CN115826392A - Decision method and device for redundancy control system of unmanned aerial vehicle - Google Patents

Decision method and device for redundancy control system of unmanned aerial vehicle Download PDF

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CN115826392A
CN115826392A CN202211693444.9A CN202211693444A CN115826392A CN 115826392 A CN115826392 A CN 115826392A CN 202211693444 A CN202211693444 A CN 202211693444A CN 115826392 A CN115826392 A CN 115826392A
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control instruction
redundancy
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陈清阳
王玉杰
朱炳杰
王鹏
鲁亚飞
侯中喜
贾高伟
高显忠
辛宏博
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National University of Defense Technology
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Abstract

The application relates to a decision method and a decision device for an unmanned aerial vehicle redundancy control system in the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicle control, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the redundancy decision device receives the control instruction and the sensor state bit output by each flight controller in real time and counts the number of the normally working redundancies; the redundancy decision-making device carries out mutual detection of control instructions according to the redundancy quantity which works normally, carries out self-detection according to the state bit of the sensor and determines the optimal control instruction; and the redundancy decision device transmits the optimal control instruction to the execution mechanism through the network interface to be used as an effective control instruction at the current moment. According to the method, the optimal flight controller can be screened out according to the control instructions with multiple redundancies and the sensor state bits, and the optimal flight controller is used for carrying out flight control on the unmanned aerial vehicle in the current control period. By adopting the method, the expansion of the redundancy can be flexibly realized, the effectiveness of each redundancy can be efficiently and accurately judged, and the redundancy and the safety of the unmanned aerial vehicle control system are improved.

Description

Decision method and device for redundancy control system of unmanned aerial vehicle
Technical Field
The application relates to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicle control, in particular to a decision-making method and device for an unmanned aerial vehicle redundancy control system.
Background
Along with the wide application of unmanned aerial vehicle system, unmanned aerial vehicle's security problem also receives much attention, and common security problem mainly shows in two aspects: firstly, the equipment loss caused by the crash of the unmanned aerial vehicle is large; secondly, the threat to ground personnel and facilities is large.
Various statistical results show that the cause of unmanned aerial vehicle crash mainly has two factors: firstly, unmanned aerial vehicle electromechanical system trouble, secondly artificial misoperation. Wherein the first type of factor accounts for a greater proportion. And in unmanned aerial vehicle electromechanical system trouble, flight control system fault rate list is first, mainly because traditional flight control system adopts the form of single unit list sensor more, has following fault point easily: the single CPU runs with the probability of hardware failure caused by overflow of a memory, a register, a stack and the like and the influence of an electromagnetic environment; the probability of faults or damages of other components, particularly sensors, in electromagnetic, temperature and vibration environments; software, especially an operating system, has a probability of being down during operation.
The quality of a flight control system directly determines the task completion rate of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and a flight control computer, namely an autopilot, is the core of the flight control system. The automatic pilot acquires original information of the unmanned aerial vehicle such as attitude, speed and position from the airborne sensor, performs navigation calculation, further performs calculation of a control law, and finally outputs a control signal to the execution mechanism to control the aircraft to fly according to a preset flight task. However, with the expansion of the application field of the unmanned aerial vehicle, the executed task is more and more complex, the task execution environment can be extremely severe, and great pressure is caused on the stability and reliability of the flight control system, so that the probability of failure in flight is greatly increased, and the reliability of the flight control system is reduced. In practice, however, the more complex and harsh environments in which tasks are performed, the higher the requirements on the reliability of the aircraft tend to be. In order to improve the reliability of the flight control system, a great deal of research is carried out by relevant organizations at home and abroad, and the research results show that: in addition to improving the quality of flight control system components during design and manufacturing, redundancy techniques are the fundamental way to improve the reliability of flight control systems.
At present, when an unmanned aerial vehicle is controlled based on a redundancy technology, interconnection and intercommunication between a plurality of sets of navigation equipment and a plurality of sets of control computers are mainly realized based on forms such as a CAN bus. And the control computer simultaneously acquires information of a plurality of sets of navigation equipment, and the information is compared and fused with each other to obtain ideal navigation information for control law calculation. The output commands of the multiple sets of control computers are compared, and a proper command is selected as a final control command of the execution mechanism. However, one problem with this design is that the hardware system has poor connection and expansion, and poor flexibility in upgrading and replacing the device; the second is that the comparison content of the navigation information is more, the difference of the information from the navigation equipment with different characteristics is larger, the design of a unified judging and comparing method is difficult, the expansibility is poor, and the system maintenance is difficult.
Disclosure of Invention
Therefore, it is necessary to provide a method and an apparatus for determining the redundancy control system of an unmanned aerial vehicle in order to solve the above technical problems.
A decision-making method for a redundancy control system of an unmanned aerial vehicle comprises the following steps: the system comprises a plurality of sets of flight controllers, 1 set of redundancy decision maker and 1 set of actuating mechanism which are interconnected through IP, wherein each set of flight controller is independently connected with one set of navigation module; the navigation module is used for acquiring sensor data and judging a sensor state bit; the flight controller is used for receiving the sensor data and the sensor state bit output by a navigation module connected with the flight controller, and resolving according to the sensor data to obtain a control instruction; the method comprises the following steps:
and the redundancy decision device receives the control instruction and the sensor state bit output by each flight controller in real time and counts the redundancy quantity which normally works.
