CN115860750A - Electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method - Google Patents

Electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method Download PDF

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Publication number
CN115860750A
CN115860750A CN202310165002.5A CN202310165002A CN115860750A CN 115860750 A CN115860750 A CN 115860750A CN 202310165002 A CN202310165002 A CN 202310165002A CN 115860750 A CN115860750 A CN 115860750A
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electric vehicle
identity authentication
signature
privacy protection
protection method
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CN115860750B (en
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邱日轩
肖子洋
李元诚
付俊峰
陈牧
井思桐
施玮
金波
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State Grid Corp of China SGCC
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Jiangxi Electric Power Co Ltd
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State Grid Corp of China SGCC
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Jiangxi Electric Power Co Ltd
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Abstract

The invention discloses an electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method, which comprises the following steps: leader node selection of security parameters
Figure ZY_1
Running a group generation algorithm of the symmetric prime order bilinear pairs and generating public parameters, and selecting an anti-collision hash function by the leader node and issuing the public parameters; randomly selecting a main key and a public key which meet the requirement of uniform distribution from a collision-resistant hash function by the electric automobile; according to the identity authentication privacy protection scheme for the electric vehicle in the optimized charging and discharging transaction process, the anonymous certificate and the block chain are combined, and the credible third scheme is not relied onThe method uses pseudonyms to represent identities in the processes of charging/discharging optimization scheduling and identity authentication, the legality is endorsed by CL signatures and zero knowledge certificates, and security analysis shows that the proposed model does not reveal any privacy information to potential internal attackers such as block chain nodes and charging piles and any other external attackers and can resist some common attacks.

Description

Privacy protection method for electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of identity privacy protection, in particular to an electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method.
Background
With the large-scale popularization of electric vehicles, online electric power transaction between the electric vehicles and charging piles is more frequent, the traditional online transaction mode only allows the electric vehicles which are subjected to identity verification and authorization to access a system and participate in transaction, otherwise, security risks such as identity embezzlement, data tampering and information stealing are easy to occur;
in addition, the transaction information can also be collected and stored in a database for transaction information query, arbitration and the like, some private information of the electric vehicle user, such as the position, the available charging period, the license plate number, the driver's license and other private information, can be inevitably revealed in the process, and through analyzing the private information, an attacker can further reveal the track, the living habits and the like of the electric vehicle user and share the track, the living habits and the like with a marketer, an insurance company and the like.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method to solve the defects in the background technology.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the invention provides the following technical scheme: an electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method comprises the following steps:
s1: leader node selection of security parameters
Figure SMS_2
Running a group generation algorithm of symmetric prime order bilinear pairs
Figure SMS_4
Generating a common parameter, the leader node selects an anti-collision hash function>
Figure SMS_7
Issuing a common parameter->
Figure SMS_8
, wherein />
Figure SMS_9
Is a random prime number, is selected>
Figure SMS_10
Is prime-graded>
Figure SMS_11
G is belonging to>
Figure SMS_1
Is selected, is selected and is selected>
Figure SMS_3
For a bilinear map, in conjunction with a look-up table>
Figure SMS_5
Is a number>
Figure SMS_6
A finite field of (a);
s2: electric automobile
Figure SMS_13
，/>
Figure SMS_14
Slave->
Figure SMS_15
Randomly selecting a private key that satisfies a uniform distribution>
Figure SMS_16
And the public key->
Figure SMS_17
ω represents the number of electric vehicles served by each block link point, and the block link node ≥ h>
Figure SMS_18
，
Figure SMS_19
For issuing a certificate, signing a list of attributes, wherein ≥ is present>
Figure SMS_12
Is a random integer;
S3：
Figure SMS_20
proof key for a given credential paradigm, the zero knowledge proof expression is:
Figure SMS_21
，
in the formula ,
Figure SMS_23
is a safety parameter>
Figure SMS_24
In the possession of a credential>
Figure SMS_25
Are all number->
Figure SMS_26
Is determined by the random number in the finite field of,
Figure SMS_27
，/>
Figure SMS_28
selecting its private key>
Figure SMS_29
And the corresponding public key->
Figure SMS_22
。
Preferably, the electric vehicle
Figure SMS_30
The method comprises the following steps: setting each block link point to serve>
Figure SMS_31
Electric automobile
Figure SMS_32
And the electric automobile acquires the certificate from the block link point in a zero-knowledge proof mode and proves that the secret attribute corresponding to the certificate is known to the charging pile.
Preferably, in step S2, the block link points
Figure SMS_33
The detailed process of generating the proof is:
s2.1: selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_34
，/>
Figure SMS_35
And generates a random value
Figure SMS_36
；
S2.2: generating challenges
Figure SMS_37
, wherein />
Figure SMS_38
For marking the validity period of the proof of the article, device for selecting or keeping>
Figure SMS_39
Is a block link point>
Figure SMS_40
Identity information of (2);
s2.3: computing responses
Figure SMS_41
, wherein
Figure SMS_42
，/>
Figure SMS_43
，/>
Figure SMS_44
The operation is left-over operation;
s2.4: retention
Figure SMS_45
As its public key->
Figure SMS_46
The method (1) is carried out.
Preferably, the electric vehicle
Figure SMS_47
The method comprises the following steps: is arranged and/or is>
Figure SMS_48
The secret attribute set is formed by the secret attributes of the certificate
Figure SMS_49
，m ji For each attribute information, the same master secret is included as a special attribute in ≧>
Figure SMS_50
In the certificate of (4), the private key->
Figure SMS_51
Is->
Figure SMS_52
Help bind different credentials to the same identity.
Preferably, the secret attribute verification process is:
using public keys
Figure SMS_53
Before generating a commitment>
Figure SMS_54
Will request->
Figure SMS_55
Sending>
Figure SMS_56
Certifying and verifying public keys
Figure SMS_57
；
Figure SMS_58
The verification process comprises the following steps:
calculating a random value
Figure SMS_59
；
Calculating out
Figure SMS_60
；
Satisfy the requirement of
Figure SMS_61
Then the acceptance public key +>
Figure SMS_62
Otherwise, rejecting.
