CN116366241B - Decentralised Ethernet timing transaction privacy protection execution method - Google Patents

Decentralised Ethernet timing transaction privacy protection execution method Download PDF

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CN116366241B
CN116366241B CN202310111345.3A CN202310111345A CN116366241B CN 116366241 B CN116366241 B CN 116366241B CN 202310111345 A CN202310111345 A CN 202310111345A CN 116366241 B CN116366241 B CN 116366241B
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transaction
contract
timed
follower
leader
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CN116366241A (en
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李超
刘菁钰
孙睿
王伟
段莉
刘吉强
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Beijing Jiaotong University
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    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
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Abstract

The invention provides a decentralised Ethernet timing transaction privacy protection execution method. The method comprises the following steps: the leader plans a timing trade, creates an agent contract and a supplementary contract locally, and deploys the agent contract by using the timing trade funds; the follower sends the timing transaction payload and transaction funds to the agent contract, informing the agent contract that a new follower is joining, and the follower waits for timing transaction; the committee members recruited by the leader perform timed transactions for the followers in both the active and passive modes using agent contracts and supplemental contracts. The method of the present invention protects the private elements of the timing transaction, ensuring that they will not be revealed until a set future time period, maintains different pieces of the decryption key of the timing transaction using the committee recruited in the blockchain network until a specified future time period, and invokes the proxy smart contract to perform the scheduled transaction for the specified time period to trigger a change in blockchain state for the required time period.

Description

Decentralised Ethernet timing transaction privacy protection execution method
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of blockchain Ethernet workshops, in particular to a method for performing decentralized Ethernet timed transaction privacy protection.
Background
The distributed blockchain ethernet established in 2014 has so far had millions of users, in the class ethernet blockchain supporting smart contracts, allowing not only transfer transactions but also deployment and invocation transactions of smart contracts, but all such transactions are public and visible to all, which is very disadvantageous for some transactions. For some time-sensitive transactions, it is necessary to control their execution time and to be able to obtain their execution time accurately.
The timing transaction is used as a service capable of executing the transaction in a time period selected by a user and changing the state of the blockchain, and the user can accurately control and obtain the execution time of the sensitive transaction, so that the private element in the planned transaction is protected.
Currently, blockchain ethernet timing transaction techniques and tools in the prior art can be divided into two categories, a centralization method and a decentralization method, respectively. For the centralization approach, such approach is highly centralized, requiring a high level of trust of the user to the company. In existing decentralization methods, the ethernet alarm clock project proposes to recruit ethernet accounts to trigger a redeployment contract to invoke a target contract within a specified period of time. However, this solution does not protect sensitive elements well nor guarantee the execution of transactions.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a decentralised Ethernet timing transaction privacy protection execution method, which is used for realizing a timing transaction execution method which is safe, extensible, privacy-protecting and cost-effective.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the present invention adopts the following technical scheme.
An execution method for protecting privacy of a decentralised Ethernet timing transaction comprises the following steps:
the leader plans a timing trade, creates an agent contract and a supplementary contract locally, and deploys the agent contract by using the timing trade funds;
the follower sends its timed transaction payload and transaction funds to the proxy contract informing the proxy contract that a new follower is joining, the follower waiting for a timed transaction;
the committee member recruited by the leader performs a timed transaction for the follower using the proxy contract and the supplemental contract in both the active and passive modes.
Preferably, the leader schedules a timed transaction, creates a proxy contract and a supplemental contract locally, deploys the proxy contract using the timed transaction funds, comprising:
leader U l Creating proxy contract C locally p Supplement contract C s Deployment of proxy contracts using timed transacted funds C p Deployed proxy contract C p Notification bulletin board smart contract C b Current block number b n And proxy contract address addr (C) p ) Leader U l From bulletin board contract C b Acquisition b n A complete list R of block registration executives;
leader U l Generating a service key pair<pk u ，sk u >Pseudo random number r≡vh (sk) u ，addr(C b )||b n ) And corresponding verification pi≡VP (sk) u ，addr(C b )||b n ) The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the And R from the complete list of executives R H(r，i)％|R| Begin selecting the first available actor as member E in Committee E i Leader U l Informing bulletin board contract C b Timing transaction timer, pk in key pair u { pi, r, b for the production Committee n Three parameters { l, t, n }, contract address addr (C) p ) And committee E details;
leader U l Sk in key pair according to (t, n) -threshold secret sharing method u Segmentation into n shared segments { s ] 1 ，...，s n Each segment s i Iterative encryption using l public keys belonging to different executives is required, each fragments i All become an onion o i ；
Leader U l Through the private extra-strand channel, will be defined by pk u Encrypted timed transaction payload, addr (C p )||C s And corresponding signature vrs u And all onions o are sent to committee E;
committee member E i By pk of a given key pair u And { pi, r, b n Verifying r, using r and b n Validating Committee E, if r or E is invalid, committee Member E i Invoking an invalid () function to let bulletin board contract C b Validating r and selected E j If r or member E j Is verified as invalid, leader U l Is to be transferred to E i And cancel the leader U l Is the lead U l Blacklisting.
