CN1602611A

CN1602611A - Lawful interception of end-to-end encrypted data traffic

Info

Publication number: CN1602611A
Application number: CN02824452.4A
Authority: CN
Inventors: I·乌斯塔罗; P·阿霍宁; R·布洛姆; K·波曼; M·奈斯伦德
Original assignee: Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB
Current assignee: Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB
Priority date: 2001-12-07
Filing date: 2002-12-06
Publication date: 2005-03-30
Anticipated expiration: 2022-12-06
Also published as: US20050063544A1; US7382881B2; WO2003049357A2; CN100592731C; EP1452000A2; AU2002361050A1; WO2003049357A3; WO2003049357B1; AU2002361050A8

Abstract

A method of facilitating the lawful interception of an IP session between two or more terminals 12,13, wherein said session uses encryption to secure traffic. The method comprises storing a key allocated to at least one of said terminals 12,13 or to at least one of the subscribers using one of the terminals 12,13, at the terminal 12,13 and at a node 5,8 within a network 1,6 through which said session is conducted, or a node coupled to that network. Prior to the creation of said session, a seed value is exchanged between the terminal 12,13 at which the key is stored and said node 5,8. The key and the seed value are used at both the terminal 12,13 and the node 5,8 to generate a pre-master key. The pre-master key becomes known to each of the terminals 12,13 involved in the IP session and to the network node 5,8. The pre-master key is used, directly or indirectly, to encrypt and decrypt traffic associated with said IP session.

Description

The Lawful intercept of end-to-end encrypted data telecommunications

Invention field

The present invention relates to be convenient to Lawful intercept for example is the method and apparatus of the datagram (Data traffic) of IP telecommunications (IP traffic).

Background technology

Can set up by the Internet now and comprise that data connection and voice are connected interior various the connection with video telephone.Along with the increase of the speed and the scope of the Internet, can expect and use the chance of voice and video telephone also can increase.Though current technology is also tended to IP multimedia session is limited in the terminal of receiving on the Internet, following technology will be provided at the IP multimedia session between each small, dedicated telephone terminal and other mobile devices such as PDA, palmtop computer.

Trust for such equipment is won generally, the key issue that must consider is fail safe.Deeply concerned is terminal related in avoiding illegal wiretapping and requiring authentication communication that two main (guarantee that promptly terminal that " user " is connected is that the user wants the terminal that connects, vice versa).Yet deeply concerned is not for these just concerning the IP multimedia, but many multi-form IP signal posts are common.There are some agreements to guarantee datagram safety with password and/or authentication.

Such security personnel's agreement is called IPsec (IETF RFC2401).For IPsec grouping can correctly be encapsulated and dismounting, must with security business be associated in the telecommunications that will send with as the key between the remote node of the predetermined recipient of telecommunications.Used for this reason structure is " security personnel related (Security Association, SA) ".Second kind of security personnel's agreement is called SRTP (security personnel's real-time protocol (RTP) (Secure Real-Time Protocol)), sees " draft-ietf-avt-srtp-02.txt ".Can expect that the third generation mobile network architecture that is called 3GPP will adopt SRTP as the agreement that guarantees IP multimedia telecommunication security.Certainly, the agreement of other such as IPsec also can be used for other mobile network architectures.

In internet draft " draft-ietf-msec-mikey-00.txt ", described a key managing project that is called multimedia internet key formation (MIKEY) and used for using in real time.This scheme is considered establishment and prerequisite master key (Pre-MasterKey, distribution PMK) of security personnel related (SA).(in fact, MIKEY is designated as these keys " TEK produces key ", but PMK is a more general term, will use throughout, because use of the present invention is not limited to MIKEY.) PMK is used for drawing a telecipher key (TEK) for each secure session.Specifically, TEK imports with the key of the selected security personnel's agreement (being SRTP) of opposing.

Summary of the invention

Traditional circuit exchanging telephone net has been taked measure for the Lawful intercept call.Intercepting like this must be instigated by competent department, is the important means of antagonism swindle and other crimes.Be appreciated that desirable is to provide convenience for Lawful intercept IP session (no matter whether being clear data, VoIP, video etc.).Yet this has a potential problem, because the IP security personnel agreement of using has been designed to provide the security measures of the terminal-to-terminal service that relates to strong encryption.

If carry out an agreement such as the MIKEY draft, security personnel's mechanism will depend on the prerequisite master key of deciding through consultation IP session side (PMK).PMK can be proposed by the initiator of session, is accepted (or refusal) by answer party, also can be used in the value that exchanges between the session each side and produce.Decide through consultation that PMK forms the part of IP multimedia key management functions.After PMK decides through consultation, the multimedia key management functions can be encrypted PMK with a privacy key (secret key) of sharing with answer party or with the public-key cryptography (public key) of answer party, perhaps the initiator can calculate the power of a Diffie-Hellman mould, to obtain PMK.Can see that in order to intercept the telecommunications with session association, the third party must know PMK.

The objective of the invention is to be convenient to one of Lawful intercept needs session each side to decide through consultation the IP session that a PMK uses for the telecommunication security that guarantees to send by session.

