CN116370844B - Safety interlocking system for particle accelerator - Google Patents
Safety interlocking system for particle accelerator Download PDFInfo
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- CN116370844B CN116370844B CN202310039469.5A CN202310039469A CN116370844B CN 116370844 B CN116370844 B CN 116370844B CN 202310039469 A CN202310039469 A CN 202310039469A CN 116370844 B CN116370844 B CN 116370844B
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- A—HUMAN NECESSITIES
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- A61N—ELECTROTHERAPY; MAGNETOTHERAPY; RADIATION THERAPY; ULTRASOUND THERAPY
- A61N5/00—Radiation therapy
- A61N5/10—X-ray therapy; Gamma-ray therapy; Particle-irradiation therapy
- A61N5/1048—Monitoring, verifying, controlling systems and methods
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- A—HUMAN NECESSITIES
- A61—MEDICAL OR VETERINARY SCIENCE; HYGIENE
- A61N—ELECTROTHERAPY; MAGNETOTHERAPY; RADIATION THERAPY; ULTRASOUND THERAPY
- A61N5/00—Radiation therapy
- A61N5/10—X-ray therapy; Gamma-ray therapy; Particle-irradiation therapy
- A61N2005/1085—X-ray therapy; Gamma-ray therapy; Particle-irradiation therapy characterised by the type of particles applied to the patient
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Abstract
The invention relates to the technical field of particle accelerator equipment, in particular to a safety interlocking system for a particle accelerator, which aims to solve the problem that the starting operation of the existing accelerator system is inconvenient. For this purpose, the accelerator safety interlocking system of the invention comprises a control cascade lock assembly, a monitoring cascade lock assembly, a field cascade lock assembly and a radiation protection interlocking assembly, wherein part of components in the field cascade lock assembly form equipment operation layer interlocking protection of the accelerator, the rest of components in the field cascade lock assembly form service layer interlocking protection of the accelerator, and the radiation protection interlocking assembly forms radiation safety layer interlocking protection of the accelerator, and the execution priority of the service layer interlocking protection is smaller than that of the radiation safety layer interlocking protection and larger than that of the equipment operation layer interlocking protection. The invention uses different execution priority levels for interlocking protection, and can ensure the stable start and safe operation of the accelerator.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of particle accelerators, and particularly provides a safety interlocking system for a particle accelerator.
Background
Particle accelerators are instruments that use an electric field to propel charged particles to high energies. Particle accelerators are widely used, such as electron linear accelerators for medical applications, proton, heavy ion, boron neutron capture therapy devices, and the like. The particle accelerator mainly comprises proton, heavy ion and boron neutron capture treatment, and the particle accelerator is used for carrying out radiotherapy on tumors by using high-energy charged particles, and is a new and improved treatment technology. The boron neutrons are generated by a neutron source, and the neutron source is a device for generating neutrons by utilizing a high-current proton accelerator to accelerate the bombardment of protons on a heavy metal target. The accelerator is a key device for neutron generation in boron neutron capture therapy (Boron Neutron Capture Therapy, abbreviated as BNCT). While the safety of the accelerator is critical to the overall treatment process and personnel radiation safety.
The control starting process of the existing accelerator is required to be judged by relying on human participation to a great extent, so that the operation requirement on staff is high, and the operation process of the existing accelerator is complicated in the starting process.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the technical problems that the starting operation of the existing accelerator system is complex and the lazy of professionals is high.
To this end, the present invention provides a safety interlock system for a particle accelerator, the safety interlock system for a particle accelerator comprising:
the control level interlocking component is used for executing logic control and data information feedback of different interlocking logics on the accelerator;
the monitoring level interlocking component is connected with the control level interlocking component and is used for data acquisition, remote control and running state monitoring of the accelerator;
the field cascade lock assembly is used for executing corresponding interlocking actions according to different interlocking logics, part of components in the field cascade lock assembly form equipment operation layer interlocking protection of the accelerator, and the rest of components in the field cascade lock assembly form service layer interlocking protection of the accelerator;
the radiation protection interlocking component is connected with the control level interlocking component and forms the radiation safety layer interlocking protection of the accelerator;
the execution priority of the radiation safety layer interlocking protection is greater than that of the service layer interlocking protection, and the execution priority of the service layer interlocking protection is greater than that of the equipment operation layer interlocking protection.
In a preferred embodiment of the above system for particle accelerator safety interlocking, the control cascade lock assembly includes a programmable logic controller.
In the above preferred technical solution for a particle accelerator safety interlock system, the monitoring stage interlock assembly includes a monitoring unit and an acquisition unit;
the monitoring unit is connected with the control level interlocking assembly, and is used for monitoring the interlocking state and the running state of the field cascade lock assembly and displaying corresponding interlocking actions;
the acquisition unit is connected with the field cascade lock assembly and is used for acquiring the running state data of the field cascade lock assembly and transmitting the running state data to the control level interlocking assembly.
In the above preferred technical solution for a particle accelerator safety interlocking system, the monitoring unit includes a server, a display, an industrial personal computer and a switch, where the server, the display, the industrial personal computer and each component in the switch are connected through data communication.
