CN115396173B - Key monitoring system for electric power fund safety control - Google Patents
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- CN115396173B CN115396173B CN202211010673.6A CN202211010673A CN115396173B CN 115396173 B CN115396173 B CN 115396173B CN 202211010673 A CN202211010673 A CN 202211010673A CN 115396173 B CN115396173 B CN 115396173B
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- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 31
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 9
- 230000002776 aggregation Effects 0.000 claims description 10
- 238000004220 aggregation Methods 0.000 claims description 10
- 238000012423 maintenance Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000007613 environmental effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000004931 aggregating effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
- H04L43/08—Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/06—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications
- H04L41/0631—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications using root cause analysis; using analysis of correlation between notifications, alarms or events based on decision criteria, e.g. hierarchy, tree or time analysis
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
- H04L43/08—Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters
- H04L43/0805—Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters by checking availability
- H04L43/0811—Monitoring or testing based on specific metrics, e.g. QoS, energy consumption or environmental parameters by checking availability by checking connectivity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
- Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
- Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
- Y04S40/20—Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security
Abstract
The invention discloses a key monitoring system for electric power fund safety control, which relates to the technical field of electric power control, and comprises: the device monitoring module monitors most of main devices in the electric power financial operation environment, the financial key monitoring module marks three different electric power fund management and control keys, the three different electric power fund management and control keys are respectively defined as a primary key, a secondary key and a tertiary key, position data, time data, temperature data and humidity data of each key are recorded, and the tertiary financial key verification module is used for verifying the three different electric power fund management and control keys. According to the invention, three-level financial key verification modules are arranged and are respectively scattered in local area networks, field networks and electric network financial centers, financial information of a last-level key verifier can be received only in a designated network, and a scattered keeping mode is adopted to facilitate the realization of 'three keys are kept separately' in electric network management requirements, so that the situation that supervision of the same building is not in place is avoided.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of electric network financial management and control, in particular to a key monitoring system for electric power fund safety management and control.
Background
Although the external network bank Ukey of the national network Anhui electric power group has realized manual registration management and control in the financial management and control-key ledger function, the monitoring of the key lacks corresponding online monitoring means, because the electric network is distributed in all places of the country, the condition of incapability of supervising the key is low-efficient through a manual registration mode, especially, whether three keys are separately stored or not is difficult to realize, whether the key of each electric network is in a normal waiting work state or not is difficult to know on time, whether discarding and the like are caused, so that the fund payment safety management and control of the external bank account of the group is enhanced, the payment risk of the external bank account of the group is prevented, the convenience and the flexibility of the external bank network bank Ukey storage authority are improved, and the existing manual registration management and control mode obviously cannot meet the updating requirement of the electric network financial industry.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the problems, and provides a key monitoring system for electric power fund safety control.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the present invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a key monitoring system for electrical funds security management, the system comprising:
the device monitoring module monitors most of main devices in the electric power financial operation environment, wherein the main devices comprise a server, network devices and keys, the server monitors performance indexes of a system operated by the server, and if the data indexes exceed a set threshold or data cannot be received, an alarm is given later to inform operation and maintenance personnel to process the performance indexes; the network equipment monitors whether the network load is excessive or the network cannot be communicated; monitoring the secret key mainly pays attention to whether the secret key works normally or not;
the financial key monitoring module marks three different electric power fund management and control keys, records position data, time data, temperature data and humidity data of each key, records the starting position K1 and the current time K2 of each electric power fund management and control key through Beidou navigation when the electric power fund management and control keys are used, and collects and calculates the temperature value K3 and the environment data of each key through a temperature and humidity sensor during the starting period of the electric power fund management and control keys, wherein the environment data comprises noise intensity K4 and humidity value K4, and index spaces K, K= { K1, K2, K3 and K4};
the three-level financial key verification module sets a certain fixed time period, takes the first-level key acquisition index space K as a message, and then a first-level key verifier selects a random numberThen the collected monitoring data is encrypted to generate electric power financial data ciphertext A ij :
While signing the encrypted power financial data using the tamper resistant device TPD:
wherein T is ij Representing the electric power financial ciphertext A ij The previous time;
and then one is connected withThe level key verifier verifies data A ij ||B i ||P ij ||K ij ||T bi ||σ Bi Transmitting to LAN, making the current time of received message be T ij ' the maximum transmission delay value allowed under the electric network financial system is delta T, when the information sent by the secret key is received, the local area network firstly judges the inequality T ij ′-T ij Whether deltat holds true or not to verify the validity of the message:
if the inequality is not true, the local server may choose to reject or discard the message, assuming the message has failed; if so, continuing to verify the validity of the message signature, and before verifying the validity of the message, executing the following steps:
Wherein H is 1 ,H 2 P is a secure hash function ij For three keys, B j Is the local area network of the ith electric power financial building, K ij For a random number, then verify if the following equation holds:
e(σ ij ,p)=e(K ij ,h i,2 )e(h i,1 P pub ,h i,2 ) Wherein σ is ij Signing the encrypted financial data for the tamper resistant device TPD using its own key;
if the equation is satisfied, the data sent by the key is legal, otherwise the local server chooses to reject or discard the electric financial data message, and the encrypted data PA is aggregated through primary data encryption after the validity of the message is verified 1 Uploading to a neighborhood network and sending to a secondary key verifier;
when the secondary key verifier receives the data PA 1 ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ||σ Bi At this time, the message is verified, then calculated and verifiedWhether or not the following equation holds:
e(P,σ Bi )=e(Y bi ,H2(PA 1 ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ||σ Bi )),
if the equation is true, the data sent by the secondary key verifier is considered to be legal; otherwise rejecting or discarding the message;
after verifying the validity of the message, the encrypted data PA is aggregated through secondary data encryption 2 Uploading to a grid financial center and sending to a third-level key verifier.