According to a first aspect of the present invention, a kind of method of being convenient to the data session between two or more terminals of Lawful intercept is provided, wherein said session guarantees telecommunication security with encrypting, described method comprises the following steps:

The key of at least one terminal in the described terminal of dispensing is stored in this terminal and is stored in a node that makes in the net that described session carried out or a node that is connected with this net;

Before the session of setting up between these terminals, between the terminal of storage key and described node, exchange seed (seed value);

Produce a prerequisite master key in this terminal with key and seed, wherein said prerequisite master key also becomes known for each related in this terminal or data session other-end; And

With described prerequisite master key directly or indirectly to the telecipher and the deciphering of described session association.

According to a second aspect of the present invention, a kind of method that guarantees the data security that sends between a plurality of terminals is provided, each terminal is respectively received on the communication network, and at least one terminal in these terminals is furnished with a home network (home network), and this method comprises the following steps:

Send a seed by the respective communication net to described at least one terminal from home network, as the part of a call signaling level authentication procedure (call signalling levelauthentication); And

Described at least one terminal produce with described seed one or more telecipher keys for to terminal between the related telecommunications of calling carry out End to End Encryption and use.

This method preferably comprises a privacy key is stored in described portable terminal and being stored in the home network, and this key sent to described mobile network for using from home network described authentication procedure, this key also is used for producing described telecipher key by wireless terminal.The step that produces one or more telecipher keys comprises the cipher key change program of carrying out between each terminal.

Preferably, with session initiation protocol set up and control terminal between calling, and this method comprises described random value is sent to portable terminal from the P-CSCF node of described home network by described mobile network.More preferably, described call signaling level authentication procedure is an IMS AKA program.

Preferably, this method also comprises described random value is transmitted to Lawful intercept organ of power, makes it to calculate the telecipher key, is decrypted thereby the telecommunications of encrypting can be transmitted to organ of power behind a call setup.

In appended claims, give some other situation of the present invention and desirable characteristic.

Description of drawings

Fig. 1 principle ground illustration make the communication network that can set up the IP session between two portable terminals;

Fig. 2 show between the portable terminal of Fig. 1 and a net node, exchange with establish the signaling that shared privacy key is relevant;

Fig. 3 intercepts the flow chart of the method for IP session for illustration;

Fig. 4 illustration the signaling relevant with Diffie-Hellman exchange;

Fig. 5 illustration the web frame of UE to visit net registration;

Fig. 6 illustration the AKA agreement;

Fig. 7 illustration with authentication and the module of the relevant UE that ensures public security;

Fig. 8 illustration setting up the step of SIP in calling out; And

Fig. 9 at length illustration setting up two steps among the SIP that receives between the online user of different 3G.

Embodiment

The illustrated communication system of Fig. 1 comprises first mobile radio communication 1, is assumed to be a 3GPP (or UMTS) net for this explanation.In 3GPP net 1 is 2 and GPRS nets 3 of a UMTS terrestrial radio Access Network (UTRAN).The GPRS net comprises one or more Serving GPRS Support Nodes (SGSN) 4 and one or more Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN) 5.The responsibility of SGSN 4 is the position of subscriber equipment (UE) in maintain subscription data (identification number and address) and the tracking network.The responsibility of GGSN 5 is the IP address of maintain subscription information and dispensing, and follows the tracks of the SGSN 4 that UE connect.Net 1 also contains some customer data bases, and for example HSS or AuC/HLR 14 are used for safeguarding relevant user's subscription information, the cipher key application information that is used to ensure public security etc.

Fig. 1 also illustration second mobile radio communication 6, also being assumed to be is a 3GPP net.This net also comprises some SGSN 7 and the GGSN 8 of a part that forms a GPRS net 9, and a UTRAN 10.GGSN 5,8 receives on the IP network 11.UE 12,13 receives respectively on first and second nets 1,6.3GPP has been for UE provides a kind of " all the time connect " service, makes UE so long as registered this service to a net (home network or visit net), and they just can be assigned to the IP address, thereby can receive and send data and do not need to connect.Available call setup agreement, for example (Session Initiation Protocol SIP), sets up the Multimedia session between two UE 12,13 of Fig. 1 to session initiation protocol.(SIP will be described in detail after a while.Set up session as long as know available SIP here by " invitation " other user's participant sessions.) in GPRS net 3,9, be the strategy that GGSN 5,8 realizes network operator, for example which user can obtain which kind of service, user's priority etc.

Usually, when the operator of a 3GPP net was registered, he obtained a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card, has a unique IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) code above a user.Except that IMSI, here advise a privacy key k also is stored on the SIM card.This key has only network operator and user's (exactly being user's SIM card) to know, and a copy of this key is stored in the customer data base (SDB) 14 of the HSS of user's the home network for example of attaching troops to a unit or HLR/AuC.Be stored on user's the SIM card pseudo-random function in addition in (perhaps being stored in user's the memory of UE) and the SDB 14, key formation hash such as SHA-1 or MD5 or 3GPPMilenage algorithm (seeing 3GPP TS 35.205-35.209) (or MAC, message authentication code) and so on.

Owing to reason above-mentioned, may need the IP session between two UE 12,13 is intercepted.The situation of intercepting execution is as follows.

