CN117729051B - Bidirectional safety verification method for MCU software upgrade and automobile control system - Google Patents
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Abstract
The application provides a bidirectional safety verification method for MCU software upgrade and an automobile control system. The method comprises the following steps: the MPU end initiates a security access verification request to the MCU end, wherein the verification request comprises a security level and a key seed; after the MCU receives the verification request, generating a primary key through a verification algorithm according to the security level, and returning the primary key to the MPU; after receiving the primary key, the MPU verifies the primary key through an algorithm; if the primary key is correct, generating a secondary key by using the primary key; after the MCU receives the secondary key, verifying the secondary key through a verification algorithm; after receiving the returned response, the MPU receives the response and if the response is affirmative, the MPU continues to access through the security access check; if the answer is an error code, the secure access is exited. Therefore, the application can realize the bidirectional safety verification of the MCU software upgrading through the verification of the primary key and the secondary key, thereby improving the safety and reliability of the MCU software upgrading.
Description
Technical Field
The application relates to the technical field of software upgrading, in particular to a bidirectional safety verification method for MCU software upgrading and an automobile control system.
Background
Under the high-speed development of intelligent network-connected automobiles, the functions of the automobile network are more and more common, and under the background, the MCU (Microcontroller Unit, microcontroller) is more and more important to the industry. The current security check method in MCU upgrade is that the MCU checks the key generated by the MPU (Microprocessor Unit, microprocessor), so-called security check will not exist if the MCU side shields the check logic.
Therefore, how to ensure the safe upgrade of the MCU software is a technical problem to be solved in the art.
Disclosure of Invention
The application aims to provide a bidirectional safety verification method for MCU software upgrading and an automobile control system, which can improve the safety and reliability of MCU software upgrading.
In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a bidirectional security check method for upgrading MCU software, which is applied to an intelligent network-connected automobile control system, where the control system includes: the method comprises the following steps of:
the MPU end initiates a security access verification request to the MCU end, wherein the verification request comprises a security level and a key seed;
After the MCU receives the verification request, generating a primary key through a verification algorithm according to the security level, and returning the primary key to the MPU;
After receiving the primary key, the MPU verifies the primary key through an algorithm; if the primary key is correct, generating a secondary key by using the primary key, and sending the secondary key to the MCU side; if the primary key is wrong, the security access is exited;
after the MCU receives the secondary key, verifying the secondary key through a verification algorithm; if the secondary key is correct, a positive acknowledgement is returned to the MPU terminal; if the secondary secret key is wrong, an error code is returned to the MPU end;
after receiving the returned response, the MPU receives the returned response, and if the returned response is affirmative, the MPU continues to access through the security access check; if the answer is an error code, the secure access is exited.
In a possible implementation manner, the key seed is random data of a corresponding data length generated according to the security level.
In a possible implementation manner, the data length of the key seed is calculated according to a first formula, where the first formula is as follows:
L=（（A - 1）* 2 + 4）；
wherein A represents a security level, and A is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1; l represents the data length of the key seed in bytes.
In a possible implementation manner, the primary key generation process is as follows:
The MCU end carries out exclusive-or operation on the key seeds to obtain first data, and carries out exclusive-or operation on the upper 4 bits and the lower 4 bits of the first data to obtain second data;
Obtaining a parameter n in a primary key algorithm through a second formula;
The second formula is: n= ((b2+ (4*A))%64); wherein B2 represents the second data;
Traversing bytes in the key seed, calculating to obtain a parameter n0 through a third formula, and obtaining a primary key from the seed secret according to n 0;
The third formula is: n0= ((B [ i ]% 64) +n+i); wherein i is the sequence number when traversing the key seed, i is greater than or equal to 0 and less than the length of the key seed, B represents the key seed array, and B [ i ] represents the (i+1) th data in the key seed.
In a possible implementation manner, the algorithm input of the secondary key is the primary key, and the algorithm of the secondary key is: SHA256 encryption algorithm, MD5 encryption algorithm, or RSA encryption algorithm.
