CN116956358A - Smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption - Google Patents
Smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption Download PDFInfo
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- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
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Abstract
The application discloses a smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption, which comprises the following steps: s1: generating a public key and a private key for a user for encryption and verification, and distributing the keys to entities of the smart grid; s2: encrypting and aggregating user data, transmitting the user data to a control center through an aggregation node, encrypting and aggregating personal data of a power grid user; s3: decrypting the aggregate data within the region; the SMn encrypts personal data by using a main public key and a public key of a CC (CC), and signs by using a secret key of the SMn; the aggregator does not have a decryption key, cannot know any data information about the individual user, verifies the signature by the public key of the SMn, aggregates all data if the verification passes, simultaneously signs the correct data and forwards the correct data to the CC; through the encryption stage, encryption and aggregation of user data in the smart grid are realized, and privacy in the data transmission process is ensured.
Description
Technical Field
The application relates to the technical field of privacy protection, in particular to a smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption.
Background
The intelligent power grid is a substitute of a traditional power grid, the intelligent power grid collects fine-grained electricity consumption data of a user through the intelligent power meter connected to the user side, a control center analyzes electricity consumption and electricity consumption distribution time of the user, predicts power requirements of the area, and makes reasonable electricity prices so that the operation of the power grid is more stable and efficient.
In addition, since the intelligent ammeter is deployed at the user side and belongs to the edge equipment, the computing and communication capacity of the intelligent ammeter is weak, the performance of the intelligent ammeter can be influenced by high computing cost, communication delay is brought, and the communication cost of the intelligent ammeter and the control center is reduced as much as possible. The basic requirements of the intelligent power grid network communication safety are to realize the integrity, confidentiality and availability of data, when a control center frequently accesses the power consumption data of a user, the personal habits of the user are exposed, and the personal life habits such as the number of families, life patterns and the like can be analyzed by analyzing the power consumption data of each period. Such as: the power consumption data is continuously monitored, so that whether a user is at home or not, and even the state of the user is at home can be known; the long-time electricity consumption data analysis can know the number of people and the work and rest of a family, including financial conditions and the like; this seriously jeopardizes the personal privacy of the user. If the power consumption data of a company or an important facility is revealed, a malicious attacker can obtain some relevant information, and the damage is brought to us. In view of the foregoing, a lightweight cryptographic scheme is needed to protect user privacy and data security.
For protecting the privacy of users, we use many methods such as differential privacy, blockchain, and homomorphic encryption. The homomorphic encryption is to encrypt the data of the user when the data is uploaded to the control center, so that an attacker cannot obtain the power consumption data of the user, and meanwhile, in order to prevent the abuse of the data by the control center, the data is aggregated before the data is uploaded to the control center, and the control center can only obtain the power consumption data of a plurality of aggregated users, thereby protecting the personal privacy of the users. The existing privacy protection methods have some limitations, namely only external attacks or partial internal attacks can be resisted, meanwhile, the possible quantum attacks are faced, better privacy protection cannot be achieved, most importantly, the computing capacity of the edge equipment is limited, and the computing and communication cost is reduced.
For this reason, we propose a smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption.
Disclosure of Invention
The application aims to provide a smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption, which aims to solve the problems in the background technology.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the present application provides the following technical solutions: the smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption comprises the following steps:
s1: generating a public key and a private key for a user for encryption and verification, and preparing for encrypting and signing user data in a power grid by distributing the keys to entities of the smart grid;
s2: encrypting and aggregating user data, transmitting the user data to a control center through an aggregation node, encrypting and aggregating personal data of a power grid user;
s3: and decrypting the aggregated data in the area, wherein the smart grid cannot acquire fine-grained data of the individual users.
The TA is a third party trust authority responsible for generating parameters needed for encryption, the TA generates a master key and a master public key, and generates its own subkeys for CC, BS1 and SMn.
Preferably, in step S1, the master key and the master public key are generated by the trust authority, and the sub-keys thereof are generated for the control center and the aggregation node.
Preferably, in step S1, the trust authority generates a master public key h=g×f of the system by a master key generation algorithm -1 mod q and master keyGenerating { t for CC by sub-key generation algorithm c ，(s 1C ，s 2C ) "BS i Generating { t ] Bi ，(s 1Bi ，s 2Bi ) "SM ij Generating { t ] ij ，(s 1ij ，s 2ij ) Simultaneously using pre-imaging sampling technique as SM ij Generation of (a) ij ，T ij ) Is BS i Generation of (a) Bi ，T Bi ) The trust mechanism selects n random numbers y ij E R, distribute to SM ij ，y ij Satisfy->The trust mechanism selects m random numbers y i E R, distributed to BS i ，y i Satisfy->
The task of the TA in this stage is to distribute keys (including public and private keys) for entities in the system, the keys being used to encrypt personal electricity data of the user against decryption by malicious attackers, and random numbers being used to protect the identity of the user.
