CN115359932B - P11 non-permission signal generation device and method and related system for nuclear power plant - Google Patents
P11 non-permission signal generation device and method and related system for nuclear power plant Download PDFInfo
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- CN115359932B CN115359932B CN202210996982.9A CN202210996982A CN115359932B CN 115359932 B CN115359932 B CN 115359932B CN 202210996982 A CN202210996982 A CN 202210996982A CN 115359932 B CN115359932 B CN 115359932B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21C—NUCLEAR REACTORS
- G21C15/00—Cooling arrangements within the pressure vessel containing the core; Selection of specific coolants
- G21C15/18—Emergency cooling arrangements; Removing shut-down heat
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method and a device for generating a non-permission signal of a reactor protection system P11, and a related system for a nuclear power plant, wherein the method comprises the following steps: receiving a channel-level P11 non-permission signal from a protection channel as an input signal, and judging whether the signal is valid or not; determining whether to execute logic voting or not according to the number of the effective input signals, wherein the logic voting is carried out in a mode that: when the number of valid input signals is 4, performing a two-out-of-four logic voting; when the number of valid input signals is 3, performing two-out-of-three logic voting; when the number of effective input signals is 2, performing two-out-of-two logic voting; when the valid input signal is 1 or 0, no logical voting is performed. The P11 non-permission signal generation method can furthest ensure that when the input signal loop has detectable faults, the functions of automatically opening the safety injection box isolation valve, automatically closing the voltage stabilizer protection valve and protecting the reactor coolant system against low temperature and overpressure are successfully executed, and the false triggering is not caused.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of nuclear power plant instruments and control, in particular to a P11 non-permission signal generation device and method and related system equipment for a nuclear power plant.
Background
The reactor protection system is used for monitoring important parameters related to the safety of the reactor and has a very important role in protecting the reactor, the nuclear power plant equipment, personnel and preventing the release of radioactive substances to the surrounding environment.
When the operation working condition of the nuclear power plant reaches the setting value of the protection action, the reactor protection system automatically acts to stop the reactor, and the special safety facility is driven under the corresponding accident working condition to relieve the accident result. The logic of the reactor protection system characterizes various combinations of variables in relation to the primary and secondary loop events of the power plant, and once the required logic is reached, the system sends out a protection action signal.
Depending on the actual conditions, the reactor protection system uses the enable signal (P signal) to enable certain protection actions or to block other protection actions.
As shown in fig. 1, the reactor protection system for the "huaron-one" third generation nuclear power consists of four redundant and independent protection channels and two redundant and independent logic series a and B. The system is designed with a P11 enable signal, which is generated by the pressure of the voltage stabilizer being less than or equal to 13.8 MPa. Corresponding to the four protection channels, the system designs four voltage stabilizer pressure sensors. In each protection channel, when the pressure of the voltage stabilizer collected by the sensor is less than or equal to 13.8MPa, a local P11 permission signal is generated, and the local P11 permission signal is sent to the other three protection channels, so that each protection channel contains four local P11 permission signals. In each protection channel, after '2/4' (four taking two) voting is carried out on the protection channels, a channel stage P11 permission signal is generated, and then a non-operation is carried out on the protection channels, so that a channel stage P11 non-permission signal is obtained.
The logic for generating the non-enable signal for the reactor protection system P11 is shown in fig. 1. The RCS005MP, RCS006MP, RCS013MP and RCS018MP in fig. 1 are four voltage regulator pressure sensors, RCS is the system code of the power plant system "reactor coolant system", RRP is the system code of the power plant system "reactor protection system", RSI is the system code of the "safety injection system", IP, IIP, IIIP and IVP are the codes of four protection channels, A, B is the code of two logic series.Representing the decrease of the pressure of the voltage stabilizer from high to less than or equal to 13.8MPa, a local P11 permission signal is generated.
The channel-level P11 non-permission signals generated by the four protection channels are sent to downstream logic series A and B, and a final P11 non-permission signal is generated after '2/4' voting is carried out in each logic series respectively, so that the following functions are executed: (1) automatically opening an injection box isolation valve; (2) automatically closing the regulator protection valve; (3) And the low-temperature overpressure protection function of the reactor coolant system is participated.