In the above preferred technical solution for a particle accelerator safety interlock system, the field cascade lock assembly includes an ion source and implantation system, a low energy section, a main magnet, a radio frequency system, an extraction probe, a high energy transmission section, a target system, a vacuum system, and an auxiliary system, all connected to the control stage interlock assembly.
In a preferred embodiment of the above-described safety interlock system for a particle accelerator, the ion source and implantation system, the low energy section, the main magnet, the rf system, the extraction probe, the high energy transmission section, the target system, and the vacuum system form the equipment run layer interlock protection for an accelerator, the equipment run layer interlock protection being used to characterize an interlock state inside other components than the auxiliary system and between the components in the field level interlock assembly;
the interlocking state of the equipment operation layer interlocking protection is displayed through the monitoring cascade lock assembly.
In a preferred embodiment of the above-mentioned safety interlock system for a particle accelerator, the auxiliary system includes a cooling system, a compressed air system, and a power supply system;
the cooling system is used for providing a first cooling support for the operation of the accelerator;
the compressed air system is used for providing a compressed gas source and a second cooling support for the operation of the accelerator;
the power supply system is used for providing power support for the operation of the accelerator.
In a preferred embodiment of the above-described safety interlock system for a particle accelerator, the cooling system, the compressed air and the power supply system form the service level interlock protection for an accelerator, the service level interlock protection is configured as an interlock state of the safety detection of the components in the auxiliary system, and the interlock state of the service level interlock protection is displayed and/or checked by the monitoring cascade lock assembly.
In the above-mentioned preferred technical solution for the particle accelerator safety interlock system, the radiation protection interlock assembly includes a high voltage monitoring assembly, a radiation monitoring assembly, a scram button, an audible and visual alarm signal, and a beam measuring assembly;
the high-voltage monitoring component is used for monitoring the high-voltage state of a power supply required by the accelerator;
the radiation monitoring component is used for monitoring the nuclear radiation state of the accelerator;
the emergency stop button is used for carrying out emergency stop on the accelerator when an emergency condition occurs;
the audible and visual alarm component is used for sending out audible and visual alarm signals when any fault state signal and/or interlocking state exists in the accelerator;
the beam measuring component is used for monitoring and/or detecting the state data of the beam in the accelerator.
In a preferred embodiment of the above-described safety interlock system for a particle accelerator, redundancy is provided between the high voltage monitoring assembly, the radiation monitoring assembly, and the emergency stop button and a portion of the components in the field cascade lock assembly by hard wiring and software monitoring.
Under the condition of adopting the technical scheme, the particle accelerator safety interlocking system comprises a control level interlocking component, a monitoring cascade lock component, a field cascade lock component and a radiation protection interlocking component. The control level interlocking assembly is used for carrying out data processing on the system of the accelerator and is responsible for logic control and data information feedback of different interlocking logics; the monitoring cascade lock assembly is connected with the control cascade lock assembly and is used for data acquisition, remote control and running state monitoring of the accelerator; the field cascade lock assembly is connected with the control level interlocking assembly, and executes corresponding interlocking actions according to different interlocking logics, part of components in the field cascade lock assembly form equipment operation layer interlocking protection of the accelerator, and the rest of components in the field cascade lock assembly form service layer interlocking protection of the accelerator. The radiation protection interlock component forms a radiation protection layer interlock protection for the accelerator, wherein to perform prioritization: radiation safety layer interlocking protection > service layer interlocking protection > equipment operation layer interlocking protection. In the invention, the stable starting and safe operation of the accelerator can be ensured effectively by implementing the respective functions of the control level interlocking assembly, the monitoring cascade lock assembly, the field cascade lock assembly and the radiation protection interlocking assembly and by implementing the interlocking protection with different execution priority levels.
Drawings
Preferred embodiments of the present invention are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a configuration for a particle accelerator safety interlock system in accordance with an exemplary embodiment;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating the construction of a monitoring cascade lock assembly and a field cascade lock assembly in accordance with an exemplary embodiment;
FIG. 3 is a safety interlock flow diagram illustrating an accelerator start-up operation in a safety interlock system for an accelerator for boron neutron capture therapy, according to an exemplary embodiment;
FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating an auxiliary system abnormal shut down interlock for use in a particle accelerator safety interlock system, according to one exemplary embodiment;
FIG. 5 is a flow chart illustrating a radiant safety exception shutdown interlock for use in a particle accelerator safety interlock system in accordance with an exemplary embodiment;
FIG. 6 is a flow chart illustrating an ion source and implantation system abnormal shut down interlock in a safety interlock system for an accelerator for boron neutron capture therapy, according to an exemplary embodiment;
FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating an abnormal shutdown interlock for a radio frequency system in a particle accelerator safety interlock system in accordance with one illustrative embodiment;
FIG. 8 is a flow chart illustrating an abnormal shutdown interlock for the extraction probe and the main magnet in a particle accelerator safety interlock system, according to one exemplary embodiment;
FIG. 9 is a flow chart illustrating an abnormal shut down interlock for a vacuum system in a particle accelerator safety interlock system in accordance with one illustrative embodiment;
FIG. 10 is a flow chart illustrating an abnormal shut down interlock for a target system in a particle accelerator safety interlock system according to one exemplary embodiment.
