CN117640061A - Anti-side channel attack password card - Google Patents
Anti-side channel attack password card Download PDFInfo
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- CN117640061A CN117640061A CN202311659501.6A CN202311659501A CN117640061A CN 117640061 A CN117640061 A CN 117640061A CN 202311659501 A CN202311659501 A CN 202311659501A CN 117640061 A CN117640061 A CN 117640061A
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- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 38
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 26
- 238000004422 calculation algorithm Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 20
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 14
- 230000006378 damage Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 8
- 238000005457 optimization Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 8
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 8
- 239000002184 metal Substances 0.000 claims description 22
- 239000000523 sample Substances 0.000 claims description 5
- 239000007769 metal material Substances 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000001360 synchronised effect Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- 239000011248 coating agent Substances 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000000576 coating method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000005059 dormancy Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000007790 scraping Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 abstract description 6
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 abstract description 5
- 238000005336 cracking Methods 0.000 abstract description 3
- 230000009545 invasion Effects 0.000 abstract description 3
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012962 cracking technique Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000009795 derivation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000005670 electromagnetic radiation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000116 mitigating effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000007619 statistical method Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
- H04L9/005—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms for timing attacks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/065—Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
- H04L9/0656—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
- H04L9/0662—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/12—Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention particularly relates to a password card for resisting side channel attack. The password card for resisting the side channel attack adopts a software and hardware integrated protection design and comprises a password calculation unit and a security control unit; the password processing unit comprises a security chip, a noise source chip and a storage chip; the security chip performs algorithm optimization processing aiming at timing attack, power consumption analysis attack and electromagnetic analysis attack; the security control unit is used for performing anti-side-road attack detection on a physical layer and realizing electromagnetic shielding, anti-disassembly detection and temperature detection. According to the password card for resisting the side channel attack, from two aspects of hardware design and software design, the leakage condition of side channel information is comprehensively considered to be reduced, the cracking difficulty is increased, the data security and the communication security of a user in the daily use process can be ensured, the security of system core data is protected, the invasion and the damage to the whole system are resisted, and safer password service is provided for the user.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of computers, in particular to a password card for resisting side channel attack.
Background
Side channel attacks exploit physical leakage of cryptographic hardware rather than theoretical vulnerabilities to recover keys, with serious real-world threats to the security of cryptographic systems. The key information may be leaked due to energy, electromagnetism, buffer memory, fault output and other side information generated when the cryptographic device operates, and an attacker obtains the key information by analyzing characteristic points related to the key in the side information. The side channel attack provides additional information for an attacker, and reduces the difficulty of recovering an unknown key.
Unlike conventional cryptanalysis, the cracking technique of side channel attacks is independent of key length or linearly dependent. When there is enough information to leak, the side channel attack can recover the key at little cost. It is therefore imperative to study how side channel attacks can be resisted through various design and technical paths.
Based on the above situation, the invention provides a password card for resisting side channel attack.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a simple and efficient password card for resisting side channel attack in order to make up the defects of the prior art.
The invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
the utility model provides a cryptographic card is attacked to anti side channel which characterized in that: the software and hardware integrated protection design is adopted, and the software and hardware integrated protection design comprises a password calculation unit and a security control unit;
the password processing unit comprises a safety chip, a noise source chip and a storage chip, wherein the safety chip is also connected with an authentication interface, a destruction interface and an indicator lamp;
the SM1 algorithm, the SM2 algorithm, the SM3 algorithm and the SM4 algorithm are realized in the security chip, signature verification, asymmetric encryption and decryption, symmetric encryption and decryption and hash algorithm interfaces are externally provided, algorithm optimization processing is carried out aiming at timing attack, power consumption analysis attack and electromagnetic analysis attack, side channel information leakage is reduced, and the side channel attack resistance protection capability of the password card is improved;
the security control unit comprises a protection circuit, a security chip, a sensor, a shielding layer and a button power supply, and is used for performing anti-side-road attack detection on a physical layer to realize electromagnetic shielding, anti-disassembly detection and temperature detection;
the security chip is connected to the security chip, and the security chip is connected with the host computer through the PCIE bus.