Suppose that session is by a UE 12 initiations.UE 12 sends an invitation message by the GGSN 5 that it connect.This invitation message has marked initiation UE 12 and response UE (being UE 13 in this case).In this stage, session initiation is in wait state, and database 14 is checked, and determines whether it has the key of initiating UE 12.If there is not key in database 14, session initiation does not just allow to continue, so can return to 12 1 notification messages of UE.On the other hand, if there is the key of UE 12, SDB 14 just produces a random number or " disposable number (nonce) " returns to UE 12 by GGSN 5.This disposable number provides a seed (seed value) for further calculating.Disposable number does not need security personnel to be transferred to UE 12 (promptly encrypting).Then, UE 12 and SDB 14 both sides are by calculating a prerequisite master key (PMK) k_m to cipher key shared and disposable number application pseudo-random function, promptly

k_m＝PRF(k，nonce)

After having determined PMK, GGSN 5 just sends invitation message to the home network 6 of response UE 13 by " IP Multimedia System " 15, the 16 operator operation of mobile network 1,6 (respectively by).The GGSN 8 that response UE 13 passes through to be connect receives invitation message.Suppose response UE 13 request of setting up of being ready to accept session, so the stage 1 of IKE (for example be MIKEY) begins.This requires UE 12 to send the PMK that it is determined with SDB 14 to UE 13.The privacy key that PMK can share with UE 12,13 or with the public key encryption (SRTP does not stipulate how to exchange or to consult PMK, and it only requires that common secret PMK is necessary for known to the each side, for example by utilizing MIKEY) of response UE 13.No matter be which kind of situation, the result is that the SDB 14 that UE 12,13 and initiation UE 12 are connect knows PMK when the stage 1 finishes.

In the stage 2 of IKE, the PMK that UE 12,13 usefulness are shared produces a telecipher key (TEK).In the MIKEY draft of mentioning related program has been proposed in the above.Know owing to calculate required algorithm and parameter (the comprising PMK) SDB 14 of TEK, so SDB can calculate TEK.In case produced TEK, just can begin the IP session.Telecommunications is used for example SRTP encryption and decryption in the UE 12,13 that uses this TEK.In some cases, can produce a pair of TEK in the stage 2 of IKE, one of them TEK is used for to the telecipher on the direction and another TEK is used for to the telecipher on the rightabout.

As can be seen, will pass through GGSN 5 all the time with the IP telecommunications of session association.Thereby GGSN 5 can intercept telecommunications, if obtain these keys from SDB 14, with regard to available TEK it is deciphered.Then, the telecommunications through deciphering can be sent to governmental power mechanism such as the police.Perhaps, also can be that the net operator is given to governmental power mechanism with TEK during session is set up.Intercept at GGSN 5 places telecommunications therefore directly transmit governmental power mechanism, governmental power mechanism can decipher telecommunications with the TEK that had before received.

Fig. 2 illustration produce the signaling relevant with PMK with switching phase.Fig. 3 is the flow chart of this mechanism of further illustration.Be appreciated that if ratify Lawful intercept is carried out in this IP session also just GGSN can obtain TEK.

Can between some governments and net operator, hold consultation, make a governmental power mechanism can intercept the IP session of initiating at an extraneous UE of interested government power.In this case, the PMK that the node at extranets can be produced sends to the net under this interested government power administration from these extranets.Can intercept the IP session with PMK then.

Though abovely describe, invention is not to be considered as being limited to mobile network with regard to UE and mobile network.The present invention also be applicable to the IP session of carrying out between the terminal of receiving on online and other wireless networks of fixed line and receiving dissimilar online terminals (for example one be portable terminal and another is the fixed line terminal) between the IP session carried out.The present invention can be used to be connected on the same Access Network UE be connected to different Access Networks on UE.

In a kind of modification of said procedure, can with a kind of such as data encryption standard (DES) or Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption function rather than produce PMK with pseudo-random function according to disposable number and shared secret key.In another modification, can be with the part of shared secret key or its modified model rather than with whole shared secret key k generation PMK.In another modification, TEK draws by one or more intermediate cryptographic keys from PMK.

The personnel that are familiar with this technical field can see, can carry out various modifications to the embodiment of above explanation under the situation that does not deviate from scope of patent protection of the present invention.For example, can produce PMK, rather than produce PMK by initiating UE with the exchange of the Diffie-Hellman between the UE that participates in.

If (G *) is an abelian group.G in natural number x and the G establishes

g^x＝g*g*...*g

(the x power of g).This problem of y=g^x is calculated in consideration when given g and x.According to " binary system " method, this can realize with log_2 (x) group's operation (" multiplying each other " and " involution ").Consider now given y (=g^x) and ask the inversion problem of x under the situation of g.This is called (dispersing) logarithm problem.If (G *) is included in real number multiplication under to the group, and logarithm almost resembles easy calculating the calculating g^x itself.Yet, sometimes, for example in that (G *) is

Under multiplication to the integer of the mould of a suitable prime number p

2. the point on the suitable elliptic curve of next bar of addition,

The time, for the logarithm problem still do not know to have assorted petty high efficiency algorithm (running time of best universal method roughly with | G|^ (1/2) is directly proportional, wherein | G| estimates for the group's), though " forward exponentiation " remain that high efficiency calculates.