Reference numerals illustrate:
10. controlling the cascade lock assembly; 20. monitoring the cascade lock assembly; 30. a field cascading lock assembly; 40. a radiation protection interlock assembly; 41. a high voltage monitoring assembly; 42. a radiation monitoring assembly; 43. an emergency stop button; 44. an audible and visual alarm component; 45. a beam measuring assembly; 210. a monitoring unit; 220. and an acquisition unit.
Detailed Description
Preferred embodiments of the present invention are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that these embodiments are merely for explaining the technical principles of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.
The invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings in conjunction with the embodiments.
As shown in FIG. 1, an exemplary embodiment of the present invention provides a safety interlock system for a particle accelerator. Included in this one safety interlock system for a particle accelerator is a control level interlock assembly 10, a monitoring cascade lock assembly 20, and a field cascade lock assembly 30.
The control stage interlock assembly 10 is used to perform logic control of the various interlock logic on the accelerator, selectively protecting or shielding the corresponding structure or subsystem in the accelerator. It should be noted that the subsystem may include, but is not limited to, an ion source and implantation system, a low energy section, a main magnet, a radio frequency system, an extraction probe, a high energy transmission section, a target system, a vacuum system, an auxiliary system, etc., wherein the subsystem may also include other involved structures in the accelerator.
Wherein the control level interlock assembly 10 is a logic control system. The starting process or the running process of the accelerator can be logically controlled by the logic control system so as to ensure the safety of the accelerator in the stable starting or running process. For example, an operator may start an accelerator via a logic control system when all of the structures or subsystems in the accelerator meet normal start-up requirements. Or when a subsystem or a structure fails in the operation process of the accelerator, the logic control system rapidly stops the operation of the structure or the component corresponding to the failure signal in the accelerator after receiving the failure signal, or directly controls the stop of the accelerator.
The control cascade lock assembly 10 is also used for data information feedback to various subsystems or structures in the accelerator. For example, the cascade lock assembly 10 is controlled to receive corresponding operation state information of each subsystem or structure of the accelerator, process the corresponding operation state information to form a processing signal, and then feed back the processing signal to the subsystem or structure corresponding to the processing signal in the accelerator.
In one example, the control cascade lock assembly 10 may include, but is not limited to, a programmable logic controller (Programmable Logic Controller, PLC for short). A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) may include a controller module, a controller power module, a digital quantity input signal module, a digital quantity output signal module, an analog quantity input signal module, an analog quantity output signal module, a communication module, and the like.
The controller module may include, but is not limited to, a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU for short), a microprocessor, and the like. The controller module can execute programs set by a user, and the user can realize corresponding functions of the accelerator by writing corresponding control programs, interlocking logic rules and the like.
The controller power module is connected with the controller module and is used for supplying power to the controller module.
The digital quantity input signal module is used for receiving the digital quantity signal, and the digital quantity output signal module is used for outputting the digital quantity signal. The digital quantity input signal module and the digital quantity output signal module are mainly used for controlling working states of equipment such as relays, contactors, electromagnetic valves, indicator lamps and the like in all subsystems in the accelerator.
The analog input signal module is used for receiving analog signals, and the analog output signal module is used for outputting analog signals. The analog input signal module and the analog output signal module are mainly used for controlling equipment needing continuous adjustment, such as voltage, circuits, power, frequency, a regulating valve, a frequency converter, a speed regulator and the like, in each subsystem in the accelerator.
The communication module is used for communication connection between each subsystem in the accelerator and the programmable logic controller, such as optical fiber communication connection. The optical fiber communication connection has the advantages of wide transmission frequency band, large communication capacity, low transmission loss, long relay distance, insulation, strong electromagnetic interference resistance, strong corrosion resistance, strong radiation resistance, strong confidentiality and the like.
With continued reference to FIG. 1, a monitoring stage interlock assembly 20 is coupled to the control cascade lock assembly 10, the monitoring stage interlock assembly 20 being used for data acquisition, remote control and operational status monitoring of the accelerator.
The data collection of the accelerator may include collection of related data of structures to be detected in all subsystems in the accelerator, for example, collection of state information of a power supply in the accelerator, collection of on-off state information of valve bodies arranged in each subsystem, collection of water flow pressure information, collection of temperature information, collection of voltage and current information, collection of angle and radius information in each subsystem, collection of valve body information for control output, collection of state information of emergency stop switches, and collection of other information in the subsystems.
Meanwhile, the monitoring cascade lock assembly 20 can be used for remotely controlling the starting-up, the shutting-down, the emergency shutdown, various fault information monitoring and removal and the like of the accelerator. The reason for the interlocking reaction of the subsystems in the accelerator with each other can also be monitored and displayed by the monitoring-stage interlocking assembly 20, and the equipment can be restored to the allowable operation state by correcting the condition of the interlocking reaction on the monitoring-stage interlocking assembly 20.
