CN115883578A - 5G power network node trust management method based on block chain technology - Google Patents
5G power network node trust management method based on block chain technology Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN115883578A CN115883578A CN202211496396.4A CN202211496396A CN115883578A CN 115883578 A CN115883578 A CN 115883578A CN 202211496396 A CN202211496396 A CN 202211496396A CN 115883578 A CN115883578 A CN 115883578A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- node
- nodes
- network
- block
- candidate
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Images
Abstract
The invention relates to the technical field of block chain networks, in particular to a block chain technology-based 5G power network node trust management method, which comprises the steps of introducing a credit mechanism into a power communication network formed by a power system and power equipment, generating a credit evidence after the node nodes in the power communication network are interacted, calculating credit values of the nodes through the credit evidence, calculating total scores of current nodes according to the credit values of the nodes and rewards and punishments obtained by the reward and punishment mechanism, and taking the first N nodes with the highest total scores in the network as nodes of a maintenance consensus mechanism; when a new block structure is generated in the network, the multiple nodes carry out joint verification on the generated block structure, and reward or punish the nodes generating the block structure according to the verification result; when a new node joins a network, applying block information to a node nearby the new node to acquire an initial trust value; the invention can store the safety information in the network and ensure the correctness and traceability of the block.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of blockchain networks, in particular to a 5G power network node trust management method based on blockchain technology.
Background
In recent years, the advantages of 5G power networks have become more apparent, and power network technologies are widely used in various fields. Power generation, power transmission, power maintenance, etc. cannot be disconnected from the power network. Although power networks are becoming more and more powerful, they still face serious challenges in terms of safety. Under the background conditions of wide acceptance, wide coverage and rapid interaction, the traditional trust management method cannot meet the current development requirement and cannot ensure the credible security of the nodes in the network.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the above problems, the present application provides a method for trust management of 5G power network nodes based on a block chain technology,
a credit mechanism is introduced into a power communication network formed by a power system and power equipment, a trust evidence is generated after node nodes in the power communication network interact with each other, a credit value of the node is calculated by the trust evidence, a total score of a current node is calculated according to the credit value of the node and reward and punishment obtained by the credit and punishment mechanism, and the first N nodes with the highest total score in the network are used as nodes of a maintenance consensus mechanism;
when a new block structure is generated in the network, the plurality of nodes perform joint verification on the generated block structure, and reward or punish the nodes generating the block structure according to the verification result;
when a new node joins the network, the new node applies block information to the nodes nearby to acquire an initial trust value.
Furthermore, in a communication network, a base station is taken as a statistical node and a decision node, nodes with the calculation power larger than a set threshold value in the network are taken as candidate nodes, other nodes are taken as common nodes, and nodes for maintaining a consensus mechanism are selected from the candidate nodes; the common nodes can participate in the distribution of the blocks and the forwarding of the messages and vote for the candidate nodes; the statistical node is used for collecting statistical node information and recording voting conditions of the nodes in the whole network, and the decision node is used for selecting a representative node by integrating the voting conditions and various factors.
Further, the credit value of a candidate node is subjected to average value calculation according to the interaction between the candidate node and the common node, and when packet loss and tampering occur in the interaction process between the candidate node and the common node in one detection, the score of the candidate node is 0; when delay occurs in the interaction process of the candidate node and the common node, the score of the candidate node is 0.5; when no packet loss, tampering or delay occurs in the interaction process of the candidate node and the common node, the score of the candidate node is 1.
Further, in the process of each round of voting, if the ordinary nodes participate in the voting, the credit value of the ordinary nodes is given as a reward, if the ordinary nodes abandon the right, the credit value of the ordinary nodes is reduced, and when the credit value of the ordinary nodes is lower than a set threshold value, the ordinary nodes cannot acquire block information.
Further, when the reputation value of the common node is lower than a set threshold value, the time limit that the common node cannot acquire the block information is set as r network operation periods, and the authority of the common node is recovered after the r periods are finished; if the m-th occurrence credit value of the common node is lower than the set threshold, the period for which the common node cannot acquire the block information is m × r network operation periods.
