CN115442111A

CN115442111A - Risk data pushing method and system and trusted unit

Info

Publication number: CN115442111A
Application number: CN202211055261.4A
Authority: CN
Inventors: 钱锋; 陈远; 郭倩婷; 王辛民; 李书博; 孙善禄; 杨仁慧; 杨文玉
Original assignee: Ant Blockchain Technology Shanghai Co Ltd
Current assignee: Ant Blockchain Technology Shanghai Co Ltd
Priority date: 2022-08-31
Filing date: 2022-08-31
Publication date: 2022-12-06

Abstract

A risk data pushing method, system and trusted unit, the method comprising: the plurality of organization devices send ciphertext push data to a trusted unit for privacy data processing; the trusted unit decrypts the received ciphertext push data respectively to obtain push data; generating first data corresponding to the first organization based on the plurality of push data, wherein the first data comprises account information of a first account in the first organization and a first risk label set; encrypting the first data to obtain first ciphertext data; providing the first ciphertext data to the first mechanism device; and the first mechanism equipment decrypts the first ciphertext data to obtain a first risk label set of the first account.

Description

Risk data pushing method and system and trusted unit

Technical Field

The embodiment of the specification belongs to the technical field of computers, and particularly relates to a risk data pushing method, a risk data pushing system and a trusted unit.

Background

Currently, authorities are often required to fulfill the obligation of anti-money laundering for institutions involved in major transactions, i.e. to analyze and report transaction data for both large and suspicious transactions. However, information isolation between organizations forms an information island, and organizations have difficulty identifying suspicious users in the event of insufficient information. How to protect the privacy data of the user while pushing the risk information to the account opening mechanism of the upstream and downstream accounts of the transaction is a problem to be solved in the current anti-money laundering scheme.

Disclosure of Invention

The invention aims to provide a risk data pushing scheme, which is used for realizing the pushing of risk data among a plurality of organizations by processing the risk data of upstream and downstream accounts of the organization accounts in a trusted unit, protecting privacy data and simultaneously improving the processing efficiency of the pushed data of the plurality of organizations.

A first aspect of the present specification provides a risk data pushing method, including:

the method comprises the steps that a plurality of mechanism devices send ciphertext push data to a trusted unit, wherein the mechanism devices comprise a first mechanism device, the first mechanism device belongs to a first mechanism, and the trusted unit is used for processing private data;

the trusted unit decrypts the received ciphertext push data respectively to obtain a plurality of push data, wherein the push data comprise account information of one or more accounts in mechanisms sending the push data, risk labels and mechanism identifications of other mechanisms which are related to the accounts in other mechanisms in service; generating first data corresponding to the first institution based on the plurality of pushed data, wherein the first data comprises account information of a first account in the first institution and a first risk label set; encrypting the first data to obtain first ciphertext data; providing the first ciphertext data to the first mechanism device;

and the first mechanism equipment decrypts the first ciphertext data to obtain a first risk label set of the first account.

A second aspect of the present specification provides a risk data pushing method, which is executed by a trusted unit, and includes:

acquiring a plurality of ciphertext push data of a plurality of mechanisms, wherein the mechanisms comprise a first mechanism;

decrypting the ciphertext push data respectively to obtain a plurality of push data, wherein the push data comprise account information of one or more accounts in mechanisms sending the push data, account information of risk labels in other mechanisms and mechanism identifications of the other mechanisms, wherein the accounts are related to the mechanism sending the push data in business;

generating first data corresponding to the first institution based on the plurality of pushed data, wherein the first data comprises account information of a first account in the first institution and a first risk label set;

encrypting the first data to obtain first ciphertext data;

providing the first ciphertext data to a first organization device of the first organization.

A third aspect of the present specification provides a risk data pushing system comprising a plurality of agency devices and a trusted unit,

the mechanism devices are used for sending ciphertext push data to the trusted unit, wherein the mechanism devices comprise a first mechanism device, and the first mechanism device belongs to a first mechanism;

the trusted unit is used for decrypting the received ciphertext push data respectively to obtain a plurality of push data, and the push data comprise account information of one or more accounts in mechanisms sending the push data in other mechanisms related to business, risk labels and mechanism identifications of the other mechanisms; generating first data corresponding to the first institution based on the plurality of pushed data, wherein the first data comprises account information of a first account in the first institution and a first risk label set; encrypting the first data to obtain first ciphertext data; providing the first ciphertext data to the first mechanism device;

and the first mechanism equipment is used for decrypting the first ciphertext data to obtain a first risk label set of the first account.

A fourth aspect of the specification provides a trusted unit comprising:

the system comprises an acquisition unit, a processing unit and a display unit, wherein the acquisition unit is used for acquiring a plurality of ciphertext push data of a plurality of mechanisms, and the mechanisms comprise a first mechanism;

the decryption unit is used for decrypting the ciphertext push data respectively to obtain a plurality of push data, and the push data comprise account information of one or more accounts in mechanisms sending the push data, risk labels and mechanism identifications of other mechanisms which are related to the accounts in the other mechanisms in service;

a generating unit, configured to generate first data corresponding to the first organization based on the plurality of pushed data, where the first data includes account information of a first account in the first organization and a first risk tag set;

the encryption unit is used for encrypting the first data to obtain first ciphertext data;

a providing unit configured to provide the first ciphertext data to a first mechanism device of the first mechanism.

A fifth aspect of the present specification provides a computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which, when executed in a computer, causes the computer to perform the method of the second aspect.