Preferably, in step S2, SM ij Randomly select r ij ，e 1ij ，e 2ij ←{-1，0，1} N ；k i ←{0，1} N For ciphertext m ij ∈{0，1} m Encryption, where M ij The method is the electricity consumption data of a single user in the intelligent power grid, and fine-grained data of the power grid user are encrypted;
the detailed process is as follows:
v ij =2 l [v ij /2 l ]
SM ij signing with self subkey in order to ensure that the identity of the user in the smart grid is correct, selecting the hash function H n ：{0，1} * →R n Sigma using pre-imaging sampling techniques ij ←SamplePre(T ij ，H n (m ij ) Calculation of:
w ij ＝s 1ij ·H n (m ij )+s 2ij *h·H n (m ij )+y ij
then outputTo BS i ，T v Is a time stamp.
Preferably, in step S2, when BS i All SM's are received ij After the information of (a), the time stamp T is verified v And user SM ij Identity correctness, calculationIf the equation is satisfied, the user identity verification passes, otherwise, the user identity verification does not pass, namely the verification of our signature ensures that the user is a legal user in the power grid, and after the verification passes, the BS (base station) i Aggregating received user information->
Preferably, in step S2, BS i Signing with self-key, selecting hash function H n ：{0，1} * →R n Sigma using pre-imaging sampling techniques i ←SamplePre(T B i，H n (c i ) Calculation of:
w i ＝s Bi ·H n (c i )+s Bi *h·H n (c i )+y i
transmitting five-tuple (w) i ，σ i ，u i ，v i ，c i ，T v ) To the control center.
After the CC receives all the aggregated data, the signature is verified, and the random number is added into the signature, so that the data sent by the correct aggregator is ensured, because the public key of the CC is used for data encryption, the CC can decrypt only by using the private key of the CC, but the CC can decrypt only to obtain the aggregated data, namely the data of all users in a certain area and cannot obtain the data of any person, so that the scheme realizes the safe uploading of the user data in the intelligent power grid, and simultaneously enables the CC to obtain the data so as to achieve the aim of protecting the personal privacy of the user.
Preferably, in step S3, after the control center receives the aggregate data, the time stamp T is verified a priori v and BSi If the identity signature of (1)User authentication passes, otherwise, the user authentication does not pass, and after authentication passes, we calculate w i ＝v i -u i *s 2c ，/>m i Is the BS received by the control center i Aggregate data within an area.
Preferably, in step S3, the correctness of the signature verification scheme is verified: knowing s 1 +s 2 * h=t, while the pre-imaging sampling technique we know f a (σ)＝H n (-), so:
t·f a (σ)＝s 1 ·f a (σ)+s 2 *h·f a (σ)＝s 1 ·H n (·)+s 2 *h·H n (·)。
the scheme is suitable for protecting personal data privacy of users in the intelligent power grid, the intelligent power grid is used for collecting data of the users, the stability and high efficiency of power grid operation are achieved through different processing of the data, the privacy disclosure of the personal data of the users can be caused by collecting the data of the users, and the intelligent power grid can only obtain the data of all the users in an area to protect the privacy of the users through aggregating the data;
the intelligent power grid data privacy protection method comprises the steps that a first stage is used for generating necessary initial parameters for the intelligent power grid, the parameters are used for guaranteeing the integrity and confidentiality of data, a second stage is used for encrypting personal user data in the intelligent power grid, encryption and aggregation of the user data are achieved through homomorphic encryption technology, necessary signatures provide correctness of data sources, and a third stage is used for obtaining final regional aggregation data by the intelligent power grid, so that the usability of the data is achieved, the privacy of single user data is guaranteed, and therefore the data privacy protection of the intelligent power grid can be achieved.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the present application further provides the following technical solutions:
a smart grid signature based on mesh encryption, comprising:
the generation module is configured to generate a public key and a private key for encryption and verification by a user, and distribute the keys to entities of the smart grid;
the aggregation module is configured to encrypt user data and aggregate, transmit the user data to the control center through the aggregation node, encrypt personal data of the power grid user and aggregate;
and the decryption module is configured to decrypt the aggregate data in the area.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the present application further provides the following technical solutions:
a readable storage medium having stored thereon executable instructions which when executed by a processor implement a method as claimed in any one of the preceding claims.
Compared with the prior art, the application has the beneficial effects that: the SMn encrypts personal data by using a main public key and a public key of a CC (CC), and signs by using a secret key of the SMn;
the signature is added with random numbers, so that correct users can upload data, malicious attackers can be prevented from forging and falsifying smart grid data, then encrypted data and the signature are forwarded to an aggregator BSm, the aggregator has no decryption key, only has the capability of verifying the signature and aggregating the data, cannot know any data information about individual users, verifies the signature through a public key of SMn, aggregates all the data after verification, simultaneously signs the correct data, and forwards the data to a CC;
because of the homomorphism nature of NTRU, we can perform additive operation on data without affecting the accuracy of decryption under the condition of not decrypting, and through the encryption stage, we realize encryption and aggregation of user data in the smart grid, and guarantee privacy in the data transmission process.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic view of the overall structure of the present application;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the three scheme curves of the present application;
FIG. 3 is a schematic view of a ladder according to three embodiments of the present application;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a time comparison of three schemes of the present application;
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a step time comparison of three schemes of the present application;
FIG. 6 is a flow chart of a smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption of the present application;
fig. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of an NTRU grid-based smart grid privacy protection aggregation device according to the present application;
fig. 8 is an internal structural view of the computer device of the present application.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present application will be made clearly and completely with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which it is apparent that the embodiments described are only some embodiments of the present application, but not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be made by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the application without making any inventive effort, are intended to be within the scope of the application.
Referring to fig. 1-8, the present application provides a technical solution: the smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption comprises the following steps:
s1: generating a public key and a private key for a user for encryption and verification, and preparing for encrypting and signing user data in a power grid by distributing the keys to entities of the smart grid;
s2: encrypting and aggregating user data, transmitting the user data to a control center through an aggregation node, encrypting and aggregating personal data of a power grid user;
s3: and decrypting the aggregated data in the area, wherein the smart grid cannot acquire fine-grained data of the individual users.
The TA is a third party trust authority responsible for generating parameters needed for encryption, the TA generates a master key and a master public key, and generates its own subkeys for CC, BS1 and SMn.
In step S1, a master key and a master public key are generated by a trust authority, and sub-keys of the master key and the master public key are generated for a control center and an aggregation node.
In step S1, the trust authority generates a master public key h=g×f of the system by a master key generation algorithm -1 mod q and master keyGenerating { t for CC by sub-key generation algorithm c ，(s 1C ，s 2C ) "BS i Generating { t ] Bi ，(s 1Bi ，s 2Bi ) "SM ij Generating { t ] ij ，(s 1ij ，s 2ij ) Simultaneously using pre-imaging sampling technique as SM ij Generation of (a) ij ，T ij ) Is BS i Generation of (a) Bi ，T Bi ) The trust mechanism selects n random numbers y ij E R, distribute to SM ij ，y ij Satisfy->The trust mechanism selects m random numbers y i E R, distributed to BS i ，y i Satisfy->
Wherein h=g×f -1 mod q; h is the main public key, f, g is the short vector for encrypting ciphertext, and g and f are the raw products for satisfying hForming;b is a main private key, and in order to distribute sub-keys to system participants, the sub-keys comprise CC, BS and SM; { t c ，(s 1C ，s 2C ) -gaussian sampled subkeys; and t is c Is a public key generated for the CC,(s) 1C ，s 2C ) Is a private key generated for the CC; { t Bi ，(s 1Bi ，s 2Bi ) T in } Bi Is the public key generated by TA for BSi,(s) 1Bi ，s 2Bi ) Is the private key generated by TA for BSi, SM ij Middle SM ij Is the j-th SM, { t, under the i-th BSi ij ，(s 1ij ，s 2ij ) T in } ij Is the public key generated by TA for SMij,(s) 1ij ，s 2ij ) Is the private key generated by TA for SMij, (a) ij ，T ij ) In a ij ，T ij Is a public key private key generated for SMij using a pre-imaging sampling technique, BS i For BSi is the ith BS, (a) Bi ，T Bi ) In a Bi ，T Bi a ij ，T ij Is a public-key private key pair generated for BSi using a pre-imaging sampling technique, y ij E R is a random number R, y ij Is a random number generated for SMij, < >>Is added as o to eliminate the effect of random number on SM aggregate signature after aggregation, y i Is a random number R, y i Is a random number generated for BSi, +.>The addition of 0 is to eliminate the effect of random numbers on BS aggregated signatures after aggregation.
The task of the TA in this stage is to distribute keys (including public and private keys) for entities in the system, the keys being used to encrypt personal electricity data of the user against decryption by malicious attackers, and random numbers being used to protect the identity of the user.
In step S2, SM ij Randomly select r ij ，e 1ij ，e 2ij ←{-1，0，1} N ；k i {0，1} N For ciphertext m ij ∈{0，1} m Encryption, where M ij The method is the electricity consumption data of a single user in the intelligent power grid, and fine-grained data of the power grid user are encrypted;
the detailed process is as follows:
SM ij signing with self subkey in order to ensure that the identity of the user in the smart grid is correct, selecting the hash function H n ：{0，1} * →R n Sigma using pre-imaging sampling techniques ij ←SamplePre(T ij ，H n (m ij ) And (3) calculating:
w ii ＝s 1ij ·H n (m ij )+s 2ij *h·H n (m ij )+y ij
then outputTo BS i ，T v Is a time stamp;
wherein ,rij ，e 1ij ，e 2ij ←{-1，0，1} N ；k i ←{0，1} N ，r ij ，e 1ij ，e 2ij Is a random number selected randomly by SMij, the limitation of the range is to correctly decrypt the encrypted ciphertext after calculating the encrypted ciphertext, and k is a random number {0,1} N And k is i Is also a random number and is also the key for decrypting ciphertext, m ij ∈{0，1} m M in ij Is the plaintext of the electricity meter data generated by SMij, wherein u is ij and vij The plaintext m of SMij is completed through the selected random number and the public key of CC and the main public key ij Is encrypted by H n ：{0，1} * →R n Is a hash function, which can hash plaintext with arbitrary length into ciphertext with fixed length, sigma ij ←SamplePre(T ij ，H n (m ij ))σ ij Is a verification message, w, obtained by sampling by a pre-imaging sampling technique ij ＝s 1ij ·H n (m ij )+s 2ij *h·H n (m ij )+y ij W of (3) ij Is obtained by comparing a secret key of SMij and a random number with a plaintext m ij The signature is performed and the signature is performed,to send the encryption and signature to the aggregator, i.e. BSi, T v Is a timestamp to prevent replay attacks.
In step S2, when BS i All SM's are received ij After the information of (a), the time stamp T is verified v And user SM ij Identity correctness, calculationIf the equation is satisfied, the user identity verification passes, otherwise, the user identity verification does not pass, namely the verification of our signature ensures that the user is a legal user in the power grid, and after the verification passes, the BS (base station) i Aggregating received user information->
wherein ,the BSi performs batch verification of the received signature,
and />v i ，c i It is BSi that aggregates the received SMij messages in its jurisdiction.
In step S2, BS i Signing with self-key, selecting hash function H n ：{0，1} * →R n Sigma using pre-imaging sampling techniques i ←SamplePre(T Bi ，H n (c i ) Calculation of:
w i ＝s Bi ·H n (c i )+s Bi *h·H n (c i )+y i
transmitting five-tuple (w) i ，σ i ，u i ，v i ，c i ，T v ) To a control center;
wherein ,Hn ：{0，1} * →R n Is a hash function, which can hash plaintext with arbitrary length into ciphertext with fixed length, sigma i ←SamplePre(T Bi ，H n (c i ) Sigma in ] i Is a verification message, w, generated by BSi through a pre-imaging sampling technique i ＝s Bi ·H n (c i )+s Bi *h·H n (c i )+y i Is a BSi generated signature, (w) in order to prove the correctness of its identity to the CC i ，σ i ，u i ，v i ，c i ，T v ) W of (3) i ，σ i ，u i ，v i ，c i ，T v The signature aggregate ciphertext is sent to the CC.
After the CC receives all the aggregated data, the signature is verified, and the random number is added into the signature, so that the data sent by the correct aggregator is ensured, because the public key of the CC is used for data encryption, the CC can decrypt only by using the private key of the CC, but the CC can decrypt only to obtain the aggregated data, namely the data of all users in a certain area and cannot obtain the data of any person, so that the scheme realizes the safe uploading of the user data in the intelligent power grid, and simultaneously enables the CC to obtain the data so as to achieve the aim of protecting the personal privacy of the user.
In step S3, after the control center receives the aggregate data, the time stamp T is verified a priori v and BSi If the identity signature of (1)User authentication passes, otherwise, the user authentication does not pass, and after authentication passes, we calculate w i ＝v i -u i *s 2c ，/>m i Is the BS received by the control center i Aggregate data within the region;
wherein ,CC gathers the signatures from all BSi, carries out batch de verification, verifies whether the identity of BSi is correct, and verifies whether ciphertext is tampered, w i ＝v i -u i *s 2c 、/>Andthe method is a process of decrypting the ciphertext, the decrypted key is decrypted through the key of the CC, so that the correct aggregate plaintext is obtained, and because the encrypted ciphertext is encrypted by the public key of the CC, the encrypted ciphertext can be only decrypted by the key of the CCThe secret, for encryption, the public key is the encryption plaintext, the private key is the decryption ciphertext, for verification, the private key is used for signature, the public key is used for signature verification, the private key is secret, only the owner knows it is public, and the public key is known.
In step S3, the correctness of the signature verification scheme is verified: knowing s 1 +s 2 * h=t, while the pre-imaging sampling technique we know f a (σ)＝H n (-), so:
t·f a (σ)＝s 1 ·f a (σ)+s 2 ·h·f a (σ)＝s 1 ·H n (·)+s 2 *h·H n (·)；
wherein ,s1 +s 2 * h=t is one step in our encryption algorithm, is the relationship between private and public keys, f a (σ)＝H n (. Cndot.) is one step in our pre-imaging sampling algorithm, by which t.cndot.f can be achieved a (σ)＝s 1 ·f a (σ)+s 2 *h·f a (σ)＝s 1 ·H n (·)+s 2 *h·H n Equation relation of (-), whileAs a rounding function.
The scheme is suitable for protecting personal data privacy of users in the intelligent power grid, the intelligent power grid is used for collecting data of the users, the stability and high efficiency of power grid operation are achieved through different processing of the data, the privacy disclosure of the personal data of the users can be caused by collecting the data of the users, and the intelligent power grid can only obtain the data of all the users in an area to protect the privacy of the users through aggregating the data;
the intelligent power grid data privacy protection method comprises the steps that a first stage is used for generating necessary initial parameters for the intelligent power grid, the parameters are used for guaranteeing the integrity and confidentiality of data, a second stage is used for encrypting personal user data in the intelligent power grid, encryption and aggregation of the user data are achieved through homomorphic encryption technology, necessary signatures provide correctness of data sources, and a third stage is used for obtaining final regional aggregation data by the intelligent power grid, so that the usability of the data is achieved, the privacy of single user data is guaranteed, and therefore the data privacy protection of the intelligent power grid can be achieved.
The signature is added with random numbers, so that correct users can upload data, malicious attackers can be prevented from forging and falsifying smart grid data, then encrypted data and the signature are forwarded to an aggregator BSm, the aggregator has no decryption key, only has the capability of verifying the signature and aggregating the data, cannot know any data information about individual users, verifies the signature through a public key of SMn, aggregates all the data after verification, simultaneously signs the correct data, and forwards the data to a CC;
because of the homomorphism nature of NTRU, we can perform additive operation on data without affecting the accuracy of decryption under the condition of not decrypting, and through the encryption stage, we realize encryption and aggregation of user data in the smart grid, and guarantee privacy in the data transmission process.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the present application further provides the following technical solutions:
a smart grid signature based on mesh encryption, comprising:
the generation module is configured to generate a public key and a private key for encryption and verification by a user, and distribute the keys to entities of the smart grid;
the aggregation module is configured to encrypt user data and aggregate, transmit the user data to the control center through the aggregation node, encrypt personal data of the power grid user and aggregate;
and the decryption module is configured to decrypt the aggregate data in the area.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the present application further provides the following technical solutions:
a readable storage medium having stored thereon executable instructions which when executed by a processor implement a method as claimed in any one of the preceding claims.
The method is stored in a computer-readable storage medium in the form of an executable program and is executed by an integrated control module of the NTRU grid-based smart grid privacy protection aggregation device. The integrated control module can be an embedded processor such as an FPGA/CPLD or ARM single chip microcomputer.
In the present application, a computer device may include a memory, a storage controller, one or more (only one is shown in the figure) processors, etc., and each element is directly or indirectly electrically connected to each other to achieve data transmission or interaction. For example, electrical connections may be made between these elements through one or more communication buses or signal buses. The NTRU grid-based smart grid privacy protection aggregation method includes at least one software function module that may be stored in a memory in the form of software or firmware (firmware), for example, the NTRU grid-based smart grid privacy protection aggregation apparatus includes a software function module or a computer program, respectively. The memory may store various software programs and modules, such as program instructions/modules corresponding to the NTRU grid-based smart grid privacy protection aggregation method and device provided by the embodiment of the application. The processor executes various functional applications and data processing by running software programs and modules stored in the memory, i.e., implements the parsing method in embodiments of the present application.
Consists of four algorithms: (1) a master key generation algorithm that generates a master key; (2) A sub-key generation algorithm that generates a key for any identity of the user using the master key; (3) An encryption algorithm that allows anyone to encrypt a message for a user given a master public key and the user's identity; (4) A decryption algorithm that enables the user to decrypt a message intended for him with his key.
(1) The master key generation algorithm (N, q) gives the value of N, q, we calculateSelecting f, g and E, calculating rho f ，/> and Rf ，/>Make it satisfy- ρ f ·f＝R f mod(x N +1),-ρ g ·g＝R g mod(x N +1), GCD (R f ，R g ) =1 and GCD (R f Q) =1. Calculating a ∈k using an extended Euclidean algorithm>So that it satisfies a.R f +b·R f =1, calculate f=qbρ g ，G＝-qaρ f ，/>Let f=f-k×f, g=g-k×g to reduce the sizes of F and G, the master public key and master key are respectively: />
(2) Subkey generation algorithm
Giving master keysHash function->The user's ID, we calculate,generating a subkey s of a user by gaussian sampling 2 ，(s 1 ，s 2 ) ≡ (t, 0), satisfy { s } 1 +s 2 * h=t }. t is distributed to parties as pseudo-identities s 1 ，s 2 Stored as a key in a secure repository of users;
(3) Encryption algorithm
A hash function H' is given: {0,1} N →{0，1} m Message m e {0,1} m Randomly selecting r, e 1 ，e 2 ∈{-1，0，1} N ；k∈{0，1} N Calculation of Output encryption tuple +.>
(4) Decryption algorithm
Calculating w=v-u×s 2 ，Calculate->m is the decrypted plaintext.
Pre-imaging sampling technology: the pre-imaging sampling technique is implemented by a probabilistic polynomial algorithm that satisfies the following conditions, which enables signers with trapdoors to create signatures in a global hash scheme, specifically as follows:
1.TrapGen(1 n ): from TrapGen (1) n ) Generating (a, t), wherein a satisfies an effective computable function f a ：D n →R n (D n and Rn Is an identifiable domain and a range determined by n), a is a public key of the signature, and t is a private key of the signature.
2.SampleDom(1 n ): slave domain D n Sampling to obtain x, so that x meets f a (x) In the domain R n Are uniformly distributed.
Samplepre (t, y): for a given y ε R n Any signer knowing trapdoor t can sample x from SamplePre (t, y) to let f a (x)＝y。
4. Pre-imaging minimum entropy: for a given y ε R n Satisfy f a (x) The conditional minimum entropy of sample x of =y is at least ω (log n).
5. Crash resistance: absence of x 1 ，x 2 ∈D n And x is 1 ≠x 2 Make the followingGet f a (x 1 )＝f a (x 2 )。
The proposal can protect the privacy and the safety of the electricity data of the user, is lightweight, can prevent external attack, internal attack and quantum attack, reduces the communication and calculation cost, can be deployed in the edge equipment with limited calculation capability, gives detailed communication and calculation cost, and is compared with the prior proposal;
communication overhead: in our scheme, because the distribution of keys to each party in the initialization stage is not frequently performed, and not in our consideration, SM1 periodically transmits encryption information and signatures of individuals of users, sends the encryption information and signatures to BS1 in an area, BS1 verifies the correctness of the signatures and then aggregates data, adds own signatures to send the data to a CC, and the CC verifies the signatures and then decrypts the messages, SM1 sends one piece of information to BS1 each time, and BS1 sends one piece of information to the CC each time, and the BS is supposed to consist of 100SM1 at most;
because we do not consider every in-home appliance, our message count is smaller than other schemes, as shown in fig. 2-3:
(scheme 1 in fig. 2-3 is Abdallah), (scheme 2 in fig. 2-3 is shen) and (scheme 3 in fig. 2-3 is our);
we consider 100SM1 s, 1 BS1 s, and when the number of SM1 s increases, the number of BSs increases little, which has little effect on communication cost, and since other schemes consider finer granularity data collection, our scheme has certain advantages;
calculation overhead: each time the SM1 performs an encryption and signature operation, each time the BS1 performs a verification and signature operation, the CC performs a verification and decryption operation;
first embodiment: let us assume T e ，T d ，T s ，T v Representing the time taken for one encryption operation, one decryption operation, one signature operation, one verification operation, respectively, the time taken for one data collection is (T e +T s )n+(2T v +T s +T d ) m, where m is the number of BS1 and n is the number of SM1 in each BS 1;
second embodiment: considering 100SM1 and 1 BS1, our communication cost is (T) e +T s )n+(2T v +T s +T d )；
As shown in fig. 4 and 5, (scheme 1 in fig. 4-5 is Abdallah), (scheme 2 in fig. 4-5 is shen) and (scheme 3 in fig. 4-5 is our);
the comparison of the scheme and other existing schemes is given, the calculation cost of different collection times is given, when data are collected once in 15 minutes, the effect of the scheme is not great, when electricity data are collected once in 5 minutes, the scheme has smaller advantages compared with the traditional scheme, and in general, the scheme realizes the lightweight requirements on communication and calculation cost.
Although embodiments of the present application have been shown and described, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made therein without departing from the principles and spirit of the application, the scope of which is defined in the appended claims and their equivalents.
Claims (10)
1. The smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1: generating a public key and a private key for a user for encryption and verification, and distributing the keys to entities of the smart grid;
s2: encrypting and aggregating user data, transmitting the user data to a control center through an aggregation node, encrypting and aggregating personal data of a power grid user;
s3: the aggregate data within the region is decrypted.
2. The smart grid signing and verification method based on grid encryption of claim 1, wherein in step S1, a master key and a master public key are generated by a trust authority, and a sub-key of the master key and the sub-key of the master key are generated for a control center and an aggregation node.
3. The smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption as claimed in claim 1, wherein in step S1, the trust authority generates a master public key h=g×f of the system through a master key generation algorithm -1 mod q and master keyGenerating { t for CC by sub-key generation algorithm c ，(s 1C ，s 2C ) "BS i Generating { t ] Bi ，(s 1Bi ，s 2Bi ) "SM ij Generating { t ] ij ，(s 1ij ，s 2ij ) Simultaneously using pre-imaging sampling technique as SM ij Generation of (a) ij ，T ij ) Is BS i Generation of (a) Bi ，T Bi ) The trust mechanism selects n random numbers y ij E R, distribute to SM ij ，y ij Satisfy->The trust mechanism selects m random numbers y i E R, distributed to BS i ，y i Satisfy->
Wherein h=g×f -1 mod q; h is a main public key, f, g are short vectors for encrypting ciphertext, and g and f are generated for satisfying h;b is a main private key, and in order to distribute sub-keys to system participants, the sub-keys comprise CC, BS and SM; { t c ，(s 1C ，s 2C ) -gaussian sampled subkeys; and t is c Is a public key generated for the CC and,(s) 1C ，s 2C ) Is a private key generated for the CC; { t Bi ，(s 1Bi ，s 2Bi ) T in } Bi Is the public key generated by TA for BSi,(s) 1Bi ，s 2Bi ) Is the private key generated by TA for BSi, SM ij Middle SM ij Is the j-th SM, { t, under the i-th BSi ij ，(s 1ij ，s 2ij ) T in } ij Is the public key generated by TA for SMij,(s) 1ij ，s 2ij ) Is the private key generated by TA for SMij, (a) ij ，T ij ) In a ij ，T ij Is a public key private key generated for SMij using a pre-imaging sampling technique, BS i For BSi is the ith BS, (a) Bi ，T Bi ) In a Bi ，T Bi a ij ，T ij Is a public-key private key pair generated for BSi using a pre-imaging sampling technique, y ij E R is a random number R, y ij Is a random number generated for SMij, < >>Is added as o to eliminate the effect of random number on SM aggregate signature after aggregation, y i Is a random number R, y i Is a random number generated for BSi, +.>The addition of 0 is to eliminate the effect of random numbers on BS aggregated signatures after aggregation.
4. The smart grid signing and verification method based on grid encryption of claim 1, wherein in step S2, SM ij Randomly select r ij ，e 1ij ，e 2ij ←{-1，0，1} N ；k i ←(0，1} N For ciphertext m ij ∈{0，1} m Encrypting;
the detailed process is as follows:
SM ij signing with self subkey, selecting hash function H n ：{0，1} * →R n Sigma using pre-imaging sampling techniques ij ←SamplePre(T ij ，H n (m ij ) Calculation of:
w ij ＝s 1ij ·H n (m ij )+s 2ij *h·H n (m ij )+y ij
then outputTo BS i ，T v Is a time stamp;
wherein ,rij ，e 1ij ，e 2ij ←{-1，0，1} N ；k i ←{0，1} N ，r ij ，e 1ij ，e 2ij Is a random number selected randomly by SMij, the limitation of the range is to correctly decrypt the encrypted ciphertext after calculating the encrypted ciphertext, and k is a random number {0,1} N And k is i Is also a random number and is also the key for decrypting ciphertext, m ij ∈{0，1} m M in ij Is the plaintext of the electricity meter data generated by SMij, wherein u is ij and vij The plaintext m of SMij is completed through the selected random number and the public key of CC and the main public key ij Is encrypted by H n ：{0，1} * →R n Is a hash function, can be used for writing plaintext with arbitrary lengthThe hash is made into a ciphertext of a fixed length,is a verification message, w, obtained by sampling by a pre-imaging sampling technique ij ＝s 1ij ·H n (m ij )+s 2ij *h·H n (m ij )+y ij W of (3) ij Is obtained by comparing a secret key of SMij and a random number with a plaintext m ij The signature is performed and the signature is performed,to send the encryption and signature to the aggregator, i.e. BSi, T v Is a timestamp to prevent replay attacks.
5. The smart grid signing and verification method as claimed in claim 3, wherein in step S2, when BS i All SM's are received ij After the information of (a), the time stamp T is verified v And user SM ij Identity correctness, calculationIf the equation is satisfied, user authentication passes, otherwise, the user authentication does not pass, and after the authentication passes, the BS i Aggregating received user information->
wherein ,the BSi performs batch verification of the received signature, and />v i ，c i It is BSi that aggregates the received SMij messages in its jurisdiction.
6. The smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption as claimed in claim 3, wherein in step S2, BS i Signing with self-key, selecting hash function H n ：{0，1} * →R n Sigma using pre-imaging sampling techniques i ←SamplePre(T Bi ，H n (c i ) Calculation of:
w i ＝s Bi ·H n (c i )+s Bi *h·H n (c i )+y i
transmitting five-tuple (w) i ，σ i ，u i ，v i ，c i ，T v ) To a control center;
wherein ,Hn ：{0，1} * →R n Is a hash function, which can hash plaintext with arbitrary length into ciphertext with fixed length, sigma i ←SamplePre(T Bi ，H n (c i ) Sigma in ] i Is a verification message, w, generated by BSi through a pre-imaging sampling technique i ＝s Bi ·H n (c i )+s Bi *h·H n (c i )+y i Is a BSi generated signature, (w) in order to prove the correctness of its identity to the CC i ，σ i ，u i ，v i ，c i ，T v ) W of (3) v σ i ，u i ，v i ，c i ，T v The signature aggregate ciphertext is sent to the CC.
7. The smart grid signature and verification method based on grid encryption as claimed in claim 1, wherein in step s3, after the control center receives the aggregated data, the control center verifies the timestamp T a priori v and BSi If the identity signature of (1)User authentication passes, otherwise, the user authentication does not pass, and after authentication passes, we calculate w i ＝v i -u i *s 2c ，/>m i Is the BS received by the control center i Aggregate data within the region;
wherein ,CC gathers the signatures from all BSi, carries out batch de verification, verifies whether the identity of BSi is correct, and verifies whether ciphertext is tampered, w i ＝v i -u i *s 2c 、/>Andthe method is a process of decrypting the ciphertext, and the decrypted key is required to be decrypted through the key of the CC, so that the correct aggregate plaintext is obtained.
8. The smart grid signing and verification method based on grid encryption of claim 7, wherein in step S3, the correctness of the signature verification scheme is verified: knowing s 1 +s 2 * h=t, while the pre-imaging sampling technique we know f a (σ)＝H n (-), so:
t·f a (σ)＝s 1 ·f a (σ)+s 2 *h·f a (σ)＝s 1 ·H n (·)+s 2 *h·H n (·)；
wherein ,s1 +s 2 * h=t is one step in our encryption algorithm, between private and public keysRelation, f a (σ)＝H n (. Cndot.) is one step in our pre-imaging sampling algorithm, by which t.cndot.f can be achieved a (σ)＝s 1 ·f a (σ)+s 2 *h·f a (σ)＝s 1 ·H n (·)+s 2 *h·H n Equation relation of (-), whileAs a rounding function.
9. A smart grid signature based on mesh encryption, comprising:
the generation module is configured to generate a public key and a private key for encryption and verification by a user, and distribute the keys to entities of the smart grid;
the aggregation module is configured to encrypt user data and aggregate, transmit the user data to the control center through the aggregation node, encrypt personal data of the power grid user and aggregate;
and the decryption module is configured to decrypt the aggregate data in the area.
10. A readable storage medium having stored thereon executable instructions stored therein, which when executed by a processor, implement the method of any of claims 1 to 8.
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| WO2021227241A1 (en) * | 2020-05-13 | 2021-11-18 | 西南石油大学 | Statistical analysis method for key leakage prevention of encrypted data aggregation in smart power grid |
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| CN111131148A (en) * | 2019-11-11 | 2020-05-08 | 重庆邮电大学 | Aggregation method and system capable of protecting privacy data and facing smart power grid |
| WO2021227241A1 (en) * | 2020-05-13 | 2021-11-18 | 西南石油大学 | Statistical analysis method for key leakage prevention of encrypted data aggregation in smart power grid |
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