CN116340331A - Large instrument experimental result evidence-storing method and system based on blockchain - Google Patents
Large instrument experimental result evidence-storing method and system based on blockchain Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN116340331A CN116340331A CN202310316124.XA CN202310316124A CN116340331A CN 116340331 A CN116340331 A CN 116340331A CN 202310316124 A CN202310316124 A CN 202310316124A CN 116340331 A CN116340331 A CN 116340331A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- ipfs
- experimental
- blockchain
- verification
- data
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 45
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 10
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 4
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 36
- 238000002474 experimental method Methods 0.000 claims description 23
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 11
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000002452 interceptive effect Effects 0.000 abstract description 2
- 238000013500 data storage Methods 0.000 description 6
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000011160 research Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000010200 validation analysis Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000013524 data verification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000013523 data management Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000009795 derivation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
- 150000002170 ethers Chemical class 0.000 description 1
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012384 transportation and delivery Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
- G06F16/20—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor of structured data, e.g. relational data
- G06F16/23—Updating
- G06F16/2379—Updates performed during online database operations; commit processing
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
- G06F16/20—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor of structured data, e.g. relational data
- G06F16/27—Replication, distribution or synchronisation of data between databases or within a distributed database system; Distributed database system architectures therefor
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D10/00—Energy efficient computing, e.g. low power processors, power management or thermal management
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Data Mining & Analysis (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a large instrument experimental result evidence-storing method and system based on a blockchain. And secondly, the experimenter and the verifier carry out interactive transmission of related information through the intelligent contract. The experimenter and the verifier then generate a shared secret by the diffie-hellman method through the obtained coefficients, and the experimenter uses the shared secret to encrypt and store the private key in the IPFS. And finally, the experimenter transmits the IPFS hash address, the verifier acquires an encrypted private key in the IPFS, and the encrypted private key is decrypted through the shared secret to verify the data and verify the data. The system mainly comprises a network layer, a service layer and a user layer. The network layer forms the basis of the framework, the service layer handles the core functions, and the user layer provides the user with a front-end interface for interaction with the system. The invention provides a safe, transparent and efficient way for ensuring the authenticity and the integrity of experimental data.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of blockchain, in particular to a blockchain-based large instrument experimental result evidence storage method and system.
Background
Government has greatly promoted the progress of scientific research on the promotion of technological development, the sharing of large-scale instruments, innovation coupons and other subsidy policies. However, the problem of validating and storing experimental data remains a challenge. The traditional data storage mode is easy to tamper, lose data and leak data, and the safety and the integrity of the data are difficult to ensure.
Systems and methods using blockchain and IPFS (interstrand file system) techniques provide a solution to this problem. By storing the certificates on the blockchain, the experimental data is stored encrypted on the IPFS, ensuring that the experimental data is stored in a secure, decentralized and non-tamperable manner. This provides researchers and innovators with transparent and non-tamperable experimental data and verification result records.
In addition, by using the blockchain and IPFS technology, related processes can be reserved, experimental results of large instruments can be saved, and privacy and safety can be protected. The experimental data can be encrypted using a powerful and efficient algorithm such as AES (advanced encryption standard) to ensure access only by authorized parties.
Subsequent development may also be facilitated by providing researchers and innovators with a platform for sharing experimental data and collaborative research projects. The use of blockchain and IPFS techniques provides a transparent and trustworthy platform that encourages open collaboration and promotes innovation.
The traditional large instrument experiment result management and storage has the following defects: a 1-centralized server may create a single point of failure, resulting in potential data loss and reduced system resiliency. 2 traditional systems are susceptible to accidental or malicious data tampering, thereby compromising the integrity of the experimental results. 3 tracking the source and modification of experimental results is difficult, leading to potential errors and lack of accountability. 4 traditional storage systems are more vulnerable to hacking, data leakage, and other security risks than decentralised systems.
