CN116167632A - Multi-layer defense system efficiency evaluation method - Google Patents
Multi-layer defense system efficiency evaluation method Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN116167632A CN116167632A CN202210958158.4A CN202210958158A CN116167632A CN 116167632 A CN116167632 A CN 116167632A CN 202210958158 A CN202210958158 A CN 202210958158A CN 116167632 A CN116167632 A CN 116167632A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- defense
- target
- probability
- attack
- attack target
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
- 230000007123 defense Effects 0.000 title claims abstract description 165
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 title abstract description 15
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 44
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 14
- 238000010304 firing Methods 0.000 claims description 27
- 238000009826 distribution Methods 0.000 claims description 15
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 claims 1
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 7
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 description 6
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000003860 storage Methods 0.000 description 6
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000013178 mathematical model Methods 0.000 description 2
- 229920006395 saturated elastomer Polymers 0.000 description 2
- 230000009471 action Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010276 construction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000002360 preparation method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007704 transition Effects 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q10/00—Administration; Management
- G06Q10/06—Resources, workflows, human or project management; Enterprise or organisation planning; Enterprise or organisation modelling
- G06Q10/063—Operations research, analysis or management
- G06Q10/0639—Performance analysis of employees; Performance analysis of enterprise or organisation operations
- G06Q10/06393—Score-carding, benchmarking or key performance indicator [KPI] analysis
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F30/00—Computer-aided design [CAD]
- G06F30/20—Design optimisation, verification or simulation
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2111/00—Details relating to CAD techniques
- G06F2111/08—Probabilistic or stochastic CAD
Abstract
The invention discloses a multi-layer defense system efficiency evaluation method, which comprises the following steps: constructing a defense model of an air defense weapon system waiting for an attack target, and calculating the interception probability of the defense model to the attack target; the method specifically comprises the following steps: constructing a process model of a space domain to be ground for an attack target to arrive at the coast; constructing a shooting model of a fire channel of an air defense weapon system on an attack target; constructing a model of the air flight time of an attack target in the killing area; on the basis of the steps, a defense model of an air defense weapon system waiting for an attack target is constructed; calculating the breakthrough probability of the attack target, and further obtaining the interception probability of the attack target; deploying two sets of air defense weapon systems, and calculating the defending efficiency of the two sets of air defense weapon systems. The method for evaluating and calculating the effectiveness of the coast land double-layer defense system is provided, particularly, under the steady state condition, the method for calculating the defense efficiency of the terminal high-layer and low-layer aiming at the attack target strength lambda is provided, and a certain theoretical support is provided for the coast land defense deployment.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of auxiliary decision making, in particular to a multi-layer defense system efficiency evaluation method.
Background
Coastal land air combat operations are often equipped with different types of air defense weapon systems, which constitute a echelon interception defense system according to the far-reaching kill of the air defense weapon systems. Under the modern air defense anti-lead combat system, the main combat style facing the coast is multi-direction, multi-echelon and multi-form saturated attack, the combat mode is essentially multi-weapon and multi-target high-speed dynamic countermeasure action under the complex environment, and the method relates to a plurality of subsystems such as information, decisions, weapons and the like, so that the air combat tactic has stronger variability and deception, and the defending command decisions face the examination of a plurality of complex and uncertain factors. Therefore, how to rely on the existing defense combat equipment on the coast and adopt a scientific defense method have important significance for improving the defense efficiency of the coast.
The coast land air defense efficiency evaluation is a key link in the development of a land air defense system, and is an important basis for checking whether the construction of the coast land air defense system is reasonable, and the land air defense combat efficiency evaluation needs to establish a proper mathematical model. After the initial queuing theory of 60 years is generated, the method is quickly applied to various military fields, and the mathematical model based on the queuing theory plays an important role in the defending efficiency of an air defense system of the combat, because the queuing theory can better simulate the randomness and shooting process of the air defense.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to improve the coast land defense efficiency, the multi-directional, multi-echelon and multi-form saturated attack facing the coast land is effectively treated, the terminal double-layer anti-air defense anti-conduction defense system is taken as an example, terminal high-layer and low-layer successive interception is carried out on an attack target, echelon configuration is formed on a defense array, and the attack target is intercepted orderly.
In view of the above technical problems, the present invention provides a method, an apparatus and a storage medium for evaluating performance of a multi-layered defense system.
