CN116528239A - Internet of things software integrity proving method based on super SIM card - Google Patents

Internet of things software integrity proving method based on super SIM card Download PDF

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Publication number
CN116528239A
CN116528239A CN202310280878.4A CN202310280878A CN116528239A CN 116528239 A CN116528239 A CN 116528239A CN 202310280878 A CN202310280878 A CN 202310280878A CN 116528239 A CN116528239 A CN 116528239A
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CN
China
Prior art keywords
sim card
verifier
proving
request
internet
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Pending
Application number
CN202310280878.4A
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Chinese (zh)
Inventor
和建文
孔令南
冯国栋
冯林
李晢燊
傅磊毅
陈洲廷
李涛
张柳凤
钱振东
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China Mobile Group Yunnan Co Ltd
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China Mobile Group Yunnan Co Ltd
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Application filed by China Mobile Group Yunnan Co Ltd filed Critical China Mobile Group Yunnan Co Ltd
Priority to CN202310280878.4A priority Critical patent/CN116528239A/en
Publication of CN116528239A publication Critical patent/CN116528239A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/51—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems at application loading time, e.g. accepting, rejecting, starting or inhibiting executable software based on integrity or source reliability
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3278—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response using physically unclonable functions [PUF]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/40—Security arrangements using identity modules
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/121—Timestamp
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

Abstract

The invention relates to an Internet of things software integrity proving method based on a super SIM card, and belongs to the technical field of computer information remote proving. And generating a control flow graph of the software program by using a dynamic binary instrumentation tool, and measuring the software program through a software integrity measurement formula to obtain a measurement result. After the device receives the request initiated by the verifier, the identity of the verifier is verified through the certification service and the request, and the target program is operated according to the input in the request. And acquiring real-time control flow data of the target program through the runtime tracker and transmitting the control flow data to the super SIM card. The certification report is obtained by PUF, signature and hash operations of the super SIM card, and the certification service then sends the report to the verifier. According to the invention, by using the super SIM card, the Internet of things equipment can effectively carry out remote proof on the software integrity without special hardware, and the cost for implementing the software integrity proof of the Internet of things equipment can be effectively reduced.

Description

Internet of things software integrity proving method based on super SIM card
Technical Field
The invention relates to an Internet of things software integrity proving method based on a super SIM card, and belongs to the technical field of computer information remote proving.
Background
Along with the continuous development of the internet of things technology, the internet of things equipment appears in the aspects of our lives. And these internet of things devices are facing the threat of compromised software integrity. To address these threats, researchers have proposed control flow integrity (CFI, control flow integrity), control flow remote attestation, and the like.
Control flow integrity by analyzing normal control flow of a program, a control flow graph (CFG, control flow graph) of the program is obtained, and the control flow is transferred within a range limited by the control flow graph, so that the integrity of software in running is ensured.
Remote attestation consists of a trusted verifier and one or more resource-constrained attestations. In general, it is the agreement between the verifier and the prover. The verifier obtains a real-time and trusted report from the prover and verifies the software integrity through the report. In remote attestation, the large portion of the computation overhead is passed to the verifier, who only needs to complete the necessary computation effort. Therefore, the remote proving is very suitable for the internet of things equipment with limited resources, the safety can be ensured, and the expenditure of a proving person can be reduced.
Many remote attestation schemes currently require specific hardware, or are based on some specific CPU implementation, which means additional costs for implementing software control flow attestation, which is a significant cost to the internet of things device manufacturer. At present, card-inserted type internet of things equipment widely exists, and a super SIM card can be used as a safety protection technology for software integrity certification, so that the research and development cost of internet of things equipment manufacturers can be reduced, and the super SIM card can be reused as long as the super SIM card is not damaged, so that the cost for implementing software integrity certification is further reduced.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an Internet of things software integrity proving method based on a super SIM card, which is used for solving the technical problems.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows: the Internet of things software integrity proving method based on the super SIM card comprises the following specific steps:
step1: the verifier analyzes the target program, obtains the binary instruction of the target program, the source address of the jump instruction and the destination address of the jump instruction, calculates the binary instruction, the source address of the jump instruction and the destination address of the jump instruction through a measurement calculation formula, obtains the final measurement value of each running path, and stores the measurement value and the corresponding input range on equipment of the verifier.
Step2: the verifier generates a random number, then generates a public-private key for the session from the random number using a key derivation function, and symmetrically encrypts the random number using PUF fingerprint information on the device, and then generates a certification request to be sent to the device.
Step3: after receiving the request, the device firstly checks the freshness of the request, then calculates the integrity protection data according to the data in the request and the super SIM card, and compares whether the integrity protection data is the same as the data in the request, so as to judge whether the identity of the verifier and the request are tampered.
Step4: after the equipment verifies the identity successfully, the target program is operated according to the input in the request, the control flow data of the target program during operation is acquired through the tracker during operation, the acquired data is transmitted to the super SIM card for hash and signature calculation, so that a final proving report is obtained, and the report is sent to a verifier through proving service.
Step5: after receiving the certification report, the verifier checks the certification report to determine the freshness of the report. And then, the digital signature in the proving report is checked by using the session public key, if the signature verification is successful, whether the metric value in the proving report is the same as the legal metric value is continuously checked, if the metric value is the same, the integrity of the software on the proving equipment is not tampered, otherwise, the integrity of the software on the equipment is attacked.
Further, the data obtained by analyzing the target program comprises all binary instructions of the program, source addresses of jump instructions and destination addresses of the jump instructions.
Further, the metric calculation formula is:
H＝H(H dm ,H Sn )
where H () is a hash function, H s Is a static state metric value, H d Is a dynamic metric value, H is a final metric value, I is a binary code of a software program, interception acquisition is performed by a runtime tracker when the program is running, E represents a jump edge in a control flow graph, data in the edge comprises a source address of a jump instruction and a destination address of the jump instruction, and H (0) is an initial hash value, and the interception acquisition is performed by a management departmentSet, typically 0.
Further, the hash algorithm uses the SM3 password hash algorithm supported by the super SIM card, the SM4 block password algorithm supported by the super SIM card and the symmetric encryption algorithm uses the SM2 elliptic curve public key algorithm supported by the super SIM card, and the digital signature algorithm uses the digital signature algorithm in the SM2 elliptic curve public key algorithm supported by the digital signature algorithm.
Further, the verifier is completely trusted, and the certification programs on the device are stored in the readable memory of the device.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows: the method and the system can detect and control two attacks of stream hijacking attack and static attack simultaneously, and combine the super SIM card with the software integrity certification of the Internet of things equipment, so that the Internet of things terminal equipment does not need to add extra special hardware, and can also provide safe encryption and lightweight trust root for the Internet of things equipment through the super SIM card. Because no extra special hardware is needed, the cost of the manufacturers of the Internet of things equipment can be effectively reduced.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a diagram of the overall architecture of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a software integrity remote attestation process of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention will be further described with reference to the drawings and detailed description.
Example 1: as shown in fig. 1, an internet of things software integrity proving method based on a super SIM card comprises the following specific steps:
step1: the verifier analyzes the target program, acquires a binary instruction of the target program, a source address of a jump instruction and a destination address of the jump instruction, calculates through a measurement calculation formula to obtain a final measurement value of each running path, and stores the measurement value and a corresponding input range on equipment of the verifier;
step2: the verifier generates a random number, then generates a public-private key for the session from the random number using a key derivation function, and symmetrically encrypts the random number using PUF fingerprint information on the device, and then generates a certification request to be sent to the device.
Step3: after receiving the request, the equipment firstly checks the freshness of the request, calculates the integrity protection data according to the data in the request and the super SIM card, and compares whether the integrity protection data is the same as the data in the request, so as to judge whether the identity of the verifier and the request are tampered;
step4: after the equipment verifies the identity successfully, operating a target program according to the input in the request, acquiring control flow data of the target program during operation through a tracker during operation, transmitting the acquired data to a super SIM card for hash and signature calculation, thus obtaining a final proving report, and transmitting the report to a verifier through proving service;
step5: after receiving the certification report, the verifier checks the certification report to determine the freshness of the report. And then, the digital signature in the proving report is checked by using the session public key, if the signature verification is successful, whether the metric value in the proving report is the same as the legal metric value is continuously checked, if the metric value is the same, the integrity of the software on the proving equipment is not tampered, otherwise, the integrity of the software on the equipment is attacked.
The data obtained by analyzing the target program comprises all binary instructions of the program, source addresses of jump instructions and destination addresses of the jump instructions.
The measurement calculation formula is as follows:
H＝H(H dm ,H Sn )
where H () is a hash function, H s Is a static state metric value, H d Is a dynamic metric, H is the final metric, I is the binary code of the software program, and is intercepted by the runtime tracker at program runtimeAcquisition, wherein E represents a jump edge in the control flow graph, the data in the edge includes the source address of the jump instruction, the destination address of the jump instruction, and H (0) is an initial hash value, set by the management department, typically 0.
The SM3 password hash algorithm supported by the super SIM card used by the hash algorithm, the SM4 block password algorithm supported by the super SIM card used by the symmetric encryption algorithm and the digital signature algorithm in the SM2 elliptic curve public key password algorithm supported by the super SIM card used by the digital signature algorithm.
The verifier is completely trusted, and the certification programs on the device are stored in the readable memory of the device.
Example 2: based on embodiment 1, as shown in fig. 2, an internet of things software integrity proving method based on a super SIM card, wherein the specific steps of the remote proving are as follows:
step1: the verifier first generates a random number R and encrypts R by means of an SM4 block encryption algorithm to obtain helper data AD, the key used being the fingerprint information FI of the PUF. The verifier then uses the key derivation function KDF to generate a public and private key for the current session through R. Finally, the safety hash function SM3 is used for carrying out hash operation on the program input in, the time stamp T1 and the auxiliary data AD to obtain the integrity protection data IPD. When in hash operation, the random number R generated before is used as salt to be added into the hash operation, so that an attacker can be prevented from changing the data in the authentication request more effectively. Finally, the verifier splices the program input A, the timestamp T1, the auxiliary data AD and the integrity protection data IPD to form a certification request Req, and sends the certification request Req to the equipment.
Step2: after receiving the attestation request from the verifier, the device receives the attestation request from the verifier. The freshness of the time stamp is checked immediately. If the difference between the time stamp and the time when the request was received exceeds a certain threshold, the session is aborted. The device then decrypts the helper data AD using the SM4 packet decryption algorithm and the fingerprint information FI of the PUF to obtain the random number R'. And then generating a public and private key of the session by using the random number and a key derivation function KDF. Then the secure hash function SM3 is used for inputting in and time to the programThe stamp T1, the auxiliary data AD and the random number R 'are subjected to hash operation to obtain integrity protection data IPD'. And then compares whether the IPD and IPD' are the same, and if they are different, aborts the session. The device then executes the application program P using the program input in and obtains the instruction information I used by the target program and the address information of the jump instruction Src by means of the interceptor 0 ,Dest 0 ],···,[Src n ,Dest n ]. The final metric value h of the program is calculated by using the secure hash function SM3 and the metric calculation formula. The device then hashes the timestamp T2 and the final metric value h, and then signs it using the digital signature algorithm of the session private key SK and SM 2. And finally, splicing the timestamp T2, the final metric value h and the digital signature S to form a certification report Rep, and sending the certification report Rep to a verifier.
Step3: after receiving the certification report, the verifier first checks the freshness of the time stamp. If the difference between the time stamp and the time when the report was received exceeds a certain threshold, the session is aborted, proving a failure. The verifier then hashes the timestamp T2 and the final metric value h, and then signs the hash result and the digital signature using the SM2 signing algorithm and the session public key. If the signature verification fails, the signature verification proves failure. Otherwise, judging whether the target software program on the equipment is complete or not and whether the target software program is subjected to control flow hijacking attack or static attack or not by comparing whether the expected measurement value corresponding to the input in the database is the same as the final measurement value in the proving report.
While the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the drawings, the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and various changes can be made without departing from the spirit of the present invention within the knowledge of those skilled in the art.

