CN115743565A - Automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic architecture based on man-machine effect and automatic throttle system - Google Patents
Automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic architecture based on man-machine effect and automatic throttle system Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
An automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic structure and an automatic throttle system based on man-machine efficiency can balance the problems of harassment alarming and alarming but not alarming. The logic architecture comprises alarm logic of an automatic accelerator function, and can ideally balance human-computer efficacy problems under the scenes of takeoff, low-altitude missed approach, misoperation of a TO/GA button after landing and the like. In the alarm logic of the automatic throttle function, there is alarm trigger suppression logic that suppresses the triggering of both a voice alarm indicating that the automatic throttle function is off and a CAS alarm indicating that the automatic throttle function is disabled, the suppression logic being configured to: in the non-inhibition stage which does not meet the inhibition condition that the automatic flight vertical mode is a take-off mode, the voice alarm and the CAS information are in a state of being capable of being triggered; in the suppression phase when the suppression condition is satisfied, the voice alarm and the CAS information are not triggered, and only the notification that the auto throttle function is off is displayed in the FMA region of the main display.
Description
5 field of the invention
The invention relates to an automatic throttle alarm and protection logic architecture based on man-machine efficiency, which particularly comprises protection logic of an Automatic Throttle (AT) function and alarm logic of the AT function (provided with alarm trigger suppression logic for suppressing voice/CAS alarm).
In addition, the invention also relates to an automatic throttle system adopting the automatic throttle alarm 0 alarm and protection logic architecture based on the man-machine effect.
Background
An automatic throttle system (AT) is an onboard system on an airplane, two 5 thrust handles are automatically controlled by providing instructions to independent servo motors on each throttle platform, and automatic thrust control in the processes of takeoff, climbing, cruising, descending, approaching and fly-back is provided. For the active accelerator platform, in a key takeoff stage, in order to prevent the thrust handle from moving in a non-instruction mode, the thrust handle is kept at a takeoff thrust position or a flexible takeoff thrust position.
From the analysis of human factors, the key stage of takeoff is to deal with the possible Automatic Throttle (AT)
And (4) function disconnection voice alarm, automatic Throttle (AT) function failure CAS information and the like are inhibited, and 0, the condition of interfering the pilot is avoided. Meanwhile, the scenes of take-off, landing, missed flight and the like need to be considered, the expected effect of the voice alarm and the alarm triggering suppression logic of the CAS information under each scene is ensured, and the situation of false suppression is avoided.
Currently, the main branch passenger aircraft such as ARJ21 and ERJ160/190 adopt an active throttle platform,
and when the takeoff airspeed is more than 60 knots and 400ft of the ground, the automatic throttle enters a holding mode, and the throttle 5 platform does not respond to the automatic throttle instruction. Mainline aircraft such as B737/B787 also employ active throttle stations,
and when the takeoff airspeed is more than 80 knots and 400ft above the ground, the automatic throttle enters a holding mode, and the throttle platform does not respond to the automatic throttle instruction. The A320/A330/A350 of the air passenger series aircraft adopts a passive throttle platform, the automatic throttle is always in a pre-positioned state in the takeoff phase, and when the takeoff phase is converted into the climbing phase, the pilot places the throttle platform below the CLB thrust position, and the automatic throttle is automatically switched on.
The B787 airplane and the A320 airplane both have warning level automatic throttle opening CAS information, the information and corresponding voice are inhibited in the key takeoff stage, and the specific definition of the inhibited stage is different. The ERJ160/190 is similar to the ARJ in that there is no CAS message indicating an automatic throttle off, there is a separate automatic throttle off voice, there is a CAS message indicating an automatic throttle failure and the CAS message is suppressed during the key phase of takeoff. In contrast, the automatic throttle off voice of the ERJ160/190 is not suppressed during the key takeoff phase.
However, in the prior art, when an automatic throttle protection logic is designed, the man-machine efficacy problems in two similar scenes, namely accidental touch of low-height missed approach and misoperation of a 'TO/GA' (adjusting the throttle TO the maximum position) button after landing, cannot be ideally balanced, and the fact that the prior art has problems is proved by a crash accident of the aliemide B787 airplane. The immediate cause of the catastrophic event was disclosed in the accident investigation report of the 8/6/8 alidade aircraft UAE5211 flight 2016 by the pilot pressing the "TO/GA" button TO fly back after touchdown, and the design logic for this model was such that the "TO/GA" button was disabled when the aircraft touchdown, and therefore the auto throttle did not push the throttle lever forward TO the back-flight thrust position as expected by the pilot, resulting in the aircraft crashing into a runway due TO insufficient thrust when flying back. In this accident, the aircraft is subjected TO wind shear near landing, with both main wheels touching the ground in 6 seconds, but both main wheels are simultaneously on the ground for less than 2 seconds, causing the pilot TO think that he is pressing the "TO/GA" button TO fly back before the aircraft touches down. In addition, the manufacturer of this model indicates that the "TO/GA" button is suppressed from the ground state during an accident investigation in order TO meet the requirements of the FAA120-29A, i.e. misselecting the GA mode after touchdown should not adversely affect safe taxi-out and stop of the aircraft. As can be seen from the accident, the design logic of the ground state suppression TO/GA button is adopted TO meet the requirement of the automatic accelerator, and potential safety hazards exist in the aspect of human factors.