Further, the calculation of the total score of the node in the process of selecting the node for maintaining the consensus mechanism comprises the following steps:
wherein Q is the total score of the candidate node, alpha i Weight of the ith node voted to the candidate node, S i The number of votes obtained in the voting link for the ith node voted for the candidate node is n, and the number of the nodes voted for the candidate node is n; t is the reputation value of the candidate node, E is the initial energy value of the node, and the magnitude of the initial energy value is related to the importance degree of the node in the power network, for example, the energy of a hub transfer station is greater than that of a common transfer station, and the person skilled in the art sets the initial energy value according to the importance degree of the node; ε is the attenuation factor.
Further, the block structure includes a block number, a block header, and a block body, wherein the block header includes a negative block hash value and a version, a timestamp, a difficulty, a random number, and a Mercker tree root of the block, and the block body includes a node ID, a reputation value, an energy, a node type, and a list of suspect nodes.
The method comprises the steps of firstly, improving an original DPoS consensus mechanism in a block chain, and using a credit value to elect a node to maintain trust information in a network; secondly, improving the original block structure in the block chain, storing the trust information of network security into the blocks, simultaneously jointly verifying the production blocks by a plurality of nodes to ensure the correctness and traceability of the generated blocks, and then applying for obtaining the block information from the original nodes in the network when a new node joins the network in the network operation, rapidly obtaining the trust information in the network and determining the trusted interaction node.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic flowchart of a 5G power network node trust management method based on a block chain technology according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of an improved DPoS consensus mechanism employed by the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a block chain structure diagram according to the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the construction of the Mercker tree in the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be obtained by a person skilled in the art without making any creative effort based on the embodiments in the present invention, belong to the protection scope of the present invention.
The invention provides a 5G power network node trust management method based on a block chain technology, which comprises the following steps:
a credit mechanism is introduced into a power communication network formed by a power system and power equipment, a trust evidence is generated after node nodes in the power communication network interact with each other, a credit value of the node is calculated by the trust evidence, a total score of a current node is calculated according to the credit value of the node and reward and punishment obtained by the credit and punishment mechanism, and the first N nodes with the highest total score in the network are used as nodes of a maintenance consensus mechanism;
when a new block structure is generated in the network, the multiple nodes carry out joint verification on the generated block structure, and reward or punish the nodes generating the block structure according to the verification result; the reward and punishment in the invention means that when the node successfully releases the block, the node in the network is given certain reward according to the workload of the node in the network, for example, the reward with the node metric of 3 as a generated block is given, and the reward with the node metric of 1 participating in the block generation at this time is given, in the invention, the node is rewarded in the direction of encouraging candidate node to select representative node, and the specific measurement and reward value can be set by technicians in the field according to actual conditions; if the representative node issues an invalid block, a malicious tampering block, unsuccessful block issuing and no block issuing at the specified time are found, the decision node directly eliminates the node from the network, selects the nodes with the top three ranks from the candidate representative nodes, and selects the representative node through the comprehensive performance of the node, wherein the larger the comprehensive performance of the node is, the larger the chance of selecting the representative node is.
When a new node joins the network, the new node applies block information to the nodes nearby to acquire an initial trust value.
As shown in fig. 1, the present embodiment provides a method for trust management of a 5G power network node based on a blockchain technology, which needs to go through three steps, specifically including:
improving a DPoS (distributed denial of service) consensus mechanism, and introducing a trust value and a reward and punishment mechanism into the DPoS consensus mechanism to select proxy nodes of a generation block;
designing a new block structure, and improving the original block structure in a block chain to store the security information in the network;
the new node quickly determines the interactive node, and when the new node is added into the network, the trusted interactive node can be quickly obtained by reading the information in the block.
The block structure adopted in the present invention is shown in fig. 3, and includes a block number, a block header, and a block body, where the block number is determined according to the block number of the previous block structure; the block header comprises a parent block hash value, a version, a timestamp, a difficulty, a random number and a Merckel root; the block body is composed of information collected by all nodes in all networks in the process of creating and verifying the current block, and at least comprises a node ID, a reputation value, energy, a node type and a suspicious node list.