The technical scheme for solving the technical problems is as follows:
a multi-layered defense system efficacy evaluation method comprising the steps of:
step 1: constructing a defense model of an air defense weapon system waiting for an attack target, and calculating the breakthrough probability and interception probability of the attack target;
step 2: deploying two sets of air defense weapon systems, and calculating the defense efficiency of the two sets of air defense weapon systems;
the step 1 comprises the following steps:
step 1.1: constructing a process model of a space domain to be ground for an attack target to arrive at the coast;
step 1.2: constructing a shooting model of a fire channel of an air defense weapon system on an attack target;
step 1.3: constructing a model of the air flight time of an attack target in the killing area;
step 1.4: constructing a defense model of an air defense weapon system waiting for an attack target on the basis of the steps 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3;
step 1.5: and calculating the breakthrough probability and interception probability of the incoming targets.
Further, the step 1.1 of constructing an attack target arrival process model includes:
by P n (t) represents the probability of n targets coming within time t, then:
where n=0, 1,2, … and t >0, λ represents the intensity of the incoming target.
Further, in the step 1.2, constructing a shooting model of the fire channel of the air defense weapon system for the attack target, including:
when an incoming target enters the firing zone of the air defense weapon system, the air defense weapon system shoots the incoming targets by using idle fire channels, each idle fire channel has the same shooting condition on the incoming target and can shoot only one incoming target at a time, and the shooting time tau of each idle fire channel on the target obeys the negative exponential distribution of the parameter mu, namely
P(τ<t)＝1-e -μt ,t≥0
wherein ,
random time for shooting an incoming target.
Further, in the step 1.3, constructing a model of the time of flight of the incoming target over the killing area, including:
the time compliance parameter of the incoming target flying above the killing area is a negative exponential distribution of v, namely
P(τ<t)＝1-e -νt ,t≥0
wherein ,
for the time the target stays in the kill zone.
Further, in the step 1.4, constructing a defense model of the air defense weapon system waiting for the target to attack by using queuing theory includes:
let N (t) denote the number of incoming targets in the air defense weapon system at time t, s denote the number of targets waiting to be shot; n represents an idle fire channel;
probability p of absence of an incoming target in a killing area 0 ；
Probability p of K attack targets in killing area k The number of the attack targets is smaller than the number of idle fire channels, namely k is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n-1;
probability p that n+s incoming targets stay in the emission area and there is no idle fire channel n+s ；
Where ρ represents the firing density of the air defense weapon system, ρ=λ μ the ratio of the average arrival rate to the average firing rate of the targets,
the average number of targets that are burst by exceeding the waiting time in the average firing time is represented, and i represents the number of shots.
Further, the calculating the direct breakthrough probability of the attack target in the step 1.5 includes:
average number of targets waiting to be shot in fire kill zone
Probability of direct burst without being shot
I.e.
Further, the attack target interception probability in step 1.5 includes:
a. the probability that an incoming target reaches the defense system and is immediately shot but not knocked down;
when the fire system is in N (t) =i (i)<n) in the idle condition, the target can be shot immediately after reaching the system; assume that the defending system shoots an incoming target no more than χ max Second, the probability of such an event is:
wherein ,Pkill Single shot kill probability for a weapon system;
b. probability of an incoming target not being shot directly against;
c. when an attack target arrives, the attack target enters the queue due to the fact that the non-firepower unit is idle, and is attacked before flying away from the killing area, but the attack target is not destroyed;
since the target of attack may be shot 1,2, …, χ max The probability of an incoming target being subjected to i shots of an event that is not knocked down is expected to be:
the probability of this event is thus:
the probability of an attack on the target is:
P ref ＝P ref0 +P ref1 +P ref2 ；
probability of interception of incoming targets:
P＝1-P ref 。
further, two sets of defense systems are deployed in the step 2, including a terminal high-level interception and a terminal low-level echelon interception defense system;
the method for calculating the defending efficiency of the terminal high-rise defending line comprises the following steps:
wherein ,ρh Representing the shot density of the terminal high-rise line of defense,
finding targets for terminal high-rise line-of-defense radarsIs a function of the probability of (1),
probability of attack of target against terminal high-rise defense line, +.>
Probability of directly outburst the terminal high-rise line of defense, < ->
The probability that the target reaches the terminal high-rise line of defense and is immediately shot but not knocked down; />
