CN116609797A - GNSS spoofing identification method, GNSS spoofing identification device, electronic equipment and storage medium - Google Patents

GNSS spoofing identification method, GNSS spoofing identification device, electronic equipment and storage medium Download PDF

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Publication number
CN116609797A
CN116609797A CN202310574060.3A CN202310574060A CN116609797A CN 116609797 A CN116609797 A CN 116609797A CN 202310574060 A CN202310574060 A CN 202310574060A CN 116609797 A CN116609797 A CN 116609797A
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China
Prior art keywords
data
gnss
positioning data
class
positioning
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CN202310574060.3A
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Inventor
习成
高雅庭
韦聚琛
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Guangzhou Asensing Technology Co Ltd
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Guangzhou Asensing Technology Co Ltd
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Priority to CN202310574060.3A priority Critical patent/CN116609797A/en
Publication of CN116609797A publication Critical patent/CN116609797A/en
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/015—Arrangements for jamming, spoofing or other methods of denial of service of such systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
    • G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
    • G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/42—Determining position
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)

Abstract

The embodiment of the invention provides a GNSS spoofing identification method, a device, an electronic device and a storage medium, which belong to the technical field of navigation positioning, after positioning equipment acquires one type of GNSS positioning data, when target trusted data matched with the one type of GNSS positioning data exists in a cache, the target trusted data is acquired from the cache, and the target trusted data is two types of GNSS positioning data which are acquired by a safety terminal and are successfully checked by the positioning equipment, so that the one type of GNSS positioning data is spoofed and identified based on the target trusted data, the credibility of the one type of GNSS positioning data is obtained, the two types of GNSS positioning data which are acquired by the safety terminal are skillfully utilized to perform spoofing identification on the one type of GNSS positioning data acquired by the positioning equipment, and the false detection rate and the omission rate of the GNSS positioning data acquired by the positioning equipment can be greatly reduced, thereby being beneficial to improving the spoofing prevention capability and navigation positioning accuracy of a vehicle-mounted positioning system.

Description

GNSS spoofing identification method, GNSS spoofing identification device, electronic equipment and storage medium
Technical Field
The present invention relates to the field of navigation positioning technologies, and in particular, to a GNSS fraud recognition method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium.
Background
GNSS signal spoofing is an important factor affecting the reliability of an in-vehicle positioning system. GNSS signal spoofing refers to an attack method that an attacker falsifies GNSS signals through software radio and other equipment, spoofs an on-board positioning system, enables the on-board positioning system to output an error position, and further operates a vehicle.
Currently, the spoofing identification of common GNSS signals includes two types. One is to combine the last GNSS positioning data with the vehicle pose and acceleration data measured by the IMU to calculate a reasonable range for the current position to identify whether GNSS fraud is present based on the reasonable range. And the other is that after the GNSS positioning is acquired, a high-precision map is used for inquiring the environmental characteristics within a certain range of the position, and the environmental characteristics are matched with the environmental characteristics identified by the sensor so as to identify whether GNSS deception exists. However, the first type of fraud recognition is difficult to recognize whether to fraud when all GNSS signals are forged, and the second type of fraud recognition is susceptible to environmental influences, and has high false detection rate and omission rate.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above, an object of the present invention is to provide a GNSS fraud recognition method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium, which can solve the problems of difficulty in recognition, high false detection rate, and high omission rate of the conventional GNSS signal fraud recognition.
In order to achieve the above object, the technical scheme adopted in the embodiment of the invention is as follows:
in a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a GNSS fraud identification method applied to a positioning device, where the positioning device is communicatively connected to a secure terminal, the method including:
periodically acquiring GNSS positioning data of one class according to a preset frequency;
when target trusted data matched with the GNSS positioning data exists in the cache, acquiring the target trusted data from the cache; the target trusted data are two-class GNSS positioning data which are acquired by the safety terminal and successfully checked by the positioning equipment;
performing deception identification on the class of GNSS positioning data based on the target credible data to obtain the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data;
and when target credible data matched with the class of GNSS positioning data does not exist in the buffer memory, the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data is set as doubtful.