A sixth aspect of the present specification provides a computing device comprising a memory having stored therein executable code, and a processor that when executing the executable code, implements the method of the second aspect.

In the embodiment of the specification, by sending a pushed file comprising risk data of an upstream account and a downstream account to the TEE after desensitization encryption processing is carried out on the pushed file by an institution device, and carrying out summary processing on the risk data in the TEE, the efficiency of pushing the risk data of the upstream account and the downstream account among a plurality of institutions is improved while the privacy of a user is protected.

Drawings

In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments in the present specification, the drawings required to be used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments described in the present specification, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art that other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive labor.

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a system in an embodiment of the present description;

fig. 2 is a flowchart of a method for generating an encrypted push file on the device side of a mechanism in an embodiment of the present specification;

FIG. 3 is a flow chart of a method for a server to verify the identity of an organization in an embodiment of the present description;

FIG. 4 is a flow chart of a risk data pushing method in one embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a process of generating a mechanism push file in an embodiment of the present specification;

fig. 6 is an architecture diagram of a trusted unit in an embodiment of the present specification.

Detailed Description

In order to make those skilled in the art better understand the technical solutions in the present specification, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present specification will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present specification, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present specification, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by a person skilled in the art based on the embodiments in the present specification without any inventive step should fall within the scope of protection of the present specification.

Data sharing is often a requirement for organizations to handle traffic. Often, a single organization cannot acquire enough information to handle the service, and thus, a need exists to acquire information from other organizations. For example, among the anti-money laundering compliance requirements of various countries, many require various financial institutions to provide anti-money laundering audits. Currently, many countries, at the center, and many large financial institutions have attempts to utilize blockchains in the anti-money laundering area to improve efficiency and accuracy and meet regulatory requirements. Meanwhile, as a resource, the mobility and the availability of data are the basis of the development of many data applications and industries, but privacy protection in the data exchange and sharing process is always a great challenge in the development of the industries. The above anti-money laundering will be described as an example.

Anti-Money Laundering (AML) refers to a measure for preventing Money Laundering activities of such crimes as drug disguising, drug concealing, black-social organization crimes, terrorist activity crimes, smuggling crimes, bribery crimes, and financial management crimes, and the source and nature of their revenues. Common money laundering approaches widely involve various fields such as banks, insurance, securities, real estate, and the like. Most anti-money laundering work involves three core items:

1. a customer identity identification system. When the anti-money laundering obligation main body establishes a business relationship with a client or conducts a transaction with the client, the anti-money laundering obligation main body should verify and record the identity of the client according to the real and effective identity certificate, and update the identity information data of the client in time during the existence period of the business relationship.

2. Large and Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) system. Illegal fund flow generally has the characteristics of huge amount, abnormal transactions and the like, so the law stipulates a large amount and suspicious transaction reporting system, and a financial institution is required to report abnormal transactions with the amount reaching a certain standard and lacking legal purposes to an anti-money laundering administrative department in time so as to be used as a clue for pursuing illegal criminal behaviors.

3. The customer identity data and the transaction record storage system stores the customer identity data and the transaction record, means that a financial institution adopts necessary measures to store the customer identity data and the transaction information for a certain period of time according to law, and can provide evidence support for pursuing criminal behaviors.

The Customer identification system, also known as "Know Your Customer" (KYC), refers to obtaining Customer-related identification information, including knowing the Customer's identity when establishing a service with the Customer, knowing the purpose of the transaction, knowing the source and destination of funds, knowing the long business activities and financial transaction conditions of the Customer, and the like, and is the basis of money laundering.

Different financial institutions are obligated to review suspicious transactions. When, for example, organization a finds in the monitoring analysis that a customer "a" suspected of being at risk for money laundering has frequent/high volume transactions with "B" opening an account with organization B, it can be determined that B has a close relationship with a and is at risk for money laundering. Organization a may actively push account information and risk labels of a counterparty "B" of customer "a" to organization B, so that organization B may re-determine the risk level of the account of customer "B" based on the pushed information. Here, the account of "B" may be referred to as an upstream and downstream account (or service-related account) of the account of "a", and the institution B may be referred to as an upstream and downstream account opening institution of the institution a. In the embodiment of the description, risk data pushed by a plurality of mechanisms to upstream and downstream account opening mechanisms are summarized based on the trusted unit, so that the pushing efficiency of the risk data is improved.

Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a system in an embodiment of the present description. As shown in fig. 1, the institution devices 100, 200, and 300 may be computing devices such as institution a, institution B, and institution C, respectively, which may be any of financial, insurance, transaction, etc. institutions, for example. It is to be understood that three mechanism devices are shown as an example, and that other numbers of multiple mechanism devices may be included in practice. The client side of the money laundering platform is installed in the mechanism equipment, and each mechanism equipment can directly receive the information of the user, so that the client side can complete certain processing work based on the information of the user, such as suspicious transaction examination, and can obtain the risk label of each user.

Taking the risk label specifically as the money laundering risk level as an example, the institution a and the institution B can respectively index the money laundering risk level to the user account opened by the institution based on the anti-money laundering auditing capability of the institution. As described above, each organization indexes the risk level of the account opened by the organization, and simultaneously, the risk level of the upstream and downstream accounts opened by other organizations corresponding to the account can be correspondingly indexed, and the push data is generated based on the risk data of the upstream and downstream accounts of other organizations.