When an attack target arrives, the attack target enters the queue due to the idle non-firepower unit and is attacked before flying away from the terminal high-rise defending line killing area, but the attack target has no possibility of being destroyed; p (P) h The terminal high-layer defense efficiency is achieved;
after the incoming target flow passes through the first layer of defense line, the incoming strength is weakened to be lambda' =lambda P h Thus, the method for calculating the defense efficiency of the terminal lower-layer defense line comprises the following steps:
wherein ,ρl Representing the shot density of the lower fire line of the end,
the probability of finding a target for the end low-level line of defense radar,
probability of attack of target against terminal lower defense line, +.>
Probability of directly outburst the terminal lower line of defense, < ->
The probability that the target reaches the lower-layer defense line of the tail end and is immediately shot but not knocked down; />
When an attack target arrives, the attack target enters the queue due to the idle non-firepower unit and is attacked before flying away from the lower-layer defending line killing area at the tail end, but the attack target has no possibility of being destroyed; p (P) l Low-layer defense efficiency for the terminal;
the air defense double-layer defense efficiency E is:
E＝P h +(1-P h )P l 。
compared with the prior art, the invention has the following technical effects:
the method for evaluating and calculating the effectiveness of the coast land double-layer defense system is provided, particularly, under the steady state condition, the method for calculating the defense efficiency of the terminal high-layer and low-layer aiming at the attack target strength lambda is provided, and a certain theoretical support is provided for the coast land defense deployment.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for evaluating the performance of an air defense system according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a defensive model flow for constructing an air defense weapon system waiting for an incoming target according to the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating the state transition of the M/M/n/c system of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The principles and features of the present invention are described below with reference to the drawings, the examples are illustrated for the purpose of illustrating the invention and are not to be construed as limiting the scope of the invention.
Referring to fig. 1-3, a multi-layered defense system performance evaluation method comprises the following steps:
Queuing theory is also called random service system theory, and the object researched by the queuing theory accords with the Markov process, namely the distribution of the future state is related to the distribution of the current state, is unrelated to the distribution of the past state, and has the characteristic of no memory. Assuming that N (t) is a random number of targets that are hit by an air defense weapon system at time t, the change process of N (t) is a markov chain, because the number N (t+Δt) at time t+Δt is related to the probability of arrival of a new target, the working efficiency of a service desk, and the like on the basis of the number N (t) at time t, and is irrelevant to data before time t.
The method specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1.1, constructing an incoming target arrival process model.
The arrival process of the incoming target refers to that the target arrives at the coastal space domain according to what rule, namely, the arrival time interval obeys what probability distribution, what the distribution parameters are, and whether the arrival time interval is independent or not. In queuing studies there are typically equidistant time arrivals, negative exponential distribution arrivals, geometric distribution inputs, generally independent inputs, batch inputs, and other forms of inputs. Since poisson distribution is suitable for describing the times of random event occurrence in unit time, the law of arrival process of an incoming target can be well described, and thus, the arrival process of the incoming target is assumed to obey poisson distribution with parameter lambda.
By P n (t) represents the probability of n targets coming within time t, then:
where n=0, 1,2, … and t >0.
The number of incoming targets reached within time t is denoted by N (t), and the mean E (N (t)) and the variance function V (N (t)) are expressed as:
E(N(t))＝λt,V(N(t))＝λt。
step 1.2: and constructing a shooting model of the fire channel of the air defense weapon system to the target.
An air defense weapon system consisting of n fire channels of the same type of weapons is assumed on the sea, and the shooting rule adopted by the air defense weapon system is a random service system with limited waiting of a captain. When an attack target enters a firing zone of the air defense weapon system, the air defense weapon system shoots the attack target by using an idle fire channel; if the fire channels are all busy, the incoming target continues to fly until the idle fire channel shoots on. If the target is not shot in the transmitting area, the attack target is directly burst successful.
Wherein, each fire channel adopts the firing principle of 'fire-observation-firing', namely, the firing effect is observed immediately after one firing, if the target is destroyed, the fire channel fires other targets immediately; if the target is not knocked, shooting it continues until the target is knocked down or leaves the kill zone. Each fire channel has the same shooting condition on the incoming targets, and only one incoming target can be shot at a time.