Optionally, the protection measure of the primary data encryption aggregation is as follows:
s1, calculating financial data C of a user i1 ,C i2 ,C i3 ,...,C iω Above encrypted aggregated data PA 1 :
S2, using private key X Bi Signature:
σBi=x bi H 2 (PA i ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ) Wherein T is bi Representing encryption of aggregated data PA for primary data 1 The current time of signature, NAN is the neighborhood network of the adjacent electric financial building;
finally, the encrypted data PA i ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ||σ Bi Uploading to a neighborhood network and transmitting to a secondary key verifier.
Optionally, the second-stage data encryption aggregation PA 2 The protection measures of (2) are as follows:
s1, calculating
S2, using private key X N Signature:
σN=x N H 2 (SA i ||NAN||P ij ||T N ) Wherein T is N Representing the encryption aggregation of a PA for a secondary data 2 The current time of the signature.
Optionally, the batch authentication operation performed by the local server is as follows:
wherein P is pub If the equation is satisfied, the batch message is valid and sent to the next-stage key verifier, otherwise the local server chooses to reject or discard the electric financial data message.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
according to the invention, by arranging the equipment monitoring module, the equipment monitoring module monitors most of main equipment in the electric power financial operation environment, the main equipment comprises a server, network equipment and a secret key, and the normal operation of the equipment is monitored, so that a foundation is laid for further monitoring of the secret key.
According to the invention, three different electric power fund management and control keys are marked by arranging a financial key monitoring module, the starting position K1 of each electric power fund management and control key recorded through Beidou navigation and the current time K2 are recorded, the temperature value K3 and environmental data of each key are acquired and calculated through a temperature and humidity sensor during the starting period of each electric power fund management and control key, the environmental data comprises noise intensity K4, an index space K is obtained, and encryption data are transmitted in real time through the K values for the verification work of three key verifiers.
According to the invention, three-level financial key verification modules are arranged and are respectively scattered in local area networks, field networks and electric network financial centers, financial information of a last-level key verifier can be received only in a designated network, and a scattered keeping mode is adopted to facilitate the realization of 'three keys are kept separately' in electric network management requirements, so that the situation that supervision of the same building is not in place is avoided. The invention judges the validity of the encrypted data sent by the key verifier at the upper level through the algorithm, if the algorithm can be continuously sent to the key verifier at the lower level, the verification is carried out in such a way, and whether the three keys are in a normal waiting state or not can be known by the verification work of the three verifiers each day.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of three keys and three persons separately stored in the invention;
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present invention will be made clearly and completely with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which it is apparent that the embodiments described are only some embodiments of the present invention, but not all embodiments.