If a processing unit generating a channel level P11 non-permission signal in the protection channel or the protection channel generates a detectable fault to a communication link transmitting the channel level P11 non-permission signal to the logic series, when a final P11 non-permission signal is generated after '2/4' voting is performed in the logic series in the prior art, all three functions (automatic opening of an safety injection box isolation valve, automatic closing of a voltage stabilizer protection valve and participation in a low-temperature overpressure protection function of a reactor coolant system) cannot be guaranteed, and malfunction cannot be caused.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a method for generating a non-permission signal of a reactor protection system P11, which solves the problems that in the prior art, when a processing unit generating the non-permission signal of a channel level P11 in a protection channel or a communication link of the protection channel for transmitting the non-permission signal of the channel level P11 to a logic series has detectable faults, when a final P11 non-permission signal is generated after '2/4' voting in the logic series, the three functions of automatically opening an injection tank isolation valve, automatically closing a voltage stabilizer protection valve and participating in the low-temperature overpressure protection of a reactor coolant system cannot be ensured.
The invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
the method for generating the non-permission signal of the reactor protection system P11 comprises the following steps:
s1, receiving a channel-level P11 non-permission signal from 4 protection channels as an input signal, and judging whether the input signal is valid or not;
s2, determining whether to execute logic voting or not according to the number of the effective input signals, wherein the logic voting is in a mode that:
when the number of effective input signals is 4, performing four-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the number of effective input signals is 3, performing two-out-of-three logic voting to obtain a voting result;
When the number of effective input signals is 2, performing two-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the effective input signal is 1 or 0, logic voting is not carried out;
the value range of the voting result comprises a first value and a second value;
s3, outputting a control signal: when the logic voting is not executed in the step S2, outputting a control signal with the same value as the first value; otherwise, the voting result is output as a control signal, and the control signal is a reactor protection system P11 non-permission signal, namely the final P11 non-permission signal.
In some embodiments, as a further improvement of the present solution, the channel level P11 non-allowed signal includes a signal value and a signal quality bit, where the signal quality bit includes a third value representing that the signal is valid and a fourth value representing that the signal is invalid, and in step S1, it is determined whether the input signal is valid according to the value of the signal quality bit.
In some embodiments, as a further improvement of the present solution, the third value is "1", the fourth value is "0", the second value is "1", and the first value is "0".
Still another object of the present invention is to provide a device for generating a non-permission signal of a reactor protection system P11, which solves the problem that when a final P11 non-permission signal is generated after "2/4" voting in a logic series, three functions of automatically opening an isolation valve of an injection tank, automatically closing a protection valve of a voltage stabilizer, and participating in low temperature and overpressure protection of a reactor coolant system cannot be guaranteed, and the device comprises the following modules:
The signal receiving and processing module is used for receiving a channel-level P11 non-permission signal from the 4 protection channels as an input signal and judging whether the input signal is valid or not;
the voting module is used for determining whether to execute logic voting and a mode of the logic voting according to the number of the effective input signals:
when the number of effective input signals is 4, performing four-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the number of effective input signals is 3, performing two-out-of-three logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the number of effective input signals is 2, performing two-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the valid input signal is 1 or 0, logic voting is not performed;
the value range of the voting result comprises a first value and a second value;
the output module is used for outputting a control signal, and outputting the control signal with the same value as the first value when the voting module does not execute logic voting; otherwise, the voting result is output as a control signal.
In some embodiments, as a further improvement of the above arrangement, the channel stage P11 non-allowed signal includes a signal value and a signal quality bit, the signal quality bit including a third value representing that the signal is valid and a fourth value representing that the signal is not valid; when the system generates a channel level P11 non-permission signal, the system also assigns the signal quality bit of the channel level P11 non-permission signal to be a third value or a fourth value according to the input signal; the signal receiving and processing module judges whether the input signal is valid or not according to the value of the signal quality bit.
In some embodiments, as a further improvement of the above apparatus solution, the third value is "1", the fourth value is "0", the second value is "1", and the first value is "0".
It is a further object of the present invention to provide a computer device and a computer readable storage medium:
a computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the method of generating a non-permission signal for the reactor protection system P11 in any of the above aspects when executing the computer program.
A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the reactor protection system P11 non-permission signal generation method of any one of the above aspects.