The root of the mercker tree is to solve the problem that the traditional data integrity verification is slow. Generally, if the amount of data is small, the hash value of the data is calculated before the data is transmitted and is followed by the tail of the data, and after the data is received by a receiver, in order to verify the integrity of the data, the data is hashed again and is compared with the hash value followed by the tail of the data, and if the hash value is the same as the hash value, the data is not modified, otherwise, the data is tampered. However, in the case of an excessively large amount of data, it is obvious that this approach is not suitable, and a large amount of resources are wasted. Therefore, the merkel tree is provided for the integrity structure of the verified data, the merkel tree can quickly summarize the integrity and the correctness of the data in the verification block chain, the essence of the merkel tree is a binary tree established based on a hash value, the establishment process is as shown in fig. 4, the data of each node is subjected to hash operation, then two nodes are combined in pairs and further subjected to hash until a hash value is finally obtained, if four nodes exist, the data of each node is D0-D3 in sequence, and each data value is respectively subjected to hash to obtain N0-N3, and the two hashes are spliced in parallel and then subjected to hash operation. When the subsequent data is verified, whether the data is modified can be judged only by verifying whether the root hash is changed, and if the data is tampered, the tampered position can be quickly positioned. If the data at N5 is tampered with, it can be determined that it is certain that the data of N2 or N3 is changed, and so on, and fast locating is performed.
A credit mechanism is introduced into a communication network, trust evidences are generated after interaction between network nodes, and credit values are calculated through the trust evidences. According to factors such as a credit value and a corresponding reward and punishment mechanism, an original DPoS consensus mechanism in a block chain is improved, nodes of a maintenance consensus mechanism are elected, and a specific flow is shown in FIG. 2 and specifically comprises the following steps:
the nodes in the network are divided into common nodes and candidate nodes according to the computational power of the nodes, wherein the candidate nodes can be elected as proxy nodes capable of generating blocks, a threshold value can be set by a person skilled in the art when the candidate nodes are screened, the candidate nodes which are larger than the threshold value are the candidate nodes, otherwise, the nodes with the computational power of the first N% in the network can be set as the candidate nodes.
Taking a base station in a network as a statistical node and a decision node, monitoring interaction behaviors of candidate nodes in the network by the base station as behavior evidences of the candidate nodes, calculating trust values of the candidate nodes according to the behavior evidences, recording the interaction between the candidate nodes and common nodes each time in the embodiment, giving a certain score to each interaction, taking an average score of all interactions as a trust value of a current candidate node as an optional implementation mode, wherein a behavior certificate of the candidate node is malicious behaviors such as packet loss, delay and tampering in the interaction process between the candidate nodes and the common nodes each time, when the packet loss and tampering of the candidate nodes are detected, the score of the current candidate node is 0, when the delay behavior of the candidate nodes is detected, the score of the current candidate node is 0, when the malicious behavior of the candidate nodes is not detected, the score of the current candidate node is 1, and the score of the detected candidate node is an interaction accumulated value between the candidate nodes and the common nodes each time divided by a detection technology, namely the average score of the interaction between the candidate nodes and the common nodes.
The common node votes for the candidate nodes, then the candidate nodes vote for each other, and a comprehensive score is calculated according to the current trust value, the number of votes obtained and the energy of the current candidate node, wherein the score can be expressed as:
wherein Q is the total score of the candidate node, alpha i Weight of the ith node voted to the candidate node, S i The number of votes obtained in the voting link for the ith node voted for the candidate node is n, and the number of the nodes voted for the candidate node is n; t is the credit value of the candidate node, E is the initial energy value of the node, wherein the magnitude of the initial energy value is related to the importance degree of the initial energy value in the power network, for example, the energy of a junction transfer station is larger than that of a common transfer station, epsilon is an attenuation factor, the factor decays along with time, is a decay function set by each node according to the type and time of the current node, for example, the energy of two nodes decays along with time, but the node with the larger importance degree decays more slowly and decays in a time period, and when the current time period is over, the energy of the node is initially setThe initial value is reset, and the attenuation is carried out again according to the attenuation function, and the process is repeated.
Selecting N nodes with the highest scores from the candidate nodes to serve as proxy nodes according to the score of each candidate node, wherein the proxy nodes serve as accounting nodes in a block chain in turn and generate blocks;
when a node generates a new block, at least two proxy nodes in the network verify the generated block, and the proxy nodes of the generated block are subjected to reward and punishment through a verification result, namely the generated block is verified to reward a certain trust value of the proxy nodes of the generated block, otherwise, the trust value of the proxy nodes of the generated block is deducted, the deducted value and the reward value are set by a user according to actual needs, and after the generation and verification of one block are completed, a network cycle is completed.
