CN117176332A - Identity authentication method, system, terminal equipment and storage medium - Google Patents
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Abstract
本发明公开了一种身份认证方法、系统、终端设备及存储介质。该方法包括:对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对;基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对;当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。本发明旨在解决端卡分离的问题,提高业务流程的安全性,降低业务流程的复杂性。
The invention discloses an identity authentication method, system, terminal equipment and storage medium. The method includes: setting a public-private key pair for a preset business participant to obtain a public-private key pair set, wherein the public-private key pair set includes a card public-private key pair and a terminal public-private key pair; based on the card public-private key pair The key pair and the end public and private key pair are used to generate a combined public and private key pair; when the first preset request is received, the first public and private key pair are verified based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair. Identity information corresponding to a preset request. The invention aims to solve the problem of terminal card separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce the complexity of business processes.
Description
技术领域Technical field
本发明涉及网络安全技术领域,尤其涉及一种身份认证方法、系统、终端设备及存储介质。The present invention relates to the field of network security technology, and in particular to an identity authentication method, system, terminal equipment and storage medium.
背景技术Background technique
基于移动网络的车联网存在“端卡分离”的安全风险,可能造成用于车联网的SIM(Subscriber Identity Module,用户识别卡)/USIM(Universal Subscriber IdentityModule,全球用户识别卡)卡被滥用,并且,移动端也存在“端卡分离”的情况;其中,端卡分离是指车载通信终端中的SIM/USIM卡可能被拔出而挪作它用。因此,需要建立端卡绑定机制来防止这种情况的发生。在移动网络层面,可以通过IMSI(International MobileSubscriber Identity,国际移动用户识别码)/SUPI(Subscription PermanentIdentifier,用户隐藏标识符)和IMEI(International Mobile Subscriber Identity,国际移动用户识别码)绑定设置或信令分析方法来检测并确认端卡绑定关系;在车联网层面,目前既没有相应的绑定关系检测和绑定关系确认机制,也无法直接利用移动网络层面的能力。如果间接利用移动网络层面的能力,则需要调用服务接口,在一定程度上增加了业务流程的复杂性。The Internet of Vehicles based on mobile networks has the security risk of "end-card separation", which may cause the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module, User Identity Card)/USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module, Global User Identity Card) cards used in the Internet of Vehicles to be abused, and , the mobile terminal also has the situation of "terminal card separation"; among them, terminal card separation means that the SIM/USIM card in the vehicle communication terminal may be pulled out and used for other purposes. Therefore, a terminal card binding mechanism needs to be established to prevent this situation from happening. At the mobile network level, settings or signaling can be bound through IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, International Mobile Subscriber Identity)/SUPI (Subscription Permanent Identifier, User Hidden Identifier) and IMEI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, International Mobile Subscriber Identity) Analytical methods are used to detect and confirm the terminal card binding relationship; at the Internet of Vehicles level, there is currently neither a corresponding binding relationship detection nor binding relationship confirmation mechanism, nor can it directly utilize the capabilities of the mobile network layer. If you indirectly use the capabilities at the mobile network level, you need to call the service interface, which increases the complexity of the business process to a certain extent.
发明内容Contents of the invention
本发明实施例的主要目的在于提供一种身份认证方法、系统、终端设备及存储介质,旨在解决端卡分离的问题,提高业务流程的安全性,降低业务流程的复杂性。The main purpose of the embodiments of the present invention is to provide an identity authentication method, system, terminal device and storage medium, aiming to solve the problem of terminal card separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce the complexity of business processes.
为实现上述目的,本发明实施例提供一种身份认证方法,所述身份认证方法包括:To achieve the above object, an embodiment of the present invention provides an identity authentication method, which includes:
对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对;Set public and private key pairs for the preset business participants to obtain a public and private key pair set, wherein the public and private key pair set includes a card public and private key pair and a terminal public and private key pair;
基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对;Generate a combined public and private key pair based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair;
当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。When the first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair.
可选地,所述预设业务参与方包括发起方、接收方,所述基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息的步骤包括:Optionally, the preset service participants include an initiator and a receiver, and the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair. Steps include:
基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,通过所述发起方加密所述第一预设请求,得到决策信息;Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the initiator encrypts the first preset request to obtain decision information;
基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,通过所述接收方验证所述决策信息对应的身份信息。Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the identity information corresponding to the decision-making information is verified by the recipient.
可选地,所述基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对的步骤之后包括:Optionally, the step of generating a combined public and private key pair based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair includes:
当所述接收方接收到第二预设请求时,通过所述接收方将所述第二预设请求发送至所述发起方;When the recipient receives the second preset request, the recipient sends the second preset request to the initiator;
接收所述发起方基于所述第二预设请求生成的第一预设请求,并执行步骤:基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。Receive the first preset request generated by the initiator based on the second preset request, and perform the steps of: verifying the first preset request based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair Corresponding identity information.
可选地,所述接收方包括第一参与方、第二参与方,所述基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,通过所述接收方验证所述决策信息对应的身份信息的步骤包括:Optionally, the recipient includes a first participant and a second participant, and based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the recipient verifies the decision information corresponding to The steps for identity information include:
通过所述第一参与方验证所述决策信息中,基于所述第一参与方的公私密钥对生成的签名信息;Verify, by the first participant, the signature information generated based on the public-private key pair of the first participant in the decision-making information;
若验证通过,则通过所述第一参与方将所述决策信息发送至所述第二参与方;If the verification passes, the decision information is sent to the second participant through the first participant;
通过所述第二参与方验证所述决策信息中,基于所述第二参与方的组合公私密钥对生成的签名信息。The second party verifies the signature information generated based on the combined public and private key pair of the second party in the decision information.
可选地,所述基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,通过所述发起方加密所述第一预设请求,得到决策信息的步骤包括:Optionally, the step of obtaining the decision information by encrypting the first preset request by the initiator based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair includes:
基于所述第一预设请求,生成第一随机数、第二随机数;Based on the first preset request, generate a first random number and a second random number;
基于所述第一预设请求、所述第二随机数,生成组合信息;Generate combined information based on the first preset request and the second random number;
基于所述第一随机数、所述第二随机数、所述组合信息、所述第一预设请求、所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,得到所述决策信息。The decision information is obtained based on the first random number, the second random number, the combination information, the first preset request, the public-private key pair set, and the combined public-private key pair.
可选地,所述通过所述第一参与方将所述决策信息发送至所述第二参与方的步骤之前包括:Optionally, the step of sending the decision information to the second participant through the first participant includes:
基于所述决策信息,生成第三随机数;Based on the decision information, generate a third random number;
基于所述第二参与方的组合公私密钥对,对所述第三随机数加密,得到第一签名;Based on the combined public and private key pair of the second participant, the third random number is encrypted to obtain the first signature;
基于所述第一签名,更新所述决策信息。Based on the first signature, the decision information is updated.
可选地,所述基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对的步骤之后包括:Optionally, the step of generating a combined public and private key pair based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair includes:
将所述公私密钥对集的公钥,发送至所述预设业务参与方;Send the public key of the public-private key pair set to the preset service participant;
将所述组合公私密钥对的公钥,发送至所述预设参与方。Send the public key of the combined public-private key pair to the preset participant.
此外,为实现上述目的,本发明还提供一种身份认证系统,所述系统包括:In addition, to achieve the above objectives, the present invention also provides an identity authentication system, which includes:
密钥集生成模块,用于对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对;The key set generation module is used to set public and private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a public and private key pair set, wherein the public and private key pair set includes a card public and private key pair and a terminal public and private key pair;
组合密钥生成模块,用于基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对;A combined key generation module, configured to generate a combined public and private key pair based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair;
身份验证模块,用于当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。An identity verification module, configured to, when receiving the first preset request, verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair.
此外,为实现上述目的,本发明还提供一种终端设备,所述终端设备包括:存储器、处理器及存储在所述存储器上并可在所述处理器上运行的身份认证方法,所述身份认证的程序被所述处理器执行时实现如上所述的身份认证方法的步骤。In addition, in order to achieve the above object, the present invention also provides a terminal device. The terminal device includes: a memory, a processor, and an identity authentication method stored on the memory and operable on the processor. When the authentication program is executed by the processor, the steps of the identity authentication method as described above are implemented.
此外,为实现上述目的,本发明还提供一种计算机可读存储介质,所述计算机可读存储介质上存储有身份认证的程序,所述身份认证的程序被处理器执行时实现如上所述的身份认证方法的步骤。In addition, in order to achieve the above object, the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium, the computer-readable storage medium stores an identity authentication program, and when the identity authentication program is executed by the processor, the above-mentioned Steps of the authentication method.
本发明实施例提出的身份认证方法、系统、终端设备及存储介质,通过对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,以根据公私密钥对集对信息加密,提高信息传输的安全性,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对;基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对,以确认端卡绑定关系,降低端设备的卡的滥用频率;当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息,以确认第一预设请求的身份信息,为响应第一预设请求提供判断依据。本发明旨在解决端卡分离的问题,提高业务流程的安全性,降低业务流程的复杂性。The identity authentication method, system, terminal device and storage medium proposed by the embodiment of the present invention obtain a public and private key pair set by setting a public and private key pair for the preset business participants, so as to encrypt information according to the public and private key pair set, and improve Security of information transmission, wherein the set of public and private key pairs includes a card public and private key pair and a terminal public and private key pair; based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair, a combined public and private key is generated Yes, to confirm the end card binding relationship and reduce the frequency of card abuse of the end device; when receiving the first preset request, based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair, verify the third The identity information corresponding to a preset request is used to confirm the identity information of the first preset request and provide a basis for judgment in response to the first preset request. The invention aims to solve the problem of terminal card separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce the complexity of business processes.
附图说明Description of drawings
图1为本发明身份认证装置所属终端设备的功能模块示意图;Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the functional modules of the terminal equipment to which the identity authentication device of the present invention belongs;
图2为本发明身份认证方法第一实施例的流程示意图;Figure 2 is a schematic flow chart of the first embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention;
图3为本发明身份认证方法第一应用场景的示意图;Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the first application scenario of the identity authentication method of the present invention;
图4为本发明身份认证方法第四实施例的流程示意图;Figure 4 is a schematic flow chart of the fourth embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention;
图5为本发明身份认证方法第二应用场景的示意图;Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the second application scenario of the identity authentication method of the present invention;
图6为本发明身份认证方法第三应用场景的示意图;Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of the third application scenario of the identity authentication method of the present invention;
图7为本发明身份认证方法车联网远程操控业务场景的交互示意图;Figure 7 is an interactive schematic diagram of the Internet of Vehicles remote control business scenario of the identity authentication method of the present invention;
图8为本发明身份认证方法车联网业务订购业务场景的交互示意图;Figure 8 is an interactive schematic diagram of the Internet of Vehicles service ordering business scenario of the identity authentication method of the present invention;
图9为本发明身份认证系统的功能模块示意图。Figure 9 is a schematic diagram of the functional modules of the identity authentication system of the present invention.
本发明目的的实现、功能特点及优点将结合实施例,参照附图做进一步说明。The realization of the purpose, functional features and advantages of the present invention will be further described with reference to the embodiments and the accompanying drawings.
具体实施方式Detailed ways
应当理解,此处所描述的具体实施例仅仅用以解释本发明,并不用于限定本发明。It should be understood that the specific embodiments described here are only used to explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.
本发明实施例的主要解决方案是:对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对;基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对;当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。The main solution of the embodiment of the present invention is to set a public and private key pair for the preset business participants to obtain a public and private key pair set, wherein the public and private key pair set includes a card public and private key pair and a terminal public and private key pair. ; Based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair, generate a combined public and private key pair; when receiving the first preset request, based on the public and private key pair set, the combined public and private key pair Yes, verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request.
本发明实施例涉及的技术术语:Technical terms involved in the embodiments of the present invention:
SIM:(Subscriber Identity Module,用户识别卡),是GSM系统的移动用户所持有的IC卡。GSM系统通过SIM卡来识别GSM用户。同一张SIM卡可在不同的手机上使用。GSM手机只有插入SIM卡后,才能入网使用。SIM: (Subscriber Identity Module, subscriber identification card) is an IC card held by mobile users of the GSM system. The GSM system identifies GSM users through SIM cards. The same SIM card can be used on different mobile phones. GSM mobile phones can only be used online after inserting a SIM card.
USIM:(Universal Subscriber Identity Module,全球用户识别卡),全球用户身份模块(USIM),也叫做升级SIM,是在UMTS(全称为Universal Mobile TelecommunicationSystem,通用无线通信系统)3G网络的一个构件。除能够支持多应用之外,USIM卡还在安全性方面对算法进行了升级,并增加了卡对网络的认证功能,这种双向认证可以有效防止黑客对卡片的攻击。USIM: (Universal Subscriber Identity Module, Global Subscriber Identity Card), Global Subscriber Identity Module (USIM), also called upgrade SIM, is a component of the UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System, Universal Wireless Communication System) 3G network. In addition to supporting multiple applications, the USIM card has also upgraded its security algorithm and added a card-to-network authentication function. This two-way authentication can effectively prevent hackers from attacking the card.
OBU:(On board Unit,车载单元),是采用DSRC(Dedicated Short RangeCommunication)技术,与RSU进行通讯的微波装置。在ETC系统中,OBU放在车上,路边架设路侧单元(RSU-Road Side Unit),相互之间通过微波进行通讯。OBU: (On board Unit, on-board unit) is a microwave device that uses DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) technology to communicate with RSU. In the ETC system, the OBU is placed on the vehicle, and the RSU-Road Side Unit is set up on the roadside to communicate with each other through microwaves.
T-BOX:(Travel-box,旅行盒子),是经过户外生活经验的积累与及技术创新发展而成的完整可移动的旅行盒子。T-BOX: (Travel-box, travel box) is a complete removable travel box developed through the accumulation of outdoor life experience and technological innovation.
IMSI:(International Mobile Subscriber Identity,国际移动用户识别码),是用于区分蜂窝网络中不同用户的、在所有蜂窝网络中不重复的识别码。手机将IMSI存储于一个64比特的字段发送给网络。IMSI可以用来在归属位置寄存器(HLR,Home LocationRegister)或拜访位置寄存器(VLR,Visitor Location Register)中查询用户的信息。IMSI: (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is an identification code that is used to distinguish different users in cellular networks and is not repeated in all cellular networks. The mobile phone stores the IMSI in a 64-bit field and sends it to the network. IMSI can be used to query the user's information in the Home Location Register (HLR, Home Location Register) or the Visitor Location Register (VLR, Visitor Location Register).
SUPI:(Subscription Permanent Identifier,用户隐藏标识符)SUPI由15位十进制数组成,其中前三位为国家代码MCC,中间2-3位为运营商代码MNC,剩余9-10位为移动用户标识码MSIN共同来代表用户和运营商;SUPI就等同于唯一标识ME的IMSI,也是一个15位的字符串。SUPI: (Subscription Permanent Identifier, User Hidden Identifier) SUPI consists of 15 decimal digits, of which the first three digits are the country code MCC, the middle 2-3 digits are the operator code MNC, and the remaining 9-10 digits are the mobile subscriber identification code MSIN represents users and operators together; SUPI is equivalent to the IMSI that uniquely identifies ME, and is also a 15-digit string.
IMEI:(International Mobile Subscriber Identity,国际移动用户识别码),是用于区分蜂窝网络中不同用户的、在所有蜂窝网络中不重复的识别码。手机将IMSI存储于一个64比特的字段发送给网络。IMSI可以用来在归属位置寄存器(HLR,Home LocationRegister)或拜访位置寄存器(VLR,Visitor Location Register)中查询用户的信息。IMEI: (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is an identification code that is used to distinguish different users in cellular networks and is not repeated in all cellular networks. The mobile phone stores the IMSI in a 64-bit field and sends it to the network. IMSI can be used to query the user's information in the Home Location Register (HLR, Home Location Register) or the Visitor Location Register (VLR, Visitor Location Register).
ECU:(Electronic Control Unit,电子控制单元),又称“行车电脑”、“车载电脑”等。它和普通的电脑一样,由微控制器(MCU)、存储器(ROM、RAM)、输入/输出接口(I/O)、模数转换器(A/D)以及整形、驱动等大规模集成电路组成。ECU: (Electronic Control Unit, electronic control unit), also known as "driving computer", "vehicle computer", etc. Like an ordinary computer, it consists of a microcontroller (MCU), memory (ROM, RAM), input/output interface (I/O), analog-to-digital converter (A/D), and large-scale integrated circuits such as shaping and driving. composition.
IVI:(In-Vehicle Infotainment,车载信息娱乐系统),是采用车载专用中央处理器,基于车身总线系统和互联网服务,形成的车载综合信息处理系统。IVI能够实现包括三维导航、实时路况、IPTV、辅助驾驶、故障检测、车辆信息、车身控制、移动办公、无线通讯、基于在线的娱乐功能及TSP服务等一系列应用。IVI: (In-Vehicle Infotainment, in-vehicle infotainment system) is an in-vehicle integrated information processing system that uses a dedicated in-vehicle central processor and is based on the body bus system and Internet services. IVI can realize a series of applications including 3D navigation, real-time traffic conditions, IPTV, assisted driving, fault detection, vehicle information, body control, mobile office, wireless communications, online-based entertainment functions and TSP services.
APP:(application,手机软件),手机软件,主要指安装在智能手机上的软件,完善原始系统的不足与个性化。使手机完善其功能,为用户提供更丰富的使用体验的主要手段。手机软件的运行需要有相应的手机系统,截至2017年6月1日,主要的手机系统:苹果公司的iOS、谷歌公司的Android(安卓)系统、塞班平台和微软平台。APP: (application, mobile software), mobile software, mainly refers to software installed on smart phones, which improves the deficiencies and personalization of the original system. It is the main means to improve the functions of mobile phones and provide users with a richer experience. The operation of mobile phone software requires a corresponding mobile phone system. As of June 1, 2017, the main mobile phone systems are: Apple's iOS, Google's Android system, Symbian platform and Microsoft platform.
车联网:车联网主要指车辆上的车载设备通过无线通信技术,对信息网络平台中的所有车辆动态信息进行有效利用,在车辆运行中提供不同的功能服务。Internet of Vehicles: Internet of Vehicles mainly refers to the on-board equipment on vehicles using wireless communication technology to effectively utilize all vehicle dynamic information in the information network platform and provide different functional services during vehicle operation.
设备指纹:设备指纹是指可以用于唯一标识出该设备的设备特征或者独特的设备标识。Device fingerprint: Device fingerprint refers to device characteristics or unique device identification that can be used to uniquely identify the device.
非对称加密:对称加密算法在加密和解密时使用的是同一个秘钥;而非对称加密算法需要两个密钥来进行加密和解密,这两个密钥是公开密钥(Public Key,简称公钥)和私有密钥(Private Key,简称私钥)。Asymmetric encryption: Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same secret key for encryption and decryption; asymmetric encryption algorithms require two keys for encryption and decryption. These two keys are public keys (Public Key for short). Public key) and private key (Private Key, referred to as private key).
椭圆曲线加密算法:(Elliptic Curve Cryptography,ECC),是一种建立公开密钥加密的算法,也就是非对称加密。类似的还有RSA、ElGamal等算法。ECC被公认为在给定密钥长度下最安全的非对称加密算法。Elliptic Curve Cryptography: (Elliptic Curve Cryptography, ECC) is an algorithm that establishes public key encryption, which is asymmetric encryption. Similar algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. ECC is recognized as the most secure asymmetric encryption algorithm for a given key length.
国密标准公钥密码算法SM2:国密标准公钥密码算法SM2算法和RSA算法都是公钥密码算法,SM2算法是一种更先进安全的算法,在我们国家商用密码体系中被用来替换RSA算法。National secret standard public key cryptography algorithm SM2: National secret standard public key cryptography algorithm SM2 algorithm and RSA algorithm are both public key cryptography algorithms. The SM2 algorithm is a more advanced and secure algorithm and is used to replace it in our national commercial cryptography system. RSA algorithm.
随着密码技术和计算机技术的发展,目前常用的1024位RSA算法面临严重的安全威胁,我们国家密码管理部门经过研究,决定采用SM2椭圆曲线算法替换RSA算法。With the development of cryptography and computer technology, the currently commonly used 1024-bit RSA algorithm faces serious security threats. After research, our national cryptography management department decided to use the SM2 elliptic curve algorithm to replace the RSA algorithm.
身份标识密码技术:基于身份标识的密码系统(Identity-Based Cryptograph,简称IBC),是一种非对称的公钥密码体系。标识密码最主要观点是系统中不需要证书,使用用户的标识如姓名、IP地址、电子邮箱地址、手机号码等作为公钥。用户的私钥由密钥生成中心(Key Generate Center,简称KGC)根据系统主密钥和用户标识计算得出。用户的公钥由用户标识唯一确定,从而用户不需要第三方来保证公钥的真实性。Identity cryptography technology: Identity-Based Cryptograph (IBC) is an asymmetric public key cryptography system. The main point of identification password is that no certificate is required in the system, and the user's identification such as name, IP address, email address, mobile phone number, etc. is used as the public key. The user's private key is calculated by the Key Generate Center (KGC) based on the system master key and user ID. The user's public key is uniquely determined by the user's identity, so the user does not need a third party to ensure the authenticity of the public key.
组合公钥(CPK):在信息安全领域,CPK是“Combined Public Key”的缩写,即组合公钥,是一种加密算法,以很小的资源,生成大规模密钥。组合公钥CPK是基于标识的数字签名协议和密钥交换协议。Combined Public Key (CPK): In the field of information security, CPK is the abbreviation of "Combined Public Key", that is, combined public key. It is an encryption algorithm that can generate large-scale keys with very small resources. The combined public key CPK is an identity-based digital signature protocol and key exchange protocol.
消息摘要算法:消息摘要算法是密码学算法中非常重要的一个分支,它通过对所有数据提取指纹信息以实现数据签名、数据完整性校验等功能,由于其不可逆性,有时候会被用做敏感信息的加密。消息摘要算法也被称为哈希(Hash)算法、杂凑算法或散列算法。Message digest algorithm: The message digest algorithm is a very important branch of cryptography algorithms. It extracts fingerprint information from all data to implement functions such as data signature and data integrity verification. Due to its irreversibility, it is sometimes used Encryption of sensitive information. Message digest algorithm is also called hash algorithm, hash algorithm or hash algorithm.
消息摘要算法不存在密钥的管理与分发问题,主要应用在“数字签名”领域,作为对明文的摘要算法。The message digest algorithm does not have the problem of key management and distribution, and is mainly used in the field of "digital signature" as a digest algorithm for plaintext.
国密标准密码杂凑算法SM3:SM3密码杂凑算法是中国国家密码管理局2010年公布的中国商用密码杂凑算法标准。该算法于2012年发布为密码行业标准(GM/T 0004-2012),2016年发布为国家密码杂凑算法标准(GB/T32905-2016)。National Secret Standard Crypto Hash Algorithm SM3: The SM3 Crypto Hash Algorithm is China’s commercial cryptographic hash algorithm standard announced by the State Cryptometry Administration of China in 2010. This algorithm was released as the cryptographic industry standard (GM/T 0004-2012) in 2012 and as the national cryptographic hash algorithm standard (GB/T32905-2016) in 2016.
SM3适用于商用密码应用中的数字签名和验证,是在SHA-256基础上改进实现的一种算法,其安全性和SHA-256相当。SM3和MD5的迭代过程类似,也采用Merkle-Damgard结构。消息分组长度为512位,摘要值长度为256位。SM3 is suitable for digital signature and verification in commercial cryptographic applications. It is an algorithm improved on SHA-256, and its security is equivalent to SHA-256. The iterative processes of SM3 and MD5 are similar and also use the Merkle-Damgard structure. The message packet length is 512 bits and the digest value length is 256 bits.
基于移动网络的车联网存在“端卡分离”的安全风险,可能造成用于车联网的SIM/USIM卡被滥用,并且,移动端也存在“端卡分离”的情况;其中,端卡分离是指车载通信终端(OBU/T-BOX)中的SIM/USIM卡可能被拔出而挪作它用。因此,需要建立端卡绑定机制来防止这种情况的发生。在移动网络层面,可以通过IMSI/SUPI和IMEI绑定设置或信令分析方法来检测并确认端卡绑定关系;在车联网层面,目前既没有相应的绑定关系检测和绑定关系确认机制,也无法直接利用移动网络层面的能力。如果间接利用移动网络层面的能力,则需要调用服务接口,在一定程度上增加了业务流程的复杂性。The Internet of Vehicles based on mobile networks has the security risk of "end-card separation", which may cause the SIM/USIM cards used for the Internet of Vehicles to be abused. Moreover, there is also the situation of "end-card separation" on the mobile side; among them, end-card separation is It means that the SIM/USIM card in the vehicle communication terminal (OBU/T-BOX) may be pulled out and used for other purposes. Therefore, a terminal card binding mechanism needs to be established to prevent this situation from happening. At the mobile network level, the terminal card binding relationship can be detected and confirmed through IMSI/SUPI and IMEI binding settings or signaling analysis methods; at the Internet of Vehicles level, there is currently neither a corresponding binding relationship detection nor a binding relationship confirmation mechanism. , and cannot directly utilize the capabilities at the mobile network level. If you indirectly use the capabilities at the mobile network level, you need to call the service interface, which increases the complexity of the business process to a certain extent.
本发明提供一种解决方案,旨在解决端卡分离的问题,提高业务流程的安全性,降低业务流程的复杂性。The present invention provides a solution, aiming to solve the problem of terminal card separation, improve the security of the business process, and reduce the complexity of the business process.
具体地,参照图1,图1是本发明身份认证装置所属终端设备的功能模块示意图。该身份认证装置可以为独立于终端设备的、能够进行图片处理、网络模型训练的装置,其可以通过硬件或软件的形式承载于终端设备上。该终端设备可以为手机、平板电脑等具有数据处理功能的智能移动终端,还可以为具有数据处理功能的固定终端设备或服务器等。Specifically, refer to Figure 1, which is a schematic diagram of the functional modules of the terminal equipment to which the identity authentication device of the present invention belongs. The identity authentication device can be a device that is independent of the terminal device and capable of image processing and network model training. It can be carried on the terminal device in the form of hardware or software. The terminal device can be a smart mobile terminal with data processing functions such as a mobile phone or a tablet computer, or a fixed terminal device or server with data processing functions.
在本实施例中,该身份认证装置所属终端设备至少包括输出模块110、处理器120、存储器130以及通信模块140。In this embodiment, the terminal device to which the identity authentication device belongs includes at least an output module 110, a processor 120, a memory 130 and a communication module 140.
存储器130中存储有操作方法以及身份认证程序;输出模块110可为显示屏等。通信模块140可以包括WIFI模块、移动通信模块以及蓝牙模块等,通过通信模块140与外部设备或服务器进行通信。The memory 130 stores operating methods and identity authentication programs; the output module 110 can be a display screen, etc. The communication module 140 may include a WIFI module, a mobile communication module, a Bluetooth module, etc., and communicates with external devices or servers through the communication module 140 .
其中,存储器130中的身份认证程序被处理器执行时实现以下步骤:对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对;When the identity authentication program in the memory 130 is executed by the processor, the following steps are implemented: setting a public and private key pair for the preset business participant to obtain a public and private key pair set, wherein the public and private key pair set includes the card's public and private key pairs. Key pair, end public and private key pair;
基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对;Generate a combined public and private key pair based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair;
当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。When the first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair.
进一步地,存储器130中的身份认证程序被处理器执行时还实现以下步骤:Further, when the identity authentication program in the memory 130 is executed by the processor, the following steps are also implemented:
基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,通过所述发起方加密所述第一预设请求,得到决策信息;Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the initiator encrypts the first preset request to obtain decision information;
基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,通过所述接收方验证所述决策信息对应的身份信息。Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the identity information corresponding to the decision-making information is verified by the recipient.
进一步地,存储器130中的身份认证程序被处理器执行时还实现以下步骤:Further, when the identity authentication program in the memory 130 is executed by the processor, the following steps are also implemented:
当所述接收方接收到第二预设请求时,通过所述接收方将所述第二预设请求发送至所述发起方;When the recipient receives the second preset request, the recipient sends the second preset request to the initiator;
接收所述发起方基于所述第二预设请求生成的第一预设请求,并执行步骤:基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。Receive the first preset request generated by the initiator based on the second preset request, and perform the steps of: verifying the first preset request based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair Corresponding identity information.
进一步地,存储器130中的身份认证程序被处理器执行时还实现以下步骤:Further, when the identity authentication program in the memory 130 is executed by the processor, the following steps are also implemented:
通过所述第一参与方验证所述决策信息中,基于所述第一参与方的公私密钥对生成的签名信息;Verify, by the first participant, the signature information generated based on the public-private key pair of the first participant in the decision-making information;
若验证通过,则通过所述第一参与方将所述决策信息发送至所述第二参与方;If the verification passes, the decision information is sent to the second participant through the first participant;
通过所述第二参与方验证所述决策信息中,基于所述第二参与方的组合公私密钥对生成的签名信息。The second party verifies the signature information generated based on the combined public and private key pair of the second party in the decision information.
进一步地,存储器130中的身份认证程序被处理器执行时还实现以下步骤:Further, when the identity authentication program in the memory 130 is executed by the processor, the following steps are also implemented:
基于所述第一预设请求,生成第一随机数、第二随机数;Based on the first preset request, generate a first random number and a second random number;
基于所述第一预设请求、所述第二随机数,生成组合信息;Generate combined information based on the first preset request and the second random number;
基于所述第一随机数、所述第二随机数、所述组合信息、所述第一预设请求、所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,得到所述决策信息。The decision information is obtained based on the first random number, the second random number, the combination information, the first preset request, the public-private key pair set, and the combined public-private key pair.
进一步地,存储器130中的身份认证程序被处理器执行时还实现以下步骤:Further, when the identity authentication program in the memory 130 is executed by the processor, the following steps are also implemented:
基于所述决策信息,生成第三随机数;Based on the decision information, generate a third random number;
基于所述第二参与方的组合公私密钥对,对所述第三随机数加密,得到第一签名;Based on the combined public and private key pair of the second participant, the third random number is encrypted to obtain the first signature;
基于所述第一签名,更新所述决策信息。Based on the first signature, the decision information is updated.
进一步地,存储器130中的身份认证程序被处理器执行时还实现以下步骤:Further, when the identity authentication program in the memory 130 is executed by the processor, the following steps are also implemented:
将所述公私密钥对集的公钥,发送至所述预设业务参与方;Send the public key of the public-private key pair set to the preset service participant;
将所述组合公私密钥对的公钥,发送至所述预设参与方。Send the public key of the combined public-private key pair to the preset participant.
本实施例通过上述方案,具体通过对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对;基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对;当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。本发明旨在解决端卡分离的问题,提高业务流程的安全性,降低业务流程的复杂性。In this embodiment, through the above solution, specifically by setting public and private key pairs for preset business participants, a public and private key pair set is obtained, wherein the public and private key pair set includes a card public and private key pair and a terminal public and private key pair; Based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair, a combined public and private key pair is generated; when the first preset request is received, based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair , verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request. The invention aims to solve the problem of terminal card separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce the complexity of business processes.
基于上述终端设备架构但不限于上述架构,提出本发明方法实施例。Based on the above terminal device architecture but not limited to the above architecture, method embodiments of the present invention are proposed.
参照图2,图2为本发明身份认证方法第一实施例的流程示意图。所述身份认证方法包括:Referring to Figure 2, Figure 2 is a schematic flow chart of the first embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention. The identity authentication methods include:
步骤S101,对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对。Step S101: Set a public-private key pair for the preset service participant to obtain a public-private key pair set, where the public-private key pair set includes a card public-private key pair and a terminal public-private key pair.
本实施例方法的执行主体可以是一种身份认证系统,也可以是一种身份认证终端设备或服务器,本实施例以身份认证系统进行举例。身份认证系统包括预设业务参与方,预设业务参与方包括发起方、接收方;接收方包括第一参与方、第二参与方。The execution subject of the method in this embodiment may be an identity authentication system, or an identity authentication terminal device or server. This embodiment takes an identity authentication system as an example. The identity authentication system includes preset business participants, and the preset business participants include an initiator and a receiver; the receiver includes a first participant and a second participant.
为了解决端卡分离的问题,提高业务流程的安全性,降低业务流程的复杂性,需要对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集。在本实施例中,将车联网业务作为上述预设业务。In order to solve the problem of terminal card separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce the complexity of business processes, it is necessary to set public and private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a set of public and private key pairs. In this embodiment, the Internet of Vehicles service is used as the above-mentioned default service.
具体地,首先,基于椭圆曲线算法,为所有车联网业务参与方,生成基于标识的公私密钥对,为具有移动通信能力的端设备生成基于标识的卡公私密钥对和端公私密钥对,由公私密钥对、卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对构成公私密钥对集,并将各参与方的公钥分发送至相关参与方,将密钥发放至对应的参与方。Specifically, first, based on the elliptic curve algorithm, identity-based public and private key pairs are generated for all Internet of Vehicles business participants, and identity-based card public and private key pairs and end public and private key pairs are generated for end devices with mobile communication capabilities. , a public-private key pair set is composed of a public-private key pair, a card public-private key pair, and a terminal public-private key pair, and the public keys of each participant are distributed to relevant participants, and the keys are distributed to the corresponding participants.
例如,车联网业务参与方包括车联网服务平台、车企服务平台和车联网端设备(包括车端和移动端)。将移动端作为上述发起方,车联网服务平台、车企服务平台、车端作为上述接收方。For example, participants in the Internet of Vehicles business include Internet of Vehicles service platforms, car enterprise service platforms, and Internet of Vehicles terminal devices (including car terminals and mobile terminals). The mobile terminal is used as the above-mentioned initiator, and the Internet of Vehicles service platform, car enterprise service platform, and car terminal are used as the above-mentioned receivers.
基于椭圆曲线算法,为车联网服务平台、车企服务平台和车联网端设备(包括车端和移动端)生成公私密钥对,并分发公钥。每个参与方均具有与之相关联的参与方的公钥。对于具备移动通信能力的端设备而言,需要分别生成基于标识的卡(SIM/USIM卡)公私密钥对和端(车端/移动端)公私密钥对。Based on the elliptic curve algorithm, public and private key pairs are generated for the Internet of Vehicles service platform, car enterprise service platform and Internet of Vehicles end devices (including car terminals and mobile terminals), and the public keys are distributed. Each party has the public key of the party associated with it. For terminal devices with mobile communication capabilities, it is necessary to generate identity-based card (SIM/USIM card) public and private key pairs and terminal (car terminal/mobile terminal) public and private key pairs respectively.
由此,基于椭圆曲线算法,为预设业务参与方生成公私密钥对,以此提高数据传输的安全性。并且,为具有移动通信能力的端设备生成了端公私密钥对、卡公私密钥对,以此确认端卡的绑定关系,防止车载通信终端(OBU/T-BOX)中的SIM/USIM卡可能被拔出而挪作它用的现象发生。As a result, based on the elliptic curve algorithm, a public-private key pair is generated for the preset business participants to improve the security of data transmission. In addition, a terminal public and private key pair and a card public and private key pair are generated for the terminal device with mobile communication capabilities to confirm the binding relationship of the terminal card and prevent SIM/USIM in the vehicle communication terminal (OBU/T-BOX). The card may be pulled out and used for other purposes.
步骤S102,基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对。Step S102: Generate a combined public and private key pair based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair.
步骤S103,当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。Step S103: When receiving the first preset request, verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair.
基于卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对,通过椭圆曲线算法生成组合公私密钥对。Based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair, a combined public and private key pair is generated through the elliptic curve algorithm.
具体地,利用椭圆曲线算法的密钥组合特性,将卡公私密钥对和端公私密钥对进行组合,为端设备生成新的组合公私密钥对,通过组合密钥确认端卡(车端与相应的SIM/USIM卡和移动端与相应的SIM/USIM卡)绑定关系,并分发公钥至与端设备相关联的设备。Specifically, the key combination characteristics of the elliptic curve algorithm are used to combine the card public and private key pairs with the end public and private key pairs, generate a new combined public and private key pair for the end device, and confirm the end card (car end) through the combined key Bind the relationship with the corresponding SIM/USIM card and the mobile terminal with the corresponding SIM/USIM card), and distribute the public key to the device associated with the terminal device.
由此,基于卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对,通过椭圆曲线算法生成组合公私密钥对,利用组合密钥对直接确定端卡(车端与SIM/USIM卡和移动端与SIM/USIM卡)的绑定关系,防止车载通信终端(OBU/T-BOX)中的SIM/USIM卡可能被拔出而挪作它用的现象发生。Therefore, based on the card public and private key pair and the end public and private key pair, a combined public and private key pair is generated through the elliptic curve algorithm, and the combined key pair is used to directly determine the end card (car end and SIM/USIM card and mobile end and SIM/ USIM card) to prevent the SIM/USIM card in the vehicle communication terminal (OBU/T-BOX) from being pulled out and used for other purposes.
进一步地,当接收到第一预设请求时,基于公私密钥对集、组合公私密钥对,验证第一预设请求对应的身份信息。其中,第一预设请求包括启动发动机/空调、远程解锁/上锁车门、远程寻车等请求。Further, when the first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair. Among them, the first preset request includes starting the engine/air conditioner, remotely unlocking/locking the car door, remotely searching for the car, etc.
具体地,在车联网业务交互过程中,当接收到第一预设请求时,采用标识密钥、数字签名和相应的加密技术,基于公私密钥对集、组合公私密钥对建立满足多参与方(假设为N方)相互信任关系的身份认证,以及业务处理相关的数据机密性、完整性、抗重放和行为抗抵赖等安全要求的验证方式,验证第一预设请求对应的身份信息;其中,将身份认证过程次数保持在N量级,N量级为N×(N-1)/2。Specifically, during the interaction process of the Internet of Vehicles business, when the first preset request is received, the identification key, digital signature and corresponding encryption technology are used to establish a multi-participation system based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair. Identity authentication of the mutual trust relationship between parties (assumed to be N parties), as well as verification methods of security requirements such as data confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay and behavioral non-repudiation related to business processing, and verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request ; Among them, the number of identity authentication processes is kept at the N level, and the N level is N×(N-1)/2.
进一步地,当接收方接收到第二预设请求时,通过接收方将第二预设请求发送至发起方;接收发起方基于第二预设请求生成的第一预设请求,并执行步骤S103:基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。其中,第二预设请求包括路况信息订阅、音视频服务点播等订购信息服务。Further, when the recipient receives the second preset request, the recipient sends the second preset request to the initiator; receives the first preset request generated by the initiator based on the second preset request, and executes step S103 : Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request. Among them, the second preset request includes subscription information services such as traffic information subscription and audio and video service on demand.
具体地,当接收方接收到第二预设请求时,通过接收方将第二预设请求发送至发起方;发起方将第二预设请求显示给用户,用户作出响应,将用户的响应信息作为第一预设请求,并执行步骤S103:基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。Specifically, when the recipient receives the second preset request, the recipient sends the second preset request to the initiator; the initiator displays the second preset request to the user, and the user responds by sending the user's response information. As the first preset request, step S103 is executed: based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair, verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request.
由此,采用标识密钥、数字签名和相应的加密技术,满足多参与方(假设为N方)相互信任关系的身份认证以及相关数据的机密性、完整性、抗重放和行为抗抵赖等安全要求。Therefore, identification keys, digital signatures and corresponding encryption technologies are used to satisfy the identity authentication of the mutual trust relationship between multiple participants (assumed to be N parties) and the confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay and behavioral non-repudiation of related data. Security requirements.
本实施例通过上述方案,具体通过对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对;基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对;当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。本发明为具有移动通信能力的端设备生成了端公私密钥对、卡公私密钥对,以此确认端卡的绑定关系,防止车载通信终端(OBU/T-BOX)中的SIM/USIM卡可能被拔出而挪作它用的现象发生,提高业务流程的安全性,降低业务流程的复杂性。In this embodiment, through the above solution, specifically by setting public and private key pairs for preset business participants, a public and private key pair set is obtained, wherein the public and private key pair set includes a card public and private key pair and a terminal public and private key pair; Based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair, a combined public and private key pair is generated; when the first preset request is received, based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair , verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request. The invention generates a terminal public and private key pair and a card public and private key pair for terminal equipment with mobile communication capabilities, thereby confirming the binding relationship of the terminal card and preventing SIM/USIM in the vehicle-mounted communication terminal (OBU/T-BOX). The card may be pulled out and used for other purposes, which improves the security of the business process and reduces the complexity of the business process.
基于上述图2所示的实施例,提出本发明身份认证方法第二实施例。在本实施例中,如图3所示,车联网业务参与方包括决策者、转发者和执行者,需要为所有参与方生成公私密钥对,将公私密钥对分发给相应的参与方,并将各方的公钥分发给其它参与方(公开或与相关参与方进行密钥交换)。其中,决策者决定在某次业务交互中是否执行某种操作,并对执行结果进行存证;转发者的作用是将决策信息(通过下一个转发者)转发给执行者,将执行者返回的执行结果(通过下一个转发者)转发给决策者,并对转发过程进行存证;执行者:完成决策信息指定的操作,返回执行结果,并对决策信息进行存证。Based on the above embodiment shown in Figure 2, a second embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention is proposed. In this embodiment, as shown in Figure 3, the Internet of Vehicles business participants include decision-makers, forwarders and executors. It is necessary to generate public and private key pairs for all participants and distribute the public and private key pairs to the corresponding participants. And distribute the public keys of each party to other participants (publicly or perform key exchange with relevant participants). Among them, the decision-maker decides whether to perform a certain operation in a certain business interaction and documents the execution results; the role of the forwarder is to forward the decision-making information (through the next forwarder) to the executor and return the result returned by the executor. The execution result (through the next forwarder) is forwarded to the decision-maker, and the forwarding process is certified; the executor: completes the operation specified by the decision-making information, returns the execution result, and certifies the decision-making information.
在不同的应用场景中,决策者、转发者、执行者的对象并不完全相同。例如,在车联网远程操控的应用示例中,决策者为移动端(车主),转发者为车联网服务平台和车企服务平台,执行者为车端(ECU),车主通过移动端向车端发送操作指令,车联网服务平台和车企服务平台将操作指令转发给车端,车端的ECU执行操作指令。在车联网业务订购的应用示例中,决策者为移动端(车主),转发者为车端(IVI)和车企服务平台,执行者为车联网服务平台,车主通过移动端将针对业务订购的决策信息发送给车端,车端的IVI和车企服务平台将决策信息转发给车联网服务平台(特定的业务流程可能允许驾乘者进行干预,例如直接终止业务订购),车联网服务平台根据决策信息对业务订购进行处理(例如确认订购或取消订购)。In different application scenarios, the objects of decision makers, forwarders, and executors are not exactly the same. For example, in the application example of remote control of the Internet of Vehicles, the decision-maker is the mobile terminal (car owner), the forwarder is the Internet of Vehicles service platform and the car enterprise service platform, the executor is the vehicle terminal (ECU), and the car owner sends requests to the vehicle terminal through the mobile terminal. Send the operation command, the Internet of Vehicles service platform and the car enterprise service platform forward the operation command to the car, and the ECU of the car executes the operation command. In the application example of Internet of Vehicles business ordering, the decision-maker is the mobile terminal (car owner), the forwarder is the vehicle terminal (IVI) and the car company service platform, the executor is the Internet of Vehicles service platform, and the car owner will use the mobile terminal to order the business. The decision information is sent to the car, and the IVI of the car and the car company service platform forward the decision information to the Internet of Vehicles service platform (specific business processes may allow drivers and passengers to intervene, such as directly terminating business subscriptions), and the Internet of Vehicles service platform makes decisions based on Information to process business subscriptions (such as confirming or canceling subscriptions).
在本实施例中,采用椭圆曲线算法,根据特定的参数定义(例如参照SM2的参数定义),基于各参与方的标识生成公私密钥对,通过现有的密钥管理体系完成密钥分发,使各参与方获得自己的公钥和私钥,并获得(知晓)其它参与方的公钥。私钥必须严格保密,可以使用硬件密码模块(例如加密芯片)或软件密码模块(例如软盾)进行安全存储。假设k为私钥,K为公钥,决策者获得的公私密钥对为(kd,Kd),转发者获得的公私密钥对为(kf,Kf),执行者获得的公私密钥对为(ke,Ke)。In this embodiment, the elliptic curve algorithm is used to generate a public-private key pair based on the identification of each participant based on specific parameter definitions (for example, refer to the parameter definition of SM2), and key distribution is completed through the existing key management system. Each participant obtains his or her own public key and private key, and obtains (knows) the public keys of other participants. The private key must be kept strictly confidential and can be stored securely using a hardware cryptographic module (such as an encryption chip) or a software cryptographic module (such as a soft shield). Suppose k is a private key and K is a public key. The public-private key pair obtained by the decision-maker is (k d , K d ), the public-private key pair obtained by the forwarder is (k f , K f ), and the public-private key pair obtained by the executor is (k f , K f ). The key pair is (k e ,K e ).
具体地,在本实施例中,将涉及到车联网服务平台(平台云)、车企服务平台(车企云)、车端(驾乘者)和移动端(车主),四个车联网业务参与方。Specifically, in this embodiment, four Internet of Vehicles services will be involved: the Internet of Vehicles service platform (platform cloud), the car enterprise service platform (Car Enterprise Cloud), the car terminal (driver and passenger) and the mobile terminal (car owner). participants.
车联网服务平台既可能是转发者角色,也可能是执行者角色。可以基于车联网服务平台的平台标识(例如运营者代码)生成公私密钥对,例如:车联网服务平台获得的公私密钥对为(k01,k01)。The Internet of Vehicles service platform may be either a forwarder or an executor. A public-private key pair can be generated based on the platform identification (such as operator code) of the Internet of Vehicles service platform. For example, the public-private key pair obtained by the Internet of Vehicles service platform is (k 01 , k 01 ).
车企服务平台是转发者角色。可以基于车企服务平台的平台标识(例如企业代码)生成公私密钥对,例如:车联网服务平台获得的公私密钥对为(k02,K02)。The car company service platform plays the role of forwarder. A public-private key pair can be generated based on the platform identification (such as enterprise code) of the car enterprise service platform. For example, the public-private key pair obtained by the Internet of Vehicles service platform is (k 02 , K 02 ).
车端既可能是转发者角色,也可能是执行者角色。车端是具备移动通信能力的端设备,通信模组中具有可拆卸的SIM/USIM卡,可以基于卡标识和端(车)标识分别生成公私密钥对,卡标识可以是ICCID等唯一标识,端标识可以是OBU/T-BOX系统特征信息、车架号或基于车端多维信息生成的车端设备指纹。例如:车端获得的基于卡标识的公私密钥对为(k11,K11),基于端标识的公私密钥对(k12,K12)。The car end may be either a forwarder or an executor. The car end is an end device with mobile communication capabilities. The communication module has a removable SIM/USIM card. It can generate public and private key pairs based on the card identification and the terminal (car) identification. The card identification can be a unique identification such as ICCID. The terminal identifier can be OBU/T-BOX system characteristic information, vehicle frame number, or vehicle terminal device fingerprint generated based on vehicle terminal multi-dimensional information. For example: the public and private key pair based on the card identification obtained by the car terminal is (k 11 , K 11 ), and the public and private key pair based on the terminal identification (k 12 , K 12 ).
移动端是决策者角色。移动端是具备移动通信能力的端设备,其SIM/USIM卡是可拆卸的,可以基于卡标识和端(移动设备/手机)标识分别生成公私密钥对,卡标识可以是ICCID等唯一标识,端标识可以是Device ID、MAC或基于移动端多维信息生成的移动端设备指纹。例如:移动端获得的基于卡标识的公私密钥对为(k21,K21),基于端标识的公私密钥对(k22,K22)。The mobile terminal is the decision-maker. The mobile terminal is a terminal device with mobile communication capabilities. Its SIM/USIM card is detachable and can generate public and private key pairs based on the card identification and terminal (mobile device/mobile phone) identification. The card identification can be a unique identification such as ICCID. The terminal identifier can be Device ID, MAC or mobile device fingerprint generated based on multi-dimensional information of the mobile terminal. For example: the public and private key pair based on the card identification obtained by the mobile terminal is (k 21 , K 21 ), and the public and private key pair based on the terminal identification (k 22 , K 22 ).
由此,采用椭圆曲线算法,根据特定的参数定义(例如参照SM2的参数定义),基于各参与方的标识生成公私密钥对,并通过现有的密钥管理体系完成密钥分发,使各参与方获得自己的公钥和私钥,并获得(知晓)其它参与方的公钥。以提高信息传输过程的安全性,通过密钥对完成对身份信息的认证。Therefore, the elliptic curve algorithm is used to generate a public-private key pair based on the identification of each participant based on specific parameter definitions (for example, refer to the parameter definition of SM2), and key distribution is completed through the existing key management system, so that each party can Participants obtain their own public and private keys, and obtain (know) the public keys of other participants. In order to improve the security of the information transmission process, the authentication of identity information is completed through key pairs.
在车联网业务中,端设备通常具有端卡绑定的要求。基于上述图2所示的实施例,提出本发明身份认证方法第三实施例。在本实施例中,采用椭圆曲线算法为端设备(车端和移动端)生成两对公私密钥对,分别是基于卡标识的公私密钥对和基于端标识的公私密钥对。In the Internet of Vehicles business, terminal devices usually have terminal card binding requirements. Based on the above embodiment shown in Figure 2, a third embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention is proposed. In this embodiment, the elliptic curve algorithm is used to generate two pairs of public and private key pairs for the terminal device (car terminal and mobile terminal), which are a public and private key pair based on the card identification and a public and private key pair based on the terminal identification.
由于椭圆曲线算法生成的公私密钥对具有组合特征,即采用椭圆曲线算法生成的m对公私密钥对(k1,K1),…,(ki,Ki),…,(km,Km)可以组合生成新的公私密钥对(kc,Kc),生成组合公私密钥对的计算方法如下:Since the public and private key pairs generated by the elliptic curve algorithm have combination characteristics, that is, m pairs of public and private key pairs generated by the elliptic curve algorithm (k 1 ,K 1 ),…,(k i ,K i ),…,(k m , K m ) can be combined to generate a new public-private key pair (k c , K c ). The calculation method for generating a combined public-private key pair is as follows:
kc=(k1+…+ki+…+km)mod(n)k c =(k 1 +…+k i +…+k m )mod(n)
其中:n为基点G的阶,n和G都是定义好的椭圆曲线算法参数,kc与Kc的计算方式并不完全相同。Among them: n is the order of the base point G, n and G are both defined elliptic curve algorithm parameters, and the calculation methods of kc and Kc are not exactly the same.
根据椭圆曲线算法的组合特征,可以将端设备的卡标识公私密钥对和端标识公私密钥对进行组合,生成端设备的组合公私密钥对,以利用组合密钥对证明端设备的端卡绑定关系,当组合公私密钥对生成时,即证明了端设备的端卡绑定关系。According to the combination characteristics of the elliptic curve algorithm, the card identification public and private key pair of the terminal device and the terminal identification public and private key pair can be combined to generate a combined public and private key pair of the terminal device, so as to use the combined key pair to prove the terminal device's terminal The card binding relationship, when the combined public and private key pair is generated, proves the end card binding relationship of the end device.
对于车端,假设组合公私密钥对为(k13,K13),则:For the car terminal, assuming that the combined public and private key pair is (k 13 , K 13 ), then:
k13=(k11+k12)mod(n)k 13 = (k 11 + k 12 ) mod (n)
对于移动端,假设组合公私密钥对为(k23,K23),则:For the mobile terminal, assuming that the combined public and private key pair is (k 23 , K 23 ), then:
k23=(k21+k22)mod(n)k 23 = (k 21 + k 22 ) mod (n)
通过现有密钥管理体系,车端将组合公钥K13分发给车联网服务平台、车企服务平台和移动端,移动端将组合公钥K23分发给车联网服务平台、车企服务平台和车端。Through the existing key management system, the car terminal distributes the combined public key K 13 to the Internet of Vehicles service platform, the car enterprise service platform and the mobile terminal, and the mobile terminal distributes the combined public key K 23 to the Internet of Vehicles service platform and the car enterprise service platform. and car end.
由此,通过为端设备设置组合公私密钥对,利用组合密钥对直接确定端卡(车端与SIM/USIM卡和移动端与SIM/USIM卡)的绑定关系,防止车载通信终端(OBU/T-BOX)中的SIM/USIM卡可能被拔出而挪作它用的现象发生。Therefore, by setting a combined public and private key pair for the end device, the combined key pair is used to directly determine the binding relationship between the end card (the car end and the SIM/USIM card and the mobile end and the SIM/USIM card), preventing the vehicle communication terminal ( The SIM/USIM card in the OBU/T-BOX may be pulled out and used for other purposes.
参照图4,图4为本发明身份认证方法第四实施例的流程示意图。基于上述图2所示的实施例,在本实施例中,预设业务参与方包括发起方、接收方,步骤S103:基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息包括:Referring to Figure 4, Figure 4 is a schematic flow chart of the fourth embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention. Based on the above embodiment shown in Figure 2, in this embodiment, the preset service participants include the initiator and the receiver. Step S103: Based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair, verify all The identity information corresponding to the first preset request includes:
步骤S1031,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,通过所述发起方加密所述第一预设请求,得到决策信息。Step S1031: Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the initiator encrypts the first preset request to obtain decision information.
作为一种实施方式,在本实施例中,基于公私密钥对集、组合公私密钥对,通过发起方加密第一预设请求,得到决策信息。As an implementation manner, in this embodiment, based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair, the initiator encrypts the first preset request to obtain the decision information.
具体地,基于第一预设请求,生成第一随机数、第二随机数;基于第一预设请求、第二随机数,生成组合信息;基于第一随机数、第二随机数、组合信息、第一预设请求、公私密钥对集、组合公私密钥对,得到决策信息。Specifically, based on the first preset request, the first random number and the second random number are generated; based on the first preset request and the second random number, the combination information is generated; based on the first random number, the second random number, and the combination information , the first preset request, the public-private key pair set, the combined public-private key pair, and the decision-making information is obtained.
例如,接收方包括第一参与方、第二参与方。通过第一参与方的公私密钥对的公钥,对第一随机数加密,得到第一签名;通过发起方的组合公私密钥对的私钥,对第一随机数加密,得到第二签名;通过第二参与方的组合公私密钥对的公钥,对第一预设请求、第二随机数加密,得到第三签名、第四签名;基于第一预设请求、第二随机数,得到组合信息;通过发起方的组合公私密钥对的私钥,对组合信息的信息摘要加密,得到第五签名;将第一签名、第二签名、第三签名、第四签名、第五签名,作为上述决策信息。For example, the receiving party includes a first party and a second party. The first random number is encrypted using the public key of the public-private key pair of the first participant to obtain the first signature; the first random number is encrypted using the private key of the combined public-private key pair of the initiator to obtain the second signature. ;Use the public key of the second party's combined public-private key pair to encrypt the first preset request and the second random number to obtain the third signature and the fourth signature; based on the first preset request and the second random number, Obtain the combined information; use the private key of the initiator's combined public-private key pair to encrypt the information digest of the combined information to obtain the fifth signature; combine the first signature, second signature, third signature, fourth signature, and fifth signature , as the above decision-making information.
由此,基于公私密钥对集、组合公私密钥对,对第一预设请求加密,采用每一个参与方的公钥对其加密,生成相应的签名信息,以便后续通过参与方的私钥对签名信息加以验证,提高数据的安全性。并且,通过随机数,判断决策信息的有效性。Therefore, based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the first preset request is encrypted, and the public key of each participant is used to encrypt it, and the corresponding signature information is generated for subsequent use of the participant's private key. Verify signature information to improve data security. And, through random numbers, the validity of decision-making information is judged.
步骤S1032,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,通过所述接收方验证所述决策信息对应的身份信息。Step S1032: Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the recipient verifies the identity information corresponding to the decision-making information.
在本实施例中,基于公私密钥对集、组合公私密钥对,通过接收方验证决策信息对应的身份信息。In this embodiment, based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the identity information corresponding to the decision-making information is verified by the recipient.
具体地,通过第一参与方验证决策信息中,基于第一参与方的公私密钥对生成的签名信息;若验证不通过,则拒绝决策信息对应的请求;若验证通过,则通过第一参与方将决策信息发送至第二参与方;通过第二参与方验证决策信息中,基于第二参与方的组合公私密钥对生成的签名信息;若验证通过,则执行决策信息对应的请求;若验证不通过,则拒绝决策信息对应的请求。Specifically, the first participant verifies the signature information generated based on the public-private key pair of the first participant in the decision information; if the verification fails, the request corresponding to the decision information is rejected; if the verification passes, the signature information generated by the first participant is passed. The first party sends the decision information to the second party; the second party verifies the signature information generated based on the combined public and private key pair of the second party in the decision information; if the verification is passed, the request corresponding to the decision information is executed; if If the verification fails, the request corresponding to the decision information will be rejected.
例如,通过第一参与方的公私密钥对的私钥,对决策信息解密,得到第第一随机数;通过发起方的组合公私密钥对的公钥,对决策信息进行验签;若验证不通过,则拒绝决策信息对应的请求;若验签通过,则通过第一参与方将决策信息发送至所述第二参与方。通过第二参与方的组合公私密钥对的私钥,对决策信息解密,通过第一参与方的公私密钥对的公钥,对决策信息验签,以对决策信息进行验证;若验证通过,则执行决策信息对应的请求;若验证不通过,则拒绝决策信息对应的请求。For example, the decision information is decrypted using the private key of the first party's public-private key pair to obtain the first random number; the decision information is verified using the public key of the initiator's combined public-private key pair; if verified If it fails, the request corresponding to the decision-making information is rejected; if the signature verification passes, the decision-making information is sent to the second participant through the first participant. Decrypt the decision-making information through the private key of the second party's combined public-private key pair, and verify the signature of the decision-making information through the public key of the first party's public-private key pair to verify the decision-making information; if the verification passes , then the request corresponding to the decision information is executed; if the verification fails, the request corresponding to the decision information is rejected.
在执行步骤:通过所述第一参与方将所述决策信息发送至所述第二参与方之前,基于决策信息,生成第三随机数;基于第二参与方的组合公私密钥对,对第三随机数加密,得到第一签名;基于第一签名,更新决策信息。Before executing the step of: before sending the decision information to the second participant through the first participant, a third random number is generated based on the decision information; based on the combined public and private key pair of the second participant, the third random number is generated based on the decision information. Three random numbers are encrypted to obtain the first signature; based on the first signature, the decision-making information is updated.
例如,基于决策信息,生成第三随机数;通过第二参与方的组合公私密钥对的公钥,对第三随机数加密,得到第五签名;通过第一参与方的公私密钥对的私钥,对第三随机数的信息摘要加密,得到第六签名。基于第五签名、第六签名,更新决策信息。For example, a third random number is generated based on the decision-making information; the third random number is encrypted using the public key of the second party's combined public-private key pair to obtain a fifth signature; the fifth signature is obtained through the public key of the first party's public-private key pair The private key encrypts the information digest of the third random number to obtain the sixth signature. Based on the fifth signature and the sixth signature, the decision information is updated.
由此,参与方通过自身具有的公钥、私钥,对决策信息进行解密,判断、更新,以此提高加密、解密过程的效率,提高信息传输过程的安全性。As a result, participants use their own public and private keys to decrypt, judge, and update decision-making information, thereby improving the efficiency of the encryption and decryption process and improving the security of the information transmission process.
本实施例通过上述方案,具体通过对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对;基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对;当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。本发明旨在解决端卡分离的问题,采用每一个参与方的公钥对其加密,生成相应的签名信息,以便后续通过参与方的私钥对签名信息加以验证,提高数据的安全性,降低业务流程的复杂性。In this embodiment, through the above solution, specifically by setting public and private key pairs for preset business participants, a public and private key pair set is obtained, wherein the public and private key pair set includes a card public and private key pair and a terminal public and private key pair; Based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair, a combined public and private key pair is generated; when the first preset request is received, based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair , verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request. The present invention aims to solve the problem of terminal card separation, encrypt it using the public key of each participant, and generate corresponding signature information, so that the signature information can be subsequently verified through the private key of the participant, thereby improving the security of the data and reducing the risk of Business process complexity.
基于上述图4所示的实施例,提出本发明身份认证方法第五实施例。在本实施例中,提供一种基于椭圆曲线算法的车联网协同身份认证方法,在车联网业务交互过程中,采用标识密钥、数字签名和相应的加密技术,满足多参与方(假设为N方)建立相互信任关系的身份认证,以及业务处理相关的数据机密性、完整性、抗重放和行为抗抵赖等安全要求,身份认证过程次数保持在N量级,同时利用组合密钥证明端设备的端卡绑定关系。Based on the above embodiment shown in Figure 4, a fifth embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention is proposed. In this embodiment, a collaborative identity authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles based on the elliptic curve algorithm is provided. During the interaction process of the Internet of Vehicles business, identification keys, digital signatures and corresponding encryption technologies are used to satisfy multiple participants (assumed to be N (Party) identity authentication to establish a mutual trust relationship, as well as security requirements such as data confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay, and behavioral non-repudiation related to business processing. The number of identity authentication processes is maintained at the N level, and the combined key is used to prove the end. The device’s terminal card binding relationship.
如图5所示,实际的车联网业务场景可能涉及的业务参与方包括一个决策者、一个执行者以及零个、一个或多个(例如m个)转发者。As shown in Figure 5, the actual Internet of Vehicles business scenario may involve business participants including a decision-maker, an executor, and zero, one or more (for example, m) forwarders.
本实施例所提出的车联网协同身份认证方法,采用椭圆曲线算法对各业务参与方之间传递的相关信息(决策信息:REQ;执行结果:RES;随机数:RAND)进行加解密处理,满足身份认证(签名/验签)、数据机密性、抗重放和行为抗抵赖等安全要求,预设E为加密处理,D为解密处理;采用信息摘要算法满足数据完整性要求,预设H为信息摘要算法,具体的信息摘要算法可以按需选择SHA、SM3等;利用端设备的组合密钥满足端卡绑定要求。The collaborative identity authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles proposed in this embodiment uses the elliptic curve algorithm to encrypt and decrypt the relevant information (decision information: REQ; execution result: RES; random number: RAND) transmitted between each business participant, and satisfies For security requirements such as identity authentication (signature/signature verification), data confidentiality, anti-replay and behavioral non-repudiation, the preset E is encryption processing and D is decryption processing; the information digest algorithm is used to meet the data integrity requirements, and the preset H is Information digest algorithm. The specific information digest algorithm can be selected as SHA, SM3, etc. as needed; the combined key of the end device is used to meet the end card binding requirements.
如图6所示,以下考虑涉及的业务参与方包括一个决策者(远程操控和业务订购:移动端/车主)、一个执行者(远程操控:车端;业务订购:车联网服务平台)和两个转发者(远程操控:车联网服务平台和车企服务平台;业务订购:车端和车企服务平台)的情况。As shown in Figure 6, the business participants involved in the following considerations include a decision-maker (remote control and business ordering: mobile terminal/car owner), an executor (remote control: car-end; business ordering: Internet of Vehicles service platform) and two The situation of forwarders (remote control: Internet of Vehicles service platform and car company service platform; business ordering: car terminal and car company service platform).
经过车联网协同身份认证方法处理后,决策者发送给转发者#1的决策信息变换为:After being processed by the Internet of Vehicles collaborative identity authentication method, the decision information sent by the decision maker to forwarder #1 is transformed into:
{E(Kf1,RANDf1),E(kd,H(RANDf1)),E(Ke,RANDe),E(Ke,REQ),E(kd,H(REQ,RANDe))}{E(K f1 ,RAND f1 ),E(k d ,H(RAND f1 )),E(K e ,RAND e ),E(K e ,REQ),E(k d ,H(REQ,RAND e ))}
其中,Kf1是转发者#1的公钥,RANDf1是决策者为转发者#1产生的随机数,RANDe是决策者为执行者产生的随机数。因为决策者是移动端,kd是组合密钥(私钥);如果转发者#1是车端,则Kf1是组合密钥(公钥);如果执行者是车端,则Ke是组合密钥(公钥)。Among them, K f1 is the public key of forwarder #1, RAND f1 is the random number generated by the decision-maker for forwarder #1, and RAND e is the random number generated by the decision-maker for the executor. Because the decision maker is the mobile terminal, k d is the combined key (private key); if the forwarder #1 is the car terminal, then K f1 is the combined key (public key); if the executor is the car terminal, then K e is Combined key (public key).
转发者#1接收到决策消息后,使用自己的私钥kf1解密得到RANDf1,使用决策者的公钥Kd进行验签处理,如果After forwarder #1 receives the decision message, he uses his own private key k f1 to decrypt it to obtain RAND f1 , and uses the decision maker’s public key K d to perform signature verification. If
H(D(kf1,E(Kf1,RANDf1)))=D(Kd,E(kd,H(RANDf1))H(D(k f1 ,E(K f1 ,RAND f1 )))=D(K d ,E(k d ,H(RAND f1 ))
则转发者#1可以完成对决策者的身份认证,确认该决策信息来自决策者。转发者#1无需了解决策信息的具体内容,但可以记录经过加密的决策信息做为存证。Then forwarder #1 can complete the identity authentication of the decision-maker and confirm that the decision-making information comes from the decision-maker. Forwarder #1 does not need to know the specific content of the decision-making information, but can record the encrypted decision-making information as evidence.
转发者#1采用车联网协同身份认证方法对决策信息进行处理后,将决策信息转发给转发者#2,该决策信息变换为:After forwarder #1 uses the Internet of Vehicles collaborative identity authentication method to process the decision information, it forwards the decision information to forwarder #2. The decision information is transformed into:
{E(Kf2,RANDf2),E(kf1,H(RANDf2)),E(Ke,RANDe),E(Ke,REQ),E(kd,H(REQ,RANDe))}{E(K f2 ,RAND f2 ),E(k f1 ,H(RAND f2 )),E(K e ,RAND e ),E(K e ,REQ),E(k d ,H(REQ,RAND e ))}
其中,是Kf2转发者#2的公钥,RANDf2是转发者#1为转发者#2产生的随机数。如果转发者#1是车端,则kf1是组合密钥(私钥)。Among them, K f2 is the public key of forwarder #2, and RAND f2 is the random number generated by forwarder #1 for forwarder #2. If forwarder #1 is the car, then k f1 is the combined key (private key).
转发者#2接收到决策消息后,使用自己的私钥kf2解密得到After forwarder #2 receives the decision message, he uses his own private key k f2 to decrypt it and obtain
RANDf2,使用转发者#1的公钥Kf1进行验签处理,如果RAND f2 , use forwarder #1’s public key K f1 for signature verification, if
H(D(kf2,E(Kf2,RANDf2)))=D(Kf1,E(kf1,H(RANDf2))H(D(k f2 , E(K f2 , RAND f2 )))=D(K f1 , E(k f1 , H(RAND f2 ))
则转发者#2可以完成对转发者#1的身份认证,确认该决策信息来自转发者#1。转发者#2无需了解决策信息的具体内容,但可以记录经过加密的决策信息做为存证。Then forwarder #2 can complete the identity authentication of forwarder #1 and confirm that the decision information comes from forwarder #1. Forwarder #2 does not need to know the specific content of the decision-making information, but can record the encrypted decision-making information as evidence.
转发者#2采用本申请提案所提出的车联网协同身份认证方法对决策信息进行处理后,将决策信息转发给执行者,该决策信息变换为:Forwarder #2 uses the Internet of Vehicles collaborative identity authentication method proposed in this application proposal to process the decision information, and then forwards the decision information to the executor. The decision information is transformed into:
{E(Ke,RANDfe),E(kf2,H(RANDfe)),E(Ke,RANDe),E(Ke,REQ),E(kd,H(REQ,RANDe))}{E(K e ,RAND fe ),E(k f2 ,H(RAND fe )),E(K e ,RAND e ),E(K e ,REQ),E(k d ,H(REQ,RAND e) ))}
其中,RANDfe是转发者#2为执行者产生的随机数。如果执行者是车端,则Ke是组合密钥(公钥)。Among them, RAND fe is the random number generated by forwarder #2 for the executor. If the executor is the car, then K e is the combined key (public key).
执行者接收到决策消息后,使用自己的私钥Ke解密得到RANDfe,使用转发者#2的公钥Kf2进行验签处理,如果After receiving the decision message, the executor uses his own private key K e to decrypt to obtain RAND fe , and uses forwarder #2’s public key K f2 to perform signature verification. If
H(D(ke,E(Ke,RANDfe)))=D(Kf2,E(kf2,H(RANDfe))H(D(k e ,E(K e ,RAND fe )))=D(K f2 ,E(k f2 ,H(RAND fe ))
则执行者可以完成对转发者#2的身份认证,确认该决策信息来自转发者#2。Then the executor can complete the identity authentication of forwarder #2 and confirm that the decision information comes from forwarder #2.
执行者使用自己的私钥ke解密得到RANDe和REQ,使用决策者的公钥Kd进行验签处理,如果The executor uses his own private key k e to decrypt to obtain RAND e and REQ, and uses the decision maker's public key K d to perform signature verification. If
H(D(ke,E(Ke,REQ)),D(ke,E(Ke,RANDe)))=D(Kd,E(kd,H(REQ,RANDe)))H(D(k e ,E(K e ,REQ)),D(k e ,E(K e ,RAND e )))=D(K d ,E(k d ,H(REQ,RAND e )) )
则执行者可以完成对决策者的身份认证,确认原始决策信息REQ来自决策者,并且未经篡改或重放。Then the executor can complete the identity authentication of the decision maker and confirm that the original decision information REQ comes from the decision maker and has not been tampered with or replayed.
执行者根据决策信息REQ的要求完成相关操作后,可以通过应答处理流程将原始执行结果RES通报决策者。执行结果沿决策信息传递的反向路径从执行者传递到决策者,除了相应的参数替换之外,其处理方法与决策信息的传递相同,这里不再赘述。After the executor completes the relevant operations according to the requirements of the decision information REQ, the original execution result RES can be notified to the decision maker through the response processing process. The execution results are transmitted from the executor to the decision-maker along the reverse path of decision-making information transmission. Except for the corresponding parameter replacement, the processing method is the same as the transmission of decision-making information, which will not be described again here.
在执行结果反向传递的过程中,依次完成转发者#2对执行者、转发者#1对转发者#2、决策者对转发者#1以及决策者对执行者的身份认证,从而完成在此次业务交互过程中所需的所有双向身份认证过程,保证四方互信关系,同时完成转发者#1和转发者#2对执行结果的存证,并保证原始执行结果信息RES的机密性、完整性和抗重放。During the process of reverse transmission of execution results, the identity authentication of forwarder #2 to the executor, forwarder #1 to forwarder #2, the decision-maker to forwarder #1, and the decision-maker to the executor are completed in sequence, thus completing the All two-way identity authentication processes required during this business interaction ensure the mutual trust relationship between the four parties, while completing the storage of the execution results by forwarder #1 and forwarder #2, and ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the original execution result information RES performance and replay resistance.
综上所述,基于椭圆曲线算法的车联网协同身份认证方法满足了多参与方建立相互信任关系的身份认证以及相关数据的机密性、完整性、抗重放和行为抗抵赖等安全要求,并将身份认证过程次数保持在N量级;同时还利用组合密钥证明了端设备的端卡绑定关系。In summary, the collaborative identity authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles based on the elliptic curve algorithm meets the security requirements of identity authentication for multiple participants to establish mutual trust relationships and the confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay and behavioral non-repudiation of related data, and The number of identity authentication processes is kept at the N level; at the same time, the combined key is used to prove the end-card binding relationship of the end device.
参照图7,图7为本发明身份认证方法车联网远程操控业务场景的交互示意图。在本实施例中,端设备具有组合公私密钥对,车联网远程操控应用允许车主利用远程操控APP对其车辆进行远程操作控制,实现远程启动发动机/空调、远程解锁/上锁车门、远程寻车等功能。Referring to Figure 7, Figure 7 is an interactive schematic diagram of the remote control business scenario of the Internet of Vehicles based on the identity authentication method of the present invention. In this embodiment, the end device has a combined public and private key pair, and the Internet of Vehicles remote control application allows car owners to use the remote control APP to remotely operate and control their vehicles, enabling remote starting of the engine/air conditioner, remote unlocking/locking of car doors, and remote search. car and other functions.
假设车主在车联网服务平台注册了远程操控服务,并在手机(移动端)上下载安装了远程操控APP,车联网服务平台提供统一的服务管理,但可能并不提供具体的远程操控服务,而是对接相应的车企服务平台实现服务交付。在车联网远程操控业务场景应用示例中,移动端(车主)是决策者,车联网服务平台(平台云)和车企服务平台(车企云)是转发者,车端(ECU)是执行者,应用流程如下:Assume that the car owner registers the remote control service on the Internet of Vehicles service platform and downloads and installs the remote control APP on the mobile phone (mobile terminal). The Internet of Vehicles service platform provides unified service management, but may not provide specific remote control services. It is to connect with the corresponding car company service platform to achieve service delivery. In the application example of the Internet of Vehicles remote control business scenario, the mobile terminal (car owner) is the decision-maker, the Internet of Vehicles service platform (Platform Cloud) and the car enterprise service platform (Car Enterprise Cloud) are the forwarders, and the vehicle terminal (ECU) is the executor. , the application process is as follows:
首先,车主启动手机(移动端)上的远程操控APP,选择希望执行的操作,例如开启空调、启动发动机、远程解锁/上锁车门等,作为操作指令,并确认发送操作指令。First, the car owner starts the remote control APP on the mobile phone (mobile terminal), selects the operation he wishes to perform, such as turning on the air conditioner, starting the engine, remotely unlocking/locking the door, etc., as the operation command, and confirms that the operation command is sent.
进一步地,手机采用协同身份认证方法对操作指令进行处理。产生两个Further, the mobile phone uses a collaborative identity authentication method to process the operation instructions. generate two
随机数RAND1和RAND2,使用车联网服务平台(平台云)的公钥K01对RAND1进行加密,得到E(K01,RAND1),使用移动端(手机)Random numbers RAND 1 and RAND 2 , use the public key K 01 of the Internet of Vehicles service platform (platform cloud) to encrypt RAND 1 to get E (K 01 , RAND 1 ), use the mobile terminal (mobile phone)
私钥k23(组合密钥)对RAND1的信息摘要进行加密,得到手机给平台The private key k 23 (combined key) encrypts the information digest of RAND 1 and obtains the mobile phone to the platform
云的签名E(k23,H(RAND1));使用车端公钥K13(组合密钥)分别对RAND2和决策信息REQ(操作指令)进行加密,得到E(K13,RAND2)和E(K13,REQ),使用手机私钥k23对REQ和RAND2组合信息的信息摘要进行加密,得到手机给车端(ECU)的签名E(k23,H(REQ,RAND2))。Cloud's signature E(k 23 , H(RAND 1 )); use the car-end public key K 13 (combined key) to encrypt RAND 2 and decision information REQ (operation instructions) respectively to obtain E(K 13 , RAND 2 ) and E(K 13 , REQ), use the mobile phone's private key k 23 to encrypt the information digest of the combined information of REQ and RAND 2 , and obtain the signature E(k 23 , H(REQ, RAND 2) from the mobile phone to the vehicle end (ECU) )).
由此,通过手机对操作指令进行变换,得到操作指令的变换信息,并将操作指令的变换信息发送至平台云;其中,操作指令的变换信息为:As a result, the operation instructions are transformed through the mobile phone to obtain the transformation information of the operation instructions, and the transformation information of the operation instructions is sent to the platform cloud; where, the transformation information of the operation instructions is:
{E(K01,RAND1),E(k23,H(RAND1)),E(K13,RAND2),E(K13,REQ),E(k23,H(REQ,RAND2))}其次,平台云对接收到的操作指令的变换信息进行处理。{E(K 01 , RAND 1 ), E(k 23 , H(RAND 1 )), E(K 13 , RAND 2 ), E(K 13 , REQ), E(k 23 , H(REQ, RAND 2 ))} Secondly, the platform cloud processes the transformation information of the received operation instructions.
具体地,使用平台云的私钥k01对操作指令的变换信息解密得到RAND1,使用手机公钥K23(组合密钥)对操作指令的变换信息进行验莶处理,如果Specifically, use the private key k 01 of the platform cloud to decrypt the transformation information of the operation instruction to obtain RAND 1 , and use the mobile phone public key K 23 (combined key) to verify the transformation information of the operation instruction. If
H(D(k01,E(K01,RAND1)))=D(K23,E(k23,H(RAND1))H(D(k 01 , E(K 01 , RAND 1 )))=D(K 23 , E(k 23 , H(RAND 1 ))
则平台云完成对手机的身份认证,确认该操作指令来自手机。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述操作指令。由此,平台云无需了解操作指令的具体内容,但可以记录包括E(K13,REQ)在内的信息做为存证。Then the platform cloud completes the identity authentication of the mobile phone and confirms that the operation command comes from the mobile phone. If the identity verification fails, the above operation instructions will be rejected. Therefore, the platform cloud does not need to know the specific content of the operation instruction, but can record information including E(K 13 , REQ) as evidence.
进一步地,基于操作指令的变换信息,产生随机数RAND3,使用车企Further, based on the transformation information of the operation instructions, a random number RAND 3 is generated, using the car company's
服务平台(车企云)的公钥K02对RAND3进行加密,得到E(K02,RAND3),使用平台云私钥k01对RAND3的信息摘要进行加密,得到平台云给车企云的签名E(k01,H(RAND3))。The public key K 02 of the service platform (car enterprise cloud) encrypts RAND 3 to obtain E (K 02 , RAND 3 ). The platform cloud private key k 01 is used to encrypt the information summary of RAND 3 to obtain the platform cloud and give it to the automobile enterprise. The signature of the cloud is E(k 01 , H(RAND 3 )).
由此,通过随机数可以验证操作指令的发起方,而无需对内部的信息进行解析,提高效率。As a result, the initiator of the operation instruction can be verified through random numbers without parsing the internal information, improving efficiency.
进一步地,平台云对操作指令的变换信息进行更新,发送给车企云,操作指令的变换信息更新为:Further, the platform cloud updates the transformation information of the operation instructions and sends it to the car enterprise cloud. The transformation information of the operation instructions is updated as:
{E(K02,RAND3),E(k01,H(RAND3)),E(K13,RAND2),E(K13,REQ),E(k23,H(REQ,RAND2))}{E(K 02 , RAND 3 ), E(k 01 , H(RAND 3 )), E(K 13 , RAND 2 ), E(K 13 , REQ), E(k 23 , H(REQ, RAND 2 ))}
再次,车企云对接收到的操作指令进行处理。使用车企云私钥k02解密得到RAND3,使用平台云公钥K01进行验签处理,如果Thirdly, Cheqi Cloud processes the received operation instructions. Use the Cheqi cloud private key k 02 to decrypt to obtain RAND 3 , and use the platform cloud public key K 01 for signature verification. If
H(D(k02,E(K02,RAND3)))=D(K01,E(k01,H(RAND3))H(D(k 02 , E(K 02 , RAND 3 )))=D(K 01 , E(k 01 , H(RAND 3 ))
则车企云完成对平台云的身份认证,确认该操作指令来自平台云。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述操作指令。由此,车企云无需了解操作指令的具体内容,但可以记录包括E(K13,REQ)在内的信息做为存证。基于操作指令的变换信息,产生随机数RAND4,使用车端公钥K13对RAND4进行加密,得到E(K13,RAND4),使用车企云私钥k02对RAND4的信息摘要进行加密,得到车企云给车端的签名E(k02,H(RAND4))。Then Cheqi Cloud completes the identity authentication of the platform cloud and confirms that the operation instruction comes from the platform cloud. If the identity verification fails, the above operation instructions will be rejected. Therefore, Cheqi Cloud does not need to know the specific content of the operation instruction, but can record information including E(K 13 , REQ) as evidence. Based on the transformation information of the operation instructions, a random number RAND 4 is generated. The car-end public key K 13 is used to encrypt RAND 4 to obtain E(K 13 , RAND 4 ). The car enterprise cloud private key k 02 is used to summarize the information of RAND 4 . Encrypt and obtain the signature E(k 02 , H(RAND 4 )) from the car cloud to the car.
车企云对操作指令变换信息进行更新,并发送至车端,其中,操作指令的变换信息更新为:The Cheqi Cloud updates the operation instruction transformation information and sends it to the car terminal. The operation instruction transformation information is updated as:
{E(K13,RAND4),E(k02,H(RAND4)),E(K13,RAND2),E(K13,REQ).E(k23,H(REQ,RAND2))}{E(K 13 , RAND 4 ), E(k 02 , H(RAND 4 )), E(K 13 , RAND 2 ), E(K 13 , REQ).E(k 23 , H(REQ, RAND 2 ))}
最后,车端对接收到的操作指令进行处理。使用车端私钥k13(组合密钥)Finally, the vehicle terminal processes the received operation instructions. Use car-side private key k 13 (combined key)
解密得到RAND4,使用车企云公钥K02进行验签处理,如果Decrypt to obtain RAND 4 , and use the car cloud public key K 02 for signature verification. If
H(D(k13,E(K13,RAND4)))=D(K02,E(k02,H(RAND4))H(D(k 13 , E(K 13 , RAND 4 )))=D(K 02 , E(k 02 , H(RAND 4 ))
则车端完成对车企云的身份认证,确认该决策信息来自车企云。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述操作指令。使用车端私钥k13解密得到RAND2和REQ,使用手机公钥K23进行验签处理,如果Then the car terminal completes the identity authentication of the Cheqi Cloud and confirms that the decision-making information comes from the Cheqi Cloud. If the identity verification fails, the above operation instructions will be rejected. Use the car-end private key k 13 to decrypt to obtain RAND 2 and REQ, and use the mobile phone public key K 23 to perform signature verification. If
H(D(k13,E(K13,REQ)),D(k13,E(K13,RAND2)))=D(K23,E(k23,H(REQ,RAND2)))则车端完成对手机的身份认证,确认原始操作指令REQ来自手机,并且未经篡改或重放。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述操作指令。车端将操作指令交由ECU执行,例如开启空调、启动发动机、远程解锁/上锁车门等。H(D(k 13 , E(K 13 , REQ)), D(k 13 , E(K 13 , RAND 2 )))=D(K 23 , E(k 23 , H(REQ, RAND 2 )) ), the car terminal completes the identity authentication of the mobile phone and confirms that the original operation command REQ comes from the mobile phone and has not been tampered with or replayed. If the identity verification fails, the above operation instructions will be rejected. The vehicle end hands over the operation instructions to the ECU for execution, such as turning on the air conditioner, starting the engine, remotely unlocking/locking the doors, etc.
车端根据操作指令REQ的要求完成相关操作后,可以通过应答处理流程将执行结果RES通报移动端(手机/车主)。产生两个随机数RAND5和RAND6,使用车企云公钥K02对RAND5进行加密,得到E(K02,RAND5),使用车端私钥k13对RAND5的信息摘要进行加密,得到车端给车企云的签名E(k13,H(RAND5));使用手机公钥K23分别对RAND6和执行结果RES进行加密,得到E(K23,RAND6)和E(K23,RES),使用车端私钥k13对RES和RAND6组合信息的信息摘要进行加密,得到车端给手机的签名E(k13,H(REQ,RAND6))。After the car terminal completes the relevant operations according to the requirements of the operation command REQ, it can notify the mobile terminal (mobile phone/car owner) of the execution result RES through the response processing process. Generate two random numbers RAND 5 and RAND 6 , use the car cloud public key K 02 to encrypt RAND 5 to get E(K 02 , RAND 5 ), use the car end private key k 13 to encrypt the information summary of RAND 5 , obtain the signature E(k 13 , H(RAND 5 )) from the car terminal to the car enterprise cloud; use the mobile phone public key K 23 to encrypt RAND 6 and the execution result RES respectively, and obtain E(K 23 , RAND 6 ) and E (K 23 , RES), use the vehicle-side private key k 13 to encrypt the information digest of the combined information of RES and RAND 6 , and obtain the signature E(k 13 , H(REQ, RAND 6 )) from the vehicle-side to the mobile phone.
进一步地,车端将经过协同身份认证方法处理后的执行结果变换信息发送给车企云,执行结果的变换信息为:Further, the car terminal sends the execution result transformation information processed by the collaborative identity authentication method to the car enterprise cloud. The execution result transformation information is:
{E(K02,RAND5),E(k13,H(FAND5)),E(K23,RAND6),E(K23,RES),E(k13,H(RES,RAND6))}{E(K 02 , RAND 5 ), E(k 13 , H(FAND 5 )), E(K 23 , RAND 6 ), E(K 23 , RES), E(k 13 , H(RES, RAND 6 ))}
车企云对接收到的执行结果进行处理。使用车企云私钥k02解密得到Cheqi Cloud processes the received execution results. Use the car cloud private key k 02 to decrypt and obtain
RAND5,使用车端公钥K13进行验签处理,如果RAND 5 , use the car-end public key K 13 for signature verification processing, if
H(D(k02,E(K02,RAND5)))=D(K13,E(k13,H(RAND5))H(D(k 02 , E(K 02 , RAND 5 )))=D(K 13 , E(k 13 , H(RAND 5 ))
则车企云完成对车端的身份认证,确认该执行结果来自车端。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述操作指令。车企云无需了解执行结果的具体内容,但可以记录包括E(K23,RES)在内的信息做为存证。产生随机数RAND7,使用平台云公钥K01对RAND7进行加密,得到E(K01,RAND7),使用车企云私钥k02对RAND7的信息摘要进行加密,得到车企云给平台云的签名E(k02,H(RAND7))。Then Cheqi Cloud completes the identity authentication of the car terminal and confirms that the execution result comes from the car terminal. If the identity verification fails, the above operation instructions will be rejected. Cheqi Cloud does not need to know the specific content of the execution results, but it can record information including E(K 23 , RES) as evidence. Generate a random number RAND 7 , use the platform cloud public key K 01 to encrypt RAND 7 , and get E(K 01 , RAND 7 ), use the Cheqi Cloud private key k 02 to encrypt the information summary of RAND 7 , and get the Cheqi Cloud Give the signature to the platform cloud E(k 02 , H(RAND 7 )).
车企云将经过协同身份认证方法处理后的执行结果变换信息发送给平台云,执行结果的变换信息更新为:Cheqi Cloud sends the execution result transformation information processed by the collaborative identity authentication method to the platform cloud, and the execution result transformation information is updated to:
{E(K01,RAND7),E(k02,H(RAND7)),E(K23,RAND6),E(K23,RES),E(k13,H(RES,RAND6))}进一步地,平台云对接收到的执行结果进行处理。使用平台云私钥k01解密得到RAND7,使用车企云公钥K02进行验签处理,如果{E(K 01 , RAND 7 ), E(k 02 , H(RAND 7 )), E(K 23 , RAND 6 ), E(K 23 , RES), E(k 13 , H(RES, RAND 6 ) ))}Further, the platform cloud processes the received execution results. Use the platform cloud private key k 01 to decrypt to obtain RAND 7 , and use the car enterprise cloud public key K 02 for signature verification. If
H(D(k01,E(K01,RAND7)))=D(K02,E(k02,H(RAND7))H(D(k 01 , E(K 01 , RAND 7 )))=D(K 02 , E(k 02 , H(RAND 7 ))
则平台云完成对车企云的身份认证,确认该执行结果来自车企云。平台云无需了解执行结果的具体内容,但可以记录包括E(K23,RES)在内的信息做为存证。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述操作指令。基于执行结果产生随机数RAND8,使用手机公钥K23对RANDB进行加密,得到E(K23,RAND8),使用平台云私钥k01对RAND8的信息摘要进行加密,得到平台云给手机的签名E(k01,H(RAND8))。Then the platform cloud completes the identity authentication of the Cheqi Cloud and confirms that the execution result comes from the Cheqi Cloud. The platform cloud does not need to know the specific content of the execution result, but can record information including E(K 23 , RES) as evidence. If the identity verification fails, the above operation instructions will be rejected. Generate a random number RAND 8 based on the execution result, use the mobile phone public key K 23 to encrypt RAND B to obtain E (K 23 , RAND 8 ), and use the platform cloud private key k 01 to encrypt the information summary of RAND 8 to obtain the platform cloud The signature given to the mobile phone is E(k 01 , H(RAND 8 )).
进一步地,平台云将经过协同身份认证方法处理后的执行结果变换信息发送给手机,执行结果的变换信息更新为:Further, the platform cloud sends the execution result transformation information processed by the collaborative identity authentication method to the mobile phone, and the execution result transformation information is updated to:
{E(K23,RAND8),E(k01,H(RAND8)),E(K23,RAND6),E(K23,RES),E(k13,H(RES,RAND6))}手机对接收到的执行结果进行处理。使用手机私钥k23解密得到RAND8,使用平台云公钥K01进行验签处理,如果{E(K 23 , RAND 8 ), E(k 01 , H(RAND 8 )), E(K 23 , RAND 6 ), E(K 23 , RES), E(k 13 , H(RES, RAND 6 ) ))}The mobile phone processes the received execution results. Use the mobile phone private key k 23 to decrypt to obtain RAND 8 , and use the platform cloud public key K 01 to perform signature verification. If
H(D(k23,E(K23,RAND8)))=D(K01,E(k01,H(RAND8))H(D(k 23 , E(K 23 , RAND 8 )))=D(K 01 , E(k 01 , H(RAND 8 ))
则手机完成对平台云的身份认证,确认该执行结果来自平台云。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述操作指令。使用手机私钥k23解密得到RAND6和RES,使用车端公钥K13进行验签处理,如果Then the mobile phone completes the identity authentication of the platform cloud and confirms that the execution result comes from the platform cloud. If the identity verification fails, the above operation instructions will be rejected. Use the mobile phone's private key k 23 to decrypt to obtain RAND 6 and RES, and use the car's public key K 13 to perform signature verification. If
H(D(k23,E(K23,RES)),D(k23,E(K23,RAND6)))=D(K13,E(k13,H(RES,RAND6)))H(D(k 23 , E(K 23 , RES)), D(k 23 , E(K 23 , RAND 6 )))=D(K 13 , E(k 13 , H(RES, RAND 6 )) )
则手机完成对车端的身份认证,确认原始执行结果RES来自车端,并且未经篡改或重放。手机可以对执行结果进行记录和/或手机将执行结果展示给车主。Then the mobile phone completes the identity authentication of the car terminal and confirms that the original execution result RES comes from the car terminal and has not been tampered with or replayed. The mobile phone can record the execution results and/or the mobile phone can display the execution results to the car owner.
由此,通过操作指令和执行结果的传递,完成了在远程操控业务交互过程中所需的四次双向身份认证过程,保证了四方互信关系,同时完成平台云和车企云对本次远程操控行为的存证,并保证原始操作指令和执行结果信息的机密性、完整性和抗重放。对于移动端(手机)和车端,采用组合密钥证明了其端卡绑定关系。As a result, through the transmission of operation instructions and execution results, the four two-way identity authentication processes required in the remote control business interaction process are completed, ensuring the mutual trust relationship between the four parties, and at the same time completing the remote control between the platform cloud and the car enterprise cloud. Store evidence of behavior and ensure the confidentiality, integrity and resistance to replay of original operation instructions and execution result information. For mobile terminals (mobile phones) and car terminals, the combined key is used to prove their terminal-card binding relationship.
由于车联网远程操控应用必须保证相关业务参与方之间的安全信任,因此,在本实施例中,采用基于椭圆曲线算法的车联网协同身份认证方法,可以满足相关业务参与方建立相互信任关系的身份认证以及相关数据的机密性、完整性、抗重放和行为抗抵赖等安全要求,并将身份认证过程次数保持在N量级;同时还利用组合密钥证明了端设备的端卡绑定关系。Since the Internet of Vehicles remote control application must ensure security and trust between relevant business participants, in this embodiment, a collaborative identity authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles based on the elliptic curve algorithm is used to meet the requirements of relevant business participants to establish a mutual trust relationship. Security requirements such as identity authentication and related data confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay and behavioral non-repudiation, and keep the number of identity authentication processes at the N level; at the same time, the combined key is also used to prove the end-card binding of the end device relation.
参照图8,图8为本发明身份认证方法车联网业务订购业务场景的交互示意图。在本实施例中,通过车载信息娱乐系统(IVI),驾乘者可以在车企服务平台订购信息服务,或者通过车企服务平台在车联网服务平台上订购信息服务,例如路况信息订阅、音视频服务点播等。实际进行业务订购操作的驾乘者可能并不是车主(例如是乘车的孩子或借车使用的朋友等),因而业务订购(特别是付费业务订购)应该得到车主的确认。Referring to Figure 8, Figure 8 is an interactive schematic diagram of the Internet of Vehicles service ordering business scenario of the identity authentication method of the present invention. In this embodiment, through the in-vehicle infotainment system (IVI), drivers and passengers can order information services on the car company service platform, or order information services on the Internet of Vehicles service platform through the car company service platform, such as traffic information subscription, audio Video services on demand, etc. The driver and passenger who actually performs the service ordering operation may not be the car owner (for example, a child riding in the car or a friend borrowing the car, etc.), so the service ordering (especially the paid service ordering) should be confirmed by the car owner.
驾乘者使用IVI浏览和选购车企服务平台(车企云)的信息娱乐业务,如果驾乘者浏览或选择订购的业务并非是车企云提供的,而是车联网服务平台(平台云)提供的,车企云将把驾乘者引导到平台云上进行相应的操作。因为驾乘者可能不是车主,特定的操作(例如付费业务订购)必须得到车主的确认。Drivers and passengers use IVI to browse and purchase the infotainment services of the car company service platform (Cheqi Cloud). If the business that the driver and passengers browse or choose to order is not provided by Cheqi Cloud, but the Internet of Vehicles service platform (Platform Cloud) ), Cheqi Cloud will guide drivers and passengers to the platform cloud to perform corresponding operations. Because the driver or passenger may not be the car owner, specific operations (such as paying service subscriptions) must be confirmed by the car owner.
在车联网业务订购业务场景应用示例的业务订购确认过程中,移动端(车主)是决策者,车端(IVI)和车企服务平台(车企云)是转发者,车联网服务平台(平台云)是执行者。驾乘者虽然是业务订购的发起者,但不能干预正常的业务订购确认处理流程(当然实际的业务订购流程可以允许驾乘者随时终止业务订购),因此在流程图中未予考虑。应用流程简要说明如下:In the business order confirmation process of the Internet of Vehicles service ordering business scenario application example, the mobile terminal (car owner) is the decision-maker, the vehicle terminal (IVI) and the car enterprise service platform (Car Enterprise Cloud) are the forwarders, and the Internet of Vehicles service platform (platform Cloud) is the executor. Although drivers and passengers are the initiators of business ordering, they cannot interfere with the normal business ordering confirmation processing process (of course, the actual business ordering process can allow drivers and passengers to terminate the business ordering at any time), so they are not considered in the flow chart. A brief description of the application process is as follows:
首先,驾乘者通过车端IVI与车企云和平台云交互,浏览和选购信息娱乐业务。假设驾乘者选择订购平台云提供的音视频点播业务,当平台云要求驾乘者确认业务订购时,驾乘者确认了业务订购(当然也可以拒绝而终止此次业务订购)。First, drivers and passengers interact with the car enterprise cloud and platform cloud through the car-side IVI to browse and purchase infotainment services. Assume that the driver and passenger choose to subscribe to the audio and video on-demand service provided by the platform cloud. When the platform cloud requires the driver and passenger to confirm the service subscription, the driver and passenger confirm the service subscription (of course, they can also refuse and terminate the service subscription).
驾乘者选择确认业务订购后,因为该业务订购需要得到车主的确认,车端(IVI)向车主的手机(移动端)发送确认业务订购请求。手机将确认业务订购请求展示给车主;车主做出针对确认业务订购请求的决定(例如同意或拒绝),作为订购决定。After the driver and passenger choose to confirm the service order, because the service order needs to be confirmed by the car owner, the vehicle terminal (IVI) sends a confirmation service order request to the car owner's mobile phone (mobile terminal). The mobile phone will display the confirmation service ordering request to the car owner; the car owner makes a decision (such as agreeing or rejecting) on the confirmation service ordering request as an ordering decision.
其次,手机采用协同身份认证方法对车主的订购决定进行处理。产生两个随机数RAND1和RAND2,使用车端公钥K13(组合密钥)对RAND1进行加密,得到E(K13,RAND1),使用移动端(手机)私钥k23(组合密钥)对RAND1的信息摘要进行加密,得到手机给车端的签名E(k23,H(RAND1));使用平台公钥K01分别对RAND2和决策信息REQ(订购决定)进行加密,得到E(K01,RAND2)和E(K01,REQ),使用手机私钥k23对REQ和RAND2组合信息的信息摘要进行加密,得到手机给平台云的签名E(k23,H(REQ,RAND2))。Secondly, the mobile phone uses a collaborative identity authentication method to process the car owner’s ordering decision. Generate two random numbers RAND 1 and RAND 2 , use the car-end public key K 13 (combined key) to encrypt RAND 1 , and obtain E(K 13 , RAND 1 ), use the mobile-end (mobile phone) private key k 23 ( Combined key) to encrypt the information digest of RAND 1 to obtain the signature E(k 23 , H(RAND 1 )) from the mobile phone to the car terminal; use the platform public key K 01 to separately encrypt RAND 2 and decision information REQ (ordering decision) Encrypt, get E(K 01 , RAND 2 ) and E(K 01 , REQ), use the mobile phone private key k 23 to encrypt the information digest of the combined information of REQ and RAND 2 , and get the signature E(k 23 from the mobile phone to the platform cloud) ,H(REQ,RAND 2 )).
进一步地,手机将经过协同身份认证方法处理后的订购决定变换信息发送给车端,订购决定的变换信息更新为:Further, the mobile phone sends the ordering decision transformation information processed by the collaborative identity authentication method to the car end, and the ordering decision transformation information is updated to:
{E(K13,RAND1),E(k23,H(RAND1)),E(K01,RAND2),E(K01,REQ),E(k23,H(REQ,RAND2))}{E(K 13 , RAND 1 ), E(k 23 , H(RAND 1 )), E(K 01 , RAND 2 ), E(K 01 , REQ), E(k 23 , H(REQ, RAND 2 ) ))}
车端对接收到的订购决定进行处理。使用车端私钥k13(组合密钥)解密得到RAND1,使用手机公钥K23(组合密钥)进行验签处理,如果The vehicle terminal processes the received ordering decision. Use the car's private key k 13 (combined key) to decrypt to obtain RAND 1 , and use the mobile phone's public key K 23 (combined key) to perform signature verification. If
H(D(k13,E(K13,RAND1)))=D(K23,E(k23,H(RAND1))H(D(k 13 , E(K 13 , RAND 1 )))=D(K 23 , E(k 23 , H(RAND 1 ))
则车端完成对手机的身份认证,确认该订购决定来自手机。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述订购决定。车端无需了解订购决定的具体内容,但可以记录包括E(K01,REQ)在内的信息做为存证。产生随机数RAND3,使用车企服务平台(车企云)的公钥K02对RAND3进行加密,得到E(K02,RAND3),使用车端私钥k13对RAND3的信息摘要进行加密,得到车端给车企云的签名E(k13,H(RAND3))。Then the car terminal completes the identity authentication of the mobile phone and confirms that the ordering decision comes from the mobile phone. If the identity verification fails, the above ordering decision will be rejected. The car end does not need to know the specific content of the ordering decision, but can record information including E(K 01 , REQ) as evidence. Generate a random number RAND 3 , use the public key K 02 of the car company service platform (car company cloud) to encrypt RAND 3 to obtain E (K 02 , RAND 3 ), and use the car end private key k 13 to summarize the information of RAND 3 Encrypt and obtain the signature E(k 13 , H(RAND 3 )) from the car end to the car enterprise cloud.
进一步地,车端将经过协同身份认证方法处理后的订购决定变换信息发送给车企云,订购决定的变换信息更新为:Further, the car terminal sends the ordering decision transformation information processed by the collaborative identity authentication method to the car enterprise cloud, and the ordering decision transformation information is updated to:
{E(K02,RAND3),E(k13,H(RAND3)),E(K01,RAND2),E(K01,REQ),E(k23,H(REQ,RAND2))}{E(K 02 , RAND 3 ), E(k 13 , H(RAND 3 )), E(K 01 , RAND 2 ), E(K 01 , REQ), E(k 23 , H(REQ, RAND 2 ) ))}
车企云对接收到的订购决定进行处理。使用车企云私钥k02解密得到RAND3,使用车端公钥K13进行验签处理,如果Cheqi Cloud processes the received order decision. Use the car cloud private key k 02 to decrypt to obtain RAND 3 , and use the car end public key K 13 for signature verification. If
H(D(k02,E(K02,RAND3)))=D(K13,E(k13,H(RAND3))H(D(k 02 , E(K 02 , RAND 3 )))=D(K 13 , E(k 13 , H(RAND 3 ))
则车企云完成对车端的身份认证,确认该订购决定来自车端。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述订购决定。由此,车企云无需了解订购决定的具体内容,但可以记录包括E(K01,REQ)在内的信息做为存证。产生随机数RAND4,使用平台云公钥K01对RAND4进行加密,得到E(K01,RAND4),使用车企云私钥k02对RAND4的信息摘要进行加密,得到车企云给平台云的签名E(k02,H(RAND4))。Then Cheqi Cloud completes the identity authentication of the car terminal and confirms that the ordering decision comes from the car terminal. If the identity verification fails, the above ordering decision will be rejected. Therefore, Cheqi Cloud does not need to know the specific content of the ordering decision, but can record information including E(K 01 , REQ) as evidence. Generate a random number RAND 4 , use the platform cloud public key K 01 to encrypt RAND 4 , and obtain E(K 01 , RAND 4 ), use the Cheqi Cloud private key k 02 to encrypt the information summary of RAND 4 , and obtain the Cheqi Cloud Give the signature to the platform cloud E(k 02 , H(RAND 4 )).
进一步地,车企云将经过协同身份认证方法处理后的订购决定变换信息发送给平台云,订购决定的变换信息更新为:Further, Cheqi Cloud sends the ordering decision transformation information processed by the collaborative identity authentication method to the platform cloud, and the ordering decision transformation information is updated as:
{E(K01,RAND4),E(k02,H(RAND4)),E(K01,RAND2),E(K01,REQ),E(k23,H(REQ,RAND2))}平台云对接收到的订购决定进行处理。使用平台云私钥k01解密得到RAND4,使用车企云公钥K02进行验签处理,如果{E(K 01 , RAND 4 ), E(k 02 , H(RAND 4 )), E(K 01 , RAND 2 ), E(K 01 , REQ), E(k 23 , H(REQ, RAND 2 ))}The platform cloud processes the received ordering decision. Use the platform cloud private key k 01 to decrypt to obtain RAND 4 , and use the car enterprise cloud public key K 02 for signature verification. If
H(D(k01,E(K01,RAND4)))=D(K02,E(k02,H(RAND4))H(D(k 01 , E(K 01 , RAND 4 )))=D(K 02 , E(k 02 , H(RAND 4 ))
则平台云完成对车企云的身份认证,确认该订购决定来自车企云。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述订购决定。使用平台云私钥k01解密得到RAND2和REQ,使用手机公钥K23进行验签处理,如果Then the platform cloud completes the identity authentication of Cheqi Cloud and confirms that the ordering decision comes from Cheqi Cloud. If the identity verification fails, the above ordering decision will be rejected. Use the platform cloud private key k 01 to decrypt to obtain RAND 2 and REQ, and use the mobile phone public key K 23 for signature verification. If
H(D(k01,E(K01,REQ)),D(k01,E(K01,RAND2)))=D(K23,E(k23,H(REQ,RAND2)))H(D(k 01 , E(K 01 , REQ)), D(k 01 , E(K 01 , RAND 2 )))=D(K 23 , E(k 23 , H(REQ, RAND 2 )) )
则平台云完成对手机的身份认证,确认原始订购决定REQ来自手机,并且未经篡改或重放。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述订购决定。平台云将按照订购决定对业务订购进行处理,例如确认订购并开通。Then the platform cloud completes the identity authentication of the mobile phone and confirms that the original ordering decision REQ comes from the mobile phone and has not been tampered with or replayed. If the identity verification fails, the above ordering decision will be rejected. The platform cloud will process the business order according to the ordering decision, such as confirming the order and activating it.
平台云根据订购决定REQ的要求完成相关操作后,可以通过应答处理流程将订购结果RES通报移动端(手机/车主)。产生两个随机数RAND5和RAND6,使用车企云公钥K02对RAND5进行加密,得到E(K02,RAND5),使用平台云私钥k01对RAND5的信息摘要进行加密,得到平台云给车企云的签名E(k01,H(RAND5));使用手机公钥K23分别对RAND6和订购结果RES进行加密,得到E(K23,RAND6)和E(K23,RES),使用平台云私钥K01对RES和RAND6组合信息的信息摘要进行加密,得到平台云给手机的签名E(k01,H(REQ,RAND6))。After the platform cloud completes relevant operations according to the requirements of the ordering decision REQ, it can notify the mobile terminal (mobile phone/car owner) of the ordering result RES through the response processing process. Generate two random numbers RAND 5 and RAND 6 , use the Cheqi cloud public key K 02 to encrypt RAND 5 to obtain E(K 02 , RAND 5 ), and use the platform cloud private key k 01 to encrypt the information summary of RAND 5 , obtain the signature E(k 01 , H(RAND 5 )) from the platform cloud to the car enterprise cloud; use the mobile phone public key K 23 to encrypt RAND 6 and the order result RES respectively, and obtain E(K 23 , RAND 6 ) and E (K 23 , RES), use the platform cloud private key K 01 to encrypt the information digest of the combined information of RES and RAND 6 , and obtain the signature E (k 01 , H (REQ, RAND 6 )) from the platform cloud to the mobile phone.
进一步地,平台云将经过协同身份认证方法处理后的订购结果变换信息发送给车企云,执行结果的变换信息更新为:Further, the platform cloud sends the ordering result transformation information processed by the collaborative identity authentication method to the car enterprise cloud, and the execution result transformation information is updated to:
{E(K02,RAND5),E(k01,H(RAND5)),E(K23,RAND6),E(K23,RES),E(k01,H(RES,RAND6))}车企云对接收到的订购结果进行处理。使用车企云私钥k02解密得到RAND5,使用平台云公钥K01进行验签处理,如果{E(K 02 , RAND 5 ), E(k 01 , H(RAND 5 )), E(K 23 , RAND 6 ), E(K 23 , RES), E(k 01 , H(RES, RAND 6 ) ))}Cheqi Cloud processes the received order results. Use the Cheqi cloud private key k 02 to decrypt to obtain RAND 5 , and use the platform cloud public key K 01 for signature verification. If
H(D(k02,E(K02,RAND5)))=D(K01,E(k01,H(RAND5))H(D(k 02 , E(K 02 , RAND 5 )))=D(K 01 , E(k 01 , H(RAND 5 ))
则车企云完成对平台云的身份认证,确认该订购结果来自平台云。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述订购决定。车企云无需了解订购结果的具体内容,但可以记录包括E(K23,RES)在内的信息做为存证。产生随机数RAND7,使用车端公钥K13对RAND7进行加密,得到E(K13,RAND7),使用车企云私钥k02对RAND7的信息摘要进行加密,得到车企云给车端的签名E(k02,H(RAND7))。Then Cheqi Cloud completes the identity authentication of the platform cloud and confirms that the order result comes from the platform cloud. If the identity verification fails, the above ordering decision will be rejected. Cheqi Cloud does not need to know the specific content of the order result, but it can record information including E(K 23 , RES) as evidence. Generate a random number RAND 7 , use the car-side public key K 13 to encrypt RAND 7 , and get E(K 13 , RAND 7 ). Use the Cheqi Cloud private key k 02 to encrypt the information summary of RAND 7 , and get the Cheqi Cloud The signature given to the car end is E(k 02 , H(RAND 7 )).
进一步地,车企云将经过协同身份认证方法处理后的订购结果变换信息发送给车端,执行结果的变换信息更新为:Further, Cheqi Cloud sends the transformation information of the ordering results processed by the collaborative identity authentication method to the car terminal, and the transformation information of the execution results is updated to:
{E(K13,RAND7),E(k02,H(RAND7)),E(K23,RAND6),E(K23,RES),E(k01,H(RES,RAND6))}{E(K 13 , RAND 7 ), E(k 02 , H(RAND 7 )), E(K 23 , RAND 6 ), E(K 23 , RES), E(k 01 , H(RES, RAND 6 ))}
车端对接收到的订购结果进行处理。使用车端私钥k13解密得到RAND7,使用车企云公钥K02进行验签处理,如果The car terminal processes the received order results. Use the car-side private key k 13 to decrypt to obtain RAND 7 , and use the car cloud public key K 02 to perform signature verification. If
H(D(k13,E(K13,RAND7)))=D(K02,E(k02,H(RAND7))H(D(k 13 , E(K 13 , RAND 7 )))=D(K 02 , E(k 02 , H(RAND 7 ))
则车端完成对车企云的身份认证,确认该订购结果来自车企云。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述订购决定。车端无需了解订购结果的具体内容,但可以记录包括E(K23,RES)在内的信息做为存证。产生随机数RAND8,使用手机公钥K23对RAND8进行加密,得到E(K23,RAND8),使用车端私钥k13对RAND8的信息摘要进行加密,得到车端给手机的签名E(k13,H(RAND8))Then the car terminal completes the identity authentication of Cheqi Cloud and confirms that the order result comes from Cheqi Cloud. If the identity verification fails, the above ordering decision will be rejected. The vehicle end does not need to know the specific content of the order result, but can record information including E(K 23 , RES) as a certificate. Generate a random number RAND 8 , use the mobile phone's public key K 23 to encrypt RAND 8 , and obtain E(K 23 , RAND 8 ). Use the car's private key k 13 to encrypt the information summary of RAND 8 , and obtain the information summary given by the car to the mobile phone. Signature E(k 13 , H(RAND 8 ))
车端将经过协同身份认证方法处理后的订购结果变换信息发送给手机,订购结果的变换信息为:The car terminal sends the transformation information of the ordering result processed by the collaborative identity authentication method to the mobile phone. The transformation information of the ordering result is:
{E(K23,RAND8),E(k13,H(RAND8)),E(K23,RAND6),E(K23,RES),E(k01,H(RES,RAND6))}{E(K 23 , RAND 8 ), E(k 13 , H(RAND 8 )), E(K 23 , RAND 6 ), E(K 23 , RES), E(k 01 , H(RES, RAND 6 ))}
进一步地,手机对接收到的订购结果进行处理。使用手机私钥k23解密得到RAND8,使用车端公钥K13进行验签处理,如果Further, the mobile phone processes the received order result. Use the mobile phone's private key k 23 to decrypt to obtain RAND 8 , and use the car's public key K 13 to perform signature verification. If
H(D(k23,E(K23,RAND8)))=D(K13,E(k13,H(RAND8))H(D(k 23 , E(K 23 , RAND 8 )))=D(K 13 , E(k 13 , H(RAND 8 ))
则手机完成对车端的身份认证,确认该订购结果来自车端。若身份验证不通过,则拒绝上述订购决定。使用手机私钥k23解密得到RAND6和RES,使用平台云公钥K01进行验签处理,如果Then the mobile phone completes the identity authentication of the car terminal and confirms that the order result comes from the car terminal. If the identity verification fails, the above ordering decision will be rejected. Use the mobile phone private key k 23 to decrypt to obtain RAND 6 and RES, and use the platform cloud public key K 01 for signature verification. If
H(D(k23,E(K23,RES)),D(k23,E(K23,RAND6)))=D(K01,E(k01,H(RES,RAND6)))H(D(k 23 , E(K 23 , RES)), D(k 23 , E(K 23 , RAND 6 )))=D(K 01 , E(k 01 , H(RES, RAND 6 )) )
则手机完成对平台云的身份认证,确认原始订购结果RES来自平台云,并且未经篡改或重放。手机可以对订购结果进行记录等处理。Then the mobile phone completes the identity authentication of the platform cloud and confirms that the original order result RES comes from the platform cloud and has not been tampered with or replayed. The mobile phone can record the order results and other processing.
最后,手机将订购结果展示给车主。如果车主的订购决定是同意订购业务,并且平台云也成功地完成了业务订购处理和业务开通,则驾乘者可以开始使用业务,例如开始播放点播的音视频节目。Finally, the mobile phone displays the order results to the car owner. If the car owner’s ordering decision is to agree to the subscription service, and the platform cloud successfully completes the service order processing and service activation, the driver and passengers can start using the service, such as starting to play on-demand audio and video programs.
通过订购决定和订购结果的传递,完成了在业务订购业务交互过程中所需的业务订购车主确认流程,通过四次双向身份认证过程,保证了四方互信关系,同时完成车企云和车端对本次业务订购确认行为的存证,并保证原始订购决定和订购结果信息的机密性、完整性和抗重放。对于移动端(手机)和车端,采用组合密钥证明了其端卡绑定关系。Through the transmission of ordering decisions and ordering results, the business ordering car owner confirmation process required in the business ordering business interaction process is completed. Through four two-way identity authentication processes, the mutual trust relationship between the four parties is ensured, and the mutual trust between the car enterprise cloud and the car terminal is completed at the same time. This business order confirmation behavior is documented and the confidentiality, integrity and anti-replay of the original order decision and order result information are guaranteed. For mobile terminals (mobile phones) and car terminals, the combined key is used to prove their terminal-card binding relationship.
由于车联网远程操控应用必须保证相关业务参与方之间的安全信任,因此,在本实施例中,采用基于椭圆曲线算法的车联网协同身份认证方法,可以满足相关业务参与方建立相互信任关系的身份认证以及相关数据的机密性、完整性、抗重放和行为抗抵赖等安全要求,并将身份认证过程次数保持在N量级;同时还利用组合密钥证明了端设备的端卡绑定关系。Since the Internet of Vehicles remote control application must ensure security and trust between relevant business participants, in this embodiment, a collaborative identity authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles based on the elliptic curve algorithm is used to meet the requirements of relevant business participants to establish a mutual trust relationship. Security requirements such as identity authentication and related data confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay and behavioral non-repudiation, and keep the number of identity authentication processes at the N level; at the same time, the combined key is also used to prove the end-card binding of the end device relation.
参照图9,图9为本发明身份认证系统的功能模块示意图。身份认证系统包括:Referring to Figure 9, Figure 9 is a schematic diagram of the functional modules of the identity authentication system of the present invention. Identity authentication systems include:
密钥集生成模块10,用于对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对;The key set generation module 10 is used to set public and private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a public and private key pair set, wherein the public and private key pair set includes a card public and private key pair and a terminal public and private key pair;
组合密钥生成模块20,用于基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对;The combined key generation module 20 is configured to generate a combined public and private key pair based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair;
身份验证模块30,用于当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。The identity verification module 30 is configured to, when receiving the first preset request, verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public and private key pair set and the combined public and private key pair.
本实施例实现身份认证的原理及实施过程,请参照上述各实施例,在此不再赘述。For the principle and implementation process of identity authentication in this embodiment, please refer to the above embodiments and will not be described in detail here.
此外,本发明实施例还提出一种终端设备,所述终端设备包括存储器、处理器及存储在所述存储器上并可在所述处理器上运行的身份认证程序,所述身份认证程序被所述处理器执行时实现如上所述的身份认证方法的步骤。In addition, an embodiment of the present invention also proposes a terminal device. The terminal device includes a memory, a processor, and an identity authentication program stored on the memory and executable on the processor. The identity authentication program is When the processor is executed, the steps of implementing the identity authentication method as described above are implemented.
由于本身份认证程序被处理器执行时,采用了前述所有实施例的全部技术方案,因此至少具有前述所有实施例的全部技术方案所带来的所有有益效果,在此不再一一赘述。Since this identity authentication program adopts all the technical solutions of all the foregoing embodiments when executed by the processor, it has at least all the beneficial effects brought by all the technical solutions of all the foregoing embodiments, which will not be described again one by one.
此外,本发明实施例还提出一种计算机可读存储介质,所述计算机可读存储介质上存储有身份认证程序,所述身份认证程序被处理器执行时实现如上所述的身份认证方法的步骤。In addition, embodiments of the present invention also provide a computer-readable storage medium, the computer-readable storage medium stores an identity authentication program, and when the identity authentication program is executed by a processor, the steps of the identity authentication method as described above are implemented. .
由于本身份认证程序被处理器执行时,采用了前述所有实施例的全部技术方案,因此至少具有前述所有实施例的全部技术方案所带来的所有有益效果,在此不再一一赘述。Since this identity authentication program adopts all the technical solutions of all the foregoing embodiments when executed by the processor, it has at least all the beneficial effects brought by all the technical solutions of all the foregoing embodiments, which will not be described again one by one.
相比现有技术,本发明提供的一种身份认证方法、系统、终端设备及存储介质,通过对预设业务参与方设置公私密钥对,得到公私密钥对集,其中,所述公私密钥对集包括卡公私密钥对、端公私密钥对;基于所述卡公私密钥对、所述端公私密钥对,生成组合公私密钥对;当接收到第一预设请求时,基于所述公私密钥对集、所述组合公私密钥对,验证所述第一预设请求对应的身份信息。本发明旨在解决端卡分离的问题,提高业务流程的安全性,降低业务流程的复杂性。Compared with the existing technology, the present invention provides an identity authentication method, system, terminal device and storage medium. By setting public and private key pairs for preset business participants, a public and private key pair set is obtained, wherein the public and private key pairs are The key pair set includes a card public and private key pair and a terminal public and private key pair; based on the card public and private key pair and the terminal public and private key pair, a combined public and private key pair is generated; when the first preset request is received, Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified. The invention aims to solve the problem of terminal card separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce the complexity of business processes.
需要说明的是,在本文中,术语“包括”、“包含”或者其任何其他变体意在涵盖非排他性的包含,从而使得包括一系列要素的过程、方法、物品或者方法不仅包括那些要素,而且还包括没有明确列出的其他要素,或者是还包括为这种过程、方法、物品或者方法所固有的要素。在没有更多限制的情况下,由语句“包括一个……”限定的要素,并不排除在包括该要素的过程、方法、物品或者方法中还存在另外的相同要素。It should be noted that, as used herein, the terms "include", "comprises" or any other variation thereof are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article or method that includes a list of elements includes not only those elements, but It also includes other elements not expressly listed or inherent in the process, method, article or method. Without further limitation, an element defined by the statement "comprises a..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or method that includes the element.
上述本发明实施例序号仅仅为了描述,不代表实施例的优劣。The above serial numbers of the embodiments of the present invention are only for description and do not represent the advantages and disadvantages of the embodiments.
通过以上的实施方式的描述,本领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到上述实施例方法可借助软件加必需的通用硬件平台的方式来实现,当然也可以通过硬件,但很多情况下前者是更佳的实施方式。基于这样的理解,本发明的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来,该计算机软件产品存储在如上的一个存储介质(如ROM/RAM、磁碟、光盘)中,包括若干指令用以使得一台终端设备(可以是手机,计算机,服务器,被控终端,或者网络设备等)执行本发明每个实施例的方法。Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by means of software plus the necessary general hardware platform. Of course, it can also be implemented by hardware, but in many cases the former is better. implementation. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention can be embodied in the form of a software product in essence or that contributes to the existing technology. The computer software product is stored in one of the above storage media (such as ROM/RAM, magnetic disc, optical disk), including several instructions to cause a terminal device (which can be a mobile phone, a computer, a server, a controlled terminal, or a network device, etc.) to execute the method of each embodiment of the present invention.
以上仅为本发明的优选实施例,并非因此限制本发明的专利范围,凡是利用本发明说明书及附图内容所作的等效结构或等效流程变换,或直接或间接运用在其他相关的技术领域,均同理包括在本发明的专利保护范围内。The above are only preferred embodiments of the present invention, and do not limit the patent scope of the present invention. Any equivalent structure or equivalent process transformation made using the description and drawings of the present invention may be directly or indirectly used in other related technical fields. , are all similarly included in the scope of patent protection of the present invention.
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