Preferably, the electric vehicle
Figure SMS_63
Use according to the Pedersen commitment scheme +>
Figure SMS_64
In conjunction with a public key (C;)>
Figure SMS_65
To the secret attribute pick>
Figure SMS_66
Generating a commitment>
Figure SMS_67
，/>
Figure SMS_68
Proof commitment is that correctly generating corresponding zero knowledge proof expression: />
Figure SMS_69
，
Figure SMS_70
Generating the proof of promise includes the steps of:
selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_71
，/>
Figure SMS_72
And generates random values>
Figure SMS_73
；
Generating challenges
Figure SMS_74
wherein />
Figure SMS_75
Is the current timestamp;
computing responses
Figure SMS_76
, wherein />
Figure SMS_77
；
Sending
Figure SMS_78
To>
Figure SMS_79
。
Preferably, the block link point
Figure SMS_80
Pair { [ MEANS FOR SIGNALING ]) Using CL-SIGNALING ALGORITHM>
Figure SMS_81
Committed commitment>
Figure SMS_82
Signing to issue a credential ≧>
Figure SMS_83
。
Preferably, the block link point
Figure SMS_85
Generates the factor->
Figure SMS_87
And calculate->
Figure SMS_89
，/>
Figure SMS_91
Calculating out
Figure SMS_94
And calculate->
Figure SMS_95
，/>
Figure SMS_96
Intermediate parameters which are all CL signature algorithms are finally->
Figure SMS_84
Calculated to obtainTo signature->
Figure SMS_86
And is sent to->
Figure SMS_88
Directly on a commitment using a CL signature algorithm>
Figure SMS_90
The signature generated pick>
Figure SMS_92
Valence directly to->
Figure SMS_93
The signature result of (2).
Preferably, the block link point
Figure SMS_97
Verifying the credential signature includes:
Figure SMS_98
receive>
Figure SMS_99
After the transmitted signature, the signature is verified>
Figure SMS_100
Valid, binding attribute set>
Figure SMS_101
Packaging into a signature certificate and storing, wherein the signature verification process comprises the following steps:
Figure SMS_102
by>
Figure SMS_103
Judging;
Figure SMS_104
and />
Figure SMS_105
Respectively pass through>
Figure SMS_106
and />
Figure SMS_107
Judging;
Figure SMS_108
pass and/or>
Figure SMS_109
And (6) judging.
Preferably, the first and second liquid crystal materials are,
Figure SMS_110
presenting a blinded version of a credential to participate in an optimized charge-discharge transaction>
Figure SMS_111
Selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_112
And computes the blinded version of the credential as:
Figure SMS_113
，
wherein ,
Figure SMS_114
is further blinded to +>
Figure SMS_115
Uniformly distributed, independent of all parameters, will->
Figure SMS_116
To do so>
Figure SMS_117
In a transaction, the pseudonym used in each transaction>
Figure SMS_118
Along with transaction information is recorded in the blockchain for transaction inquiry and transaction arbitration.
In the technical scheme, the invention has the following technical effects and advantages:
according to the identity authentication privacy protection scheme of the electric vehicle optimization charging and discharging transaction process, an anonymous certificate and a block chain are combined, a trusted third party is not relied on, the identity is represented by using a pseudonym in the charging/discharging optimization scheduling and identity authentication process, the pseudonym has anonymity and unlinkability, the legality is endorsed by CL signature and zero knowledge certificate, and security analysis shows that the proposed model does not leak any privacy information to potential internal attackers such as block chain nodes and charging piles and any other external attackers and can resist some common attacks.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments described in the present invention, and other drawings can be obtained by those skilled in the art according to the drawings.
FIG. 1 is a system architecture diagram of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a flow chart of the system setup of the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of anonymous attribute verification in accordance with the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a flowchart of credential issuance according to the present invention.
Fig. 5 is a flowchart illustrating the charging authentication of the electric vehicle according to the present invention.
FIG. 6 is a graph showing the calculation overhead of blockchain nodes according to the number of secret attributes
Figure SMS_119
And the number of electric vehicles served thereby>
Figure SMS_120
Schematic diagram of the variation of (1).
FIG. 7 shows the calculation of the electric vehicle and the charging pile according to the present inventionOverhead follow-up
Figure SMS_121
Schematic diagram of the variation of (1).
FIG. 8 shows the secret attribute numbers of the electric vehicle according to the present invention
Figure SMS_122
Total number of electric vehicles served by each block link point
Figure SMS_123
Schematic diagram of the variation.
FIG. 9 shows the communication overhead between the charging pile and the electric vehicle according to the present invention
Figure SMS_124
Schematic diagram of the variation of (1).
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are some, but not all, embodiments of the present invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Example 1
Referring to fig. 1 and fig. 2, in the present embodiment, a method for protecting privacy of electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication includes the following steps:
(1) Block chain node:
Figure SMS_125
is a set of nodes that make up a distributed blockchain network, where τ is a random integer. On one hand, all the blockchain nodes commonly maintain the normal operation of the blockchain network, including transaction generation, consensus, blockchain packaging and uplink and the like. On the other hand, the area block chain node also serves as a certificate issuing mechanism and issues a digital certificate to a group of attributes of the electric automobile in a distributed mode, and the digital certificate is called belowIs a credential.
In addition, the block chain system is built by the HyperledgerFabric, and the used Raft consensus algorithm has a mature, efficient and high-reliability leader node (leader) selection mechanism. Considering that a single node can be invaded by an attacker to cause a single point of failure, the leader node is a dynamically selected reliable node which is responsible for initializing system setting, issuing system common parameters and providing registration service for the nodes.
(2) Charging pile: the charging pile firstly verifies whether the electric automobile obtains charging permission or not, and then provides charging/discharging service for the electric automobile in a distributed mode. The built-in smart electric meter of charging pile can record the charge and discharge data of the electric automobile in real time.
