CN1708163A - Method for preventing mobile user identification module card of radio public telephone from being used to mobile phone - Google Patents
Method for preventing mobile user identification module card of radio public telephone from being used to mobile phone Download PDFInfo
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- CN1708163A CN1708163A CNA2004100371915A CN200410037191A CN1708163A CN 1708163 A CN1708163 A CN 1708163A CN A2004100371915 A CNA2004100371915 A CN A2004100371915A CN 200410037191 A CN200410037191 A CN 200410037191A CN 1708163 A CN1708163 A CN 1708163A
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- authentication
- esn
- mobile phone
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 58
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 32
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000004321 preservation Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000006872 improvement Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000977 initiatory effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000009434 installation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000000926 separation method Methods 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/08—Access security
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/18—Processing of user or subscriber data, e.g. subscribed services, user preferences or user profiles; Transfer of user or subscriber data
- H04W8/183—Processing at user equipment or user record carrier
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention discloses one method of preventing radio public telephone R-UIM card from being used in cellphone. The EF-UIM ID value different from that in cellphone R-UIM card is first set for radio public telephone terminal; and during identifying authority of radio public telephone terminal side, the EF-UIM ID value is judged, and the judged value is one corresponding to that of R-UIM for radio public telephone terminal, the user information of the same type as that in the network side is used as ESN to participating in identifying authority. In this way, radio public telephone R-UIM card may be used only in radio public telephone terminal and may not be used in cellphone normally.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the access technology of mobile radio network, be meant that especially a kind of movably subscriber identification module (R-UIM, Removable User Identity Module) card of Public CDMA WLL that prevents is used for the method for mobile phone.
Background technology
Public CDMA WLL is mobile network to the extension of fixed network and replenishes, and can use in the fixed location, adopts the expenses standard suitable with landline telephone, use and the identical R-UIM card of code division multiple access (CDMA) mobile phone.Wireless Pay Phone has been avoided the constraint of telephone wire owing to do not need the fixing public words of picture ditching to sunken cord, and makes installations, mobile very convenient, and the user that is more convenient for enjoys telecommunications service, so has obtained sufficient development all over the world.
On present CDMA commercial network, in order to prevent the Electronic Serial Number (ESN of user by palming off, E1ectronic Serial Number) and mobile identification code (MIN, Mobile Identification Number) the illegal network that is linked into, in all user's access procedures, such as: the user makes a phone call, receives calls, receives and dispatches short message etc., and network side all needs to finish authorizing procedure, only under the authentication case of successful, network side just allows the user to be linked into network; Otherwise the user can not be linked into network.
Usually, CDMA mobile phone that uses on the cdma network and Public CDMA WLL all are to use the mode of separation between machine and card, and the authorizing procedure of user side is all finished in the R-UIM card.The R-UIM card mainly be that function is to preserve user profile, participate in authentication, the protection mechanism to user profile is provided.In addition, in the mobile switching centre (MSC) of network side or attaching position register (HLR) or access controller equipment such as (AC), also preserve with the R-UIM card in some identical user profile, as ESN, IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), KI parameters such as (A-KEY).Like this, can utilize these parameters to carry out corresponding calculating respectively, then result of calculation be compared, thereby realization is to user's authentication in terminal equipment side and network side.
Following parameter is arranged in the R-UIM card, and these parameters are for the authentication important influence:
1、R-UIM?ID
Identifier " 6F31 ".
This parameter is unique for each R-UIM card, and R-UIM ID can replace the function of ESN.It doesn't matter for the accompanying terminal equipment of R-UIM ID and R-UIM card.
2、ESN-ME
Identifier " 6F38 ".
After terminal equipment judges that the R-UIM card inserts, this parameter is passed to the R-UIM card.And, after the each start of terminal equipment, ESN number of terminal equipment itself can be write the ESN-ME position in the R-UIM card.
3、EF-UIM?ID：
Identifier " 6F42 ".
This parametric representation is to adopt R-UIM ID recited above or ESN-ME as authentication and voice encryption algorithm (CAVE in " ESN " participation R-UIM card, Cellular Authentication AndVoice Encryption) authentication, and employing R-UIM ID still is the sign of ESN-ME as terminal equipment.