And the redundancy decision-making device performs mutual detection on the control instructions according to the redundancy quantity in normal work, performs self-detection according to the state bit of the sensor and determines the optimal control instruction.
And the redundancy decision maker transmits the optimal control instruction to the execution mechanism through a network interface as an effective control instruction at the current moment.
An unmanned aerial vehicle redundancy control system decision-making device, includes:
and the redundancy counting module is used for receiving the control instruction and the sensor state bit output by each flight controller in real time and counting the number of the normally working redundancies.
And the instruction determining module is used for carrying out mutual detection on the control instructions according to the redundancy quantity in normal work, carrying out self-detection according to the state bit of the sensor and determining the optimal control instruction.
And the instruction transmission module is used for transmitting the optimal control instruction to the execution mechanism through a network interface to be used as an effective control instruction at the current moment.
The decision method and the device for the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle are characterized by comprising the following steps: the redundancy decision device receives the control instruction and the sensor state bit output by each flight controller in real time and counts the number of the normally working redundancies; the redundancy decision-making device carries out mutual detection of control instructions according to the redundancy quantity which works normally, carries out self-detection according to the state bit of the sensor and determines the optimal control instruction; and the redundancy decision device transmits the optimal control instruction to the execution mechanism through the network interface to be used as an effective control instruction at the current moment. According to the method, the optimal flight controller can be screened out according to the control instructions with multiple redundancies and the sensor state bits, and the optimal flight controller is used for carrying out flight control on the unmanned aerial vehicle in the current control period. By adopting the method, the expansion of the redundancy can be flexibly realized, the effectiveness of each redundancy can be efficiently and accurately judged, and the redundancy and the safety of the unmanned aerial vehicle control system are improved.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a system for controlling redundancy of an unmanned aerial vehicle according to an embodiment;
fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart illustrating a decision-making method of the redundancy control system of the drone according to an embodiment;
fig. 3 is a schematic flow chart of the control command determination step of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle in another embodiment;
fig. 4 is a schematic flow chart of a three-redundancy signal voting method of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle in another embodiment;
fig. 5 is a schematic flow chart illustrating a dual redundancy signal voting method of the redundancy control system of the drone according to another embodiment;
fig. 6 is a schematic flow chart illustrating a processing method when the redundancy control system of the drone receives only one redundancy signal according to another embodiment;
fig. 7 is a schematic flow chart illustrating a processing method of the drone redundancy control system in another embodiment when the drone redundancy control system does not receive any redundancy signal;
fig. 8 is a schematic flow chart of the unmanned aerial vehicle redundancy control system in combination with the priority of the flight controller to select the optimal control command according to the sensor data in another embodiment.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more apparent, the present application is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present application and are not intended to limit the present application.
The structural block diagram of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle related to the decision method of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle is shown in fig. 1, the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle comprises a plurality of sets of flight controllers 20, 1 set of redundancy decision maker 30,1 set of actuating mechanism 40 and communication equipment 50 supporting the IP interconnection function, wherein each set of flight controller is independently connected with one set of navigation module 10, each flight controller comprises an unmanned aerial vehicle power model, and the unmanned aerial vehicle power model comprises an attitude control loop and a position control loop. This unmanned aerial vehicle redundancy control system's theory of operation: each set of navigation module 10 collects sensor data and judges the state bit of the sensor, and transmits the data to the flight controller 20 connected with the sensor; each set of flight controller 20 performs calculation according to the sensor data transmitted by the corresponding navigation module 10 to obtain a control instruction of the aircraft, and sends the control instruction and the sensor status bit information to the redundancy decision-making unit 30 through a network interface; the redundancy decision device 30 receives control instructions and sensor state bit information output by the multiple sets of flight controllers 20 through a network interface, decides to obtain reasonable control instructions according to a decision method of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and sends the reasonable control instructions to the execution mechanism 40 through the network interface; the executing mechanism 40 receives the optimal control instruction output by the redundancy decision-making device 30 through a network interface, and drives the corresponding moving mechanism to work, so as to realize the flight control of the unmanned aerial vehicle. And the communication device 50 is used for realizing data transmission among the flight controller 20, the redundant decision module 30 and the execution mechanism 40 through an IP network.
In one embodiment, as shown in fig. 1 and 2, there is provided a method for deciding a redundancy control system of a drone, the redundancy control system of the drone comprising: a plurality of sets of flight controllers 20, 1 set of redundancy decision maker 30 and 1 set of execution mechanism 40 which are interconnected through IP, wherein each set of flight controller 20 is independently connected with one set of navigation module 10; the navigation module 10 is configured to collect sensor data and determine a sensor status bit, where the sensor data includes: airspeed, position, altitude, attitude, heading, speed; the flight controller is used for receiving the sensor data and the sensor status bit output by the navigation module 10 connected with the flight controller, and resolving according to the sensor data to obtain a control instruction; the method comprises the following steps:
step 200: and the redundancy decision device receives the control instruction and the sensor state bit output by each flight controller in real time and counts the number of the normally working redundancies.
Specifically, there is one redundancy per flight controller.
And receiving control signals and sensor data of a plurality of redundancies in real time according to periods, and counting the number of the redundancies which work normally.
Step 202: and the redundancy decision-making device performs control instruction mutual detection according to the redundancy quantity in normal work, performs self-detection according to the state bit of the sensor and determines the optimal control instruction.