Therefore, the system and the method for evidence storage of large-scale instrument experimental results by using the blockchain and IPFS technology provide a safe, decentralised and efficient solution for the challenges of data storage and verification in scientific research.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems, the invention provides a large-scale instrument experimental result evidence storing method and system based on a blockchain, and the method solves the problems of data tampering and storage in experimental data management. By using blockchain and IPFS techniques, the proposed solution provides secure storage and traceability of experimental data and experimental data proof, while making it easier for researchers to manage and share data. The invention aims to store the experimental result of a large instrument, store the evidence and issue NFT (non-homogeneous pass) at the same time, and ensure the privacy of the experimental result of the large instrument. Based on the method, a system is established, and the blockchain, the intelligent contract, the IPFS and related privacy protection algorithms are utilized to maintain the authenticity of data and ensure the decentralization of the whole system method, ensure the privacy of experimental data, ensure that all transactions and data changes can be tracked and audited, and simultaneously ensure the safety and reduce the risks of data leakage and network attack compared with the traditional decentralization storage.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a solution: a large instrument experimental result evidence storage method based on a blockchain comprises the following steps:
s1: the experimental data is generated into a public-private key pair by utilizing an RSA algorithm, the public key is encrypted, and the private key is used for decryption, storage of the experimental data by utilizing an IPFS and the like.
1.1, obtaining experimental data, and carrying out hash processing on the experimental data to obtain an experimental data hash value.
1.2, generating a public-private key pair by utilizing an RSA algorithm, wherein the public key and the private key are included, the public key can encrypt experimental data, and the private key can decrypt the experimental data. And carrying out public key encryption on the experimental data to generate an experimental data public key encryption value, and reserving a private key.
1.3, storing the experimental data hash value generated in 1.1 and the experimental data public key encryption value generated in 1.2 into the IPFS to obtain a corresponding IPFS address hash, wherein the IPFS address hash can help to find a corresponding file in the IPFS.
1.4, storing the IPFS address hash and basic information of experiments, such as time and place experiment instruments, into an intelligent contract, wherein the intelligent contract can be deployed on a block chain to realize data transmission and storage.
S2: the verifier interacts with the verifier present in the smart contract to transfer relevant information through the smart contract, including requesting verification, and transferring coefficients of Diffie-Hellman (Diffie-Hellman) needed to calculate the shared secret.
2.1 the experimenter invokes the intelligent contract to request verification of experimental data and transmits the Deffie-Hellman related parameters prime p and the base q, which can help the experimenter and the verifier to subsequently generate a shared secret.
2.2 the verifier agrees to the verifier request by means of the smart contract to verify p, q.
2.3 generating a random secret number a by the experimental party according to the formula a=q a mod p (mod is a remainder), and a Deffie-Hellman related parameter a is generated. The verifier generates a random secret number B, according to the formula b=q b mod p, generates a Deffie-Hellman related parameter B.
2.4 the experimenter and the verifier exchange a, B through intelligent contracts.
S3: the proving party and the proving party generate the shared secret through a Diffie-Hellman method by the coefficient obtained in the S2.
3.1 Experimental recipe Using the Deffie-Hellman method, according to the formula s=B a mod p, the shared secret is calculated, and the verifier uses the Deffie-Hellman method to calculate the shared secret according to the formula s=a b mod p, the shared secret is calculated, and the two shared secrets are equal.
S4: based on the shared secret obtained in the step S3, the experimenter uses the shared secret to encrypt and store the private key obtained in the step S1 in the IPFS;
4.1 the experimenter encrypts the private key generated in step 1 using the shared secret.
4.2, the experimenter stores the encrypted private key into the IPFS to obtain the hash address of the IPFS.
S5: the verifier transmits the IPFS hash address, acquires an encryption private key in the IPFS hash address, decrypts the IPFS hash address through the shared secret, verifies experimental data and verifies the NFT.
5.1 the verifier sends the IPFS address of the encrypted private key to the verifier.
5.2 the verifier shares the secret to decrypt the experimental data and performs comparison verification.
5.3 after verification by the verifier, manufacturing the NFT to the verifier according to experiments through intelligent contracts, and storing the NFT on a blockchain as an experiment certificate.
A large instrument experimental result evidence-storing system based on a blockchain mainly comprises three modules: a network layer, a service layer, and a user layer. Wherein:
the network layer forms the basis of the framework, including the blockchain network and the IPFS network. It is responsible for storing, retrieving and transmitting data in an decentralized manner. Techniques used by this layer include blockchains (e.g., ethernet) and the interplanetary file system (IPFS). It interacts with the service layer to return data from the blockchain and IPFS.
Service layer: the service layer handles core functions such as smart contracts, deffie-Hellman shared secret generation, and key management. The main techniques used in this layer include smart contracts (e.g., the solubility of ethernet) and a cryptographic library for Deffie-Hellman key exchange. It interacts with the network layer to store and retrieve data from the blockchain and IPFS.
User layer: the user layer provides a front-end interface for the user to interact with the system. The main technology used by this layer includes Web development frameworks (e.g., exact, vue, or angullar). The user layer communicates with the service layer to perform key generation, encryption, and decryption tasks. The API endpoints sent to the service layer through HTTP requests facilitate interactions between the layers.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
invariance: the data stored on the blockchain and IPFS is immutable, meaning that it cannot be altered or deleted. This ensures that the experimental data and evidence are not tamperable, thereby increasing the confidence and trustworthiness of the results.
Transparency: the use of blockchain and IPFS allows for transparent and decentralised storage and validation of experimental data and evidence, thus making scientific research more open and collaborative.
Traceability: by storing experimental data and evidence on blockchains and IPFS, the source and history of the data can be traced, providing a clear and auditable record for research.
Safety: the use of privacy preserving algorithms such as cryptography and Deffie-Hellman ensures that only authorized personnel can access the data. This greatly reduces the risk of data being tampered with, stolen or lost.
Decentralizing: the decentralized nature of blockchains and IPFS means that there is no single point of failure or control. This makes it more difficult for any individual or entity to manipulate or destroy the data.
In general, the blockchain and IPFS are utilized to store and verify large-scale instrument experimental data, and a safe, transparent and efficient way is provided for guaranteeing the authenticity and integrity of the experimental data.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a functional schematic of a smart contract of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the interaction of the system of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention will be further described with reference to the drawings and the detailed description, but the invention is not limited to the scope. The basic flow of the invention is shown in fig. 1, and the functions contained in the smart contract are shown in fig. 2.
The invention discloses a blockchain-based large instrument experimental result verification method, which comprises the following specific implementation steps:
the main steps of evidence storage are as follows:
s1: the experimental data is generated by using RSA algorithm, the public key is encrypted, and the private key is used for decryption, storage of the experimental data by using IPFS and the like.
The experimental formula makes experiments to obtain experimental data, hashes the experimental data, and uses the hashes as follows:
SHA-256 is used for the hash process, with SHA-256 accepting an input message of arbitrary length and producing a 256-bit output of fixed size, typically represented as a hexadecimal string of 64 characters. The algorithm uses a series of logical operations, including bitwise operations, modulo operations, and conditional statements, to process the input message and generate an output hash value.
Generating a public-private key, carrying out public-key encryption on experimental data, wherein the private key can be decrypted, and the public-private key encryption is mainly as follows:
the RSA algorithm is adopted, two independent keys are generated for encryption and decryption respectively for an asymmetric cryptography, namely, the public key is used for encrypting experimental data, and the private key is used for decrypting the experimental data. RSA encryption working principle steps:
two large prime numbers p1 and q1 are generated and their product n=p1q1 is calculated.
Then a value e is chosen that is compatible with (p 1-1) (q 1-1). The e value is used as the public key exponent.
The private key is then calculated using an extended euclidean algorithm to find the modulo inverse of e modulo (p 1-1) × (q 1-1), i.e. the private key exponent d.
And then, storing the hash of the experimental data and the ciphertext of the experimental data into the IPFS to obtain a corresponding IPFS address hash, and storing the corresponding IPFS address hash into the IPFS:
the hash and ciphertext of the experimental data are saved in the IPFS. The hash value of the experimental data may later be used to verify its integrity, while the ciphertext is used to decrypt the data when needed. And then the IPFS address corresponding to the data stored in the IPFS is obtained. I.e., a Content Identifier (CID), which is generated using a hash of the data. This CID may be used to retrieve data from the IPFS network.
The IPFS address hash and the basic information of the experiment, such as time and place experiment instruments, are then stored in the intelligent contract call store experiment data function (storeexperimentData), which stores the IPFS address hash and the basic information of the experiment (such as time, place, experiment equipment, etc.) of the encrypted experiment data. It may obtain parameters such as IPFS hash, time, place and equipment and save them in the store of the contract.
S2: the interactive transfer of relevant information between the verifier and the verifier via intelligent contracts includes the steps of requesting verification, and transferring the Diffie-Hellman coefficients required for calculating the shared secret.
(1) The experimenter requests verification data:
the verifier initiates a smart contract function request verification function (requestVerification) to request verification data from the verifier. This function allows the experimenter to request verification of experimental data. The experimenter provides Diffie-Hellman parameters (prime p and radix q) as parameters, which the function saves in the store of the contract. p and q may assist the verifier and verifier in the subsequent generation of the shared secret.
(2) The verification party agrees to the experiment request:
the verifier confirms the request by executing an intelligent contract function named approve verification, which is called by the verifier to approve the verifier's verification request. It validates the prime number p and the base q received from the experimenter and updates the storage of the contract to indicate that the validation request has been approved.
(3) The experimenter and the verifier generate A and B privately:
the experimenter randomly generates a secret number a, calculates A=q a mod p. The verifier generates a random secret number B, calculates b=q b mod p. The experimental and validation parties exchange a and B through intelligent contracts: both parties pass a, B to each other using a smart contract function of commit coefficients (subtcoeffecients). This function enables the verifier and the verifier to submit their Diffie-Hellman coefficients a and B. It should accept the sender's role (the experimenter or the verifier), the coefficient (a or B) and the value of the coefficient as parameters and store them in the store of the contract.
S3: the coefficients obtained by the verifier and the verifier through S2 generate a shared secret through Diffie-Hellman.
Parameters a, B obtained by both parties by invoking a smart contract that obtains coefficients (getcoeffients) that allow the experimenter and the verifier to retrieve the stored coefficients a and B. When either party invokes it can return the stored coefficients from the store of the contract. The shared secret is generated using the Deffie-Hellman method. The Deffie-Hellman used is as follows:
Diffie-Hellman is a key exchange algorithm that allows two parties to securely exchange keys over an unsecure communication channel. Namely, exchanging private keys capable of decrypting experimental data by using intelligent contracts. The method comprises the following steps:
the experimenter and the verifier respectively calculate a shared secret s=b a mod p and s=a b mod p。
S4: based on the shared secret obtained in S3, the experimental party encrypts and stores the private key obtained in S1 in the IPFS using the shared secret.
The party uses a Key Derivation Function (KDF) to derive a symmetric encryption key from the shared secret s. The experimenter encrypts the private key with AES using the derivative key. The encrypted private key is stored on the IPFS to obtain the IPFS address.
S5: the experimental part transmits the IPFS address, the verification part acquires the encryption private key in the IPFS, and the verification part decrypts the data through the shared secret and verifies the data simultaneously.
1. The verifier sends an IPFS address to the verifier by invoking a submit encrypted private key IPFS hash (subMIEncryptiedPrivateKeyIPFS) intelligent contract function. This function allows the experimenter to submit an IPFS address hash of the encrypted private key. It takes the IPFS hash as a parameter and stores it in the store of the contract.
2. The verifier shares a secret to decrypt the experimental data and verify. The method comprises the following specific steps:
the verifier invokes an IPFS address hash that obtains the encrypted private key from a getencryptedprivateKeyIPFS intelligent contract function. This function enables the verifier to retrieve the IPFS address hash of the encrypted private key. When called by the verifier, it returns the stored IPFS hash address from the store of the contract. The verifier retrieves the encrypted private key from the IPFS. The verifier derives the same symmetric encryption key from the shared secret s using the same KDF, and the verifier decrypts the AES-encrypted private key using the derivative key, which can now be used to decrypt the experimental data.
3. And after verification of the verification party is successful, an NFT transaction (issueNFT) intelligent contract function is called, the NFT is manufactured according to experiments, and the function is called by the verification party after verification of experimental data is successful. It creates an NFT that represents the experimental certificate and distributes it to the experimenter. The function may accept parameters such as the address of the experimenter and any associated metadata and update the storage of the contract to record the issued NFT. While NFT is stored as experimental evidence on the blockchain. In order to ensure traceability and privacy of the proving process, the following information can be stored in the NFT:
experimental details: the NFT may include all necessary information about the experiment, such as experiment name, date, location, experimental equipment used, experimental protocol, and any other relevant details.
IPFS address hash: NFT may also contain IPFS address hashes to encrypt experimental data and private keys, facilitating reference and verification.
Experimental certificate ID: the NFT may have a unique ID or serial number to identify the experimental certificate and its authenticity.
Verification information: the NFT may contain information about the authentication process, including details of the authenticator and any other relevant information.
Timestamp: NFT may also contain a timestamp to indicate when the experiment was performed and when the certificate was issued.
By including all of this information in the NFT, it becomes a secure and traceable experimental record that can be easily verified by anyone with access to the blockchain. Furthermore, the use of NFT provides privacy protection by encrypting experimental data and only providing access to authorized parties using private keys.
The smart contract should also include access control and authentication mechanisms to ensure that only authorized parties can invoke certain functions and to ensure that the data provided is valid.
According to the illustration in fig. 3, the system for large-scale experimental storage and certification based on blockchain intelligent contracts and IPFS is mainly described as follows:
a large instrument experimental result evidence-storing system based on a blockchain mainly comprises three modules: a network layer, a service layer and a user layer.
Network layer: the functions are as follows: 1. data storage and retrieval: the experimental data and certificates are stored in a decentralised manner using IPFS. 2. Blockchain operation: managing intelligent contract deployment and interaction on blockchains. Interaction with other layers: 1. the network layer communicates with the service layer by responding to API calls and smart contract requests issued by the service layer. 2. It stores and retrieves data from the IPFS upon request from the service layer. 3. It processes smart contract transactions generated by the service layer.
Service layer: the functions are as follows: 1. intelligent contract management: smart contracts are deployed and managed on the blockchain for data storage, authentication requests, parameter delivery, and NFT certificate issuance. Deffie-Hellman shared secret generation: a shared secret is generated between the verifier and the verifier using a Deffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. 3. Key management: the generation, encryption and decryption of the public and private keys are processed to achieve secure data transmission and storage. Interaction with other layers: 1. the service layer interacts with the deployed intelligent contracts by using libraries such as Webs 3.Js or Ethers. Js, and the service layer stores related information on the IPFS by using IPFS client libraries such as js-IPFS or IPFS-http-client. 2. It processes user requests from the user layer, for example, initiates authentication or exchange keys and sends the results of the processing back to the user layer as JSON or XML responses. 3. It performs encryption operations, such as key generation and encryption, based on user input and securely shares information with the user layer.
User layer: the functions are as follows: 1. user interface: the user is provided with a front-end interface to interact with the system enabling them to enter data, request verification, and receive NFT certificates. Interaction with other layers: 1. the user layer communicates with the service layer, initiates a key exchange, requests data verification, and interacts with the intelligent contracts on the blockchain. 2. It receives data and instructions from the service layer to update the user interface with relevant information, such as authentication status or NFT certificate details. 3. It sends user input (e.g., experimental data or Deffie-Hellman parameters) to the service layer for processing and storage.