Be rendered as ticklishly based on discrete logarithm problem, Diffie-Hellman adopts following key to decide through consultation method.If (G is such one " firmly " group *), and establishing g again is the appointment unit of G.Below with two terminal UE _AAnd UE _BFor example in Fig. 4 illustration the situation of this agreement.(note by interchangeability: yB^xA=(g^xB) ^xA=(g^xA) ^xB=yA^xB.) result of Diffie-Hellinan exchange is a shared secret key k that PMK is provided.

In fact, owing to security personnel's reason, can directly not encrypt telecommunications, but draw certain Traffic encryption key(TEK) (TEK) (for example by getting the hash of PMK) from PMK k with k.For complete security personnel, UE _AAnd UE _BNo matter will need mutual authentication, be with the shared secret key of previously known or with digital signature and certificate.

Disposable number exchange and Diffie-Hellman exchange between integrated use net and the UE just can obtain a kind of reliable mechanism that obtains the shared secret key, and this mechanism allows to carry out Lawful intercept.This relates to from SDB to initiating disposable number of UE transmission.UE and SDB both sides are to this disposable number and shared secret cipher key application pseudo-random function, generation value x.UE is according to x the power of g^x generation value g, and wherein g is a non-secret value, is known for the UE that participates in communication with for SDB at least.The value that calculates (first interaction parameter) sends to response UE.After response UE receives a disposable number from the SDB that it connected, just produce a shared secret key y, calculate g^y (second interaction parameter) again, it is returned to initiate UE with it.So both sides calculate PMK according to k_m=g^ (xy).During this process, node such as GGSN can be intercepted and captured or " discovery " issues the value g^y that initiates UE from response UE.As long as GGSN has known the value (for example, being that SDB gives it) of x, it just also can calculate PMK.This can decipher GGSN to telecommunications.In addition, in a preferred alternative, GGSN just is given to the center of intercepting with telecommunications, and key is given to the center of intercepting in addition, at the center of intercepting telecommunications is deciphered.

Be appreciated that at UE to be roamed into from its home network (being the net that UE contracts) under the situation of the area of coverage of a visit net that privacy key k is known for UE and its home network just referring to Fig. 5.In order to ensure public security, preferably key k does not allow the visit net know.Yet, still can carry out Lawful intercept to the UE in the visit net.In this case, disposable number can send to UE by the visit net from home network.Simultaneously, home network calculates PMK, and it is sent to the visit net.Therefore, the visit net can be to the telecommunications deciphering of encrypting with PMK (the perhaps TEK that draws from PMK).Under the situation that adopts the Diffie-Hellman exchange, the visit net obtains the value x that home network sends, and can the value of listening to g^y, visits net and can calculate PMK{g^ (xy) thereby make }.

3G (UMTS) cellular standards supports authentication and the key between portable terminal (UE) and the net (radio network controller (RNC) node) to decide through consultation.One of this agreement is called authentication and key and decides through consultation that the part of (AKA) agreement is used for determining the key of the telecommunications that link between a protection UE and the RNC is interior.Yet the agreement of this prior art is not considered to guarantee the safety of telecommunications outside this link with this key or key that some draw from this key.Here propose to guarantee the end-to-end i.e. safety from the user terminal to the user terminal of telecommunications with key.

The working condition of AKA is as follows.The home network shared secret key k of mobile terminal UE and it (be stored on the SIM card of UE and the SDB that is stored in operator is in HSS or the HLR/AuC).Receive a visit when online at UE, this visit net is to " quintet " of being made up of five values of home network request.Related here just wherein three values, rand, XRES and k _cValue rand is a random value that produces with home network.Value k _cCan equal privacy key x, by to privacy key k _iUse key derivative function KDF with random value rand and (normally use k for one _iBlock encryption function as key) draws, i.e. k _c=KDF (k _i, rand).XRES is drawn by home network, is XRES=f (k _i, rand), wherein function f is generally a disclosed known function.

The visit net will be worth rand and be transmitted to UE.Therefore UE knows function f and KDF, can calculate kc and RES as a result.Value RES returns to the visit net, compares with value XRES there.Suppose XRES=RES, the visit net has just confirmed that UE is credible.Other of wishing to communicate by letter with it for the terminal of at first mentioning are received a portable terminal that visit is online, will carry out similar program.Utilize the Diffie-Hellman exchange, both sides' terminal just can be known this PMK.Because the visit net can be found g^k _{C (A or B)}, it also just can draw PMK (g^ _{Kc (a or B)}k _{C (B or A)}).The visit net also can authenticate a terminal and be to use the key k that decides through consultation _cRather than attempt to play tricks with other self-generating keys.The further illustration of Fig. 6 the AKA agreement, though Fig. 7 illustration these modules that are used for supporting AKA and IKE that in UE, realize, the dotted line in Fig. 7 has indicated at one and has been used for improving the assembly that should contain in anti-the altering " module " of fail safe.

Illustrated mechanism has supposed that the visit net is believable in the last paragraph.If situation is not like this, a solution is to allow portable terminal to produce a key k _c'=KDF2 (k _i, rand), wherein KDF2 be on the password with KDF another key derivative function independently.The independence of KDF and KDF2 can realize with diverse function, can be a block encryption KDF (k also at first function, r)=E (k, r) obtain second function with a simple conversion under the situation, for example KDR2=E (k XORm is arranged for certain fixing bit mask m, r) (certainly, also have other alternative solutions).These two keys that in the Diffie-Hellman exchange, use portable terminal to produce.Because the visit net is not also known KDF2, so they can not draw key k _{C ' (A and B)}Carry out Lawful intercept at a visit net if desired, can be with the privacy key k of a terminal _c' send to this visit net from the home network of this terminal.Lawful intercept can be carried out in home network, as long as the visit net at first provides the value g^k that is found to home network _c, then again the telecommunications of encrypting is transmitted to home network.

Adopt this mechanism, a visit net can not be with the privacy key k that decides through consultation _c' confirm that a terminal is certain.This is easy to the value g^k by allowing the exchange of visit net to find _{C (A and B)}The value that will send is compared with the value that should send and is remedied again.This does not still make a visit net at first not receive key k from home network _c' situation under can intercept telecommunications.

As the personnel that are familiar with this technical field can see, can also do further modification to top illustrated embodiment.For example, available MTI, platform are decided through consultation PMK to platform agreement etc. rather than Diffie-Hellman between portable terminal.Use the modification of property in many ways of IKE, multiple terminals teleconference that can organization security.

Among the illustrated embodiment, supposed that privacy key k and pseudo-random function PRF are stored on user's the SIM card in the above.Along with SIM card is improved,, therefore might the whole process that produces PMK will on SIM card, finish comprising disposal ability to a certain degree.

For further illustration the present invention, will describe another embodiment below.This embodiment uses the present invention on SIP (application) level, can for example use under the situation of user's IP multimedia communication the user.This example is based on current 3GPP standard, but very clear being not limited thereto.Suppose that these UE that wish foundation security personnel session register to visit net separately, with access network.This will relate to usually carries out the AKA program between UE and GGSN separately and home network.The 2nd AKA program that is called IMS AKA (seeing IETF RFC3310) is used in the SIP level UE being authenticated.The present invention has utilized the mode can not introduce extra signaling traffic load of IMS AKA program to produce the advantage of session key.

Done introduction above the session initiation protocol (SIP).Yet more detailed again explanation may be useful.The following abbreviation of this explanation:

CSCF call server controlled function (Call Server Control Function)

CN core net (Core Network)

HTTP hypertext transport protocol (Hyper Text Transport Protocol)

IMPI IMS specific identity number (IMS Private Identity)

IMS IP Multimedia System (IP Multimedia Subsystem)

The SEG gateway (Security Gateway) of ensuring public security

SDP Session Description Protocol (Session Description Protocol)

SIP session initiation protocol (Session Initiation Protocol)

The SADB linked database (Security Association Database) of ensuring public security

The SPD policy database (Security Policy Database) of ensuring public security

UAC user agent client (User Agent Client)

UAS subscriber proxy server (User Agent Server)

SIP is the control protocol that can initiate, stop and revise Multimedia session, specifies in " IETFRFC 2543 (1999) SIP: session initiation protocol ".Multimedia session comprises for example voice call, video conference, streamer and chat.Generally be that Session Description Protocol (SDP) (seeing " IETF RFC 2327 (1998) SDP: Session Description Protocol ") uses in conjunction with SIP, need the coding decoder of usefulness with clear and definite session and negotiation.Can connect a user with different IP addresses (being terminal), this depends on registration process.In registration process, user's sign-on ID number and corresponding IP address.

SIP works in a similar fashion based on HTTP, and promptly it is based on client-server model.Therefore, entity or send request as a client computer perhaps sends response as a server.Sip event has triggered in request and has taken place when a response and client computer receive this response.

When using SIP, to use many different entities.These entities are:

The user agent

User agent and customer interaction are for example when the user invites (foundation) and the opposing party's audio call.A user agent can be a client computer or server, and this depends on that it is to initiate request or return response.

Acting server

Acting server can be (the Call Stateful) of call state monitoring, (Transaction Stateful) or (Stateless) of stateless monitoring of transaction status monitoring.The agency of a stateless monitoring does not store any state, and promptly it is only transmitted request and can carry out Route Selection for response according to the path leader.The agency of a call state monitoring begins the store status parameter from the session that starts with INVITE, up to conversation end.Such agency can measure the length of calling.Notice that all sip messages subsequently all will be by the agency of a call state monitoring in a specific session.The agency of transaction status monitoring, the agency of branch (Forking proxy) for example, storage only with a parameter that specific affairs are relevant, promptly store this affairs always into and finish.

The agency of branch(Forking Proxy)

The agency of branch is a sip agent, can attempt some different position candidate for an INVITE, and this can finish in the serial or parallel mode.

Redirect Server(Redirect Server)

Redirect Server can have the information of some different contact addresses that can contact with a specific user.If a calling party has tried a friend's public address, calling party's UA will receive the some different candidate site that this friend may be in from Redirect Server.So calling party's UA can attempt all these candidate sites.

Register

Register is accepted registration, i.e. SIP registration.A sip user can be told Register with in which address contacting with this user.

Definition has six different " mechanism " to be included in the request in SIP.These mechanism are:

INVITE(invitation)

INVITE sends to other users or the server that this user wishes to set up with it session (for example video conference or streamer) from a user.

ACK(affirmation)

SIP has used a kind of three journeys for INVITE shake hands (three-way handshake).This is the unique method as three journeys, and every other method all is a round trip.This allows to use the agency of branch.In addition, it has also been considered owing to different reasons may will be expended the considerable time by invited party before actual accepting the invitation.Initiate the user and when the invited user call accepted, send ACK.At this moment, all interested parties to have examined INVITE still effective.

OPTIONS(option)

OPTIONS is used for identifying the ability of a server, and for example which method it supports.

BYE(goodbye)

In the time will stopping a session, just send a BYE.

CANCEL(cancelling)

A user may send INVITE to another user.Before returning ACK, send the user who invites and to stop this affairs owing to different reasons with CANCEL.

REGISTER(registration)

The user can send a REGISTER to a Register, with the IP address notification server that can contact with this user.

Fig. 8 illustration set up the program of " calling " with SIP.In this case, play the UA transmission INVITE that will play server or UAS effect of the user agent of client computer or UAC effect to a friend.UAC sends INVITE (1) to acting server SIP, and acting server will be communicated by letter (2) with a dns server, so that find out the address of next hop.Acting server is transmitted SIP INVITE (3), and at this time acting server need be communicated by letter (4) with a location server, so that find out recipient's IP address, and then transmits INVITE (5).Subscriber proxy server will be beamed back response to UAC, and response has sentence structure 180 RINGING (ring) in SIP.So UAC knows message and is received by UAS.In this case, UAC can determine end call, for example drags too for a long time owing to UAS replys.At that rate, UAC sends SIP CANCEL to the UAS with SIP 200 OK response.If the user determines answering call, UAS just postbacks SIP 200OK, so UAC will send SIP ACK to UAS, expression is called out and remained up-to-date.Note having some packet loss, therefore this ACK mechanism is essential.Here it is, and so-called three journeys are shaken hands.Now, for example use RTP to begin session according to defined in " IETF RFC 1889 (1996) RTP: use transportation protocol in real time ".(notice that Session Initiation Protocol is experiencing some important changes, for example reflects some 3GPP requirements, can be referring to " IETF RFC 2543bis-09 (2002) SIP: session initiation protocol ".

3GPP IMS is a CN in the UMTS, based on SIP.Relevant with SIP in IMS have four entities:

UE (subscriber equipment) contains UA

P-CSCF plays a part an outbound proxy.This is first contact point of the UA in the UE that is in the visit net.It transmits the SIP request to I-CSCF.Attention: if GGSN resides in the home network, P-CSCF is just also in home network.

This is contact point in home network for I-CSCF, plays a part a sip agent.It transmits SIP request or response to S-CSCF.

This can be equivalent to Register, acting server and a UA S-CSCF.Before UE can send INVITE, it must at first successfully register a disclosed identification number or IMPU.Registering an IMPU finishes to home network transmission REGISTER by UE.HN issues an inquiry (challenge) to UE.The identification number that obtains authenticating is specific identity number or IMPI, and authentication is carried out by S-CSCF.

Fig. 9 illustration send the situation of INVIIE from a UE to another UE, these two UE reside in the 3GPP net.

For first and last hop (between UE and P-CSCF), by in that " 3GTS 33.203: third generation partnership project (3GPP); Technical specification group (TSG) SA3; The access security of IP-based service, (version 5) " in such IPsec ESP that uses of defined.(note: this protection is for the SIP signaling, rather than for actual user's communication.) sensitive data will exchange between visit net and home network with Session Initiation Protocol.Therefore require mid-level net SIP signaling to protect with SEG.

Key management

The session key of integrity protection draws from IMS AKA program.When UE sends a unshielded REGISTER message, receive home network (HN) after this message, promptly S-CSCF just issues an inquiry to UE.This sip message that contains inquiry comprises the session key that is fit to P-CSCF, and UE draws identical session key according to this inquiry.This program relates to as mentioned above to P-CSCF transmission rand, XRES and k _cParameter and transmit the rand parameter to UE.

IKE

IKE is used for consulting to protect the IPsec SA of the SIP signaling between visit net and the home network.

Remember that importantly just the SIP signaling is by IMS (CSCF node), the actual user data payload will send by common GPRS (GGSN) net by an agreement carrying as RTP.Therefore, key management (for example MIKEY) will be the part of SIP signaling in the IMS usually, and actual safety measure (for example SRTP) is used for passing through the grouping that another path sends in whole GPRS net.

Utilize the above introduction that the IP multimedia call is set up, the following describes the exemplary manner that available the present invention intercepts the IP multimedia communication of the 3GPP standard of deferring to that obtains end-to-end protection (for example using SRTP).For simplicity, suppose to adopt between the user Diffie-Hellman key to decide through consultation (for example using MIKEY), the personnel that are familiar with this technical field certainly know that it equally also is operable that the additive method (using the method for prerequisite shared key or public-key cryptography) that illustrates is previously done after the corresponding modify.

As mentioned above, when a user A execution SIP registration, he will draw the key k of the SIP signaling between the interior P-CSCF of a protection he and visit net.Utilize k, can draw key and form data x (for example, in the simplest form, establishing x=k).User A gives user B with g^x as his Diffie-Hellman value transmission (for example being used as the MIKEY of the part of a SIP/SDP message) now on call setup.Similar, user B obtains key y, postbacks g^y in a similar fashion.Net separately can carry out Lawful intercept with the g^y (or g^x) of known index x (or y) and " discovery " now, corresponding key is formed data (for example from the x of P-CSCF with from the g^y of GGSN) is transmitted to and intercepts a little, again with the telecommunications (encrypted) of reality from it the GGSN node of process be transmitted to and intercept a little.Note,, do not need to change existing standardized communication interface if the present invention uses with 3GPP IMS standard.

Certainly, as the personnel that are familiar with this technical field are easy to see, also available here all before mentioned expansion, for example adopt secondary key to derive KDF2, intercept only to allow home network to carry out.

Claims

1. method of being convenient to the data session between two or more terminals of Lawful intercept, wherein said session guarantees telecommunication security with encrypting, described method comprises the following steps:

The key of at least one terminal in the described terminal of dispensing is stored in this terminal and is stored in a node that makes in the network that described session carried out or a node that is connected with this network;

Before the session of setting up between these terminals, seed of exchange between the terminal of storage key and described node;

Produce a prerequisite master key in terminal with key and seed, wherein said prerequisite master key also becomes known for each related in this terminal or data session other-end; And

2. the process of claim 1 wherein that described node produces prerequisite master key, use for the Lawful intercept data session.

3. claim 1 or 2 method, the wherein said step that produces prerequisite master key with key and seed in terminal comprise with a cipher key change program one first interaction parameter are sent to another terminal and one second interaction parameter is sent to described at least one terminal from this another terminal from described at least one terminal.

4. the method for claim 3, wherein said cipher key change program are the Diffie-Hellman exchanges.

5. the method for claim 4, described method comprise that also described key and seed are used a key derivative function draws one second key, produces a power of described second key, again for use in the Diffie-Hellman exchange.

6. the method for any one claim in the above claim is wherein saidly carried out in the time will setting up a new data session in exchange seed between terminal and the net node and the step that produces prerequisite master key at every turn.

7. the method for claim 6, wherein said between terminal and net node exchange seed and the step that produces prerequisite master key no matter whether need to give Lawful intercept for each data session execution.

8. the method for any one claim in the above claim, wherein said prerequisite master key is used for producing one or more telecipher keys by terminal related in the data session, and these telecipher keys are used for to the telecipher related with data session.

9. the method for any one claim in the above claim, wherein said node are nodes of the signatory with it home network of the user of described at least one terminal.

10. the method for claim 9, wherein said at least one terminal is connected on the extranets, and described seed sends to terminal by these extranets.

11. the method for claim 10, when accessory claim 5, the node that also is included in described home network produces second key, and this key is sent to extranets with seed, and seed rather than described second key are sent to terminal.

12. the method for any one claim in the above claim, wherein said data session are IP data sessions.

13. method of intercepting a data session of setting up with the method for any one claim in the above claim, described method is included in described node and produces prerequisite master key, and directly or indirectly data is deciphered with prerequisite master key at this node or another node that receives prerequisite master key.

14. the method for claim 13, when accessory claim 4, described method also is included in described node or sends to the power of one second key of described at least one terminal from a reciprocity terminal in another node detection that session telecommunications is passed through between the Diffie-Hellman commutation period, and produces prerequisite master key with second key of described at least one terminal of sum of powers of detected second key.

15. a line module that is used for communication terminal, described module comprises:

Memory allocation is given the memory of a user's who uses this terminal a key;

Before a data session of setting up between the communication terminal described module and one make communication network that the enciphered data session carried out node or with a node that this net is connected between exchange the device of a seed;

Produce a device that also becomes known prerequisite master key for each related in this terminal or data session other-end with key and seed; And

With prerequisite master key directly or indirectly to the telecipher of described session association and the device of deciphering.

16. one kind be used to intercept with receive a communication network on two or more terminals between the network node of the related encryption telecommunications of the data session that carries out, described node comprises:

Memory allocation is given terminal or to the memory of the user's of described net registration key;

Before a data session of setting up between the terminal with the device of terminal switch seed; And

Produce a prerequisite master key or key and seed sent to key and seed and have the device of another node that produces the device of a prerequisite master key with key and seed.

At least one terminal in the described terminal is a vehicular radio 17. a method of being convenient to the data session between two or more terminals of Lawful intercept, wherein said session are with encrypting the assurance telecommunication security, and described method comprises:

A key of distributing to described at least one terminal or user is stored in a node in the home network of this terminal and this terminal/subscriber;

With described key terminal/subscriber is authenticated during in terminal/subscriber to the registration of home network and/or one visit net; And

With key and a seed that sends to terminal from home network to the telecommunications End to End Encryption during described data session.

18. the method for claim 17, wherein said step with the key authentication terminal/subscriber uses authentication and key to decide through consultation the AKA agreement, and this agreement also guarantees the data security that sends with key on a radio link.

19. the method for claim 17 or 18, wherein said step with the key authentication terminal/subscriber is included in described node and produces a challenge value and produce a response at portable terminal with key, challenge value is compared with response, only when these two value couplings, prove that just terminal/subscriber is credible.

20. the method for any one claim in the claim 17 to 19, wherein saidly the step of telecommunications End to End Encryption is included in the used for mobile terminal seed and the key at first mentioned produces one second key, and carries out Diffie-Hellman with described second key and exchange with key and the seed that sends to terminal from home network.

21. the method for any one claim in the claim 17 to 20, described method also comprises key and seed is sent to a Lawful intercept organ of power, the user's telecommunications that wherein need intercept is transmitted to Lawful intercept organ of power from Access Network, and organ of power can the telecommunications deciphering to being transmitted with key that receives and seed.

Find one or more and the related parameter of the IKE between the described terminal in Access Network 22. the method for claim 21, described method also comprise, and these parameters are transmitted to Lawful intercept organ of power with described key and seed.

23. one kind guarantees the method for respectively receiving the data security that wherein sends between the terminal of at least one home network of attaching troops to a unit on the communication network a plurality of, described method comprises the following steps:

Send a seed by the respective communication net to described at least one terminal from home network, as the part of call signaling level authentication procedure; And

Produce one or more telecipher keys in described at least one terminal with described seed, for to terminal between the related telecommunications of calling carry out End to End Encryption and use.

24. the method for claim 23, wherein said at least one terminal are to receive a mobile radio terminal that mobile communication is online.

25. the method for claim 23 or 24, described method comprises a privacy key is stored in described at least one terminal and the home network, and this key or a key that from then on draws sent to described communication network from home network, for using in described authentication procedure, the key that is sent also is used for producing described telecipher key by wireless terminal.

26. the method for claim 25, the step of the one or more telecipher keys of wherein said generation comprise the cipher key change program of execution between these terminals.

27. the method for any one claim in the claim 23 to 26, wherein set up with session initiation protocol and control terminal between calling.

28. the method for claim 27, described method also comprise described seed is sent to described at least one terminal from S-CSCF node of described home network through a P-CSCF node of described communication network.

29. the method for claim 28, wherein said call signaling level authentication procedure is an IMSAKA program.

30. the method for any one claim in the claim 23 to 29, described method also comprises described seed is transmitted to a Lawful intercept organ of power, make this organ of power can calculate the telecommunications decruption key, thereby when a call setup, the telecommunications of encrypting can be transmitted to this organ of power's deciphering.

31. one kind is transmitted the method for data at one between by second terminal of one second network service on the basis end-to-end security personnel by first terminal of one first network service and one, described method comprises:

One first authentication and key are decided through consultation subprogram, relate to the specified home operator of one first class value from first terminal sent to first network and draw at least one first encryption parameter that first terminal will be used according to first class value;

One second authentication and key are decided through consultation subprogram, relate to the specified home operator of one second class value from second terminal sent to second net and draw at least one second encryption parameter that second terminal will be used according to second class value;

A cipher key change subprogram relates to one first interaction parameter is sent to second terminal and one second interaction parameter is sent to first terminal from second terminal from first terminal; And

A stage of communication, this stage first terminal and second terminal by one in first terminal according to described at least one first encryption parameter and described second interaction parameter with in second terminal according to the exchange message that is connected of described at least one second encryption parameter and the described first interaction parameter End to End Encryption.

32. one kind is transmitted the method for data according to claim 31, it is characterized in that at least that in first network one of them intercepts the information exchange between first terminal and second terminal according to second encryption parameter and first interaction parameter according to first encryption parameter and second interaction parameter with in second network.

33. one kind is transmitted the system of data according to end-to-end ensuring safety between first and second terminals, described system comprises:

One is first network of first Terminal Service;

One is second network of second Terminal Service;

First network has one to the specified home operator of first terminal and the interface of second network, and second network has one to the specified home operator of second terminal and the interface of first network, and

At least one is stored in the Lawful intercept database of any interaction parameter of setting up between the described terminal that exchanges during end-to-end security personnel connect between first terminal and second terminal, one of them can insert described at least one Lawful intercept database from least the first network and second network.

34. one kind according to end-to-end security personnel is transmitted the communication node of data by first terminal of one first network service and one between by second terminal of one second network service at one, it is characterized in that described node comprises:

One first ciphering unit is used for the specified home operator of one first class value from first terminal sent to first network and draw at least one first encryption parameter that first terminal will be used according to first class value;

One second ciphering unit is used for the specified home operator of one second class value from second terminal sent to second network and draw at least one second encryption parameter that second terminal will be used according to second class value; And

A cipher key change unit is used for one first interaction parameter is sent to second terminal and one second interaction parameter is sent to first terminal from second terminal from first terminal.

35. one kind is transmitted the terminal of data with at least one other-end on end-to-end security personnel's basis, described terminal is by one first network service, and described at least one other-end is by one second network service, and the feature of described terminal is that it comprises:

One first ciphering unit is used for to one first class value of specified home operator request of first terminal and receives at least one first encryption parameter;

A cipher key change unit is used for one first interaction parameter is sent to described at least one other-end and receives one second interaction parameter from described at least one other-end; And

A data transceiver was used for by being connected and described at least one other-end exchange message according to described at least one first encryption parameter and the described second interaction parameter End to End Encryption.