Referring to shown in Figure 1, after terminal equipment start, at first judge the value of EF-UIM ID usually, if the value of EF-UIM ID is 0, then adopt the ESN-ME in the R-UIM card, the ESN that promptly adopts terminal equipment itself is as ESN and participate in ensuing CAVE authentication; If the value of EF-UIM ID is 1, the R-UIM ID that then adopts the R-UIM card is as ESN and participate in ensuing CAVE authentication.
Common authentication process generally adopts generic authentication (G1obal Challenge) method, the flow process of this authentication process, referring to shown in Figure 2:
In the mobile device side, by IMSI_S1, ESN, SSD_A, RAND parameter, and carry out the CAVE authentication arithmetic, finally calculate AUTHR; Mobile device inserts message with AUTHR, RANDC, the COUNT parameter that calculates by system and sends to network then.And at network side, this system inserts message and is sent to MSC or authentication devices such as HLR or AC by the base station, authentication device also calculates AUTHR by IMSI_S1, ESN, SSD_A, and the AUTHR that the AUTHR that calculates and mobile device calculate compared, if it is identical, then think validated user, allow the user to insert; Otherwise need decide according to the network side configuration is to initiate shared secret data (SSD) update (SSD Update) process, and still unique authentication (Unique Challenge) process, or even refusing user's inserts.
If network configuration is for initiating the shared secret data (SSD) update process, then this process is referring to shown in Figure 3:
At first, network side is initiated the shared secret data (SSD) update process by shared secret data (SSD) update message (SSD Update Message).After mobile device is received this message, according to the RANDSSD in the message, and the A-KEY and the ESN of mobile device preservation itself, use SSD to produce algorithm, calculate the SSD_A_NEW and the SSD_B_NEW that make new advances; Terminal equipment sends to network by base station authentication order (Base Station ChallengeOrder) message with parameters R ANDBS then.The network side base station is by the RANDBS in this message, and the IMSI_S1 of network side preservation, ESN, SSD_A NEW calculate AUTHBS, and confirm that by the base station authentication order (Base Station Challenge Confirmation Order) message sends to terminal equipment with the AUTHBS that calculates.Terminal equipment compares the AUTHBS that network side calculates with the local AUTHBS that calculates, if both are identical, then send shared secret data (SSD) update to network side and confirm order (SSD Update Confirmation Order), allows the user to insert; Otherwise, sending shared secret data (SSD) update refusal order (SSD Update Rejection Order) to network side, refusing user's is linked into network.
If network side is initiated unique authentication process, then this process is referring to shown in Figure 4:
At first, network side is initiated unique authentication process by unique authentication message (Authentication Challenge Message).Mobile device is after receiving the Authentication ChallengeMessage that network side issues, according to wherein with RANDU, and IMSI_SI, IMSI_S2, the parameters such as ENS, SSD_A of mobile device preservation, use the CAVE authentication process to calculate AUTHU, and the AUTHU that calculates is sent to network by Authentication Challenge Order message.Network side compares the AUTHU that terminal equipment calculates with the local AUTHU that calculates, if both are identical, think that then the user is a validated user, allows the user to insert; Otherwise, think that this user is the access of illegal user's refusing user's.
But, because Public CDMA WLL and CDMA mobile phone adopt same R-UIM card, and all be in same cdma network, to adopt to carry out authentication in the same way, and the rate of Public CDMA WLL are relatively cheap, therefore some area finds to have the people to use among the R-UIM card of Public CDMA WLL being inserted into the mobile phone of CDMA, enjoyed unnecessary service price, thereby damaged benefits of operators, heavy damage operator get the rate system, having hindered operator provides the enthusiasm of better services, therefore, be a urgent problem.
Summary of the invention
In view of this, main purpose of the present invention is to provide a kind of movably subscriber identify module card of Public CDMA WLL that prevents to be used for the method for mobile phone, make the R-UIM card that is used for Public CDMA WLL on the Public CDMA WLL terminal, to use, and can not on the CDMA mobile phone, finish normal telecommunication service.