On the other hand, the monitoring level interlock assembly 20 may also be used to monitor the operational status of various subsystems of the accelerator, such as the associated cooling temperatures in the cooling system of the accelerator, the current and voltage data of the various subsystems of the accelerator, or the radiant status, high voltage status, etc. information in the accelerator.
With continued reference to FIG. 1, the field level interlock assembly 30 is used to perform corresponding interlock actions according to different interlock logic. For example, when the monitoring level interlock assembly 20 collects certain state data in the accelerator and deviates from the allowable use range, the control cascade lock assembly 10 feeds back a corresponding interlock signal according to the collected corresponding state data information and corresponding interlock logic, and the field cascade lock assembly 30 executes a corresponding interlock action according to the interlock signal. For example, when the water cooling flow rate in the cooling system in the accelerator is too low, or the compressed air temperature is abnormal, the accelerator is stopped.
Wherein some of the components in the field level interlock assembly 30 form a device run layer interlock protection for the accelerator. The equipment run level interlock protection is used to characterize the safety interlock status inside the portion of the components and between the various components in the field cascade lock assembly.
While the remaining components in the field level interlock assembly 30 form a service level interlock protection for the accelerator that is configured as an interlock state for the safety detection condition of the remaining components in the field cascade lock assembly.
With continued reference to fig. 1, a radiation protection interlock assembly 40 is coupled to the control cascade lock assembly 10, the radiation protection interlock assembly 40 forming a radiation protection layer interlock protection for the accelerator. The radiation safety layer interlock protection is used to ensure that the beam does not run in potentially radiation or high voltage safety hazard environments where personnel may be exposed. Wherein the execution priority of the radiation safety layer interlocking protection is the highest priority. That is, the execution priority of the radiation safety layer interlock protection is equal to or greater than the execution priority of the service layer interlock protection, and the execution priority of the service layer interlock protection is greater than the device operation layer interlock protection.
It should be noted that the operation state of the accelerator in this example includes several state mechanisms, such as a shutdown state, a standby state, a ready state, and an operating state, which are mutually converted. Wherein the radiation protection layer is put into a ready state after the interlock protection is ready. And entering a standby state after the service layer interlocking protection is ready. When the accelerator is started, the equipment operation layer is in an operating state after being in preparation for interlocking protection. If the device run level interlock protection is abnormal, the accelerator is rolled back to a standby state. Regardless of whether the accelerator is in an operating state or a standby state, the accelerator immediately returns to a ready state upon occurrence of an abnormality in service layer interlock protection. Whether the accelerator is in an operating state or a standby state or a ready state, the accelerator is immediately retracted to a shutdown state once an abnormality occurs in the radiation safety layer interlock protection.
In the particle accelerator safety interlocking system of the embodiment, the cascade lock assembly 10 is controlled to process data of the accelerator system and is responsible for logic control and data information feedback of different interlocking logics; the monitoring level interlock assembly 20 is used for data acquisition, remote control and running state monitoring of the accelerator; the field cascade lock assembly 30 may perform corresponding interlocking actions according to different interlocking logic, wherein a portion of the components in the field level interlock assembly 30 form a device run level interlock protection for the accelerator and the remaining portion of the components in the field level interlock assembly 30 form a service level interlock protection for the accelerator. The radiation protection interlock assembly 40 forms a radiation safety layer interlock protection for the accelerator to perform prioritization: radiation safety layer interlocking protection > service layer interlocking protection > equipment operation layer interlocking protection. That is, the present example can ensure that the accelerator is effectively smoothly started and safely operated by the implementation of the respective functions of the control stage interlock assembly 10, the monitoring cascade lock assembly 20, the field cascade lock assembly 30, and the radiation protection interlock assembly 40.
As shown in fig. 2, in some embodiments, the monitoring cascade lock assembly 20 includes a monitoring unit 210 and a collection unit 220.
A monitoring unit 210 is coupled to the control level interlock assembly 10, the monitoring unit 210 being configured to monitor the interlock status and the operational status of the field cascade lock assembly 30 and to display the corresponding interlock actions or interlock status between the various subsystems. The monitoring unit 210 may be composed of a server, a display, an industrial personal computer, a switch, and the like. All components in the server, the display, the industrial personal computer and the switch are connected through data communication. It should be noted that, the monitoring unit 210 formed by the above devices may adopt a connection manner in the prior art, only the corresponding devices may be connected by data, and may be in data communication, and the specific connection manner is not described herein.
The acquisition unit 220 may include, but is not limited to, a sensor. The number of the collection units 220 is plural, and the collection units 220 have different collection functions, for example, the collection units 220 may include a temperature sensor, a humidity sensor, a displacement sensor, a current detection sensor, a voltage detection sensor, a pressure sensor, a flow sensor, a torque sensor, a magnetic switch, a proximity switch, a photoelectric sensor, an optical fiber sensor, a micro switch, an intelligent sensor, etc., so as to complete collection of data to be monitored or detected in each subsystem in the accelerator. That is, the collecting unit 220 using different collecting functions may collect the operation state information, the detection state information, the fault state information, etc. of each subsystem of the accelerator and transmit the operation state information, the detection state information, the fault state information, etc. of each subsystem to the programmable logic controller. Alternatively, the collection unit 220 is configured to collect the operational status data of the field cascade lock assembly 30 and transmit the operational status data to the control cascade lock assembly 10.
It should be noted that the number of the acquisition units 220 may be greater than the number of the accelerator subsystems.
In this embodiment, monitoring of the interlock status and the operational status of the respective subsystems, structures, or field tandem lock assembly 30 of the accelerator may be achieved by the monitoring unit 210, and the corresponding interlock actions or interlock status between the respective subsystems of the accelerator may also be displayed. Meanwhile, the collecting unit 220 may be used to collect the operation state information, detection state information and fault state information of each subsystem in the accelerator, or collect the operation state data of the field cascade lock assembly 30, and transmit the information or data to the control cascade lock assembly 10, so that the control level interlock assembly 10 performs calculation analysis on the information or data, feeds back corresponding interlock logic signals, and finally receives corresponding interlock logic signals through the field cascade lock assembly 30 and performs corresponding interlock actions, thereby effectively ensuring stable start and safe operation of the accelerator and improving the success rate of one-key start of the accelerator.
As shown in fig. 2, in some embodiments, the in-situ cascade lock assembly 30 may include, but is not limited to, an ion source and implantation system, a low energy section, a main magnet, a radio frequency system, an extraction probe, a high energy transmission section, a target system, a vacuum system, and an auxiliary system.
The ion source and the ion source in the injection system are used for generating ions of a required type and extracting proton beam current from the ions, and the ion source and the injection system in the injection system are used for injecting the proton beam current into the accelerator for the accelerator to use.
It should be noted that the state data to be detected or monitored in the ion source and the implantation system may include, but is not limited to, an on state of a water flow and gas flow switch, a high-voltage cabinet lock-up state, a deflection power on state, an implantation beam (implantation of proton beam) stop state, a deflector power on state, an ion source gate valve on state, and the like. When any detected or monitored state data has faults or deviations, the operation of the ion source and the injection system can be stopped through manual operation of a display and the like, or the operation of the ion source and the injection system can be automatically controlled through a programmable logic controller.
Meanwhile, in the one-key starting process of the accelerator, the sequential interlocking checking flow aiming at the ion source and the injection system is as follows: the water flow and air flow switch is opened, the high-voltage cabinet is locked, the deflection power supply is opened, the injection beam (injection of proton beam) is stopped, the deflector power supply is opened, and the ion source gate valve is opened.
The current sensor arranged in the low-energy section is used for detecting the running states of equipment such as a radio frequency system, an ion source, an injection system and the like. The current sensor arranged in the high-energy transmission section is used for detecting the operation state of the high-energy section equipment.
The main magnet is used for providing stable magnetic field environment for the operation of the accelerator. Status data that needs to be monitored in the main magnet may include, but is not limited to, whether the power source is ramped up to a set point or not.
The radio frequency system is used for providing an accelerating electric field for particles, and meanwhile, the electric field in the accelerator is kept stable through feedback control.
The state data that needs to be detected or monitored in the rf system may include, but is not limited to, a cooling fan on state, a filament power on state, a grid power on state, a screen power on state, a driver power on state, etc.
Meanwhile, in the one-key starting process of the accelerator, the sequential interlocking checking flow for the radio frequency system is as follows: the method comprises the steps of starting a cooling fan, starting filament power, starting a power grid power supply, starting a screen electrode power supply, starting a screen power supply and starting a driver power supply.
Status data in the lead probe that needs to be detected or monitored may include, but is not limited to, azimuth and radius interlock status. And in the one-key starting process of the accelerator, the interlocking checking flow for the leading-out probe is as follows: the azimuth and radius interlocking state is normal.
The target system is a core component of the particle generator, and can bombard the target surface of the target system by utilizing high-energy ion beam to generate fusion reaction and release high-energy particles. Status data that needs to be detected or monitored in the target system may include, but is not limited to, target temperature up-to-standard status, water cooling flow up-to-standard status, water cooling valve open status, etc. In the one-key starting process of the accelerator, the sequential interlocking checking flow for the target system is as follows: target temperature reaches standard, water cooling flow reaches standard, and the water cooling valve is opened.
The vacuum system provides a vacuum environment for the operation of the accelerator. The state data to be detected or monitored in the vacuum system may include, but is not limited to, a main vacuum cavity pressure standard state, an injection line vacuum pressure standard state, a beam line vacuum pressure standard state, an ion source vacuum pressure standard state, an extraction probe vacuum pressure standard state, and the like. In the one-key starting process of the accelerator, the sequential interlocking checking flow for the vacuum system is as follows: the main vacuum cavity pressure is up to standard, the injection line vacuum pressure is up to standard, the beam line vacuum pressure is up to standard, the ion source vacuum pressure is up to standard, and the extraction probe vacuum pressure is up to standard.
Auxiliary systems may include, but are not limited to, cooling systems, compressed air systems, and power supply systems.
The cooling system is used to provide a first cooling support for the operation of the accelerator. Wherein the first cooling support may be cooled with water or with a high temperature liquid alloy. That is, the subsystem or structure of the accelerator that needs to be cooled may be cooled using a cooling medium in a cooling system, where the cooling medium may include, but is not limited to, water or a high temperature liquid alloy (e.g., a high temperature liquid lead bismuth alloy, etc.).
The compressed air system is used to provide a source of compressed gas and a second cooling support for operation of the accelerator. Wherein the second cooling support may be cooled with gas or air. The power supply system is used for providing power required by strong current, weak current and the like for each subsystem or structure in the accelerator.
The state data that needs to be detected or monitored in the auxiliary system may include, but is not limited to, a water pipe leakage state, a current detection state, a compressed air temperature state, a compressed air pressure state, and the like. In the process of starting the accelerator by one key, the sequential interlocking checking flow for the auxiliary system is as follows: the water pipe has no leakage, normal current detection, normal compressed air temperature and normal compressed air pressure.
Referring to fig. 3, in the process of one-key start of the accelerator, the sequential interlock checking flow for each subsystem in the accelerator is sequentially: auxiliary system, vacuum system, radio frequency system, ion source and implantation system, extraction probe, main magnet and target system. The auxiliary system and each subsystem sequentially pass through the interlocking inspection, and then the accelerator can be started, so that the accelerator can be smoothly and stably started by one key, and the safe operation of the accelerator is ensured.
In this embodiment, the ion source, the implantation system, the low energy section, the main magnet, the rf system, the extraction probe, the high energy transmission section, the target system, and the vacuum system form an equipment run layer interlock protection for the accelerator. Wherein the equipment run layer interlock protection is used to characterize the safety interlock status within and between the various components of the field level interlock assembly other than the auxiliary system. That is, the equipment run layer interlock protection is used to characterize the interlock state of the ion source with the interior of each of the components in the implantation system, low energy section, main magnet, radio frequency system, extraction probe, high energy transmission section, target system, and vacuum system, as well as the interlock state between any two or more components. For example, whether the vacuum pressure reaches the standard, whether the current meets the use requirement after the power is turned on, and the like.
The device run level interlock protection may prevent security protection after the accelerator enters an improper or potentially damaging state. The interlocking state and the interlocking reason generated in the interlocking protection of the running layer of the equipment can be checked through a monitoring interface such as a display in the monitoring unit 210, the condition causing the interlocking reaction can be corrected through the monitoring unit 210, and after the condition causing the interlocking reaction is corrected, the corresponding structure or subsystem generating the interlocking reaction can be restored to the allowable operation state.
While the cooling system, the compressed air system and the power supply system in the auxiliary system form an interlocking protection for the service layer of the accelerator. The service level interlock protection is configured to assist in the interlock state of the safety detection conditions of the components in the system, such as whether the valve body is open and closed, whether the water flow state is normal, whether the water pressure state is normal, whether the air pressure state is normal, whether the power-on condition is normal, and the like. Namely, whether the cooling system, the compressed air system and the power supply system are all in a safe use state in the starting process of the accelerator, when the detected or monitored state data in any system is abnormal or out-of-range, the cascade lock assembly 10 is controlled to acquire the abnormal or out-of-range state data and feed back corresponding interlocking signals, and after the cooling system or the compressed air system or the power supply system receives the corresponding interlocking signals, corresponding interlocking actions are executed to perform interlocking protection on the starting of the accelerator.
In one example, if the water used in the accelerator has been completely deionized, the control stage interlock assembly 10 may acquire water pipe leakage information or current leakage information and then feed back a corresponding water pipe leakage signal or current leakage signal, and the water cooling system in the service stage interlock protection receives the water pipe leakage signal to cut off the waterway, or the power supply system receives the current leakage signal to cut off the circuit, preventing serious consequences, and effectively protecting the accelerator.
In another example, some of the structures in the accelerator, such as the rf coupler, resonator and beamformer, and the injection quadrupoles are cooled by compressed air, with a flow switch provided in the corresponding control circuit for each structure. When the pressure of the compressed air is low or the air flow is insufficient, the control level interlocking assembly 10 feeds back corresponding interlocking signals, and the service level interlocking protection finishes corresponding interlocking protection, so that the accelerator cannot continue to operate, and the accelerator is effectively protected.
The status of the interlock protection generated by the water pipe leakage signal, the current leakage signal, the flow signal of the compressed air, or the like may be displayed on the maintenance panel of the corresponding cooling system, the power supply system, or the compressed air system, and may be checked or corrected by the respective maintenance panels.
In the above embodiment, the execution priority of the service layer interlock protection is greater than the execution priority of the device operation layer interlock protection. That is, in the one-key starting process of the accelerator, the service layer interlocking protection flow is executed first, that is, the auxiliary system is detected or monitored correspondingly, and when the related state data in the auxiliary system are all normal, the equipment layer interlocking protection flow is executed again, so that each subsystem of the accelerator is detected or monitored correspondingly, the starting or running of the accelerator is protected well, and the safe running coefficient of the accelerator is improved.
Referring to fig. 1, in some embodiments, the radiation protection interlock assembly may include, but is not limited to, a high voltage monitoring assembly 41, a radiation monitoring assembly 51, a scram button 43, an audible and visual alarm assembly 44, and a beam monitoring assembly 80.
The high voltage monitoring assembly 41 is used to monitor the high voltage condition of the power supply required by the accelerator.
The radiation monitoring assembly 51 is used to monitor the nuclear radiation status of the accelerator.
The emergency stop button 43 is used to make an emergency stop for the accelerator when an emergency situation occurs during the start-up or operation of the accelerator, which affects the safety of the accelerator or the safety of personnel.
The audible and visual alarm assembly 44 is configured to emit an audible and visual alarm signal based on any fault condition signal and/or interlock condition. When any factor causing personnel injury exists in the accelerator, such as any interlocking state or fault state exists in high voltage, beam current and the like, the programmable logic controller sends out an alarm signal, and the audible and visual alarm component 44 sends out a warning after receiving the alarm signal so as to remind a worker to timely process or correct the corresponding interlocking state or fault state. Wherein audible and visual alarm assembly 44 may include, but is not limited to, a buzzer, audible and visual alarm, and the like.
The beam measuring assembly 45 is used for monitoring and/or detecting the state data of the beam in the accelerator to ensure the stability of the operation state of the accelerator.
That is, the high voltage monitoring assembly 41, the radiation monitoring assembly 51, the scram button 43, the audible and visual alarm assembly 44, and the beam measuring assembly 45 form an interlock protection for the radiation safety layer of the accelerator. The radiation safety layer interlock protection is used to ensure that the beam does not run in potentially radiation or high voltage safety hazard environments where personnel may be exposed.
Wherein redundancy is formed between the high voltage monitoring assembly 41, the radiation monitoring assembly 51, the emergency stop button 43, the audible and visual alarm assembly 44 and the beam measuring assembly 45 and the parts in the field cascade lock assembly 30 by hard wiring and software monitoring. Specifically, the high voltage monitoring assembly 41, the radiation monitoring assembly 51, the emergency stop button 43, the audible and visual alarm assembly 44 and the beam measuring assembly 45 can be designed in a redundant control manner of hard wiring and software monitoring with an ion source and an injection system, a high voltage power supply and the like, and once workers are exposed to radiation or high voltage dangerous conditions, the programmable logic controller can immediately cut off the power supply of the ion source and the equipment such as the injection system, the high voltage power supply and the like so as to ensure personal safety of the workers.
Referring to FIG. 4, in one example, service level interlock protection is performed on the auxiliary system when in a first abnormal state, wherein the accelerator is shut down and an audible and visual alarm indication is issued by audible and visual alarm assembly 44. The first exception state may include, but is not limited to: too low water cooling flow, too high current or tripping, insufficient compressed air pressure, abnormal compressed air temperature, power-on faults and the like.
Referring to fig. 5, in one example, when a second abnormal condition exists, a radiation safety layer interlock protection is performed to protect the accelerator, wherein protecting the accelerator includes shutting down the ion source and the implantation system, shutting down the high voltage power supply, and issuing an alarm signal through the audible and visual alarm assembly 44. The second abnormal state may include, but is not limited to: scram, personnel detection abnormality under high pressure, exceeding of radiation detection, etc.
Referring to fig. 6, in one example, when a third abnormal condition exists, the ion source is de-energized from the implantation system and an audible and visual alarm indication is provided by audible and visual alarm assembly 44. The third abnormal state may include, but is not limited to: water cooling temperature is too high, water flow does not reach the standard, a high-voltage cabinet is not locked, a deflection power supply fault, an ion source gate valve fault and the like.
Referring to FIG. 7, in one example, when a fourth abnormal condition exists, the radio frequency system is powered down and an audible and visual alarm indication is issued by audible and visual alarm assembly 44. The fourth abnormal state may include, but is not limited to, cooling fan failure, filament power failure, grid power failure, screen power failure, driver power failure, and the like.
Referring to FIG. 8, in one example, when a fifth abnormal condition exists, the lead probe is deactivated or the primary magnet is de-energized and an audible and visual alarm indication is provided by audible and visual alarm assembly 44. The fifth abnormal state may include, but is not limited to, azimuthal failure, radius failure, or magnet power failure, etc.
Referring to fig. 9, in one example, when a sixth abnormal condition exists, the ion source is shut down from the ion source, the injection line and the beam line in the implantation system and an audible and visual alarm indication is issued by audible and visual alarm assembly 44. The sixth abnormal state may include, but is not limited to, a vacuum system outage, a vacuum level deterioration, a vacuum pump failure, etc.
Referring to fig. 10, in one example, when a seventh abnormal condition exists, the target system is abnormally shut down, in which the ion source is shut down simultaneously with the ion source, injection line and beam line in the implantation system, and an audible and visual alarm indication is issued by audible and visual alarm assembly 44. The seventh abnormal state may include, but is not limited to, too high a target temperature, too high a target water cooling temperature, too high or too low a target water cooling pressure, too low a target water cooling flow, abnormal opening of the target water cooling valve, and the like.
In the above embodiments, the radiation safety layer interlock protection, the equipment operation layer interlock protection, and the service layer interlock protection collectively constitute a safety interlock system for an accelerator. The execution priority of the radiation safety layer interlocking protection is the highest priority, the execution priority of the service layer interlocking protection is the next, and finally the equipment operation layer interlocking protection is executed. In addition, a redundant design, an optimal cut-off design and a failure safety design are adopted between each subsystem and a safety interlocking system in the accelerator, and the subsystem can be started and operated only after the safety interlocking conditions are met in the radiation safety layer interlocking protection, the service layer interlocking protection and the equipment operation layer interlocking protection; or when any interlocking state exists in the accelerator, the interlocking state needs to be cleared or corrected, and the accelerator can be started only after the required safety condition is met.
In this embodiment, by using the execution of the safety interlocking system, the safety interlocking system of the accelerator is realized, and the accelerator can be effectively ensured to automatically detect various operation data in the start-stop process and the operation process, so that the automatic adjustment and the safety protection of the accelerator are realized, the automatic linkage control of the accelerator is realized, and meanwhile, the function of one-key starting can be realized, the operation of the accelerator is safer and simpler, and the accelerator product is more mature.
Thus far, the technical solution of the present invention has been described in connection with the preferred embodiments shown in the drawings, but it is easily understood by those skilled in the art that the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited to these specific embodiments. Equivalent modifications and substitutions for related technical features may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the principles of the present invention, and such modifications and substitutions will fall within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. A safety interlock system for a particle accelerator, comprising:
the control level interlocking component is used for executing logic control and data information feedback of different interlocking logics on the accelerator;
the monitoring level interlocking component is connected with the control level interlocking component and is used for data acquisition, remote control and running state monitoring of the accelerator;
the monitoring-stage interlocking assembly comprises a monitoring unit and an acquisition unit; the monitoring unit is connected with the control level interlocking assembly, and is used for monitoring the interlocking state and the running state of the field cascade lock assembly and displaying corresponding interlocking actions; the acquisition unit is connected with the field cascade lock assembly and is used for acquiring the running state data of the field cascade lock assembly and transmitting the running state data to the control level interlocking assembly;
the field cascade lock assembly is used for executing corresponding interlocking actions according to different interlocking logics, part of components in the field cascade lock assembly form equipment operation layer interlocking protection of the accelerator, and the rest of components in the field cascade lock assembly form service layer interlocking protection of the accelerator;
the field cascade lock assembly comprises an ion source and injection system, a low-energy section, a main magnet, a radio frequency system, an extraction probe, a high-energy transmission section, a target system, a vacuum system and an auxiliary system which are all connected with the control level interlocking assembly; the ion source and implantation system, the low energy section, the main magnet, the radio frequency system, the extraction probe, the high energy transmission section, the target system and the vacuum system form the equipment operation layer interlocking protection for an accelerator, and the equipment operation layer interlocking protection is used for representing the interlocking states of the insides of other parts except the auxiliary system and among the parts in the field level interlocking assembly; the interlocking state of the equipment operation layer interlocking protection is displayed through the monitoring level interlocking component; the auxiliary system comprises a cooling system, a compressed air system and a power supply system; the cooling system is used for providing a first cooling support for the operation of the accelerator; the compressed air system is used for providing a compressed gas source and a second cooling support for the operation of the accelerator; the power supply system is used for providing power support for the operation of the accelerator; the cooling system, the compressed air and the power supply system form the service level interlock protection for an accelerator, the service level interlock protection is configured as an interlock state of a safety detection condition of each component in the auxiliary system, and the interlock state of the service level interlock protection is displayed and/or checked by the monitoring cascade lock assembly;
the radiation protection interlocking component is connected with the control level interlocking component and forms the radiation safety layer interlocking protection of the accelerator;
the radiation protection interlocking assembly comprises a high-voltage monitoring assembly, a radiation monitoring assembly, a scram button, an audible and visual alarm assembly and a beam monitoring assembly;
the high-voltage monitoring component is used for monitoring the high-voltage state of a power supply required by the accelerator;
the radiation monitoring component is used for monitoring the nuclear radiation state of the accelerator;
the emergency stop button is used for carrying out emergency stop on the accelerator when an emergency condition occurs;
the audible and visual alarm component is used for sending out audible and visual alarm signals when any fault state signal and/or interlocking state exists in the accelerator;
the beam measuring component is used for monitoring and/or detecting the state data of the beam in the accelerator;
the execution priority of the radiation safety layer interlocking protection is greater than that of the service layer interlocking protection, and the execution priority of the service layer interlocking protection is greater than that of the equipment operation layer interlocking protection.
2. The safety interlock system for a particle accelerator of claim 1 wherein the control cascade lock assembly comprises a programmable logic controller.
3. The safety interlock system for a particle accelerator of claim 1 wherein the monitoring unit comprises a server, a display, an industrial personal computer, and a switch, wherein the components of the server, the display, the industrial personal computer, and the switch are connected by data communication.
4. The safety interlock system for a particle accelerator of claim 1, wherein redundancy is provided between the high voltage monitoring assembly, the radiation monitoring assembly, and the emergency stop button and a portion of the components in the field cascade lock assembly by hard wiring and software monitoring.
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