CN117336715A - Physical layer secure communication method based on wireless channel direct encryption - Google Patents
Physical layer secure communication method based on wireless channel direct encryption Download PDFInfo
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- CN117336715A CN117336715A CN202311365688.9A CN202311365688A CN117336715A CN 117336715 A CN117336715 A CN 117336715A CN 202311365688 A CN202311365688 A CN 202311365688A CN 117336715 A CN117336715 A CN 117336715A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 31
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 22
- 238000012937 correction Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 20
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 19
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 10
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 5
- 238000012805 post-processing Methods 0.000 claims 1
- 238000013139 quantization Methods 0.000 description 5
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 3
- 101100504388 Arabidopsis thaliana GFS12 gene Proteins 0.000 description 2
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000000523 sample Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000003321 amplification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007423 decrease Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000002708 enhancing effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000002452 interceptive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000003199 nucleic acid amplification method Methods 0.000 description 1
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/004—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received by using forward error control
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0875—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords based on channel impulse response [CIR]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/40—Network security protocols
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The invention provides a physical layer safety communication method based on wireless channel direct encryption, which comprises the following steps: the two communication parties firstly use the mutual sending detection signals of the wireless channels; calculating local channel gain according to channel state information provided by the detection signal, and then quantizing the local channel gain to obtain a local physical key; an information transmission step: the sender performs error correction code encoding on information to be transmitted, and then performs symmetric encryption processing on the information subjected to error correction code encoding by using a local physical key of the sender to obtain sent information; the receiving party uses the received sending information as receiving information, symmetrically decrypts the receiving information by utilizing the local physical key of the receiving party, and then decodes the decrypted information into error correction codes to recover the transmission information. The invention can also enable the two communication parties to carry out information transmission under the condition of not obtaining the accurate secret key, thereby avoiding the complicated secret key negotiation process and having the characteristics of low cost, low complexity, high safety and high efficiency.
Description
Technical Field
Relates to a wireless communication encryption technology, in particular to a physical layer communication technology based on wireless channel direct encryption.
Background
Traditional encryption methods in the communication field play a key role in data transmission, however, with the improvement of computing power and the continuous evolution of attack means, the security of the traditional encryption methods is gradually challenged. In this context, information encryption models based on physical layer keys are attracting attention of the technicians.
The physical layer key is an encryption mode based on channel characteristics, and unlike the conventional cryptography-based method, it uses the randomness and noise characteristics of the channel to generate a key, thereby enhancing the confidentiality of information to some extent.
In practical application, the existing physical layer key generation method often needs to obtain accurate key information, and both communication parties need to use an error-free channel to carry out a secondary information negotiation process so as to obtain a completely consistent physical layer key through negotiation. Because a key can be generated by secondary negotiation, the communication overhead is high, the efficiency is low, and the application range of the physical layer key is greatly limited. Moreover, the existing physical layer key is not generally related to encryption and decryption of information, so that the physical layer key is not better practically applied.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is to provide a physical layer safety communication method which has small communication cost and high efficiency and applies a physical layer secret key to information encryption.
The invention adopts the technical proposal that the physical layer safety communication method based on the direct encryption of wireless channels comprises the following steps:
and a channel detection step: the two communication parties firstly use the mutual sending detection signals of the wireless channels; one party calculates a local channel gain according to the channel state information provided by the acquired detection signal sent by the other party, and then quantizes the local channel gain to obtain a local physical key;
an information transmission step: the sender performs error correction code encoding on information to be transmitted, and then performs symmetric encryption processing on the information subjected to error correction code encoding by using a local physical key of the sender to obtain sent information; the sender sends the sending information to the receiver through a public error channel; the receiving party uses the received sending information as receiving information, symmetrically decrypts the receiving information by utilizing the local physical key of the receiving party, and then decodes the decrypted information into error correction codes to recover the transmission information.
Further, in the information transmission step, before error correction code encoding is performed on the information to be transmitted, the information to be transmitted is subjected to confusion processing and then is subjected to subsequent processing.