In addition, the prior art does not disclose how to balance nuisance alarms and stress alarms but not alarms when designing automatic throttle voice alarm suppression logic.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention is made to solve the technical problems, and aims to provide an automatic throttle alarm and protection logic architecture based on man-machine effect and an automatic throttle system adopting the logic architecture, which can balance the problems of harassment alarm and alarm but no alarm when the automatic throttle voice alarm suppression logic is designed.
Another objective of the present invention is TO provide an automatic throttle alarm and protection logic architecture based on human-machine efficiency and an automatic throttle system using the same, which can ideally balance human-machine efficiency problems in the situations of takeoff, low altitude missed approach, and misoperation of the "TO/GA" button after landing.
In order to achieve at least one of the above objects of the present invention, the present invention provides an automatic throttle alarm and protection logic architecture based on human-machine efficiency, including alarm logic of an automatic throttle function, characterized in that, in the alarm logic of the automatic throttle function, there is alarm trigger suppression logic that suppresses triggering of both a voice alarm indicating disconnection of the automatic throttle function and a CAS alarm indicating failure of the automatic throttle function, the alarm trigger suppression logic is configured to:
in a non-inhibition stage of not meeting the inhibition condition including that the automatic flight vertical mode is a take-off mode, the voice alarm and the CAS information are in a state capable of being triggered;
in the suppression stage when the suppression condition is met, the voice alarm and the CAS information are not triggered, and only the notification of the disconnection of the automatic throttle function is displayed in the FMA area of the main display.
In addition, in the automatic throttle warning and protection logic structure based on man-machine effect, if a touchdown scene occurs in the low altitude missed flight process, the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is disconnected, the notification of the automatic throttle state (the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is disconnected) can be seen in the FMA region of the main display, and the voice warning of the automatic throttle disconnect is also normally triggered, so that the situation that the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is disconnected due to inadvertent triggering in the process of missed flight from the very low altitude can be ideally ensured to prompt a pilot through the voice warning. Therefore, the problems of harassment alarm and alarm but no alarm can be balanced in the design of the automatic accelerator voice alarm suppression logic.
More specifically, the suppression conditions are set to: when the auto-flight vertical mode is the takeoff mode, the aircraft is released from dual takeoff thrust, braking to radio altitude of greater than 400 feet, or the aircraft is airborne for more than 30 seconds.
Preferably, the automatic throttle warning and protection logic architecture based on human-machine efficiency comprises the protection logic of the automatic throttle function in addition to the warning logic of the automatic throttle function.
Wherein the protection logic of the automatic throttle function is designed to:
in the takeoff phase, the automatic flight vertical mode is set as the takeoff mode, when the aircraft is kept grounded for more than a specified time and the average airspeed on two sides is more than the specified airspeed, the automatic throttle system enters the holding mode of the automatic throttle function and is always in the holding mode in the key takeoff phase before the radio altitude is more than 400 feet, until the automatic throttle system exits the holding mode after the radio altitude is more than 400 feet,
in the landing phase, the automatic flight vertical mode is set to the approach mode,
when the aircraft normally lands and touches the ground, if the automatic throttle function is in a connection state,
the auto throttle function is automatically turned off,
when the "TO/GA" button is pressed in the air, the missed approach phase is entered,
in the fly-back stage, the automatic flight vertical mode is set to the fly-back mode,
when the missed approach mode is activated at normal altitude, the automatic throttle function is automatically switched on,
when the missed approach mode is activated at low altitude, the automatic throttle function is automatically switched on,
and automatically disconnecting the automatic throttle function when the main wheel of the airplane touches the ground.
In addition, the warning logic of the automatic throttle function is designed to:
during the take-off phase, the aircraft is in a take-off phase,
when in the key takeoff phase of the hold mode of the auto-throttle function,
the alarm trigger suppression logic is executed and,
triggering the displaying of the CAS information on the EICAS display if the auto throttle function is still in a disabled state after takeoff to a radio altitude greater than 400 feet, and further triggering the voice alert if the auto throttle function has not been turned back on thereafter or is subsequently confirmed to be turned off,
in the landing stage and the re-flight stage, when the aircraft touches the ground, the voice alarm is triggered while the automatic throttle function is disconnected.
More preferably, the protection logic of the automatic throttle function is further designed to:
when the contact time of the airplane does not exceed the specified time in the landing stage and the re-flight stage, the airplane does not inhibit the automatic throttle function, at the moment, the automatic throttle function can be automatically activated by pressing a 'TO/GA' button,
and when the contact time of the airplane in the landing stage exceeds a specified time, the airplane inhibits the automatic throttle function.
According TO the structure, compared with the prior art, the invention provides the specific automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic architecture based on the man-machine effect according TO the signals of the automatic flight vertical mode, the wheel load, the airspeed, the throttle lever angle and the like of the airplane and mainly considering different special requirements under take-off, landing and fly-back scenes, thereby effectively avoiding the situations of alarming error suppression of the automatic throttle function, non-instruction movement of the throttle lever and misoperation of the TO/GA button, which are possibly caused in the special scenes in the prior art, of misoperation of the automatic throttle function.
The present invention further provides an automatic throttle system, which is characterized in that the automatic throttle system comprises: a primary display that receives signals from an atmospheric system regarding airspeed and altitude; a data concentrator that forwards on-board signals from the landing gear system, in which the above-described human-machine-efficiency-based automatic throttle warning and protection logic architecture is employed.
Preferably, the auto-throttle system has an auto-throttle section with an auto-throttle monitor and an auto-throttle application, the auto-throttle monitor receiving processed signals regarding airspeed and altitude processed by the main display and the on-wheel signal forwarded by the data concentrator and sending an enable signal or a disable signal of the auto-throttle function to the flight control panel.
After the automatic throttle monitor sends an enabling signal of an automatic throttle function to the flight control panel, the flight control panel sends the enabling signal to the throttle platform, the throttle platform is in a state of receiving an automatic throttle instruction for automatic control at the moment, the throttle lever responds to a control instruction sent by the automatic throttle application to control the running of an engine, and the automatic throttle application receives a feedback throttle platform state signal to indicate the next control instruction. On the other hand, when the aircraft is kept in contact with the ground for more than the specified time and the average airspeed on both sides is more than the specified airspeed, the automatic throttle monitor sends a disabling signal of the automatic throttle function to the flight control panel, the flight control panel forwards the disabling signal to the throttle platform, and the throttle platform uses the disabling signal to power off the servo of the throttle platform and does not respond to the control instruction sent by the automatic throttle application.
Furthermore, when the auto-throttle function is disconnected or disabled, the auto-throttle application sends an alarm signal of the disconnection or the failure of the auto-throttle function to the main display and the data concentrator, respectively, and forwards the alarm signal to a speaker or an EICAS display, i.e., triggers a voice alarm indicating the disconnection of the auto-throttle function or triggers the display of CAS information indicating the failure of the auto-throttle function on the EICAS display.
Meanwhile, when the auto throttle function is automatically turned off, the mark representing the auto throttle function in the FMA region of the main display is flashed for a prescribed time, and then the mark is continuously displayed until the pilot disappears after confirming the turn-off.
Aiming AT the problems that when the alarm and protection logic of the automatic Accelerator (AT) function is designed in the prior art,
'TO/GA' for imperfect balanced takeoff, low altitude missed approach and misoperation after landing "
The invention relates to a man-machine efficiency problem under scenes such as buttons, and an automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic framework based on man-machine efficiency and an automatic throttle system adopting the logic framework can ideally balance the man-machine efficiency problem under a plurality of scenes, wherein the specific scenes are as follows:
(1) Considering the reduced thrust takeoff condition, the minimum thrust position allowed to be used for the takeoff of the airplane is 60 degrees. And the statistical analysis result shows that the speed of the airplane in the takeoff process reaches 60 hours, and the automatic throttle system moves the throttle lever to the takeoff thrust position. Therefore, in the logic for suppressing the voice alarm indicating the disconnection of the Automatic Throttle (AT) function and the CAS alarm indicating the failure of the Automatic Throttle (AT) function, the double takeoff thrust is defined as the engine starting and the throttle lever angle is more than 59 degrees, and the airspeed used in the protection logic of the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is the average airspeed AT both sides which is more than 60 knots;
(2) During normal landing of the aircraft, a "TO/GA" button is pressed AT low altitude (about 30 feet) in the air TO activate a missed approach mode (low altitude missed approach), and an Automatic Throttle (AT) function automatically turns on and pushes forward the throttle lever. When the airplane touches the ground in the low-altitude re-flying process, the angle of the throttle lever on two sides is larger than 59 degrees and is not in the re-flying thrust position, the brake is released, the wheel load is the ground, and the airspeed is larger than 100 knots, so that the definition of the flight stage T2 required by the take-off and the re-flying is met.
If the suppression conditions for the voice alarm indicating that the Auto Throttle (AT) function is off and the CAS alarm indicating that the Auto Throttle (AT) function is disabled are determined as shown in fig. 3 in order to satisfy the definition of the flight phase T2 required for the takeoff and the missed approach, as in the related art, the Auto Throttle (AT) function is off due to the aircraft ground contact (WOW = 1), and the voice alarm indicating that the Auto Throttle (AT) function is off is suppressed as a result of satisfying the definition of the flight phase T2, and therefore, the Auto Throttle (AT) function is off in this scene but "auto throttle disable" does not occur "
The voice alarms, and the pilot may not realize that the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is disconnected, so that the fly-by thrust is insufficient.
In contrast, in the present invention, based on the analysis of the takeoff and missed approach scenarios, the logic of the aircraft flight phase definition, entry and exit of the auto-throttle (AT) function into the takeoff suppression state is considered comprehensively, and the suppression conditions of the voice alarm indicating the auto-throttle (AT) function disconnection and the CAS alarm indicating the auto-throttle (AT) function failure are set to include the auto-flight vertical mode as the takeoff mode, and more specifically set as follows: "when the auto-flight vertical mode is takeoff mode, from dual takeoff thrust (engine on and throttle lever angle greater than 59 °), the brake is released to radio altitude greater than 400 feet, or the aircraft is airborne for more than 30 seconds. Accordingly, in the warning logic of the auto throttle function according to the present invention, as shown in fig. 2, when the throttle levers on both sides are greater than 59 degrees and the fly-back thrust position is not reached, the aircraft touches the ground, the Auto Throttle (AT) function is turned off AT this time, and the notification of the auto throttle state (the Auto Throttle (AT) function is turned off) is visible in the FMA (flight mode signal) region of the main display, and further, since the auto flight vertical mode AT this time is the fly-back mode and not the takeoff mode, the suppression conditions of the voice warning indicating the turn-off of the Auto Throttle (AT) function and the CAS warning indicating the failure of the Auto Throttle (AT) function, that is, the "auto throttle disconnect" voice warning is triggered in the same order as the turn-off of the auto throttle function. Similarly, if the Automatic Throttle (AT) is disconnected due to the function failure, the "AT FAULT" CAS information and the "automatic disconnect" voice alarm are also triggered normally in the process.
(3) When the aircraft lands normally, the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is turned off. When the airplane is grounded briefly (less than 5 seconds), namely the air shear occurs when the allied aircraft is approaching TO the landing, both main wheels touch the ground within 6 seconds, but the state of the two main wheels on the ground is less than 2 seconds simultaneously (WOW =1 is not kept for more than 5 seconds), the airplane will not inhibit the Automatic Throttle (AT) function, AT this moment, the Automatic Throttle (AT) function can be automatically activated by pressing a 'TO/GA' (throttle is adjusted TO the maximum position) button, if the touch-down occurs again in the process, the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is disconnected and is accompanied by an 'automatic throttle disconnect' voice alarm. When the aircraft lands for 5 seconds (WOW =1 is kept for more than 5 seconds), the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is not automatically turned on even if the "TO/GA" (throttle TO maximum position) button is erroneously operated.
Therefore, the automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic framework based on the man-machine effect can ideally ensure that the throttle lever can not move in a non-instruction mode after the thrust of the automatic throttle system reaches the takeoff thrust during takeoff.
Furthermore, the ergonomic-based auto-throttle warning and protection logic architecture of the present invention does not automatically turn on the auto-throttle (AT) function even if the "TO/GA" button is inadvertently pressed after the aircraft lands for a period of time, and therefore, does not adversely affect the ability of the aircraft TO safely roll off and stop.
Therefore, the invention accurately identifies the take-off, re-flight and landing scenes of the airplane on the premise of ensuring the safety of the airplane, correctly inhibits the alarm of the Automatic Throttle (AT) function, and can ideally balance the man-machine efficiency problems under the scenes of accidental touch in the take-off and low-altitude re-flight processes, misoperation of a 'TO/GA' button after landing and the like by adopting the automatic throttle alarm and protection logic architecture based on the man-machine efficiency in the take-off stage, the landing and the re-flight stage of the airplane, thereby improving the man-machine efficiency of an automatic throttle system.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an auto-throttle system employing the ergonomic-based auto-throttle warning and protection logic architecture of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram showing how the auto throttle warning and protection logic architecture of the auto throttle system of the present invention acts in a low altitude missed touchdown scenario.
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing how the auto throttle alert and protection logic architecture of a prior art auto throttle system acts in a low altitude missed touchdown scenario.
Detailed Description
An automatic throttle warning and protection logic architecture (hereinafter, referred to as "logic architecture") based on human-machine effect and an automatic throttle system 100 using the logic architecture according to the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which fig. 1 is a schematic diagram showing the automatic throttle system 100 using the automatic throttle warning and protection logic architecture based on human-machine effect according to the present invention, and fig. 2 is a schematic diagram showing how the automatic throttle warning and protection logic architecture of the automatic throttle system 100 operates in a low altitude missed touchdown scene.
First, the automatic throttle system 100 of the present invention will be explained. As shown in figure 1 of the drawings, in which,
the automatic throttle system 100 includes: a main display 110, the main display 110 receiving a signal S1a from the atmospheric system 200 regarding airspeed and altitude; a data concentrator 120, said data concentrator 120 forwarding the on-wheel signal WOW from the landing gear system 300. In the auto-throttle system having the auto-throttle system 100 of the present invention, an airspeed that is an indication of the main display 110 is used, and further, a wheel-borne signal WOW =1 represents that the aircraft is in the ground, and a wheel-borne signal WOW =0 represents that the aircraft is in the air (not in the ground).
As shown in fig. 1, the auto-throttle system 100 has an auto-throttle section 130, and the auto-throttle section 130 has an auto-throttle monitor 131 and an auto-throttle application 132. The auto-throttle monitor 131 receives the processing signal S1b regarding the airspeed and altitude processed by the main display 110 and the wheel-borne signal WOW forwarded by the data concentrator 120, and sends an enable signal S of an auto-throttle (AT) function to the flight control panel 140 enabled Or not enable signal S Disabled 。
The auto throttle monitor 131 sends an enable signal S of an Auto Throttle (AT) function to the flight control panel 140 enabled After, the flightThe control board 140 will enable the signal S enabled And the throttle lever 150 responds to the control instruction sent by the automatic throttle application 132 to control the operation of the engine 400, and the automatic throttle application 132 receives a feedback throttle station state signal S3 to indicate the next control instruction.
On the other hand, when WOW =1 (i.e., the aircraft touches down) is maintained for more than 5 seconds and the average airspeed on both sides is more than 60 knots, the auto throttle monitor 131 sends an Auto Throttle (AT) function disable signal S to the flight control panel 140 Disabled The flight control panel 140 will not enable the signal S Disabled To the throttle station, which uses the disable signal S Disabled The throttle station servo (not shown) is de-energized and no longer responds to control commands sent by the auto throttle application 132.
In addition, when the Auto Throttle (AT) function is disconnected or fails, the auto throttle application 132 sends an alarm signal S2 of the disconnection or failure of the auto throttle function to the main display 110 and the data concentrator 120, respectively, and forwards the alarm signal S2 of the disconnection or failure of the auto throttle function to the speaker or EICAS (i.e., engine indication and crew warning system) display 160, i.e., triggers the voice alarm "auto throttle disconnect" indicating the disconnection of the Auto Throttle (AT) function, or triggers the display of "AT FAULT" CAS on the EICAS display 160
And (4) information.
In addition, in the data concentrator 120, an alarm trigger suppression logic is set for the disconnected or failed alarm signal S2.
More specifically, the alarm trigger suppression logic is configured to: in the non-suppression phase, the inhibition phase,
the data concentrator 120 receives the warning signal S2 of the disconnection or failure of the Auto Throttle (AT) function and forwards it to the speaker or EICAS (i.e., engine indication and crew warning system) display 160, i.e., triggers the voice warning "auto throttle disconnect" indicating that the Auto Throttle (AT) function is disconnected, or displays "AT FAULT" CAS information on the EICAS display 160 separately or additionally; in the suppression phase, the aforementioned voice alarm and CAS information are not triggered, but the FMA (flight mode signal panel) region of the main display 110 does not suppress the indication of the Auto Throttle (AT) function off. When the Auto Throttle (AT) function is automatically turned off, the "AT" character representing the auto throttle function in the FMA region of the main display 110 will blink for 5 seconds, and then the "AT" character in yellow continues to be displayed until it disappears after the pilot confirms the turn-off.
In the following, the automatic throttle warning and protection logic architecture based on man-machine effect of the present invention when the aircraft is in different stages will be described respectively. The automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic architecture based on man-machine efficiency comprises protecting logic of an Automatic Throttle (AT) function and alarming logic of the AT function. In addition, the alarm logic of the automatic throttle function also comprises alarm trigger suppression logic for suppressing both a voice alarm indicating that the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is disconnected and a CAS alarm indicating that the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is failed.
(takeoff phase)
For an auto-throttle system based on an active-throttle table design, the pilot will pre-position the auto-throttle system 100 by pressing the "AT" (i.e., auto-throttle function) button on the flight control panel 140 before the aircraft takes off.
Typical operating procedures at takeoff are: the pilot releases the brakes, advances the throttle lever 150 TO a certain position, presses the "TO/GA" (i.e., throttle TO maximum position) button, and the auto-throttle system 100 (auto-throttle section 130) automatically activates and advances the throttle lever 150 TO the takeoff thrust position. Once the takeoff thrust is set, the pilot will hold his or her hands on the throttle lever 150 until the aircraft speed reaches the takeoff decision speed. When WOW =1 (i.e., the aircraft is grounded) for more than 5 seconds and the average airspeed on both sides is greater than 60 knots, the auto-throttle system 100 enters the HOLD (HOLD) mode and is always in the HOLD (HOLD) mode during the key stage of takeoff from the forward push of the throttle lever 150 to the takeoff thrust position to the departure greater than 400 feet, until the auto-throttle system 100 exits the HOLD (HOLD) mode when the radio altitude is greater than 400 feet, which is the protection logic for the auto-throttle (AT) function. While auto throttle system 100 is in HOLD (HOLD) mode, auto throttle portion 130 (auto throttle application 132) no longer issues any control commands to throttle lever 150, including moving throttle lever 150. Also, it is preferable that the throttle lever 150 is designed to also not respond to erroneous control commands issued by the auto throttle application 132 at this stage.
In addition, in a key takeoff phase, due to the fact that the workload of a pilot is large, voice alarm indicating that an automatic Accelerator (AT) function is disconnected is restrained in the key takeoff phase, and interference on a unit is avoided. In other words, during the key phase of takeoff, if the Auto Throttle (AT) function is off, the annunciation of the auto throttle status is displayed only in the FMA region of the main display 110, without triggering the "AT FAULT" CAS message (indicating "the auto throttle system 100 is off due to a failure"
Etc. failure information) and a voice alarm indicating disconnection of the Auto Throttle (AT) function, which is a voice alarm indicating disconnection of the Auto Throttle (AT) function, indicating the Auto Throttle (AT)
The alarms that suppress both failed CAS alarms trigger the suppression logic.
After flying more than 400 feet off the ground, if the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is still in a disabled state, an "AT FAULT" CAS message is displayed on the EICAS (i.e., engine indicator and crew warning system) display 160. If the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is not switched on again after the moment or the pilot presses an 'AT OFF' (automatic throttle OFF) button to cancel the notification of the automatic throttle state, a voice alarm indicating that the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is switched OFF is further given, which is the alarm logic of the Automatic Throttle (AT) function. This may avoid the pilot from being unaware that the Auto Throttle (AT) function has been turned off because if the pilot does not realize that the Auto Throttle (AT) function has been turned off, then when the pilot changes vertical mode after takeoff, the Auto Throttle (AT) function may fail to correspondingly automatically reduce thrust, resulting in aircraft overspeeding.
(landing stage)
In the landing stage, when the aircraft normally lands on the ground, if the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is in an on state AT this time, the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is automatically turned off, which is a protection logic of the Automatic Throttle (AT) function, and AT the same time, since the voice alarm indicating that the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is turned off is not suppressed, a voice alarm "auto throttle disconnect" is accompanied, which is an alarm logic of the Automatic Throttle (AT) function. In addition, if the pilot mistakenly touches the "AT" (auto throttle) button or the "TO/GA" 5 seconds after the aircraft lands (WOW = 1) "
(throttle is adjusted to the maximum position) buttons, the Automatic Throttle (AT) function can not be automatically switched on,
still in the off state, which is also the protection logic for the Auto Throttle (AT) function.
(flying stage)
After a pilot obtains a landing instruction of a tower, the airplane starts to normally land, the automatic flight vertical mode is an approach mode, the airplane stably approaches along a radio-built lower slideway, and the airplane descends while approaching. If a sudden special condition occurs, such as runway incursion, wind shear, etc., which are a series of factors, the pilot needs to operate the throttle stick 150 of the aircraft to climb back to the ground, re-approach or go to another airport to return for landing. In the missed approach stage, two scenarios, namely normal missed approach and low-altitude missed approach, are considered.
During normal fly-back, after the pilot presses the "TO/GA" (throttle TO maximum position) button, the auto flight vertical mode is fly-back mode, the Auto Throttle (AT) function is automatically turned on, and the auto throttle system 100 automatically pushes the throttle lever 150 TO the "TO/GA" position.
Low altitude missed approach refers to a missed approach situation encountered AT low altitude (about 30 feet) in the air, as shown in FIG. 2, where the pilot manually disconnects the Automatic Throttle (AT) function when entering the approach mode, and presses when a special event suddenly occurs AT low altitude (about 30 feet) in the air
The TO/GA button activates the fly-back mode (low altitude fly-back), the auto flight vertical mode is the fly-back mode, and the Auto Throttle (AT) function is automatically switched on. During the automatic throttle system 100 automatically pushes the throttle lever 150 forward from the IDLE position TO the TO/GA position, the main wheel of the aircraft touches down (WOW = 1), and AT this time, the Automatic Throttle (AT) function is automatically turned off, which is the protection logic of the Automatic Throttle (AT) function. In addition, since the angle of the throttle lever 150 on both sides is greater than 59 degrees and does not reach the thrust position of the missed approach, the brake is released, the wheel load is the ground, and the airspeed is greater than 100 knots, that is, as shown in fig. 3, the definition of the flight phase T2 required for the takeoff and missed approach is satisfied, but as shown in fig. 2, the suppression condition including the auto flight vertical mode as the takeoff mode, which is determined by comprehensively considering the logic of the aircraft flight phase definition, the auto Accelerator (AT) function entering and exiting the takeoff suppression state based on the analysis of the takeoff and missed approach scenes in the present invention. AT this time, not only the annunciation of the auto throttle state (auto throttle (AT) function off) is visible in the FMA region of the main display 110, but also the voice alarm indicating that the Auto Throttle (AT) function is off and the CAS alarm indicating that the Auto Throttle (AT) function is disabled are not suppressed, that is, accompanied by the "auto throttle disconnect" voice alarm. Similarly, if the AT fails and disconnects during this process, the "AT FAULT" CAS message will also be triggered normally and
the 'Autothrottle disconnect' voice alarm.
Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made in these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined in the appended claims and their equivalents.
For example, in the present invention, the auto throttle monitor 131 sends an enable signal S of an Auto Throttle (AT) function to the flight control panel 140 with WOW =1 held for more than 5 seconds as an example of a predetermined period of time and 60 knots as an example of a predetermined airspeed enabled Or not to enable the signal S Disabled However, those skilled in the art should understand that the specified time period should not be limited to only 5 seconds, and the specified airspeed should not be limited to only 60 knots, and as long as the requirements of takeoff and missed flight can be met, the specified time period can be set to any value greater than 5 seconds, and the specified airspeed can be set to a specified value greater than 60 knots.
Claims (12)
1. An automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic structure based on man-machine effect comprises an alarming logic of an automatic throttle function and is characterized in that,
in the alarm logic of the automatic throttle function, alarm trigger suppression logic which suppresses the triggering of both a voice alarm indicating that the automatic throttle function is off and a CAS alarm indicating that the automatic throttle function is disabled,
the alarm trigger suppression logic is configured to:
in a non-inhibition stage of not meeting the inhibition condition including that the automatic flight vertical mode is a take-off mode, the voice alarm and the CAS information are in a state capable of being triggered;
in the suppression phase when the suppression condition is satisfied, the voice alarm and the CAS information are not triggered, and only the notification that the automatic throttle function is disconnected is displayed in the FMA area of the main display.
2. The human-machine-efficiency-based automatic throttle alert and protection logic architecture of claim 1,
the suppression conditions are set to: when the auto-flight vertical mode is the takeoff mode, the dual takeoff thrust, brake release to radio altitude is greater than 400 feet, or the aircraft is airborne for more than 30 seconds.
3. The human-machine-efficiency-based automatic throttle alert and protection logic architecture of claim 2, further comprising protection logic for an automatic throttle function,
the protection logic for the automatic throttle function is designed to:
in the takeoff phase, the automatic flight vertical mode is set as the takeoff mode, when the aircraft is kept grounded for more than a specified time and the average airspeed on two sides is more than the specified airspeed, the automatic throttle system enters the holding mode of the automatic throttle function and is always in the holding mode in the key takeoff phase before the radio altitude is more than 400 feet, until the automatic throttle system exits the holding mode after the radio altitude is more than 400 feet,
in the landing stage, the automatic flight vertical mode is set to the approach mode,
when the aircraft normally lands on the ground, if the automatic throttle function is in a connected state, the automatic throttle function is automatically disconnected,
when the "TO/GA" button is pressed in the air, the missed approach phase is entered,
in the fly-back stage, the automatic flight vertical mode is set to the fly-back mode,
when the fly-back mode is activated at normal altitude, the automatic throttle function is automatically switched on,
when the fly-back mode is activated at low altitude, the auto-throttle function is automatically turned on, and when the main wheel of the aircraft touches the ground, the auto-throttle function is automatically turned off.