Specifically, when the number of working redundancy is greater than or equal to 3, the control instructions of every two flight controllers are compared, and the sensors are divided into three levels, wherein the first level sensor has the largest influence on flight safety, the second level sensor has a larger influence on flight state and tasks, and the third level sensor has a smaller influence on flight safety. And checking the sensor state bits output by each flight controller according to the hierarchy, completing system self-check until finding out the optimal flight controller, and taking the output of the optimal flight controller as an effective control instruction at the current moment.
And when the number of the working redundancy is equal to 2, judging according to the priority of the flight controller and the state of the sensor, finding out the optimal flight controller, and taking the output of the optimal flight controller as an effective control instruction at the current moment.
And when the number of the redundancy which works normally is equal to 1, taking the control instruction output by the flight control sub-module corresponding to the redundancy as an effective control instruction at the current moment.
And when the redundancy quantity in normal operation is 0, adopting the control surface neutral command as output.
The method comprehensively considers the number of redundancy of the flight controllers, the priority of the flight controllers, the difference of the control instructions and the sensor state bit judgment information output by the flight controllers to the navigation modules of the flight controllers, and decides the optimal control instruction of each control period in a hierarchical manner.
Control command mutual inspection and sensor state bit self-checking combine together, combine redundancy priority and sensor data, periodically sieve out the optimum redundancy from a plurality of redundancies, export as the control information source of unmanned aerial vehicle system next period, can effectively promote unmanned aerial vehicle system's performance to improve system task completion rate.
Step 204: and the redundancy decision device transmits the optimal control instruction to the execution mechanism through the network interface to be used as an effective control instruction at the current moment.
In the decision method for the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle, the method comprises the following steps: the redundancy decision-making device receives the control instruction and the sensor state bit output by each flight controller in real time and counts the redundancy number which works normally; the redundancy decision-making device performs mutual detection on the control instructions according to the redundancy quantity in normal work, performs self-detection according to the state bit of the sensor and determines the optimal control instruction; and the redundancy decision device transmits the optimal control instruction to the execution mechanism through the network interface to be used as an effective control instruction at the current moment. According to the method, the optimal flight controller can be screened out according to the control instructions with multiple redundancies and the sensor state bits, and the optimal flight controller is used for carrying out flight control on the unmanned aerial vehicle in the current control period. By adopting the method, the expansion of the redundancy can be flexibly realized, the effectiveness of each redundancy can be efficiently and accurately judged, and the redundancy and the safety of the unmanned aerial vehicle control system are improved.
In one embodiment, the step 202 of determining the optimal control instruction in the redundancy decider specifically includes:
in each control period, if the redundancy quantity in normal work is more than or equal to 3, the optimal control instruction is determined by adopting a method of combining control instruction cross check and sensor state bit judgment.
And in each control period, if the number of the working redundancy is equal to 2, comprehensively judging according to different priorities and sensor status bits of the flight controller to determine an optimal control instruction.
And in each control period, if the redundancy quantity which works normally is equal to 1, taking the received control instruction of the flight controller as an optimal control instruction.
In each control period, if the margin number of normal operation is equal to 0, the control surface neutral command is adopted as the optimal control command.
The flow of the control instruction determining step of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle is shown in fig. 3.
In one embodiment, in each control cycle, if the number of the normally operating redundancy is greater than or equal to 3, determining the optimal control command by using a method of combining control command cross check and sensor status bit judgment, including: in each control cycle, if the number of working normal margins is greater than or equal to 3: determining the mutual detection state of the difference between the two redundancies according to the difference of the control instructions between any two redundancies which work normally and a differentiation threshold; judging the consistency of the two sets of flight controllers which work normally according to the mutual detection state value; taking the flight controllers which have mutual consistency and work normally as effective flight controllers, and taking the normal flight controllers which do not have mutual consistency with other normal flight controllers as ineffective flight controllers; if any two sets of flight controllers which work normally do not have mutual consistency, all the flight controllers which work normally are used as effective flight controllers; sequencing all effective flight controllers from high to low according to the redundancy priority, and counting the fault counts of all effective control modules from the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority; if the effective flight controller with the fault count smaller than the preset threshold exists, taking the control instruction output by the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority and the fault count smaller than the preset threshold as an optimal control instruction; and if the fault counts of all the effective flight controllers are larger than the preset threshold value, determining an optimal control instruction according to the redundancy priority and the sensor status bits of all the effective flight controllers.
Specifically, (1) for N sets of flight controllers, control instructions output by any two sets of flight controllers are respectively compared, and the consistency of the two sets of flight controllers is judged according to a differentiated threshold value, so that the effectiveness of the two sets of flight controllers is judged, namely, for the ith set of flight controller and the jth set of flight controller received by a redundancy decision maker, the judgment is carried out according to the formula (1), the flight controllers with the mutual consistency are considered as effective flight controllers, and the flight controllers without the mutual consistency with other flight controllers are considered as invalid flight controllers; and if any two sets of flight controllers do not have mutual consistency, all the flight controllers are considered to be effective flight controllers.
(2) And for the effective flight controllers, performing self-checking and fault counting operation according to the status bit of each set of flight controllers from high priority to low priority. If the fault count of a certain set of flight controller is smaller than a set threshold value, the control instruction of the flight controller is adopted as a reasonable control instruction to be output; and if the fault counts of all the flight controllers exceed the set threshold, judging which set of control instruction of the flight controllers is used according to the differentiation criticality of the abnormal state bits of the sensors.
