CN118054911A - Zero-knowledge identity authentication method and system based on trusted mechanism - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention relates to the technical field of cryptography and information security, in particular to a zero-knowledge identity authentication method and system based on a trusted mechanism. The method comprises the following steps: step S1, a first entity applies for obtaining an event certificate from a trusted organization; step S2, the first entity sends the obtained event certificate to the second entity, and the second entity receives the verification parameters obtained by calculation after the event certificate is successfully verified; s3, the first entity generates response parameters according to the received verification parameters and sends the response parameters to the second entity; and S4, the second entity judges whether the identity authentication of the first entity passes or not based on the response parameter and the comparison parameter. The invention ensures that the first entity can prove that the first entity has specific identity or private information to the second entity, and any private information does not need to be revealed in the process, thereby not only improving the efficiency and the safety of identity authentication, but also reducing the requirement on communication bandwidth.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of cryptography and information security, in particular to a zero-knowledge identity authentication method and system based on an elliptic curve algorithm under a trusted institution.
Background
With the rapid development of network technology, network security issues have become a focus of attention. In computers and computer network systems, identity authentication is a vital link that aims to confirm the identity of a user, thereby ensuring that the user's access and usage rights to resources are legal and efficient. This not only helps to secure the computer system and data, but also helps to maintain legal rights for authorized access users.
In a network environment, if a user is to access a server's services, an authentication process is required, which may be either unidirectional or bidirectional. Sometimes, a third party trusted by both parties also participates in identity authentication to further confirm the authenticity of the user and server identities.
At present, an internet service provider mainly adopts a mode of collecting user information by itself to perform identity authentication, and the method can improve user experience to a certain extent, but has quite obvious defects. For example, excessive collection and abuse of user information is often a frequent occurrence, leading to continued post-disputes and difficult traceability. In addition, each internet service provider collects user information for administrative purposes, which not only increases the risk of user privacy leakage, but also makes information easy to be stolen by an attacker.
In summary, the conventional identity authentication method often has risks of security loopholes and privacy disclosure, and a more secure identity authentication method is needed at present.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a zero-knowledge identity authentication method and system based on a trusted institution, which solve the problem that the identity authentication in the prior art is easy to cause privacy disclosure and has poor security.
The invention aims to provide a zero-knowledge identity authentication method and system based on a trusted organization, which solve the problem that the identity authentication in the prior art has high requirements on communication bandwidth and computing resources.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on a trusted institution, comprising the following steps:
Step S1, a first entity applies for obtaining an event certificate from a trusted organization;
Step S2, the first entity sends the obtained event certificate to the second entity, and receives a verification parameter obtained by the second entity through calculation after the event certificate is verified successfully, wherein the verification parameter is obtained through calculation by a challenge factor generated by the second entity; ;
S3, the first entity generates response parameters according to the received verification parameters and sends the response parameters to the second entity;
and S4, the second entity judges whether the identity authentication of the first entity passes or not based on the response parameter and the comparison parameter, wherein the comparison parameter is obtained by the calculation participation of the challenge factor generated by the second entity.
In some embodiments, the step S1 further includes:
the first entity sends the verification factor to the trusted authority;
The trusted authority verifies the verification factor, if the verification is successful, an event certificate is generated, and if the verification is failed, the identity authentication is failed.
In some embodiments, the validation factor comprises:
password, pin, and biometric characteristic.
In some embodiments, the step S1 further includes:
The first entity selects to generate a private parameter k and generates a corresponding public parameter P A;
The first entity sends a public parameter P A to the trusted authority;
The trusted authority establishes identity information ID A for the first entity, digitally signs identity information ID A with public parameter P A to obtain signature value sig ta, generates event certificate C A and sends event certificate C A to the first entity.
In some embodiments, in step S1,
The privacy parameter k is a random number between [1, n-1], n is the order of the elliptic curve base point G;
The corresponding generation expression of the public parameter P A is P A = [ k ] G;
Signature value sig ta corresponds to generation expression sig ta＝signature(IDA,PA);
event certificate C A corresponds to generation expression C A＝(IDA,PA,sigta).