Further, the step of performing spoofing identification on the class of GNSS positioning data based on the target trusted data to obtain the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data includes:
calculating the positioning range of the target trusted data;
judging whether the positioning position of the GNSS positioning data is in the positioning range of the target credible data;
if yes, the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data is judged to be credible, and if not, the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data is judged to be not credible.
Further, the step of calculating the positioning range of the target trusted data includes:
and when the target trusted data is single data, analyzing the target trusted data to obtain the corresponding position of the target trusted data, and determining a positioning range by taking the corresponding position as a center.
Further, the method comprises the steps of:
when the target trusted data is a plurality of data, analyzing the corresponding position of each target trusted data;
and determining the central positions of a plurality of corresponding positions, and determining the positioning range by taking the central positions as the center.
Further, the method further comprises:
when a positioning data packet sent by the safety terminal is obtained, checking a signature of the positioning data packet; the positioning data packet comprises two types of GNSS positioning data acquired by the safety terminal at the same frequency as the positioning equipment;
and under the condition that the signature verification is successful, extracting the two-class GNSS positioning data from the positioning data packet, and storing the two-class GNSS positioning data into a cache.
Further, after the step of periodically acquiring one type of GNSS positioning data according to the preset frequency, before the step of acquiring the target trusted data from the buffer when there is target trusted data matching the one type of GNSS positioning data in the buffer, the method further includes:
analyzing the acquisition time of the GNSS positioning data, and judging whether target trusted data matched with the GNSS positioning data is determined in a cache or not based on the acquisition time.
Further, the step of determining whether the target trusted data matching the class of GNSS positioning data is determined in the buffer based on the obtaining time includes:
determining a matching period by taking the acquisition time as an intermediate time, and judging whether the second class of GNSS positioning data with the acquisition time in the matching period exists in the cache;
if yes, the two kinds of GNSS positioning data are used as target credible data.
In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a GNSS fraud recognition apparatus, applied to a positioning device, where the positioning device is in communication connection with a secure terminal, where the GNSS fraud recognition apparatus includes a first acquisition module, a second acquisition module, a first recognition module, and a second recognition module;
the first acquisition module is used for periodically acquiring GNSS positioning data of one type according to preset frequency;
the second obtaining module is configured to obtain, when target trusted data matching the class of GNSS positioning data exists in the cache, the target trusted data from the cache; the target trusted data are two-class GNSS positioning data which are acquired by the safety terminal and successfully checked by the positioning equipment;
the first recognition module is used for performing deception recognition on the class of GNSS positioning data based on the target credible data to obtain the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data;
the second identifying module is configured to put the reliability of the class of GNSS positioning data as in doubt when there is no target trusted data matching the class of GNSS positioning data in the buffer.
In a third aspect, embodiments of the present invention provide an electronic device comprising a processor and a memory, the memory storing machine executable instructions executable by the processor to implement the GNSS fraud identification method according to the first aspect.
In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements a GNSS fraud identification method according to the first aspect.
According to the GNSS deception identification method, the device, the electronic equipment and the storage medium, after the positioning equipment acquires one type of GNSS positioning data, when target trusted data matched with the one type of GNSS positioning data exists in the cache, the target trusted data are acquired from the cache, and the target trusted data are two types of GNSS positioning data which are acquired by the safety terminal and have successful verification of the positioning equipment, so that deception identification is performed on the one type of GNSS positioning data based on the target trusted data, the credibility of the one type of GNSS positioning data is acquired, deception identification is performed on the one type of GNSS positioning data of the positioning equipment by skillfully utilizing the two types of GNSS positioning data which are acquired by the safety terminal, and the false detection rate and the omission rate of the GNSS data of the positioning equipment can be greatly reduced, so that the deception prevention capability and the navigation positioning accuracy of the vehicle-mounted positioning system can be improved.