The server 400 includes a Trusted unit, which may be any computing unit capable of processing private data or confidential data and protecting data from being leaked, for example, the Trusted unit includes a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), a computing device in a Trusted authority, and the like. An example of TEE40 as a trusted unit is shown in fig. 1, and TEE40 is described below as an example of a trusted unit. Each facility device may send desensitized and encrypted push data to the server 400, and the server 400 stores the push data for each facility in a local or file storage server (not shown in fig. 1). TEE40 may receive an address storing push data from server 400, obtain the push data from the address, perform fusion processing on the push data of multiple institutions, and return the fusion processed data to each institution device, thereby pushing risk data of a user between each institution while protecting privacy of the user. Server 400 and TEE40 may be connected to blockchain 500, and perform the risk data pushing scheme in the embodiments of this disclosure in conjunction with blockchain 500. It is to be appreciated that although the trusted unit is shown in fig. 1 as being located inside the server 400, embodiments of the present description are not limited thereto, and the TEE may also be located in another computing device to which the server 400 may connect by connecting with the computing device.

Fig. 2 is a flowchart of a method for generating an encrypted push file on the mechanism device side in an embodiment of the present specification. The mechanism apparatus in fig. 2 may be any one of the plurality of mechanism apparatuses in fig. 1. The mechanism apparatus 100 will be described below as an example

As shown in fig. 2, first, in step S201, the institution apparatus 100 reads the file F1, and acquires the upstream and downstream accounts, the risk label, and the institution identification of the account opening institution.

In the institution a corresponding to the institution device 100, the institution administrator may periodically generate a file F1 in the institution device 100 according to the data analysis result in the institution a, where the file F1 includes risk data of the upstream and downstream accounts of the account of the institution, so as to push the risk data to the upstream and downstream account opening institution corresponding to the upstream and downstream accounts. It should be understood that, although data or information is carried in the form of a file, the embodiments of the present disclosure are not limited thereto, and for example, data or information may also be carried in the form of a text or a table, which is not limited thereto. The risk file F1 includes a plurality of rows, each row including an upstream and downstream account, a risk label of the upstream and downstream accounts, and an institution identification of an account opening institution of the upstream and downstream accounts. The risk label is a label which indicates the risk degree and is negotiated by a plurality of mechanisms. For example, the risk label may include a risk label such as riskH, for example indicating high risk, riskM, for example indicating medium risk, riskL, for example indicating low risk. The risk label for a single user may include multiple risk labels, e.g., risk1, riskH, where risk1, for example, indicates a particular type of risk, etc.

After the facility administrator generates the file F1 in the facility device 100, the file F1 is uploaded to the storage of the client. After listening to the update of the file F1, the client may read the file F1 line by line, for example, to perform desensitization processing line by line.

In step S203, the agency device 100 requests a desensitized account of the upstream and downstream accounts from the server 400.

Specifically, since the server 400 is also not fully trusted, the institution device 100 also needs to desensitize the upstream and downstream accounts when requesting desensitization accounts corresponding to the accounts in one row from the server 400 in the desensitization process performed on a row-by-row basis. Specifically, the institution device may calculate the hash value hash1= hash (Account 1) of the upstream Account1, and then the institution device 100 may send the hash value hash1 to the server 400 to request the desensitization Account corresponding to the hash value.

At step S205, the server 400 returns a desensitization account to the institution apparatus 100.

After receiving hash1, the server 400 may calculate a desensitization account corresponding to hash1 using a preset rule.

In one embodiment, to further enhance data security, the server 400 may perform a salt addition operation on hash1, for example, by calculating hash (hash 1+ salt), and using the resulting hash value as a desensitized account, where salt is a value pre-generated by the server. The user ID is obtained by adopting the salting operation on the hash1, so that a malicious party can be prevented from presuming the account corresponding to the hash 1.

After determining the desensitization account, the server returns the desensitization account to the institution device 100. When other institutions request the desensitization account for the account from server 400, the server may calculate the desensitization account based on the same rules and parameters (i.e., salt) so that the same desensitization account is available and returned to the institution devices so that different institution devices use the same desensitization account for the same user account in their push files sent to the server.

Each organization device can request a desensitization account of the account opened by the organization device from the server in the same way, and create a mapping table between the user identifier opened by the organization device and the desensitization account thereof, so that the user identifier can be subsequently used for determining the user corresponding to the desensitization account, wherein the user identifier can be the identity information (such as name, identity identifier and the like) of the user, or can also be the account opened by the user in the organization device.

In step S207, the institution device 100 writes the desensitization account, the risk label, and the institution identification of the opening institution in the push file F2.

The client in the institution device 100 may initialize the file F2 while starting reading the file F1, and after obtaining the desensitization account corresponding to the account in one row in the file F1 by reading the file F1 line by line, record the desensitization account, the risk label, and the institution identification of the account opening institution in one row in the file F2 corresponding to the row in the file F1. In this way, the client can generate the push file F2 corresponding to the file F1 after performing the above-described processing for each line in the file F1.

In one embodiment, after the client generates the file F2 as described above, the rows in the file F2 may be sorted in ascending order of the desensitization accounts to facilitate subsequent merging of pushed files for multiple institutions.

In step S209, the client may also encrypt the file F2 using the public key of the TEE, thereby generating an encrypted push file F3. By doing so, the TEE outside of the server 400 cannot acquire the plaintext data in the file F2, further protecting the user privacy. It will be appreciated that the encryption of file F2 using the TEE's public key is not limited thereto, for example, other asymmetric or symmetric keys may be negotiated between the TEE and the facility device for encrypting file F2.