(3) Electric automobile: assuming that each block link point is at most serviceable
Figure SMS_126
Electric automobile
Figure SMS_127
. The electric automobile obtains the certificate from the block link point in a zero-knowledge proof mode and proves to the charging pile that the secret attribute corresponding to the certificate is known. Therefore, the electric automobile obtains charge and discharge permission and completes charge and discharge transaction under the condition that no additional information is disclosed to the block link points and the charging pile, and the electric automobile and the block link points are communicated with each other through the internet.
1. Initialization
Leader node selects appropriate security parameters
Figure SMS_129
And runs a symmetric prime order bilinear pair group generation algorithm Setup (@ v)>
Figure SMS_133
) Generating common parameters, and selecting an anti-collision hash function->
Figure SMS_134
And finally, the leader node issuesPublic parameter->
Figure SMS_135
, wherein />
Figure SMS_136
Is a random prime number, is combined with a plurality of combinations of at least two different combinations>
Figure SMS_137
Is prime-graded>
Figure SMS_138
Is g belongs to->
Figure SMS_128
Is selected, is selected and is selected>
Figure SMS_130
For a bilinear map, in conjunction with a look-up table>
Figure SMS_131
Is a number of
Figure SMS_132
A finite field of (2).
2. Key generation
Electric automobile
Figure SMS_140
，/>
Figure SMS_141
Slave/slave unit>
Figure SMS_143
Randomly selecting a private key that satisfies a uniform distribution>
Figure SMS_146
And public key &>
Figure SMS_148
. Block link node->
Figure SMS_149
，/>
Figure SMS_150
Is used for issuing a certificate, i.e. for signing a list of attributes. />
Figure SMS_139
Selects its own private key->
Figure SMS_142
And corresponding public key
Figure SMS_144
，/>
Figure SMS_145
Are all number->
Figure SMS_147
Is determined by the random number in the finite field of,
Figure SMS_151
。
3. generating a zero knowledge proof
In addition to this, the present invention is,
Figure SMS_152
the key pair needs to be certified as correct for a given credential paradigm (defining the size of a message block-equivalent to the number of attributes of the credential). This zero knowledge proves to be as follows:
Figure SMS_153
(1)，
in the formula ,
Figure SMS_154
is a safety parameter>
Figure SMS_155
Is a credential.
The identity authentication privacy protection scheme of the electric vehicle optimization charging and discharging transaction process combined with the anonymous certificate and the block chain is designed, a trusted third party is not relied on, the identity is represented by using a pseudonym in the charging/discharging optimization scheduling and identity authentication process, the pseudonym has anonymity and unlinkability, the legality of the pseudonym is endorsed by CL signature and zero knowledge certificate, and security analysis shows that the proposed model cannot reveal any privacy information to potential internal attackers such as block chain nodes, charging piles and the like and any other external attackers and can resist some common attacks.
Figure SMS_156
The detailed procedure for generating the proof is as follows: />
(1) Selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_157
，/>
Figure SMS_158
And generates a random value->
Figure SMS_159
。
(2) Generating challenges
Figure SMS_160
, wherein />
Figure SMS_161
For marking the validity period of the proof of the certificate, device for selecting or keeping>
Figure SMS_162
Is a block link point>
Figure SMS_163
Identity information of (2).
(3) Computing responses
Figure SMS_164
, wherein />
Figure SMS_165
，/>
Figure SMS_166
，
Figure SMS_167
，/>
Figure SMS_168
，/>
Figure SMS_169
The operation is left-over operation.
(4) Final reservation
Figure SMS_170
As its public key +>
Figure SMS_171
The method (1) is carried out.
Anonymous attribute verification:
Figure SMS_172
it is desirable to register a credential for a set of attributes it owns (e.g., master key, driver's license expiration date, vehicle principal name, vehicle owner's nationality, vehicle owner ID, vehicle model number, account balance, charging post address, and charging post number);
to hide secret attributes such as master key, charging post number, etc., block chain nodes may be used
Figure SMS_173
Signing the commitment of the secret attribute set instead of the original attribute without loss of generality;
suppose that
Figure SMS_174
All attributes in the credential of (a) need to be kept secret, constituting a secret attribute set @>
Figure SMS_175
，m ji For each attribute information, in particular, the designation->
Figure SMS_176
I.e. the same master secret is included as a special attribute in all
Figure SMS_177
In the certificate of (1);
can be considered as a private key
Figure SMS_178
Act as->
Figure SMS_179
Help bind different credentials to the same identity, based on the identity of the subscriber>
Figure SMS_180
Is the number of other secret attributes than the master key, based on the key value>
Figure SMS_181
In or>
Figure SMS_182
Prior to obtaining a signature on a commitment, it is necessary to provide a zero knowledge proof that he does know the secret attribute ≧ corresponding to the commitment submitted>
Figure SMS_183
。
The whole process is shown in figure 3: the detailed anonymous attribute validation process is as follows:
1) Verifying the correctness of the public key: in using public keys
Figure SMS_184
Before generating a commitment>
Figure SMS_185
Will request->
Figure SMS_186
Sending
Figure SMS_187
And verifies it.
Figure SMS_188
The detailed verification process is as follows:
(1) Calculating a random value
Figure SMS_189
。
(2) Calculating out
Figure SMS_190
。
(3) If it is satisfied with
Figure SMS_191
Then the acceptance public key +>
Figure SMS_192
Otherwise, rejecting.
Figure SMS_193
Is correct and comes from>
Figure SMS_194
The following can be demonstrated:
Figure SMS_195
，
Figure SMS_196
，/>
Figure SMS_197
(2)，
Figure SMS_198
，
Figure SMS_199
，
2) Generating a secret property commitment: in order to hide the properties from view,
Figure SMS_200
use according to the Pedersen commitment scheme +>
Figure SMS_201
Of (2) a public key
Figure SMS_202
To the secret attribute pick>
Figure SMS_203
Generates a commitment>
Figure SMS_204
The Pedersen commitment solves the problem based on discrete logarithms, allowing a message submitter to submit a message to a certain verifier without revealing the committed message details.