Be used for the method for mobile phone according to above-mentioned purpose a kind of R-UIM card of Public CDMA WLL that prevents provided by the invention, in the authentication process of access to mobile network, Public CDMA WLL terminal and mobile phone all adopt the user profile of same kind to participate in authentication as ESN at network side, and the EF-UIM ID value that used R-UIM card in Public CDMA WLL terminal and the mobile phone is set is inequality;
When in Public CDMA WLL end side authentication, judge the value of EF-UIM ID, if this is worth the EF-UIM ID value for Public CDMA WLL terminal R-UIM card correspondence, then adopt the user profile of the same kind that is adopted with network side to participate in authentication as ESN.
This method further comprises: if the result of described judgement EF-UIM ID value is the EF-UIM ID value of mobile phone R-UIM card correspondence, then still adopt the user profile of the same kind that is adopted with network side to participate in authentication as ESN.
Adopt the R-UIM ID of R-UIM card to participate in authentication in the described network side of this method as ESN.
This method further comprises: if the result of described judgement EF-UIM ID value then adopts the dissimilar user profile that is adopted with network side to participate in authentication as ESN for the EF-UIM ID value of mobile phone R-UIM card correspondence.
The described dissimilar user profile that is adopted with network side of this method is ESN-ME.
The described mobile phone of this method is the CDMA mobile phone.
The described participation authentication of this method is specially and participates in the CAVE authentication.
From above as can be seen, this paper provides a kind of movably subscriber identify module card of Public CDMA WLL that prevents to be used for the method for mobile phone, by being modified in the EF-UIM ID value of the R-UIM card that uses on the Public CDMA WLL terminal, make its EF-UIM ID value different with the R-UIM card that on mobile phone, uses, and carry out corresponding modify by authorizing procedure with the Public CDMA WLL terminal, thereby make the R-UIM card of Public CDMA WLL on the Public CDMA WLL terminal, to use, and when it is taken on the mobile phone, owing to can not pass through to insert the authentication of cdma network, and can't finish normal telecommunication service.Solved the situation that the Public CDMA WLL number resource is usurped dexterously, network side does not need to increase any hardware device simultaneously, software also need not to carry out any modification, thereby has guaranteed the mobile service benefits of operators, helps the further expansion and the exploitation of Wireless Pay Phone; Guarantee the promotion and application of operator, help the investment of better protection operator the wireless business telephone service.
Description of drawings
The flow process of Fig. 1 for entering authentication process behind the prior art mobile terminal-opening;
Fig. 2 carries out the flow process of generic authentication for prior art;
Fig. 3 carries out the flow process of shared secret data (SSD) update for prior art;
Fig. 4 carries out the flow process of unique authentication for prior art;
The flow process of Fig. 5 for entering authentication process behind the Public CDMA WLL starting up of terminal of the present invention.
Embodiment
The present invention is further described in more detail below in conjunction with drawings and the specific embodiments.
From above as can be seen, no matter be to carry out common generic authentication, shared secret data (SSD) update, or unique authentication process, the CAVE authentication is all carried out in the R-UIM card, and ESN has participated in the calculating of authenticating result in each authentication process, and the ESN of use is different in case terminal equipment participates in the ESN of authentication calculations when opening an account with network side, will cause the CAVE failed authentication and can't access network.
Therefore, thinking of the present invention is that the EF-UIM ID value of used R-UIM card in Public CDMA WLL terminal and the mobile phone is set is inequality; When Public CDMA WLL end side authentication, judge EF-UIM ID value, if this is worth the EF-UIM ID value for used R-UIM card correspondence in the Public CDMA WLL terminal, then adopt the user profile of the same kind that is adopted with network side to carry out authentication as ESN.