In some embodiments, the step S2 further includes:
the first entity sends an event certificate C A to the second entity and waits for accepting the verification challenge of the second entity;
The second entity verifies the event certificate C A, if the verification is successful, a challenge factor e is randomly generated, the challenge factor e and the public parameter P A are combined and calculated to generate a verification parameter Q, the verification parameter Q is sent to the first entity, and an expression Q= [ e ] P A corresponding to the verification parameter Q is generated;
the public parameter P A is generated for the first entity and sent by the first entity to the second entity.
In some embodiments, the verifying the event certificate C A in step S2 further includes:
The validity of the event certificate C A is verified.
In some embodiments, the step S3 further includes:
the first entity generates a response parameter S according to the received verification parameter Q, wherein the corresponding expression S= [ k -1 ] Q+ [ k ] G of the response parameter S;
Where k is a privacy parameter generated by the first entity, k -1 is the inverse of k modulo n, and G is the elliptic curve base point.
In some embodiments, the step S4 further includes:
The second entity compares the comparison parameter T with the response parameter S, if the comparison parameter T is the same as the response parameter S, the identity authentication of the second entity on the first entity is successful, and if the comparison parameter T is not the same as the response parameter S, the identity authentication of the second entity on the first entity is failed;
The comparison parameter T is calculated based on the challenge factor e in combination with the public parameter P A of the first entity, and the corresponding expression t= [ e ] g+p A.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a zero-knowledge identity authentication system based on a trusted institution, which at least includes a first entity, a second entity and the trusted institution:
The first entity, the second entity and the trusted entity are used for executing the zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on the trusted entity.
To achieve the above object, the present invention provides an electronic device including a processor and a memory:
The processor is used for executing the zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on the trusted mechanism by calling the program or the instructions stored in the memory.
To achieve the above object, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a program or instructions that cause a computer to execute the zero-knowledge authentication method based on a trusted authority as described above.
The zero-knowledge identity authentication method and system based on the trusted institution provided by the invention utilize the randomness of cryptography and discrete logarithm difficulty conditions based on elliptic curve algorithm, so that the first entity can prove that the first entity has specific identity or private information to the second entity, any private information is not required to be revealed in the process, the identity authentication efficiency and security are improved, and the requirement on communication bandwidth is reduced.
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The above and other features, properties and advantages of the present invention will become more apparent from the following description of embodiments taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in which like reference characters designate like features throughout the drawings, and in which:
FIG. 1 discloses a zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on a trusted authority according to one embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 discloses a schematic block diagram of a zero-knowledge identity authentication system based on a trusted authority, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 discloses an authentication flow diagram of a trusted authority-based zero-knowledge identity authentication system in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 4 discloses a functional block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the invention.
The meaning of the reference numerals in the figures is as follows:
A first entity 100;
A second entity 200;
300 trusted authorities;
400 electronic devices;
410 a processor;
420 memory.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the drawings and examples, in order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention.
Zero knowledge proof is used as a proof method, which allows a prover to prove whether certain information is correct or not under the condition that no useful information is provided for a verifier, and has wide application value in the field of identity authentication.
The third party authentication relies on a third party trusted authority to store the verification identity and authentication information, which provides an effective solution to the user and application server by improving password storage and use security.
The invention provides a zero-knowledge identity authentication method and system based on a trusted mechanism, wherein the trusted mechanism plays a key role in the process, and is used as a neutral third party to ensure the credibility of identity authentication by providing a digital certificate of an entity user, and intervention can be carried out to solve disputes or ensure the fairness of an interaction process.
Fig. 1 discloses a step diagram of a zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on a trusted mechanism according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 1, the zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on the trusted mechanism provided by the present invention includes the following steps:
Step S1, a first entity applies for obtaining an event certificate from a trusted organization;
step S2, the first entity sends the obtained event certificate to the second entity, and receives a verification parameter obtained by the second entity through calculation after the event certificate is verified successfully, wherein the verification parameter is obtained through calculation by a challenge factor generated by the second entity;
S3, the first entity generates response parameters according to the received verification parameters and sends the response parameters to the second entity;
and S4, the second entity judges whether the identity authentication of the first entity passes or not based on the response parameter and the comparison parameter, wherein the comparison parameter is obtained by the calculation participation of the challenge factor generated by the second entity.
Still further, the first entity generates the privacy parameter k and the public parameter P A, and the second entity may obtain the public parameter P A from the first entity.
The verification parameter Q of the second entity is generated by combining the challenge factor e generated by the second entity with the public parameter P A through calculation;
The comparison parameter T of the second entity is generated by combining the challenge factor e generated by the second entity with the public parameter P A through calculation;
The response parameter S of the first entity is calculated by combining the verification parameter Q of the second entity with the privacy parameter k.
Further, the step S1 further includes:
the first entity sends the verification factor to the trusted authority;
The trusted authority verifies the verification factor, if the verification is successful, an event certificate is generated, and if the verification is failed, the identity authentication is failed.
The authentication factor is one or more authentication means for authenticating the identity of the user. In this embodiment, the verification factors include a password, a personal identification number, a biometric characteristic value, and the like.
In this embodiment, the first entity is a proving party and the second entity is a verifying party.
To ensure the legitimacy of the first entity, the trusted authority employs a verification factor for identity authentication. Once the verification factor fails to verify, the identity of the first entity is illegal, which results in identity authentication failure, thereby blocking the attempt of illegal users disguising as the first entity. The verification factor authentication mode can obviously improve the security of the system and effectively prevent unauthorized access and attack.
As a trusted third party, the trusted authority assumes an important responsibility for the validity check of the public key (public parameter PA) in the public key hierarchy. The trusted organization can improve the efficiency of identity authentication and realize the registration of the user identity information, and once the user successfully registers, the trusted organization can protect the user identity information and ensure the authenticity and the integrity of the user identity information by using a digital signature technology.
In this embodiment, in the step S1, the first entity sends the verification factor to the trusted authority, and simultaneously sends the public parameter P A;
After the verification factor is successfully verified by the trusted authority, the identity information ID A is established for the first entity, the identity information ID A and the public parameter P A are digitally signed to obtain a signature value sig ta, an event certificate C A is generated, and the event certificate C A is sent to the first entity.
In this embodiment, in the step S2, the first entity sends the event certificate CA to the second entity, and waits for accepting the verification challenge of the second entity;
The second entity verifies the event certificate CA, if the verification is successful, a challenge factor e is randomly generated, the challenge factor e and a public parameter P A are combined and calculated to generate a verification parameter Q, and the verification parameter Q is sent to the first entity;
Wherein the public parameter P A is generated for the first entity and sent to the second entity.
In the conventional identity authentication process, a large amount of data interaction is usually required between two entities, which not only increases the delay of communication, but also puts higher demands on network bandwidth.
The zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on the trusted authority greatly reduces the requirement of communication bandwidth while ensuring the safety, and the second entity only needs to verify the event certificate of the first entity and then verifies the first entity to challenge, so that the identity authentication between the two entities is completed, only three times of data interaction is needed, and the communication efficiency and the bandwidth utilization rate are improved while ensuring the safety.
In order to protect the privacy of the first entity, a challenge factor e is introduced in step S2, which proves the fact that the first entity has the secret parameter k even if the second entity does not obtain the secret parameter k of the first entity. The process protects the privacy of the first entity and ensures the accuracy of identity authentication.
Fig. 2 is a schematic block diagram of a trusted-organization-based zero-knowledge identity authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention, and as shown in fig. 2, the trusted-organization-based zero-knowledge identity authentication system according to the present invention includes at least a first entity 100, a second entity 200, and a trusted organization 300:
the first entity 100 applies for obtaining an event certificate from the trusted authority 300 and sends the event certificate to the second entity 200; generating response parameters according to the received verification parameters, and sending the response parameters to the second entity 200;
The trusted authority 300 generates an event certificate according to the request information of the first entity 100 and transmits the event certificate to the first entity 100;
The second entity 200 calculates the challenge factor generated after the event certificate is verified successfully, combines the challenge factor with the public parameter to generate a verification parameter, and sends the verification parameter to the first entity 100; based on the response parameter and the comparison parameter, it is determined whether the identity authentication of the first entity 100 is passed, and the comparison parameter is obtained by the calculation participation of the challenge factor generated by the second entity 200.
The workflow of the first entity 100, the second entity 200 and the trusted authority 300 has been described in describing the trusted authority-based zero-knowledge identity authentication method as shown in fig. 1, and will not be described again here.
The invention also provides a zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on the trusted mechanism, which is realized by adopting the elliptic curve cryptography algorithm. It should be noted that the implementation of the present invention does not exclude the existence of other encryption algorithms. That is, besides elliptic curve cryptography algorithm, other encryption algorithms can be adopted to implement the zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on the trusted mechanism.
For a better understanding of the core content of the present invention, a brief explanation of the elliptic curve cryptography algorithm is required.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC, elliptic curve cryptography) is a public key system based on an elliptic curve algorithm defined over a finite field, for example, the SM2 algorithm is a specific algorithm for an ECC cryptosystem.
The following symbols are specified, and the following symbols can refer to parameters specified in national standard GB/T32918 information security technology SM2 elliptic curve public key cryptography:
G, a base point of the elliptic curve, wherein the order of the base point is prime;
n, the order of the base point G;
[k] p, the k times point of the point P on the elliptic curve, i.e Where k is a positive integer.
In the cryptography field, the discrete logarithm problem has smaller key size and computational resource requirements than the large number decomposition problem, while achieving nearly identical security. This feature helps to reduce system cost, improve efficiency, and increase response speed.
The invention adopts the zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on the trusted mechanism and realized by elliptic curve cryptography algorithm, takes discrete logarithm difficulty as the basis of password security, and can use smaller key size and calculation resources compared with large number decomposition difficulty. The technology is particularly suitable for identity authentication of intelligent terminal equipment.
More specifically, based on the elliptic curve algorithm, a 256-bit key length may reach an algorithm strength comparable to the 2048-bit key length of the RSA algorithm. However, the required key length is greatly reduced compared to the RSA algorithm. Due to the limited computing and storage capabilities of intelligent terminal devices, shorter keys and more efficient algorithms are more advantageous for these small terminal devices, contributing to improved computing performance.
The following describes a trusted-organization-based zero-knowledge identity authentication method implemented by using an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm with reference to fig. 3, taking the trusted-organization-based zero-knowledge identity authentication system as an example shown in fig. 2.
Fig. 3 discloses an authentication flow chart of a zero-knowledge identity authentication system based on a trusted institution, and as shown in fig. 3, the zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm under the trusted institution specifically comprises the following steps:
Step S1, a first entity applies for obtaining an event certificate from a trusted organization.
The first entity 100 selects to generate a secret parameter k, wherein k is a random number between [1, n-1], generates a corresponding public parameter P A, and generates a corresponding generation expression as P A = [ k ] G;
A first entity 100 generating a verification factor certifying identity;
The first entity 100 sends the public parameter P A and the verification factor to the trusted authority 300;
the trusted authority 300 verifies the verification factor, if verification is successful, an event certificate C A is generated, if verification is failed, identity authentication is failed, and the flow is exited.
Further, the trusted authority 300, after successful verification, establishes a unique identity information ID A for the first entity 100, digitally signs the identity information ID A with the public parameter P A to obtain a signature value sig ta＝signature(IDA,PA), generates an event certificate C A＝(IDA,PA,sigta) and sends the event certificate C A to the first entity 100.
And S2, the first entity sends the obtained event certificate and the public parameters to the second entity, the second entity verifies the event certificate, generates a challenge factor, calculates the challenge factor and the public parameters in a combined mode to generate a verification parameter, and sends the verification parameter to the first entity.
The first entity 100 sends the event certificate C A and the public parameter P A to the second entity 200 and waits for acceptance of the authentication challenge of the second entity 200;
The second entity 200 verifies the event certificate C A, if the verification is successful, randomly generates a challenge factor e, calculates a verification parameter q= [ e ] P A according to the challenge factor e and the public parameter P A, and sends the verification parameter Q to the first entity 100.
Still further, the second entity 200 verifies the event certificate C A, further including:
The validity of the event certificate C A is verified.
Verifying the validity of an event certificate CA involves a number of issues to be considered.
For example, to check if a certificate has expired, if it has expired, it cannot be used for verification purposes anymore, since its security cannot be guaranteed;
For another example, it is necessary to confirm whether the certificate is revoked, if it is revoked, meaning that it is no longer valid nor should it be trusted.
In addition, it is also necessary to verify whether the certificate was obtained from a trusted authority. Only certificates obtained from trusted certificate authorities have reliability and security.
Meanwhile, the second entity 200 calculates a comparison parameter T based on the challenge factor e in combination with the public parameter P A of the first entity 100, and the corresponding expression t= [ e ] g+p A.
When calculating the comparison parameter T, it should be noted that the calculation timing of the comparison parameter T may be performed simultaneously or after the challenge factor is generated in step S2, or may be performed before the challenge verification is performed in step S4. This calculation timing may be determined according to specific needs and circumstances.
And step S3, the first entity generates response parameters according to the received verification parameters and sends the response parameters to the second entity.
The first entity 100 generates a response parameter S according to the received verification parameter Q, and sends the response parameter S to the second entity 200, where the response parameter S corresponds to an expression s= [ k -1 ] q+ [ k ] G;
where k is a privacy parameter generated by the first entity, G is an elliptic curve base point, and k -1 is the inverse of k modulo n, i.e. k -1 x k=1 mod n.
And S4, the second entity judges whether the identity authentication of the first entity passes or not based on the response parameter and the comparison parameter.
The second entity 200 calculates a comparison parameter t= [ e ] g+p A by combining the public parameter P A of the first entity based on the challenge factor e;
The second entity 200 compares the comparison parameter T with the response parameter S, if the comparison parameter T is the same as the response parameter S, the identity authentication of the second entity 200 on the first entity 100 is successful, and if the comparison parameter T is not the same as the response parameter S, the identity authentication of the second entity 200 on the first entity 100 is failed.
In the identity authentication process, if the comparison parameter T is the same as the response parameter S, the identity authentication is successful, and the corresponding mathematical principle is as follows:
Take the example of the first entity 100 proving to the second entity 200.
The public parameter P A of the first entity 100 is available to any party including the first entity 100, the second entity 200 and potential aggressors.
The verification parameter Q is sent from the second entity 200 to the first entity 100, and since the first entity 100 has the secret parameter (the random number k in step S1) corresponding to the public parameter P A, the first entity 100 calculates the response parameter s= [ k -1 ] q+ [ k ] G according to step S3.
In mathematical principle, S is denoted as s= [ k -1 ] q+ [ k ] G, which can be further converted into s= [ k -1][e]PA + [ k ] G, and then combining P A = [ k ] G in step S1, gives s= [ e ] g+p A, which means that the comparison parameter t= [ e ] g+p A and the response parameter S should be equal.
If the verification parameter Q is sent to the attacker, but the attacker cannot generate a response result S that can be verified by the second entity 200 because the attacker lacks the secret parameter k in step S1. In addition, since the challenge factor e is randomly generated, the attacker cannot prepare a response result S in advance to spoof the second entity 200.
In summary, the mathematical principle ensures that the response parameter S can be calculated if and only if the verification parameter Q sent by the second entity 200 is combined with the secret parameter k held by the first entity 100, and that S is equal to T, thereby realizing a secure authentication procedure.
Therefore, the zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on the trusted institution provided by the invention utilizes the randomness of cryptography and the discrete logarithm difficulty condition based on the elliptic curve algorithm to ensure that the first entity can prove that the first entity has specific identity or private information to the second entity, and any private information is not required to be disclosed in the process. The method ensures the safety and reliability of identity authentication and provides powerful support for guaranteeing information security.
Fig. 4 discloses a schematic block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention, and as shown in fig. 4, an electronic device 400 according to the present invention may include, but is not limited to, a cloud computing server, an internet of things device, a computer, and the like.
The electronic device 400 of the present application may include one or more of the following components: a processor 410, a memory 420, and one or more application programs, wherein the one or more application programs may be stored in the memory 420 and configured to be executed by the one or more processors 410, the one or more program(s) configured to perform the method as described in the foregoing method embodiments.
Wherein the processor 410 may include one or more processing cores. The processor 410 utilizes various interfaces and lines to connect various portions of the overall electronic device 400, perform various functions of the electronic device 400, and process data by executing or executing instructions, programs, code sets, or instruction sets stored in the memory 420, and invoking data stored in the memory 420. Alternatively, the processor 410 may be implemented in hardware in at least one of digital signal Processing (DIGITAL SIGNAL Processing, DSP), field-Programmable gate array (Field-Programmable GATE ARRAY, FPGA), programmable logic array (Programmable Logic Array, PLA). The processor 410 may integrate one or a combination of several of a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU), a graphics processor (Graphics Processing Unit, GPU), and a modem, etc. The CPU mainly processes an operating system, a user interface, an application program and the like; the GPU is used for being responsible for rendering and drawing the content to be displayed; the modem is used to handle wireless communications. It will be appreciated that the modem may not be integrated into the processor 410 and may be implemented solely by a single communication chip.
The Memory 420 may include a random access Memory (Random Access Memory, RAM) or a Read-Only Memory (rom), i.e., the Memory 420 may include a Memory, a dynamic random access Memory, etc. Memory 420 may be used to store instructions, programs, code sets, or instruction sets. The memory 420 may include a stored program area and a stored data area, wherein the stored program area may store instructions for implementing an operating system, instructions for implementing at least one function, instructions for implementing the various method embodiments described below, and the like. The storage data area may also store data or the like created by the electronic device 400 in use.
For example, the implementation process file of the zero-knowledge authentication method based on the trusted authority may be a computer program, stored in the memory 420, and recorded into the processor 410 for executing the method of the present application.
The implementation process file of the zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on the trusted authority is a computer program, and can also be stored in a readable storage medium of a computer or mobile equipment as an article of manufacture. For example, computer-readable storage media may include, but are not limited to, magnetic storage devices (e.g., hard disk, floppy disk, magnetic strips), optical disks (e.g., compact Disk (CD), digital Versatile Disk (DVD)), smart cards, and flash memory devices (e.g., electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), cards, sticks, key drives). Moreover, various storage media described herein can represent one or more devices and/or other machine-readable media for storing information. The term "machine-readable medium" can include, without being limited to, wireless channels and various other media (and/or storage media) capable of storing, containing, and/or carrying code and/or instructions and/or data.
The zero-knowledge identity authentication method and system based on the trusted mechanism not only improves the efficiency and the safety of identity authentication, but also reduces the requirement on communication bandwidth, and has high practical value and wide application prospect.
The invention provides a zero-knowledge identity authentication method and system based on a trusted mechanism, which has the following advantages:
1) The illegal user is prevented from being disguised as a proving party, a trusted mechanism can verify the validity of the proving party, and the illegal identity can cause authentication failure;
2) The identity authentication efficiency is remarkably improved through the trusted organization, and after the user finishes registration, the identity information of the user is protected and digitally signed by the trusted organization;
3) The verification party can finish the verification challenge of the verification party to the proving party by only verifying the event certificate of the proving party, so that the high-efficiency identity authentication is realized, the whole process only needs three times of data interaction, and the communication bandwidth requirement is effectively reduced;
4) And introducing a challenge factor e to protect the privacy security of the proving party. Even if the verifier does not obtain the secret parameter k, if the prover has the secret parameter k of the public parameter P A, the verifier can also identify that the prover does have the secret parameter;
5) Compared with the large number decomposition difficulty, the method adopts shorter key length and smaller calculation resource requirement, and is particularly suitable for identity authentication of intelligent terminal equipment.
While, for purposes of simplicity of explanation, the methodologies are shown and described as a series of acts, it is to be understood and appreciated that the methodologies are not limited by the order of acts, as some acts may, in accordance with one or more embodiments, occur in different orders and/or concurrently with other acts from that shown and described herein or not shown and described herein, as would be understood and appreciated by those skilled in the art.
As used in the specification and in the claims, the terms "a," "an," "the," and/or "the" are not specific to a singular, but may include a plurality, unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. In general, the terms "comprises" and "comprising" merely indicate that the steps and elements are explicitly identified, and they do not constitute an exclusive list, as other steps or elements may be included in a method or apparatus.
Those of skill in the art would understand that information, signals, and data may be represented using any of a variety of different technologies and techniques. For example, data, instructions, commands, information, signals, bits, symbols, and chips that may be referenced throughout the above description may be represented by voltages, currents, electromagnetic waves, magnetic fields or particles, optical fields or particles, or any combination thereof.
Those of skill would further appreciate that the various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or combinations of both. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been described above generally in terms of their functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present invention.
The embodiments described above are intended to provide those skilled in the art with a full range of modifications and variations to the embodiments described above without departing from the inventive concept thereof, and therefore the scope of the invention is not limited by the embodiments described above, but is to be accorded the broadest scope consistent with the innovative features recited in the claims.
Claims (12)
1. The zero-knowledge identity authentication method based on the trusted institution is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
Step S1, a first entity applies for obtaining an event certificate from a trusted organization;
step S2, the first entity sends the obtained event certificate to the second entity, and receives a verification parameter obtained by the second entity through calculation after the event certificate is verified successfully, wherein the verification parameter is obtained through calculation by a challenge factor generated by the second entity;
S3, the first entity generates response parameters according to the received verification parameters and sends the response parameters to the second entity;
and S4, the second entity judges whether the identity authentication of the first entity passes or not based on the response parameter and the comparison parameter, wherein the comparison parameter is obtained by the calculation participation of the challenge factor generated by the second entity.
2. The method for authenticating a zero-knowledge identity based on a trusted authority according to claim 1, wherein said step S1 further comprises:
the first entity sends the verification factor to the trusted authority;
The trusted authority verifies the verification factor, if the verification is successful, an event certificate is generated, and if the verification is failed, the identity authentication is failed.
3. The trusted authority-based zero-knowledge identity authentication method of claim 2, wherein said validation factor comprises:
password, pin, and biometric characteristic.
4. The method for authenticating a zero-knowledge identity based on a trusted authority according to claim 1, wherein said step S1 further comprises:
The first entity selects to generate a private parameter k and generates a corresponding public parameter P A;
The first entity sends a public parameter P A to the trusted authority;
The trusted authority establishes identity information ID A for the first entity, digitally signs identity information ID A with public parameter P A to obtain signature value sig ta, generates event certificate C A and sends event certificate C A to the first entity.
5. The method for authenticating a zero-knowledge identity based on a trusted authority as claimed in claim 4, wherein in said step S1,
The privacy parameter k is a random number between [1, n-1], n is the order of the elliptic curve base point G;
The corresponding generation expression of the public parameter P A is P A = [ k ] G;
Signature value sig ta corresponds to generation expression sig ta＝signature(IDA,PA);
event certificate C A corresponds to generation expression C A＝(IDA,PA,sigta).
6. The method for authenticating a zero-knowledge identity based on a trusted authority according to claim 1, wherein said step S2 further comprises:
the first entity sends an event certificate C A to the second entity and waits for accepting the verification challenge of the second entity;
The second entity verifies the event certificate C A, if the verification is successful, a challenge factor e is randomly generated, the challenge factor e and the public parameter P A are combined and calculated to generate a verification parameter Q, the verification parameter Q is sent to the first entity, and an expression Q= [ e ] P A corresponding to the verification parameter Q is generated;
Wherein the public parameter P A is generated for the first entity and sent to the second entity.
7. The method for authenticating a zero-knowledge identity based on a trusted authority as claimed in claim 6, wherein said verifying the event certificate C A in step S2 further comprises:
The validity of the event certificate C A is verified.
8. The method for authenticating a zero-knowledge identity based on a trusted authority as claimed in claim 6, wherein said step S3 further comprises:
the first entity generates a response parameter S according to the received verification parameter Q, wherein the corresponding expression S= [ k -1 ] Q+ [ k ] G of the response parameter S;
Where k is a privacy parameter generated by the first entity, k -1 is the inverse of k modulo n, and G is the elliptic curve base point.
9. The method for authenticating a zero-knowledge identity based on a trusted authority as claimed in claim 8, wherein said step S4 further comprises:
The second entity compares the comparison parameter T with the response parameter S, if the comparison parameter T is the same as the response parameter S, the identity authentication of the second entity on the first entity is successful, and if the comparison parameter T is not the same as the response parameter S, the identity authentication of the second entity on the first entity is failed;
The comparison parameter T is calculated based on the challenge factor e in combination with the public parameter P A of the first entity, and the corresponding expression t= [ e ] g+p A.
10. A trusted institution-based zero-knowledge identity authentication system, comprising at least a first entity, a second entity, and a trusted institution:
The first entity, the second entity and the trusted authority for performing the trusted authority-based zero-knowledge identity authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 9.
11. An electronic device comprising a processor and a memory:
the processor is configured to perform the trusted authority-based zero-knowledge identity authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 9 by invoking a program or instructions stored in the memory.
12. A computer-readable storage medium storing a program or instructions that cause a computer to perform the trusted authority-based zero-knowledge identity authentication method of any one of claims 1 to 9.
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