A key monitoring system for electrical funds security management, the system comprising:
the device monitoring module monitors most of main devices in the electric power financial operation environment, wherein the main devices comprise a server, network devices and keys, the server monitors performance indexes of a system operated by the server, and if the data indexes exceed a set threshold or data cannot be received, an alarm is given later to inform operation and maintenance personnel to process the performance indexes; the network equipment monitors whether the network load is excessive or the network cannot be communicated; monitoring the secret key mainly pays attention to whether the secret key works normally or not;
the financial key monitoring module marks three different electric power fund management and control keys, records position data, time data, temperature data and humidity data of each key, records the starting position K1 and the current time K2 of each electric power fund management and control key through Beidou navigation when the electric power fund management and control keys are used, and collects and calculates the temperature value K3 and the humidity value K4 of each key through a temperature and humidity sensor during the starting of the electric power fund management and control keys to obtain index spaces K, K= { K1, K2, K3 and K4};
and the third-level financial key verification module is characterized in that first-level key verifiers are located in a local area network of a certain building, second-level key verifiers are located in a neighborhood network of the first-level key verifiers, and third-level key verifiers are located in a financial center of a power grid. Setting a certain fixed time period, such as 9 hours of working in the morning or 5-6 hours of working in the morning, and adopting primary keyThe index space K is collected as a message, and then a primary key verifier selects a random numberThen the collected monitoring data is encrypted to generate electric power financial data ciphertext A ij :
While signing the encrypted power financial data using the tamper resistant device TPD:
wherein T is ij Representing the electric power financial ciphertext A ij The previous time;
next, the primary key verifier verifies data A ij ||B i ||P ij ||K ij ||T bi ||σ Bi Transmitting to local area network, making the current time of receiving message be T' ij When receiving the information sent by the key, the local area network firstly judges the inequality |T '' ij -T ij Whether deltat is true or not verifies the validity of the message.
If the inequality is not true, the local server may choose to reject or discard the message, assuming the message has failed; if so, continuing to verify the validity of the message signature, and before verifying the validity of the message, executing the following steps:
Wherein H is 1 ,H 2 P is a secure hash function ij For three keys, B j Local area for the ith power financial buildingNet, K ij The building regional network is a node in the block chain-based electric network finance, is responsible for primary data encryption aggregation after collecting encrypted data transmitted by a plurality of primary key verifiers governed by the building regional network, and signs and uploads the encrypted data to the neighborhood network.
The neighborhood network is also one of nodes in the electric network finance, and the neighborhood network is used for aggregating the financial data uploaded by a plurality of primary key verifiers into a data whole, is responsible for secondary data encryption aggregation and then uploads the data to the electric network finance center.
Then, it is verified whether the following equation is satisfied:
e(σ ij ,p)=e(K ij ,h i,2 )e(h i,1 P pub ,h i,2 ) Wherein σ is ij The encrypted financial data is signed for the tamper resistant device TPD using its own key.
If the equation is satisfied, the data sent by the key is legal, otherwise the local server chooses to reject or discard the electric financial data message, and the encrypted data PA is aggregated through primary data encryption after the validity of the message is verified 1 Uploading to a neighborhood network and transmitting to a secondary key verifier.
Specifically, the protection measure of the primary data encryption aggregation is as follows:
s1, calculating financial data C of a user i1 ,C i2 ,C i3 ,...,C iω Above encrypted aggregated data PA 1 :
S2, using private key X Bi Signature:
σBi=x bi H 2 (PA 1 ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ) Wherein T is bi Representing encryption of aggregated data PA for primary data 1 The NAN is the neighborhood network of the neighboring electric financial building at the current time of the signature.
Finally will addPost-secret data PA 1 ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ||σ Bi Uploading to a neighborhood network and transmitting to a secondary key verifier.
When the secondary key verifier receives the data PA 1 ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ||σ Bi At this time, the message is verified, and then the following equation is calculated and verified as being satisfied:
e(P,σ Bi )=e(Y bi ,H2(PA 1 ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ||σ Bi )),
if the equation is true, the data sent by the secondary key verifier is considered to be legal; otherwise reject or discard the message.
After verifying the validity of the message, the encrypted data PA is aggregated through secondary data encryption 2 Uploading to a grid financial center and sending to a third-level key verifier.
Specifically, two-level data encryption aggregation PA 2 The protection measures of (2) are as follows:
s1, calculating
S2, using private key X N Signature:
σN=x N H 2 (SA i ||NAN||P ij ||T N ) Wherein T is N Representing the encryption aggregation of a PA for a secondary data 2 The current time of the signature.
Three-level key verifier receives data PA 2 ||NAN||P i ||T N ||σ N When the following equation is satisfied, the validity of the message signature is then verified by judging whether the following equation is satisfied:
e(P,σ N )=e(Y N ,H2(PA 2 ||NAN||P ij ||T N ) If the above equation holds, the three-level key verifier uploads the data to the grid financial center and broadcasts it in the local area network and neighborhood network of all power financial buildings.
In this embodiment, the electric network finance center also belongs to one of the nodes of the electric network finance, and is mainly responsible for setting public parameters and management, registration and cancellation of key verifiers of three levels in a building local area network and a neighborhood network.