These layers interact with each other to provide a seamless and secure user experience. The user layer captures user inputs and sends them to the service layer for processing. The service layer performs encryption operations, intelligent contract management, and data storage requests, while the network layer handles de-centralized data storage and blockchain operations. Through these interactions, the system ensures that the data remains secure and private while providing an intuitive interface for users to manage their experiments and certificates.
Claims (6)
1. The large instrument experimental result evidence storage method based on the blockchain is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
s1, generating public and private key pairs from experimental data by utilizing an RSA algorithm;
s2, the experimenter interacts with the verifier existing in the intelligent contract through the intelligent contract, transmits request verification and transmits a Diffie-Hellman coefficient required by calculating the shared secret;
s3, the experimenter and the verifier generate a shared secret through a Diffie-Hellman method by using the Diffie-Hellman coefficient;
s4, based on the shared secret, the experimenter encrypts the private key obtained in the S1 by using the shared secret, and stores the encrypted private key into an interstellar file system IPFS to obtain an IPFS hash address;
s5, the experimental party transmits the IPFS hash address to the verification party, and the verification party acquires an encryption private key in the IPFS hash address, decrypts experimental data through the shared secret and performs comparison verification; and after the verification of the verification party is successful, the non-homogeneous verification NFT is manufactured according to the experiment through the intelligent contract and is given to the verification party, and the NFT is stored on the blockchain as an experiment certificate.
2. The blockchain-based large instrument experimental result verification method of claim 1, wherein the specific process of S1 is as follows:
1.1, obtaining experimental data, and carrying out hash processing on the experimental data to obtain an experimental data hash value;
1.2, generating a public-private key pair by utilizing an RSA algorithm, wherein the public-private key pair comprises a public key for encrypting experimental data and a private key for decrypting the experimental data; public key encryption is carried out on the experimental data, an experimental data public key encryption value is generated, and a private key is reserved;
1.3, storing the experimental data hash value generated in the step 1.1 and the experimental data public key encryption value generated in the step 1.2 into an IPFS to obtain a corresponding IPFS address hash;
1.4, storing the basic information of the IPFS address hash and experiment into an intelligent contract, wherein the intelligent contract can be deployed on a block chain to realize data transmission and storage.
3. The blockchain-based large instrument experimental result certification method of claim 2, wherein the basic information of the experiment in 1.4 includes time, place and experimental instrument.
4. The blockchain-based large instrument experimental result verification method of claim 2, wherein the specific process of the interaction of S2 is as follows:
2.1, the experimental party calls the request verification experimental data of the intelligent contract and transmits prime numbers p and base numbers q of the Defbie-Hellman;
2.2, the verification party agrees with the request of the verification party through the intelligent contract, and confirms p and q;
2.3, the experimental party generates a random secret number a according to the formula a=q a mod p, wherein mod is the remainder taken, generating a Deffie-Hellman parameter A;
the verifier generates a random secret number B, according to the formula b=q b mod p, generating a Deffie-Hellman parameter B;
2.4, the experimenter and the verifier exchange A and B through intelligent contracts.
5. The blockchain-based large instrument experiment result certification method of claim 4, wherein in S3, the specific process of generating the shared secret is as follows:
the experimental party uses the Deffie-Hellman method to calculate the formula s=b a mod p, calculating a shared secret;
the verifier uses the Deffie-Hellman method to determine the formula s=a b mod p, the shared secret is calculated, and the two shared secrets are equal.