3) And (3) generating a commitment certificate:
Figure SMS_205
his commitment must be proven to be correctly generated, corresponding to the following zero-knowledge proof:
Figure SMS_206
(3)，
Figure SMS_207
the detailed process of generating the proof of promise is as follows:
(1) Selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_208
，/>
Figure SMS_209
And generates a random value->
Figure SMS_210
；
(2) Generating challenges
Figure SMS_211
wherein />
Figure SMS_212
Is the current timestamp;
(3) Computing responses
Figure SMS_213
, wherein />
Figure SMS_214
，/>
Figure SMS_215
；
(4) Sending
Figure SMS_216
To>
Figure SMS_217
。
4) Verifying the acceptance certification: received from
Figure SMS_218
After the assertion of (4), is selected>
Figure SMS_219
Acts as proof that the verifier verifies the commitment by indirectly proving that the electric vehicle really knows the secret property ≥ corresponding to the commitment>
Figure SMS_220
：
(1) Computing
Figure SMS_221
；
(2) Computing
Figure SMS_222
；
(3) If it is satisfied with
Figure SMS_223
Then accepts the commitment>
Figure SMS_224
Otherwise, rejecting.
Figure SMS_225
Is correct and comes from>
Figure SMS_226
The following can be verified; />
Figure SMS_227
（4）。
Example 2
As shown in fig. 4: in the present example, the description is given
Figure SMS_228
Pair { [ MEANS FOR SIGNALING ]) Using CL-SIGNALING ALGORITHM>
Figure SMS_229
Committed commitment>
Figure SMS_230
Signing to issue a credential ≧>
Figure SMS_231
。
1) And (3) generating a certificate signature:
Figure SMS_235
firstly, a factor is randomly generated>
Figure SMS_238
And calculate->
Figure SMS_241
Then->
Figure SMS_243
Counting/or>
Figure SMS_245
，/>
Figure SMS_246
，/>
Figure SMS_247
And calculate->
Figure SMS_232
，
Figure SMS_234
Are all intermediate parameters of the CL signature algorithm. Finally->
Figure SMS_236
Calculating to obtain the signature
Figure SMS_237
And is sent to->
Figure SMS_239
. Directly committing/validating using CL signature algorithm>
Figure SMS_240
Generated signature
Figure SMS_242
Equivalent direct pair->
Figure SMS_244
Because->
Figure SMS_233
The following can be demonstrated:
Figure SMS_248
，
Figure SMS_249
，
Figure SMS_250
(5)，
Figure SMS_251
，/>
Figure SMS_252
，
Figure SMS_253
，
to pair
Figure SMS_255
In particular, the pair->
Figure SMS_257
Submitted->
Figure SMS_259
Signature and direct set of attributes thereof>
Figure SMS_261
The security of the signature is the same. This is because->
Figure SMS_263
The validity of the commitment corresponding attribute is proved in a zero-knowledge mode. Is paired and/or matched>
Figure SMS_264
In speaking, is>
Figure SMS_265
Can only be slave>
Figure SMS_254
Pick up an association>
Figure SMS_256
The privacy information of (1). But is known according to the Pedersen commitment>
Figure SMS_258
Is a safety commitment whose information is theoretically independent of &>
Figure SMS_260
So that the information theoretically hides the secret set of attributes ≥>
Figure SMS_262
。
2) Verifying the certificate signature: receive a
Figure SMS_266
After the transmitted signature, is/are>
Figure SMS_267
It is necessary to check its signature->
Figure SMS_268
Is valid and then combines with the attribute set>
Figure SMS_269
And packaging into a signature certificate and storing. The specific signature verification process is as follows:
2.1）
Figure SMS_270
whether or not it can correctly pass>
Figure SMS_271
To make a judgment. The correctness of this equation verifies as follows:
Figure SMS_272
(6)，
2.2）
Figure SMS_273
and />
Figure SMS_274
Can respectively pass through>
Figure SMS_275
And
Figure SMS_276
and (6) judging. The correctness verification of the two equations is shown as (7) and (8), respectively:
Figure SMS_277
(7),
Figure SMS_278
(8),
2.3）
Figure SMS_279
whether or not it can correctly pass>
Figure SMS_280
To judge. The correctness of this equation verifies as follows:
Figure SMS_281
(9)，
as shown in fig. 5, once
Figure SMS_282
Reach the charging station and connect with the stake of charging within a specified period of time, it needs to verify oneself and carry out charging and discharging. />
Figure SMS_283
Instead of simply sending an account and corresponding master key or key hash to the charging post for authentication, a different pseudonym (a special cryptographic token, derived non-deterministically from the credentials) is used to interact with the charging post. />
Figure SMS_284
It is necessary that the corresponding set of attributes for a pseudonym is not revealed>
Figure SMS_285
The pseudonym is proved to be owned by the charging pile on the premise of (1). Finally->
Figure SMS_286
The validity of the identity of the user is verified under the condition that privacy information is not leaked, so that the charging/discharging service provided by the charging pile is obtained.
In order not to reveal the credentials,
Figure SMS_287
presenting a blinded version of the credential to participate in optimizing the charging and discharging transaction. />
Figure SMS_288
Selecting a random number->
Figure SMS_289
And computes a blinded version of the credential as follows:
Figure SMS_290
，
wherein
Figure SMS_291
Is further blinded to >>
Figure SMS_292
The uniform distribution is independent of all other parameters. Can therefore combine +>
Figure SMS_293
To do so>
Figure SMS_294
The pseudonym of (1). Due to the non-tamperable and traceable security features of the blockchain, the pseudonym used in each transaction is->
Figure SMS_295
Along with other transaction information may be recorded in the blockchain for transaction inquiry and transaction arbitration.
3) Generating a certificate proof:
Figure SMS_296
it needs to be proven that he knows the set of attributes that the voucher corresponds to->
Figure SMS_297
The corresponding zero knowledge is demonstrated below.
Figure SMS_298
(10),
wherein
Figure SMS_299
，/>
Figure SMS_300
，/>
Figure SMS_301
，/>
Figure SMS_302
All are intermediate parameters of the CL signature.