4. The human-machine-efficiency-based automatic throttle alert and protection logic architecture of claim 3,
the warning logic of the automatic throttle function is designed to:
during the take-off phase, the aircraft is,
executing the alarm trigger suppression logic when the key takeoff phase of the holding mode of the automatic throttle function is in,
triggering the displaying of the CAS information on the EICAS display if the auto throttle function is still in a disabled state after takeoff to a radio altitude greater than 400 feet, and further triggering the voice alert if the auto throttle function has not been turned back on thereafter or is subsequently confirmed to be turned off,
in the landing stage and the re-flight stage, when the aircraft touches the ground, the voice alarm is triggered while the automatic throttle function is disconnected.
5. The ergonomic benefit based automatic throttle alert and protection logic architecture of claim 3 or 4,
the protection logic for the auto throttle function is further designed to:
when the touchdown time of the airplane does not exceed the specified time in the landing stage and the re-flying stage, the airplane does not inhibit the automatic throttle function, at the moment, the automatic throttle function can be automatically activated by pressing the 'TO/GA' button,
and when the contact time of the airplane in the landing stage exceeds a specified time, the airplane inhibits the automatic throttle function.
6. The human-machine-efficiency-based automatic throttle alert and protection logic architecture of claim 5,
the prescribed period of time is 5 seconds,
the specified airspeed is 60 knots.
7. An automatic throttle system is characterized in that,
the automatic throttle system includes:
a primary display that receives signals from an atmospheric system regarding airspeed and altitude;
a data concentrator that relays on-wheel signals from the landing gear system,
in the data concentrator, the automatic throttle warning and protection logic architecture based on human-machine efficiency of any one of claims 1 to 6 is adopted.
8. The automatic throttle system of claim 7,
the automatic throttle system has an automatic throttle section with an automatic throttle monitor and an automatic throttle application,
the automatic throttle monitor receives the processing signals of the airspeed and the altitude processed by the main display and the wheel-borne signals forwarded by the data concentrator, and sends enabling signals or disabling signals of the automatic throttle function to the flight control panel.
9. The automatic throttle system of claim 8,
after the automatic throttle monitor sends an enabling signal of an automatic throttle function to the flight control panel, the flight control panel sends the enabling signal to the throttle platform, the throttle platform is in a state capable of receiving an automatic throttle instruction for automatic control at the moment, the throttle lever responds to a control instruction sent by the automatic throttle application to control the running of an engine, and the automatic throttle application receives a feedback throttle platform state signal to indicate the next control instruction.
10. The automatic throttle system of claim 8,
when the airplane is maintained to touch the ground for more than a specified time and the average airspeed on two sides is greater than the specified airspeed, the automatic throttle monitor sends out a disabling signal of the automatic throttle function to the flight control panel, the flight control panel forwards the disabling signal to the throttle platform, and the throttle platform uses the disabling signal to power off the servo of the throttle platform and does not respond to a control command sent by the automatic throttle application.
11. The auto-throttle system of claim 8,
when the automatic throttle function is disconnected or disabled, the automatic throttle application respectively sends out an alarm signal indicating the disconnection or the failure of the automatic throttle function to the main display and the data concentrator, and forwards the alarm signal to a loudspeaker or an E I CAS display, namely, a voice alarm indicating the disconnection of the automatic throttle function is triggered, or CAS information indicating the failure of the automatic throttle function is triggered to be displayed on the E I CAS display.
12. The automatic throttle system of claim 8,
when the automatic throttle function is automatically disconnected, the mark representing the automatic throttle function in the FMA area of the main display flickers for a set time, and then the mark is continuously displayed until the pilot disappears after confirming the disconnection.
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202211627671.1A CN115743565A (en) | 2022-12-16 | 2022-12-16 | Automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic architecture based on man-machine effect and automatic throttle system |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202211627671.1A CN115743565A (en) | 2022-12-16 | 2022-12-16 | Automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic architecture based on man-machine effect and automatic throttle system |
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| CN115743565A true CN115743565A (en) | 2023-03-07 |
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| CN202211627671.1A Pending CN115743565A (en) | 2022-12-16 | 2022-12-16 | Automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic architecture based on man-machine effect and automatic throttle system |
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| Country | Link |
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| CN (1) | CN115743565A (en) |
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