CN115766207B - Anonymous message transfer method and system based on blockchain - Google Patents

Anonymous message transfer method and system based on blockchain Download PDF

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CN115766207B
CN115766207B CN202211422142.8A CN202211422142A CN115766207B CN 115766207 B CN115766207 B CN 115766207B CN 202211422142 A CN202211422142 A CN 202211422142A CN 115766207 B CN115766207 B CN 115766207B
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transaction
message
detection
receiver
blockchain
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CN115766207A (en
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许嘉璐
徐旸
谭江浩
张程
孙鹏
陈果
曾湘祥
张尧学
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Hunan University
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Hunan University
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Abstract

The invention discloses an anonymous message transfer method and system based on a blockchain, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the receiver R generates a request transaction and submits the request transaction to a blockchain, waits for a miner to respond, selects a miner after receiving the response, generates a detection transaction containing a detection key DSK based on the request transaction, submits the detection transaction to a detection transaction pool of the blockchain and then sends the detection transaction to the miner, acquires a message transaction set formed by a real message transaction and a false positive message transaction from a block generated by the miner by using a fuzzy message detection method FMD to execute the detection transaction based on the detection key DSK, extracts the real message transaction from the message transaction set, and extracts a plaintext message sent by the sender S from the real message transaction. The invention can realize anonymous message transmission based on the blockchain, can outsource a message detection task to a decentric untrusted third party, and has the advantages of low user cost, safety, reliability and high throughput.

Description

Anonymous message transfer method and system based on blockchain
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of information security of blockchains, and particularly relates to an anonymous message transfer method and system based on blockchains.
Background
The Web3 is a new generation network architecture with the center of users, and by combining with technologies such as blockchain, the characteristics of decentralization, verifiability, openness, reliability and the like can be further obtained and enhanced on the basis of the previous network architecture. Whereas end-to-end communication has been widely studied as one of the important communication infrastructures of the Web 3. The anonymous message transfer technology, as an end-to-end communication method for protecting privacy, can protect communication data and user metadata. It is expected to play an important role in establishing a safe and zero-trust Web3 ecosystem. However, most anonymous messaging schemes today need to rely on a small portion of Trusted Third Parties (TTPs). As the number of users increases, these TTPs face single point failure and performance bottlenecks, which in turn limit the scalability of anonymous messaging systems. Worse still, such a system may be said to be controlled by TTP rather than by the user, which is contrary to the original intent of Web 3. However, with existing schemes that do not require TTP, most require users to search for messages themselves, which is a great burden for users, limiting the feasibility of practical deployment of these schemes.
In response to the above-mentioned problems, a so-called Fuzzy Message Detection (FMD) scheme is proposed in the prior art (Beck G , Len J , Miers I , et al. Fuzzy Message Detection[C]// Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2021.). This scheme allows the receiver R to generate a specific detection key that can identify messages with a certain false positive rate. On this basis, the receiver R can outsource the detection work to an untrusted third party without revealing his private metadata, thereby reducing the burden on the user. Although this solution does not already require TTP, it still requires a centralized third party to participate, which is contrary to the decentralized idea of Web 3.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the technical problems: aiming at the problems in the prior art, the invention provides the anonymous message transfer method and the anonymous message transfer system based on the blockchain, which can realize the anonymous message transfer based on the blockchain, can outsource a message detection task to a decentric untrusted third party, and have the advantages of low user cost, safety, reliability and high throughput.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a blockchain-based anonymous messaging method, comprising:
S101, a receiver R generates a request transaction for a message transaction in a message transaction pool of a blockchain and submits the request transaction to the request transaction pool of the blockchain;
S102, the receiver R waits for a response returned by a miner from the downlink channel, and jumps to step S103 after receiving the response;
s103, the receiver R selects a miner according to the received response, generates a detection transaction containing a detection key DSK based on the request transaction, submits the detection transaction to a detection transaction pool of a blockchain and sends the detection transaction to the miner;
S104, the receiver R acquires a message transaction set formed by a real message transaction and a false positive message transaction from a block generated by a miner executing a detection transaction based on a detection key DSK by adopting a fuzzy message detection method FMD, extracts the real message transaction from the message transaction set, and extracts a plaintext message sent by the sender S from the real message transaction.
Optionally, before step S101, the sender S encrypts the plaintext message to be transferred into a ciphertext message by using the public key of the receiver R, submits the ciphertext message to the storage service SSP to obtain an address tag, encrypts and packages the address tag into a message transaction, and submits the message transaction to the message transaction pool of the blockchain.