In an embodiment, in a case where the security requirement is low, the desensitization process may not be performed on the upstream and downstream accounts in the file F1, so that the file F1 may be directly encrypted to obtain the encrypted push file F3.

Wherein, the TEE is a trusted execution environment which is based on the safety extension of CPU hardware and is completely isolated from the outside. The industry is concerned with TEE solutions, and almost all mainstream chip and Software consortiums have their own TEE solutions, such as TPM (Trusted Platform Module) in Software, and Intel SGX (Software Guard Extensions) in hardware, ARM Trustzone, and AMD PSP (Platform Security Processor). The TEE can function as a hardware black box, and codes and data executed in the TEE cannot be peeped even in an operating system layer, and can be operated only through an interface predefined in the codes. In terms of efficiency, due to the black box nature of the TEE, plaintext data is operated on in the TEE, rather than the complex cryptographic operations in homomorphic encryption, and little loss in computational process efficiency occurs.

The Intel SGX (hereinafter referred to as SGX) technology is taken as an example. The block link points may create enclaves (enclosures or enclaves) as TEEs based on SGX technology. The server may use a processor instruction newly added in the CPU, and may allocate a partial area EPC (enclosure Page Cache, enclave Page Cache, or Enclave Page Cache) in the memory, so as to reside the above enclosure. The Memory area corresponding to the EPC is encrypted by a Memory Encryption Engine MEE (Memory Encryption Engine) inside the CPU, the content (code and data in the enclave) in the Memory area can be decrypted only in the CPU core, and a key for Encryption and decryption is generated only when the EPC is started and is stored in the CPU. It can be seen that the security boundary of enclave only includes itself and CPU, and no matter privileged or non-privileged software can not access enclave, even an operating system administrator and VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor, or Hypervisor) can not affect the code and data in enclave, so that the enclave has extremely high security. And the data entering and exiting the TEE can be encrypted, so that the privacy of the data is guaranteed.

The TEE may prove to the user that it is authentic before it is used. The process of certifying itself as authentic may involve remote certification reporting. The remote attestation report is generated during a remote attestation process for the TEE. The remote attestation report may be generated by an authoritative authentication server verifying referral information generated by the TEE. The remote attestation report may be used to indicate that the TEE is trusted.

For example, the institution device 100 may first verify that the TEE is authentic before encrypting the file F2 using the TEE's public key. Specifically, the agency device 100 may initiate a challenge to the TEE and receive a remote attestation report back from the TEE. After obtaining the remote attestation report, the authority device 100 may verify the signature of the remote attestation report according to the public key of the authoritative certification server, and may confirm that the TEE is authentic if the verification is passed. Specifically, after receiving the verification request, the TEE generates authentication information based on its internal mechanism, and sends the authentication information and the hardware public key of the TEE to the agency device 100. The authentication information includes, for example, signature information, hardware information, software information, and the like of the TEE. Wherein the signature information is generated, for example, by a hardware key of the TEE; the hardware information includes, for example, indicators of various hardware, such as CPU main frequency, memory capacity, and the like; the software information includes a code hash value, a code name, a version, an operation log, and the like of each program. As known to those skilled in the art, a TEE may perform a "measurement" of the program running therein through memory hardware, such as obtaining a code hash value of the program, a hash value of the memory occupancy of the program at a particular execution point, etc., and include in the authentication information "measurement" information for the program, which is authentic because the "measurement" information is executed by the TEE's own entity (memory hardware) without involving any software, operating system, etc. The agency device 100, upon receiving the authentication information, may send the authentication information to a remote authentication server of the TEE, thereby receiving a remote attestation report for the TEE from the server. The remote attestation report includes, among other things, authentication of the TEE, and authentication of programs executing within the TEE. Thus, the agency device 100 may determine that the TEE is authentic based on the remote attestation report, and the results of the query by the TEE are authentic. At the same time, the agency device 100 may locally hold the TEE's hardware public key for subsequent verification of the TEE's signature. Wherein, a pair of public and private keys is stored in the TEE, and the private key is kept in the TEE properly. Content transmitted by the TEE may be signed with a private key stored within the TEE, thereby proving the result of execution by the TEE.

In the embodiment of the present specification, a digital identity may be created for each organization by means of DIS in combination with a blockchain. The blockchain may provide a decentralized (or weakly centralized), non-tamperproof (or difficult to tamper) and trusted distributed ledger, and may provide a secure, stable, transparent, auditable, and efficient way to log transactions and data information interactions. The blockchain network may include a plurality of nodes. Typically one or more nodes of a blockchain are attributed to a participant. In general, the more participants in the blockchain network, the more authoritative the participants are, and the higher the trustworthiness of the blockchain network is. A blockchain network formed by a plurality of participants is referred to herein as a blockchain platform. With the help of the blockchain platform, the identity of the organization can be verified.