In one embodiment, determining the mutual detection state of the difference between two redundancies according to the difference of the control command between any two normally operating redundancies and the differentiation threshold value comprises: according to the difference value and the differentiation threshold value of the control command between any two redundancies which work normally, the mutual detection state of the difference value between the two redundancies is determined as follows:
Figure BDA0004022292910000071
wherein, T ij Is a differentiated threshold, X, of control commands between a redundancy i and a redundancy j ij Is the mutual detection state of the difference between the redundancy i and the redundancy j, | Δ ε ij (t) | is the difference of the same control instruction between the redundancy i and the redundancy j.
In one embodiment, if the failure counts of all active flight controllers are greater than the predetermined threshold, determining the optimal control instruction according to the redundancy priority and the sensor status bits of all active flight controllers includes: if the fault counts of all active flight controllers exceed a predetermined threshold: dividing the sensors into three levels according to different influences of sensor data on flight safety; the first-level sensor comprises a sensor with the largest influence on flight safety, the second-level sensor comprises a sensor with a larger influence on the flight state, and the third-level sensor comprises a sensor with a smaller influence on the flight safety; and checking the sensor state bits of each effective flight controller layer by layer according to the hierarchy of the sensors, judging the corresponding conditions of the abnormal sensor states of the control instructions of all the effective flight controllers, and determining the optimal control instruction.
In one embodiment, the step of checking the sensor state bits of each effective flight controller layer by layer according to the hierarchy of the sensors, judging the corresponding conditions of the abnormal sensor states of the control commands of all the effective flight controllers, and determining the optimal control command includes: checking whether the sensor status bit of the first-level sensor of each effective flight controller is abnormal or not; if the sensor status bit of only one set of effective flight controller is not abnormal, taking the control instruction of the set of effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bits of the first-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers are not abnormal, checking whether the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the effective flight controllers, which are screened out and have no abnormality, are abnormal or not, and determining an optimal control instruction according to the checking result; and if the sensor state bits of the first-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, checking whether the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal or not, and determining an optimal control instruction according to the checking result.
In one embodiment, if there are a plurality of sets of valid flight controllers and there is no abnormality in the sensor status bits of the first level sensors, checking whether there is an abnormality in the sensor status bits of the second level sensors of the valid flight controllers for which there is no abnormality in the sensor status bits of the first level sensors that are screened out, and determining the optimal control command according to the checking result includes: if the sensor state bits of the first-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers are not abnormal, checking whether the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the effective flight controllers, which are screened out and have no abnormality, are abnormal; if the sensor state bit of the second-level sensor of only one set of effective flight controller is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers are not abnormal, checking whether the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of the screened effective flight controllers with the abnormal sensor state bits of the second-level sensors are abnormal or not, and determining an optimal control instruction according to the checking result; and if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers without the abnormal sensor state bits of the first-level sensors as the optimal control instruction.
In one embodiment, if there are a plurality of sets of valid flight controllers, the method checks whether there is an abnormality in the sensor status bits of the second-level sensors, and determines an optimal control command according to the check result, includes: if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers do not have abnormity, checking whether the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of the screened effective flight controllers, of which the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors do not have abnormity, are abnormal; if the sensor status bit of the third-level sensor of only one set of flight controller is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the flight controller as an effective control instruction at the current moment; if the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor of the plurality of sets of effective flight controllers is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers with the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor not abnormal as the optimal control instruction; and if the sensor state bits of all the third-level sensors of the effective flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers without the abnormal sensor state bits of the second-level sensors as the optimal control instruction.
In one embodiment, if the sensor status bits of the first-level sensors of all the active flight controllers are abnormal, checking whether the sensor status bits of the second-level sensors of all the active flight controllers are abnormal, and determining the optimal control command according to the checking result includes: if the sensor status bits of the first-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, checking whether the sensor status bits of the second-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal or not; if the sensor state bit of the second-level sensor of only one set of effective flight controller is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers do not have abnormity, checking whether the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of the screened effective flight controllers, of which the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors do not have abnormity, are abnormal, and if the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of only one set of effective flight controllers do not have abnormity, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor of the plurality of sets of effective flight controllers is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers with the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor not abnormal as the optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers, of which the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors are not abnormal, as the optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, checking the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers, and if the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of only one set of effective flight controllers are not abnormal, using the control instruction of the set of effective flight controllers as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor of the plurality of sets of effective flight controllers is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened flight controllers of which the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor is not abnormal as the optimal control instruction; and if the sensor status bits of the third-level sensors of all the flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the flight controller with the highest redundancy priority level in all the flight controllers which work normally as the optimal control instruction.
In a specific embodiment, the unmanned aerial vehicle redundancy control system comprises 3 flight controllers, namely: the remainder of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle is 3, and the decision algorithm of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle comprises the following steps:
1) Receiving control instructions and sensor state bit information corresponding to the three flight controllers in real time, wherein the control instructions and the sensor state bit information comprise position information, attitude information, flight tasks, flight state information and the like of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and counting the redundancy quantity of normal work.