Like this, the Public CDMA WLL terminal owing to still use the user profile of the same kind that is adopted with mobile phone to carry out authentication as ESN, is still mated as the user profile of ESN with network side when inserting the authentication of cdma network, therefore, can pass through authentication smoothly; But, if being inserted in the mobile phone, uses by the R-UIM card of this Public CDMA WLL terminal, then owing to the EF-UIM ID value of this card is revised, according to existing flow process shown in Figure 1, behind the mobile phone power-on, the user profile that adopts another type is carried out the authentication calculations of mobile phone side as ESN, different with network side as the user profile of ESN, therefore, no matter be common generic authentication, shared secret data (SSD) update, still unique authentication process can not pass through.Thereby having stoped this R-UIM to be stuck in the CDMA mobile phone uses.
At present, domestic cdma network, EF-UIM ID parameter all is set to adopt R-UIM ID value as the CAVE authentication in the ESN participation R-UIM card.Below just as example, the preferable implementation of the present invention is elaborated.
At first, revise EF-UIM ID parameter in the R-UIM card that the Public CDMA WLL terminal is used, the value that makes EF-UIM ID is 0.Because as can be seen according to the normal flow of prior art shown in Figure 1, if adopt R-UIM ID value as the CAVE authentication in the ESN participation R-UIM card, then should the R-UIMID value be set to 1, the value of present embodiment EF-UIM ID is set to 0, thereby distinguishes in the R-UIM card that the R-UIM card that the Public CDMA WLL terminal is used uses from the CDMA mobile phone.
Then, for amended R-UIM card still can pass through access authentication in the Public CDMA WLL terminal, the flow process that enters authentication process behind the Public CDMA WLL starting up of terminal, referring to shown in Figure 5:
Behind the Public CDMA WLL starting up of terminal, judge EF-UIM ID parameter value, but the value of the ID of EF-UIM as a result that no matter judges is 0 or 1, the R-UIM ID that adopts the R-UIM card is as ESN and participate in the CAVE authentication.
Because do not relate to the modification of network side, the ESN that network side is preserved in MSC/HLR/AC remains the R-UIM ID of R-UIM card.Like this, for the Public CDMA WLL terminal, Public CDMA WLL end side and network side all use R-UIM ID to participate in the CAVE authentication as ESN, like this no matter be common generic authentication, shared secret data (SSD) update process, or unique authentication process, the authenticating result that the Public CDMA WLL terminal calculates all should be identical with the result that network side calculates, therefore network side thinks that this user is a validated user, and allows to be linked into network.
If the R-UIM Qana of Public CDMA WLL uses to the CDMA mobile phone,, therefore will carry out according to normal flow shown in Figure 1 because the authorizing procedure of CDMA mobile phone does not change.Then when mobile phone power-on, judge the EF-UIM ID value of R-UIM card, owing to EF-UIMID value in the R-UIM card of Public CDMA WLL is 0, then with the ESN of mobile phone self as ESN, and participate in CAVE authentication in the R-UIM card.And at network side, because the ESN that preserves in HLR remains the R-UIM ID of R-UIM card, therefore network side is carrying out still using the R-UIM ID of this R-UIM card to carry out authentication when concrete authenticating result is calculated, like this because the ESN of CDMA mobile phone is two different values with R-UIM ID, thereby no matter be common authentication, the shared secret data (SSD) update process, still in unique authentication process, the authenticating result that mobile phone calculates is all different with the result that network side calculates, thereby cause failed authentication, network side thinks that this user is illegal user, does not allow access network.
In above-mentioned flow process shown in Figure 5, because being used for the EF-UIM ID value of the R-UIM card of wireless terminal is 0, when the ID of the EF-UIM as a result value of judging is 1, the R-UIMID that also can not adopt the R-UIM card is as ESN and participate in the CAVE authentication, such as: the ESN that adopts terminal itself is as ESN and participate in the CAVE authentication.Like this, be equivalent to also prevent simultaneously that the R-UIM that uses is stuck on the wireless terminal uses on the CDMA mobile phone.