Assuming that the firing time τ of each fire channel to the target obeys a negative exponential distribution of the parameter μ, i.e
P(τ<t)＝1-e -μt ,t≥0
wherein ,
the random time used for shooting the target is related to the defense weapon system and the incoming target flying speed.
Step 1.3: and constructing a model of the flight time of the attack target above the killing area.
Assuming that the time of flight of an incoming target over the killing region obeys a negative exponential distribution of the parameter v, i.e
P(τ<t)＝1-e -νt ,t≥0
wherein ,
for the time the target stays in the kill zone.
Step 1.4: and constructing a defense model of the air defense weapon system waiting for an incoming target.
The N (t) represents the target number in the air defense weapon system at the moment t, namely N (t) is the state process of the random service system. According to the above assumption, the defense model can be regarded as an M/M/n/c model, and the possible states of the system are respectively:
A 0 : the weapon system has n fire channels idle, and 0 targets are arranged in the system;
A 1 : the weapon system has a fire channel firing, 1 target in the system;
┉
A n : all fire channels of the weapon system are shooting, and n targets are in the system;
A n+1 : all fire channels of the weapon system are firing, and 1 target in the system is waiting to be fired;
┉
A n+s : all fire channels of the weapon system are firing and there are s targets in the system waiting to be fired.
(1) At time t the system is in state N (t) =0, it consists of two mutually incompatible events. The first event is that no target exists in the killing area and no new target appears in the time delta t, and the probability of the event is as follows:
the second event is that at time t the system is in state N (t) =1, there is one fire unit firing a unique target in the kill zone and ending in Δt time with no new target present, the probability of the event is:
P 1 (t)·(μΔt+o(Δt))(1-λΔt+o(Δt))＝P 1 (t)μΔt+o(Δt).
so that the probability that the system is still in state N (t) =0 at time t+Δt is
P 0 (t+Δt)＝P 0 (t)(1-λΔt)+P 1 (t)μΔt+o(Δt).
Is prepared by finishing
Let Deltat.fwdarw.0, there is
(2) When the system is in the state N (t) =k, (1.ltoreq.k.ltoreq.n-1), it is composed of the sum of the probabilities of three mutually independent events. The first event is that the system is in state N (t) =k-1 at time t, a new target arrives within Δt time, and the probability of this event is λΔtp k-1 The second event is that at time t the system is in state N (t) =k and there is no new target in Δt time, while none of the k fire units has finished shooting, the probability of this event is:
P k (t)(1-λΔt+o(Δt))(1-kμΔt+o(Δt))＝P k (t)-λΔtP k (t)-kμΔtP k (t)+o(Δt)；
the third event is that at time t the system is in state N (t) =k+1, there is no new target in Δt time, while only one of the k+1 firing cells is ending firing, the probability of the event is:
P k+1 (t)(1-λΔt+o(Δt))((k+1)μΔt+o(Δt))＝(k+1)μΔtP k+1 (t)+o(Δt)
so that the probability that the system is still in state N (t) =k at time t+Δt is:
P k (t+Δt)＝λΔtP k-1 (t)+P k (t)-λΔtP k (t)-kμΔtP k (t)+(k+1)μΔtP k+1 (t)+o(Δt)
is prepared by finishing
Let Deltat to 0 have
(3) When the system is in state N (t) =k, (n+.k < c, k=n+s), it is the sum of four mutually incompatible events: a first event, at time t, the system is in state N (t) =k, during the time interval Δt, no new targets are present, and n+s targets stay in the firing zone and all fire channels are not fired, the event probability being:
(1-λΔt+ο(Δt))(1-sνΔt+o(Δt))(1-nμΔt+ο(Δt))P k (t)＝(1-λΔt-sνΔt-nμΔt)P k (t)+ο(Δt).
a second event, at time t, the system is in state N (t) =k-1, in the time interval Δt, there is a new target reaching the system, and n+s targets stay in the emission area and all fire channels are not shot, the second event probability is:
λΔt(1-nμΔt+o(Δt))(1-sνΔt+o(Δt))P k-1 (t)＝λΔtP k-1 (t)+o(Δt)；
a third event, at time t, the system is in state N (t) =k+1, and during time interval Δt, one of the s+1 targets flies out of the firing zone or one fire unit in the weapon system ends firing, the probability of the event being (nμΔt+ (s+1) vΔt) P k+1 (t). So that at time t+Δt the system is still in state N (t) =k, (n+.k)<c, k=n+s) is:
P k (t+Δt)＝(1-λΔt-sνΔt-nμΔt)P k (t)+λΔtP k-1 (t)+(nμΔt+(s+1)νΔt)P k+1 (t)+o(Δt)
the preparation method comprises the following steps of:
let Deltat to 0 have
In summary, the state equation of the queuing model M/M/n/c system with a limited waiting time of the multiple service desks is as follows:
for the M/M/n/c queuing model, when the time t → infinity, the system tends to be in a steady state, and all state probabilities become constant, i.e
P i (t)＝P i ,i＝0,1,2,…,n,n+1,…,c.