2) And performing mutual detection of control instructions and self-detection of sensor status bits according to the received redundancy quantity of the flight controllers, and making a decision to obtain a reasonable control instruction. If the outputs of the three flight controllers are normal, screening reasonable control instructions as the outputs by using a method of combining control instruction cross inspection and sensor state bit judgment, as shown in FIG. 4; if one flight controller has no output, comprehensively judging and screening reasonable control instructions as output according to different priorities and state bit information of the flight controllers, as shown in fig. 5; if only one flight controller has an output, the control command of the flight controller is used as the output, as shown in fig. 6; if there is no output from any of the three flight controllers, the control surface neutral command is used as an output, as shown in fig. 7.
Assuming that there is a 3-redundancy control system, let ε 1 、ε 2 、ε 3 Are mutually independent random processes, and respectively represent the measured value T of a certain control instruction of redundancy 1, redundancy 2 and redundancy 3 ij For differentiated thresholds of control commands between the redundancies, between the redundanciesMutual detection state X of difference 12 、X 23 、X 31 The values are:
Figure BDA0004022292910000111
and judging whether the two sets of flight controllers have consistency or not according to the mutual detection state values, thereby judging the effectiveness of the two sets of flight controllers. If one flight controller and the other two sets of flight controllers do not have mutual consistency but the other two sets of flight controllers have mutual consistency, the flight controller is considered to be invalid; otherwise, the three sets of flight controllers are all considered to be effective.
3) And starting from the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority, judging soft fault counting (self-increment operation is carried out on the soft fault counting when mutual detection is effective but potential faults and sensor data are abnormal), and judging the flight controller with the second priority if the counting is out of limit. And if the soft fault counts of the three flight controllers exceed the limit, judging which flight controller is used according to the differentiation criticality of the abnormal state bit of the sensor by combining the priorities of the flight controllers.
The method for selecting the optimal flight controller according to the differentiation key of the abnormal state bits of the sensor by combining the priority of the flight controller divides the sensor data into three levels, the first level sensor has the largest influence on the flight safety, the second level sensor has larger influence on the flight state and the task, and the third level sensor has smaller influence on the flight safety. The specific determination flow of the method is shown in fig. 8.
Judging the sensor state bit of the first level sensor of each flight controller, if:
1) Only one flight controller has no exception, and the control command of the flight controller is used as an output.
2) If a plurality of flight controllers do not have abnormity, judging the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the flight controllers screened for the first time, and if: (1) only one flight controller has no exception, and the control instruction of the flight controller is used as output; (2) if a plurality of flight controllers do not have abnormity, judging the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of the flight controllers screened out for the second time, and if: a. if only one flight controller has no abnormality, the control instruction of the flight controller is used as output, b, if a plurality of flight controllers have no abnormality, one of the flight controllers with the highest priority is selected as output, and c, if all the flight controllers have abnormality, the one of the flight controllers with the highest priority selected for the second time is used as output; (3) and if all the flight controllers have the abnormity, using the highest priority one of the first screened flight controllers as an output.
3) If all flight controllers are abnormal, considering the result of the first screening as all flight controllers, judging the sensor state bits of the sensors at the second level, and if: (1) only one flight controller has no abnormity, and the control instruction of the flight controller is used as output; (2) if a plurality of flight controllers do not have abnormity, judging the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of the flight controllers screened out for the second time, and if: a. if only one flight controller has no abnormality, the control instruction of the flight controller is used as output, b, if a plurality of flight controllers have no abnormality, one of the flight controllers with the highest priority is selected as output, and c, if all the flight controllers have abnormality, the one of the flight controllers with the highest priority selected for the second time is used as output; (3) and if all flight controllers are abnormal, considering the result of the second screening as all flight controllers, judging the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors, and if: a. using the control command of one flight controller as output if only one flight controller has no exception, b, selecting one of the flight controllers with the highest priority as output if a plurality of flight controllers have no exception, and c, using the flight controller with the highest priority as output if all the flight controllers have exception.
Through the decision method of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle, the control signals and the sensor state bit information of the three flight controllers can be received in real time, fault-tolerant control is performed on the data, real-time collection and reliable processing of reliability data of the flight control system are achieved, then the optimal control instruction is screened out from the three redundancy control instructions, and the optimal control instruction is used for performing flight control on the unmanned aerial vehicle in the current control period. In the invention, the redundancy of the unmanned aerial vehicle sensor and the robustness of the unmanned aerial vehicle control system can be improved by providing the decision algorithm of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and the unmanned aerial vehicle can be ensured to execute the designated task safely and stably.
Compared with the existing redundancy control mode, the decision method of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle has the following beneficial effects:
1) The main basis based on control instruction mutual detection is combined with the secondary basis based on sensor state bit self-detection, so that redundancy mutual redundancy judgment and complementation are realized, the decision-making problem under the condition that the mutual detection result is difficult to determine is solved through the sensor state bit self-detection, and reasonable output in the whole state space can be ensured.
2) The redundancy decision is made based on the mutual detection of the control instructions and the self-detection of the state bits of the sensors, the physical concept is clear, the problems of complex calculation and easy error judgment caused by the mutual comparison of sensor information sources of various different types and sensor information of the same type and different parameter attributes are solved, the calculation amount is small, and the real-time calculation of an embedded system is facilitated.
3) The judgment is carried out according to different sensor state bits, the sensors are considered in a grading mode, different requirements of safety and task completion can be better met, and the maximization of the task completion is achieved on the premise that flight safety is guaranteed.