In order to make the above objects, features and advantages of the present invention more comprehensible, preferred embodiments accompanied with figures are described in detail below.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings that are needed in the embodiments will be briefly described below, it being understood that the following drawings only illustrate some embodiments of the present invention and should not be considered as limiting the scope, and other related drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.
Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a GNSS fraud recognition system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 illustrates one of flow diagrams of a GNSS fraud identification method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a second flowchart of a GNSS fraud identification method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 shows a flow diagram of part of the sub-steps of step S16 in fig. 2.
Fig. 5 is a block diagram of a GNSS fraud recognition apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 6 shows a block schematic diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Reference numerals: 100-a GNSS fraud recognition system; 10-positioning equipment; 20-a navigation device; 30-a secure terminal; 40-GNSS fraud recognition means; 401-a first acquisition module; 402-a second acquisition module; 403-a first identification module; 404-a second identification module; 50-electronic device.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present invention will be made clearly and fully with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which it is evident that the embodiments described are only some, but not all embodiments of the invention. The components of the embodiments of the present invention generally described and illustrated in the figures herein may be arranged and designed in a wide variety of different configurations.
Thus, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the invention, as presented in the figures, is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, as claimed, but is merely representative of selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments, which can be made by a person skilled in the art without making any inventive effort, are intended to fall within the scope of the present invention.
It is noted that relational terms such as "first" and "second", and the like, are used solely to distinguish one entity or action from another entity or action without necessarily requiring or implying any actual such relationship or order between such entities or actions. Moreover, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one … …" does not exclude the presence of other like elements in a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises the element.
Currently, the spoofing identification of common GNSS signals includes two types. One is to calculate a reasonable range of the current position in combination with the last GNSS positioning data and the vehicle pose and acceleration data measured by the IMU, and consider that GNSS fraud is present if the current GNSS positioning is not within that range or if the continuous multiple GNSS positioning is beyond the dead reckoning range. In the method, under the condition that all data including the GNSS positioning data acquired for the first time are forged by an attacker, whether GNSS spoofing exists or not is difficult to detect.
And the other is that after the GNSS positioning is acquired, the environment characteristics within a certain range of the position are queried by utilizing a high-precision map, the environment characteristics are matched with the environment characteristics identified by the sensor, and if the environment characteristics within the certain range of the GNSS positioning position cannot be matched, the GNSS deception is considered to exist. However, this method may cause false detection when the environment is changed and the high-precision map is not updated in time, and may cause missed detection when the environmental features are not obvious.
Based on the above consideration, embodiments of the present invention provide a GNSS fraud recognition method capable of improving the problem of difficulty in detecting GNSS fraud, missed detection, and false detection.
The GNSS fraud recognition method provided by the embodiment of the present invention may be applied to the GNSS fraud recognition system 100 shown in fig. 1, where the GNSS fraud recognition system 100 includes a positioning device 10, a navigation device 20 (i.e. a navigator) of a vehicle, and a secure terminal 30, and the positioning device 10 may be communicatively connected to the navigation device 20 through a can bus, and may be communicatively connected to the secure terminal 30 through a wireless connection manner such as bluetooth.
The secure terminal 30 may be a terminal device running a security protection program with high security. For example, it may be a mobile terminal, a smart phone, etc.
The positioning device 10 is configured to periodically acquire a class of GNSS positioning data according to a set frequency.
The secure terminal 30 is configured to acquire the two types of GNSS positioning data according to the same set frequency or a frequency greater than the set frequency of the positioning device 10, and send the two types of GNSS positioning data to the vehicle-mounted terminal in real time. The two types of GNSS positioning data sent to the positioning apparatus 10 are signed data.
The positioning device 10 is further configured to receive the two-class GNSS positioning data sent by the secure terminal 30, perform signature verification, and store the two-class GNSS positioning data in the cache if the signature verification is successful.