Figure SMS_303
The detailed process of generating the credential proof is as follows:
computing
Figure SMS_304
、/>
Figure SMS_305
、/>
Figure SMS_306
and />
Figure SMS_307
；
Selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_308
，/>
Figure SMS_309
And calculates->
Figure SMS_310
；
Computing challenge
Figure SMS_311
, wherein />
Figure SMS_312
Is a current timestamp, which is used to resist potential replay attacks;
calculate the corresponding
Figure SMS_313
, wherein />
Figure SMS_314
，/>
Figure SMS_315
，/>
Figure SMS_316
；
Sending
Figure SMS_317
，/>
Figure SMS_318
And finally, charging the electric pile.
4) And (3) verification certificate certification: received from
Figure SMS_319
After the information is received, the charging pile firstly compares the current time with the timestamp &>
Figure SMS_320
To preliminarily judge the validity of the proof. Then, it is verified by judging whether the formulas (5-11) - (5-13) are satisfied or not
Figure SMS_321
，/>
Figure SMS_322
The validity of (2).
The correctness of equations (11) - (13) are proved to be similar to equations (6) - (8), and are not described in detail here.
Figure SMS_323
(11),
Figure SMS_324
(12),
Figure SMS_325
(13),
Finally, the charging pile completes the pairing through the following zero knowledge proving process
Figure SMS_326
Validation of submitted information and authorization to begin on a false name @>
Figure SMS_327
The electric automobile->
Figure SMS_328
And charging and discharging are carried out.
(1) Computing
Figure SMS_329
、/>
Figure SMS_330
、/>
Figure SMS_331
and />
Figure SMS_332
；
(2) Calculating out
Figure SMS_333
；
(3) Computing
Figure SMS_334
；
(4) If it is satisfied with
Figure SMS_335
The credential is accepted, otherwise it is rejected.
Figure SMS_336
Is correct and comes from>
Figure SMS_337
The following can be verified:
Figure SMS_338
,
it can be concluded from the above procedure that the cryptographic pseudonym derived therefrom has the property that on the one hand no entity can determine whether two pseudonyms are from the same master secret, and on the other hand if the master secret and other attributes corresponding to the pseudonym are not known, it is not possible for the electric vehicle to successfully authenticate itself by means of the pseudonym.
The attack mode of identity privacy protection comprises the following steps:
1. block link point attack
The electric automobile verifies that the anonymous secret attribute corresponding to the promise is known to the block link point in a zero-knowledge proof mode. The process does not require the electric vehicle to present its own true identity. And finally, the block chain node can only know that an anonymous electric vehicle requests for carrying out charge and discharge optimization scheduling, and cannot know privacy information such as charging habits, positions, personal information and the like from the process.
2. Attack of charging pile
The proposed scheme generates an electric vehicle pseudonym by CL signature and authenticates it with zero knowledge proof. The pseudonym is anonymous and unrelated to the true identity of the electric car. And finally, the charging pile can only know that a legal electric automobile completes charging and discharging in the distributed time period, and the real identity of the electric automobile cannot be known in the process.
3. Federation chain ledger attack
In the proposed scheme, the transaction information of the electric automobile and the charging pile stored on the alliance chain is transparent to users of the alliance chain. But a different electric vehicle pseudonym is saved in each newly generated transaction. Pseudonyms are randomly generated and evenly distributed, and it is difficult for an attacker to distinguish pseudonyms and associate them with a single identity.
4. Man-in-the-middle attack
Because the scheduling request information sent by the electric vehicle to the blockchain node can be encrypted by using the public key of the blockchain node. Even if an attacker were able to capture the data, it would not have access to the information inside. And even if an attacker hijacks the blockchain node and acquires the plaintext information of the scheduling request, the attacker can only know when and where a certain electric automobile is to be charged and discharged and cannot know the real identity of the electric automobile and associate the real identity with the future charging and discharging behaviors because the information is only bound with one pseudonym. In addition, the electric automobile needs to send the certification to the block link points in the identity authentication process. Since the proof is zero knowledge, the attacker cannot obtain any private information about the electric vehicle from the proof.
5. Replay attacks
The verifier finally judges the validity of the proof by detecting that the current time is within the valid period of the proof and verifying the cryptographic validity of the proof.
6. Denial of service attacks
The system can require a pre-paid deposit to resist denial of service attacks when the electric vehicle applies for charge and discharge scheduling transactions. Thus, initiating a large number of scheduling requests may be costly and reduce the aggression of an attacker.
The scheme mainly considers the identity privacy of the electric automobile and jointly considers the privacy of positions, charging habits and the like based on the identity privacy. The above security analysis may show that the proposed scheme does not reveal this private information to other internal or external attackers. The blockchain nodes cannot be exposed to private information, but are still able to authenticate the electric vehicle and issue a certificate to it with zero knowledge proof. It is difficult to link two certificates that result from the same credential with a charging post or block link point. The charging post can verify the validity of the electric vehicle by means of a credential (anonymous and not linkable to the real identity) and a corresponding proof without having to access other private information. Any attacker cannot acquire the scheduling request information and the personal information from the communication channel or the alliance chain ledger and match the scheduling request information and the personal information with the real electric vehicle identity. Therefore, the scheme can protect the privacy of the electric vehicle users in a distributed environment.
Example 3
This example is mainly used to evaluate the protection methods in examples 1 and 2, including:
1) Simulation setting: the scheme implements CL signature algorithm and SchnorrNIZKP protocol based on TypeAparing of JPBC (JavaPair-based cryptography) Library. The performance of the scheme was evaluated on an Intel (R) 4CoreCPU @2.80GHz8GB memory virtual machine running the CentOS7.4 computing system. In addition, the federation chain system is built based on HyperLegendr Fabricv2.3.2, and a client program and an intelligent contract are developed based on the fabric-sdk-java and the fabric-chaincode-java respectively.