It should be understood that although the various steps in the flowcharts of fig. 2-8 are shown in order as indicated by the arrows, the steps are not necessarily performed in order as indicated by the arrows. The steps are not limited to being performed in the exact order illustrated and, unless explicitly stated herein, may be performed in other orders. Moreover, at least some of the steps in fig. 2-8 may include multiple sub-steps or multiple stages that are not necessarily performed at the same time, but may be performed at different times, and the order of performance of the sub-steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but may be performed in turn or alternating with other steps or at least some of the sub-steps or stages of other steps.
In one embodiment, there is provided a decision-making device for a redundancy control system of a drone, the decision-making device comprising: redundancy statistics module, instruction confirm module and instruction transmission module, wherein:
and the redundancy counting module is used for receiving the control instruction and the sensor state bit output by each flight controller in real time and counting the number of the normally working redundancies.
And the instruction determining module is used for carrying out mutual detection on the control instructions according to the redundancy quantity in normal work, carrying out self-detection according to the state bit of the sensor and determining the optimal control instruction.
And the instruction transmission module is used for transmitting the optimal control instruction to the execution mechanism through the network interface to be used as an effective control instruction at the current moment.
In one embodiment, the instruction determining module is further configured to determine, in each control cycle, an optimal control instruction by using a method of combining control instruction cross check and sensor status bit judgment if the number of working-normal redundancies is greater than or equal to 3; in each control period, if the number of the working redundancy is equal to 2, comprehensively judging according to different priorities and sensor status bits of the flight controller to determine an optimal control instruction; in each control period, if the redundancy quantity in normal work is equal to 1, taking the received control instruction of the flight controller as an optimal control instruction; in each control period, if the margin number of normal operation is equal to 0, the control surface neutral command is adopted as the optimal control command.
In one embodiment, the instruction determining module is further configured to, in each control cycle, if the number of normally operating margins is greater than or equal to 3: determining the mutual detection state of the difference between the two redundancies according to the difference of the control instructions between any two redundancies which work normally and a differentiation threshold; judging the consistency of the two sets of flight controllers which work normally according to the mutual detection state value; taking the flight controllers which have mutual consistency and work normally as effective flight controllers, and taking the normal flight controllers which do not have mutual consistency with other normal flight controllers as ineffective flight controllers; if any two sets of flight controllers which work normally do not have mutual consistency, all the flight controllers which work normally are used as effective flight controllers; sequencing all effective flight controllers from high to low according to the redundancy priority, and counting the fault counts of all effective control modules from the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority; if the effective flight controller with the fault count smaller than the preset threshold exists, taking the control instruction output by the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority and the fault count smaller than the preset threshold as an optimal control instruction; and if the fault counts of all the effective flight controllers are larger than the preset threshold value, determining an optimal control instruction according to the redundancy priority levels and the sensor status bits of all the effective flight controllers.
In one embodiment, the instruction determining module is further configured to determine, according to a difference between any two normally operating redundancies and a differentiation threshold, an expression of a mutual detection state of the difference between the two redundancies, as shown in equation (1).
In one embodiment, the instruction determination module is further configured to, if the failure counts of all active flight controllers exceed a predetermined threshold: dividing the sensor into three levels according to different influences of sensor data on flight safety; the first-level sensor comprises a sensor with the largest influence on flight safety, the second-level sensor comprises a sensor with a larger influence on the flight state, and the third-level sensor comprises a sensor with a smaller influence on the flight safety; and checking the sensor state bits of the effective flight controllers layer by layer according to the sensor hierarchy, judging the corresponding conditions of the abnormal sensor states of the control instructions of all the effective flight controllers, and determining the optimal control instruction.
In one embodiment, the instruction determination module is further configured to check whether a sensor status bit of the first-level sensor of each active flight controller is abnormal; if the sensor status bit of only one set of effective flight controller is not abnormal, taking the control instruction of the set of effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bits of the first-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers are not abnormal, checking whether the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the effective flight controllers, which are screened out and have no abnormality, are abnormal or not, and determining an optimal control instruction according to the checking result; and if the sensor state bits of the first-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, checking whether the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal or not, and determining an optimal control instruction according to the checking result.
In one embodiment, the instruction determining module is further configured to, if there are multiple sets of sensor status bits of the first-level sensors of the active flight controllers, check whether there is an abnormality in the sensor status bits of the second-level sensors of the active flight controllers for which there is no abnormality in the sensor status bits of the first-level sensors that are screened out; if the sensor state bit of the second-level sensor of only one set of effective flight controller is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers are not abnormal, checking whether the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of the screened effective flight controllers with the abnormal sensor state bits of the second-level sensors are abnormal or not, and determining an optimal control instruction according to the checking result; and if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers, of which the sensor state bits of the first-level sensors are not abnormal, as the optimal control instruction.
In one embodiment, the instruction determining module is further configured to, if there are multiple sets of sensor status bits of a second-level sensor of the active flight controllers, check whether there is an abnormality in a sensor status bit of a third-level sensor of the active flight controller, where there is no abnormality in the sensor status bit of the second-level sensor that is screened out; if the sensor status bit of the third-level sensor of only one set of flight controller is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the flight controller as an effective control instruction at the current moment; if the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor of the plurality of sets of effective flight controllers is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers with the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor not abnormal as the optimal control instruction; and if the sensor state bits of all the third-level sensors of the effective flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers, in which the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors are not abnormal, as the optimal control instruction.
In one embodiment, the instruction determining module is further configured to check whether the sensor status bits of the second-level sensors of all valid flight controllers are abnormal if the sensor status bits of the first-level sensors of all valid flight controllers are abnormal; if the sensor state bit of the second-level sensor of only one set of effective flight controller is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers do not have abnormity, checking whether the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of the screened effective flight controllers, of which the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors do not have abnormity, are abnormal, and if the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of only one set of effective flight controllers do not have abnormity, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor of the plurality of sets of effective flight controllers is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers with the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor not abnormal as the optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers, of which the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors are not abnormal, as the optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, checking the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers, and if the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of only one set of effective flight controllers are not abnormal, using the control instruction of the set of effective flight controllers as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor of the plurality of sets of effective flight controllers is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened flight controllers of which the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor is not abnormal as the optimal control instruction; and if the sensor status bits of the third-level sensors of all the flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the flight controller with the highest redundancy priority level in all the flight controllers which work normally as the optimal control instruction.
For specific limitations of the apparatus for deciding the redundancy control system of the drone, reference may be made to the above limitations on the method for deciding the redundancy control system of the drone, and details are not described herein again. All modules in the decision device of the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle can be completely or partially realized by software, hardware and a combination thereof. The modules can be embedded in a hardware form or independent from a processor in the computer device, and can also be stored in a memory in the computer device in a software form, so that the processor can call and execute operations corresponding to the modules.
The technical features of the above embodiments can be arbitrarily combined, and for the sake of brevity, all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are not described, but should be considered as the scope of the present specification as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.
The above-mentioned embodiments only express several embodiments of the present application, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but not construed as limiting the scope of the invention. It should be noted that, for a person skilled in the art, several variations and modifications can be made without departing from the concept of the present application, which falls within the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present patent application shall be subject to the appended claims.

Claims (10)

1. The decision method for the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle is characterized in that the redundancy control system of the unmanned aerial vehicle comprises the following steps: the system comprises a plurality of sets of flight controllers, 1 set of redundancy decision maker and 1 set of actuating mechanism which are interconnected through IP, wherein each set of flight controller is independently connected with one set of navigation module; the navigation module is used for acquiring sensor data and judging a sensor state bit; the flight controller is used for receiving the sensor data and the sensor state bit output by a navigation module connected with the flight controller, and resolving according to the sensor data to obtain a control instruction; the method comprises the following steps:
the redundancy decision device receives the control instruction and the sensor state bit output by each flight controller in real time and counts the number of the normally working redundancies;
the redundancy decision maker performs control instruction mutual detection according to the redundancy quantity which works normally, performs self detection according to the state bit of the sensor, and determines an optimal control instruction;
and the redundancy decision maker transmits the optimal control instruction to the execution mechanism through a network interface as an effective control instruction at the current moment.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the redundancy decider performs control command cross-checking according to the number of normally operating redundancies and performs self-checking according to the status bit of the sensor to determine an optimal control command, comprising:
in the redundancy decider:
in each control period, if the redundancy quantity in normal work is more than or equal to 3, determining an optimal control instruction by adopting a method of combining control instruction cross check and sensor state bit judgment;
in each control period, if the number of the working redundancy is equal to 2, comprehensively judging according to different priorities and sensor status bits of the flight controller to determine an optimal control instruction;
in each control period, if the redundancy quantity in normal work is equal to 1, taking the received control instruction of the flight controller as an optimal control instruction;
in each control period, if the margin number of normal operation is equal to 0, the control surface neutral command is adopted as the optimal control command.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein in each control cycle, if the number of working-normality margins is greater than or equal to 3, determining the optimal control command by combining the control command cross check and the sensor status bit judgment comprises:
in each control cycle, if the number of working normal margins is greater than or equal to 3:
determining the mutual detection state of the difference between the two redundancies according to the difference of the control instructions between any two redundancies which work normally and a differentiation threshold;
judging the consistency of the two sets of flight controllers which work normally according to the mutual detection state value;
taking the flight controllers which have mutual consistency and work normally as effective flight controllers, and taking the normal flight controllers which do not have mutual consistency with other normal flight controllers as ineffective flight controllers;
if any two sets of flight controllers which work normally do not have mutual consistency, all the flight controllers which work normally are used as effective flight controllers;
sequencing all the effective flight controllers according to the sequence of the redundancy priorities from high to low, and counting the fault counts of all the effective control modules from the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority;
if the effective flight controller with the fault count smaller than the preset threshold exists, taking the control instruction output by the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority and the fault count smaller than the preset threshold as an optimal control instruction;
and if the fault counts of all the effective flight controllers are larger than a preset threshold value, determining an optimal control instruction according to the redundancy priority and the sensor state bits of all the effective flight controllers.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein determining a mutual detection status of a difference between two normally functioning redundancies based on the difference in control commands between any two redundancies and a differentiation threshold comprises:
according to the difference value and the differentiation threshold value of the control command between any two redundancies which work normally, the mutual detection state of the difference value between the two redundancies is determined as follows:
Figure FDA0004022292900000021
wherein, T ij A differentiation threshold, X, for control commands between a redundancy i and a redundancy j ij Is the mutual detection state of the difference between the redundancy i and the redundancy j, | Δ ε ij (t) | is the difference of the same control instruction between the redundancy i and the redundancy j.
5. The method of claim 3, wherein determining optimal control instructions based on the redundancy priorities and sensor status bits of all of the active flight controllers if the fault counts of all of the active flight controllers are greater than a predetermined threshold comprises:
if the fault counts of all active flight controllers exceed a predetermined threshold:
dividing the sensors into three levels according to different influences of sensor data on flight safety; the first-level sensor comprises a sensor with the largest influence on flight safety, the second-level sensor comprises a sensor with a larger influence on the flight state, and the third-level sensor comprises a sensor with a smaller influence on the flight safety;
and checking the sensor state bits of each effective flight controller layer by layer according to the hierarchy of the sensors, judging the corresponding conditions of the abnormal sensor states of the control instructions of all the effective flight controllers, and determining the optimal control instruction.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the step of checking the sensor status bits of the active flight controllers layer by layer according to the sensor hierarchy, judging the correspondence between the abnormal sensor statuses of all the active flight controller control commands, and determining the optimal control command comprises:
checking whether the sensor status bit of the first-level sensor of each effective flight controller is abnormal or not;
if the sensor status bit of only one set of effective flight controller is not abnormal, taking the control instruction of the set of effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction;
if the sensor state bits of the first-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers are not abnormal, checking whether the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the effective flight controllers, which are screened out and have no abnormality, are abnormal or not, and determining an optimal control instruction according to the checking result;
and if the sensor state bits of the first-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, checking whether the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal or not, and determining an optimal control instruction according to the checking result.
7. The method according to claim 6, wherein if there are a plurality of sets of active flight controllers and the sensor status bit of the first level sensor is not abnormal, checking whether there is an abnormality in the sensor status bit of the second level sensor of the active flight controller that has been screened out of the first level sensor and has no abnormality in the sensor status bit, and determining the optimal control command according to the checking result, includes:
if the sensor state bits of the first-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers are not abnormal, checking whether the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the effective flight controllers, which are screened out and have no abnormality, are abnormal;
if the sensor state bit of the second-level sensor of only one set of effective flight controller is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction;
if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers are not abnormal, checking whether the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of the screened effective flight controllers with the abnormal sensor state bits of the second-level sensors are abnormal or not, and determining an optimal control instruction according to the checking result;
and if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers, of which the sensor state bits of the first-level sensors are not abnormal, as the optimal control instruction.
8. The method according to claim 7, wherein if there are a plurality of sets of active flight controllers, the method further comprises checking whether there is an abnormality in the sensor status bits of the third level sensors of the active flight controllers for which there is no abnormality in the sensor status bits of the second level sensors, and determining the optimal control command according to the result of the checking, the method comprising:
if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers do not have abnormity, checking whether the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of the screened effective flight controllers, of which the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors do not have abnormity, are abnormal;
if the sensor status bit of the third-level sensor of only one set of flight controller is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the flight controller as an effective control instruction at the current moment;
if the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor of the plurality of sets of effective flight controllers is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers with the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor not abnormal as the optimal control instruction;
and if the sensor state bits of all the third-level sensors of the effective flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers, in which the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors are not abnormal, as the optimal control instruction.
9. The method of claim 6, wherein if the sensor status bits of the first-level sensors of all active flight controllers have an exception, checking the sensor status bits of the second-level sensors of all active flight controllers for the exception, and determining the optimal control command according to the checking result comprises:
if the sensor status bits of the first-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, checking whether the sensor status bits of the second-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal or not;
if the sensor state bit of the second-level sensor of only one set of effective flight controller is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction;
if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers do not have abnormity, checking whether the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of the screened effective flight controllers, of which the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors do not have abnormity, are abnormal, and if the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of only one set of effective flight controllers do not have abnormity, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor of the plurality of sets of effective flight controllers is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers with the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor not abnormal as the optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened effective flight controllers, of which the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors are not abnormal, as the optimal control instruction;
if the sensor state bits of the second-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers are abnormal, checking the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of all the effective flight controllers, and if the sensor state bits of the third-level sensors of only one set of effective flight controllers are not abnormal, using the control instruction of the set of effective flight controllers as an optimal control instruction; if the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor of the multiple sets of effective flight controllers is not abnormal, using the control instruction of the effective flight controller with the highest redundancy priority in the screened flight controllers with the sensor state bit of the third-level sensor not abnormal as the optimal control instruction; and if the sensor status bits of the third-level sensors of all the flight controllers are abnormal, using the control instruction of the flight controller with the highest redundancy priority level in all the flight controllers which work normally as the optimal control instruction.
10. The utility model provides an unmanned aerial vehicle redundancy control system decision-making device which characterized in that includes:
the redundancy counting module is used for receiving the control instruction and the sensor state bit output by each flight controller in real time and counting the redundancy number which works normally;
the command determining module is used for carrying out mutual detection on control commands according to the redundancy quantity in normal work, carrying out self-detection according to the state bit of the sensor and determining an optimal control command;
and the instruction transmission module is used for transmitting the optimal control instruction to the execution mechanism through a network interface to be used as an effective control instruction at the current moment.
CN202211693444.9A 2022-12-28 2022-12-28 Decision method and device for redundancy control system of unmanned aerial vehicle Pending CN115826392A (en)

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN116774570A (en) * 2023-08-23 2023-09-19 成都飞航智云科技有限公司 Redundancy data analysis method and system

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN116774570A (en) * 2023-08-23 2023-09-19 成都飞航智云科技有限公司 Redundancy data analysis method and system
CN116774570B (en) * 2023-08-23 2023-11-07 成都飞航智云科技有限公司 Redundancy data analysis method and system

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