CN116390087A - 6G-oriented physical layer key distribution method and electronic equipment - Google Patents
6G-oriented physical layer key distribution method and electronic equipment Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The application provides a 6G-oriented physical layer key distribution method and electronic equipment, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the transmitting user and the receiving user turn to transmit pilot frequency to the opposite side, and estimate the channel respectively to obtain a corresponding transmitting channel estimation sequence and a corresponding receiving channel estimation sequence; based on the transmission channel estimation sequence and the receiving channel estimation sequence, carrying out fuzzy phase extraction to obtain corresponding transmission fuzzy phase information and receiving fuzzy phase information; and according to the sending fuzzy phase information and the receiving fuzzy phase information, the secret key is encrypted and transmitted. The scheme directly uses the incompletely consistent channel characteristics for encryption distribution of the secret key, reduces the probability of unmatched secret keys on the premise of ensuring the safety performance, simultaneously allows users to further improve the anti-noise performance of the secret key distribution process through error correction coding, and reduces the secret key leakage problem caused by the negotiation process.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of communication, and particularly relates to a 6G-oriented physical layer key distribution method and electronic equipment.
Background
With the development of 6G, the application scenario of the wireless communication technology becomes more and more complex, and the flexibility is also higher and higher. The method further promotes the landing and realization of concepts such as the Internet of things, the Internet of vehicles, the smart city and the like. But the security problem of wireless communications has been a hotspot for research due to its broadcast nature.
Today's physical layer security technologies (Physical layer security, PLS) can be broadly divided into two categories, keyed and non-keyed. The keyed PLS scheme generally has two kinds of encryption at a bit level by masking and at a symbol level by phase rotation, and the keyless scheme acquires channel gain and security capacity by means such as beamforming, power allocation, and the like. The artificial noise is a scheme that trades off a small part of the communication performance for the secure capacity, but from an implementation point of view, these artificial noise are generated by pseudo-random number generators, and the number of seeds used by the generators can be considered as a form of key, so the artificial noise scheme can also be understood as a keyed PLS scheme. The frequency hopping technology avoids detection and eavesdropping of an eavesdropper by continuously changing the frequency band used for transmitting signals, and the generation of a frequency hopping path is the same as that of an artificial noise scheme, and a key is needed to be generated.
Key generation or distribution is a critical issue to ensure the validity and security of these schemes. Traditional cryptography provides a public key system for key distribution, the security of which comes from mathematical problems such as discrete logarithm problems (Discrete logarithmproblem, DLP). However, increasing computer power is creating threats and challenges to public key systems.
The wireless channel has the characteristics of space-time uniqueness, space mutual diversity, randomness and the like, so that the wireless channel becomes an ideal random source and can be used for extracting keys. The main current research method is to quantize the channel characteristics to obtain the initial key, but due to the existence of errors, the initial key has certain inconsistency, and the errors in the initial key need to be deleted or corrected through negotiation, the former can cause the decline of the key generation rate, and the latter can leak the key information to an eavesdropper. Such schemes are known as Secret Key Generation (SKG) schemes. In addition, due to the randomness of the wireless channel, the initial key is also random at the beginning of generation, and any error correction codes (Error control coding, ECC) cannot be applied in advance to eliminate errors. At its root, the inconsistency of the initial key becomes a core problem.
Disclosure of Invention
The embodiment of the specification aims to provide a 6G-oriented physical layer key distribution method and electronic equipment.
In order to solve the technical problems, the embodiments of the present application are implemented in the following manner:
in a first aspect, the present application provides a 6G-oriented physical layer key distribution method, where the method includes:
the transmitting user and the receiving user turn to transmit pilot frequency to the opposite side, and estimate the channel respectively to obtain a corresponding transmitting channel estimation sequence and a corresponding receiving channel estimation sequence;
based on the transmission channel estimation sequence and the receiving channel estimation sequence, carrying out fuzzy phase extraction to obtain corresponding transmission fuzzy phase information and receiving fuzzy phase information;
and according to the sending fuzzy phase information and the receiving fuzzy phase information, the secret key is encrypted and transmitted.
In one embodiment, a transmitting user and a receiving user turn to transmit pilot frequencies to each other, and estimate channels respectively to obtain corresponding transmitting channel estimation sequences and receiving channel estimation sequences, including:
the transmitting user obtains a transmitting estimated channel value through a channel estimation method based on a real channel value and transmitting equivalent receiver noise;
the transmission estimation channel values at different moments form a transmission channel estimation sequence;
the receiving user obtains a receiving estimation channel value through a channel estimation method based on a real channel value and receiving equivalent receiver noise;
the received estimated channel values at different times constitute a received channel estimation sequence.
In one embodiment, there is no correlation between the transmit estimated channel values at different times and there is no correlation between the receive estimated channel values at different times.