The anti-side channel attack password card of the invention adopts a PCIE interface for communication with a host, and the PCI-E interface adopts PCIE 3.0x4 signals, which can reach 32Gbps at most, and can provide high-speed password service for upper layer application.
The shielding layer comprises a hard metal material shell and a metal wire mesh;
when typesetting is carried out on the printed circuit board PCB (Printed Circuit Board), bus signals and data signals are designed on the inner layer of the printed plate so as to prevent the external scraping of the surface coating of the printed circuit board PCB and the direct detection of electric signals by using probes; meanwhile, all components are arranged on the front surface of the circuit board, and the front and back surfaces of the circuit board are fully wrapped by adopting a hard metal shell so as to prevent external snooping;
the wire mesh is arranged inside the hard metal shell, and after the hard metal shell is pressed, the wire mesh is tightly attached to the circuit board so as to eliminate a tiny gap between the shell and the circuit board, prevent electromagnetic interference and resist electromagnetic analysis attack in non-invasive attack.
The protection circuit consists of a mechanical detection circuit and a trigger notification circuit;
the mechanical detection circuit is provided with at least two detection points at different positions, wherein the detection points work in a multi-unit parallel mode and are used for detecting the vertical distance between the upper cover of the hard metal shell and the PCB;
if the vertical distance detected by any detection point changes, the upper cover of the hard metal shell is considered to be disassembled, the triggering notification circuit sends an alarm signal to the security chip, and the security chip destroys the main key component stored by the security chip and pushes alarm information to the security chip to destroy sensitive information.
More preferably, the mechanical detection circuit is provided with 4 detection points for detecting the vertical distance between the upper cover of the hard metal shell and the PCB at 4 different positions.
The button power supply has the power supply function of the password card under the condition of power failure, and can realize the emergency destruction function of related resources of the password card under the power failure state of the external power supply.
The sensor is a temperature sensor and is used for detecting the ambient temperature near the security chip and the storage chip inside the password card for resisting side channel attack; if the environment temperature exceeds the user-defined threshold value, the environment is considered to be invalid, the security chip destroys the main key component stored by the security chip, and the alarm information is pushed to the security chip to destroy the sensitive information.
When the password card is used for password calculation, a one-bit random number m is firstly obtained, and random delay operation is carried out; after the password calculation is completed, a bit of random number n is obtained, after random time delay operation is carried out, a calculation result is returned to an upper layer, so that the time consumed by the password calculation operation of the same information is different, and the time attack is relieved and optimized.
The random delay time is 1-10 ms.
The password card resistant to side channel attack uses the synchronous random calculation of the security chip and the security chip, so that the password card as a whole presents power consumption randomness when carrying out password operation, and the outside cannot acquire the ongoing password operation condition through power consumption analysis.
Specifically, the security chip transmits a working signal to the security chip while performing password calculation; the security chip acquires a random number sequence, and performs random dormancy, addition or multiplication operation according to the random number sequence;
after the password operation is finished, the ending signal is transmitted to the security chip, and the security chip stops random calculation.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows: according to the password card for resisting the side channel attack, from two aspects of hardware design and software design, the leakage condition of side channel information is comprehensively considered to be reduced, the cracking difficulty of an attacker is increased, the data security and the communication security of a user in the daily use process can be better ensured, the security of system core data is protected when security threat occurs, the invasion and damage to the whole system are resisted, and safer password service is provided for the user.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings that are required in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly described, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the present invention, and other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a side channel attack resistant cryptographic card according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solution of the present invention, the following description will make clear and complete description of the technical solution of the present invention in combination with the embodiments of the present invention. It will be apparent that the embodiments described below are only some, but not all, embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments, which can be made by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without making any inventive effort, shall fall within the scope of the present invention.