Optionally, extracting the plaintext message sent by the sender S from the actual message transaction in step S104 includes:
s201, a receiver R extracts an encryption address label from a real message transaction;
s202, a receiver R decrypts the encrypted address label to obtain an original address label;
S203, the receiver R acquires the ciphertext message from the storage service SSP according to the original address tag;
s204, the receiver R decrypts the ciphertext message by using the private key of the receiver R to obtain the original plaintext message.
Optionally, the function expression of the public key of the receiver R is:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, Is the public key of receiver R,/>~/>For all of the public keys of receiver R/>A component; the encryption process for detecting the key DSK in step S103 is:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, ~/>For the private key/>, of the receiver RAll of (1)/>N components of the components, and hasSo that the detection key DSK is relative to the public key/>, of the recipient RContains a more weakened detection condition, so that a miner uses a fuzzy message detection method FMD to execute a detection transaction based on a detection key DSK to generate a block comprising real message transaction and false positive message transaction,/>Representing the encryption process.
Optionally, the expression of the calculation function for detecting the key DSK in step S103 is:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, Representing a preset encryption algorithm,/>Representing the private key of the receiver R,/>And expressing the false positive rate, wherein the expression of a calculation function of the false positive rate is as follows:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, The false positive rate is represented, n is the number of components of the detection key DSK, and γ is the number of components in the public key and the private key of the receiver R.
Optionally, the request transaction generated in step S101 contains matching conditions for the message transaction, including at least one constraint of detection range and time limit.
Optionally, the detection transaction generated based on the request transaction in step S103 includes the address of the mineworker, the address of the request transaction, the detection key DSK, the timestamp, and the signature of the receiver R.
Optionally, in step S104, the receiver R performs, from the miner, the detection transaction using the fuzzy message detection method FMD based on the detection key DSK, and the content of the block header includes the hash, the detection transaction, the request transaction, the miner address and the timestamp of the previous block, and the block includes the message transaction set.
In addition, the invention also provides a block chain based anonymous messaging system comprising a microprocessor and a memory interconnected, the microprocessor programmed or configured to perform the block chain based anonymous messaging method.
Furthermore, the present invention provides a computer readable storage medium having stored therein a computer program for programming or configuring by a microprocessor to perform the blockchain-based anonymous messaging method.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the main advantages that:
1. The receiver R acquires a message transaction set formed by real message transactions and false positive message transactions from a block generated by a miner executing a detection transaction based on a detection key DSK by adopting a fuzzy message detection method FMD, and by using a fuzzy message detection scheme, the work of the receiver R for detecting the message can be wrapped to an unreliable third party, the false positive message cannot be distinguished by the third party, and the receiver R can identify and discard the false positive message when receiving the false positive message. In the encryption, detection and verification processes of the whole message, a trusted third party is not needed, privacy security can be effectively ensured, and user spending is small.
2. The invention transmits the ciphertext message and outsourcing message detection information by the blockchain technology, and each user can store transaction information such as ciphertext address, detection message time limit and the like on the blockchain, thereby fully utilizing the advantages of the blockchain, improving the transparency and having the advantages of safety and credibility.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a core flow chart of a method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of an interaction flow of the receiver R, miner and blockchain in an embodiment of the invention.
Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of a system structure according to an embodiment of the invention.
FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a block chain according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 5 is a graph showing the detection time of different detection tasks and miner numbers in a simulation experiment according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 6 is a graph showing the detection time of different false positive rates and miner numbers in a simulation experiment according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 7 is a graph showing time delays for different message transactions and miner counts in a simulation experiment according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
As shown in fig. 1 and 2, the anonymous messaging method based on a blockchain of the present embodiment includes:
S101, a receiver R generates a request transaction for a message transaction in a message transaction pool of a blockchain and submits the request transaction to the request transaction pool of the blockchain;
S102, the receiver R waits for a response returned by a miner from the downlink channel, and jumps to step S103 after receiving the response;
s103, the receiver R selects a miner according to the received response, generates a detection transaction containing a detection key DSK based on the request transaction, submits the detection transaction to a detection transaction pool of a blockchain and sends the detection transaction to the miner;
S104, the receiver R acquires a message transaction set formed by a real message transaction and a false positive message transaction from a block generated by a miner executing a detection transaction based on a detection key DSK by adopting a fuzzy message detection method FMD, extracts the real message transaction from the message transaction set, and extracts a plaintext message sent by the sender S from the real message transaction.
Referring to fig. 3, in the anonymous messaging system based on blockchain of this embodiment, the roles involved mainly include a user, a miner and a storage service SSP, wherein the user includes a sender S and a receiver R, the sender S is used to send a message, the receiver R is used to receive a message, their roles are for the same message, and for different messages, their roles may be any two of the users. The storage service SSP comprises a plurality of storage nodes, and each storage node is a storage position. The storage service SSP uses IPFS protocols to achieve decentralised distributed storage. The user and miners communicate through the on-chain channel and the off-chain channel of the blockchain, so that information and data interaction is realized. Without being limited to the blockchain of the present embodiment, one of ordinary skill in the art may implement the deployment of the blockchain according to the actual situation. In addition, when the blockchain is deployed, a system manager initializes and deploys the blockchain system, sets necessary parameters, and a sender and a receiver register in the blockchain and have a pair of public key and private key to facilitate message transfer.
Referring to fig. 3, step S101 of the present embodiment further includes that the sender S encrypts the plaintext message to be transferred into the ciphertext message by using the public key of the receiver R, submits the ciphertext message to the storage service SSP to obtain an address tag, encrypts and packages the address tag into a message transaction, and submits the message transaction to the message transaction pool of the blockchain. Specifically, in this embodiment, the commit storage server SSP obtains the address tag from the interstellar file system (IPFS) of the commit storage server SSP. As an alternative implementation manner, when the sender S encrypts and packages the address tag into a message transaction, additional transaction cost is required as a cost of message delivery in this embodiment, but this is just an implementation manner of a business mode, and in actual application, no transaction cost may be added according to the selection of the actual business mode. Similar to general blockchain communications, transactions such as message transactions may be appended with the signature of the transaction presenter as needed to prevent transaction forgery.
Based on the disclosure of the technical solution, it can be understood by those skilled in the art that the server, the user and the miner implement data transmission through the blockchain, such as the process of issuing a message transaction, issuing a request transaction, issuing a detection transaction, mixing a true message with a false positive message, retrieving and verifying a message, and the like, including the process of implementing secure transmission through the blockchain, that is, the process of issuing a transaction and creating a block through the blockchain by the user and the miner, including the process of responding to a receiver through a sub-chain channel of the blockchain by the miner, and also including the process of how the miner uses DSK and flag ciphertext to check and determine whether the message is the message required by the receiver.
In this embodiment, the step S104 of extracting the plaintext message sent by the sender S from the actual message transaction includes:
s201, a receiver R extracts an encryption address label from a real message transaction;
s202, a receiver R decrypts the encrypted address label to obtain an original address label;
S203, the receiver R acquires the ciphertext message from the storage service SSP according to the original address tag;
s204, the receiver R decrypts the ciphertext message by using the private key of the receiver R to obtain the original plaintext message.
In this embodiment, the function expression of the public key of the receiver R is:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, Is the public key of receiver R,/>~/>For all of the public keys of receiver R/>A component; specifically, in the present embodiment, a public key that encrypts a message is generated using a tag-based hash encryption algorithm. In order to achieve the purpose that no party other than the intended receiver can know which public key is used for encrypting the message, that is, who the receiver does not reveal the message is, the scheme uses ElGamal public key encryption algorithm to generate the public key and the private key, and then in step S2, the sender encrypts the message to be encrypted by using the generated public key to generate the flag ciphertext. By selecting a proper public key encryption algorithm, the scheme can achieve the aim of anonymity of a receiver.
In this embodiment, the encryption process for detecting the key DSK in step S103 is:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, ~/>For the private key/>, of the receiver RAll of (1)/>N components of the components, and hasSo that the detection key DSK is relative to the public key/>, of the recipient RContains a more weakened detection condition, so that a miner uses a fuzzy message detection method FMD to execute a detection transaction based on a detection key DSK to generate a block comprising real message transaction and false positive message transaction,/>Representing the encryption process.
In this embodiment, the expression of the calculation function for detecting the key DSK in step S103 is:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, Representing a preset encryption algorithm,/>Representing the private key of the receiver R,/>The expression of the calculation function for expressing the false positive rate is as follows:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, The false positive rate is represented, n is the number of components of the detection key DSK, and γ is the number of components in the public key and the private key of the receiver R. The number of components of the detection key DSK and the number of components in the public and private keys of the receiver R may be determined according to the total number of messages, the number of users and the expected traffic of the receiver in the actual use process. By calculating false positive rate/>, as described aboveA trade-off between privacy and efficiency can be achieved if a low false positive rate/>, is chosenThe longer the ciphertext list received by the receiver R is, the higher the privacy is, but the work required by the receiver R increases with the increase of the false positive rate, and at this time, a proper false positive rate/>, is selectedThis is particularly important for the overall scheme. By selecting a proper false positive rate, the high efficiency and high privacy of message detection by a user through a block chain can be ensured.
In this embodiment, the request transaction generated in step S101 is used to indicate that it wishes to receive a message, and generally includes a matching condition of the message transaction, where the matching condition includes at least one constraint of a detection range and a time limit. As an alternative embodiment, the request transaction also requires an additional transaction fee as a cost for message receipt, but this is just one implementation of a business model, and no transaction fee may be added depending on the choice of the actual business model when actually applied. The request transaction may be considered an outsourcing task, which is stored in a request transaction pool of the blockchain. When a mineworker wishes to generate a new block to make a profit, he selects a recipient's request from his local pool of synchronous request transactions and sends a response to that recipient. The response contains the mineworker signature associated with the request transaction and is sent to the recipient through an out-of-chain privacy channel (an out-of-chain channel, not through the blockchain, but rather directly). The mineworker may repeat responding to the request as long as the request has not been responded to. The receiver R selects a miner according to the received response, generates a detection transaction containing a detection key DSK based on the request transaction, submits the detection transaction to a detection transaction pool of the blockchain and sends the detection transaction to the miner. In this embodiment, the detection transaction generated based on the request transaction in step S103 includes the address of the miners, the address of the request transaction, the detection key DSK, the time stamp, and the signature of the receiver R.
The mineworker is an executor of the detection transaction, and when the mineworker receives the detection transaction from the receiver, it decrypts the flag ciphertext in all received message transactions using the DSK to find a eligible message. These message transactions are packed into blocks that contain both real and false positive transactions sent by the sender. The mineworker then packages some of the data into the block header, such as the hash of the previous block, the hash of the current block, the timestamp, the address of the corresponding request transaction and detection transaction, etc., with the complete structure of the block being shown in fig. 4. Referring to fig. 4, in step S104, the receiver R performs the detection transaction using the fuzzy message detection method FMD based on the detection key DSK from the miner, and the content of the block header includes the hash of the previous block, the detection transaction, the request transaction, the miner address and the timestamp, and the block contains the message transaction set including the real message transaction and the false positive message transaction, but the miner cannot distinguish the real message transaction from the false positive message transaction because the miner performs the detection transaction using the existing fuzzy message detection method FMD(Beck G , Len J , Miers I , et al. Fuzzy Message Detection[C]// Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2021.) based on the detection key DSK. Upon completion, the miner broadcasts the new block to the blockchain, and the blockchain node validates the block in the blockchain. In this embodiment, the blockchain uses a new consensus mechanism, similar to a proof of work (PoW), but the miners do not need to do useless, wasteful hashing operations, meaning that when the miners receive new requests from the recipients, they need to traverse all transactions to find the recipient's corresponding message. Because the mathematical puzzles in PoW are similar to the detection tasks in this scenario, they are difficult to find, but easy to verify.
In order to verify the method of the embodiment, a simulation experiment is adopted for verification, specifically, a benchmark test tool based on Go language is used for evaluating the performance of message detection, and Python is used for simulating the interaction process of entities in a blockchain. As shown in fig. 5, when there are 50 mines, the method of the embodiment takes about 240 seconds to retrieve 100 recipients of 10000 mails, which is about 95% faster than a single server for centralized detection. This is because the user-centric block architecture allows miners to perform detection tasks in parallel without interfering with each other. Fig. 6 shows that the overhead required for detection by the method of the present embodiment gradually increases with decreasing false positive rate. Furthermore, the impact of the number of message transactions on the time delay can be evaluated in fig. 7. With a more intuitive condition, such as only one centralized server, the time delay grows linearly with the number of transactions. These detection tasks can be processed in parallel while adding more miners, which greatly reduces the time delay. However, as the number of miners increases, the efficiency does not increase significantly. This is because the number of miners is close to the number of requests, which results in competition between miners. When there is competition, the efficiency does not increase linearly with the number of miners. In the simulation experiments herein, the time delay for detecting messages at three false positive rates was tested using the same remaining settings as in the existing fuzzy message detection method FMD. When the false positive rate was 12.5%, the detection time was 0.274ms. When the false positive rate was 3.125%, the detection time was 0.371ms. When the false positive rate was 0.098%, the detection time was 0.647ms. In the scheme of the method, the message detection is outsourced to the blockchain, so that the expenditure of a user is reduced, and the dependence on a centralized server is avoided. Meanwhile, the structure of the block chain is changed to adapt to a new consensus mechanism, and the proposed consensus mechanism in the method of the embodiment enables an anonymous message transfer system to process detection tasks in parallel, thereby realizing high throughput. In summary, the method of the embodiment can realize a method for anonymously transferring the message and outsource the message detection task to the block chain-based anonymous message transfer method of the un-centralized untrusted third party, and has the advantages of low user cost, safety, reliability and high throughput.
In addition, the present embodiment also provides a blockchain-based anonymous messaging system including a microprocessor and a memory interconnected, the microprocessor programmed or configured to perform the aforementioned blockchain-based anonymous messaging method. Furthermore, the present embodiment also provides a computer readable storage medium having stored therein a computer program for programming or configuring by a microprocessor to perform the foregoing blockchain-based anonymous messaging method.
It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that embodiments of the present application may be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present application may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-readable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, and the like) having computer-usable program code embodied therein. The present application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems) and computer program products according to embodiments of the application. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks. These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks. These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the above examples, and all technical solutions belonging to the concept of the present invention belong to the protection scope of the present invention. It should be noted that modifications and adaptations to the present invention may occur to one skilled in the art without departing from the principles of the present invention and are intended to be within the scope of the present invention.

Claims (7)

1. A blockchain-based anonymous messaging method, comprising:
S101, a receiver R generates a request transaction for a message transaction in a message transaction pool of a blockchain and submits the request transaction to the request transaction pool of the blockchain;
S102, the receiver R waits for a response returned by a miner from the downlink channel, and jumps to step S103 after receiving the response;
s103, the receiver R selects a miner according to the received response, generates a detection transaction containing a detection key DSK based on the request transaction, submits the detection transaction to a detection transaction pool of a blockchain and sends the detection transaction to the miner;
S104, the receiver R acquires a message transaction set formed by a real message transaction and a false positive message transaction from a block generated by a miner executing a detection transaction based on a detection key DSK by adopting a fuzzy message detection method FMD, extracts the real message transaction from the message transaction set, and extracts a plaintext message sent by the sender S from the real message transaction;
The function expression of the public key of the receiver R is:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, Is the public key of receiver R,/>~/>For all of the public keys of receiver R/>A component;
the encryption process for detecting the key DSK in step S103 is:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, ~/>For the private key/>, of the receiver RAll of (1)/>N of the components, and there are/>So that the detection key DSK is relative to the public key/>, of the recipient RContains a more weakened detection condition, so that a miner uses a fuzzy message detection method FMD to execute a detection transaction based on a detection key DSK to generate a block comprising real message transaction and false positive message transaction,/>Representing an encryption process, the computational function expression of the detection key DSK is as follows:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, Representing a preset encryption algorithm,/>Representing the private key of the receiver R,/>And expressing the false positive rate, wherein the expression of a calculation function of the false positive rate is as follows:
In the above-mentioned method, the step of, Representing the false positive rate, n is the number of components of the detection key DSK,/>Gamma is the number of components in the public and private keys of the receiver R;
in step S104, the receiver R executes the detection transaction from the miner by using the fuzzy message detection method FMD based on the detection key DSK, and the content of the block header includes the hash of the previous block, the detection transaction, the request transaction, the miner address and the timestamp, and the block includes the message transaction set.
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising prior to step S101, the sender S encrypting the plaintext message to be transferred into a ciphertext message using the public key of the receiver R, submitting the storage service SSP to obtain an address tag, cryptographically packaging the address tag into a message transaction and submitting the message transaction to the blockchain.
3. The blockchain-based anonymous messaging method of claim 2, wherein extracting the plaintext message sent by the sender S from the actual message transaction in step S104 comprises:
s201, a receiver R extracts an encryption address label from a real message transaction;
s202, a receiver R decrypts the encrypted address label to obtain an original address label;
S203, the receiver R acquires the ciphertext message from the storage service SSP according to the original address tag;
s204, the receiver R decrypts the ciphertext message by using the private key of the receiver R to obtain the original plaintext message.
4. The blockchain-based anonymous messaging method of claim 1, wherein the request transaction generated in step S101 contains a matching condition of the message transaction, the matching condition including at least one constraint of a detection range and a time limit.
5. The blockchain-based anonymous messaging method of claim 1, wherein the detection transaction generated based on the request transaction in step S103 includes an address of a miner, an address of the request transaction, a detection key DSK, a timestamp, and a signature of the receiver R.
6. A blockchain-based anonymous messaging system comprising a microprocessor and a memory interconnected, wherein the microprocessor is programmed or configured to perform the blockchain-based anonymous messaging method of any of claims 1-5.
7. A computer readable storage medium having a computer program stored therein, the computer program being for programming or configuring by a microprocessor to perform the blockchain-based anonymous messaging method of any of claims 1-5.
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