CN115858687A - Auditable and compulsory revocable block chain modification method and system - Google Patents
Auditable and compulsory revocable block chain modification method and system Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention provides a block chain modification method and a block chain modification system capable of auditing and forcibly revoking, which relate to the technical field of block chain safety, and the specific scheme comprises the following steps: performing inner and outer color-changing dragon hash chain connection on the chain connection data based on keys of a user and an auditor; the auditor audits the new modified data of the user and generates an audit certificate for the new modified data which passes the audit; based on the audit certification, the modified new data and the original data of the inner chameleon hash, the user modifies the data on the block chain; the auditor periodically checks the modified data, and forcibly cancels the modification which does not pass the check through the trap door with the outer chameleon hash; the present invention ensures that new, newly modified data is content audited prior to winding, and also supports revocation of operations and overhead of modifier modification rights when modification operations are illegal.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of block chain security, and particularly relates to a block chain modification method and system capable of auditing and forcibly canceling.
Background
The statements in this section merely provide background information related to the present disclosure and may not necessarily constitute prior art.
The block chain technology has the characteristics of decentration, openness and transparency and no falsification, and provides a safety guarantee and a credit platform for various distributed applications such as finance, a supply chain, an intelligent contract, the Internet of things and the like; among them, the non-tamper property is a property that is most critical to building the credibility of the block chain, and it is important to ensure that the data recorded on the chain is not modified, tampered or forged, and to ensure the integrity of the data on the chain.
However, with the expansion of blockchain applications and the increase of blockchain data volume, from the data processing point of view, such absolute irreparable modification sometimes becomes redundant, for example, data protection regulations require that data storage should have "forgetting" while data on the blockchain cannot be deleted or modified, so that the regulations cannot be satisfied and cannot be directly used for data storage; in addition, when data management is performed by using the block chain, once the uplink of erroneous and illegal data is difficult to modify, only a new block or branch can be generated, which may cause the consequences of low management efficiency, bad information dissemination, etc. In the face of such problems, atenies et al propose an editable block chain based on chameleon hash, and only need to update the hash primitive by using a trapdoor key without creating a new transaction or forking when modifying or deleting data on the chain, and the hash value is unchanged, and the scheme has been applied in the industry in 2017.
However, the existing chameleon hash-based editable blockchain only focuses on controlling the modification right, for example, the chameleon hash based on identity or policy gives the modification right of the hash value to a modifier meeting the requirements of identity or policy, that is, a trapdoor for finding chameleon hash collision is handed to the modifier, and when modification or deletion is needed, the modifier can directly operate data on the blockchain; this presents two problems:
(1) When a modifier wants to modify the data on the link, the existing method cannot verify the correctness of the modified new data, so that the modifier cannot be prevented from maliciously tampering legal and key information;
(2) Because the modifier is the only party with the data modification right, the behavior of the modifier is not restricted, once the modifier deletes or modifies the data on the chain in an error or malicious way, the existing method can not withdraw the operation and can not withdraw the modification right of the modifier.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to overcome the defects of the prior art, the invention provides an auditable and compulsory revocable block chain modification method and system, which ensure that the modified new data is subjected to content audit before uplink, and support the revocation of operation and the revoking of modification authority of a modifier when the modification operation is illegal.
In order to achieve the above object, one or more embodiments of the present invention provide the following technical solutions:
the invention provides a block chain modification method which can be audited and can be forcibly cancelled;
an auditable, mandatory-revocable blockchain modification method, comprising:
performing inner and outer color-changing dragon hash chain connection on the chain connection data based on keys of a user and an auditor;
after receiving an audit request sent by a user, an auditor audits the new data modified by the user and generates an audit certificate for the modified new data which passes the audit;
based on the audit certification, the modified new data and the original data of the inner chameleon hash, the user modifies the data on the block chain;
and the auditor periodically checks the modified data, and forcibly cancels the modification which does not pass the check through the trap door of the outer chameleon hash.
Further, the keys of the user and the auditor are generated through a key generation algorithm based on the generated public parameters when the block chain is initialized.