The above only is preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is in order to restriction the present invention, within the spirit and principles in the present invention not all, any modification of being done, is equal to replacement, improvement etc., all should be included within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1, a kind of R-UIM card of Public CDMA WLL that prevents is used for the method for mobile phone, in the authentication process of access to mobile network, Public CDMA WLL terminal and mobile phone all adopt the user profile of same kind to participate in authentication as ESN at network side, it is characterized in that the EF-UIM ID value that used R-UIM card in Public CDMA WLL terminal and the mobile phone is set is inequality;
When in Public CDMA WLL end side authentication, judge the value of EF-UIM ID, if this is worth the EF-UIM ID value for Public CDMA WLL terminal R-UIM card correspondence, then adopt the user profile of the same kind that is adopted with network side to participate in authentication as ESN.
2, method according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, further comprise:, then still adopt the user profile of the same kind that is adopted with network side to participate in authentication as ESN if the result of described judgement EF-UIM ID value is the EF-UIM ID value of mobile phone R-UIM card correspondence.
3, method according to claim 1 and 2 is characterized in that, adopts the R-UIM ID of R-UIM card to participate in authentication as ESN in the described network side.
4, method according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, further comprise: if the result of described judgement EF-UIM ID value then adopts the dissimilar user profile that is adopted with network side to participate in authentication as ESN for the EF-UIM ID value of mobile phone R-UIM card correspondence.
5, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, the described dissimilar user profile that is adopted with network side is ESN-ME.
6, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, described mobile phone is the CDMA mobile phone.
7, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, described participation authentication is specially and participates in the CAVE authentication.
Priority Applications (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB2004100371915A CN100421501C (en) | 2004-06-09 | 2004-06-09 | Method for preventing mobile user identification module card of radio public telephone from being used to mobile phone |
| PCT/CN2005/000765 WO2005122465A1 (en) | 2004-06-09 | 2005-06-01 | A method for preventing the removable user identify module card from using in the different type of terminal device |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB2004100371915A CN100421501C (en) | 2004-06-09 | 2004-06-09 | Method for preventing mobile user identification module card of radio public telephone from being used to mobile phone |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN1708163A true CN1708163A (en) | 2005-12-14 |
| CN100421501C CN100421501C (en) | 2008-09-24 |
Family
ID=35503464
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB2004100371915A Expired - Lifetime CN100421501C (en) | 2004-06-09 | 2004-06-09 | Method for preventing mobile user identification module card of radio public telephone from being used to mobile phone |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN100421501C (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2005122465A1 (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US9055437B2 (en) | 2008-12-26 | 2015-06-09 | Nec Corporation | Communication system, femtocell base station, authentication apparatus, communication method, and recording medium |
Family Cites Families (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US6493553B1 (en) * | 1999-06-25 | 2002-12-10 | Lucent Technologies Inc. | Mobile-station adapted for removable user identity modules |
| DE19934098A1 (en) * | 1999-07-21 | 2001-01-25 | Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd | Starting device with PIN protection without input involves encoding PIN using unique identity number, comparing user code, unique identity, decoding PIN using unique identity number |
| CN1158882C (en) * | 2000-03-01 | 2004-07-21 | 中国联合通信有限公司 | Method for realizing telephone set/card separation on CDMA mobile communication net |
| US6697637B1 (en) * | 2000-09-21 | 2004-02-24 | Motorola Inc. | Method for ESN rebinding when a TMSI is assigned |
| KR20020074314A (en) * | 2001-03-20 | 2002-09-30 | 엘지전자 주식회사 | Method of same ESN and UIM-ID distinction in mobile communication network |
| KR100492548B1 (en) * | 2002-08-21 | 2005-06-03 | 엘지전자 주식회사 | Method for preventing illegal using of user identity module in mobile communication terminal |
-
2004
- 2004-06-09 CN CNB2004100371915A patent/CN100421501C/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
-
2005
- 2005-06-01 WO PCT/CN2005/000765 patent/WO2005122465A1/en active Application Filing
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US9055437B2 (en) | 2008-12-26 | 2015-06-09 | Nec Corporation | Communication system, femtocell base station, authentication apparatus, communication method, and recording medium |
| CN102265659B (en) * | 2008-12-26 | 2015-06-24 | 日本电气株式会社 | Communication system, femto cell base station, authentication device, communication method, and recording medium |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| WO2005122465A1 (en) | 2005-12-22 |
| CN100421501C (en) | 2008-09-24 |
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