To use the distributed digital identity services provided by the blockchain platform, an organization may register its own identity in the blockchain platform. For example, organization a may create a pair of public and private keys, the private key being stored securely, and may create a distributed digital identity (also known as Decentralized identifiers, DID). The DID may be created by agency a itself or may be requested by a Distributed Identity Service (DIS) system. DIS is an identity management scheme based on a block chain, and can provide functions of creating, verifying, managing and the like of digital identities, so that entity data can be managed and protected in a standardized manner, authenticity and efficiency of information transfer are guaranteed, and the problems of cross-organization identity authentication, data cooperation and the like can be solved. The DIS system may be connected to a blockchain platform. And a DID can be created for the organization A through the DIS system, the DID and the public key are sent to the block chain platform for storage, and the created DID is returned to the organization A. The public key may be incorporated into a DID document (DIDdoc), which may be stored in a blockchain platform. The DIS creates a DID for the organization a, which may be created based on a public key sent by the organization a, for example, by calculating the public key of the organization a using a Hash function, or may be created according to other information of the organization a (which may or may not include the public key). The latter may require that institution a provide some information beyond the public key. Thereafter, agency a may provide an authentication function to prove itself to the other party as agency a. Fig. 3 is a flowchart of a method for verifying identity of an organization by a server in an embodiment of the present specification, including:

s301: the agency device 100 of agency a initiates a DID creation request to DIS, where the request includes the public key of agency a.

S303: in response to the creation request, the DIS creates a DID and a corresponding DIDdoc for the agency a after the agency information (such as the qualification, the certificate, and the like) of the agency a passes verification, and sends the DID and the corresponding DIDdoc to a blockchain platform for saving. The DIDdoc includes the public key of the organization a. The DIDdoc also includes information such as a verifiable proof download address of the identity of the organization a.

S305: the blockchain platform receives a verification request sent by a server, wherein the verification request comprises the DID of the organization A.

S307: and the block chain platform takes the DIDdoc corresponding to the DID out of the storage of the block chain platform and returns the DID to the server.

S309: the server generates a character string and transmits the character string to the agency device 100 of the agency a.

S311: the institution device 100 signs the string with the private key of institution a and returns to the server.

S313: and the server verifies whether the returned signature is correct or not by using the received public key in the DIDdoc, and if so, the identity of the organization A is confirmed.

The server 400 may perform the risk data push method shown in fig. 4 after authentication of the organization is passed.

As shown in fig. 4, first, in step S401, the agency device 100 transmits an encrypted push file F3 to the server 400.

The server 400 may periodically request an encrypted push file from each agency device, and the agency device 100 may transmit a file F3 generated through the flow shown in fig. 2 to the server 400 in response to the request of the server. Specifically, the organization device 100 may sign the document F3 using the private key of the DID of the organization a, and transmit the DID of the organization a (e.g., DID), the document F3, and the signature of the document F3 by the private key of the DID to the server 400.

At step S403, the server 400 provides the TEE with the encrypted push document (including document F3) and the institution public key corresponding to each institution DID.

After receiving the encrypted push file from each of the organization devices, the server 400 may store the encrypted push file in a storage server inside or outside the server, and obtain a storage address of the encrypted push file.

Thereafter, the server 400 may send to the TEE the DID list for each organization, and the document address and public key of the encrypted push document corresponding to each DID. The TEE can read the encrypted push document corresponding to each DID from the document address corresponding to each DID. The public key of each organization is subsequently used for encrypting the file sent to the organization, and it can be understood that the TEE is not limited to encrypting the file sent to the organization by using the public key of the organization, but may use any key negotiated by the TEE and the organization device or the server and the organization device, including a symmetric key and an asymmetric key.

In one embodiment, the server 400 may send the DID list of each organization and the document address and the public key of the encrypted push document corresponding to each DID to the TEE after the signature verification of the encrypted push document of each organization passes.

In one embodiment, the server may provide a plurality of signatures of the plurality of institution devices to the TEE, so that the TEE first verifies the plurality of signatures using public keys of the plurality of institutions, respectively, before decrypting the plurality of encrypted push files, respectively, and if the verification succeeds, decrypts the plurality of encrypted push files.

In step S405, the TEE chains the public agency keys of the respective agencies received from the server.

The TEE links the operation of the server by linking the public keys of each institution received from the server, and each institution can verify whether the public key provided by the server is correct, so that the possibility of the following servers doing harm is avoided: it is possible that the server replaces the public key of the institution device with its own public key to the TEE so that the server can decrypt the file output by the TEE encrypted with the server public key using its own private key, which would have been encrypted with the public key of the institution device to send to the institution device so that the server can steal the user privacy information in this manner.

In step S407, the TEE generates a mechanism push file for each mechanism, including the mechanism push file F4 for mechanism a.

Specifically, after obtaining the encrypted push files of each mechanism, the TEE decrypts each encrypted push file by using its own private key, thereby obtaining the push files of each mechanism (including the push file F2). Thereafter, the TEE may generate an organization push file corresponding to each organization based on the push files of the plurality of organizations.

Fig. 5 is a schematic diagram of a process of generating a mechanism to push a file in an embodiment of the present specification. The upper part of fig. 5 schematically shows the pushed files of the respective organizations, wherein the pushed file of the organization a corresponds to the organization identifier DIDa of the organization a, the pushed file of the organization B corresponds to the organization identifier DIDb of the organization B, and the pushed file of the organization C corresponds to the organization identifier DIDc of the organization C. Desensitization accounts (or upstream and downstream accounts) for upstream and downstream accounts of various institutions, risk labels, and account opening institution identification are shown in each push file. Where multiple lines in the push file may be arranged in ascending order of desensitized accounts.

In the TEE, when merging processing is performed on a plurality of push files, as shown in fig. 5, a minimum desensitization account is first indicated with a pointer for each push file. Among the desensitization accounts indicated by the pointers in the three pushed files in fig. 5, desensitization account Acc1 of institution a is the smallest account, and the account opening institution corresponding to desensitization account Acc1 is institution b, and therefore, "Acc1{ risk1}" is written in line 1 in the institution pushed file (middle file) of institution b shown in the lower part of fig. 5, where { risk1} is Acc 1's current risk label set.

After the information corresponding to Acc1 is written in the mechanism push file of mechanism B, the pointer is pointed to the next row, i.e., the row corresponding to Acc3, in the push file of mechanism a, and the above-described processing procedure is repeated. Specifically, after the minimum ID indicated by the three pointers is determined to be Acc2 in the TEE, information "Acc2{ risk2, riskL }" corresponding to Acc2 is recorded on line 1 in the institution push file F4 of the institution a corresponding to the desensitized account Acc 2. Through the same process as described above, after traversing all rows in each pushed file using the fingers, the mechanism pushed file of each mechanism shown in the lower part of fig. 5 for sending to the mechanism device of each mechanism can be obtained.

In one embodiment, a summary file may be first generated in the TEE based on the pushed files of the respective organizations, and the summary file summarizes data in a plurality of pushed files into one file, wherein one row in the summary file includes the desensitization account, the risk tag set and the account opening organization identifier, and wherein the risk tag set is obtained based on the plurality of pushed files. Additionally, the multiple rows in the summary file may be arranged in order of desensitization accounts from smaller to larger. After generating the summary file, the TEE may generate organization push files for the various organizations based on the summary file. Taking agency a as an example, each row in the summary file can be traversed in the TEE, and when the agency identifier in the row is "DIDa", the desensitization account and risk label set in the row are recorded in the agency push file F4 of agency a. In this way, for example, a mechanism push file F4 as shown in fig. 5 is obtained.

In step S409, the TEE encrypts the mechanism push file F4 to obtain a file F5.

The TEE may encrypt the organization push file F4 using the public key of organization a, resulting in file F5.

The TEE encrypts the file F4 by using the public key of the organization a so that the server 400 cannot read the plaintext data in the file F4, thereby further protecting the privacy of the user. It is understood that the embodiment of the present specification is not limited to encrypting file F4 using the public key of organization a, for example, TEE may envelope file F4 based on the public key of organization a, or TEE may encrypt file F4 using other symmetric or asymmetric keys negotiated in advance with organization a.

In step S411, the TEE provides file F5 to server 400.

Specifically, the TEE stores the file F5 outside the TEE (i.e., the EPC), and transmits the storage address to the server, so that the server 400 can read the file F5.

In step S413, the server transmits the file F5 to the agency device 100 of the agency a.

In step S415, the facility device 100 decrypts the file F5, resulting in a file F4

Specifically, in the case where the file F5 is encrypted using the public key of the organization a, the organization device 100 decrypts the file F5 using the private key of the organization a, resulting in the file F4.

In step S417, the agency device 100 replaces the desensitized account in file F4 with the user identification, resulting in file F6.

Specifically, the institution device 100 may read the user identifier corresponding to each desensitized account in the file F4 in the aforementioned stored mapping table of the user identifier and the user desensitized account, and replace the desensitized account in the file F4 with the user identifier, so that the file F6 may be generated. The mechanism apparatus 100 can thereby comprehensively judge the risk level of the risky user based on the risk label sets of the respective users in the file F6, improving the judgment accuracy.

Although the method for performing risk data pushing in conjunction with a server and a TEE is shown in fig. 4, embodiments of the present specification are not limited thereto. In one embodiment, the facility device may directly send the encrypted push file to the TEE, and the TEE may directly send the generated file F5 to the facility device, thereby implementing the risk data push method. The TEE can obtain the public keys of the institutions from the blockchain, so as to encrypt the pushed files of the institutions.

In the embodiment of the specification, the risk data push efficiency among a plurality of organizations is improved while the privacy of users is protected by sending the desensitized encryption processing to the TEE by the organization device and then carrying out the summary processing of the risk data in the TEE.

Fig. 6 is an architecture diagram of a trusted unit in an embodiment of the present specification, including:

an obtaining unit 61, configured to obtain multiple cipher text push data of multiple mechanisms, where the multiple mechanisms include a first mechanism;

a decryption unit 62, configured to decrypt the ciphertext push data respectively to obtain multiple push data, where the push data includes account information of accounts in other mechanisms and risk tags of the accounts, and mechanism identifiers of the other mechanisms, where one or more accounts in the mechanism that sends the push data are related in business;

a generating unit 63, configured to generate first data corresponding to the first institution based on the plurality of pushed data, where the first data includes account information of a first account in the first institution and a first risk label set;

an encrypting unit 64, configured to encrypt the first data to obtain first ciphertext data;

a providing unit 65 is configured to provide the first ciphertext data to the first mechanism device of the first mechanism.

Embodiments of the present specification also provide a computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which, when executed in a computer, causes the computer to perform the method as shown in fig. 2, fig. 3 or fig. 4.

Embodiments of the present specification also provide a computing device, including a memory and a processor, where the memory stores executable code, and the processor executes the executable code to implement the method shown in fig. 2, fig. 3, or fig. 4.