The password card for resisting the side channel attack adopts a software and hardware integrated protection design and comprises a password calculation unit and a security control unit;
the password processing unit comprises a safety chip, a noise source chip and a storage chip, wherein the safety chip is also connected with an authentication interface, a destruction interface and an indicator lamp;
the SM1 algorithm, the SM2 algorithm, the SM3 algorithm and the SM4 algorithm are realized in the security chip, signature verification, asymmetric encryption and decryption, symmetric encryption and decryption and hash algorithm interfaces are externally provided, algorithm optimization processing is carried out on timing attack, power consumption analysis attack and electromagnetic analysis attack, side channel information leakage is comprehensively reduced, and the side channel attack resistance protection capability of the password card is improved;
the security control unit comprises a protection circuit, a security chip, a sensor, a shielding layer and a button power supply, and is used for performing anti-side-road attack detection on a physical layer to realize electromagnetic shielding, anti-disassembly detection and temperature detection;
the security chip is connected to the security chip, and the security chip is connected with the host computer through the PCIE bus.
The anti-side channel attack password card adopts a PCIE interface for communication with a host, and the PCI-E interface adopts PCIE 3.0x4 signals, which can reach 32Gbps at most, and can provide high-speed password service for upper-layer application.
Hardware safety protection design: the cipher card hardware design is typeset from the PCB, the external metal shielding layer, the inside is set up and prevented tearing open, temperature detection sensor prevents cipher card side channel information disclosure.
The shielding layer comprises a hard metal material shell and a metal wire mesh;
when typesetting is carried out on the printed circuit board PCB (Printed Circuit Board), bus signals and data signals are designed on the inner layer of the printed plate so as to prevent the external scraping of the surface coating of the printed circuit board PCB and the direct detection of electric signals by using probes; meanwhile, all components are arranged on the front surface of the circuit board, and the front and back surfaces of the circuit board are fully wrapped by adopting a hard metal shell so as to prevent external snooping;
the wire mesh is arranged inside the hard metal shell, and after the hard metal shell is pressed, the wire mesh is tightly attached to the circuit board so as to eliminate a tiny gap between the shell and the circuit board, prevent electromagnetic interference and resist electromagnetic analysis attack in non-invasive attack.
The protection circuit consists of a mechanical detection circuit and a trigger notification circuit;
in order to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the detection and disassembly actions and prevent the prying up of a certain part from escaping the detection, the mechanical detection circuit is provided with at least two detection points at different positions, wherein the detection points work in a multi-unit parallel mode and are used for detecting the vertical distance between the upper cover of the hard metal shell and the PCB;
if the vertical distance detected by any detection point changes, the upper cover of the hard metal shell is considered to be disassembled, the triggering notification circuit sends an alarm signal to the security chip, and the security chip destroys the main key component stored by the security chip and pushes alarm information to the security chip to destroy sensitive information.
More preferably, the mechanical detection circuit is provided with 4 detection points for detecting the vertical distance between the upper cover of the hard metal shell and the PCB at 4 different positions.
The button power supply has the power supply function of the password card under the condition of power failure, and can realize the emergency destruction function of related resources of the password card under the power failure state of the external power supply.
The sensor is a temperature sensor and is used for detecting the ambient temperature near the security chip and the storage chip inside the password card for resisting side channel attack; if the environment temperature exceeds the user-defined threshold value, the environment is considered to be invalid, the security chip destroys the main key component stored by the security chip, and the alarm information is pushed to the security chip to destroy the sensitive information.
Software safety protection design: the method is characterized in that targeted optimization adjustment is carried out on non-invasive attacks at a software level to reduce side channel information leakage, and targeted relief optimization is carried out on common non-invasive attack means such as timing attacks, power consumption analysis attacks and the like to reduce side channel information leakage.
Timing attack mitigation optimization, timing attack is the derivation of a password by an attacker by analyzing the time execution of an encryption algorithm. Each logic operation needs time to be executed in the computer, the execution time is accurately measured according to different input, and the password is reversely deduced according to the execution time. When the password card for resisting the side channel attack calculates the password, firstly acquiring a random number m, and carrying out random delay operation; after the password calculation is completed, a bit of random number n is obtained, after random time delay operation is carried out, a calculation result is returned to an upper layer, so that the time consumed by the password calculation operation of the same information is different, and the time attack is relieved and optimized.
