |
| CN107017995B (en) * | 2017-04-21 | 2019-06-07 | 广东信鉴信息科技有限公司 | Mixing signature and sign test method, apparatus and system |
Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN1342007A (en) * | 2000-09-05 | 2002-03-27 | 深圳市中兴集成电路设计有限责任公司 | New scrambler |
| CN1416237A (en) * | 2002-10-01 | 2003-05-07 | 齐宇庆 | Encryption method and device |
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Patent Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN1342007A (en) * | 2000-09-05 | 2002-03-27 | 深圳市中兴集成电路设计有限责任公司 | New scrambler |
| CN1416237A (en) * | 2002-10-01 | 2003-05-07 | 齐宇庆 | Encryption method and device |
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| CN1722656A (en) | 2006-01-18 |
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