CN1620056A - Bridge protocol data unit examination method using bridge address allowal table - Google Patents
Bridge protocol data unit examination method using bridge address allowal table Download PDFInfo
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- CN1620056A CN1620056A CN 200310115110 CN200310115110A CN1620056A CN 1620056 A CN1620056 A CN 1620056A CN 200310115110 CN200310115110 CN 200310115110 CN 200310115110 A CN200310115110 A CN 200310115110A CN 1620056 A CN1620056 A CN 1620056A
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Abstract
This invention refers to a verification method for bridge protocol data unit (BPDU) using bridge address permission list (BAPL). In network, spread tree protocol (STP) calculating non-circulation and complete connected active bridge network topology, the BAPL can be used as simple BPDU verification method wherein the terminal user can dedicate bridge address in permission list to dedicate prospective potential mot node bridge and activate mot node bridge check system making the non-trust bridge can not join avoiding the error configuring active bridge network topology and illegal BPDU interference.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of energy and filter bridger protocol data unit (the BridgeProtocol Data Unit that is not allowed to, BPDU) method, particularly relate to and a kind ofly utilize bridger address permission table (Bridge Address Permit List BAPL) filters as filtercondition and is not allowed to bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) verification method of BPDU with the use bridger address permission table (BAPL) of the mechanism that reaches confidentiality.
Background technology
(Spanning Tree Protocol STP) can calculate nothing circulation and the active bridger topology network that is connected fully to expand tree protocol.Its this active topology of reruning to be suitable for the change of network certainly, becomes initiatively or non-active and online becoming initiatively or non-active such as interchanger.This kind can play a role from suitable ability, but network may be subjected to the influence by misspecification or the unexpected activation topology change that malice caused.Such as, increase STP bridger priority non-on as the interchanger of root point bridger (root bridge), that is should value reduce.Cause the narrower flow bottleneck between the leaf interchanger.See also shown in Figure 1ly, interchanger A and interchanger B can be chosen to potentiality root point bridger, because it has big frequency range, when interchanger A was root point bridger, down normal, this port that is connected to interchanger B of interchanger C was for sealing attitude.Flow between interchanger A and interchanger B is direct.If mistake is made as root point bridger with interchanger C now, the flow between interchanger A and interchanger B will be by there being the interchanger C of low frequency range.
If must one proof method be arranged to BPDU, the BPDU of invalidated can be left in the basket and can not cause topology to change.Yet checking does not have regulation to BPDU in IEEE specification 802.1D or 802.1w.
Therefore, in the present invention, BAPL can be as the simply but quite effectively BPDU proof method of head it off.
This shows that above-mentioned existing use bridger address allows bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) verification method of table (BAPL) still to have many defectives, and demands urgently further being improved.In order to solve the problem of bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) the verification method existence of using bridger address permission table (BAPL), relevant manufacturer there's no one who doesn't or isn't seeks solution painstakingly, but do not see always that for a long time suitable design finished by development, and common product does not have appropriate structure to address the above problem, and this obviously is the problem that the anxious desire of relevant dealer solves.
Because the defective that above-mentioned existing use bridger address allows bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) verification method of table (BAPL) to exist, the inventor is based on being engaged in this type of product design manufacturing abundant for many years practical experience and professional knowledge, actively studied innovation, in the hope of founding a kind of bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) verification method of novel use bridger address permission table (BAPL), can improve bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) verification method of general existing use bridger address permission table (BAPL), make it have more practicality.Through constantly research, design, and after studying sample and improvement repeatedly, create the present invention who has practical value finally.
Summary of the invention
The objective of the invention is to, overcome the defective of bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) the verification method existence of existing use bridger address permission table (BAPL), and provide a kind of bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) verification method of new use bridger address permission table (BAPL), technical problem to be solved is to make it use the bridger address that can filter the bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) that is not allowed to allow the method for table (BAPL), the bridger topology network is disturbed by misspecification or illegal BPDU and can avoid initiatively, thereby be suitable for practicality more, and have the value on the industry.
The object of the invention to solve the technical problems realizes by the following technical solutions.According to a kind of verification method of carrying out the network that expands tree protocol that the present invention proposes, this network comprises most bridgers, a majority layer, and most interchangers and most ports, this verification method comprises: most bridger protocol data units; One allows table; And most checking rules.