In the 90's of the 20 th century, improvements to a technology could clearly distinguish between improvements in hardware (e.g., improvements to circuit structures such as diodes, transistors, switches, etc.) and improvements in software (improvements to process flow). However, as technology advances, many of today's process flow improvements have been seen as direct improvements in hardware circuit architecture. Designers almost always obtain the corresponding hardware circuit structure by programming an improved method flow into the hardware circuit. Thus, it cannot be said that an improvement in the process flow cannot be realized by hardware physical blocks. For example, a Programmable Logic Device (PLD), such as a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), is an integrated circuit whose Logic functions are determined by programming the Device by a user. A digital system is "integrated" on a PLD by the designer's own programming without requiring the chip manufacturer to design and fabricate application-specific integrated circuit chips. Furthermore, nowadays, instead of manually manufacturing an Integrated Circuit chip, such Programming is often implemented by "logic compiler" software, which is similar to a software compiler used in program development and writing, but the original code before compiling is also written by a specific Programming Language, which is called Hardware Description Language (HDL), and HDL is not only one but many, such as ABEL (Advanced Boolean Expression Language), AHDL (alternate Hardware Description Language), traffic, CUPL (core universal Programming Language), HDCal, jhddl (Java Hardware Description Language), lava, lola, HDL, PALASM, rhyd (Hardware Description Language), and vhigh-Language (Hardware Description Language), which is currently used in most popular applications. It will also be apparent to those skilled in the art that hardware circuitry that implements the logical method flows can be readily obtained by merely slightly programming the method flows into an integrated circuit using the hardware description languages described above.

The controller may be implemented in any suitable manner, for example, the controller may take the form of, for example, a microprocessor or processor and a computer-readable medium storing computer-readable program code (e.g., software or firmware) executable by the (micro) processor, logic gates, switches, an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a programmable logic controller, and an embedded microcontroller, examples of which include, but are not limited to, the following microcontrollers: ARC 625D, atmel AT91SAM, microchip PIC18F26K20, and Silicone Labs C8051F320, the memory controller may also be implemented as part of the control logic for the memory. Those skilled in the art will also appreciate that, in addition to implementing the controller in purely computer readable program code means, the same functionality can be implemented by logically programming method steps such that the controller is in the form of logic gates, switches, application specific integrated circuits, programmable logic controllers, embedded microcontrollers and the like. Such a controller may thus be considered a hardware component, and the means included therein for performing the various functions may also be considered as a structure within the hardware component. Or even means for performing the functions may be regarded as being both a software module for performing the method and a structure within a hardware component.

The systems, devices, modules or units illustrated in the above embodiments may be implemented by a computer chip or an entity, or by a product with certain functions. One typical implementation device is a server system. Of course, this application does not exclude that with future developments in computer technology, the computer implementing the functionality of the above described embodiments may be, for example, a personal computer, a laptop computer, a vehicle-mounted human-computer interaction device, a cellular phone, a camera phone, a smart phone, a personal digital assistant, a media player, a navigation device, an email device, a game console, a tablet computer, a wearable device or a combination of any of these devices.

Although one or more embodiments of the present description provide method operational steps as described in the embodiments or flowcharts, more or fewer operational steps may be included based on conventional or non-inventive approaches. The order of steps recited in the embodiments is merely one manner of performing the steps in a multitude of orders and does not represent the only order of execution. When an actual apparatus or end product executes, it may execute sequentially or in parallel (e.g., parallel processors or multi-threaded environments, or even distributed data processing environments) according to the method shown in the embodiment or the figures. The terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, the presence of additional identical or equivalent elements in processes, methods, articles, or apparatus that include the recited elements is not excluded. For example, if the terms first, second, etc. are used to denote names, they do not denote any particular order.

For convenience of description, the above devices are described as being divided into various modules by functions, which are described separately. Of course, when implementing one or more of the present description, the functions of each module may be implemented in one or more software and/or hardware, or a module implementing the same function may be implemented by a combination of multiple sub-modules or sub-units, etc. The above-described embodiments of the apparatus are merely illustrative, and for example, the division of the units is only one type of logical functional division, and other divisions may be realized in practice, for example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted, or not executed. In addition, the shown or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be in an electrical, mechanical or other form.

The present invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.

These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.

These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.

In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPUs), input/output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.

The memory may include forms of volatile memory in a computer readable medium, random Access Memory (RAM) and/or non-volatile memory, such as Read Only Memory (ROM) or flash memory (flash RAM). Memory is an example of a computer-readable medium.

Computer-readable media, including both non-transitory and non-transitory, removable and non-removable media, may implement information storage by any method or technology. The information may be computer readable instructions, data structures, modules of a program, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase change memory (PRAM), static Random Access Memory (SRAM), dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), other types of Random Access Memory (RAM), read Only Memory (ROM), electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, compact disc read only memory (CD-ROM), digital Versatile Discs (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape disk storage, graphene storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transmission medium that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device. As defined herein, a computer readable medium does not include a transitory computer readable medium such as a modulated data signal and a carrier wave.

As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, one or more embodiments of the present description may be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, one or more embodiments of the present description may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, one or more embodiments of the present description may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, and the like) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.

One or more embodiments of the present description may be described in the general context of computer-executable instructions, such as program modules, being executed by a computer. Generally, program modules include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, etc. that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types. One or more embodiments of the specification may also be practiced in distributed computing environments where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network. In a distributed computing environment, program modules may be located in both local and remote computer storage media including memory storage devices.

The embodiments in the present specification are described in a progressive manner, and the same and similar parts among the embodiments are referred to each other, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from the other embodiments. In particular, for the system embodiment, since it is substantially similar to the method embodiment, the description is simple, and for the relevant points, reference may be made to the partial description of the method embodiment. In the description of the specification, reference to the description of the term "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "an example," "a specific example," or "some examples," etc., means that a particular feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the specification. In this specification, the schematic representations of the terms used above are not necessarily intended to refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in any one or more embodiments or examples. Furthermore, various embodiments or examples and features of different embodiments or examples described in this specification can be combined and combined by one skilled in the art without contradiction.

The above description is intended to be illustrative of one or more embodiments of the disclosure, and is not intended to limit the scope of one or more embodiments of the disclosure. Various modifications and alterations to one or more embodiments described herein will be apparent to those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement or the like made within the spirit and principle of the present specification should be included in the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A risk data pushing method comprises the following steps:

the trusted unit decrypts the received ciphertext push data respectively to obtain a plurality of push data, wherein the push data comprise account information and risk labels of accounts in other mechanisms which are related to one or more accounts in the mechanism sending the push data in service and mechanism identification of the mechanism creating the account; generating first data corresponding to the first institution based on the plurality of pushed data, wherein the first data comprises account information of a first account in the first institution and a first risk label set; encrypting the first data to obtain first ciphertext data; providing the first ciphertext data to the first mechanism device;

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the plurality of authority devices transmitting ciphertext push data to the trusted unit comprises the plurality of authority devices transmitting ciphertext push data to a server, the server providing the ciphertext push data to the trusted unit;

the TEE providing the first ciphertext data to the first mechanism device comprises the TEE providing the first ciphertext data to the server, and the server sending the first ciphertext data to the first mechanism device.

3. The method of claim 1 or 2, the account information comprising: and carrying out hash calculation on the accounts in the other institutions to obtain the digest values.

4. The method of claim 3, further comprising: the institution device calculates a first hash value of an account in other institutions and sends the first hash value to the server;

and the server calculates a second hash value of the first hash value and a preset value as account information of the accounts in other institutions, and returns the account information to the institution equipment.

5. The method of claim 3, the first institution device decrypting the first ciphertext data to obtain the first set of risk tags for the first account comprising: the first mechanism equipment decrypts the first ciphertext data to obtain the first data; and generating second data according to a pre-stored corresponding relationship between the user identifier corresponding to the first account and the account information of the first account, wherein the second data comprises the user identifier corresponding to the first account and the first risk label set.

6. The method of claim 1 or 2, the ciphertext push data obtained by encrypting push data using a public key of the trusted unit, the decrypting, by the trusted unit, the plurality of ciphertext push data separately comprising: and the trusted unit decrypts the plurality of ciphertext push data respectively by using a private key of the trusted unit.

7. The method of claim 2, further comprising: the server stores the ciphertext push data pushed by each mechanism in association with the mechanism identification of each mechanism after receiving the plurality of ciphertext push data from the plurality of mechanism devices, and provides the storage address of each ciphertext push data to the trusted unit.

8. The method of claim 2, further comprising: the server providing the public key of the first institution to the trusted unit, the trusted unit encrypting the first data comprising: the trusted unit encrypts the first data using a public key of the first authority.

9. The method of claim 8, further comprising: the trusted unit certifies the public key of the first institution received from the server into a blockchain after receiving the public key of the first institution from the server.

10. The method of claim 8, the public key of the first organization being a public key of a DID of the first organization, the method further comprising: the server obtains the public key of the first institution's DID from the blockchain.

11. A risk data pushing method executed by a trusted unit includes:

acquiring a plurality of ciphertext push data of a plurality of mechanisms, wherein the plurality of mechanisms comprise a first mechanism;

decrypting the ciphertext push data respectively to obtain a plurality of push data, wherein the push data comprise account information and risk labels of accounts in other mechanisms which are related to one or more accounts in the mechanism for sending the push data in business, and mechanism identifications of the mechanisms for creating the accounts;

generating first data corresponding to the first organization based on the plurality of pushed data, wherein the first data comprises account information of a first account in the first organization and a first risk label set;

encrypting the first data to obtain first ciphertext data;

providing the first ciphertext data to a first institution device of the first institution.

12. A risk data pushing system comprises a plurality of agency devices and a trusted unit,

the mechanism devices are used for sending ciphertext push data to the trusted execution environment trusted unit, wherein the mechanism devices comprise a first mechanism device, and the first mechanism device belongs to a first mechanism;

the trusted unit is used for decrypting the received ciphertext push data respectively to obtain a plurality of push data, and the push data comprise account information and risk labels of accounts in other mechanisms which are related to one or more accounts in the mechanism sending the push data in business and mechanism identifications of the mechanisms for creating the accounts; generating first data corresponding to the first institution based on the plurality of pushed data, wherein the first data comprises account information of a first account in the first institution and a first risk label set; encrypting the first data to obtain first ciphertext data; providing the first ciphertext data to the first mechanism device;

13. A trusted unit, comprising:

the decryption unit is used for decrypting the ciphertext push data respectively to obtain a plurality of push data, and the push data comprise account information and risk labels of accounts in other mechanisms which are related to one or more accounts in the mechanism for sending the push data in business and mechanism identification of the mechanism for creating the accounts;

a generating unit, configured to generate first data corresponding to the first organization based on the plurality of pushed data, where the first data includes account information of a first account in the first organization and a first risk label set;

14. A computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored which, when executed in a computer, causes the computer to carry out the method of claim 11.

15. A computing device comprising a memory having stored therein executable code and a processor that, when executing the executable code, implements the method of claim 11.