In one embodiment, performing fuzzy phase extraction based on a transmission channel estimation sequence and a reception channel estimation sequence to obtain corresponding transmission fuzzy phase information and reception fuzzy phase information includes:
the transmission channel estimation sequence and the reception channel estimation sequence respectively determine corresponding transmission illustrative sequences and reception illustrative sequences according to the power threshold value;
obtaining a final illustrative sequence according to the sent illustrative sequence and the received illustrative sequence;
and respectively carrying out phase extraction on the reserved channels by the transmitting user and the receiving user according to the final illustrative sequence to obtain corresponding transmitting fuzzy phase information and receiving fuzzy phase information.
In one embodiment, determining the corresponding transmission illustrative sequence and the corresponding reception illustrative sequence according to the power threshold value respectively by the transmission channel estimation sequence and the reception channel estimation sequence includes:
comparing the amplitude of each transmission estimation channel value in the transmission channel estimation sequence with a power threshold value, marking an indicator value corresponding to the transmission estimation channel amplitude larger than the power threshold value as 1, marking an indicator value corresponding to the transmission estimation channel amplitude smaller than or equal to the power threshold value as 0, and obtaining a transmission indicator sequence;
and comparing the amplitude value of each receiving estimation channel value in the receiving channel estimation sequence with a power threshold value, marking the corresponding oscillography value that the receiving estimation channel amplitude value is larger than the power threshold value as 1, marking the corresponding oscillography value that the receiving estimation channel amplitude value is smaller than or equal to the power threshold value as 0, and obtaining the receiving oscillography sequence.
In one embodiment, obtaining the final illustrative sequence from the transmitted illustrative sequence and the received illustrative sequence includes:
the sending user sends the sending illustrative sequence to the receiving user, and the receiving user carries out AND operation on the sending illustrative sequence and the receiving illustrative sequence to obtain a final illustrative sequence; and the receiving user sends the received illustrative sequence to the sending user, and the sending user performs AND operation on the sent illustrative sequence and the received illustrative sequence to obtain a final illustrative sequence.
In one embodiment, when the encoding is not considered, the encryption transmission of the key according to the sending fuzzy phase information and the receiving fuzzy phase information comprises:
the sending user generates a local key;
the sending user modulates the local key to obtain a modulation symbol;
the sending user carries out phase rotation encryption on the modulation symbol by adopting the fuzzy phase information to obtain an encrypted symbol;
the encrypted symbol is received by a receiving user through a channel to obtain a received signal;
the receiving user adopts the received fuzzy phase information to conduct reverse phase rotation decryption on the received signal, and a decrypted signal is obtained;
receiving a decryption signal demodulated by a user to obtain a secret key;
the sending user calculates a first hash value or a first parity value of the local key;
receiving a second hash value or a second parity value of the user calculation key;
the consistency check is accomplished by sharing the first hash value and the second hash value or sharing the first parity value and the second parity value.
In one embodiment, considering the encoding, the encrypting the key according to the sending fuzzy phase information and the receiving fuzzy phase information includes:
the sending user generates a local key;
the sending user encodes the local key to obtain an encoded local key;
the sending user modulates the coded local key to obtain a modulation symbol;
the sending user carries out phase rotation encryption on the modulation symbol by adopting the fuzzy phase information to obtain an encrypted symbol;
the encrypted symbol is received by a receiving user through a channel to obtain a received signal;
the receiving user adopts the received fuzzy phase information to conduct reverse phase rotation decryption on the received signal, and a decrypted signal is obtained;
receiving a decryption signal demodulated by a user to obtain a coded key;
and decoding the coded key by the receiving user to obtain the key.
In one embodiment, the method further comprises:
the sending user calculates a first hash value or a first parity value of the local key;
receiving a second hash value or a second parity value of the user calculation key;
the consistency check is accomplished by sharing the first hash value and the second hash value or sharing the first parity value and the second parity value.
In a second aspect, the present application provides an electronic device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the physical layer key distribution method as in the first aspect when executing the program.
The technical scheme provided by the embodiment of the present specification can be seen from the following scheme: and extracting fuzzy phase information from the wireless channel, and under the condition that the fuzzy phase information is not completely consistent, performing phase rotation encryption and decryption on the key, directly using the incompletely consistent channel characteristics to encrypt and distribute the key, reducing the probability of unmatched keys on the premise of ensuring the safety performance, simultaneously allowing a user to further improve the anti-noise performance of the key distribution process through error correction coding, and reducing the key leakage problem caused by the negotiation process.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present description or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings that are required in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly described below, it being obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some of the embodiments described in the present description, and that other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.
Fig. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a physical layer key distribution method provided in the present application;
FIG. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a physical layer key distribution method according to the present application;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a signal format of a key encryption distribution stage provided in the present application;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the method of the present application compared to existing CQA and CQG schemes;
FIG. 5 is a graph showing bit error probability of the method according to the present application under different modulation modes;
FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating the secure key rate of the physical layer key distribution method according to the present application in different modulation modes;
fig. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided in the present application.