It should be noted that, only the two types of GNSS positioning data within the preset time period before the current time are stored in the buffer memory of the positioning device 10. Taking the preset duration of 2 seconds as an example, the current time is 0 point 01 minute 22 seconds, only two types of GNSS positioning data exist in the buffer memory of the positioning device 10 in the period from 0 point 01 minute 20 seconds to 0 point 01 minute 22 seconds.
The positioning device 10 is further configured to periodically obtain a class of GNSS positioning data according to a preset frequency, obtain target trusted data from the cache when target trusted data matching the class of GNSS positioning data exists in the cache, and perform spoofing identification on the class of GNSS positioning data based on the target trusted data to obtain the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data. The positioning device 10 may tag the type of GNSS positioning data with a confidence level and send it to the navigation device 20.
Further, after the navigation device 20 obtains the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data, navigation is performed according to the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data. For example, in the case that the credibility is credible, positioning navigation is directly performed by using one kind of GNSS positioning data.
Through the processing, the anti-deception capability of the vehicle-mounted navigation positioning system on GNSS positioning data can be improved, and the accuracy of navigation positioning is improved.
In one possible embodiment, the present invention provides a GNSS fraud identification method, referring to fig. 2, may include the following steps. In the present embodiment, the GNSS fraud recognition method is applied to the positioning apparatus in fig. 1 for illustration.
S12, periodically acquiring GNSS positioning data according to a preset frequency.
S14, judging whether target trusted data matched with one type of GNSS positioning data exists in the cache. If yes, go to step S16, if no, go to step S18.
In this embodiment, the target trusted data is two kinds of GNSS positioning data that are acquired by the secure terminal 30 and successfully checked by the positioning device 10. The secure terminal 30 may acquire the two-class GNSS positioning data at the same set frequency as the positioning apparatus 10, or may acquire the two-class GNSS positioning data at a frequency greater than the set frequency of the positioning apparatus 10.
S16, obtaining target credible data from the cache, and performing deception identification on the GNSS positioning data based on the target credible data to obtain the credibility of the GNSS positioning data.
Where trustworthiness includes trustworthiness, doubt, and untrustworthiness.
S18, the credibility of the GNSS positioning data is set as doubtful.
Taking the example that the secure terminal 30 and the positioning device 10 acquire the GNSS positioning data with the same frequency, after the secure terminal 30 acquires the two types of GNSS positioning data, the two types of GNSS positioning data are signed and then sent to the positioning device 10, and after the positioning device 10 successfully signs the two types of GNSS positioning data, the two types of GNSS positioning data are stored in the buffer memory. The positioning device 10 periodically acquires a class of GNSS positioning data at a set frequency.
After the positioning device 10 acquires the type of GNSS positioning data, when it detects that there is target trusted data matching with the type of GNSS positioning data in the buffer, it extracts the target trusted data from the buffer, and performs spoofing identification on the type of GNSS positioning data based on the target trusted data, so as to obtain the credibility of the type of GNSS positioning data. If the target credible data matched with the GNSS positioning data is not available, the credibility of the GNSS positioning data is directly set as doubt.
After determining the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data, the positioning device 10 adds a credibility tag to the class of GNSS positioning data and sends the class of GNSS positioning data to the navigation device 20, and the navigation device 20 can navigate according to the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data. Alternatively, the positioning device 10 may perform positioning processing according to the credibility of one type of GNSS positioning data.
Compared with the traditional GNSS deception identification method, in the GNSS deception identification method, deception identification is performed on one class of GNSS positioning data of the positioning equipment by skillfully utilizing the two classes of GNSS positioning data which are acquired by the security terminal, so that the false detection rate and the omission rate of the GNSS data of the positioning equipment can be greatly reduced, and the deception prevention capability and the navigation positioning accuracy of the vehicle-mounted positioning system can be improved.
Further, referring to fig. 3, the GNSS fraud recognition method according to the embodiment of the present invention may further include the following steps.