In order to solve the problem that node voting in the network is not positive, a voting and punishing mechanism for non-proxy nodes and non-candidate nodes is introduced. After the node finishes voting, the node is given a certain trust value reward. If the node refuses voting, a certain trust value punishment is given to the node, and when the trust value of the node is lower than a certain threshold value, the punishment node cannot obtain block information in the network and cannot obtain the service provided by the system, a cold quiet period is set, for example, the ten-turn network running time is set, and after the cold quiet period is passed, the punishment node can return to the network again to obtain the service; if the node does not cooperate with voting, the node is punished out of the network again, and then a longer period of cold quiet period exists, for example, twenty rounds of network running time, and so on.
After the nodes complete voting, the statistical nodes and decision nodes in the network, that is, the base stations, will sort the candidate nodes from high to low according to their total scores S, and select some nodes with the highest scores from them as a set of proxy nodes, for example, the top 50% of the ranks will be used as proxy nodes, and the proxy nodes generate blocks in turn according to the order of scores from high to low.
In this embodiment, a new block structure is provided to store security information in a network, and a plurality of nodes jointly verify a new block produced at the same time, thereby ensuring the correctness and traceability of the block. The block chain structure, as shown in fig. 3, a block is composed of three major parts, a block number, a block header and a block body, wherein the block number determines the sequence of the block chain; the block head stores a father block hash value and block information, wherein the father block hash value surface determines the father block of the current block, and the block information comprises a version number, a timestamp, difficulty, a random number and a Merckel root; the version number is determined by the version of the used block; the time stamps represent the sequence of block generation; the difficulty and the random number are generated by the cryptology safety so as to ensure the randomness and the safety of the block chain; the root of the mercker tree is to solve the problem that the traditional data integrity verification is slow. Generally, if the amount of data is small, the hash value of the data is calculated before the data is transmitted and is followed by the tail of the data, and after the data is received by a receiver, in order to verify the integrity of the data, the data is hashed again and is compared with the hash value followed by the tail of the data, and if the hash value is the same as the hash value, the data is not modified, otherwise, the data is tampered. However, in the case of an excessively large amount of data, it is obvious that this approach is not suitable, and a large amount of resources are wasted. Therefore, a structure of the merkel tree for verifying the integrity of the data is provided, which can quickly summarize the integrity and correctness of the data in the verification blockchain, and the essence is a binary tree built based on hash values, and the building process is shown in fig. 4. The method comprises the steps of firstly carrying out Hash calculation on data at the bottom layer, carrying out pairwise Hash calculation on obtained Hash values, and finally obtaining a Hash tree root, namely a Merck tree root. When the subsequent data is verified, whether the data is modified can be judged only by verifying whether the root hash is changed, and if the data is tampered, the tampered position can be quickly positioned. If the data at N5 is tampered with, it can be determined that it is certain that the data of N2 or N3 is changed, and so on, and fast locating is performed.
Aiming at the characteristics of a block chain and the requirement of network security, the content in a block body is improved and consists of information (such as a network node ID value, a trust value, a suspicious node behavior type and monitoring time, a suspicious node list and a node state) collected by other network nodes in the communication range of the network node in the process of creating and verifying the current block. D0-Dn represent data acquired by the network node from the network, the D0 is hashed to obtain a hash value N0, N4 is a value obtained by hashing N0 and N1, and the hash values are hashed pairwise, and finally a root hash value is obtained and placed in a block header, so that the method can be used for quickly judging whether the data are tampered.
When a new network interaction round begins, new blocks are generated by the first node ranked by the agent nodes, the new blocks are generated by the agent nodes in turn according to the ranking sequence along with the increment of the network interaction round, when one agent node generates the blocks, other agent nodes randomly generate verification or non-verification selection, but at least more than 2 agent nodes carry out verification so as to prevent the agent nodes from being in cooperation with each other badly.