Further, the inner chameleon hash layer and the outer chameleon hash layer are obtained by calculating a user private key, and the outer chameleon hash layer is obtained by calculating an auditor public key and the user private key.
Further, the audit request sent by the user specifically includes: commitment of new data to modify and zero knowledge proof thereof;
the commitment of the new modified data is calculated in a blinding mode;
the zero knowledge proof is the zero knowledge proof of the calculation commitment and the private key of the user.
Further, the auditor generates an audit trail for the new modified data that is audited, specifically:
an auditor receives a modification request of a user;
verifying that the zero knowledge proof is legal;
verifying the correctness of the modified new data;
and generating an audit certificate for the verified modified new data through self-adaptive pre-signing, and encrypting and sending the audit certificate to the user.
Further, the user modifies the data on the block chain based on the audit trail, the modified new data and the original data of the inner chameleon hash, specifically:
verifying the audit certificate;
and after the verification is passed, replacing the original data of the inner chameleon hash by the audit certification and the modified new data, and modifying the original image of the inner chameleon hash.
Further, the trapdoor with the outer chameleon hash is used for forcibly canceling the modification which is not checked, and specifically comprises the following steps:
the auditor extracts the private key of the outer chameleon hash as a trapdoor of the outer chameleon hash based on the audit certification and the modified new data;
and rewriting the inner chameleon hash based on the extracted outer chameleon hash trapdoor to realize the suspension of the modification right of the user and the forced revocation of the modified new data.
A second aspect of the invention provides an auditable, mandatory-to-revocable blockchain modification system.
An auditable and compulsory revocation blockchain modification system, comprising a data hashing module, a modification auditing module, a data modification module and a modification revocation module:
a data hashing module configured to: performing inner and outer color-changing dragon hash chain connection on the chain connection data based on keys of a user and an auditor;
a modification audit module configured to: the auditor audits the new modified data of the user and generates an audit certificate for the new modified data which passes the audit;
a data modification module configured to: based on the audit certification, the modified new data and the original data of the inner chameleon hash, the user modifies the data on the block chain;
a modification revocation module configured to: and the auditor periodically checks the modified data, and forcibly cancels the modification which does not pass the check through the trap door of the outer chameleon hash.
A third aspect of the present invention provides a computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a program which, when executed by a processor, carries out the steps of a method of auditable, revocable blockchain modification according to the first aspect of the present invention.
A fourth aspect of the present invention provides an electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor and a program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the steps of the auditable and compulsory revocation block chain modification method according to the first aspect of the present invention when executing the program.
The above one or more technical solutions have the following beneficial effects:
compared with the original block chain modification method based on chameleon hash, the block chain modification method based on chameleon hash utilizes self-adaptive signatures, zero knowledge proof, double-layer chameleon hash structures and the like to provide modified new data audit for each modification, and verifiable audit proof generated by both the modifier and the auditor ensures that the modified new data on the chain is correct and the modification is agreed by both parties, so that the safety of modification behaviors and the reliability of the block chain are improved.
The invention utilizes the hash key extraction design capable of being extracted forcibly, the revocation authority of the modification behavior is given to the auditor, the auditor can revoke the modification with problems and revoke the modification authority of the modifier with problems, and the problems of counterfeit modification and malicious modification of the modifier in the block chain modification process are solved.
The invention improves the safety and reliability protection of the modification process, so that the credible assumption of a modifier can be relaxed, a common user can reasonably modify the data on the chain under the supervision of an auditor, a data owner can conveniently manage the data, and the capacity and efficiency of data management and storage of the block chain are improved.
Advantages of additional aspects of the invention will be set forth in part in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of the invention.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, are included to provide a further understanding of the invention, and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate exemplary embodiments of the invention and together with the description serve to explain the invention and not to limit the invention.
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the method of the first embodiment.
FIG. 2 is a timing diagram of the method according to the first embodiment.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described with reference to the following figures and examples.
The symbols and parameters in the examples are illustrated in table 1.