The object of the invention to solve the technical problems also can be applied to the following technical measures to achieve further.
Aforesaid verification method, wherein said bridger protocol data unit comprises: a point is distinguished field; And one bridger distinguish field.
Aforesaid verification method, wherein said permission table comprise the plural bridger address of this bridger protocol data unit permission that is received.
Aforesaid verification method, wherein said checking rule comprises: if this bridger address that this bridger protocol data unit that is received is used this interchanger, this bridger protocol data unit is allowed to; If this bridger mail returned on ground of incorrect address of this bridger discriminator is should this interior bridger address is shown in permission, this bridger protocol data unit that is received is abandoned; And if the bridger mail returned on ground of incorrect address of this root point discriminator is should allow this interior bridger address of table, this bridger protocol data unit that is received is abandoned.
Aforesaid verification method, wherein said port more comprise a state board.
Aforesaid verification method, wherein said wherein when this port receives not this bridger protocol data unit that is allowed by this permission table, this checking rule more comprises: this state board of reseting this expansion tree protocol; Handle this bridger protocol data unit that allows table by this; If this port is a marginal end mouth, an operEdeg parameter is made as vacation; And when not receiving in a period of time, then proceed not by this bridger protocol data unit of this permission table permission.
Aforesaid verification method, be tens of seconds wherein said period.
Aforesaid verification method wherein when this expansion tree protocol activation is on this interchanger, can be used this checking rule.
Aforesaid verification method, this bridger address of this bridger of a wherein potential some bridger are to be specified in this permission table, to trigger the inspection of a some discriminator.
Aforesaid verification method, all interchangers in the bridger territory of wherein being trusted are to be specified in this permission table.
The present invention compared with prior art has tangible advantage and beneficial effect.By above technical scheme as can be known, in order to reach aforementioned goal of the invention, major technique of the present invention thes contents are as follows:
The invention provides a kind of method of using the bridger address that can filter the bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) that is not allowed to allow table (BAPL), the bridger topology network is disturbed by misspecification or illegal BPDU to avoid initiatively.
Root point discriminator field and bridger discriminator field are arranged in BPDU.Root point discriminator can pick out this bridger that is assumed to be root point uniquely, utilizes and sends a setting BPDU (with reference to the 8.5.1.1 joint (IEEE Standards Section 8.5.1.1 in 802.1D) of IEEE specification 802.1D).This bridger discriminator picks out another transmitter of setting BPDU (with reference to the 8.5.3.7 joint (IEEE Standards Section 8.5.3.7 in 802.1D) of IEEE specification 802.1D) uniquely.The form of this two discriminator is identical, because in bridger formula network, root point discriminator is and one of bridger discriminator.The format specification of bridger discriminator is in the 9.2.5 joint (IEEEStandards Section 9.2.5 in 802.1w) of IEEE specification 802.1w).It has 64, partly forms by three.First partly is 4 bridger priority, and second partly is 12 regional appointing system discriminator, and the 3rd partly is 48 bridger address.Bridger address (being defined in the 7.12.5 joint (IEEE Standards Section 7.12.5 in 802.1D) of IEEE specification 802.1D) is the unique medium access control of globality (MAC) address that is assigned to this bridger.This bridger address can be unique MAC Address of port.
On the other hand, proof procedure is described below.Interchanger can be verified received setting BPDU by the bridger address of checking bridger discriminator and root point discriminator.Rule is as described below:
If 1 received BPDU uses the bridger address of this interchanger, this BPDU then is allowed to.The bridger address of this interchanger is forever in being implied in this permission table.
If this bridger mail returned on ground of incorrect address of the bridger discriminator field of 2 received BPDU closes the arbitrary bridger address in this permission table, then ignore this BPDU.
If this bridger mail returned on ground of incorrect address of the root point discriminator of 3 received BPDU closes the specified arbitrary bridger address of root point discriminator in the permission table, then ignore this BPDU.