Detailed Description
In order to make the technical solutions in the present specification better understood by those skilled in the art, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present specification will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present specification, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present specification, not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be made by one of ordinary skill in the art without undue burden from the present disclosure, are intended to be within the scope of the present disclosure.
In the following description, for purposes of explanation and not limitation, specific details are set forth, such as particular system configurations, techniques, etc. in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the present application. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the present application may be practiced in other embodiments that depart from these specific details. In other instances, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, devices, circuits, and methods are omitted so as not to obscure the description of the present application with unnecessary detail.
It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and variations can be made in the specific embodiments of the present disclosure without departing from the scope or spirit of the disclosure. Other embodiments will be apparent to the skilled person from the description of the present application. The specification and examples are exemplary only.
As used herein, the terms "comprising," "including," "having," "containing," and the like are intended to be inclusive and mean an inclusion, but not limited to.
The "parts" in the present application are all parts by mass unless otherwise specified.
In the prior art, the key extraction is usually completed by adopting the processes of sampling, quantizing and negotiating, but the initial key obtained by quantizing is not completely consistent due to the incomplete consistency of the initial channel, and the error bit is deleted or corrected by negotiating means in the traditional scheme, but negotiating also leads to the problems of low key generation rate or key leakage. At its root, the inconsistency of the initial key becomes a core problem.
Based on the defects, the application provides a 6G-oriented physical layer key distribution method, which directly uses the incompletely consistent channel characteristics for encryption distribution of keys without quantization, reduces the influence of legal users on the inconsistency of channel observation, reduces the probability of key mismatch on the premise of ensuring the safety performance, simultaneously allows the users to further improve the anti-noise performance of the key distribution process through error correction coding, and reduces the communication overhead and key leakage problems caused by negotiation.
The invention is described in further detail below with reference to the drawings and examples.
Referring to fig. 1 and 2, a flow diagram of a physical layer key distribution method applicable to the embodiment of the application is shown. As shown in fig. 2, the physical layer key distribution method provided in the present application may be divided into three stages: first stage channel estimation, second stage fuzzy phase extraction and third stage key encryption distribution.
As shown in fig. 1, the physical layer key distribution method may include:
channel estimation phase
S110, transmitting pilot frequency is transmitted to the opposite side by the transmitting user and the receiving user, and the channel is estimated respectively to obtain a corresponding transmitting channel estimation sequence and receiving channel estimation sequence, which may include:
the transmitting user obtains a transmitting estimated channel value through a channel estimation method based on a real channel value and transmitting equivalent receiver noise;
the transmission estimation channel values at different moments form a transmission channel estimation sequence;
the receiving user obtains a receiving estimation channel value through a channel estimation method based on a real channel value and receiving equivalent receiver noise;
the received estimated channel values at different times constitute a received channel estimation sequence.
Wherein, the transmission estimation channel values at different moments are uncorrelated, and the reception estimation channel values at different moments are uncorrelated.
Specifically, let us assume that the sending user and the receiving user are legitimate users Alice and Bob, respectively, abbreviated as a and B.
Alice and Bob send pilot frequencies to each other in turn and estimate the channel. Assuming Bob sends a pilot signal p to Alice, alice receives the signal in the format:
y A，1 ＝h 1p +z A，1
wherein |p| 2 ＝1，h 1 Is the true channel value, z, of the first stage A，1 Is the receiver noise at Alice in the first stage.
By means of the channel estimation method, alice can obtain a transmission estimated channel value, whose value is equal to the superposition of the real channel value and the equivalent receiver noise:
by the same method, bob obtains the received estimated channel value as:
assuming that the real channel obeys a zero-mean complex gaussian distribution with a mean value of 1, i.e
Receiver noise compliance variance sigma 2 Gaussian noise of (i.e.)>
Definition γ=1/σ 2 Is signal-to-noise ratio (SNR); the distribution of the equivalent receiver noise is related to a specific channel estimation method, in which the power of the equivalent noise is identical to the power of the original noise, i.e.)>
In order to extract a sufficient amount of ambiguous phase information, a length-N channel estimation sequence should be prepared
And->
In addition, in order to avoid security degradation caused by channel correlation, the channel estimation values at different times should be uncorrelated, which can be defined by a coherence bandwidth or a coherence time. In addition, channel estimation is not required to be immediately in the subsequent stage in time and can be completed long before key distribution.
In terms of the choice of channel characteristics, the channel characteristics should carry as little information as possible for safety reasons. Since the phase under the rayleigh channel is subject to uniform distribution, the phase becomes a very ideal ambiguity feature. This is also the reason why phase rotation encryption is used in the third stage.
The extracted phase is also affected by noise due to the presence of channel noise. Obviously, when the channel amplitude is larger, the phase noise is smaller, so that the range of the phase noise can be greatly reduced by performing power screening on the sampling channel.
It can be appreciated that the channel sampling in the channel estimation phase, the channels of Alice and Bob at the same time should be as correlated as possible; channels of the same user at different times should be as uncorrelated as possible.
Fuzzy phase extraction stage
S120, based on the transmission channel estimation sequence and the receiving channel estimation sequence, carrying out fuzzy phase extraction to obtain corresponding transmission fuzzy phase information and receiving fuzzy phase information, wherein the method comprises the following steps:
the transmission channel estimation sequence and the reception channel estimation sequence respectively determine corresponding transmission illustrative sequences and reception illustrative sequences according to the power threshold value;
obtaining a final illustrative sequence according to the sent illustrative sequence and the received illustrative sequence;
and respectively carrying out phase extraction on the reserved channels by the transmitting user and the receiving user according to the final illustrative sequence to obtain corresponding transmitting fuzzy phase information and receiving fuzzy phase information.
The method for determining the transmission illustrative sequence and the reception illustrative sequence according to the power threshold value respectively comprises the following steps:
comparing the amplitude of each transmission estimation channel value in the transmission channel estimation sequence with a power threshold value, marking an indicator value corresponding to the transmission estimation channel amplitude larger than the power threshold value as 1, marking an indicator value corresponding to the transmission estimation channel amplitude smaller than or equal to the power threshold value as 0, and obtaining a transmission indicator sequence;
and comparing the amplitude value of each receiving estimation channel value in the receiving channel estimation sequence with a power threshold value, marking the corresponding oscillography value that the receiving estimation channel amplitude value is larger than the power threshold value as 1, marking the corresponding oscillography value that the receiving estimation channel amplitude value is smaller than or equal to the power threshold value as 0, and obtaining the receiving oscillography sequence.
Wherein, according to the sending illustrative sequence and the receiving illustrative sequence, obtaining a final illustrative sequence comprises:
the sending user sends the sending illustrative sequence to the receiving user, and the receiving user carries out AND operation on the sending illustrative sequence and the receiving illustrative sequence to obtain a final illustrative sequence; and the receiving user sends the received illustrative sequence to the sending user, and the sending user performs AND operation on the sent illustrative sequence and the received illustrative sequence to obtain a final illustrative sequence.
Specifically, the input in the phase of fuzzy phase extraction is a channel estimation sequence
And->
Power threshold +.>
Where μ is the normalized power threshold.
Respectively comparing the power of the channel observation sequences by Alice and Bob, reserving channels with power larger than a power threshold value, discarding channels smaller than the power threshold value, and respectively obtaining an illustrative sequence I A And I B . In the illustrative sequence, the reserved channel is noted 1 and the reject channel is noted 0; i.e., alice and Bob respectively calculate an illustrative value of whether the sampled channel amplitude is greater than the power threshold δ:
where x ε { A, B }. The illustrative sequence is I x ＝[I x [1]，I x [2]，...，I x [n]，...，I x [N]]。
Alice and Bob respectively and respectively perform AND operation on the local illustrative sequence and the opposite illustrative sequence to obtainFinal illustrative sequence I 0 . I.e. Alice will have its sequence of representation I A Send to Bob, who will have its sequence I shown B And sending the final sequence to Alice, wherein the two parties obtain the final sequence through AND operation:
i 0 ＝[I[1]，I[2]，...，I[n]，...，I[N]]。
Alice and Bob reserve channels with power greater than the power threshold in both estimates.
According to the final illustrative sequence I 0 Alice and Bob respectively perform phase extraction on the reserved channels to obtain fuzzy phase information phi with length of L A And phi is B I.e. Alice and Bob perform phase extraction Φ according to the final illustrative sequence I0 x ＝{φ x，1 [n]|I 0 [n]=1 }, wherein,
represents->
Is a phase value of (a).
The above-mentioned phase extraction screening process is actually to screen the channel with channel estimation values of both communication parties being greater than the power threshold value, and the number of generated phases L is necessarily smaller than N. The number of phases generated is related to SNR and power threshold δ. Record h 1 Is the modulus of
The probability density function (probability density function, PDF) of the modulus value is:
when h 1 When the time is given, the control unit,
and->
Is m of the modulus of (2) A And m B Obeying the rice distribution, and its cumulative distribution function (cumulative distribution function, CDF) is shown as follows:
wherein Q is 1 (a, b) is a Marcum Q function.
We can derive:
the above formula has been verified through simulation, and the phase information generation ratio at the specified SNR and δ can be calculated by the formula.
Key encryption distribution stage
The previous stage has produced the ambiguous phase information Φ A And phi is B This stage will be used to encrypt the key for transmission. Without loss of generality, suppose Alice is the initiator of the key transmission and Bob is the receiver of the key transmission. The roles of both parties may be interchanged.
S130, encrypting and transmitting the secret key according to the sending fuzzy phase information and the receiving fuzzy phase information.
In one embodiment, when the encoding is not considered, S130 performs encrypted transmission on the key according to the sending ambiguous phase information and the receiving ambiguous phase information, which may include:
the sending user generates a local key;
the sending user modulates the local key to obtain a modulation symbol;
the sending user carries out phase rotation encryption on the modulation symbol by adopting the fuzzy phase information to obtain an encrypted symbol;
the encrypted symbol is received by a receiving user through a channel to obtain a received signal;
the receiving user adopts the received fuzzy phase information to conduct reverse phase rotation decryption on the received signal, and a decrypted signal is obtained;
receiving a decryption signal demodulated by a user to obtain a secret key;
the sending user calculates a first hash value or a first parity value of the local key;
receiving a second hash value or a second parity value of the user calculation key;
the consistency check is accomplished by sharing the first hash value and the second hash value or sharing the first parity value and the second parity value.
In one embodiment, considering the encoding, S130 performs encrypted transmission on the key according to the sending ambiguous phase information and the receiving ambiguous phase information, which may include:
the sending user generates a local key;
the sending user encodes the local key to obtain an encoded local key;
the sending user modulates the coded local key to obtain a modulation symbol;
the sending user carries out phase rotation encryption on the modulation symbol by adopting the fuzzy phase information to obtain an encrypted symbol;
the encrypted symbol is received by a receiving user through a channel to obtain a received signal;
the receiving user adopts the received fuzzy phase information to conduct reverse phase rotation decryption on the received signal, and a decrypted signal is obtained;
receiving a decryption signal demodulated by a user to obtain a coded key;
and decoding the coded key by the receiving user to obtain the key.
When considering coding, the key is obtained without checking or only once.
When checking once, the method further comprises the following steps:
the sending user calculates a first hash value or a first parity value of the local key;
receiving a second hash value or a second parity value of the user calculation key;
the consistency check is accomplished by sharing the first hash value and the second hash value or sharing the first parity value and the second parity value.
Specifically, the transmission process without considering coding includes the steps of:
1) Alice generates a local Key A ；
2) Alice pairs Key A Modulating to obtain a modulation symbol s A ；
3) Alice uses the fuzzy phase information phi A For modulation symbol s A Phase rotation encryption is performed to obtain a transmission symbol (i.e. an encrypted symbol) of
4) The encrypted symbol is received by Bob through a channel, and the Bob received signal is
5) Bob uses its fuzzy phase information Φ B And performing anti-phase rotation decryption on the received signal to obtain a decrypted signal:
6) Bob demodulates the decrypted signal to obtain a Key B ；
7) Alice and Bob calculate Key keys respectively A And Key B The hash value or parity value of (c) and the consistency check is completed through sharing. The verification requires that the deletion or correction of inconsistent bits be accomplished through negotiation.
It should be noted that in the inverse phase rotation decryption formula, it can be seen that symbol recovery is mainly affected by phase noise and receiver noise; the phase information subject to the uniform distribution does not affect the noise subject to the gaussian distribution, i.e
And z B，2 Is uniformly distributed.
Taking QPSK as an example of the modulation scheme, the signal format in the above process is shown in fig. 3, and fig. 3 (a) is a QPSK modulation symbol; FIG. 3 (b) is a phase rotated Alice transmit symbol; FIG. 3 (c) is a Bob received signal; fig. 3 (d) shows QPSK symbols obtained by phase-derotation of Bob.
The transmission process taking into account the coding comprises the following steps:
1) Alice generates a local Key A ；
2) Alice to local Key A Coding to obtain a coded local key Ckey A ＝enc(Key A )；
3) Alice pair Ckey A Modulating to obtain a modulation symbol s A ；
4) Alice uses the fuzzy phase information phi A For modulation symbol s A Phase rotation encryption is performed to obtain a transmission symbol (i.e. an encrypted symbol) of
5) The encrypted symbol is received by Bob through a channel, and the Bob received signal is
6) Bob uses its fuzzy phase information Φ B And performing anti-phase rotation decryption on the received signal to obtain a decrypted signal:
7) Bob demodulates the decrypted signal to obtain an encoded key CKey B ；
8) Bob versus CKey B Decoding to obtain Key B ＝dec(CKey B )。
The transmission process step 8) is followed by no or only one check.
Wherein enc (·) and dec (·) are the encoder and decoder, respectively, of error correction coding.
It will be appreciated that the modulation schemes described above may be selected from QPSK, 8PSK, 16PSK or 8QAM, 16QAM and higher order modulation schemes. When the high-order QAM modulation is adopted, the symbol power can be utilized by an eavesdropper to obtain key information, and in the simulation result of the specific embodiment, the highest key security obtained by the PSK modulation mode can be seen.
The physical layer key distribution method provided by the application extracts fuzzy phase information from the wireless channel, and is used for phase rotation encryption and decryption of the key under the condition that the fuzzy phase information is not completely consistent with the wireless channel. The scheme has the advantages that:
1) Compared with the traditional SKG scheme, the sensitivity of the method for extracting the information from the channels is greatly reduced.
2) Allowing a user to obtain higher fault tolerance performance by performing error correction coding on the secret key; the scheme allows two modes of coding before transmission and negotiating after transmission to achieve consistency of the final key, and has high flexibility.
3) Simulation results show that under the conditions of no coding and consistent key generation rate, the key bit inconsistency rate of the scheme is lower than that of the traditional SKG scheme.
4) Simulation results show that the key generation rate of the scheme is higher under the conditions of no coding and identical key bit inconsistency rate.
5) Simulation results show that under the conditions of no coding and identical key bit inconsistency rate, a higher safety key extraction rate than a QAM modulation mode can be obtained by adopting PSK modulation.
Security analysis and modulation scheme selection
When the power of all points in the constellation diagram of the modulation mode is consistent (such as QPSK, 8PSK and the like), an eavesdropper cannot acquire a real symbol phase in a violent search mode; and because the channels at different moments are not related to each other, an eavesdropper cannot estimate the phase information obeying uniform distribution through a statistical analysis means. In summary, it can be considered an eavesdropperThe phase rotation encryption method cannot be broken. However, when different power points exist in the constellation diagram (such as 8QAM and 16 QAM), an eavesdropper can completely acquire part of information of the symbol through power (a module value), which can pose a certain threat to the security performance of the system. Specifically, for the 8QAM modulation scheme, which includes constellation points of two powers, and each occurrence probability is 1/2, the amount of leakage information is I leak，8QAM ＝2×1/2×(-log 2 (1/2))=1bit; for a 16QAM modulation mode, which comprises three kinds of power star points, the occurrence probability is 1/4,1/2 and 1/4 respectively, and the leakage information quantity is I leak，16QAM ＝2×1/4×(-log 2 (1/4)0+1/2×(-log 2 (1/2))=1.5 bits. Therefore, if the eavesdropper can estimate the modulation symbol power, the 8QAM modulation mode only carries 2bit safety information, which is equivalent to QPSK; the 16QAM modulation scheme carries 2.5bit security information. In practical situations, the eavesdropper is affected by noise, and a certain error exists in the estimation of the symbol power, which may lead to the increase of safety information, and this is discussed and verified in the simulation link.
Experimental simulation
A. Reference index
From the above description we have obtained the amount of phase information L and then encrypt a modulation symbol with one phase information, while a modulation symbol will carry qbits information, if the bits can be transmitted safely, these phases can be considered to have an Lqbits encryption effect according to one-time-pad concept. Such an understanding helps to compare the schemes presented herein with conventional quantization-based SKG schemes. The reference indices are as follows:
(1) Bit generation rate (Bit Generation Rate, BGR). For the conventional SKG scheme, BGR is defined as the average number of keys that can be generated per channel, and in this application, equivalent BGR is defined as:
(2) Bit Error Rate (BER), also known as Bit mismatch Rate (Bit Mismatch Rate, BMR). An error may be considered to have occurred when the keys generated by legitimate users are inconsistent. There is an inevitable error between legitimate users, affected by phase noise and AWGN noise, and the statistical average of this error is noted as BER.
(3) Leakage Entropy (leakage Entropy). The index is mainly aimed at entropy of the high-order QAM modulation mode through constellation power leakage. It is assumed here that an eavesdropper Eve has the same signal-to-noise ratio as Bob and can intercept the screening sequence I A And I B But Eve channels are mutually uncorrelated with legitimate user channels. Eve can obtain information entropy about the key by guessing the channel power: if the guess result is consistent with the real power, the information entropy is considered to be leaked, and the amount of the leaked entropy is related to the ratio of the number of constellation points with the same power to the total number of points. For example, when the outermost constellation point of the 16QAM leaks, the leakage information amount is-log 2 (4/16) =2bits, the amount of intermediate layer leakage information is-log 2 (8/16)＝1bits。
(4) Secure Key Rate (SKR). Skr=bgr-reduced entry. This index characterizes the number of security keys that the system can transmit, which is more important than BGR.
B. Comparison with other SKG protocols
Fig. 4 shows the present application scheme in comparison with existing selection threshold based quantization schemes (Channel Quantization Alternating, CQA) and guard threshold based quantization schemes (Channel Quantization with Guardband, CQG), where bgr=1.02 bits/symbol. The comparative experiments were performed in both cases q=2 and q=4. When q=2, the quantization intervals of the CQA and the CQG are 4 respectively, namely 2bit information is extracted from one channel information, and the FSKG scheme provided by the application adopts QPSK to modulate the secret key; when q=4, there are 16 quantization intervals of CQA and CQG, i.e., 4bit information is extracted from one channel information, and the proposed FSKG scheme modulates the key with 16 PSK. To achieve control variables, the bit generation rates BGR of the three schemes remain strictly consistent. Because the proposal of the application only adopts the phase information as the encryption means, the CQA and CQG technologies only adopt the phase information to extract the key.
Simulation results show that when the signal-to-noise ratio is larger, the scheme provided by the application has lower bit error probability BER than the traditional CQA and CQG technologies.
C. Comparison of different modulation modes
Fig. 5 shows the bit error probability BER of the proposed scheme under different modulation schemes, where bgr=1.02 bits/symbol. It can be seen that the bit error rate of QPSK is lowest and the bit error rate of 16PSK is highest. The curves of 8PSK, 8QAM and 16QAM are relatively close, the BER of 8QAM is the lowest when the signal-to-noise ratio is less than 18dB, and the signal-to-noise ratio of 8PSK is the lowest when the signal-to-noise ratio is greater than 18 dB.
Fig. 6 shows the security key rate SKR of the proposed scheme under different modulation modes, where ber=0.01. BER consistency is achieved by searching for a power filtering threshold. It can be seen that when the signal-to-noise ratio is sufficiently large, the SKR of 8QAM approaches 2bits/symbol and the SKR of 16QAM approaches 2.8bits/symbol. Notably, the PSK curve is always above the QAM curve: within the range of 0-16dB, QPSK has the highest SKR, within the range of 16-23dB, and 8PSK is optimal; above 23dB, 16PSK is optimal.
Fig. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present application. As shown in fig. 7, a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device 700 suitable for use in implementing embodiments of the present application is shown.
As shown in fig. 7, the electronic apparatus 700 includes a Central Processing Unit (CPU) 701, which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to a program stored in a Read Only Memory (ROM) 702 or a program loaded from a storage section 708 into a Random Access Memory (RAM) 703. In the RAM 703, various programs and data required for the operation of the device 700 are also stored. The CPU 701, ROM 702, and RAM 703 are connected to each other through a bus 704. An input/output (I/O) interface 705 is also connected to bus 704.
The following components are connected to the I/O interface 705: an input section 706 including a keyboard, a mouse, and the like; an output portion 707 including a Cathode Ray Tube (CRT), a Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), and the like, a speaker, and the like; a storage section 708 including a hard disk or the like; and a communication section 709 including a network interface card such as a LAN card, a modem, or the like. The communication section 709 performs communication processing via a network such as the internet. The drive 710 is also connected to the I/O interface 705 as needed. A removable medium 711 such as a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a magneto-optical disk, a semiconductor memory, or the like is mounted on the drive 710 as necessary, so that a computer program read therefrom is mounted into the storage section 708 as necessary.
In particular, according to embodiments of the present disclosure, the process described above with reference to fig. 1 may be implemented as a computer software program. For example, embodiments of the present disclosure include a computer program product comprising a computer program tangibly embodied on a machine-readable medium, the computer program comprising program code for performing the physical layer key distribution method described above. In such an embodiment, the computer program may be downloaded and installed from a network via the communication portion 709, and/or installed from the removable medium 711.
The flowcharts and block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in the flowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function(s). It should also be noted that, in some alternative implementations, the functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved. It will also be noted that each block of the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, can be implemented by special purpose hardware-based systems which perform the specified functions or acts, or combinations of special purpose hardware and computer instructions.
The units or modules described in the embodiments of the present application may be implemented by software, or may be implemented by hardware. The described units or modules may also be provided in a processor. The names of these units or modules do not in some way constitute a limitation of the unit or module itself.
The system, apparatus, module or unit set forth in the above embodiments may be implemented in particular by a computer chip or entity, or by a product having a certain function. One typical implementation is a computer. In particular, the computer may be, for example, a personal computer, a notebook computer, a mobile phone, a smart phone, a personal digital assistant, a media player, a navigation device, an email device, a game console, a tablet computer, a wearable device, or a combination of any of these devices. In addition to personal applications, typical implementations of this approach also include wireless terminals or base stations such as sensors, cameras, smart vehicles, smart robotic arms, and AP (Access Point) devices such as WiFi.
It should be noted that the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one … …" does not exclude the presence of other like elements in a process, method, article or apparatus that comprises an element.
In this specification, each embodiment is described in a progressive manner, and identical and similar parts of each embodiment are all referred to each other, and each embodiment mainly describes differences from other embodiments. In particular, for system embodiments, since they are substantially similar to method embodiments, the description is relatively simple, as relevant to see a section of the description of method embodiments.
Claims (10)
1. A 6G-oriented physical layer key distribution method, the method comprising:
the transmitting user and the receiving user turn to transmit pilot frequency to the opposite side, and estimate the channel respectively to obtain a corresponding transmitting channel estimation sequence and a corresponding receiving channel estimation sequence;
based on the transmission channel estimation sequence and the receiving channel estimation sequence, carrying out fuzzy phase extraction to obtain corresponding transmission fuzzy phase information and receiving fuzzy phase information;
and encrypting and transmitting the secret key according to the sending fuzzy phase information and the receiving fuzzy phase information.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the transmitting user and the receiving user turn stream to each other to transmit pilot frequencies, and respectively estimate channels to obtain corresponding transmitting channel estimation sequences and receiving channel estimation sequences, comprising:
the transmitting user obtains a transmitting estimated channel value through a channel estimation method based on a real channel value and transmitting equivalent receiver noise;
the transmission estimation channel values at different moments form the transmission channel estimation sequence;
the receiving user obtains a receiving estimation channel value through a channel estimation method based on a real channel value and receiving equivalent receiver noise;
the received estimated channel values at different instants constitute the received channel estimation sequence.
3. The method of claim 2 wherein there is no correlation between said transmit estimated channel values at different times and there is no correlation between said receive estimated channel values at different times.
4. The method of claim 2, wherein the performing fuzzy phase extraction based on the transmission channel estimation sequence and the reception channel estimation sequence to obtain corresponding transmission fuzzy phase information and reception fuzzy phase information comprises:
the sending channel estimation sequence and the receiving channel estimation sequence respectively determine corresponding sending illustrative sequences and receiving illustrative sequences according to a power threshold value;
obtaining a final illustrative sequence according to the sending illustrative sequence and the receiving illustrative sequence;
and respectively carrying out phase extraction on the reserved channels by the sending user and the receiving user according to the final illustrative sequence to obtain the corresponding sending fuzzy phase information and the corresponding receiving fuzzy phase information.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the transmitting channel estimation sequence and the receiving channel estimation sequence determine corresponding transmitting and receiving illustrative sequences based on power thresholds, respectively, comprising:
comparing the amplitude value of each transmission estimation channel value in the transmission channel estimation sequence with the power threshold value, marking an illustrative value corresponding to the transmission estimation channel amplitude value larger than the power threshold value as 1, marking an illustrative value corresponding to the transmission estimation channel amplitude value smaller than or equal to the power threshold value as 0, and obtaining the transmission illustrative sequence;
and comparing the amplitude value of each receiving estimation channel value in the receiving channel estimation sequence with the power threshold value, marking an illustrative value corresponding to the receiving estimation channel amplitude value larger than the power threshold value as 1, marking an illustrative value corresponding to the receiving estimation channel amplitude value smaller than or equal to the power threshold value as 0, and obtaining the receiving illustrative sequence.
6. The method of claim 4, wherein the deriving a final illustrative sequence from the transmit illustrative sequence and the receive illustrative sequence comprises:
the sending user sends the sending illustrative sequence to a receiving user, and the receiving user carries out AND operation on the sending illustrative sequence and the receiving illustrative sequence to obtain the final illustrative sequence; and the receiving user sends the receiving illustrative sequence to a sending user, and the sending user carries out AND operation on the sending illustrative sequence and the receiving illustrative sequence to obtain the final illustrative sequence.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein said encrypting the key based on said transmit ambiguous phase information and said receive ambiguous phase information irrespective of encoding comprises:
the sending user generates a local key;
the sending user modulates the local key to obtain a modulation symbol;
the sending user adopts the sending fuzzy phase information to carry out phase rotation encryption on the modulation symbol to obtain an encrypted symbol;
the encrypted symbol is received by a receiving user through a channel to obtain a receiving signal;
the receiving user adopts the received fuzzy phase information to conduct reverse phase rotation decryption on the received signal, and a decrypted signal is obtained;
receiving the decryption signal and demodulating the decryption signal by a user to obtain a secret key;
the sending user calculates a first hash value or a first parity value of the local key;
receiving a second hash value or a second parity check value of the key calculated by a user;
consistency checking is accomplished by sharing the first hash value and the second hash value or sharing the first parity value and the second parity value.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein said encrypting the key based on said transmit ambiguous phase information and said receive ambiguous phase information in consideration of encoding comprises:
the sending user generates a local key;
the sending user encodes the local key to obtain an encoded local key;
the sending user modulates the coded local key to obtain a modulation symbol;
the sending user adopts the sending fuzzy phase information to carry out phase rotation encryption on the modulation symbol to obtain an encrypted symbol;
the encrypted symbol is received by a receiving user through a channel to obtain a receiving signal;
the receiving user adopts the received fuzzy phase information to conduct reverse phase rotation decryption on the received signal, and a decrypted signal is obtained;
receiving a key after the decryption signal is demodulated by a user to obtain the key after the encoding;
and decoding the coded key by the receiving user to obtain the key.
9. The method of claim 8, wherein the method further comprises:
the sending user calculates a first hash value or a first parity value of the local key;
receiving a second hash value or a second parity check value of the key calculated by a user;
consistency checking is accomplished by sharing the first hash value and the second hash value or sharing the first parity value and the second parity value.
10. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the physical layer key distribution method of any of claims 1-9 when the program is executed by the processor.
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