TABLE 1 Key symbols and parameter Table
Example one
The existing editable block chain method based on chameleon hash assigns the modifying right of a hash value to a modifier meeting the requirements of identity or strategy, so that at least two roles exist in the system: the system comprises a modifier and a user, wherein the modifier can modify the uplink data endowed with the modification authority, and the user can not directly modify the own on-chain data before being endowed with the modification authority and converted into the role of the modifier, so that the user cannot efficiently manage the own on-chain data, and the data management capability and efficiency of the block chain are reduced.
In order to improve the efficiency of data modification, the present embodiment sets at least two roles, namely a user and an auditor, on a block chain, and ensures auditability, withdrawability and security of a modification behavior by increasing audit on new modified data and withdrawal on the modification behavior, so that a modification right can be directly given to the user without causing a significant influence on the security of the block chain system, and the user can manage data on the block chain.
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of the method in this embodiment, and as shown in fig. 1, ach is the method in this embodiment, hash is the data hash algorithm in this embodiment, adapt is the decryption adaptation algorithm, and H is the secure hash function. The blocks adopt a standard block chain data structure, one block
The method comprises the following steps: 1) The previous block hash being the previous block->
A hash value calculated by a secure hash function; 2) A time stamp, which is the time when the block is recorded in the block chain; 3) The hash tree root is a root node hash value of the Mercker tree formed by the hashes of all transactions on the current chain; 4) And the random number is a random workload proof generated by the block chain consensus algorithm. A. B, C and D are summary records corresponding to different transaction data, namely hash values of the transaction data calculated by a secure hash function. The block chain modification scheme is to modify the transaction level, and after modification, the chameleon hash value h corresponding to the data m contained in the original block corresponds to the summary note on the chainRecord D = H (H), after modification, the chameleon hash value corresponding to the new data m' is still H, and the digest records D × = H (H) corresponding to the chain are equal to D, so that the change of the hash tree root of the block chain is not caused.
On the basis of two roles of a user and an auditor, as shown in fig. 1, the embodiment discloses an auditable and revocable block chain modification method ACHR, which includes:
performing inner and outer color-changing dragon hash chain connection on the chain connection data based on keys of a user and an auditor;
the auditor audits the new modified data of the user and generates an audit certificate for the new modified data which passes the audit;
based on the audit certification, the modified new data and the original data of the inner chameleon hash, the user modifies the data on the block chain;
and the auditor periodically checks the modified data, and forcibly cancels the modification which does not pass the check through the trap door of the outer chameleon hash.
Fig. 2 is a timing diagram of the method of the embodiment, and as shown in fig. 2, an auditable and revocable-enforced blockchain modification method is based on cryptographic algorithms such as chameleon hash algorithm, self-adaptive signature, and the like, where "record" means that a verified block is recorded on a blockchain. The specific scheme can be realized by referring to the following contents:
the first process is as follows: and initializing, including generating public parameters and generating keys of the role entities.
In addition to the normal initialization of the block chain, including the establishment of a point-to-point network, the setting of a consensus algorithm, and the like, in this embodiment, keys of the user and the auditor are generated through a key generation algorithm based on the generated public parameters.
Generating common parameters by setup algorithm
The user and the auditor generate keys via the ukeygen and akeygen algorithms, respectively, wherein the user key ≧ is>
Contains two pairs of keys: a pair of RSA keys>
And a pair of ^ which satisfy the difficult relationship R>
The auditor key contains two pairs of RSA keys: one pair for RSA encryption and one pair for adapter signing keys to generate an adaptable, non-forgeable audit trail.
The difficult relationship R is a relationship defined for the proposition/evidence pair (Y, Y) that satisfies the following condition: 1) An algorithm GenR exists that makes it easy to calculate (Y, Y); 2) R is polynomial time calculable; 3) The likelihood of generating a legitimate proof Y for Y is negligible for an attacker in any polynomial time.