S21, when the positioning data packet sent by the safety terminal is obtained, checking the positioning data packet.
In this embodiment, the positioning data packet includes two types of GNSS positioning data acquired by the secure terminal 30 at the same frequency as the positioning apparatus 10. The positioning data packet may be two signed types of GNSS positioning data sent by the secure terminal 30.
S23, under the condition that the signature verification is successful, the class-II GNSS positioning data are extracted from the positioning data packet, and the class-II GNSS positioning data are stored in the cache.
After the secure terminal 30 acquires the two kinds of GNSS positioning data, it signs the two kinds of GNSS positioning data to obtain a positioning data packet, and sends the positioning data packet to the positioning device 10 in real time. Any signature method may be used for signing, for example, an ECDSA algorithm or an MD5 algorithm, and in this embodiment, the method is not particularly limited.
After the positioning device 10 receives the positioning data packet, a signature verification algorithm is adopted to verify the positioning data packet, if the signature verification is successful, the two types of GNSS positioning data in the positioning data packet are recorded into a cache, and if the signature verification is successful, the positioning data packet is deleted. Therefore, the safety of the two-class GNSS positioning data can be improved to a certain extent, meanwhile, the complexity of judging the authenticity of the GNSS positioning data can be reduced, and the accuracy and the reliability of the deception identification result are improved.
In order to accurately and quickly determine target trusted data matching a class of GNSS positioning data, in one possible implementation, an acquisition time instant match is introduced. Referring to the figure, step S14 of the GNSS fraud identification method provided by the embodiment of the present invention may be further implemented as: and analyzing the acquisition time of the GNSS positioning data of one class, and judging whether target credible data matched with the GNSS positioning data of one class is determined in the cache based on the acquisition time.
Further, the acquiring time can be used as the intermediate time to determine the matching time period, and whether the two types of GNSS positioning data with the acquiring time within the matching time period exist in the buffer memory is judged, if yes, the two types of GNSS positioning data are used as the target trusted data.
Taking the example that the acquisition time is 0 point 01 minute 02 seconds, and the preset matching time is 1 second, then 0 point 01 minute 1.5 seconds to 0 point 01 minute 2.5 seconds are taken as the matching time period, and the class-II GNSS positioning data with the acquisition time between 0 point 01 minute 1.5 seconds and 0 point 01 minute 2.5 seconds in the cache is taken as the target trusted data. If the second class of GNSS positioning data with the acquisition time between 0 point 01 minutes 1.5 seconds and 0 point 01 minutes 2.5 seconds does not exist in the buffer memory, the credibility of the first class of GNSS positioning data is doubtful.
For step S16, the manner of performing the fraud recognition may be flexibly set, for example, a pre-trained fraud recognition model may be used to process the target trusted data and the GNSS positioning data, or the fraud recognition may be performed according to a preset rule, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment.
In a possible embodiment, referring to fig. 4, step S16 may be further implemented as the following steps.
S161, calculating the positioning range of the target trusted data.
S162, judging whether the positioning position of the GNSS positioning data is within the positioning range of the target credible data. If yes, step S163 is executed, and if no, step S164 is executed.
S163, determining the credibility of the GNSS positioning data as credibility.
S164, determining that the credibility of the GNSS positioning data is not credible.
Calculating the location range of the target trusted data may be related to the amount of the target trusted data.
When the target trusted data is unit data, analyzing the target trusted data to obtain the corresponding position of the target trusted data, and determining the positioning range by taking the corresponding position as the center.
When the target trusted data is a plurality of data, analyzing the corresponding position of each target trusted data, determining the central positions of the corresponding positions, and determining the positioning range by taking the central position as the center.
The manner of determining the center positions of the plurality of corresponding positions may be flexibly set, and for example, the corresponding position having the acquisition time as the intermediate time may be set as the center position, or the average position of the plurality of corresponding positions may be set as the center position.
In one possible embodiment, the center position can be determined in an area formed by a plurality of corresponding positions.
In order to further improve the accuracy of the central position, the environment of the area formed by the corresponding positions can be determined, a road section model of the area formed by the corresponding positions is constructed by combining road section design standards corresponding to the environment, and the central position is determined from the road section model.
For example, when the environment is a mountain area, plain, hilly, high speed or provincial road, the road section design criteria are different, and the information such as the width and shape of the constructed road section model are different, so that the determined center positions are also different. Therefore, the environment is considered when the central position is determined, so that the simulation degree can be improved, and the accuracy of deception identification of GNSS positioning data can be improved.
After the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data is determined, the switch state of the safety positioning switch is obtained, when the switch state is on, the class of GNSS positioning data is used for positioning navigation only under the condition that the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data is credible, and when the switch state is on, the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data is directly used for positioning navigation.
The switch state of the safety positioning switch is preset by a user.
Taking the on-off state of the safety positioning switch of the positioning device 10 as an example, under the condition that the credibility of one type of GNSS positioning data is credible, correcting the one type of GNSS positioning data by using RTK (real time kinematic) resolving data, and carrying out position calculation by combining the corrected one type of GNSS positioning data, vehicle state data and inertial navigation data to obtain the position of the vehicle. And if the credibility of the GNSS positioning data is unreliable or suspicious, sending out a data error prompt.
According to the GNSS deception identification method provided by the embodiment of the invention, the security terminal 30 is introduced, the two types of GNSS positioning data input to the positioning equipment 10 by the security terminal 30 are used as the trusted data, deception identification is carried out on the one type of GNSS positioning data acquired by the positioning equipment 10 by using the trusted data, so that the credibility of the one type of GNSS positioning data is determined, the false detection rate and the omission rate are reduced, the deception prevention capability of a navigation positioning system is improved, and the positioning navigation accuracy is improved.
Based on the same inventive concept as the above-described GNSS fraud recognition method, embodiments of the present invention also provide a GNSS fraud recognition apparatus 40, which GNSS fraud recognition apparatus 40 may be applied to the positioning device 10 in fig. 1. Referring to fig. 5, the gnss fraud recognition apparatus 40 may include a first acquisition module 401, a second acquisition module 402, a first recognition module 403, and a second recognition module 404.
The first acquiring module 401 is configured to periodically acquire a class of GNSS positioning data according to a preset frequency.
The second obtaining module 402 is configured to obtain, when target trusted data matching with one type of GNSS positioning data exists in the buffer, the target trusted data from the buffer.
The target trusted data is two kinds of GNSS positioning data that are acquired by the secure terminal 30 and successfully checked by the positioning device 10.
The first recognition module 403 is configured to perform spoofing recognition on the class of GNSS positioning data based on the target trusted data, so as to obtain the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data.
The second identifying module 404 is configured to put the reliability of the class of GNSS positioning data as in doubt when there is no target reliability data matching the class of GNSS positioning data in the buffer.
In the above-mentioned GNSS fraud recognition apparatus 40, through the synergistic effect of the first acquisition module 401, the second acquisition module 402, the first recognition module 403 and the second recognition module 404, the security terminal is used to acquire the reliable two-class GNSS positioning data to perform fraud recognition on the one-class GNSS positioning data acquired by the positioning device, so that the false detection rate and the omission rate of the GNSS data of the positioning device can be greatly reduced, so as to be helpful to improve the fraud prevention capability and the navigation positioning accuracy of the vehicle-mounted positioning system.
The specific limitation of the GNSS fraud recognition apparatus 40 may be referred to above as limitation of the GNSS fraud recognition method, and will not be described here. The various modules in the GNSS fraud recognition device 40 described above may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, or a combination thereof. The above modules may be embedded in hardware or independent of a processor in the electronic device, or may be stored in software in a memory of the electronic device, so that the processor may call and execute operations corresponding to the above modules.
In one embodiment, an electronic device 50 is provided, the electronic device 50 may be the positioning device 10, and the internal structure thereof may be as shown in fig. 6. The electronic device 50 comprises a processor, a memory, a communication interface and input means connected by a system bus. Wherein the processor of the electronic device 50 is adapted to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the electronic device 50 includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage media. The communication interface of the electronic device 50 is used for communicating with an external terminal in a wired or wireless manner, where the wireless manner may be implemented through WIFI, an operator network, near Field Communication (NFC), or other technologies. The computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the GNSS fraud identification method provided by the above embodiment.
The structure shown in fig. 6 is merely a block diagram of a portion of the structure related to the present invention and does not constitute a limitation of the electronic device 50 to which the present invention is applied, and a specific electronic device 50 may include more or less components than those shown in fig. 6, or may combine some components, or have a different arrangement of components.
In one embodiment, the GNSS fraud recognition device 40 provided by the present invention may be implemented in the form of a computer program that is executable on an electronic device 50 as shown in FIG. 6. The memory of the electronic device 50 may store various program modules constituting the GNSS fraud recognition apparatus 40, such as a first acquisition module 401, a second acquisition module 402, a first recognition module 403, and a second recognition module 404 shown in fig. 5. The computer program of each program module causes the processor to perform the steps in the GNSS fraud identification method described in the present specification.
For example, the electronic device 50 shown in fig. 6 may perform step S12 through the first acquisition module 401 in the GNSS fraud recognition apparatus 40 as shown in fig. 5. The electronic device 50 may perform step S14 through the second acquisition module 402. The electronic device 50 may perform step S16 through the first recognition module 403. The electronic device 50 may perform step S18 through the second recognition module 404.
In one embodiment, an electronic device 50 is provided that includes a memory storing machine executable instructions and a processor that when executing the machine executable instructions performs the steps of: periodically acquiring GNSS positioning data of one class according to a preset frequency; under the condition that target trusted data matched with one class of GNSS positioning data exists in the cache, acquiring the target trusted data from the cache; performing deception identification on the GNSS positioning data based on the target credible data to obtain the credibility of the GNSS positioning data; and under the condition that target credible data matched with the GNSS positioning data does not exist in the buffer memory, the credibility of the GNSS positioning data is set as doubtful.
In one embodiment, a storage medium having a computer program stored thereon is provided, which when executed by a processor, performs the steps of: periodically acquiring GNSS positioning data of one class according to a preset frequency; under the condition that target trusted data matched with one class of GNSS positioning data exists in the cache, acquiring the target trusted data from the cache; performing deception identification on the GNSS positioning data based on the target credible data to obtain the credibility of the GNSS positioning data; and under the condition that target credible data matched with the GNSS positioning data does not exist in the buffer memory, the credibility of the GNSS positioning data is set as doubtful.
In the several embodiments provided in the present invention, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and method may be implemented in other manners. The apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative, for example, flow diagrams and block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of apparatus, methods and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in the flowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function(s). It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved. It will also be noted that each block of the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, can be implemented by special purpose hardware-based systems which perform the specified functions or acts, or combinations of special purpose hardware and computer instructions.
In addition, the functional modules in the embodiments of the present invention may be integrated together to form a single part, or each module may exist alone, or two or more modules may be integrated to form a single part.
The functions, if implemented in the form of software functional modules and sold or used as a stand-alone product, may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention may be embodied essentially or in a part contributing to the prior art or in a part of the technical solution, in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium, comprising several instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method according to the embodiments of the present invention. And the aforementioned storage medium includes: a U-disk, a removable hard disk, a Read-Only Memory (ROM), a random access Memory (RAM, random Access Memory), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, or other various media capable of storing program codes.