When a new block is generated, other proxy nodes are optionally verified. If the verification result is correct, giving a certain trust value reward to the proxy node generating the block, connecting the newly generated block to the block chain and broadcasting the block chain to other common nodes in the network; if the verification result is wrong, giving a certain trust value punishment to the proxy node for generating the block chain, and arranging the node to the tail end of the proxy node so that the node can not participate in generating the block any more in a certain time.
When a new node joins the network, the method can apply for obtaining block information from the original node in the network to obtain corresponding trust value information, quickly obtain trust information in the network and determine a trusted interaction node, and specifically comprises the following steps:
1. and when the new node joins the network, sending a message of applying for joining the network to the base station.
When a new node wants to join the network, interacting with other nodes in the network. The base station node should first apply for a join network certificate, and when the base station receives the application, the new node will be granted its join and the information will be broadcast to all nodes in the network. At this time, it indicates that the network node has successfully joined the network.
2. And after receiving the information of the base station node, the nearby node sends the block information to the new node.
And when the nodes nearby the new node receive the broadcast information of the base station, confirming that the new node is added into the network. And then its neighboring nodes send the block information to the new node.
3. After the new node obtains the block information, the trusted nodes in the area can be selected for interaction.
After the new node obtains the block information, all the security information in the network can be obtained. If the interactive object is determined before the network is added, whether the interactive object needs to be interacted with the block information can be determined according to the trust value of the relevant node in the block information; if no interactive object exists before the network is added, the nodes with higher trust values in the block information can be selected for interaction.
Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made in these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined in the appended claims and their equivalents.
Claims (8)
1. A5G power network node trust management method based on a block chain technology is characterized by comprising the following steps:
a credit mechanism is introduced into a power communication network formed by a power system and power equipment, a trust evidence is generated after node nodes in the power communication network interact with each other, a credit value of the node is calculated by the trust evidence, a total score of a current node is calculated according to the credit value of the node and reward and punishment obtained by the credit and punishment mechanism, and the first N nodes with the highest total score in the network are used as nodes of a maintenance consensus mechanism;
when a new block structure is generated in the network, the plurality of nodes perform joint verification on the generated block structure, and reward or punish the nodes generating the block structure according to the verification result;
when a new node joins the network, the new node applies block information to the nodes nearby to acquire an initial trust value.
2. The block chain technology-based 5G power network node trust management method according to claim 1, characterized in that in a communication network, a base station is used as a statistical node and a decision node, a node with the computing power larger than a set threshold in the network is used as a candidate node, and the other nodes are used as common nodes, and a node for maintaining a consensus mechanism is selected from the candidate nodes; the regular nodes may participate in the distribution of the tiles and the forwarding of messages as well as voting for the candidate nodes.
3. The block chain technology-based 5G power network node trust management method of claim 2, wherein the reputation value of a candidate node is averaged according to the interaction between the candidate node and a common node, and when packet loss and tampering occur in the interaction process between the candidate node and the common node in one detection, the candidate node is scored as 0; when the interaction process of the candidate node and the common node is delayed, the score of the candidate node is 0.5; when no packet loss, tampering or delay occurs in the interaction process of the candidate node and the common node, the score of the candidate node is 1.
4. The 5G power network node trust management method based on the blockchain technology of claim 2, wherein all common nodes in the network give credit values of the common nodes as rewards if voting is participated in the process of each round of voting, the credit values of the common nodes are reduced if the common nodes are deprived of the weights, and when the credit values of the common nodes are lower than a set threshold value, the common nodes cannot acquire block information.
5. The 5G power network node trust management method based on the blockchain technology according to claim 4, wherein when the reputation value of the common node is lower than a set threshold, the period for which the common node cannot acquire the block information is set to r network operation periods, and the authority of the common node is recovered after the r periods are finished; if the mth appearing credit value of the common node is lower than the set threshold, the period of time that the common node cannot acquire the block information is m multiplied by r network operation periods.
6. The method for managing the trust of the nodes in the 5G power network based on the blockchain technology as claimed in claim 1, wherein the calculating the total score of the nodes in the process of selecting the node maintaining the consensus mechanism comprises:
wherein Q is the total score of the candidate node, alpha i As weights of the ith node voted to the candidate nodes, S i The number of votes obtained in the voting link for the ith node voted for the candidate node is n, and the number of the nodes voted for the candidate node is n; t is the credit value of the candidate node, E is the initial energy value of the node, and epsilon is the attenuation factor.