6. A system for implementing the blockchain-based large instrument experimental result certification method of any of claims 1-5, comprising a network layer, a service layer, and a user layer;
the network layer comprises a blockchain network and an interstellar file system IPFS network, and is used for interacting with the service layer to return data from the blockchain and the IPFS;
the service layer processes intelligent contract, diffie-Hellman shared secret generation and key management;
the user layer provides a front-end interface for the user to interact with the system, and the API endpoint sent to the service layer through HTTP requests facilitates interactions between layers, communicating with the service layer to perform key generation, encryption and decryption tasks.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202310316124.XA CN116340331A (en) | 2023-03-29 | 2023-03-29 | Large instrument experimental result evidence-storing method and system based on blockchain |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202310316124.XA CN116340331A (en) | 2023-03-29 | 2023-03-29 | Large instrument experimental result evidence-storing method and system based on blockchain |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN116340331A true CN116340331A (en) | 2023-06-27 |
Family
ID=86883628
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202310316124.XA Pending CN116340331A (en) | 2023-03-29 | 2023-03-29 | Large instrument experimental result evidence-storing method and system based on blockchain |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN116340331A (en) |
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN116506231A (en) * | 2023-06-28 | 2023-07-28 | 广东长盈科技股份有限公司 | Network security event tracing and tracking method and system based on block chain |
| CN117995279A (en) * | 2024-04-03 | 2024-05-07 | 四川大学华西医院 | Quantitative or qualitative detection result homogenization conversion method among different PCR instruments |
-
2023
- 2023-03-29 CN CN202310316124.XA patent/CN116340331A/en active Pending
Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN116506231A (en) * | 2023-06-28 | 2023-07-28 | 广东长盈科技股份有限公司 | Network security event tracing and tracking method and system based on block chain |
| CN116506231B (en) * | 2023-06-28 | 2023-10-03 | 广东长盈科技股份有限公司 | Network security event tracing and tracking method and system based on block chain |
| CN117995279A (en) * | 2024-04-03 | 2024-05-07 | 四川大学华西医院 | Quantitative or qualitative detection result homogenization conversion method among different PCR instruments |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| US10903991B1 (en) | Systems and methods for generating signatures | |
| CN109495274B (en) | Decentralized intelligent lock electronic key distribution method and system | |
| CN100561916C (en) | A kind of method and system that upgrades authenticate key | |
| JP5562687B2 (en) | Securing communications sent by a first user to a second user | |
| CN107528688A (en) | A kind of keeping of block chain key and restoration methods, device based on encryption commission technology | |
| KR20180116278A (en) | Common information secrets for secure information exchange and hierarchical and deterministic cryptographic keys | |
| US8806206B2 (en) | Cooperation method and system of hardware secure units, and application device | |
| WO2017147503A1 (en) | Techniques for confidential delivery of random data over a network | |
| CN107733654B (en) | Intelligent equipment firmware updating and official user certificate distribution method based on combined key | |
| US11831753B2 (en) | Secure distributed key management system | |
| CN116340331A (en) | Large instrument experimental result evidence-storing method and system based on blockchain | |
| Jiang et al. | Verifiable search meets blockchain: A privacy-preserving framework for outsourced encrypted data | |
| Isirova et al. | Decentralized public key infrastructure development principles | |
| CN101924739A (en) | Method for encrypting, storing and retrieving software certificate and private key | |
| Sun et al. | Research on logistics information blockchain data query algorithm based on searchable encryption | |
| US20160080336A1 (en) | Key Usage Detection | |
| EP2713545A1 (en) | Data sharing system, data distribution system and data protection method | |
| CN106953917B (en) | Method of data synchronization and system | |
| CN113836571A (en) | Method and system for matching positions of medical data owning terminals based on cloud and block chains | |
| CN110519040B (en) | Anti-quantum computation digital signature method and system based on identity | |
| CN111914270A (en) | Programmable authentication service method and system based on block chain technology | |
| CN116318784B (en) | Identity authentication method, identity authentication device, computer equipment and storage medium | |
| CN111460463A (en) | Electronic deposit certificate storage and notarization method, device, equipment and storage medium | |
| CN116232639A (en) | Data transmission method, device, computer equipment and storage medium | |
| TWI430643B (en) | Secure key recovery system and method |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| WD01 | Invention patent application deemed withdrawn after publication |
Application publication date: 20230627 |
|
| WD01 | Invention patent application deemed withdrawn after publication |