The random delay time is 1-10 ms.
The power consumption analysis attack is relieved and optimized, and the power consumption analysis attack becomes a main method for carrying out bypass attack on the realized cryptographic chip. It is mainly divided into three types: simple power consumption analysis attacks, differential power consumption analysis attacks, and correlation power consumption analysis attacks.
A simple power consumption attack (Simple Power Analysis Attack, SPA) uses the relationship between the key bits and the actual power consumption of the chip during the encryption operation to directly obtain key information from the actual measured power consumption curve.
Differential power analysis attacks (Differential Power Analysis Attack, DPA) are key information obtained by statistical analysis of a large number of plaintext or ciphertext and power consumption curves.
The correlation power consumption analysis attack (Correlation Power AnalysisAttack, CPA) is implemented by presetting a prediction model in advance and using the prediction model to carry out cryptographic operation.
The password card for resisting side channel attack uses the synchronous random calculation of the security chip and the security chip, so that the password card is in power consumption randomness when in password operation on the whole, and the outside cannot acquire the ongoing password operation condition through power consumption analysis.
Specifically, the security chip transmits a working signal to the security chip while performing password calculation; the security chip acquires a random number sequence, and performs random dormancy, addition or multiplication operation according to the random number sequence;
after the password operation is finished, the ending signal is transmitted to the security chip, and the security chip stops random calculation.
The synchronous random calculation using the security chip and the security chip has the advantages that the security chip has no extra performance loss when performing the password calculation, so that the password calculation efficiency is higher.
The electromagnetic analysis attack alleviation optimization is realized, the outside of the anti-side channel attack password card is provided with an anti-shielding wire mesh, and the structural design of the configured hard metal material shell is free of any gap, so that an external probe cannot enter a special chip of a password module or the vicinity of a logic device to directly detect electromagnetic radiation, the password card is prevented from being inserted and analyzed by using the probe and the like, and electromagnetic information leakage of the password card in the password operation process is reduced as much as possible. In addition, when the password card carries out password operation, in order to resist timing and power consumption analysis attacks, the security chip is added with a plurality of random operations, so that when the password card carries out password operation, electromagnetic information also presents certain randomness, and the analysis difficulty of an attacker is increased.
In conclusion, the side channel attack resistant password card comprehensively considers the leakage condition of side channel information from two aspects of hardware design and software design, increases the cracking difficulty of an attacker, can better ensure the data security and communication security of a user in the daily use process, protects the security of core data of a system when security threat occurs, resists invasion and damage to the whole system, and provides safer password service for the user.
The above describes a password card for resisting side channel attack in the embodiment of the present invention in detail. The principles and embodiments of the present invention have been described in this section with specific examples provided above to facilitate understanding of the core concepts of the invention and all other examples obtained by one skilled in the art without departing from the principles of the invention are intended to be within the scope of the invention.
Claims (10)
1. The utility model provides a cryptographic card is attacked to anti side channel which characterized in that: the software and hardware integrated protection design is adopted, and the software and hardware integrated protection design comprises a password calculation unit and a security control unit;
the password processing unit comprises a safety chip, a noise source chip and a storage chip, wherein the safety chip is also connected with an authentication interface, a destruction interface and an indicator lamp;
the SM1 algorithm, the SM2 algorithm, the SM3 algorithm and the SM4 algorithm are realized in the security chip, signature verification, asymmetric encryption and decryption, symmetric encryption and decryption and hash algorithm interfaces are externally provided, algorithm optimization processing is carried out aiming at timing attack, power consumption analysis attack and electromagnetic analysis attack, side channel information leakage is reduced, and the side channel attack resistance protection capability of the password card is improved;
the security control unit comprises a protection circuit, a security chip, a sensor, a shielding layer and a button power supply, and is used for performing anti-side-road attack detection on a physical layer to realize electromagnetic shielding, anti-disassembly detection and temperature detection;
the security chip is connected to the security chip, and the security chip is connected with the host computer through the PCIE bus.