The derivatives of the left end of the equal sign of the equation set are all zero, so that the system state equation set is converted into:
from p 0 +p 1 +p 2 +…+p n + … =1, as calculated:
where ρ=λμ represents the ratio of the average arrival rate of the target to the average firing rate, which can be understood as the firing density of the air defense system,
indicating the average number of targets that are armed over the average firing time due to the latency (firing zone dwell time) being exceeded.
Step 1.5: and calculating the breakthrough probability and interception probability of the incoming targets.
(1) Target direct burst probability
Average number of targets waiting to be shot in fire kill zone
So that the probability of direct burst without being shot
Namely: />
(2) Probability of attack on target
An incoming target defense event consists of three mutually incompatible independent events.
a. The probability of an incoming target reaching the defense system being immediately shot but not knocked down.
This event is only when the fire system is at N (t) =i (i<n) the target can be shot immediately after reaching the system only when the fire is idle. Assume that the defending system shoots an incoming target no more than χ max Second, the probability of such an event is:
wherein ,Pkill Is the single shot kill probability of the weapon system.
b. Probability of an incoming target not being shot directly against the event.
c. When an attack target arrives, the attack target enters the queue due to the idle non-firepower unit and is attacked before flying away from the killing area, but the attack target is not destroyed.
Since the target of attack may be shot 1,2, …, χ max The probability of an incoming target being subjected to i shots of an event that is not knocked down is expected to be:
the probability of this event is thus:
in summary, the probability of attack on the target is:
P ref ＝P ref0 +P ref1 +P ref2 。
(3) Probability of interception of incoming targets: p=1-P ref 。
Step 2: deploying two sets of air defense weapon systems, and calculating the defending efficiency of the two sets of air defense weapon systems.
Two layers of different types of air defense weapons are deployed on a coast, two guide lines are formed by different defense remote areas of the air defense weapons, a ladder interception defense system of a tail end high-level interception and a tail end low-level interception is formed, and the types of anti-guide weapons deployed in each guide line are the same. The defense model of each defense line is an M/M/n/c model waiting for a limited time, so that the coast land air defense double-layer defense efficiency evaluation method can be described as follows:
the method for calculating the defending efficiency of the terminal high-rise defending line comprises the following steps:
wherein ,ρh Representing the shot density of the terminal high-rise line of defense,
the probability of finding a target for the end high-rise line of defense radar,
probability of attack of target against terminal high-rise defense line, +.>
Probability of directly outburst the terminal high-rise line of defense, < ->
The probability that the target reaches the terminal high-rise line of defense and is immediately shot but not knocked down; />
When an attack target arrives, the attack target enters the queue due to the idle non-firepower unit and is attacked before flying away from the terminal high-rise defending line killing area, but the attack target has no possibility of being destroyed; p (P) h Is the terminal high-layer defense efficiency.
After the incoming target flow passes through the first layer of defense line, the incoming strength is weakened to be lambda' =lambda P h Thus, the method for calculating the defense efficiency of the terminal lower-layer defense line comprises the following steps:
wherein ,ρl Representing the shot density of the lower fire line of the end,
the probability of finding a target for the end low-level line of defense radar,
probability of attack of target against terminal lower defense line, +.>
Probability of directly outburst the terminal lower line of defense, < ->
The probability that the target reaches the lower-layer defense line of the tail end and is immediately shot but not knocked down; />
When an attack target arrives, the attack target enters the queue due to the idle non-firepower unit and is attacked before flying away from the lower-layer defending line killing area at the tail end, but the attack target has no possibility of being destroyed; p (P) l Is the end low-layer defense efficiency.
In summary, the calculation formula of the air defense double-layer defense efficiency is as follows:
E＝P h +(1-P h )P l 。
in this embodiment, a calculation method for evaluating the effectiveness of a coast land double-layer defense system is provided, especially, a calculation method for the defense efficiency of a terminal high-layer and a terminal low-layer aiming at the intensity lambda of an attack target under a steady state condition is provided, so that a certain theoretical support is provided for coast land defense deployment.
In an embodiment of the present invention, there is also provided a multi-layered defense system performance evaluation apparatus, including: comprises a processor, a memory and a program; the program is stored in the memory, and the processor calls the program stored in the memory to execute the multi-layer defense system efficiency evaluation method.
In the implementation of the multi-layered defense system efficacy evaluation device, the memory and the processor are electrically connected directly or indirectly to realize data transmission or interaction. For example, the elements may be electrically connected to each other via one or more communication buses or signal lines, such as through a bus connection. The memory stores computer-executable instructions for implementing the data access control method, including at least one software functional module that may be stored in the memory in the form of software or firmware, and the processor executes the software programs and modules stored in the memory to perform various functional applications and data processing.
The Memory may be, but is not limited to, random Access Memory (RAM), read Only Memory (ROM), programmable Read Only Memory (Programmable Read-Only Memory, PROM), erasable Read Only Memory (Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory, EPROM), electrically erasable Read Only Memory (EEPROM), etc. The memory is used for storing a program, and the processor executes the program after receiving the execution instruction.
The processor may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. The processor may be a general-purpose processor, including a Central Processing Unit (CPU), a Network Processor (NP), and the like. The disclosed methods, steps, and logic blocks in the embodiments of the present application may be implemented or performed. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may be any conventional processor or the like.
In an embodiment of the present invention, there is also provided a computer-readable storage medium configured to store a program configured to perform the above-described performance evaluation method of an air defense system.
It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as a method, apparatus, or computer program product. Accordingly, embodiments of the invention may take the form of an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, embodiments of the invention may take the form of a computer program product on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
Embodiments of the present invention are described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, terminal devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing terminal to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing terminal, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart.
These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart.
These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart.
The above description of the application of the multi-layered defense system performance evaluation method, the multi-layered defense system performance evaluation apparatus and a computer readable storage medium provided by the present invention has been provided in detail, and specific examples are applied herein to illustrate the principles and embodiments of the present invention, and the above examples are only for aiding in understanding the method and core idea of the present invention; meanwhile, as those skilled in the art will have variations in the specific embodiments and application scope in accordance with the ideas of the present invention, the present description should not be construed as limiting the present invention in view of the above.
Claims (8)
1. A method for evaluating the efficacy of a multi-layered defense system, comprising the steps of:
step 1: constructing a defense model of an air defense weapon system waiting for an attack target, and calculating the interception probability of the defense model to the attack target;
the step 1 comprises the following steps:
step 1.1: constructing a process model of a space domain to be ground for an attack target to arrive at the coast;
step 1.2: constructing a shooting model of a fire channel of an air defense weapon system on an attack target;
step 1.3: constructing a model of the air flight time of an attack target in the killing area;
step 1.4: constructing a defense model of an air defense weapon system waiting for an attack target on the basis of the steps 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3;
step 1.5, calculating the breakthrough probability of the attack target, and further obtaining the interception probability of the attack target;
step 2: deploying two sets of air defense weapon systems, and calculating the defending efficiency of the two sets of air defense weapon systems.
2. The method for evaluating the effectiveness of a multi-layered defense system according to claim 1, wherein the constructing an attack target arrival process model in step 1.1 comprises:
by P n (t) represents the attack of n targets within time tProbability, then:
where n=0, 1,2, … and t >0, λ represents the intensity of the incoming target.
3. The method for evaluating the effectiveness of a multi-layered defense system according to claim 1, wherein in the step 1.2, constructing a shooting model of an air defense weapon system fire channel to an attack target comprises:
when an incoming target enters the firing zone of the air defense weapon system, the air defense weapon system shoots the incoming targets by using idle fire channels, each idle fire channel has the same shooting condition on the incoming target and can shoot only one incoming target at a time, and the shooting time tau of each idle fire channel on the target obeys the negative exponential distribution of the parameter mu, namely
P(τ<t)＝1-e -μt ,t≥0
wherein ,
random time for shooting an incoming target.
4. The method for evaluating the efficacy of a multi-layered defense system according to claim 1, wherein in the step 1.3, constructing a model of the time of flight of an attack target over a killing area comprises:
the time compliance parameter of the incoming target flying above the killing area is a negative exponential distribution of v, namely
P(τ<t)＝1-e -νt ,t≥0
wherein ,
for the time the target stays in the kill zone.
5. The method for evaluating the effectiveness of a multi-layered defense system according to claim 2, wherein the constructing a defense model of an air defense weapon system waiting for an attack target by using queuing theory in step 1.4 comprises:
let N (t) denote the number of incoming targets in the air defense weapon system at time t, s denote the number of targets waiting to be shot; n represents an idle fire channel;
probability p of absence of an incoming target in a killing area 0 ；
Probability p of K attack targets in killing area k The number of the attack targets is smaller than the number of idle fire channels, namely k is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n-1;
probability p that n+s incoming targets stay in the emission area and there is no idle fire channel n+s ；
Where ρ represents the firing density of the air defense weapon system, ρ=λ/μ the ratio of the average arrival rate to the average firing rate of the targets,
the average number of targets that are burst by exceeding the waiting time in the average firing time is represented, and i represents the number of shots.
6. The method for evaluating the effectiveness of a multi-layered defense system according to claim 3, wherein the step 1.5 calculates the probability of breakthrough of an incoming target, the probability of breakthrough of the incoming target includes the probability of direct breakthrough, and the calculation steps are as follows:
average number of targets waiting to be shot in fire kill zone
Probability of direct burst without being shot
I.e.
7. The method for evaluating the effectiveness of a multi-layered defense system according to claim 3, wherein the calculating the interception probability of the attack target in the step 1.5 comprises:
a. calculating the probability that an attack target reaches the defense system and is immediately shot but not knocked down;
when the fire system is in N (t) =i (i)<n) in the idle condition, the target can be shot immediately after reaching the system; assume that the defending system shoots an incoming target no more than χ max Second, the probability of such an event is:
wherein ,Pkill Single shot kill probability for a weapon system;
b. calculating the probability of direct burst prevention of an attack target without shooting;
c. when an attack target arrives, the attack target enters the queue due to the fact that the non-firepower unit is idle, and is attacked before flying away from the killing area, but the attack target is not destroyed;
since the target of attack may be shot 1,2, …, χ max The probability of an incoming target being subjected to i shots of an event that is not knocked down is expected to be:
the probability of this event is thus:
the probability of an attack on the target is:
P ref ＝P ref0 +P ref1 +P ref2 ；
the probability of interception of an incoming target is as follows:
P＝1-P ref 。
8. the method for evaluating the efficacy of a multi-layered defense system according to claim 4, wherein two sets of defense systems are deployed in step 2, including a top-end interception and a bottom-end echelon interception defense system;
the method for calculating the defending efficiency of the terminal high-rise defending line comprises the following steps:
wherein ,ρh Representing the shot density of the terminal high-rise line of defense,
probability of finding a target for terminal high-rise line-of-defense radar,/->
Probability of attack of target against terminal high-rise defense line, +.>
Probability of directly outburst the terminal high-rise line of defense, < ->
The probability that the target reaches the terminal high-rise line of defense and is immediately shot but not knocked down; />
When an attack target arrives, the attack target enters the queue due to the idle non-firepower unit and is attacked before flying away from the terminal high-rise defending line killing area, but the attack target has no possibility of being destroyed; p (P) h The terminal high-layer defense efficiency is achieved;
after the incoming target flow passes through the first layer of defense line, the incoming strength is weakened to be lambda' =lambda P h Thus, the method for calculating the defense efficiency of the terminal lower-layer defense line comprises the following steps:
wherein ,ρl Representing the shot density of the lower fire line of the end,
probability of finding a target for end low-level line of defense radar,/->
Probability of attack of target against terminal lower defense line, +.>
Probability of directly outburst the terminal lower line of defense, < ->
The probability that the target reaches the lower-layer defense line of the tail end and is immediately shot but not knocked down; />
When an attack target arrives, the attack target enters the queue due to the idle non-firepower unit and is attacked before flying away from the lower-layer defending line killing area at the tail end, but the attack target has no possibility of being destroyed; p (P) l Low-layer defense efficiency for the terminal;
the air defense double-layer defense efficiency E is:
E＝P h +(1-P h )P l 。
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202210958158.4A CN116167632A (en) | 2022-08-11 | 2022-08-11 | Multi-layer defense system efficiency evaluation method |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202210958158.4A CN116167632A (en) | 2022-08-11 | 2022-08-11 | Multi-layer defense system efficiency evaluation method |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN116167632A true CN116167632A (en) | 2023-05-26 |
Family
ID=86413717
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202210958158.4A Pending CN116167632A (en) | 2022-08-11 | 2022-08-11 | Multi-layer defense system efficiency evaluation method |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN116167632A (en) |
Citations (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN112417653A (en) * | 2020-11-03 | 2021-02-26 | 中国人民解放军海军工程大学 | Method for establishing ship-air missile interception model |
-
2022
- 2022-08-11 CN CN202210958158.4A patent/CN116167632A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN112417653A (en) * | 2020-11-03 | 2021-02-26 | 中国人民解放军海军工程大学 | Method for establishing ship-air missile interception model |
Non-Patent Citations (6)
| Title |
|---|
| LONGYUE LI 等: "Intercepts allocation for layered defense", JOURNAL OF SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND ELECTRIONICS, vol. 27, no. 3, pages 602 - 611 * |
| 徐奕航;原超;王洪胜;: "基于排队论的舰空导弹武器系统反导射击效能模型", 指挥控制与仿真, no. 01, pages 77 - 79 * |
| 王成刚;刘志远;周晓东;: "某便携防空导弹训练系统效能评估研究", 微计算机信息, no. 36, pages 14 - 16 * |
| 王斯福, 吴晓华, 张 克, 林 涛: "基于排队论的飞行器协同突防效能分析", 战术导弹技术, no. 1, pages 10 - 15 * |
| 赵成旺: "多层防御反坦克阵地效能建模与仿真", 电光与控制, vol. 17, no. 07, pages 87 - 91 * |
| 高志华: "基于排队论的网络化要地防空作战效能研究", 基于排队论的网络化要地防空作战效能研究, vol. 40, no. 08, pages 51 - 54 * |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN107886184B (en) | Multi-type air defense weapon mixed-programming fire group target distribution optimization method | |
| CN107832885B (en) | Ship formation fire power distribution method based on self-adaptive migration strategy BBO algorithm | |
| JP6209120B2 (en) | Tactical support device, tactical support method, and tactical support program | |
| CN110186328B (en) | Missile distribution method and system for multi-target interception | |
| US10670376B2 (en) | Method and device for providing a dummy target for protecting a vehicle and/or an object from radar-guided seeker heads | |
| CN110991119A (en) | PSO-GA (particle swarm optimization-genetic algorithm) -based optimization method for weapon end defense system force deployment | |
| CN115238226B (en) | Calculation method for air defense effective killing area | |
| CN109460565B (en) | Autonomous shooting decision modeling method for cannon barracks | |
| JP5812834B2 (en) | Thermal power distribution device | |
| CN116167632A (en) | Multi-layer defense system efficiency evaluation method | |
| Li et al. | Intercepts allocation for layered defense | |
| CN116720344A (en) | Multi-warship collaborative air defense modeling method, system and medium | |
| CN113091529B (en) | Weapon decision model construction method based on emission constraint detection rule | |
| CN114047761A (en) | Elastic killer network construction method and device based on formation cross-platform resource scheduling | |
| CN112396288B (en) | Equipment system fire striking capability assessment method, device, equipment and medium | |
| CN112766775B (en) | Method for evaluating contribution rate of microwave weapon in anti-aircraft back-guidance system of naval vessel | |
| Peng-jiao et al. | Deployment optimization of air defense force deployment based on memetic algorithm | |
| CN113283112B (en) | Method, device and equipment for calculating outburst prevention interception probability under bait shielding | |
| Ma et al. | Multi-ship cooperative air defense model based on queuing theory | |
| CN115983060A (en) | Anti-ship missile explosion protection efficiency evaluation method | |
| Kisi | Suboptimal decision rule for attacking targets of opportunity | |
| Wang et al. | Simulation of effectiveness evaluation of warship multi-layer air defense system with extendsim | |
| CN112464548B (en) | Dynamic allocation device for countermeasure unit | |
| CN110781453B (en) | Network fragile edge recognition method based on complex theory | |
| CN114048628A (en) | Ship recovery strategy optimization method based on dynamic genetic algorithm under multi-wave attack |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination |