CN115766075A - Entrusted authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature - Google Patents
Entrusted authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a delegation authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature, which comprises the following steps: s01: constructing an IOTA model with a hierarchical structure; s02: constructing the detected sensor node data into a new transaction, verifying the new transaction, and performing identity signature on the new transaction after the verification is passed; s03: the principal and the agent send requests to the key generation center and obtain corresponding keys; s04: the proxy party sends proxy authentication to the proxy party, verifies information returned by the proxy party, generates a proxy certificate and sends the proxy certificate to the proxy party; s05: the proxy party receives and sends the proxy certificate, and verifies and stores the proxy certificate. In the invention, the entrusted authentication method adds a layered structure in the IOTA, reduces the dependence of the proxy node on the gateway and the risk of the gateway being malignant, and also combines an attribute-based encryption algorithm and a signature algorithm based on the identity, thereby realizing the integration of encryption and signature and reducing the communication overhead in the authentication process.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of entrusting authentication, in particular to an entrusting authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signatures.
Background
Most of the existing internet-of-things infrastructures are deployed in a centralized network by using a cloud platform, and effective control and management of equipment are realized by using a central server, but most of the existing centralized systems cannot provide guarantee of data reliability and privacy for an internet-of-things entity, a block chain technology is a feasible scheme for solving the problems, and in order to solve the problems of poor expandability, low transaction throughput and large node load existing in the traditional block chain, the existing main solutions include a block chain fragmentation technology and an account book technology based on a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) structure represented by IOTA, hashgraph and Byteball, wherein the IOTA is an account book technology based on a DAG structure and specially developed for the internet of things;
in addition, the sensor equipment in the internet of things is severely limited in resource, so that the sensor equipment cannot directly participate in the block chain network, an intermediate node needs to be entrusted as an agent of the intermediate node to interact with the block chain network, and the sensor node is vital to entrusting authentication of the agent node in order to ensure the safety and privacy of data and avoid the attack of a malicious node;
and for an identity authentication scheme: currently, the mainstream authentication schemes include the following: an authentication scheme based on digital certificates, an authentication scheme based on identity encryption, and an authentication scheme based on attribute-based encryption; in consideration of some characteristics in the environment of the internet of things, such as the huge number of devices and the continuous increase of the devices, the most of the device resources are limited, and the like, the application of the authentication schemes in the internet of things still needs further research;
the main defects are as follows: 1. performance/throughput, as is well known, transactions of a traditional blockchain can only accept one block at a time, and it takes a long time to reach a consensus to generate a new block, and although the transaction throughput of the blockchain network is increased to a certain extent by the fragmentation technology, the requirement of the internet of things with extremely high real-time transaction throughput cannot be met; 2. energy consumption and workload proving mechanism (PoW) is an important component of consensus algorithm of block chain networks such as bitcoin and Ether Fang, and mining industry is derived from the PoW, so that energy consumption is greatly improved, and obviously, the PoW is not environment-friendly; 3. the expansibility is poor, while the realization of DAG is concurrent, and synchronous data is not needed to be waited, so the expansibility is stronger; 4. transaction fee, the transaction of the traditional block chain needs to consume a part of money, so that the real meaning is not great in the scene of the internet of things, the part of technology regards the part of money as an incentive function, and the efficiency is greatly improved by removing the transaction fee by the DAG; 5. the authentication scheme based on the digital certificate is realized through a traditional public key system, and the digital certificate in the scheme needs to be issued by a certificate authority, so that the system centralization is serious, the system is not widely applicable to a distributed Internet of things environment, and a great single-point fault risk exists; 6. although the scheme based on identity encryption avoids the problems of certificate management and maintenance, the scheme has the disadvantage of excessively high requirement on the identity accuracy of the authenticated object.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an attribute-based encryption and identity signature-based entrusting authentication method which adopts an IOTA model with a hierarchical structure, reduces the dependence of a proxy node on a gateway and the risk of aversion of the gateway, realizes the integration of encryption and signature and reduces the communication overhead in the authentication process.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the invention provides the following technical scheme: a entrusting authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature comprises the following steps:
s01: constructing an IOTA model of a hierarchical structure;
s02: constructing the detected sensor node data into a new transaction, verifying the new transaction, and performing identity signature on the new transaction after the verification is passed;
s03: the principal and the agent send requests to the key generation center and obtain corresponding keys;
s04: the proxy party sends proxy authentication to the proxy party, verifies information returned by the proxy party, generates a proxy certificate and sends the proxy certificate to the proxy party;
s05: the proxy party receives and sends the delegation certificate, and verifies and stores the delegation certificate.
As a further description of the above technical solution:
in step S01, the IOTA model is composed of an upper network and a lower network, where the lower network is composed of multiple segments, each segment includes a certain number of sensor nodes, proxy nodes, and a small number of gateways, and the upper network is composed of all gateways.
As a further description of the above technical solution:
in step S02, the step of performing identity signature on the new transaction is as follows:
s02.1: the sensor node sends the detected data to the agent node, and the agent node returns a confirmation signal to the sensor node after receiving the sensor data;
s02.2: the proxy node constructs the received data into a new transaction, then randomly selects two unconfirmed transactions from the local storage for verification and quote in the constructed new transaction, and then sends the new transaction to the gateway;
s02.3: the gateway verifies the new transaction sent by the proxy node, if the new transaction passes the verification, the new transaction is signed, then the signed transaction is broadcasted to other gateways in the network and returned to the corresponding proxy node, and if the new transaction does not pass the verification, the transaction is discarded;
s02.4: and the other gateways verify and store the signed transaction, and the proxy node needs to send the signed transaction to other proxy nodes in the fragment to which the proxy node belongs.
As a further description of the above technical solution:
in step S02.2, when receiving the sensor node data, the agent node does not construct the data into a transaction for issue in the first time, but stores the data locally until the data is accumulated to a certain amount, and then packages the accumulated data together to construct a transaction for issue.
As a further description of the above technical solution:
the proxy node needs to detect the real-time property of the data before storing the data locally, and stores the data locally when detecting that the data is low in real-time property; when the data is detected to be data with high real-time performance, step S02.3 is executed.
As a further description of the above technical solution:
in step S02.4, the processing steps of the signature transaction by other agent nodes in the segment are as follows:
s02.4.1: other agent nodes receive the signature transaction and set the transaction to contain a mark field;
s02.4.2: judging whether the transaction belongs to the fragment of the transaction according to the label field, and if so, storing the transaction locally; if not, discarding the transaction;
s02.4.3: judging whether the number of the local storage transactions reaches the upper limit, if so, deleting the oldest transactions; if not, the new transaction continues to be stored.
As a further description of the above technical solution:
in step S03, the client and the agent are respectively a sensor node and an agent node, and the sensor node and the agent node respectively initiate a private key generation request to the key generation center and obtain a key based on the node identity and the attribute.
As a further description of the above technical solution:
in the step S04, the sensor node generates a corresponding ciphertext according to the data attribute required to be processed, signs the ciphertext by using a private key of the sensor node and sends the ciphertext to the proxy node, verifies the data returned by the proxy node, and generates a corresponding delegation certificate and sends the delegation certificate to the proxy node if the data returned by the proxy node passes the verification;
and the proxy node decrypts the received entrusted ciphertext according to a key generated by the data attribute set which can be processed by the proxy node to obtain a corresponding plaintext result, calculates the plaintext result to generate corresponding information and returns the information to the sensor node, and finally receives and transmits the entrusted certificate generated by the sensor node.
As a further description of the above technical solution:
in step S05, the proxy node sends the delegation certificate to the gateway, and the gateway performs verification and storage, and maintains a registered node list.
In the above technical solution, the entrusted authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature provided by the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
according to the entrusting authentication method, a layered structure is added in the IOTA, the dependence of the proxy node on the gateway is reduced, the risk of disgust of the gateway is reduced, the throughput of the whole network is improved, an attribute-based encryption algorithm is combined with a signature algorithm based on identity identification, the integration of encryption and signature is realized, and the sensor node carries out identity signature on the basis of an attribute-based encryption ciphertext, so that the proxy node meeting the entrusting requirement can carry out identity authentication on the sensor node initiating the entrusting while decrypting, and the communication overhead in the authentication process is reduced.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments described in the present invention, and other drawings can be obtained by those skilled in the art according to the drawings.
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a delegation authentication framework in a delegation authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a transaction processing flow of an agent node in a delegation authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of an IOTA model of a hierarchical structure in an entrusting authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of a process flow of proxy node data in a delegation authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 5 is a schematic diagram of a proxy node transaction processing flow in a delegation authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make those skilled in the art better understand the technical solution of the present invention, the present invention will be further described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 1-5, a delegated authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature includes the following steps:
s01: constructing an IOTA model with a hierarchical structure;
s02: constructing the detected sensor node data into a new transaction, verifying the new transaction, and performing identity signature on the new transaction after the verification is passed;
s03: the principal and the agent send requests to the key generation center and obtain corresponding keys;
s04: the proxy party sends proxy authentication to the proxy party, verifies information returned by the proxy party, generates a proxy certificate and sends the proxy certificate to the proxy party;
s05: the proxy party receives and sends the delegation certificate, and verifies and stores the delegation certificate.
According to the entrusting authentication method, a layered structure is added in the IOTA, the dependence of the proxy node on the gateway is reduced, the risk of the gateway doing harm is reduced, the throughput of the whole network is improved, an attribute-based encryption algorithm is combined with a signature algorithm based on identity identification, the integration of encryption and signature is realized, and the sensor node carries out identity signature on the basis of an attribute-based encryption ciphertext, so that the proxy node meeting the entrusting requirement can realize identity authentication on the sensor node initiating the entrusting while decrypting, and the communication overhead in the authentication process is reduced.
In step S01, the IOTA model is composed of an upper network and a lower network, where the lower network is composed of multiple segments, each segment includes a certain number of sensor nodes, proxy nodes, and a small number of gateways, and is responsible for the construction, release, and verification of transactions, and the upper network is composed of all gateways and is responsible for storing and maintaining complete entangled network information; secondly, the proxy node constructs the detection data into a new transaction according to the delegation and executes a PBFT algorithm; finally, the gateway broadcasts the new affairs submitted by the agent node in an upper layer network, and the affair constructor transmits the new affairs in the fragments to which the affair constructor belongs; it should be noted that the proxy node only stores part of transaction information in the sub-slice to which the proxy node belongs, so as to achieve the purpose of storage optimization, and meanwhile, the proxy node does not need to acquire the latest transaction information in the IOTA from the gateway any more, so that the risk of the gateway doing harm is effectively reduced;
the IOTA model architecture consists of four parts, namely a sensor node, a proxy node, a gateway and an entanglement part, wherein the sensor node comprises the following components in parts by weight: as an internet of things device with severely limited resources, a sensor node cannot be directly accessed to an IOTA network and needs to participate in the IOTA network through a proxy node, namely the sensor node needs to delegate detected data to the proxy node to process the data into a transaction and issue the transaction in the IOTA network; the proxy node: the proxy node has certain storage and calculation capacity, but the resource of the proxy node is still limited and cannot store complete tangled network transaction information, and the proxy node is responsible for receiving the sensor data, constructing the sensor data into a new transaction, issuing the new transaction and verifying an unconfirmed transaction; a gateway: the gateway is a resource-independent device whose main responsibility is to maintain the entire blockchain network, and specifically, the gateway is responsible for receiving and processing requests from proxy nodes, validating and broadcasting transactions, and storing complete intertwined network transaction information; and (3) entanglement: the entanglement is an IOTA underlying network based on a DAG structure, the proxy node needs to randomly select two unconfirmed transactions for verification when constructing a new transaction, and quote the two unconfirmed transactions in the constructed new transaction, and when the verification times of a certain unconfirmed transaction reach a set value, the transaction is converted into a confirmed transaction.
In step S02, the step of performing identity signature on the new transaction is as follows:
s02.1: the sensor node sends the detected data to the proxy node, and the proxy node returns a confirmation signal to the sensor node after receiving the sensor data;
s02.2: the proxy node constructs the received data into a new transaction, then randomly selects two unconfirmed transactions from the local storage for verification and quotes in the constructed new transaction, and then sends the new transaction to the gateway;
s02.3: the gateway verifies the new transaction sent by the proxy node, if the verification is passed, the new transaction is signed, then the signed transaction is broadcasted to other gateways in the network and returned to the corresponding proxy node, and if the verification is not passed, the transaction is discarded;
s02.4: and the other gateways verify and store the signed transaction, and the proxy node needs to send the signed transaction to other proxy nodes in the fragment to which the proxy node belongs.
In step S02.2, when receiving the sensor node data, the agent node does not construct the data into a transaction for issue in the first time, but stores the data locally until the data is accumulated to a certain amount, and then packages the accumulated data together to construct a transaction for issue.
Before storing data in the local, the proxy node needs to detect the real-time property of the data, and when the data is detected to be data with low real-time property, the data is stored in the local; when the data is detected to be data with high real-time performance, step S02.3 is executed.
In step S02.4, the processing steps of the signature transaction by other proxy nodes in the fragment are as follows:
s02.4.1: other agent nodes receive the signature transaction and set the transaction to contain a mark field;
s02.4.2: judging whether the transaction belongs to the fragment of the transaction according to the label field, and if so, storing the transaction locally; if not, discarding the transaction;
s02.4.3: judging whether the number of the local storage transactions reaches the upper limit, if so, deleting the oldest transactions; if not, the new transaction continues to be stored.
In step S03, the principal and the agent are a sensor node and an agent node, respectively, and the sensor node and the agent node respectively initiate a private key generation request to the key generation center and obtain a key based on the node identity and the attribute.
In step S04, the sensor node generates a corresponding ciphertext according to the data attribute required to be processed, signs the ciphertext by using a private key of the sensor node and sends the ciphertext to the proxy node, verifies the data returned by the proxy node, and generates a corresponding delegation certificate and sends the delegation certificate to the proxy node if the data returned by the proxy node passes the verification;
and the proxy node decrypts the received entrusted ciphertext according to a key generated by the data attribute set which can be processed by the proxy node to obtain a corresponding plaintext result, calculates the plaintext result to generate corresponding information and returns the information to the sensor node, and finally receives and transmits the entrusted certificate generated by the sensor node.
In step S05, the proxy node sends the delegation certificate to the gateway, and the gateway performs verification and storage, and maintains a registered node list.
The entrustment authentication method comprises six algorithms of system initialization (Setup), node key generation (KeyGen), entrustment ciphertext generation (Dencrypt), entrustment ciphertext decryption (DDecrypt), entrustment certificate generation (DCGen) and entrustment certificate verification (SCVerify), and the algorithms are specifically defined as follows:
(1): setting (lambda) → (PP, MSK), wherein the key generation center selects a security parameter lambda as input, and the algorithm outputs a system public parameter PP and a system master key MSK;
(2): keyGen (PP, MSK, ID, U) → (PK, SK), the algorithm is executed by a key generation center and the node, the key generation center calculates a node public key and a private key of an output part according to a system public parameter PP, a system master key MSK, an identity ID of the node and a data attribute set U thereof, and the node calculates a complete node public key PK and a complete node private key SK according to the generated partial key;
(3): the proxy ciphertext generates DEncrypt (PP, M, gamma, SK) SN ,PK SN ) → (CT), the algorithm is executed by the initiator of the delegation authentication, i.e. the sensor node, and the system public parameter PP, the message plaintext M, the access policy tree Γ, and the private key SK of the proxy node SN And its public key PK SN As input, the algorithm runs and outputs the entrusted ciphertext CT;
(4): entrusted ciphertext decryption DDecrypt (PP, SK) AN CT) → (M), which is executed by a proxy node serving as a processing party of the authentication, and which stores the system public parameter PP, the request ciphertext CT, and the private key SK of the proxy node AN As input, if the attribute set of the proxy node meets the access policy of Γ, the message plaintext M can be output, otherwise, decryption is suspended;
(5): delegate certificate Generation DCGen (KP) AN ,SK SN ,T SA )→(C SA ) The algorithm is executed by the sensor node and is delegated to the public key PK of the proxy node AN Its own private key SK SN And a current time stamp T SA As input, the algorithm runs the output delegation certificate C SA ；
(6): DCVerify, the gateway matches the public key of both sides of entrusting node included in the certificate with the registration list, then verifies the signature of the certificate according to the public key of the entrusting party included in the certificate, if both pass, the entrust takes effect.
While certain exemplary embodiments of the present invention have been described above by way of illustration only, it will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that the described embodiments may be modified in various different ways without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Accordingly, the drawings and description are illustrative in nature and should not be construed as limiting the scope of the invention.
Claims (9)
1. A delegation authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s01: constructing an IOTA model with a hierarchical structure;
s02: constructing the detected sensor node data into a new transaction, verifying the new transaction, and performing identity signature on the new transaction after the verification is passed;
s03: the principal and the agent send requests to the key generation center and obtain corresponding keys;
s04: the consignment sends consignment certification to the agent side, verifies the information returned by the agent side, generates a consignment certificate and sends the consignment certificate to the agent side;
s05: the proxy party receives and sends the delegation certificate, and verifies and stores the delegation certificate.
2. The delegated authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature of claim 1, wherein: in step S01, the IOTA model is composed of an upper network and a lower network, where the lower network is composed of multiple segments, each segment includes a certain number of sensor nodes, proxy nodes, and a small number of gateways, and the upper network is composed of all gateways.
3. The delegated authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature of claim 1, wherein: in step S02, the step of performing identity signature on the new transaction is as follows:
s02.1: the sensor node sends the detected data to the agent node, and the agent node returns a confirmation signal to the sensor node after receiving the sensor data;
s02.2: the proxy node constructs the received data into a new transaction, then randomly selects two unconfirmed transactions from the local storage for verification and quote in the constructed new transaction, and then sends the new transaction to the gateway;
s02.3: the gateway verifies the new transaction sent by the proxy node, if the verification is passed, the new transaction is signed, then the signed transaction is broadcasted to other gateways in the network and returned to the corresponding proxy node, and if the verification is not passed, the transaction is discarded;
s02.4: and the other gateways verify and store the signed transaction, and the proxy node needs to send the signed transaction to other proxy nodes in the fragment to which the proxy node belongs.
4. The delegated authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature of claim 3, wherein: in the step S02.2, when receiving the sensor node data, the agent node does not construct the data into a transaction for issuing in the first time, but stores the data locally until the data is accumulated to a certain amount, and then packages the accumulated data together to construct a transaction for issuing.
5. The delegated authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature of claim 4, wherein: the proxy node needs to detect the real-time property of the data before storing the data in the local, and stores the data in the local when detecting that the data is the data with low real-time property; when the data is detected to be data with high real-time performance, step S02.3 is executed.
6. The delegated authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature of claim 3, wherein: in step S02.4, the processing steps of the signature transaction by other proxy nodes in the segment are as follows:
s02.4.1: other proxy nodes receive the signature transaction and set the transaction to contain a mark field;
s02.4.2: judging whether the transaction belongs to the fragment to which the transaction belongs according to the label field, and if so, storing the transaction locally; if not, discarding the transaction;
s02.4.3: judging whether the number of the local storage transactions reaches the upper limit, if so, deleting the oldest transactions; if not, the new transaction continues to be stored.
7. The delegated authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature of claim 1, wherein: in step S03, the client and the agent are respectively a sensor node and an agent node, and the sensor node and the agent node respectively initiate a private key generation request to the key generation center and obtain a key based on the node identity and the attribute.
8. The delegated authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature of claim 1, wherein: in the step S04, the sensor node generates a corresponding ciphertext according to the data attribute required to be processed, signs the ciphertext by using a private key of the sensor node and sends the ciphertext to the proxy node, verifies the data returned by the proxy node, and generates a corresponding delegation certificate and sends the delegation certificate to the proxy node if the data returned by the proxy node passes the verification;
and the proxy node decrypts the received entrusted ciphertext according to a key generated by the processable data attribute set to obtain a corresponding plaintext result, calculates the plaintext result to generate corresponding information, returns the information to the sensor node, and finally receives and transmits an entrusted certificate generated by the sensor node.
9. The delegated authentication method based on attribute-based encryption and identity signature of claim 1, wherein: in step S05, the proxy node sends the delegation certificate to the gateway, and the gateway performs verification and storage to maintain a registered node list.
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| CN117094012B (en) * | 2023-08-21 | 2024-04-30 | 中胜信用管理有限公司 | Intelligent verification method and system for electronic authorization order |
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