Preferably, the timing transaction payload is data carried by the transaction at the appointed time, and comprises three basic elements of transaction type, transaction amount and transaction data; the timing transaction funds refer to a certain amount of Ethernet coins which can meet the transaction amount, are required to be protected under a specified time period and are transferred along with the occurrence of timing transaction; the timed transaction timer represents a future period of time for which the timed transaction is scheduled to be released.
Preferably, said follower sends its timed transaction payload and transaction funds to said proxy contract informing the proxy contract that a new follower is joining, said follower waiting for a timed transaction, comprising:
in service request pool mode, follower U f Sending its timed transaction payload to C by calling the following () function p Notification C p With new follower added, follower U f Transfer also the Ethernet coin to C p The follower waits for a timed transaction;
in service request pool mode, follower U f Use of its pk u Encrypting its timed transaction payload and transmitting the encrypted payload data to committee E, the follower waiting for a timed transaction;
in the negative mode, any account in the ethernet house reports the leaked key pair by calling a function named leak ()Indicate +.>
Preferably, the aggressive mode path is a default execution path in which no improper behavior occurs, the user summons a committee accounting for a timed transaction at the cost of O (n), and the committee only needs the cost of O (1) to execute the prescribed timed transaction;
the service request pool mode path allows users who do not wish to consume excessive fees to voluntarily join a service request pool to become followers, and a committee recruited by a leader of the service request pool will execute the timing transaction of the followers in the same time period after executing the timing transaction of the leader, so that the cost of the follower users is reduced from O (n) to O (1).
Preferably, the recruited committee member of the leader performs a timed transaction of the follower using the agent contract and the supplemental contract in a positive mode and a negative mode, comprising:
in the active mode:
committee member E i Disclosing keys they hold to each other through out-of-chain channels
Committee member E i Decrypting and recovering as many fragments s as possible i Forming a key s ’ ；
If more than t available fragments are restored, the executor restores sk u Decrypting the timed transaction payload of the leader and the timed transaction payload of the follower, and calling the execute () function to execute all transactions so that the protocol is successfully completed; otherwise, the protocol cannot be executed in a timed transactionThe stage is successfully executed;
in the passive mode:
committee member E i Proxy contract C by calling depth () function p Deployment of supplemental contract C s Converting execution paths from active mode to passive mode, supplementing contract C s Automatically becomes a supervising entity W, the execution of which or the request of reporting functions is prioritized;
within a short time window, an executor in Committee E needs to display C using the function real () s S, upload s i Formation of s ’ ；
Detection of any deletionsAfterwards, the supervision authority W calls the missing () function to report such inappropriate behavior;
any false detectionThe supervision authority W then calls the fake () function to report this inappropriate behaviour;
if more than t available fragments are recovered, the supervision board W recovers sk u， Decrypting the timed transaction payload of the leader and the timed transaction payload of the follower, and calling the execute () function to execute all transactions, wherein the protocol is successfully executed, otherwise, the execution fails.
As can be seen from the technical solution provided by the above embodiments of the present invention, the present invention protects the private element of a timing transaction by using a method for performing a decentralised timing transaction that combines threshold secret sharing and smart contracts, ensuring that it will not be revealed until a set future time period, maintains different pieces of the decryption key of the timing transaction by using committees recruited in the blockchain network before the specified future time period, and invokes the proxy smart contract to perform the scheduled transaction for the specified time period to trigger a change in the blockchain state for the required time period.
Additional aspects and advantages of the invention will be set forth in part in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of the invention.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings required for the description of the embodiments will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a transaction transmission model according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an execution path model according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a timing diagram of an embodiment of an implementation of a method for performing decentralized Ethernet timing transaction privacy protection;
fig. 4 is a specific process flow diagram of an implementation method for protecting privacy of a decentralized ethernet timing transaction according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
Embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals refer to the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions throughout. The embodiments described below by referring to the drawings are exemplary only for explaining the present invention and are not to be construed as limiting the present invention.