In particular, bilinear pairings are in the field
Figure SMS_339
An upper configuration in which>
Figure SMS_340
A bit. />
Figure SMS_341
Is formed by an elliptic curve>
Figure SMS_342
A large prime order of a group of points which is->
Figure SMS_343
Has a bit length of 160, i.e.>
Figure SMS_344
A bit. />
2) And (3) analyzing the calculation cost: and (4) considering the calculation overhead of the block chain nodes, the electric automobile and the charging pile in the aspects of signature, signature verification, zero knowledge proof generation and verification.
Order to
Figure SMS_345
，/>
Figure SMS_346
Respectively represent->
Figure SMS_347
and />
Figure SMS_348
Computation overhead of medium exponent operation, where->
Figure SMS_349
Is a prime numberA multiplication loop group of order q. Make->
Figure SMS_350
Representing the computational overhead of the pair operation in a bilinear pair.
The computational overhead of other operations (e.g., random number generation, multiplication, and hash value calculation) is negligible compared to the computational overhead of exponential operations and operations. Is measured by experiments
Figure SMS_351
，/>
Figure SMS_352
，
Figure SMS_353
。
Verifying commitment certification needs of an electric vehicle for a blockchain node
Figure SMS_354
Is/are>
Figure SMS_355
The exponential operation in (1). Block link point calculation of probable need ∑ for signature of an electric vehicle>
Figure SMS_356
Number of or>
Figure SMS_357
The exponential operation in (1). So that one block chain node serves all->
Figure SMS_358
Total calculation cost of individual electric vehicles is ^ greater than ^ equal>
Figure SMS_359
。
For an electric vehicle, EV validation
Figure SMS_361
Need for correctness>
Figure SMS_362
Is/are>
Figure SMS_363
Is generated based on the exponent operation in (1), the generation of a commitment needs->
Figure SMS_364
Is/are>
Figure SMS_365
Generating a commitment proof need->
Figure SMS_366
Is/are>
Figure SMS_367
The calculation overhead is
Figure SMS_360
。
Electric vehicle inspection
Figure SMS_369
、/>
Figure SMS_372
and />
Figure SMS_373
Need to be respectively>
Figure SMS_374
and />
Figure SMS_375
A plurality of pairs of operations, checking->
Figure SMS_376
Need to->
Figure SMS_377
A pair-wise arithmetic sum->
Figure SMS_368
Is/are>
Figure SMS_370
Is based on an exponent operation in (4), with a calculation overhead of->
Figure SMS_371
。
The electric automobile needs about calculation certification
Figure SMS_378
A plurality of pairs of arithmetic operations, based on the evaluation result>
Figure SMS_379
Is/are>
Figure SMS_380
Is based on an exponent operation in (4), with a calculation overhead of->
Figure SMS_381
. The total calculation cost of an electric vehicle is thus
Figure SMS_382
。
For a charging pile, the charging pile needs to be paired first
Figure SMS_383
，/>
Figure SMS_384
Signature verification requires->
Figure SMS_385
And (4) carrying out pair operation. The charging post then verifies that SchnorrNIZKF requires about >>
Figure SMS_386
A sum of pairs
Figure SMS_387
Is/are>
Figure SMS_388
The exponential operation in (1).
So that a charging pile serves the totality of an electric vehicleThe calculation cost is
Figure SMS_389
。
FIG. 6 shows the computational overhead of a blockchain node as a function of the number of secret attributes
Figure SMS_390
And the number of electric vehicles served thereby>
Figure SMS_391
Of the cell.
When in use
Figure SMS_392
，/>
Figure SMS_393
I.e. only the attribute->
Figure SMS_394
When secret keeping is carried out, the minimum calculation cost of the block chain link point is ^ greater than or equal to>
Figure SMS_395
. When/is>
Figure SMS_396
，/>
Figure SMS_397
The maximum computation overhead of the time zone blockchain node is obtained
Figure SMS_398
s。
Therefore, a blockchain node can issue anonymous certificates for all the served electric vehicles in less than half a minute.
FIG. 7 shows the calculation cost of an electric vehicle and a charging pile as a function of time
Figure SMS_399
The variation of (2). When +>
Figure SMS_400
Electric vehicle andcharging pile respectively obtains minimum calculation cost of ^ greater than or equal to>
Figure SMS_401
and />
Figure SMS_402
. When/is>
Figure SMS_403
In time, the electric automobile and the charging pile respectively obtain the maximum calculation expense of ^ and/or greater than>
Figure SMS_404
and />
Figure SMS_405
. Therefore, the electric automobile and the charging pile can complete the identity authentication process in less than 1 s. />
3) Analyzing communication overhead: secure hash function in SchnorrinZKP is implemented using SHA-256 algorithm
Figure SMS_406
Hash value thereof is greater or less>
Figure SMS_407
. Each +, as set forth in the simulation>
Figure SMS_408
The size of the element is
Figure SMS_409
. Each->
Figure SMS_410
The size of the element in (B) is->
Figure SMS_411
。
Consider the communication overhead between the block link node and the electric vehicle. Each electric automobile
Figure SMS_413
Sending proofs
Figure SMS_414
，/>
Figure SMS_416
To the block link point. Challenge->
Figure SMS_418
Is greater or less than>
Figure SMS_419
. Each->
Figure SMS_421
Is in the size >>
Figure SMS_423
，/>
Figure SMS_425
Has a total size of->
Figure SMS_426
。/>
Figure SMS_428
Is big or small>
Figure SMS_430
。/>
Figure SMS_433
And can be ignored. />
Figure SMS_434
Send signature pickand place>
Figure SMS_435
，/>
Figure SMS_436
Give/pick>
Figure SMS_412
。/>
Figure SMS_415
All sizes areIs->
Figure SMS_417
. Each one of which is
Figure SMS_420
Is big or small>
Figure SMS_422
，/>
Figure SMS_424
And &>
Figure SMS_427
Is all big or small>
Figure SMS_429
. So that the block chain node serves all->
Figure SMS_431
Total communication overhead of an electric vehicle is
Figure SMS_432
Bytes。
Consider the communication overhead between a charging pile and an electric vehicle. Each electric vehicle sends
Figure SMS_438
，/>
Figure SMS_440
Give and fill electric pile. Challenge->
Figure SMS_442
Is greater or less than>
Figure SMS_444
. Each->
Figure SMS_446
Is greater than or equal to>
Figure SMS_448
And therefore->
Figure SMS_450
Has a total size of->
Figure SMS_437
. Blinded signature->
Figure SMS_439
Comprising +>
Figure SMS_441
Medium element, thus->
Figure SMS_443
A size of
Figure SMS_445
Bytes。/>
Figure SMS_447
Can be ignored. Therefore, the total communication cost of one charging pile and 1 electric vehicle served by the charging pile is ≥ based on>
Figure SMS_449
Bytes。
FIG. 8 shows the number of secret attributes associated with an electric vehicle
Figure SMS_452
Total number of electric vehicles served by each block link point
Figure SMS_453
And the total communication overhead of one blockchain node is changed. When/is>
Figure SMS_454
，/>
Figure SMS_455
Block chaining point taking minimum communication overhead->
Figure SMS_456
. When/is>
Figure SMS_457
，/>
Figure SMS_458
At that time, the block chain node point gets the maximum communication overhead->
Figure SMS_451
。
FIG. 9 shows communication overhead between a charging pile and an electric vehicle
Figure SMS_459
The variation of (2). When the temperature is higher than the set temperature
Figure SMS_460
In the meantime, the minimum communication overhead of the charging pile and the electric automobile is
Figure SMS_461
. When in use
Figure SMS_462
In the meantime, the maximum communication overhead between the charging pile and the electric automobile is
Figure SMS_463
。
As can be seen from fig. 8 and 9, both the process of issuing anonymous certificates to all the served electric vehicles by the blockchain node and the charging and discharging authentication process of the electric vehicles occupy less communication resources.