4, when ignoring BPDU because of above-mentioned rule, the stp state board meeting that receives the port " is reseted " if this port becomes exercisable words.Statistics is upgraded, and terminal user obtains warning message.So this port is in and abandons attitude, avoid circulation, and still transmit " correctly " BPDU.At this port is under the situation at port, edge, and its operEdge variable must be made as vacation (false), make the port not transition immediately become the feedforward attitude.When no longer receiving fault BPDU, the port can be after a while just transition become the feedforward attitude.Even this port is the port, edge, this port must stay in abandons under the attitude to wait for that feedforward postpones.
These rules only are applied to when interchanger has activation STP algorithm, and in addition, those rules also can be applicable to maybe not control following time at STP when this port on the STP anergy port.That is as long as the STP method can receive BPDU and can go out to receive the port respectively, but the stp state board at port is not affected, and only abandons the BPDU that breaks rules, and upgrades statistics, and the warning terminal user.Note these rules and STP algorithm compatibility.
The permission table is the one group of bridger address that is allowed in reception BPDU.It can be set on the interchanger.The bridger address that can stipulate to have set is to be applied in the inspection of root point discriminator.
The bridger address of interchanger is the some of this table forever, makes it can allow the BPDU that is sent by itself, but the BPDU that is sent by this port that is all the reception port can be abandoned.
This BAPL method and STP compatibility.Terminal user not only benefits from this method, and the potentiality root point bridger of also being specified expection by the designated bridge address in the permission table is to trigger the inspection of root point discriminator.
Terminal user can be by specifying the permission table to specify the bridger territory of being trusted.When the interchanger of not trusted tries to add this bridger territory, then can't add.
The BAPL method can be considered simple verification method.Reason is that malicious device can be pretended to have the BPDU of the bridger address that is allowed to and try to disturb the topology that is subjected to trusted zones.
Consider deployment of the present invention, this feature can be deployed on the interchanger in distribution layer and the level of access.In the time of on being deployed in the distribution interchanger, can be considered and to trust if not the bridger address that all then is major part.Have only the meeting of potentiality root point bridger limited, the feature on all distribution interchangers can be set in it.Even, in the time of on being deployed in the access interchanger, uploading the port and be considered as reliable.This permission table can allow to be connected to the bridger address of this this equal interchanger of uploading the port.Only limit potentiality root point bridger.
One special case is blank permission table.Meaning i.e. this interchanger itself can be contemplated to root point bridger.
Via as can be known above-mentioned, the invention provides bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) verification method of a kind of bridger address permission table (BAPL).In network, expand tree protocol (STP) and calculate nothing circulation and the active bridger topology network that is connected fully.The bridger address allows table (BAPL) to can be simple bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) verification method, wherein terminal user can be by the designated bridge address in allowing table, with the potentiality root point bridger of appointment expection, and trigger root point bridger checking mechanism.The bridger territory that terminal user can specify the permission table to specify to be trusted.When the bridger of not trusted was tried to add in the bridger territory, it can't add.To avoid this active bridger topology network maybe may be the illegal BPDU interference of malice by misspecification.Therefore BAPL is simple but effective BPDU proof method, is to use the permission table to filter the BPDU that is not allowed to.
By technique scheme, the present invention has the following advantages at least:
1, the user can specify potential root point bridger, is that check is distinguished to trigger the root point in the designated bridge address in bridger address permission table.
2, the user can specify reliable bridger field, be to be specified in the bridger address permission table, when an interchanger of not trusted attempts to add this bridger field with out of court.
In sum, the use bridger address of special construction of the present invention allows bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) verification method of table (BAPL), it uses the bridger address that can filter the bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) that is not allowed to allow the method for table (BAPL), the bridger topology network is disturbed by misspecification or illegal BPDU and can avoid initiatively, thereby be suitable for practicality more, and have the value on the industry.It has above-mentioned many advantages and practical value, and in like product, do not see have similar structural design to publish or use and really genus innovation, no matter it structurally or bigger improvement all arranged on the function, have large improvement technically, and produced handy and practical effect, and more existing use bridger address allows bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) verification method of table (BAPL) to have the multinomial effect of enhancement, thereby be suitable for practicality more, and have the extensive value of industry, really be a new and innovative, progressive, practical new design.
Above-mentioned and other target of the present invention, feature and advantage can be by understanding in the detailed description of following embodiment that embodiment can more clearly understand with reference to the accompanying drawings.
It is pointed out that and to know that foregoing description and following detailed description only are usefulness for example, and further explanation of the present invention is provided.
Above-mentioned explanation only is the general introduction of technical solution of the present invention, for can clearer understanding technological means of the present invention, and can be implemented according to the content of specification, below with preferred embodiment of the present invention and conjunction with figs. describe in detail as after.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the calcspar according to the wrong root point bridger of existing prior art method.
Fig. 2 is the calcspar according to the permission table of the root point bridger that prevents an accident of a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is the calcspar according to the permission table in the believable bridger of the definition of a preferred embodiment of the present invention territory.
Switch A: interchanger A Switch B: interchanger B
Switch C: interchanger C Switch D: interchanger D
Entity F: entity F
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing and preferred embodiment, the use bridger address that foundation the present invention is proposed allows its specific implementation method of bridger protocol data unit (BPDU) verification method, feature and the effect thereof of table (BAPL), describe in detail as after.
The preferred embodiment according to the present invention, terminal user can with the potentiality root point bridger of appointment expection, and trigger root point bridger inspection method by the designated bridge address in allowing table.See also shown in Figure 2ly, only to allow interchanger A or interchanger B be on the permission table of root point bridger by interchanger A and interchanger B are listed in, and can detect the situation of violating rule, thereby can stably keep topology.
The bridger territory that terminal user can specify the permission table to specify to be trusted.When the bridger of not trusted was tried to add in the bridger territory, it can't add.Such as, see also shown in Figure 3, the preferred embodiment according to the present invention, interchanger A, B, C, D and E form the bridger territory of being trusted.Interchanger C and interchanger D are the potentiality root point bridgers of expection.The 3rd port is connected to and is not subjected to the entity F that trusts, entity F to be assumed to be terminal or is " downstream " bridger.When entity F tried to send BPDU, interchanger A can refuse to connect.As sporocarp F is " downstream " bridger, and when receiving the higher level BPDU that is sent by interchanger A, entity F must stop sending BPDU, and temporary transient refusal connects.
The preferred embodiment according to the present invention, the example of entity F is a flow monitor, duplicates target port and the 3rd port is a port.Another example of entity F is the client exchange device, and this client discharges the 3rd port from the ISP who has interchanger A.
BAPL can be considered simple verification method.Reason is, malicious device can pseudo-harness allows the BPDU and poor the topology that is subjected to trusted zones of disturbing of bridger address.See also shown in Figure 3ly, entity F realizes BPDU from the 3rd port, and finds out root point bridger discriminator and the bridger discriminator that is allowed to.It then sends BPDU, tool same root point bridger discriminator but higher bridger discriminator.This BPDU can make interchanger A mistake letter move to the 3rd port for root point bridger by the BAPL on the interchanger A.Yet this acrobatics is success forever.Such as, real root point bridger has used the possible bridger priority of institute the highest central bridger priority.Then, entity F can only produce the BPDU with same bridge priority at most.This moment, decisive factor was root point path cost (root path cost).If the root point path cost of interchanger A on the 1st port and the 2nd port is lower than the root point path cost on the 3rd port, initiatively topology can remain unchanged.Thereby, better be to set the highest bridger priority in root point bridger, or set coca point path cost on the port of not trusted.
Illustrate as Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, can be in the interchanger deploy feature in distribution layer and the level of access.
In the time of on being deployed in the distribution interchanger, then most even whole bridger address can be considered is trusted.Have only the meeting of potentiality root point bridger limited, all distribution interchangers all have feature.
On being deployed in the access interchanger time, uploading the port and can be considered and trusted.The permission table can allow to be connected to the bridger address of the equal interchanger of uploading the port.Have only the meeting of potentiality root point bridger limited.
Wherein a special case is the permission table that has existed.Therefore this interchanger itself can be contemplated to root point bridger.
In the method, can get the minimum extra load of CPU.Internal memory wherein be used for storing and setting and implementation period data.The developer is limited the amount of the buffer storage that stores fault bridger address, such as 100 last buffer storage of restriction.