Claims (5)

1. The method for proving the integrity of the software of the Internet of things based on the super SIM card is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
step1: the verifier analyzes the target program, acquires a binary instruction of the target program, a source address of a jump instruction and a destination address of the jump instruction, calculates through a measurement calculation formula to obtain a final measurement value of each running path, and stores the measurement value and a corresponding input range on equipment of the verifier;
step2: the verifier generates a random number, then generates a public and private key used by the session according to the random number by using a key derivation function, symmetrically encrypts the random number by using PUF fingerprint information on the device, and then generates a certification request and sends the certification request to the device;
step3: after receiving the request, the equipment firstly checks the freshness of the request, calculates the integrity protection data according to the data in the request and the super SIM card, and compares whether the integrity protection data is the same as the data in the request, so as to judge whether the identity of the verifier and the request are tampered;
step4: after the equipment verifies the identity successfully, operating a target program according to the input in the request, acquiring control flow data of the target program during operation through a tracker during operation, transmitting the acquired data to a super SIM card for hash and signature calculation, thus obtaining a final proving report, and transmitting the report to a verifier through proving service;
step5: after receiving the certification report, the verifier checks the certification report to determine the freshness of the report. And then, the digital signature in the proving report is checked by using the session public key, if the signature verification is successful, whether the metric value in the proving report is the same as the legal metric value is continuously checked, if the metric value is the same, the integrity of the software on the proving equipment is not tampered, otherwise, the integrity of the software on the equipment is attacked.
2. The internet of things software integrity proving method based on super SIM card according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the data obtained by analyzing the target program comprises all binary instructions of the program, source addresses of jump instructions and destination addresses of the jump instructions.
3. The internet of things software integrity proving method based on super SIM card as set forth in claim 1, wherein the metric calculation formula is:
H＝H(H dm ,H Sn )
where H () is a hash function, H s Is a static state metric value, H d Is a dynamic metric value, H is a final metric value, I is a binary code of a software program, and is intercepted and obtained by a runtime tracker when the program is running, where E represents a jump edge in a control flow graph, data in the edge includes a source address of a jump instruction, a destination address of the jump instruction, and H (0) is an initial hash value.
4. The internet of things software integrity proving method based on super SIM card according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the SM3 password hash algorithm supported by the super SIM card used by the hash algorithm, the SM4 block password algorithm supported by the super SIM card used by the symmetric encryption algorithm and the digital signature algorithm in the SM2 elliptic curve public key password algorithm supported by the super SIM card used by the digital signature algorithm.
5. The internet of things software integrity proving method based on super SIM card according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the verifier is completely trusted, and the certification programs on the device are stored in the readable memory of the device.
CN202310280878.4A 2023-03-21 2023-03-21 Internet of things software integrity proving method based on super SIM card Pending CN116528239A (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202310280878.4A CN116528239A (en) 2023-03-21 2023-03-21 Internet of things software integrity proving method based on super SIM card

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202310280878.4A CN116528239A (en) 2023-03-21 2023-03-21 Internet of things software integrity proving method based on super SIM card

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN116528239A true CN116528239A (en) 2023-08-01

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Country Status (1)

Country Link
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