The method comprises the following specific steps:
(1) Generating a common parameter by the formula:
the input is a safety parameter->
The output is a public parameter->
The method specifically comprises the following steps:
selecting a prime number
So that->
Wherein is present>
Is the RSA key generation algorithm with the security parameter->
And
for the maximum value that can be generated by the input, <' > H>
。
Selecting a prime number
So that->
Wherein is present>
Is the RSA key generation algorithm with the security parameter->
And
for the maximum value that can be generated by the input, <' > H>
。
Setting algorithm for running zero knowledge proof
Two parameters are generated: public reference character string->
And the extraction key pickup>
。
Outputting common parameters
Wherein is present>
Is a safety parameter->
Is two selected prime numbers, is selected>
Is the two maxima generated, is>
Is a common reference string.
(2) Generating a user key, formulated as:
input as a common parameter->
The output is the key pair->
，/>
Is the user's private key->
The user public key specifically includes:
knowing common parameters
Run RSA Key Generation Algorithm to get >>
So that->
，
Wherein is present>
From a common parameter->
Is taken and is taken>
、/>
Is two different large prime numbers, is>
、/>
Is the generated public-private key pair.
In the circulation group
On random selects a random number>
Calculate->
。
Exporting user keys
，/>
Is a first pair of user keys for an inner chameleon hash->
Is a second pair of user keys.
(3) Generating an auditor key, formulated as:
input as a common parameter->
The output is a key pair>
,/>
Is the private key of the auditor>
The public key of the auditor specifically comprises the following steps:
selecting a prime number
So that->
Wherein is present>
Is the security parameter in the RSA key generation algorithm->
And
for the maximum value that can be generated by the input, <' > H>
。
In the circulation group
On random selects a random number>
Calculate->
。
Key generation algorithm acquisition running RSA
So that->
，/>
Wherein is present>
、/>
From common parameters
Get in and make->
，/>
Is two different large prime numbers, is>
Is the generated public-private key pair.
Outputting Auditor keys
，/>
Is the first auditor key, is asserted>
Is a second pair of auditor keys.
And a second process: data hashing, namely performing inner-layer and outer-layer chameleon chaining on the chaining data based on a secret key of a user and an auditor, wherein the inner-layer chameleon chaining comprises two layers of chameleon hashes, and the inner-layer hash is a public key of the user
Calculated and the outer public key->
By the public key of the auditor->
And the user's private key->
Calculated, the outer hash is based on the outer public key->
The calculated hash formula of the chameleon of the inner layer and the outer layer is expressed as follows:
wherein the input is the public key of the auditor
User, user public key->
Private key of user->
And uplink data m, <' > or>
A hash value of m, is->
For a parameter used for modifying data>
The public key of the chameleon hash at the outer layer is adopted, and the concrete steps of the chameleon hash cochain at the inner layer and the outer layer are as follows:
(1) Public key for calculating outer chameleon Hash
In which>
Is the public key of the second pair of auditor keys, is->
Is the private key of the second pair of user keys.
(2) Calculating inner chameleon hash value
In the case of a circulating group->
On random selection of a random number>
Calculate->
Wherein m is uplink data, </or >>
Is the public key of the first pair of user keys, is->
Is a secure hash function, is asserted>
Is the modulo operator.
(3) Computing outer chameleon hash values
In the case of a circulating group->
On random selection of a random number>
Calculating >>
Wherein is present>
Is the inner chameleon hash value of m->
Is the public key of the first pair of user keys, is->
Is the public key of the outer chameleon hash, and>
is the modulo operator.
(4) The output after the two layers of chameleon hash is as follows:
wherein is present>
Is an outer chameleon hash value->
Are two respective slave cycle groups>
And the circulating group->
A random number selected at random on->
Is the inner chameleon hash value->
Is the public key of the second pair of auditor keys, is->
Is the private key of the second pair of user keys.
(5) After two-layer chameleon hashing, the transaction where the data is located passes through a block chain verification uplink, and is supposed to be recorded in a block B i In (1).
Through the steps, the user carries out Hash chain-loading on the original data of the user, and the public key of the outer layer Hash chameleon
Does not reveal the private key of the second pair of user keys>
So that the public key of the outer hash chameleon can be published->
And simultaneously calculating the private key of the outer chameleon hash>
Need the secondPrivate key to auditor key->
And the private key of the second pair of user keys +>
And therefore only available to auditors. User public key for inner chameleon hash>
Is compared to the public key of the first pair of user keys->
Evaluating a message pick>
The outer layer uses the public key of the outer chameleon hash>
Calculate->
The hash value of (4), the data hashed by the inner chameleon->
And user public key>
Is compared to the public key of the first pair of user keys->
And (6) binding. The data subjected to two-layer chameleon hash can be normally stored on a block chain for verification; however, at this time, since the data is not audited, neither the user nor the auditor can make direct modifications to it.
The third process: and modifying the audit, wherein an auditor audits the new data to be modified by the user, and generates an audit certificate for the new data which passes the audit.
The interactive process of the user and the auditor comprises two processes of user request and auditor audit.
In the user request process, a user firstly selects a random number as long as the user applies for the new data m' to be modified to an auditor
For blinding, i.e. generating a commitment, the new data m' to be modified; proving the identity of the user through commitment and zero-knowledge proof, and confirming whether the data modification requirement is met, and expressing as follows:
wherein the input is the private key of the user
And modified new data m' output as modification request data>
Wherein is present>
For the commitment generated by the user for the new data m>
Is committed to>
The specific calculation mode is as follows:
in the circulation group
On random selects a random number>
Calculating the commitment of the new modified data m
Wherein is present>
Is a circulating group>
Is generated and/or selected>
Is a random number, m' is modified new data, and is based on the modified value>
Is the private key of the second pair of user keys, is->
Is a private key of the first pair of user keys.
To promise of
Calculating zero knowledge proof:
wherein, pair () is used to verify whether a Pair of public and private keys is a corresponding set of keys.
Zero-Knowledge Proof (Zero-Knowledge Proof), proposed by s.goldwasser, s.micali and c.rackoff in the beginning of the 80's 20 th century, means that the prover can convince the verifier that some argument is correct without providing the verifier with any useful information; zero knowledge proof is essentially a protocol involving two or more parties, i.e., a series of steps that need to be taken by two or more parties to complete a task; the prover proves to the verifier and convinces him that he knows or owns a certain message, but the proving process cannot reveal any information about the proven message to the verifier; zero knowledge proofs are very useful in cryptography, and many problems would be effectively solved if they could be used for authentication.
An auditing process of the auditor, wherein the auditor verifies the zero-knowledge proof after receiving the user request, verifies the correctness of the modified new data and generates a pre-signature
Namely, auditing certification, and encrypting the pre-signature; the encryption is to ensure that the pre-signature is only visible to the user and to protect the completeness of the revocation, and is expressed by the formula:
wherein, the input is public parameter pp, private key of auditor
The public key of the user->
Commitment of the modified new data m>
And its zero knowledge proof->
And C is an encrypted audit certificate, and the specific calculation mode is as follows:
verifying zero knowledge proofs
If the validity is legal, the operation is continued, otherwise, the operation is returned.
And verifying the correctness of the modified new data m ', continuing if the modified new data m ' is correct, and returning if the modified new data m ' is not correct.
Generating a pre-signature: in the circulation group
On random selects a random number>
Calculating a temporary variable
And then calculates the signature->
Where Y is the public key of a second pair of user keys, and>
is the private key of the second pair of user keys, e is the random number used in generating the public key of the auditor; selecting a secure hash function H, and calculating->
And &>
Wherein is present>
And &>
Are two temporary variables, the resulting pre-signature->
I.e. an audit trail of the new data modified.
Encrypting audit certification
And sent to the user, wherein Enc () is an encryption algorithm, and @>
Is a generated audit confirmation that>
Is a ciphertext generated after encryption.
The process four is as follows: and data modification, namely decrypting the received ciphertext, verifying the pre-signature, running an adaptation algorithm, and performing primitive modification on the inner-layer chameleon hash, wherein the new message must comprise an adapted audit certificate. The matched audit certificate is calculated by the user and the auditor together, and only the modification which contains the matched audit certificate and passes the verification of the matched audit certificate can be accepted.