The above embodiments may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented in software, the above-described embodiments may be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product comprises one or more computer instructions or computer programs. The procedures or functions described in accordance with the embodiments of the present application are produced in whole or in part when the computer instructions or the computer program are loaded or executed on a computer. The computer may be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a network of computers, or other programmable device. The computer instructions may be stored on a computer readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer readable storage medium to another computer readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center by wire (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.). The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device, such as a server, data center, etc., that contains one or more collections of available media. The usable medium may be a magnetic medium (e.g., floppy disk, hard disk, magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., DVD), or a semiconductor medium. The semiconductor medium may be a solid state disk.
It should be understood that the term "and/or" herein is merely one type of association relationship that describes an associated object, meaning that three relationships may exist, e.g., a and/or B may mean: a exists singly, A and B exist simultaneously, and B exists singly, wherein A and B can be singular or plural. In addition, the "/" in this document generally indicates that the former and latter associated objects are in an "or" relationship, but may also indicate an "and/or" relationship, which may be understood with particular reference to the former and latter text.
In this application, "at least one" means one or more, "a plurality" means two or more. "at least one of the following" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of the singular or plural items. For example, at least one (one) of a, b, or c, may represent: a, b, c, a-b, a-c, b-c, or a-b-c, wherein a, b, c may be single or multiple.
It should be understood that, in the various embodiments of the present application, the sequence numbers of the above-mentioned processes do not mean the execution sequence, and the execution sequence of each process should be determined by its function and inherent logic, and should not constitute any limitation to the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.
Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the various illustrative elements and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, or combinations of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the technical solution. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present application.
It is clear to those skilled in the art that, for convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the above-described systems, apparatuses and units may refer to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and are not described herein again.
In the several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed system, apparatus and method may be implemented in other ways. For example, the above-described apparatus embodiments are merely illustrative, and for example, the division of the units is only one type of logical functional division, and other divisions may be realized in practice, for example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted, or not executed. In addition, the shown or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be in an electrical, mechanical or other form.
The units described as separate parts may or may not be physically separate, and parts displayed as units may or may not be physical units, may be located in one place, or may be distributed on a plurality of network units. Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.
In addition, functional units in the embodiments of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units are integrated into one unit.
The functions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium if they are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as separate products. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present application or portions thereof that substantially contribute to the prior art may be embodied in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium and including instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device) to execute all or part of the steps of the method according to the embodiments of the present application. And the aforementioned storage medium includes: a variety of media that can store program codes, such as a usb disk, a removable hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a Random Access Memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.
The above description is only for the specific embodiments of the present application, but the scope of the present application is not limited thereto, and any person skilled in the art can easily conceive of the changes or substitutions within the technical scope of the present application, and shall be covered by the scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims (10)

1. An electric vehicle electric power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method is characterized by comprising the following steps: the protection method comprises the following steps:
s1: leader node selection of security parameters
Figure QLYQS_2
Running a group generation algorithm of symmetric prime order bilinear pairs->
Figure QLYQS_4
Generating a common parameter, the leader node selecting an anti-collision hash function>
Figure QLYQS_6
Publishing public parameters
Figure QLYQS_7
, wherein />
Figure QLYQS_8
Is a random prime number, is selected>
Figure QLYQS_10
Is prime-graded>
Figure QLYQS_11
Is g belongs to->
Figure QLYQS_1
In a generating unit of (2), in a manner known per se>
Figure QLYQS_3
Is a bilinear map, is asserted>
Figure QLYQS_5
Is a number>
Figure QLYQS_9
A finite field of (a);
s2: electric automobile
Figure QLYQS_12
，/>
Figure QLYQS_14
Slave->
Figure QLYQS_16
Randomly selecting a privacy key that satisfies a uniform distribution>
Figure QLYQS_17
And public key
Figure QLYQS_18
，/>
Figure QLYQS_19
Represents the number of electric vehicles served by each block link point, and the block link node->
Figure QLYQS_20
，
Figure QLYQS_13
For issuing vouchers, signing an attribute list, wherein &>
Figure QLYQS_15
Is a random integer;
S3：
Figure QLYQS_21
proof key for a given credential paradigm, the zero knowledge proof expression is:
Figure QLYQS_22
，
in the formula ,
Figure QLYQS_23
for a safety parameter, <' >>
Figure QLYQS_25
In the possession of a credential>
Figure QLYQS_26
Are all number->
Figure QLYQS_27
Is determined by the random number in the finite field of,
Figure QLYQS_28
，/>
Figure QLYQS_29
selecting its private key>
Figure QLYQS_30
And the corresponding public key->
Figure QLYQS_24
。
2. The electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: the electric automobile
Figure QLYQS_31
The method comprises the following steps: setting each block link point to serve>
Figure QLYQS_32
Electric automobile>
Figure QLYQS_33
And the electric automobile acquires the certificate from the block link point in a zero-knowledge proof mode and proves that the secret attribute corresponding to the certificate is known to the charging pile.