The foregoing description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and it is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention to all embodiments, but it is intended to cover all embodiments, modifications, equivalents, and variations within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. A key monitoring system for electrical funds security management, the system comprising:
the device monitoring module monitors most of main devices in the electric power financial operation environment, wherein the main devices comprise a server, network devices and keys, the server monitors performance indexes of a system operated by the server, and if the data indexes exceed a set threshold or data cannot be received, an alarm is given later to inform operation and maintenance personnel to process the performance indexes; the network equipment monitors whether the network load is excessive or the network cannot be communicated; monitoring the secret key mainly pays attention to whether the secret key works normally or not;
the financial key monitoring module marks three different electric power fund management keys, which are respectively defined as a primary key, a secondary key and a tertiary key, records position data, time data, temperature data and humidity data of each key, records the starting position K1 and the current time K2 of each electric power fund management key through Beidou navigation when the electric power fund management keys are used, and acquires and calculates the temperature value K3 and the humidity value K4 of each key through a temperature and humidity sensor during the starting of the electric power fund management keys to obtain index spaces K, K= { K1, K2, K3 and K4};
the three-level financial key verification module sets a certain fixed time period, takes the first-level key acquisition index space K as a message, and then a first-level key verifier selects one follow-up keyNumber of machinesThen the collected monitoring data is encrypted to generate electric power financial data ciphertext A ij :
While signing the encrypted power financial data using the tamper resistant device TPD:
wherein T is ij Representing the electric power financial ciphertext A ij The previous time;
next, the primary key verifier verifies data A ij ||B i ||P ij ||K ij ||T bi ||σ Bi Transmitting to local area network, making the current time of receiving message be T' ij When receiving the information sent by the key, the local area network firstly judges the inequality |T '' ij -T ij Whether deltat holds true or not to verify the validity of the message:
if the inequality is not true, the local server may choose to reject or discard the message, assuming the message has failed; if so, continuing to verify the validity of the message signature, and before verifying the validity of the message, executing the following steps:
wherein H is 1 ,H 2 P is a secure hash function ij For three keys, B j Is the local area network of the ith electric power financial building, K ij For a random number, then verify if the following equation holds:
e(σ ij ,p)=e(K ij ,h i,2 )e(h i,1 P pub ,h i,2 ) Wherein σ is ij Signing the encrypted financial data for the tamper resistant device TPD using its own key;
if the equation is satisfied, the data sent by the key is legal, otherwise the local server chooses to reject or discard the electric financial data message, and the encrypted data PA is aggregated through primary data encryption after the validity of the message is verified 1 Uploading to a neighborhood network and sending to a secondary key verifier;
when the secondary key verifier receives the data PA 1 ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ||σ Bi At this time, the message is verified, and then the following equation is calculated and verified as being satisfied:
e(P,σ Bi )=e(Y bi ,H2(PA i ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ||σ Bi )),
if the equation is true, the data sent by the secondary key verifier is considered to be legal; otherwise rejecting or discarding the message;
after verifying the validity of the message, the encrypted data PA is aggregated through secondary data encryption 2 Uploading to a grid financial center and sending to a third-level key verifier.
2. A key monitoring system for secure management of electric funds according to claim 1, characterized in that the protection measure of the primary data encryption aggregation is as follows:
s1, calculating financial data C of a user i1 ,C i2 ,C i3 ,...,C iω Above encrypted aggregated data PA 1 :
S2, using private key X Bi Signature:
σBi=x bi H 2 (PA 1 ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ) Wherein T is bi Representing encryption of aggregated data PA for primary data 1 The current time of signature, NAN is the neighborhood network of the adjacent electric financial building;
finally, the encrypted data PA 1 ||NAN||B i ||P ij ||T bi ||σ Bi Uploading to a neighborhood network and transmitting to a secondary key verifier.
3. A key monitoring system for electric funds security management as defined in claim 1, wherein the secondary data encryption aggregate PA 2 The protection measures of (2) are as follows:
s1, calculating
S2, using private key X N Signature:
σN=x N H 2 (SA i ||NAN||P ij ||T N ) Wherein T is N Representing the encryption aggregation of a PA for a secondary data 2 The current time of the signature.
4. A key monitoring system for secure management of electric funds according to claim 1, wherein the local server performs a batch authentication operation as follows:
wherein P is pub If the equation is satisfied, the batch message is valid and sent to the next-stage key verifier, otherwise the local server chooses to reject or discard the electric financial data message.
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