7. The method as claimed in claim 6, wherein the weight of the node voted to the candidate node is determined by the power, network delay, and location of the node, and is expressed as:
α＝ηC+κL+λP；
wherein alpha represents the weight of the current node, and v represents the hash operation times of the node per second; t represents a network delay speed; (X, Y) is the coordinate of the current node, and (X, Y) is the coordinate of the whole network, the network takes the central point of a city as the starting point, the north of the city is the positive direction of an X axis, the east of the city is the positive direction of a Y axis, and then the network is expanded outwards, and the distance between the node and the center of the city is taken as one index; c represents the computational power of the current node, L represents the network delay of the current node, P represents the position of the current node, and eta, kappa and lambda are weights of C, L, P.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the block structure comprises a block number, a block header and a block body, wherein the block header comprises a negative block hash value and a version, a timestamp, a difficulty, a random number and a Mercker tree root of the block, and the block body comprises a node ID, a reputation value, an energy, a node type and a suspicious node list.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202211496396.4A CN115883578A (en) | 2022-11-25 | 2022-11-25 | 5G power network node trust management method based on block chain technology |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202211496396.4A CN115883578A (en) | 2022-11-25 | 2022-11-25 | 5G power network node trust management method based on block chain technology |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN115883578A true CN115883578A (en) | 2023-03-31 |
Family
ID=85764166
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202211496396.4A Pending CN115883578A (en) | 2022-11-25 | 2022-11-25 | 5G power network node trust management method based on block chain technology |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN115883578A (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN116489641A (en) * | 2023-05-05 | 2023-07-25 | 烟台欣飞智能系统有限公司 | 5G mobile device communication management and control system based on block chain |
-
2022
- 2022-11-25 CN CN202211496396.4A patent/CN115883578A/en active Pending
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN116489641A (en) * | 2023-05-05 | 2023-07-25 | 烟台欣飞智能系统有限公司 | 5G mobile device communication management and control system based on block chain |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN110784346B (en) | Reputation value-based PBFT consensus system and method | |
| CN109447795B (en) | Byzantine consensus method supporting rapid achievement of final confirmation | |
| CN110677485B (en) | Dynamic layered Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus method based on credit | |
| CN112039964B (en) | Node reputation consensus method based on block chain | |
| CN110796547A (en) | Improved practical Byzantine fault-tolerant system based on alliance block chain | |
| CN111131209B (en) | Improved efficient consensus method, system, computer device and storage medium | |
| CN111010278B (en) | High-fault-tolerance layering consensus method based on DPoS | |
| CN108900380B (en) | Node management method and implementation system thereof | |
| CN109214795A (en) | A kind of block chain mixing common recognition method based on DAG algorithm | |
| CN111090892A (en) | Block chain consensus method and device based on VRF and threshold signature | |
| CN113141414B (en) | Grouped multi-chain asynchronous consensus method for block chain nodes in CNFS protocol | |
| CN113570357A (en) | Dynamic layered efficient PBFT algorithm | |
| CN112468255B (en) | Block link point time synchronization method based on network consensus and VRF algorithm | |
| CN111935207A (en) | Block chain system consensus method based on improved C4.5 algorithm | |
| CN112788137A (en) | Alliance chain consensus method based on RAFT algorithm | |
| CN113660125B (en) | Consensus method and device based on random trusted committee | |
| CN113301047B (en) | Vehicle networking node consistency consensus method based on malicious node attack detection | |
| CN111798234B (en) | Lightweight block chain system and construction method | |
| CN115883578A (en) | 5G power network node trust management method based on block chain technology | |
| CN114003584A (en) | Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus method based on evolutionary game | |
| CN115633035B (en) | Improved PBFT (physical layer transmission) based block chain consensus algorithm for Internet of things | |
| CN115022326B (en) | Block chain Bayesian-court fault tolerance consensus method based on collaborative filtering recommendation | |
| CN114218612A (en) | Consensus method suitable for high-frequency trading scene of alliance chain | |
| CN114372589A (en) | Federated learning method and related device | |
| CN114449476A (en) | Block link point consensus method for safety communication in Internet of vehicles |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination |