CN1287339A - Method of realizing key data specificity in safe IC card Business - Google Patents
Method of realizing key data specificity in safe IC card Business Download PDFInfo
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- CN1287339A CN1287339A CN 99118993 CN99118993A CN1287339A CN 1287339 A CN1287339 A CN 1287339A CN 99118993 CN99118993 CN 99118993 CN 99118993 A CN99118993 A CN 99118993A CN 1287339 A CN1287339 A CN 1287339A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 47
- 238000005096 rolling process Methods 0.000 claims description 4
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 4
- 101100059544 Arabidopsis thaliana CDC5 gene Proteins 0.000 description 2
- 101150115300 MAC1 gene Proteins 0.000 description 2
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- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 description 1
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Abstract
The method is to establish same key trade data for present trade separately in safety module of both IC card and terminal by means of same mechanism. The key trade data should be established before every business and the establishment depends not only on the characteristic data the IC card provides for the present business but also on those the terminal provides for the same business. During the establishment of key trade data enciphered algorithm is adopted. All these ensure the specificity of the key trade data and the safety of the IC card business.
Description
The present invention relates to the IC-card application, particularly in the IC-card Secure Transaction, a kind of critical data that prevents from wherein to conclude the business is eavesdropped the method with bootlegging.
At present, the application of IC-card is more and more universal, scope also more and more widely, especially in the new application of IC-card, in order to guarantee security, to the security of wherein transaction critical data with uniquely proposed new requirement.The uniqueness of so-called data is meant data itself and this transaction tight association, and the content of data should have nothing in common with each other in any twice different transaction.
In existing IC-card technology, owing to there is not a special demand for security, so not to the protection of the in addition special uniqueness of the transaction critical data of transaction, to prevent extraneous eavesdropping data and illegally to be duplicated.But under new application background, to the transaction critical data uniqueness requirement has been proposed.
For example, in the application of pre-sales consumption, for solving the problem of illegal solution ash lock, and the critical data of introducing--pintle hook lock source, when ash lock IC-card, IC-card is charged in the source of pintle hook lock, when separating the ash lock or before, IC-card need be carried out this pintle hook lock source and separate the judgement that ash is locked legitimacy, and whole process of exchange will be run through in this pintle hook lock source.For guaranteeing the security of transaction, this pintle hook lock source just can not be duplicated easily by other-end safety module.But, when the terminal security module adopt be the PSAM card time because the preservation of PSAM card is not safe, that is to say, have the PSAM card by other people are ill-gotten may.After this situation takes place, in existing technology, do not have corresponding safety guarantee mechanism, after this just makes transaction critical data in the process of exchange by illegal wiretapping, might on other PSAM card, copy the critical data of transaction comparatively easily--the pintle hook lock source, thus be the IC-card illegal solution ash lock of ash lock.
Above-mentioned pintle hook lock source can be a process key of setting up on the IC-card when specific implementation, and this process key is relevant with the interim pseudo random number that generates of IC-card.In terminal offline transaction process, the process of setting up of this process key generally all is: provide pseudo random number, electronic bankbook/stored value card offline transaction sequence number by IC-card, provide the terminal transaction sequence number by the PSAM card, in IC-card and terminal PSAM card, set up identical interim process key with identical mechanism respectively and be used for this process of exchange.But since the terminal transaction sequence number that provides of PSAM card useful have only latter two byte, and this is more or less freely exactly by imitated (can be last two that the terminal transaction sequence number is adjusted in the zero authentication of withholing by the repeatedly amount of money to terminal PSAM card), so, if after having intercepted IC-card pseudo random number in certain transaction, electronic bankbook/stored value card offline transaction sequence number data, just can relatively easily in another PSAM card, be reappeared this process key, thus can be to being carried out the illegal solution ash by the IC-card of ash lock in the current transaction.
From top analysis as can be seen, the very corn of a subject is: because the safe class of the peculiar data that the safe class of the required peculiar data of setting up of critical data of participating in business in the terminal security module provides than IC-card is low, thereby, reappeared by other-end safety module easily.
For addressing the above problem, purpose of the present invention just is to provide the anti-eavesdrop of transaction critical data in a kind of IC-card Secure Transaction and the method for bootlegging, promptly guarantees the security and the uniqueness of each transaction critical data.
The present invention seeks to be achieved through the following technical solutions:
A kind of method that realizes critical data uniqueness in the IC-card Secure Transaction, it is for respectively on IC-card and terminal security module, adopt identical mechanism to set up the identical transaction critical data that is used for this Secure Transaction, this transaction critical data all should rebulid in each Secure Transaction; It is characterized in that:
The foundation of this transaction critical data not only depends on the characteristic relevant with this transaction that IC-card itself provides, and also must depend on the characteristic relevant with this transaction that the terminal security module provides simultaneously.
The algorithm that is used to set up this transaction critical data for safety, be difficult for being broken with reverse push away, can be cryptographic algorithm.
According to technique scheme, the pintle hook lock source that the described transaction critical data that is used for this Secure Transaction can be pre-sales consumer sale.
According to technique scheme, the characteristic relevant with this transaction that described IC-card provides itself is by the inner interim pseudo random number that generates of IC-card.
According to technique scheme, described terminal security module provide with the relevant characteristic of this transaction be this terminal security module self distinctive, can't be by external world's replacement, the data that in other-end safety module, can't reappear easily.For example, can be the card number of PSAM card self, a pseudo random number of the interim generation of terminal security module internal etc.
In pre-sales consumer sale, its critical data of concluding the business--the pintle hook lock source is respectively on IC-card and terminal security module, a process consumption key (SESPK) that adopts identical mechanism to set up, the characteristic relevant with this transaction that described IC-card provides itself is the inner interim pseudo random number (ICC) that generates of IC-card, what described terminal security module provided is the interim pseudo random number that generates of this terminal security module internal with the relevant characteristic of this transaction, and being used to set up this process, to consume the algorithm of key (SESPK) be the rolling cryptographic algorithm;
Process consumption key (SESPK)=DES ([3DES (DPK, DATA1)], DATA2), wherein DPK is the consumption key of electronic bankbook on the IC-card (wallet), is to be disperseed to obtain according to the application sequence number of this IC-card by electronic bankbook (wallet) consumption master key (MPK); DATA1 is latter two byte of the transaction sequence number (CTC) that includes the interim pseudo random number (ICC) that generates of described IC-card, electronic bankbook (wallet), terminal transaction sequence number (TTC); DATA2 includes the interim pseudo random number (RAND) that generates of described terminal security module; DES is meant the computing of single-length des encryption, and the formula in the bracket is meant with first parameter encrypts second parameter; 3DES is meant 3 double-length des encryption computings, and the formula in the bracket is meant with first parameter encrypts second parameter.
Because what the foundation of transaction critical data was adopted is the security algorithm that resembles cryptographic algorithm, be difficult for being broken, the foundation that more is this transaction critical data not only depends on the characteristic relevant with this transaction that IC-card itself provides, also must depend on the characteristic relevant that the terminal security module provides simultaneously with this transaction, the characteristic relevant with this transaction that this terminal security module provides can't be replaced by extraneous in this terminal security module internal, and can't be duplicated easily by other-end safety module for this terminal security module is distinctive at that time, therefore fully guaranteed the uniqueness of transaction critical data, thereby make the whole process of exchange of IC-card safer, safety coefficient is greatly improved.
Below with specific embodiment the present invention is described in further detail again.
IC-card with pre-sales transaction is applied as example, uniqueness for the required peculiar data of setting up of critical data of strengthening participating in business in the terminal security module, can consider to comprise in the peculiar data that the terminal security module provides by the interim pseudo random number that produces of terminal security module, the algorithm that its critical data of participating in business is set up is the des encryption algorithm.
Foundation to transaction critical data such as process of exchange key in the existing technology has all used the pseudo random number that IC-card provides, so can provide pseudo random number simultaneously by the terminal security module, the foundation of fellowship process of exchange key.The algorithm of setting up can use the mode of rolling and encrypting, the pseudo random number that i.e. use comprises IC-card to be provided produces intermediate key in interior data with existing technology, again with intermediate key to the pseudo random number that comprises the terminal security module and provide in interior data, adopt and produce the identical cryptographic calculation method of intermediate key, generation is used for the transaction critical data of process of exchange.As long as guarantee that the uniqueness of the uniqueness of the pseudo random number that the terminal security module provides and the pseudo random number that IC-card provides is suitable, the critical data uniqueness under current transaction security grade fully just can guarantee to conclude the business like this.
In concrete the application, be in pre-sales consumer sale flow process, the critical data of will concluding the business--process key is set up by corresponding command response flow process, makes safety verification in the transaction flow afterwards.