The invention is unique in that the invention skillfully realizes that both communication parties can transmit information under the condition that the accurate secret key is not obtained, thereby avoiding the complicated secret key negotiation process, overcoming the limitation of the use of the secret key of the prior physical layer and realizing higher-level information protection and safe transmission.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows:
1 performance advantage:
1.1 the existing method requires an error-free channel to transmit the shared key to avoid key corruption or leakage. The present scheme is able to reliably extract information even in the presence of noise interference, which benefits from advanced error correction coding, and therefore lower channel requirements.
1.2 in the prior art methods, a shared key is used to encrypt and decrypt messages, often requiring complex encryption algorithms. In the scheme, the legal communication parties use the local physical key to encrypt and decrypt the message, so that the direct dependence on the shared key is reduced.
2 cost advantages:
2.1 low overhead: the key distribution parties of the invention do not need to negotiate to transfer information with each other, and only need unidirectional transmission.
2.2 low complexity the key distribution process of the invention does not need to carry out negotiation and privacy amplification by both sides, thus the process of the invention does not need to carry out multiple interactive negotiation related to the process by both sides on a common channel, and the complexity is reduced.
2.3 high security: the current technology uses a secure communication scheme of symmetric encryption+BCH scheme in the process of establishing the secret key, so as to ensure the security of system information transmission.
2.4 high efficiency: compared with a classical key distribution model, the method has lower average inconsistency rate when the channel error rate is lower, avoids pain points needing error-free channel negotiation, and realizes effective information transmission when the channel error rate is lower.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a model for implementing the method of the embodiments;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of embodiment information transmission.
Detailed Description
Channels of Alice and Bob of two communication parties obey Rayleigh distribution, and uplink and downlink channels are generated through the following model: alice channel characteristics H A And Bob channel characteristics H B The degree of reciprocity, i.e. similarity, of (a) can be described by a correlation coefficient ρ and gaussian white noise δ:
ρ is chosen to range from 0 to 1, with the closer to 1, the better alice and Bob reciprocity.
Similarly, an illegal eavesdropper Eve eavesdropping on Alice can obtain
ρ E For Alice channel characteristics H A And Eve channel characteristics H E Ranging from 0 to 1. Delta E Is gaussian white noise of the Eve channel.
Since the generated secret key after the equal probability quantization has better information entropy, the embodiment adopts equal probability quantization, and the selected parameters are amplitude, phase and real part to generate the local secret key. The error correction coding adopts BCH [ n, k, t ], the codeword length n of the BCH code is fixed to 127, k is the number of data bits, and t is the number of error bits which can be corrected, and the error correction capability is represented. k decreases with increasing t. The value of k is specifically selected to be [120,113,106,99,92,85,78,71,64,57,50,43,36,29,22,15,8].
Model for secure communication to be implemented at physical layer fig. 1 shows:
1) Channel sounding channel detection steps:
alice and Bob mutually transmit probe signals using a wireless channel;
alice calculates local channel gain according to Channel State Information (CSI) provided by a detection signal sent by captured Bob, namely, alice channel gain, and then obtains a local physical Key (KA) according to local channel gain quantization;
bob calculates a local channel gain according to channel state information CSI provided by a probe signal sent by Alice, that is, bob channel gain, and then quantizes a local physical key KB according to the local channel gain.
Since Alice physical key KA and Bob physical key KB are calculated based on the channel gain of the common channel (Alice to Bob, bob to Alice) between the two parties, K is therefore A And K B Has strong similarity and almost the same. Eve does not belong to both communication parties and cannot generate an approximation K A And K B Is used for the key(s).
Through this step Alice and Bob obtain the physical keys locally, respectively, for subsequent encryption and decryption of the information using the local keys. Eve can also eavesdrop on the channel estimation message and estimate Alice and Bob's uplink and downlink channels to Eve, and KE is obtained by channel quantization.
2) Information transmission information transmission steps:
further, before encoding the information M to be transmitted, in order to prevent the influence of the correlation of the information, the correlation of the information bits transmitted each time is reduced as much as possible. The purpose of confusion of the information M can be achieved by means of bit-shift substitution, etc.
The information transmission process is as shown in fig. 2:
alice codes the information M with BCH [ n, k, t ] to obtain C
C＝BCH(M)
Alice encodes the BCH-encoded information C and the local physical key K A Exclusive-or to obtain a transmission signal S
The exclusive-or is regarded as RC4 encryption in symmetric encryption, namely, an implementation method for carrying out exclusive-or operation on a pseudo random stream and a plaintext to obtain a ciphertext in encryption and carrying out exclusive-or operation on the ciphertext and the pseudo random stream to obtain an original plaintext in decryption. Those skilled in the art can also utilize K according to specific requirements A C, performing other symmetrical encryption modes; k (K) A Is an encryption key;
alice sends a transmission signal S to Bob via the common error channel error-process channel. The signal received by Bob is denoted S'. S' and S will be slightly inconsistent due to the effects of channel noise
S≠S'
Bob uses the local physical key K B Exclusive-or with S 'to obtain signal C'
Accordingly, those skilled in the art can also use K according to specific encryption means B Decrypting S';
bob performs BCH decoding BCHD corresponding to BCH coding on the signal C 'to finally obtain information M'
M'＝BCHD(C")。
Since the BCH code has error correction capability, the encryption key K is used in decryption A Almost the same K B To decrypt the obtainedThe decryption result has high similarity with the original signal C, and the information M' is finally recovered by a decoding algorithm of error correction coding, namely, the decryption result is equivalent to the original information M. Eve attempts to recover the stolen signal even according to the same method, but due to the generated physical key K E Failure to match with K A Strong similarity, information M is obtained by error correction decoding E Will be far from the original information M and the effect of recovering the original information M cannot be achieved.
In particular, one skilled in the art may specifically and practically need to select different quantization methods and application effects of error correction coding in the encryption model.
The invention avoids the complex information negotiation process, and no longer has error requirement on the channel, so that Alice and Bob can encrypt and decrypt information by using the channel coding and the locally generated key without obtaining the completely consistent key through error correction. And the generated secret key is directly combined with encryption and decryption of the information, so that the physical layer secret key is fully used.
Claims (4)
1. The physical layer safety communication method based on wireless channel direct encryption is characterized by comprising the following steps:
and a channel detection step: the two communication parties firstly use the mutual sending detection signals of the wireless channels; one party calculates a local channel gain according to the channel state information provided by the acquired detection signal sent by the other party, and then quantizes the local channel gain to obtain a local physical key;
an information transmission step: the sender performs error correction code encoding on information to be transmitted, and then performs symmetric encryption processing on the information subjected to error correction code encoding by using a local physical key of the sender to obtain sent information; the sender sends the sending information to the receiver through a public error channel; the receiving party uses the received sending information as receiving information, symmetrically decrypts the receiving information by utilizing the local physical key of the receiving party, and then decodes the decrypted information into error correction codes to recover the transmission information.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein in the information transmitting step, the information to be transmitted is subjected to a post-processing after being subjected to a confusion process before the information to be transmitted is subjected to error correction code encoding.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the error correction code encoding and decoding is BCH encoding and decoding.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein symmetric encryption and symmetric decryption are exclusive-or processes.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202311365688.9A CN117336715A (en) | 2023-10-20 | 2023-10-20 | Physical layer secure communication method based on wireless channel direct encryption |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| CN202311365688.9A CN117336715A (en) | 2023-10-20 | 2023-10-20 | Physical layer secure communication method based on wireless channel direct encryption |
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| Publication Number | Publication Date |
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| CN117336715A true CN117336715A (en) | 2024-01-02 |
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| CN202311365688.9A Pending CN117336715A (en) | 2023-10-20 | 2023-10-20 | Physical layer secure communication method based on wireless channel direct encryption |
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| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN117336715A (en) |
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2023
- 2023-10-20 CN CN202311365688.9A patent/CN117336715A/en active Pending
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