See also following form table one, demonstrate instruction field and description field at this.According to predetermined condition, the BAPL method is an anergy.When its anergy, the BAPL method is halted state, but set with implementation period data unaffected.When its activation, and when STP also activation, this method can the generation effect.According to predetermined condition, this permission table is empty (except the intrinsic bridger address of regional interchanger), makes the whole BPDU that sent by other interchanger all be rejected.Before changing the permission table, better be to make this method anergy.After setting this permission table fully, this method of ability activation.
| Instruction | Describe |
| Stp bridgeaddress{enable|disable} | This bridger of activation or anergy allows table |
| [no] stp bridgeaddress permit＜mac_address〉} | any[root] | Set the bridge joint address that allows in the table.When designated key root point not, root point discriminator is also checked specified bridger address. |
Table one
See also following form table two, wherein idsplay order field and description field." showbridgeaddress " and instruction demonstrate the setting of this permission table.It also demonstrates the bridger address that is implied in this interchanger itself in the permission table forever.It demonstrates again can find some bridger address (such as the address of adjacent designated bridge) on interchanger.This helps terminal user can find out the bridger address when setting the permission table." show bridgeaddress statictics " and instruction be presented at the BPDU quantity that abandoned by this permission table on the port that respectively breaks rules and the bridger address of some fault.
| Instruction | Describe |
| ????Show?bridgeaddress | Show setting of reliable port and present permission table |
| ????Show?bridgeaddress?statistics | Show information about this permission table refusal |
| ????clear??????????bridgeaddress statistics | Again statistics |
Table two
The above, it only is preferred embodiment of the present invention, be not that the present invention is done any pro forma restriction, though the present invention discloses as above with preferred embodiment, yet be not in order to limit the present invention, any those skilled in the art, in not breaking away from the technical solution of the present invention scope, when the technology contents that can utilize above-mentioned announcement is made a little change or is modified to the equivalent embodiment of equivalent variations, in every case be the content that does not break away from technical solution of the present invention, according to technical spirit of the present invention to any simple modification that above embodiment did, equivalent variations and modification all still belong in the scope of technical solution of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1, a kind of verification method of carrying out the network that expands tree protocol, this network comprises most bridgers, a majority layer, most interchangers and most ports is characterized in that this verification method comprises:
A most bridger protocol data unit;
One allows table; And
Most checking rules.
2, verification method according to claim 1 is characterized in that wherein said bridger protocol data unit comprises:
A point is distinguished field; And
One bridger is distinguished field.
3, verification method according to claim 1 is characterized in that wherein said permission table comprises the plural bridger address of this bridger protocol data unit permission that is received.
4, verification method according to claim 1 is characterized in that wherein said checking rule comprises:
If this bridger address that this bridger protocol data unit that is received is used this interchanger, this bridger protocol data unit is allowed to;
If this bridger mail returned on ground of incorrect address of this bridger discriminator is should this interior bridger address is shown in permission, this bridger protocol data unit that is received is abandoned; And
If the bridger mail returned on ground of incorrect address of this root point discriminator is should this interior bridger address is shown in permission, this bridger protocol data unit that is received is abandoned.
5, verification method according to claim 1 is characterized in that wherein said port more comprises a state board.
6, verification method according to claim 4 is characterized in that wherein this checking rule more comprises when this port receives not this bridger protocol data unit that is allowed by this permission table:
Reset this state board of this expansion tree protocol;
Handle this bridger protocol data unit that allows table by this;
If this port is a marginal end mouth, an operEdeg parameter is made as vacation; And
When not receiving in a period of time, then proceed not by this bridger protocol data unit of this permission table permission.
7, verification method according to claim 6 is characterized in that be tens of seconds wherein said period.
8, verification method according to claim 4 is characterized in that wherein can using this checking rule when this expansion tree protocol activation is on this interchanger.
9, verification method according to claim 1, this bridger address that it is characterized in that this bridger of a wherein potential some bridger are to be specified in this permission table, to trigger the inspection of a some discriminator.
10, verification method according to claim 1, all interchangers in the bridger territory that it is characterized in that wherein being trusted are to be specified in this permission table.
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Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN1997002B (en) * | 2006-01-06 | 2010-05-12 | 财团法人资讯工业策进会 | Compatible method, system and related switch for multi-fold expansion tree protocol |
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Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN1997002B (en) * | 2006-01-06 | 2010-05-12 | 财团法人资讯工业策进会 | Compatible method, system and related switch for multi-fold expansion tree protocol |
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