The first step, by secure access module (PSAM) the acquisition pseudo random number of terminal from terminal, concurrent ash discharge lock initialization (INITIALIZE FOR CS LOCK) order starts pre-sales transaction, shown in the data field of this command message sees the following form, wherein, the terminal pseudo random number is the characteristic relevant with this transaction that terminal PSAM card provides, and sends to IC-card with INITIALIZE FOR CS LOCK order.
| Explanation | Length (byte) |
| The terminal pseudo random number | 4 |
| Cipher key index | 1 |
| The terminating machine numbering | 6 |
Second step, IC-card receives that INITIALIZE FOR CS LOCK order handles accordingly, and also produce a pseudo random number (ICC), and ICC will be included in the response message of INITIALIZE FOR CS LOCK order and return terminal, and the response message data field sees the following form.
| Explanation | Length (byte) |
| The ED/EP remaining sum | 4 |
| ED/EP offline transaction sequence number | 2 |
| The key version | 1 |
| The algorithm sign | 1 |
| Pseudo random number (ICC) | 4 |
The 3rd step, electronic bankbook/stored value card offline transaction sequence number that terminal uses pseudo random number (ICC) and IC-card to return, consumption safety authentication module (PSAM) will produce a process key (SESPK) and a message authentication sign indicating number (MAC1 represents), verify the legitimacy of PSAM for IC-card.Process key SESPK is used to the pre-sales transaction of electronic bankbook/stored value card, and the mechanism of its generation realizes by following algorithm:
TMPPK=3DES (DPK, the rightest two bytes of pseudo random number (ICC) ‖ electronic bankbook/stored value card offline transaction sequence number ‖ terminal transaction sequence number),
SESPK=DES (TMPPK, terminal pseudo random number ‖ ' 80000000 ')
Above-mentioned DPK is the consumption key of electronic bankbook on the IC-card (wallet), is to be disperseed to obtain according to the application sequence number of this IC-card by electronic bankbook (wallet) consumption master key (MPK).
Terminal is sent the order of ash lock then.
In the 4th step, IC-card is received the order of ash lock, and whether MAC1 is effective in checking, uses with above-mentioned same mechanism and produces same process key.
This process key will run through and comprise and separate that ash lock, withholdd, the online ash of separating is locked in interior whole process of exchange.Simultaneously because the generation of this process key not only depends on characteristic--the pseudo random number ICC relevant with this transaction that IC-card itself provides, also must depend on characteristic--the terminal pseudo random number relevant that the terminal security module provides simultaneously, and the algorithm of encrypting by rolling is set up with this transaction.Because the characteristic relevant with this transaction that this terminal security module provides can't be replaced by extraneous in this terminal security module internal, and can't be duplicated easily by other-end safety module for this terminal security module is distinctive at that time, therefore, guaranteed the uniqueness of transaction critical data, thereby make the whole process of exchange of IC-card safer, safety coefficient is greatly improved.
Claims (8)
1, a kind of method that realizes critical data uniqueness in the IC-card Secure Transaction, it is for respectively on IC-card and terminal security module, adopt identical mechanism to set up the identical transaction critical data that is used for this Secure Transaction, this transaction critical data all should rebulid in each Secure Transaction; It is characterized in that:
The foundation of this transaction critical data not only depends on the characteristic relevant with this transaction that IC-card itself provides, and also must depend on the characteristic relevant with this transaction that the terminal security module provides simultaneously.
2, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that: the algorithm that is used to set up this transaction critical data is a cryptographic algorithm.
3, method according to claim 1 is characterized in that: the pintle hook lock source that the described transaction critical data that is used for this Secure Transaction can be pre-sales consumer sale.
4, according to claim 1 or 3 described methods, it is characterized in that: the characteristic relevant with this transaction that described IC-card provides itself is to comprise the inner interim pseudo random number that generates of IC-card.
5, according to claim 1 or 3 described methods, it is characterized in that: described terminal security module provide with the relevant characteristic of this transaction be this terminal security module self distinctive, can't be by external world's replacement, the data that in other-end safety module, can't reappear easily.
6, method according to claim 5 is characterized in that: the characteristic relevant with this transaction that described terminal security module provides is the card number that comprises PSAM card self.
7, method according to claim 5 is characterized in that: the characteristic relevant with this transaction that described terminal security module provides is to comprise the interim pseudo random number that generates of this terminal security module internal.
8, according to claim 1 or 3 described methods, it is characterized in that: the transaction critical data in the described pre-sales consumer sale--the pintle hook lock source is respectively on IC-card and terminal security module, a process consumption key (SESPK) that adopts identical mechanism to set up, the characteristic relevant with this transaction that described IC-card provides itself is the inner interim pseudo random number (ICC) that generates of IC-card, what described terminal security module provided is the interim pseudo random number that generates of this terminal security module internal with the relevant characteristic of this transaction, and being used to set up this process, to consume the algorithm of key (SESPK) be the rolling cryptographic algorithm;
Process consumption key (SESPK)=DES ([3DES (DPK, DATA1)], DATA2), wherein DPK is the consumption key of electronic bankbook on the IC-card (wallet), is to be disperseed to obtain according to the application sequence number of this IC-card by electronic bankbook (wallet) consumption master key (MPK); DATA1 is latter two byte of the transaction sequence number (CTC) that includes the interim pseudo random number (ICC) that generates of described IC-card, electronic bankbook (wallet), terminal transaction sequence number (TTC); DATA2 includes the interim pseudo random number (RAND) that generates of described terminal security module; DES is meant the computing of single-length des encryption, and the formula in the bracket is meant with first parameter encrypts second parameter; 3DES is meant 3 double-length des encryption computings, and the formula in the bracket is meant with first parameter encrypts second parameter.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB991189930A CN1158631C (en) | 1999-09-07 | 1999-09-07 | Method of realizing key data specificity in safe IC card business |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB991189930A CN1158631C (en) | 1999-09-07 | 1999-09-07 | Method of realizing key data specificity in safe IC card business |
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| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN1287339A true CN1287339A (en) | 2001-03-14 |
| CN1158631C CN1158631C (en) | 2004-07-21 |
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| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNB991189930A Expired - Lifetime CN1158631C (en) | 1999-09-07 | 1999-09-07 | Method of realizing key data specificity in safe IC card business |
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| Country | Link |
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Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2007071140A1 (en) * | 2005-12-21 | 2007-06-28 | China Unionpay | A method for transmitting data securely |
| CN102542319A (en) * | 2010-12-10 | 2012-07-04 | 上海华虹集成电路有限责任公司 | Method for protecting keys of purchase secure access module (PSAM) card |
| CN102750776A (en) * | 2012-06-21 | 2012-10-24 | 捷德（中国）信息科技有限公司 | User IC (Integrated Circuit) card offline transaction method, apparatus and system |
-
1999
- 1999-09-07 CN CNB991189930A patent/CN1158631C/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
Cited By (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2007071140A1 (en) * | 2005-12-21 | 2007-06-28 | China Unionpay | A method for transmitting data securely |
| CN102542319A (en) * | 2010-12-10 | 2012-07-04 | 上海华虹集成电路有限责任公司 | Method for protecting keys of purchase secure access module (PSAM) card |
| CN102542319B (en) * | 2010-12-10 | 2016-06-29 | 上海华虹集成电路有限责任公司 | Cryptographic key protection method in PSAM card |
| CN102750776A (en) * | 2012-06-21 | 2012-10-24 | 捷德（中国）信息科技有限公司 | User IC (Integrated Circuit) card offline transaction method, apparatus and system |
| CN102750776B (en) * | 2012-06-21 | 2015-04-22 | 捷德（中国）信息科技有限公司 | User IC (Integrated Circuit) card offline transaction method, apparatus and system |
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| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN1158631C (en) | 2004-07-21 |
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Owner name: BEIJING TENDYRON SCI-TECH CO., LTD. Free format text: FORMER OWNER: LI DONGSHENG Effective date: 20100707 |
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Free format text: CORRECT: ADDRESS; FROM: 100085 4TH FLOOR, NO.26, STREET 4, CHUANGYE MIDDLE ROAD, SHANGDI INFORMATION INDUSTRY BASE, BEIJING CITY TO: 100083 1810, TOWER B, JINMA BUILDING, NO.17, QINGHUA EAST ROAD, HAIDIAN DISTRICT, BEIJING CITY |
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Effective date of registration: 20100707 Address after: 100083, B, block 17, golden building, No. 1810 Qinghua East Road, Beijing, Haidian District Patentee after: Beijing Tendyron Technology Co., Ltd. Address before: 100085, Beijing information industry base on the road, four 26 street, 4 Patentee before: Li Dongsheng |
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Address after: 100083, room 1810, block B, golden building, No. 17, Qinghua East Road, Beijing, Haidian District Patentee after: Tendyron Technology Co., Ltd. Address before: 100083, B, block 17, golden building, No. 1810 Qinghua East Road, Beijing, Haidian District Patentee before: Beijing Tendyron Technology Co., Ltd. |
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