The user wants to modify the data on the chain and must first obtain the audit certificate of the modified new data. After obtaining the encrypted audit certificate, the user decrypts and adapts the audit certificate; after the adaptation, the adapted audit certificate can prove that the modification is legal modification agreed by both the user and the auditor; to effect the modification, the user can certify the adapted audit
And the modified new data m' replaces the original data of the inner chameleon hash. Verifying the modified data requires verifying the adapted audit certificate>
And hash->
The completeness of (1) is specifically performed as follows:
(1) Decryption adaptation:
its input is the private key of the user
Original data m, two-layer two-color dragon hashed data h, modified parameter r and modified new data->
User public key
And a ciphertext C of the audit trail. Is known to->
Decrypting the ciphertext C to obtain the audit certificate of the new data>
. Validation Audit proof->
Needs to calculate->
，/>
Verification->
Is equal to->
If so, then the audit proves->
And (4) correct. Adapting audit certification
Make the temporary modification message be>
Let us order
Then->
. Will be in>
Replacement by->
Get->
. The modified transaction is recorded in the original block B through block chain verification i In (1), the block value is unchanged.
(2) And (3) verification: b
The input is the outer hash public key->
Subscriber public key->
And the data after the two-layer two-color dragon hash>
Parameter for modification->
And temporarily modifying the message element in the decryption adaptation step>
Outputting a result b; verification->
The adapted audit certificate included therein->
A temporary variable is calculated:
verification->
Is equal to->
And an adapted audit prove->
And (4) correct. Known to be->
If->
Then->
Otherwise
(ii) a If->
Then->
Otherwise->
. Return to
。
And a fifth process: trapdoor extraction, wherein once the modified transaction is linked, the auditor reads the modified new data m' and the adapted audit certificate
After the change of the trap door is possessed, an auditor can cancel the modification submitted by the user.
Once the modified transaction is linked, the auditor reads the new message m' and its adapted audit certificate
Then the private key (or the private key) of the outer chameleon hash can be automatically extracted>
And obtaining the trapdoor with the outer chameleon Hash, wherein the trapdoor is expressed by the formula:
the method specifically comprises the following steps: with the public and private keys of the auditor (
) Audit proof before and after fitting (</or >>
) And the public key of the second pair of user keys->
Verifying the adapted audit proof->
After correctness of the second pair of user keys, the private key of the second pair of user keys is calculated>
Private key hashed with outer chameleon>
The method specifically comprises the following steps:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is an audit proof->
Is selected and/or selected>
Is an adapted audit certificate->
，/>
Is the private key of the second auditor key, is>
Is the public key of the second pair of auditor keys.
The process six: and modifying the revoke, periodically checking the modified data by an auditor, directly rewriting the inner hash by the auditor through the extracted outer chameleon hash trapdoor once the modification behavior of the user is found to be problematic, and invalidating the inner chameleon hash key of the user after rewriting, thereby realizing the revoke of the user modification right and the withdrawal of the modified new data.
The original inner chameleon Hash key is replaced by a key pair
So that the original first key pair of the user->
Can not be used for message modification any more, and realizes the suspension of the modification right of the user and the withdrawal of the modified new data, and is expressed by the formula: />
Wherein, the input is a private key of outer chameleon Hash
And the data after the two-layer two-color dragon hash>
Parameter for modification->
Subscriber modified message->
Corresponding temporary modification message element->
And the auditor is used to replace the question->
Used temporarily modifying message element->
Is known to->
The method specifically comprises the following steps:
regenerating a key
So that
In the circulation group
Up random selection pick>
Calculate->
。
Order to
Then
。
To obtain
，/>
。
The modified transaction is recorded in the original block B through block chain verification i In (1), the block value is unchanged.
Example two
The embodiment discloses an auditable and compulsory revocable block chain modification system;
an auditable and compulsory revocable blockchain modification system comprises a data hash module, a modification audit module, a data modification module and a modification revocation module:
a data hashing module configured to: performing inner and outer color-changing dragon hash chain connection on the chain connection data based on keys of a user and an auditor;
a modification audit module configured to: the auditor audits the new modified data of the user and generates an audit certificate for the new modified data which passes the audit;
a data modification module configured to: based on the audit certification, the modified new data and the original data of the inner chameleon hash, the user modifies the data on the block chain;
a modification revocation module configured to: and the auditor periodically checks the modified data, and forcibly cancels the modification which does not pass the check through the trap door of the outer chameleon hash.
EXAMPLE III
An object of the present embodiment is to provide a computer-readable storage medium.
A computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in an auditable, mandatory-revocation blockchain modification method as described in one of the embodiments of the present disclosure.
Example four
An object of the present embodiment is to provide an electronic device.
An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the program to implement the steps of an auditable and revocable block chain modification method as described in one of the embodiments of the disclosure.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention, and various modifications and changes may be made by those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, or improvement made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. An auditable, mandatory-to-revocable blockchain modification method, comprising:
performing inner and outer color-changing dragon hash chain connection on the chain connection data based on keys of a user and an auditor;
the auditor audits the new modified data of the user and generates an audit certificate for the new modified data which passes the audit;
based on the audit certificate, the modified data and the original data of the inner chameleon hash, the user modifies the data on the block chain;
and the auditor periodically checks the modified data, and forcibly cancels the modification which does not pass the check through the trap door of the outer chameleon hash.
2. An auditable and enforceable blockchain modification method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the user and auditor keys are generated by a key generation algorithm based on the generated common parameters at blockchain initialization.
3. An auditable and revocable blockchain modification method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the inner and outer chameleon hashes are computed from a user private key, and the outer chameleon hash is computed from an auditor public key and a user private key.
4. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the modification request sent by the user to the auditor includes: commitment of new data to modify and zero knowledge proof thereof;
the commitment of the new modified data is calculated in a blinding mode;
the zero knowledge proof is the zero knowledge proof of the calculation commitment and the private key of the user.
5. An auditable and enforceable revocation blockchain modification method as claimed in claim 1, wherein said auditor generates an audit trail for new modified data that has been audited, specifically:
an auditor receives a modification request of a user;
verifying that the zero knowledge proof is legal;
verifying the correctness of the modified new data;
and generating an audit certificate for the verified modified new data through self-adaptive pre-signing, and encrypting and sending the audit certificate to the user.
6. The auditable and compulsory revocable blockchain modification method of claim 1, wherein the user modifies data on the blockchain based on the audit trail, the modified new data and the original data of the inner chameleon hash, specifically:
verifying the audit certificate;
and after the verification is passed, replacing the original data of the inner chameleon hash by the audit certification and the modified new data, and modifying the original image of the inner chameleon hash.
7. An auditable and enforceable block chain modification method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the trapdoor hashed by outer chameleon performs enforced revocation on modification that fails to pass inspection, specifically:
the auditor extracts the private key of the outer chameleon hash as a trapdoor of the outer chameleon hash based on the audit certification and the modified new data;
and rewriting the inner chameleon hash based on the extracted outer chameleon hash trapdoor to realize the suspension of the modification right of the user and the forced revocation of the modified new data.
8. An auditable and compulsory revocation block chain modification system is characterized by comprising a data hashing module, a modification auditing module, a data modification module and a modification revocation module:
a data hashing module configured to: performing inner and outer color-changing dragon hash chain connection on the chain connection data based on keys of a user and an auditor;
a modification audit module configured to: the auditor audits the new modified data of the user and generates an audit trail for the new modified data which passes the audit;
a data modification module configured to: based on the audit trail, the modified data and the original data of the inner chameleon hash, the user modifies the data on the block chain;
a modification revocation module configured to: and the auditor periodically checks the modified data, and forcibly cancels the modification which does not pass the check through the trap door of the outer chameleon hash.
9. An electronic device, comprising:
a memory for non-transitory storage of computer readable instructions; and
a processor for executing the computer readable instructions,
wherein the computer readable instructions, when executed by the processor, perform the method of any of claims 1-7.
10. A storage medium storing non-transitory computer-readable instructions, wherein the non-transitory computer-readable instructions, when executed by a computer, perform the instructions of the method of any one of claims 1-7.
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