3. The electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method according to claim 2, characterized in that: in step S2, block link points
Figure QLYQS_34
The detailed process of generating the proof is:
s2.1: selecting random numbers
Figure QLYQS_35
，/>
Figure QLYQS_36
And generates a random value->
Figure QLYQS_37
；
S2.2: generating challenges
Figure QLYQS_38
, wherein />
Figure QLYQS_39
For marking the validity period of the proof of the certificate, device for selecting or keeping>
Figure QLYQS_40
Is a block link point>
Figure QLYQS_41
Identity information of (2);
s2.3: computing responses
Figure QLYQS_42
, wherein
Figure QLYQS_43
，/>
Figure QLYQS_44
，
Figure QLYQS_45
The operation is left-over operation;
s2.4: retention
Figure QLYQS_46
As its public key->
Figure QLYQS_47
The method (1) is carried out. />
4. The electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method according to claim 3, characterized in that: the electric automobile
Figure QLYQS_48
The method comprises the following steps: is arranged and/or is>
Figure QLYQS_49
The secret attribute set is formed by the secret attributes of the certificate
Figure QLYQS_50
，m ji For each attribute information, the same master secretMi is included as a special attribute in +>
Figure QLYQS_51
In the certificate, the private key &>
Figure QLYQS_52
Is->
Figure QLYQS_53
Help bind different credentials to the same identity.
5. The electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method according to claim 4, characterized in that: the secret attribute verification process is as follows:
using public keys
Figure QLYQS_54
Before generating a commitment>
Figure QLYQS_55
Will request->
Figure QLYQS_56
Send>
Figure QLYQS_57
Proves and verifies that the public key->
Figure QLYQS_58
；
Figure QLYQS_59
The verification process comprises the following steps:
calculating a random value
Figure QLYQS_60
；
Computing
Figure QLYQS_61
；
Satisfy the requirement of
Figure QLYQS_62
Then the public key is accepted>
Figure QLYQS_63
Otherwise, rejecting.
6. The electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method according to claim 5, characterized in that: the electric automobile
Figure QLYQS_64
Use according to the Pedersen commitment scheme +>
Figure QLYQS_65
Is greater than or equal to the public key>
Figure QLYQS_66
To the secret attribute pick>
Figure QLYQS_67
Generates a commitment>
Figure QLYQS_68
，/>
Figure QLYQS_69
Proof commitment is that correctly generating corresponding zero knowledge proof expression is:
Figure QLYQS_70
，
Figure QLYQS_71
generating the proof of promise includes the steps of:
selecting random numbers
Figure QLYQS_72
，/>
Figure QLYQS_73
And generates a random value->
Figure QLYQS_74
；
Generating challenges
Figure QLYQS_75
wherein />
Figure QLYQS_76
Is the current timestamp;
computing responses
Figure QLYQS_77
, wherein />
Figure QLYQS_78
(ii) a Sending
Figure QLYQS_79
To>
Figure QLYQS_80
。
7. The electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: the block chain node
Figure QLYQS_81
Pair { [ MEANS FOR SIGNALING ]) Using CL-SIGNALING ALGORITHM>
Figure QLYQS_82
Committed commitment>
Figure QLYQS_83
Signing to issue a credential ≧>
Figure QLYQS_84
。
8. The electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method according to claim 7, characterized in that: the block chain node
Figure QLYQS_85
Is randomly generated>
Figure QLYQS_87
And calculate->
Figure QLYQS_89
，/>
Figure QLYQS_91
Computing
Figure QLYQS_94
And calculate->
Figure QLYQS_96
，/>
Figure QLYQS_97
Are intermediate parameters of the CL signature algorithm, finally->
Figure QLYQS_86
Calculates to obtain a signature pick>
Figure QLYQS_88
And send to +>
Figure QLYQS_90
Directly on a commitment using a CL signature algorithm>
Figure QLYQS_92
The signature generated pick>
Figure QLYQS_93
Valence direct pair>
Figure QLYQS_95
The signature result of (1).
9. The electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method according to claim 8, characterized in that: the block chain node
Figure QLYQS_98
Verifying the credential signature includes:
Figure QLYQS_99
receive and answer>
Figure QLYQS_100
After the transmitted signature, the signature is verified>
Figure QLYQS_101
Valid, binding attribute set>
Figure QLYQS_102
Packaging into a signature certificate and storing, wherein the signature verification process comprises the following steps:
Figure QLYQS_103
by>
Figure QLYQS_104
Judging;
Figure QLYQS_105
and />
Figure QLYQS_106
Respectively pass through>
Figure QLYQS_107
and />
Figure QLYQS_108
Judging; />
Figure QLYQS_109
By passing
Figure QLYQS_110
And (6) judging.
10. The electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method according to claim 9, characterized in that:
Figure QLYQS_111
presenting a blinded version of a credential to participate in an optimized charge-discharge transaction>
Figure QLYQS_112
Selecting a random number->
Figure QLYQS_113
And computes the blinded version of the credential as:
Figure QLYQS_114
，
wherein ,
Figure QLYQS_115
is further blinded to >>
Figure QLYQS_116
Uniformly distributed, independent of all parameters, will->
Figure QLYQS_117
To do so>
Figure QLYQS_118
Pseudonyms of eachPseudonym used in a sub-transaction>
Figure QLYQS_119
Along with transaction information is recorded in the blockchain for transaction inquiry and transaction arbitration. />
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