In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides an intelligent network-connected automobile control system, where the control system includes: an MCU end and an MPU end;
the MPU end is used for initiating a secure access verification request to the MCU end, wherein the verification request comprises a security level and a key seed;
The MCU end is used for generating a primary key through a verification algorithm according to the security level after receiving the verification request, and returning the primary key to the MPU end;
The MPU end is used for checking the primary key through an algorithm after receiving the primary key; if the primary key is correct, generating a secondary key by using the primary key, and sending the secondary key to the MCU side; if the primary key is wrong, the security access is exited;
The MCU end is used for verifying the secondary key through a verification algorithm after receiving the secondary key; if the secondary key is correct, a positive acknowledgement is returned to the MPU terminal; if the secondary secret key is wrong, an error code is returned to the MPU end;
The MPU end is used for continuing to access through the security access check if the answer is affirmative after receiving the return answer; if the answer is an error code, the secure access is exited.
In a possible implementation manner, the key seed is random data of a corresponding data length generated according to the security level.
In a possible implementation manner, the data length of the key seed is calculated according to a first formula, where the first formula is as follows:
L=（（A - 1）* 2 + 4）；
wherein A represents a security level, and A is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1; l represents the data length of the key seed in bytes.
In a possible implementation manner, the MCU side is configured to generate a primary key through the following process:
The MCU end carries out exclusive-or operation on the key seeds to obtain first data, and carries out exclusive-or operation on the upper 4 bits and the lower 4 bits of the first data to obtain second data;
Obtaining a parameter n in a primary key algorithm through a second formula;
The second formula is: n= ((b2+ (4*A))%64); wherein B2 represents the second data;
Traversing bytes in the key seed, calculating to obtain a parameter n0 through a third formula, and obtaining a primary key from the seed secret according to n 0;
The third formula is: n0= ((B [ i ]% 64) +n+i); wherein i is the sequence number when traversing the key seed, i is greater than or equal to 0 and less than the length of the key seed, B represents the key seed array, and B [ i ] represents the (i+1) th data in the key seed.
In a possible implementation manner, the algorithm input of the secondary key is the primary key, and the algorithm of the secondary key is: SHA256 encryption algorithm, MD5 encryption algorithm, or RSA encryption algorithm.
Compared with the prior art, the bidirectional security verification method for MCU software upgrading provided by the application has the advantages that the MPU end initiates a security access verification request to the MCU end, and the verification request comprises a security level and a key seed; after the MCU receives the verification request, generating a primary key through a verification algorithm according to the security level, and returning the primary key to the MPU; after receiving the primary key, the MPU verifies the primary key through an algorithm; if the primary key is correct, generating a secondary key by using the primary key; after the MCU receives the secondary key, verifying the secondary key through a verification algorithm; after receiving the returned response, the MPU receives the returned response, and if the returned response is affirmative, the MPU continues to access through the security access check; if the answer is an error code, the secure access is exited. Therefore, the application can realize the bidirectional safety verification of the MCU software upgrading through the verification of the primary key and the secondary key, thereby improving the safety and reliability of the MCU software upgrading.
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Various other advantages and benefits will become apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art upon reading the following detailed description of the preferred embodiments. The drawings are only for purposes of illustrating the preferred embodiments and are not to be construed as limiting the application. Also, like reference numerals are used to designate like parts throughout the figures. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 shows a flow chart of a bidirectional security check method for MCU software upgrade provided by an embodiment of the application;
FIG. 2 shows a schematic diagram of a secondary key algorithm provided by an embodiment of the present application;
fig. 3 shows a schematic diagram of an intelligent network-connected automobile control system according to an embodiment of the present application.
Detailed Description
Exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure will be described in more detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. While exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure are shown in the drawings, it should be understood that the present disclosure may be embodied in various forms and should not be limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope of the disclosure to those skilled in the art.
It is noted that unless otherwise indicated, technical or scientific terms used herein should be given the ordinary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs.
In addition, the terms "first" and "second" etc. are used to distinguish different objects and are not used to describe a particular order. Furthermore, the terms "comprise" and "have," as well as any variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion. For example, a process, method, system, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of steps or elements is not limited to only those listed steps or elements but may include other steps or elements not listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus.
Referring to fig. 1, fig. 1 is a flowchart of a bidirectional security check method for MCU software upgrade, which is applied to an intelligent network-connected automobile control system, and the control system includes: the method comprises the following steps of:
S101, an MPU end initiates a security access verification request to an MCU end, wherein the verification request comprises a security level and a key seed;
the key seed is random data with corresponding data length generated according to the security level. The data length of the key seed is calculated according to a first formula, wherein the first formula is as follows:
L= ((a-1) x 2+4); wherein A represents a security level, and A is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1; l represents the data length of the key seed in bytes.
Specifically, the MPU end initiates a secure access verification request, and verification request content comprises a security level A and a key seed B; the security level A is divided into 1-16 levels; the key seed B is a random data with a corresponding data length generated according to the security level a, for example, the key seed length corresponding to the security level 1 is 4 bytes, and each time the security level is increased by 1 level, the key seed length is added with 2 bytes, that is, the key seed length algorithm is ((a-1) ×2+4) bytes.
In the application, the MPU end and the MCU end are required to check the secret key. The MPU end and the MCU end store seed ciphertext M, and the ciphertext length is 64 bytes and can be customized.
S102, after receiving a verification request, the MCU receives a primary key through a verification algorithm according to the security level, and returns the primary key to the MPU;
the primary key generation process is as follows:
The MCU end carries out exclusive OR operation on the key seeds to obtain first data B1, and carries out exclusive OR operation on the upper 4 bits and the lower 4 bits of the first data B1 to obtain second data B2;
Obtaining a parameter n in a primary key algorithm through a second formula; the second formula is: n= ((b2+ (4*A))%64);
traversing bytes in the key seed B, calculating to obtain a parameter n0 through a third formula, and obtaining a primary key from a seed ciphertext M according to n 0;
The third formula is: n0= ((B [ i ]% 64) +n+i); wherein i is the sequence number when traversing the key seed, i is greater than or equal to 0 and less than the length of the key seed, B represents the key seed array, and B [ i ] represents the (i+1) th data in the key seed.
S103, after receiving the primary key, the MPU verifies the primary key through an algorithm; if the primary key is correct, a secondary key D is generated by the primary key, and the secondary key D is sent to the MCU side; if the primary key is wrong, the security access is exited;
Specifically, the MPU calculates a standard primary key C0 by using a primary key generation method. The primary key C returned by the MCU side and the standard primary key C0 are checked: if the seed ciphertext of the MCU end and the seed ciphertext of the MPU end are consistent with the primary key algorithm, the primary key C can be used as the input of the secondary key algorithm, and the secondary key is calculated; if the two types of data are inconsistent, an error is returned, and the safety check is exited.
The secondary key algorithm may be provided with various algorithms, as shown in fig. 2, where the algorithm of the secondary key is: SHA256 encryption algorithm, MD5 encryption algorithm, or RSA encryption algorithm. When in calculation, a corresponding algorithm is selected through exclusive OR calculation of all data of the primary key, and the primary key C is used as a parameter to generate a secondary key. For example, an MD5 encryption algorithm is set, a primary key C is used as a salt input, encrypted characters FlcmicroTest and 123 specified in the encryption algorithm are used as a secondary key, and the output characters are sent to the MCU end for verification.
S104, after the MCU receives the secondary key, verifying the secondary key through a verification algorithm; if the secondary secret key is correct, a positive acknowledgement is returned to the MPU terminal; if the secondary secret key is wrong, an error code is returned to the MPU end; as shown in fig. 2, the secondary key verification algorithm selects a corresponding verification algorithm according to the secondary key encryption algorithm in step S103 for verification.
S105, after receiving the returned response, the MPU receives the returned response, and if the returned response is affirmative, the MPU continues to access through the security access check; if the answer is an error code, the secure access is exited.
Specifically, when initiating secure access verification, the MPU needs to send the secure access level and the key seed to the MCU together; the key seeds are generated by the security access level through algorithm calculation, and the algorithm needs to ensure that the generated key seeds cannot be all 0.
After the MCU receives the key seeds, a verification algorithm is selected according to the key seeds, and a primary key is generated according to the security level. The primary secret key is an important parameter for the MPU to check the MCU algorithm and is calculated as a secondary secret key. And after the MPU end generates the secondary secret key, the secondary secret key is sent to the MCU end for final verification, and a final result of the safety verification is obtained. The security access checked by the method can effectively avoid the problem of bypassing the security check by avoiding the MCU check result, and greatly improves the security of MCU software upgrading and the security of information.
According to the bidirectional security verification method for MCU software upgrading, provided by the embodiment of the application, a security access verification request is initiated to an MCU end through an MPU end, wherein the verification request comprises a security level and a key seed; after the MCU receives the verification request, generating a primary key through a verification algorithm according to the security level, and returning the primary key to the MPU; after receiving the primary key, the MPU verifies the primary key through an algorithm; if the primary key is correct, generating a secondary key by using the primary key; after the MCU receives the secondary key, verifying the secondary key through a verification algorithm; after receiving the returned response, the MPU receives the returned response, and if the returned response is affirmative, the MPU continues to access through the security access check; if the answer is an error code, the secure access is exited. Therefore, the application can realize the bidirectional safety verification of the MCU software upgrading through the verification of the primary key and the secondary key, thereby improving the safety and reliability of the MCU software upgrading.
In the above embodiment, a bidirectional security check method for upgrading MCU software is provided, and correspondingly, the present application also provides an intelligent network-connected automobile control system 10. The intelligent network-connected vehicle control system 10 may include integrated or separate functional modules or units to perform the corresponding steps in the methods described above. Referring to fig. 3, the control system 10 includes: an MCU end 101 and an MPU end 102;
The MPU 102 is configured to initiate a secure access check request to the MCU, where the check request includes a security level and a key seed;
The MCU end 101 is configured to generate a primary key according to the security level through a verification algorithm after receiving the verification request, and return the primary key to the MPU end;
The MPU 102 is configured to verify the primary key through an algorithm after receiving the primary key; if the primary key is correct, generating a secondary key by using the primary key, and sending the secondary key to the MCU side; if the primary key is wrong, the security access is exited;
the MCU end 101 is configured to verify the secondary key through a verification algorithm after receiving the secondary key; if the secondary key is correct, a positive acknowledgement is returned to the MPU terminal; if the secondary secret key is wrong, an error code is returned to the MPU end;
The MPU 102 is configured to, after receiving the return response, if the response is affirmative, pass a secure access check, and continue access; if the answer is an error code, the secure access is exited.
In a possible implementation manner, the key seed is random data of a corresponding data length generated according to the security level.
In a possible implementation manner, the data length of the key seed is calculated according to a first formula, where the first formula is as follows:
L=（（A - 1）* 2 + 4）；
wherein A represents a security level, and A is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1; l represents the data length of the key seed in bytes.
In a possible implementation manner, the MCU side 101 is configured to generate a primary key through the following process:
The MCU end carries out exclusive-or operation on the key seeds to obtain first data, and carries out exclusive-or operation on the upper 4 bits and the lower 4 bits of the first data to obtain second data;
Obtaining a parameter n in a primary key algorithm through a second formula;
The second formula is: n= ((b2+ (4*A))%64); wherein B2 represents the second data;
Traversing bytes in the key seed, calculating to obtain a parameter n0 through a third formula, and obtaining a primary key from the seed secret according to n 0;
The third formula is: n0= ((B [ i ]% 64) +n+i); wherein i is the sequence number when traversing the key seed, i is greater than or equal to 0 and less than the length of the key seed, B represents the key seed array, and B [ i ] represents the (i+1) th data in the key seed.
In a possible implementation manner, the algorithm input of the secondary key is the primary key, and the algorithm of the secondary key is: SHA256 encryption algorithm, MD5 encryption algorithm, or RSA encryption algorithm.
The intelligent network-connected automobile control system provided by the embodiment of the application and the bidirectional security check method for MCU software upgrading provided by the embodiment of the application have the same beneficial effects as the method adopted, operated or realized by the same application conception.
Finally, it should be noted that: the above embodiments are only for illustrating the technical solution of the present application, and not for limiting the same; although the application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that: the technical scheme described in the foregoing embodiments can be modified or some or all of the technical features thereof can be replaced by equivalents; such modifications and substitutions do not depart from the spirit of the application, and are intended to be included within the scope of the appended claims and description.
Claims (8)
1. The bidirectional safety verification method for MCU software upgrade is characterized by being applied to an intelligent network-connected automobile control system, wherein the control system comprises: the method comprises the following steps of:
the MPU end initiates a security access verification request to the MCU end, wherein the verification request comprises a security level and a key seed;
After the MCU receives the verification request, generating a primary key through a verification algorithm according to the security level, and returning the primary key to the MPU;
After receiving the primary key, the MPU verifies the primary key through an algorithm; if the primary key is correct, generating a secondary key by using the primary key, and sending the secondary key to the MCU side; if the primary key is wrong, the security access is exited;
after the MCU receives the secondary key, verifying the secondary key through a verification algorithm; if the secondary key is correct, a positive acknowledgement is returned to the MPU terminal; if the secondary secret key is wrong, an error code is returned to the MPU end;
After receiving the returned response, the MPU receives the returned response, and if the returned response is affirmative, the MPU continues to access through the security access check; if the answer is an error code, the security access is exited;
the primary key generation process is as follows:
The MCU end carries out exclusive-or operation on the key seeds to obtain first data, and carries out exclusive-or operation on the upper 4 bits and the lower 4 bits of the first data to obtain second data;
Obtaining a parameter n in a primary key algorithm through a second formula;
The second formula is: n= ((b2+ (4*A))%64); wherein A represents a security level, and A is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1; b2 represents the second data;
Traversing bytes in the key seed, calculating to obtain a parameter n0 through a third formula, and obtaining a primary key from the seed secret according to n 0;
The third formula is: n0= ((B [ i ]% 64) +n+i); wherein i is the sequence number when traversing the key seed, i is greater than or equal to 0 and less than the length of the key seed.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the key seed is random data of a corresponding data length generated according to the security level.
3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the data length of the key seed is calculated according to a first formula, the first formula being as follows:
L=（（A - 1）* 2 + 4）；
Where L represents the data length of the key seed in bytes.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the algorithm input of the secondary key is the primary key, and wherein the algorithm of the secondary key is: SHA256 encryption algorithm, MD5 encryption algorithm, or RSA encryption algorithm.
5. An intelligent networked automotive control system, characterized in that the control system comprises: an MCU end and an MPU end;
the MPU end is used for initiating a secure access verification request to the MCU end, wherein the verification request comprises a security level and a key seed;
The MCU end is used for generating a primary key through a verification algorithm according to the security level after receiving the verification request, and returning the primary key to the MPU end;
The MPU end is used for checking the primary key through an algorithm after receiving the primary key; if the primary key is correct, generating a secondary key by using the primary key, and sending the secondary key to the MCU side; if the primary key is wrong, the security access is exited;
The MCU end is used for verifying the secondary key through a verification algorithm after receiving the secondary key; if the secondary key is correct, a positive acknowledgement is returned to the MPU terminal; if the secondary secret key is wrong, an error code is returned to the MPU end;
the MPU end is used for continuing to access through the security access check if the answer is affirmative after receiving the return answer; if the answer is an error code, the security access is exited;
The MCU end is used for generating a primary key through the following process:
The MCU end carries out exclusive-or operation on the key seeds to obtain first data, and carries out exclusive-or operation on the upper 4 bits and the lower 4 bits of the first data to obtain second data;
Obtaining a parameter n in a primary key algorithm through a second formula;
The second formula is: n= ((b2+ (4*A))%64); wherein A represents a security level, and A is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1; b2 represents the second data;
Traversing bytes in the key seed, calculating to obtain a parameter n0 through a third formula, and obtaining a primary key from the seed secret according to n 0;
The third formula is: n0= ((B [ i ]% 64) +n+i); wherein i is the sequence number when traversing the key seed, i is greater than or equal to 0 and less than the length of the key seed.
6. The control system of claim 5, wherein the key seed is random data of a corresponding data length generated according to the security level.
7. The control system according to claim 5 or 6, wherein the data length of the key seed is calculated according to a first formula, the first formula being as follows:
L=（（A - 1）* 2 + 4）；
Where L represents the data length of the key seed in bytes.
8. The control system of claim 5, wherein the algorithm input of the secondary key is the primary key, and wherein the algorithm of the secondary key is: SHA256 encryption algorithm, MD5 encryption algorithm, or RSA encryption algorithm.
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| CN117729051A (en) | 2024-03-19 |
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