As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an", "the" and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless expressly stated otherwise, as understood by those skilled in the art. It will be further understood that the terms "comprises" and/or "comprising," when used in this specification, specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements, and/or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, and/or groups thereof. It will be understood that when an element is referred to as being "connected" or "coupled" to another element, it can be directly connected or coupled to the other element or intervening elements may also be present. Further, "connected" or "coupled" as used herein may include wirelessly connected or coupled. The term "and/or" as used herein includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that, unless otherwise defined, all terms (including technical and scientific terms) used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. It will be further understood that terms, such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries, should be interpreted as having a meaning that is consistent with their meaning in the context of the prior art and will not be interpreted in an idealized or overly formal sense unless expressly so defined herein.
For the purpose of facilitating an understanding of the embodiments of the invention, reference will now be made to the drawings of several specific embodiments illustrated in the drawings and in no way should be taken to limit the embodiments of the invention.
The embodiment of the invention provides a brand new combination of a threshold key sharing scheme and an intelligent contract, which can protect the privacy of all elements of all types of transactions in a specified time. In order to better protect private elements and reduce the cost of executing intelligent contracts, the invention adopts a brand new combination of a threshold secret sharing method and an agent intelligent contract, completely separates four key components of the timing transaction, adopts three timing transaction execution paths, and realizes a timing transaction execution method which is safe, extensible, privacy-protecting and cost-effective.
In order to better protect private elements and reduce the cost of executing intelligent contracts, the invention adopts a brand new combination of a threshold secret sharing method and an agent intelligent contract, completely separates four key components of the timing transaction, adopts three timing transaction execution paths, and realizes a timing transaction execution method which is safe, extensible, privacy-protecting and cost-effective.
The embodiment of the invention provides a system model of an execution method of a decentralised timing transaction, which comprises two parts, namely a transaction sending model and an execution path model.
The structure of a transaction transmission model provided by the embodiment of the invention is shown in figure 1. The transaction sending model comprises four key components, namely a timed transaction external account, a timed transaction payload, timed transaction funds and a timed transaction timer, wherein the timed transaction external account is an external account triggering timed transaction release in a specified time period; the timing transaction payload is data carried by the transaction at the appointed time, and comprises three basic elements of transaction type, transaction amount and transaction data; the timing transaction funds refer to a certain amount of Ethernet coins which can meet the transaction amount, are required to be protected under a specified time period and are transferred along with the occurrence of timing transaction; the timed transaction timer represents a future period of time, e.g., a start block number and an end block number, for which the timed transaction is scheduled to be released.
The transaction delivery model is used to recruit a set of external accounts into an execution committee and to commonly maintain timed transaction payloads through threshold secret sharing. More specifically, the user generates a pair of keys, encrypts the timed transaction payload with one of the keys, and divides the other key into n portions for escrow with one or more external accounts prior to a specified period of time. And in a specified time period, the executives restore the key decrypted timed transaction payload together, and call the proxy intelligent contract to execute the timed transaction.
The structure of an execution path model provided by the embodiment of the invention is shown in fig. 2. The invention sets three execution paths through the execution path model, which are respectively: the system comprises a positive mode, a negative mode and a service request pool mode, wherein a positive mode path is a default execution path, no improper behavior occurs in the mode, a user reminds a committee accounting for a timing transaction at the cost of O (n), and the committee only needs the cost of O (1) to execute the specified timing transaction; the passive mode path is only used to replace the active mode path when improper behavior occurs, which may sacrifice the O (n) cost of committee to perform prescribed timed transactions to counteract the improper behavior; the service request pool mode path allows users who do not wish to consume excessive fees to voluntarily join a service request pool to become followers, and a committee recruited by a leader of the service request pool will execute the timing transaction of the followers in the same time period after executing the timing transaction of the leader, so that the cost of the users of the followers is reduced from O (n) to O (1).
The execution timing diagram of the decentralized ethernet timing transaction privacy protection execution method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is shown in fig. 3, and the specific processing flow is shown in fig. 4, and includes the following processing steps:
step S1: a timing transaction planning stage;
the leader plans a timing trade, creates an agent contract and a supplementary contract locally, and deploys the agent contract by using the timing trade funds;
step S2: a timing transaction waiting stage;
the follower sends its timed transaction payload and transaction funds to the proxy contract informing the proxy contract that a new follower is joining, the follower waiting for a timed transaction;
step S3: and (3) timing the execution stage of the transaction.
The committee member recruited by the leader performs a timed transaction for the follower using the proxy contract and the supplemental contract in both the active and passive modes.
Each step is specifically described as follows:
1) The step S1 specifically comprises the following steps:
s11 leader U l Creating proxy contract C locally p Supplement contract C s Deployment of proxy contracts using timed transacted funds C p . Deployed proxy contract C p Immediately informing a bulletin board smart contract C b Current block number b n And contract address addr (C) p ) The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the At the same time, leader U l From bulletin board contract C b Acquisition b n The block registers the complete list R of executives.
S12: leader U l Generating a service key pair<pk u ，sk u >Pseudo random number r≡vh (sk) u ，addr(C b )||b n ) And corresponding verification pi≡VP (sk) u ，addr(C b )||b n ) The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the And R from the complete list of executives R H(r，i)％|R| Begin selecting the first available actor as member E in Committee E i Finally, the leader U l Informing bulletin board contract C b Timing transaction timer, pk in key pair u { pi, r, b for the production Committee n Three parameters { l, t, n }, contract address addr (C p ) Committee E, etc.
S13: leader U l Sk in key pair according to (t, n) -threshold secret sharing method u Segmentation into n shared segments { s ] 1 ，...，s n }. Each segment s i It is necessary to use one public key belonging to a different executor for iterative encryption, so that each segment s i Can be changed into an onion o i 。
S14: leader U l Through the private extra-strand channel, will be defined by pk u Encrypted timed transaction payload, addr (C p )||C s And corresponding signature vrs u And all onions o were sent to committee E.
S15: committee member E i By pk of a given key pair u And { pi, r, b n Verifying r, then using r and b n Authentication committee E. If r or E is invalid, committee member E i Can call an invalid () function to let bulletin board contract C b Validating r and selected E j . If r or member E j Is verified as invalid, leader U l Is to be transferred to E i And cancel its transaction and blacklist it.
2) The step S2 includes the operation in the service request pool mode and the passive mode, and specifically includes the following steps:
s21 (service request pool mode): follower U f Sending its timed transaction payload to C by calling the following () function p Thereby (a)Notification C p New followers are added. Furthermore, follower U f It is also necessary to transfer small amounts of Ethernet chips to C p . The function of floor () is contained in Cp and is an application function in Cp that functions to store an address in Cp.
S22 (service request pool mode): follower U f Use of its pk u Encrypt its timed transaction payload and transmit the encrypted payload data to committee E.
3) S23 (in passive mode): any account in the ethernet bridge can report the leaked key pair by calling a function named leak ()And indicates +.>The leak () function is contained in Cp and is an application function in Cp. The step S3 includes two phases of operation in the active mode and the passive mode, specifically including the steps of:
s31 (first stage-active mode): committee member E i Disclosing their held keys to each other through out-of-chain channels
S32 (first stage-active mode): committee member E i Decrypting and recovering as many fragments s as possible i Forming a key s ’ 。
S33 (first stage-active mode): if more than t available fragments are restored, the executor restores sk u Decrypting the leader's timed transaction payload and follower's timed transaction payload and invoking the execute () function to execute all transactions so that the protocol completes successfully. Otherwise, the protocol cannot be successfully executed in the timing transaction execution stage, so that the second stage is shifted to continue execution.
S34 (second phase-passive mode): committee member E i Proxy contract C by calling depth () function p Deployment of supplemental contract C s The execution path is switched from the active mode to the passive mode. Supplement contract C s Automatically becomes a supervising authority W whose execution in the remaining steps or request of reporting function is prioritized, while other committee members E i Must wait for a short time allocated to W. The reply () function is contained in Cp and is an application function in Cp. S35 (second phase-passive mode): within a short time window, an executor in Committee E needs to display C using the real () function s S, correctly upload s i Formation of s ’ . The real () function is contained in Cs and is an application function in Cs.
S36 (second phase-passive mode): detection of any deletionsThereafter, the supervising authority W calls the missing () function to report such inappropriate behavior. The missing () function is contained in Cs and is an application function in Cs.
S37 (second phase-passive mode): any false detectionThereafter, the supervisor W calls the fake () function to report such inappropriate behavior.
S38 (second phase-passive mode): if more than t available fragments are recovered, the supervision board W recovers sk u， Decrypting the timed transaction payload of the leader and the timed transaction payload of the follower, and calling the execute () function to execute all transactions, wherein the protocol is successfully executed, otherwise, the execution fails.
In summary, the embodiment of the invention adopts the new combination of the threshold secret sharing mechanism and the intelligent contract to completely separate four key components of the timing transaction, realizes the complete decentralization of the timing transaction structure, adopts three timing transaction execution paths, reduces the cost of carrying out the timing transaction through a service request pool mode, ensures the execution of the timing transaction through two stages of the transaction execution stages, realizes a safe, extensible, privacy-protecting and cost-effective timing transaction execution method, protects the effective load information of the timing transaction, and ensures that the timing transaction can be smoothly carried out in a designated time period.
The advantages of the present invention will be discussed in terms of its safety and performance.
Security analysis
(1) The committee member cannot directly obtain the timed transaction payload. During the time transaction planning phase, the user generates a key pair<pk u ，sk u >By means of a key pk u Encrypt the timed transaction payload and use a threshold secret sharing mechanism to encrypt sk u The method comprises the steps of encrypting the file into a plurality of fragments and then delivering the encrypted fragments to committee members for preservation; during the timing transaction implementation phase, the committee member recovers the key sk u The timed transaction payload is decrypted and the timed transaction is performed, so that in a three-stage process performed by the method, the timed transaction payload is cryptographically protected.
(2) The malicious committee members cannot prevent execution of the timed transaction. During the timed transaction waiting phase, the committee member may report that it was compromised via the leak () functionThereby indicating the corresponding +.>Does not have the compromised ∈>The committee member's guard. In the first phase of the timing transaction execution phase, if there is not enough key fragment to recover Sk u Then go to the second stage of the execution stage, the committee member deploys the supplemental contract C s And automatically establishes a committee, calls a real () function to recover the key Sk u A timed transaction is performed. Theoretically, the committee has only one honest member to ensure the smooth execution of the timing transaction, so the execution of the timing transaction is protected.
On the premise that four components of the timing transaction are completely separated and the timing transaction load is encrypted, the system can discover improper behaviors through committee members and punish the improper behaviors, so that the information security of the timing transaction effective load is ensured and the smooth proceeding of the timing transaction is ensured.
Performance analysis
The system has the service request pool mode, which allows the user to join the existing pool as the follower of the leader, thus avoiding the Ethernet spending generated by the summoning committee and greatly reducing the Ethernet spending generated by the user executing the timing transaction.
Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that: the drawing is a schematic diagram of one embodiment and the modules or flows in the drawing are not necessarily required to practice the invention.
From the above description of embodiments, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the present invention may be implemented in software plus a necessary general hardware platform. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present invention may be embodied essentially or in a part contributing to the prior art in the form of a software product, which may be stored in a storage medium, such as a ROM/RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, etc., including several instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the method described in the embodiments or some parts of the embodiments of the present invention.
In this specification, each embodiment is described in a progressive manner, and identical and similar parts of each embodiment are all referred to each other, and each embodiment mainly describes differences from other embodiments. In particular, for apparatus or system embodiments, since they are substantially similar to method embodiments, the description is relatively simple, with reference to the description of method embodiments in part. The apparatus and system embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the elements illustrated as separate elements may or may not be physically separate, and the elements shown as elements may or may not be physical elements, may be located in one place, or may be distributed over a plurality of network elements. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment. Those of ordinary skill in the art will understand and implement the present invention without undue burden.
The present invention is not limited to the above-mentioned embodiments, and any changes or substitutions that can be easily understood by those skilled in the art within the technical scope of the present invention are intended to be included in the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention should be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims (4)

1. An execution method for protecting privacy of a decentralised Ethernet timing transaction is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the leader plans a timing trade, creates an agent contract and a supplementary contract locally, and deploys the agent contract by using the timing trade funds;
the follower sends its timed transaction payload and transaction funds to the proxy contract informing the proxy contract that a new follower is joining, the follower waiting for a timed transaction;
the committee member recruited by the leader performs a timed transaction for the follower using the proxy contract and the supplemental contract in a positive mode and a negative mode;
the leader schedules a timed transaction, creates a proxy contract and a supplemental contract locally, deploys the proxy contract using timed transaction funds, comprising:
leader U l Creating proxy contract C locally p Supplement contract C s Deployment of proxy contracts using timed transacted funds C p Deployed proxy contract C p Notification of bulletin board contract C b Current block number b n And proxy contract address addr (C) p ) Leader U l From bulletin board contract C b Acquisition b n A complete list R of block registration executives;
leader U l Generating a service key pair<pk u ，sk u >Pseudo random number r≡vh (sk) u ，addr(C b )||b n ) And corresponding verification pi≡VP (sk) u ，addr(C b )||b n ) The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the And R from the complete list of executives R H(r，i)％|R| Begin selecting the first available actor as member E in Committee E i Leader U l Informing bulletin board contract C b Timing transaction timer, pk in key pair u { pi, r, b for the production Committee n Three parameters { l, t, n }, contract address addr (C) p ) And committee E details;
leader U l Sk in key pair according to (t, n) -threshold secret sharing method u Segmentation into n shared segments { s ] 1 ，...，s n Each segment s i Iterative encryption using l public keys belonging to different executives is required, each fragment s i All become an onion o i ；
Leader U l Through the private extra-strand channel, will be defined by pk u Encrypted timed transaction payload, addr (C p )||C s And corresponding signature vrs u And all onions o are sent to committee E;
committee member E i By pk of a given key pair u And { pi, r, b n Verifying r, using r and b n Validating Committee E, if r or E is invalid, committee Member E i Invoking an invalid () function to let bulletin board contract C b Validating r and selected E j If r or member E j Is verified as invalid, leader U l Is to be transferred to E i And cancel the leader U l Is the lead U l Black listing;
the committee member recruited by the leader performing a timed transaction for the follower using the proxy contract and the supplemental contract in a positive mode and a negative mode, comprising:
in the active mode:
committee member E i Disclosing keys they hold to each other through out-of-chain channels
Committee member E i Decrypting and recovering as many fragments s as possible i Forming a key s ’ ；
If more than t available fragments are restored, the executor restores sk u Decrypting the timed transaction payload of the leader and the timed transaction payload of the follower, and calling the execute () function to execute all transactions so that the protocol is successfully completed; otherwise, the protocol cannot be successfully executed in the timing transaction execution stage;
in the passive mode:
committee member E i Proxy contract C by calling depth () function p Deployment of supplemental contract C s Converting execution paths from active mode to passive mode, supplementing contract C s Automatically becomes a supervising entity W, the execution of which or the request of reporting functions is prioritized;
within a short time window, an executor in Committee E needs to display C using the function real () s S, upload s i Formation of s ’ ；
Detection of any deletionsAfterwards, the supervision authority W calls the missing () function to report such inappropriate behavior;
any false detectionThereafter, the supervisor W calls the fake () function to report such mishapBehavior;
if more than t available fragments are recovered, the supervisor W recovers sk u， Decrypting the timed transaction payload of the leader and the timed transaction payload of the follower, and calling the execute () function to execute all transactions, wherein the protocol is successfully executed, otherwise, the execution fails.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the timed transaction payload is data carried by the transaction at a specified time, including three basic elements of transaction type, transaction amount, and transaction data; the timing transaction funds refer to a certain amount of Ethernet coins which can meet the transaction amount, are required to be protected under a specified time period and are transferred along with the occurrence of timing transaction; the timed transaction timer represents a future period of time for which the timed transaction is scheduled to be released.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the follower sends its timed transaction payload and transaction funds to the proxy contract informing the proxy contract that a new follower is joining, the follower waiting for a timed transaction, comprising:
in service request pool mode, follower U f Sending its timed transaction payload to C by calling the following () function p Notification C p With new follower added, follower U f Transfer also the Ethernet coin to C p The follower waits for a timed transaction;
in service request pool mode, follower U f Use of its pk u Encrypting its timed transaction payload and transmitting the encrypted payload data to committee E, the follower waiting for a timed transaction;
in the negative mode, any account in the ethernet house reports the leaked key pair by calling a function named leak ()Indicate +.>
4. A method according to claim 3, wherein the aggressive mode path is a default execution path in which no improper behavior occurs, the user commits a committee accounting for a timed transaction at the cost of O (n), and the committee only requires the cost of O (1) to execute a prescribed timed transaction;
the service request pool mode path allows users who do not wish to consume excessive fees to voluntarily join a service request pool to become followers, and a committee recruited by a leader of the service request pool will execute the timing transaction of the followers in the same time period after executing the timing transaction of the leader, reducing the cost of the follower users from O (n) to O (1).
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