The above description is only of the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention, and various modifications and variations may be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. A GNSS fraud identification method, applied to a positioning device, said positioning device being communicatively connected to a secure terminal, said method comprising:
periodically acquiring GNSS positioning data of one class according to a preset frequency;
under the condition that target trusted data matched with the GNSS positioning data exists in the cache, acquiring the target trusted data from the cache; the target trusted data are two-class GNSS positioning data which are acquired by the safety terminal and successfully checked by the positioning equipment;
performing deception identification on the class of GNSS positioning data based on the target credible data to obtain the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data;
and under the condition that target credible data matched with the class of GNSS positioning data does not exist in the buffer memory, the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data is set as doubtful.
2. The GNSS fraud recognition method of claim 1, wherein the step of performing fraud recognition on the class of GNSS positioning data based on the target trusted data to obtain the trustworthiness of the class of GNSS positioning data includes:
calculating the positioning range of the target trusted data;
judging whether the positioning position of the GNSS positioning data is in the positioning range of the target credible data;
if yes, the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data is judged to be credible, and if not, the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data is judged to be not credible.
3. The GNSS fraud identification method of claim 2, wherein the step of calculating a location range of the target trusted data includes:
and when the target trusted data is single data, analyzing the target trusted data to obtain the corresponding position of the target trusted data, and determining a positioning range by taking the corresponding position as a center.
4. A GNSS fraud identification method according to claim 2 or 3, characterised in that the method comprises:
when the target trusted data is a plurality of data, analyzing the corresponding position of each target trusted data;
and determining the central positions of a plurality of corresponding positions, and determining the positioning range by taking the central positions as the center.
5. The GNSS fraud identification method of claim 1, further comprising:
when a positioning data packet sent by the safety terminal is obtained, checking a signature of the positioning data packet; the positioning data packet comprises two types of GNSS positioning data acquired by the safety terminal at the same frequency as the positioning equipment;
and under the condition that the signature verification is successful, extracting the two-class GNSS positioning data from the positioning data packet, and storing the two-class GNSS positioning data into a cache.
6. The GNSS fraud identification method of claim 1, wherein after the step of periodically acquiring a class of GNSS positioning data at a preset frequency, before the step of acquiring the target trusted data from the buffer when there is target trusted data in the buffer that matches the class of GNSS positioning data, the method further comprises:
analyzing the acquisition time of the GNSS positioning data, and judging whether target trusted data matched with the GNSS positioning data is determined in a cache or not based on the acquisition time.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the step of determining whether the target trusted data matching the class of GNSS positioning data is determined in the buffer based on the acquisition time comprises:
determining a matching period by taking the acquisition time as an intermediate time, and judging whether the second class of GNSS positioning data with the acquisition time in the matching period exists in the cache;
if yes, the two kinds of GNSS positioning data are used as target credible data.
8. The GNSS spoofing identification device is characterized by being applied to positioning equipment, wherein the positioning equipment is in communication connection with a secure terminal, and comprises a first acquisition module, a second acquisition module, a first identification module and a second identification module;
the first acquisition module is used for periodically acquiring GNSS positioning data of one type according to preset frequency;
the second obtaining module is configured to obtain, when target trusted data matching the class of GNSS positioning data exists in the cache, the target trusted data from the cache; the target trusted data are two-class GNSS positioning data which are acquired by the safety terminal and successfully checked by the positioning equipment;
the first recognition module is used for performing deception recognition on the class of GNSS positioning data based on the target credible data to obtain the credibility of the class of GNSS positioning data;
the second identifying module is configured to put the reliability of the class of GNSS positioning data as in doubt when there is no target trusted data matching the class of GNSS positioning data in the buffer.
9. An electronic device comprising a processor and a memory, the memory storing machine executable instructions executable by the processor to implement the GNSS fraud identification method of any of claims 1 to 7.
10. A storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the GNSS fraud identification method according to any of claims 1 to 7.
CN202310574060.3A 2023-05-19 2023-05-19 GNSS spoofing identification method, GNSS spoofing identification device, electronic equipment and storage medium Pending CN116609797A (en)

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