CN116319051A - Heterogeneous network secure communication authentication method based on alliance chain - Google Patents

Heterogeneous network secure communication authentication method based on alliance chain Download PDF

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Publication number
CN116319051A
CN116319051A CN202310366893.0A CN202310366893A CN116319051A CN 116319051 A CN116319051 A CN 116319051A CN 202310366893 A CN202310366893 A CN 202310366893A CN 116319051 A CN116319051 A CN 116319051A
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identity
network domain
domain
entity
authentication server
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CN202310366893.0A
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魏雅静
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Anhui Institute of Information Engineering
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Anhui Institute of Information Engineering
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

Abstract

The invention discloses a heterogeneous network secure communication authentication method based on a alliance chain, which comprises the following steps: adding a key generation center KGC in a non-certificate network domain and a third party PKG in an identity-based network domain into a alliance blockchain to form a node of the alliance chain, checking an identity credential on the blockchain by an authentication server of the alliance chain to achieve the aim of cross-domain security authentication, and verifying the validity of the identity in the re-authentication process by using the cross-domain blockchain identity credential. The invention has the advantages that: the method realizes safe and efficient cross-domain authentication and re-authentication between the entity in the non-certificate network domain and the entity in the identity-based network domain, and has simple and reliable authentication process and high authentication efficiency; the security is higher, reduces privacy and sensitive data's possibility of being stolen in the information transmission process, adopts the security communication authentication scheme of this application to have improved the security of communication.

Description

Heterogeneous network secure communication authentication method based on alliance chain
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of network communication, and relates to a novel alliance chain-based secure communication scheme for entities in different network domains in the technical field of network security. The invention can be applied to a method for authenticating the identity of a server accessed by an entity A in a non-certificate network domain when requesting the server accessed by a domain-crossing entity B in an identity-based network domain.
Background
With the development of technology, in a distributed network environment, there is a very complex interaction mode between information service entities in different environments, and information transmission is indispensable between the entities, where the transmitted information is mostly extremely sensitive and private data. In an open environment, data information of different network domains is easy to be attacked by many security in the transmission process, when data communication is performed, a star network connection mode of a central node is usually adopted in the past, for example, a communication method and a system based on a communication route and a star network are disclosed in patent application number 202210831244.9, and the method and the system disclosed in the patent application number: a communication method and a system based on a route and a star network are characterized in that a service center node is established at a service end, a terminal establishes an end center node, the service center node and the end center node establish a unique communication link, different applications interact through the center node, an application client interacts with an application management end through the end center node and the service center node, one terminal only needs to establish one communication link, the consumption of server resources is low, the number of open ports is low, and safety management is convenient.
By adopting a star network connection mode of the central node, in the data transmission process, if the central node is broken, data is stolen and tampered by malicious users, the unpredictable result can be possibly caused, and the prior heterogeneous entity cross-domain authentication scheme has the problems of complex authentication process, low authentication efficiency and the like.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects of the prior art, and provides a heterogeneous network secure communication authentication method based on a alliance chain, which realizes secure and efficient cross-domain authentication and re-authentication between an entity in a non-certificate network domain and an entity in an identity-based network domain.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows: a heterogeneous network secure communication authentication method based on a federation chain, the method comprising: adding a key generation center KGC in a non-certificate network domain and a third party PKG in an identity-based network domain into a alliance blockchain to form a node of the alliance chain, checking an identity credential on the blockchain by an authentication server of the alliance chain to achieve the aim of cross-domain security authentication, and verifying the validity of the identity in the re-authentication process by using the cross-domain blockchain identity credential.
The method comprises the following steps:
(1) Setting two different cryptographic environments, adding authentication servers of two network domains into a alliance block chain to form authentication server nodes in the alliance chain, and generating system parameters of corresponding entities:
(2) The entity of two different network domains registers identity information on an authentication server;
(3) Calculating keys of two different network domain entities;
(4) A signcryption process;
(5) A decryption process;
(6) A cross-domain identity credential generation process;
(7) And (5) a re-authentication process.
In step (1), nodes joining the federated blockchain are preselected and given rights to query the blockchain by participants in both network domains.
In step 3: the authentication server A selects a partial key of the random value computing entity A; the entity A randomly selects a number as a secret value, and combines the secret value with the partial secret key obtained by previous calculation to generate a complete secret key; for the entity B in the identity network domain, registering the identity through an authentication server in the identity network domain; the authentication server in the identity network domain randomly selects the keys of another number of computing entities B.
In step 4: the certificate-free network domain and the authentication server based on the identity network domain respectively send the secret keys to the entity A and the entity B, and store the corresponding identity credentials in a blockchain; when the entity A in the non-certificate network domain sends a message to the entity B in the identity-based network domain, an access request needs to be sent to an authentication server in the identity-based network domain, and after the authentication server receives the request, the entity A sends a random number and a time stamp to the entity in the non-certificate network domain, and the entity A performs signcryption on the random number and the time stamp and the query message to be sent to obtain a ciphertext.
The step 5 comprises the following steps: entity A in the non-certificate network domain responds to the request based on the authentication server in the identity network domain, transmits the random number, the time stamp and the signcryption text as a message to the authentication server based on the identity network domain, and verifies whether the random number is valid or not according to decryption after the authentication server receives the message.
The step 6 comprises the following steps:
when an authentication server based on an identity network domain outputs a plaintext message in a decryption algorithm, sending an access request message and a random number to an authentication server without a certificate network domain, and applying for obtaining a blockchain identity credential of an entity A and an authentication server blockchain identity credential without the certificate network domain; the authentication server of the non-certificate network domain receives the access request and the random number sent by the authentication server of the identity network domain, and then the authentication server blockchain identity certificate of the non-certificate network domain and the random number are transmitted to the authentication server of the identity network domain together as a message; the authentication server based on the identity network domain generates a cross-domain blockchain identity credential after receiving the message, and then sends the cross-domain blockchain identity credential to an entity A in the non-certificate network domain; access to entity a in the non-credentials network domain based on entity B in the identity network domain is equally possible to achieve bi-directional cross-domain authentication.
The step 7 comprises the following steps: re-authentication is required when entity a in the non-credential network domain wants to request access to entity B in the identity-based network domain again; if the blockchain identity credential is still in the validity period, the entity A in the non-certificate network domain sends the cross-domain blockchain credential to the authentication server in the identity-based network domain, the authentication server in the identity-based network domain carries out hash operation on the cross-domain blockchain credential, and the hash value of the cross-domain blockchain identity credential is inquired on the blockchain, so that the secure communication of the two parties of the entity in the heterogeneous network domain is realized.
The decryption process in the step (4) and the step (5) is based on that the entity in the network domain of the identity can decrypt the message certificate by using the public key of the opposite party and the private key of the opposite party, and if the final result is the same as the data before the decryption, the entity of the decryption party is trusted.
The pre-selected node refers to: by utilizing the decentralized characteristic of decentralization and trust removal of the alliance block chain, the nodes which are added into the alliance chain in advance are trusted nodes after strict identity verification is carried out before the members of the alliance chain are added.
The invention has the advantages that: the method realizes safe and efficient cross-domain authentication and re-authentication between the entity in the non-certificate network domain and the entity in the identity-based network domain, and has simple and reliable authentication process and high authentication efficiency; the security is higher, reduces privacy and sensitive data's possibility of being stolen in the information transmission process, adopts the security communication authentication scheme of this application to have improved the security of communication.
Drawings
The contents of the drawings and the marks in the drawings of the present specification are briefly described as follows:
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method of secure communication authentication according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following detailed description of the invention refers to the accompanying drawings, which illustrate preferred embodiments of the invention in further detail.
The key generation center KGC in the non-certificate network domain and the third party key generation mechanism PKG in the identity-based network domain are added into the alliance blockchain to form the node of the alliance chain, an authentication server of the alliance chain checks the identity certificate on the blockchain to achieve the aim of cross-domain security authentication, and the validity of the identity in the re-authentication process is verified by using the cross-domain blockchain identity certificate, and the method comprises the following specific steps:
(1) Setting two different cryptographic environments, adding authentication servers of two network domains into a alliance chain to form proxy authentication server nodes in the alliance chain, and generating corresponding system parameters for the two network domains respectively:
(1a) Only the previously selected nodes can join the federated blockchain, and the rights to query the blockchain are owned by only the participants;
(2) The entity of two different network domains registers identity information on an authentication server;
(3) Key calculation of two different network domain entities;
(4) A signcryption process;
(5) A decryption process;
(6) A cross-domain identity credential generation process;
(7) And (5) a re-authentication process.
The pre-selected node in the step (1 a) is characterized in that the distributed characteristics of decentralization and trust removal of the alliance blockchain are utilized, the distributed nodes have fixed alliance chain members, the members are subjected to strict identity verification before joining, only the members are visible in transaction information on the alliance chain, and other people are invisible, so that the privacy of data is ensured, and all the nodes which are added into the alliance chain in advance are trusted nodes.
In the decryption process in the step (4) and the step (5), the entity in the network domain based on the identity can decrypt the message certificate by using the public key of the opposite party and the private key of the opposite party, and if the final result is the same as the data before the signcryption, the entity of the decryption party is trusted.
The specific steps of the cross-domain identity credential generation process described in step (6) are as follows:
firstly, based on an authentication server in an identity network domain, sending an access request and a random number mu to an authentication server in a non-certificate network domain, applying to obtain a blockchain identity credential of an entity A and a KGC blockchain identity credential of an authentication server thereof, and verifying whether the random number mu is valid or not by the authentication server in the non-certificate network domain, and ending an algorithm if the random number mu is invalid;
secondly, inquiring the hash value of the KGC block chain identity certificate of the authentication server on the block chain;
thirdly, sending the blockchain identity certificate of the entity A to an authentication server based on the identity network domain;
fourth, the authentication server based on the identity network domain analyzes the blockchain identity credential of the entity A, generates the cross-domain blockchain identity credential of the two parties, and writes the cross-domain blockchain identity credential into the blockchain;
fifthly, sending a cross-domain blockchain identity certificate to the entity A;
and step six, ending.
The specific steps of the re-authentication process in step (7) are as follows:
first, when entity a in the non-credential network domain wants to request access to entity B in the identity-based network domain again, the blockchain identity credential is still within the validity period, then entity a will send the cross-domain blockchain identity credential to the identity-based network domain authentication server;
and secondly, carrying out hash operation based on the identity network domain authentication server, and inquiring the hash value of the cross-domain blockchain identity certificate on the blockchain, so as to verify the validity of the cross-domain identity.
As shown in fig. 1, the specific flow steps of the present application implement the concept of the present invention: adding a key generation center KGC in a non-certificate network domain and a third party PKG in an identity-based network domain into a alliance blockchain to form a node of the alliance chain, checking an identity credential on the blockchain by an authentication server of the alliance chain to achieve the aim of cross-domain security authentication, and verifying the validity of the identity in the re-authentication process by using the cross-domain blockchain identity credential.
The method comprises the following specific steps:
(1) Setting two different cryptographic environments, adding authentication servers of two network domains into a alliance block chain to form authentication server nodes in the alliance chain, and generating system parameters of corresponding entities:
(1a) Only the previously selected nodes can join the federated blockchain, and the rights to query the blockchain are owned by only the participants;
(2) The entity of two different network domains registers identity information on an authentication server;
(3) Key calculation of two different network domain entities;
(4) A signcryption process;
(5) A decryption process;
(6) A cross-domain identity credential generation process;
(7) And (5) a re-authentication process.
In step 1: setting two different network domains, adding authentication servers of the two network domains into the alliance block chain to become authentication server nodes in the alliance chain, and generating system parameters of corresponding entities.
Step 2: the entities of two different network domains register identity information on the authentication server.
Step 3: key calculation for two different network domain entities.
The authentication server a selects a partial key of the random value computing entity a. Entity a randomly selects a number as the secret value, and combines the secret value with the partial key calculated previously to generate the complete key. For entity B in the identity network domain, identity registration is performed by an authentication server in the identity network domain. The authentication server in the identity network domain randomly selects the keys of another number of computing entities B.
And 4, message signcryption process.
The certificate-less network domain and the authentication server in the identity-based network domain send the key pair to entity a and entity B, respectively, and store the corresponding identity credential in the blockchain. When the entity A in the non-certificate network domain sends a message to the entity B in the identity-based network domain, an access request needs to be sent to an authentication server in the identity-based network domain, and after the authentication server receives the request, the entity A sends a random number and a time stamp to the entity in the non-certificate network domain, and the entity A performs signcryption on the random number and the time stamp and the query message to be sent to obtain a ciphertext.
And 5, a message decryption process.
Entity A in the non-certificate network domain responds to the request based on the authentication server in the identity network domain, transmits the random number, the time stamp and the signcryption text as a message to the authentication server based on the identity network domain, and verifies whether the random number is valid or not according to decryption after the authentication server receives the message.
And 6, a cross-domain identity credential generation process.
When the authentication server based on the identity network domain outputs a plaintext message in a decryption algorithm, an access request message and a random number are sent to the authentication server without the certificate network domain, and a blockchain identity credential of the entity A and an authentication server blockchain identity credential without the certificate network domain are applied to be obtained. The authentication server of the non-certificate network domain receives the access request and the random number sent by the authentication server of the identity network domain, and then the authentication server blockchain identity credential of the non-certificate network domain and the random number are transmitted to the authentication server of the identity network domain together as a message. The authentication server based on the identity network domain generates cross-domain blockchain identity credentials after receiving the message, and then sends the cross-domain blockchain identity credentials to entity a in the non-credential network domain. Access to entity a in the non-credentials network domain based on entity B in the identity network domain is equally possible to achieve bi-directional cross-domain authentication.
And 7, re-authentication process.
Re-authentication is required when entity a in the non-trusted network domain wants to request access to entity B in the identity-based network domain again. If the blockchain identity credential is still in the validity period, the entity A in the non-certificate network domain sends the cross-domain blockchain credential to the authentication server in the identity-based network domain, the authentication server in the identity-based network domain carries out hash operation on the cross-domain blockchain credential, and the hash value of the cross-domain blockchain identity credential is inquired on the blockchain, so that the secure communication of the two parties of the entity in the heterogeneous network domain is realized.
It is obvious that the specific implementation of the present invention is not limited by the above-mentioned modes, and that it is within the scope of protection of the present invention only to adopt various insubstantial modifications made by the method conception and technical scheme of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. A heterogeneous network secure communication authentication method based on a alliance chain is characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps: adding a key generation center KGC in a non-certificate network domain and a third party PKG in an identity-based network domain into a alliance blockchain to form a node of the alliance chain, checking an identity credential on the blockchain by an authentication server of the alliance chain to achieve the aim of cross-domain security authentication, and verifying the validity of the identity in the re-authentication process by using the cross-domain blockchain identity credential.
2. The heterogeneous network security communication authentication method based on the alliance chain as claimed in claim 1, wherein:
the method comprises the following steps:
(1) Setting two different cryptographic environments, adding authentication servers of two network domains into a alliance block chain to form authentication server nodes in the alliance chain, and generating system parameters of corresponding entities:
(2) The entity of two different network domains registers identity information on an authentication server;
(3) Calculating keys of two different network domain entities;
(4) A signcryption process;
(5) A decryption process;
(6) A cross-domain identity credential generation process;
(7) And (5) a re-authentication process.
3. The heterogeneous network security communication authentication method based on the alliance chain as claimed in claim 2, wherein: in step (1), nodes joining the federated blockchain are preselected and given rights to query the blockchain by participants in both network domains.
4. The heterogeneous network security communication authentication method based on the alliance chain as claimed in claim 2, wherein:
in step 3: the authentication server A selects a partial key of the random value computing entity A; the entity A randomly selects a number as a secret value, and combines the secret value with the partial secret key obtained by previous calculation to generate a complete secret key; for the entity B in the identity network domain, registering the identity through an authentication server in the identity network domain; the authentication server in the identity network domain randomly selects the keys of another number of computing entities B.
5. The heterogeneous network security communication authentication method based on the alliance chain as claimed in claim 2, wherein:
in step 4: the certificate-free network domain and the authentication server based on the identity network domain respectively send the secret keys to the entity A and the entity B, and store the corresponding identity credentials in a blockchain; when the entity A in the non-certificate network domain sends a message to the entity B in the identity-based network domain, an access request needs to be sent to an authentication server in the identity-based network domain, and after the authentication server receives the request, the entity A sends a random number and a time stamp to the entity in the non-certificate network domain, and the entity A performs signcryption on the random number and the time stamp and the query message to be sent to obtain a ciphertext.
6. The heterogeneous network security communication authentication method based on the alliance chain as claimed in claim 2, wherein:
the step 5 comprises the following steps: entity A in the non-certificate network domain responds to the request based on the authentication server in the identity network domain, transmits the random number, the time stamp and the signcryption text as a message to the authentication server based on the identity network domain, and verifies whether the random number is valid or not according to decryption after the authentication server receives the message.
7. The heterogeneous network security communication authentication method based on the alliance chain as claimed in claim 2, wherein:
the step 6 comprises the following steps:
when an authentication server based on an identity network domain outputs a plaintext message in a decryption algorithm, sending an access request message and a random number to an authentication server without a certificate network domain, and applying for obtaining a blockchain identity credential of an entity A and an authentication server blockchain identity credential without the certificate network domain; the authentication server of the non-certificate network domain receives the access request and the random number sent by the authentication server of the identity network domain, and then the authentication server blockchain identity certificate of the non-certificate network domain and the random number are transmitted to the authentication server of the identity network domain together as a message; the authentication server based on the identity network domain generates a cross-domain blockchain identity credential after receiving the message, and then sends the cross-domain blockchain identity credential to an entity A in the non-certificate network domain; access to entity a in the non-credentials network domain based on entity B in the identity network domain is equally possible to achieve bi-directional cross-domain authentication.
8. The heterogeneous network security communication authentication method based on the alliance chain as claimed in claim 2, wherein:
the step 7 comprises the following steps: re-authentication is required when entity a in the non-credential network domain wants to request access to entity B in the identity-based network domain again; if the blockchain identity credential is still in the validity period, the entity A in the non-certificate network domain sends the cross-domain blockchain credential to the authentication server in the identity-based network domain, the authentication server in the identity-based network domain carries out hash operation on the cross-domain blockchain credential, and the hash value of the cross-domain blockchain identity credential is inquired on the blockchain, so that the secure communication of the two parties of the entity in the heterogeneous network domain is realized.
9. The heterogeneous network security communication authentication method based on the alliance chain as claimed in claim 2, wherein: the decryption process in the step (4) and the step (5) is based on that the entity in the network domain of the identity can decrypt the message certificate by using the public key of the opposite party and the private key of the opposite party, and if the final result is the same as the data before the decryption, the entity of the decryption party is trusted.
10. The heterogeneous network security communication authentication method based on the alliance chain as claimed in claim 3, wherein:
the pre-selected node refers to: by utilizing the decentralized characteristic of decentralization and trust removal of the alliance block chain, the nodes which are added into the alliance chain in advance are trusted nodes after strict identity verification is carried out before the members of the alliance chain are added.
CN202310366893.0A 2023-04-07 2023-04-07 Heterogeneous network secure communication authentication method based on alliance chain Pending CN116319051A (en)

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Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
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CN116319051A true CN116319051A (en) 2023-06-23

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