2. The side channel attack resistant cryptographic card of claim 1, wherein: the PCI-E interface adopts PCIE 3.0x4 signals, which can reach 32Gbps at most, and can provide high-speed password service for upper layer application.
3. The side channel attack resistant cryptographic card of claim 1, wherein: the shielding layer comprises a hard metal material shell and a metal wire mesh;
when the PCB typesetting is carried out, bus signals and data signals are designed in the inner layer of the printing plate so as to prevent the external scraping of the surface coating of the PCB from directly detecting the electric signals by using probes; meanwhile, all components are arranged on the front surface of the circuit board, and the front and back surfaces of the circuit board are fully wrapped by adopting a hard metal shell so as to prevent external snooping;
the wire mesh is arranged inside the hard metal shell, and after the hard metal shell is pressed, the wire mesh is tightly attached to the circuit board so as to eliminate a tiny gap between the shell and the circuit board, prevent electromagnetic interference and resist electromagnetic analysis attack in non-invasive attack.
4. The side channel attack resistant cryptographic card of claim 1, wherein: the protection circuit consists of a mechanical detection circuit and a trigger notification circuit;
the mechanical detection circuit is provided with at least two detection points at different positions, wherein the detection points work in a multi-unit parallel mode and are used for detecting the vertical distance between the upper cover of the hard metal shell and the PCB;
if the vertical distance detected by any detection point changes, the upper cover of the hard metal shell is considered to be disassembled, the triggering notification circuit sends an alarm signal to the security chip, and the security chip destroys the main key component stored by the security chip and pushes alarm information to the security chip to destroy sensitive information.
5. The side channel attack resistant cryptographic card of claim 4, wherein: the mechanical detection circuit is provided with 4 detection points for detecting the vertical distance between the upper cover of the hard metal shell at 4 different positions and the PCB.
6. The side channel attack resistant cryptographic card of claim 1, wherein: the sensor is a temperature sensor and is used for detecting the ambient temperature near the security chip and the storage chip inside the password card for resisting side channel attack; if the environment temperature exceeds the user-defined threshold value, the environment is considered to be invalid, the security chip destroys the main key component stored by the security chip, and the alarm information is pushed to the security chip to destroy the sensitive information.
7. The side channel attack resistant cryptographic card of claim 1, wherein: when the password is calculated, a one-bit random number m is firstly obtained, and random time delay operation is carried out; after the password calculation is completed, a bit of random number n is obtained, after random time delay operation is carried out, a calculation result is returned to an upper layer, so that the time consumed by the password calculation operation of the same information is different, and the time attack is relieved and optimized.
8. The side channel attack resistant cryptographic card of claim 7, wherein: the random delay time is 1-10 ms.
9. The side channel attack resistant cryptographic card of claim 1, wherein: the synchronous random calculation of the security chip and the security chip is used, so that the password card is random in power consumption when the password operation is performed on the whole, and the external world cannot acquire the ongoing password operation condition through power consumption analysis.
10. The side channel attack resistant cryptographic card of claim 9, wherein: the security chip transmits a working signal to the security chip while performing password calculation; the security chip acquires a random number sequence, and performs random dormancy, addition or multiplication operation according to the random number sequence;
after the password operation is finished, the ending signal is transmitted to the security chip, and the security chip stops random calculation.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202311659501.6A CN117640061A (en) | 2023-12-06 | 2023-12-06 | Anti-side channel attack password card |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202311659501.6A CN117640061A (en) | 2023-12-06 | 2023-12-06 | Anti-side channel attack password card |
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| CN117640061A true CN117640061A (en) | 2024-03-01 |
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| CN202311659501.6A Pending CN117640061A (en) | 2023-12-06 | 2023-12-06 | Anti-side channel attack password card |
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- 2023-12-06 CN CN202311659501.6A patent/CN117640061A/en active Pending
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