It is still another object of the present invention to provide a reactor protection system including a plurality of protection channels generating channel-level P11 non-enable signals and a final P11 non-enable signal generating unit, each of the protection channels having disposed therein:
the pressure sensor is used for collecting the pressure of the pressure stabilizer;
the local P11 permission signal generation unit is used for receiving the pressure of the voltage stabilizer collected by the pressure sensor and generating a local P11 permission signal when the pressure of the voltage stabilizer is lower than a set value;
The channel stage P11 permission signal generating unit receives local P11 permission signals of all channels, votes the local P11 permission signals and generates channel stage P11 permission signals;
the channel stage P11 non-permission signal generating unit is used for receiving the channel stage P11 permission signal and performing non-operation on the channel stage P11 permission signal to generate a channel stage P11 non-permission signal;
the final P11 non-permission signal generating unit comprises any one of the reactor protection system P11 non-permission signal generating devices in the scheme, wherein the P11 non-permission signal generating device is used for generating a final P11 non-permission signal according to channel-level P11 non-permission signals of a plurality of channels, and sending the final P11 non-permission signal to a voltage stabilizer protection valve control system, a reactor coolant system and an injection tank isolation valve control system after direct and/or non-operation.
The invention also aims to provide a safety level instrument control system of a nuclear power plant, which comprises the reactor protection system, the voltage stabilizer protection valve control system, the reactor coolant system and the safety injection box isolation valve control system, wherein the final P11 non-permission signal generated by the P11 non-permission signal generating device of the reactor protection system is directly and/or after non-operation sent to the voltage stabilizer protection valve control system, the reactor coolant system and the safety injection box isolation valve control system.
In some embodiments, as a further improvement of the above-mentioned safety level control system for a nuclear power plant, the reactor protection system further includes a first non-taking operation module, the P11 non-permission signal generating device is connected to the safety injection box isolation valve control system and an input end of the first non-taking operation module, and an output end of the first non-taking operation module is connected to the voltage regulator protection valve control system and the reactor coolant system, so that a final P11 non-permission signal is directly sent to the safety injection box isolation valve control system, and after non-taking operation, the final P11 non-permission signal is sent to the voltage regulator protection valve control system and the reactor coolant system.
In some embodiments, as a further improvement of the above-mentioned safety level control system for a nuclear power plant, the regulator protection valve control system includes:
the input end of the second non-taking operation module is connected with the output end of the first non-taking module;
the input end of the pulse processing module is connected with the output end of the second non-sampling module;
a voting module A is taken out, one input end of the voting module A is connected with the output end of the pulse processing module, the other input end of the voting module A is connected with the manual closing instruction of the control room, and the voting module A outputs the signals output by the pulse processing module and the manual closing instruction of the control room after OR operation;
The voltage stabilizer protection valve control module is provided with 2 input ends, one input end of the voltage stabilizer protection valve control module is connected with the output end of the voting module A, the other input end of the voltage stabilizer protection valve control module is connected with a manual forced opening instruction of the control room, the voltage stabilizer protection valve control module opens the voltage stabilizer protection valve when receiving the manual forced opening instruction of the control room, and closes the voltage stabilizer protection valve when receiving a closing instruction output by the voting module A.
In some embodiments, as a further improvement of the above-mentioned nuclear power plant safety level control system, the safety injection box isolation valve control system includes:
the mode selection module is used for selecting a control mode of the safety injection box isolation valve;
and the two voting module B is adopted, one input end of the two voting module B is connected with the output end of the mode selection module, the other input end of the two voting module B is connected with a final P11 non-permission protection signal, and an operation result is output to the safety injection box isolation valve after the signals output by the mode selection module and the final P11 non-permission protection signal are subjected to AND operation so as to timely control the opening of the safety injection box isolation valve.
In some embodiments, as a further improvement of the above-described nuclear power plant safety level instrumentation system solution, the reactor coolant system includes:
the loop temperature voting module is used for performing voting according to the loop temperature condition and outputting a temperature voting result;
The coolant pressure voting module is used for performing voting according to the coolant pressure condition and outputting a coolant pressure voting result;
the second voting module C is connected with the output end of the loop temperature voting module at one input end, and is connected with the first non-taking operation module to access a signal which is not taken by the final P11 non-allowed protection signal, and performs AND operation on the temperature voting result and the signal which is not taken by the final P11 non-allowed protection signal, and outputs an operation result;
and one input end of the two-out-of-two voting module D is connected with the output end of the coolant pressure voting module, the other input end of the two-out-of-two voting module D is connected with the output end of the two-out-of-two voting module C, and the coolant pressure voting result and the operation result of the two-out-of-two voting module C are subjected to AND operation, and the operation result is output to the safety valve of the voltage stabilizer.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects:
the invention provides a reactor protection system and a method and a device for generating a P11 non-permission signal thereof, which design a scientific and reasonable voting logic degradation mode aiming at the P11 non-permission signal of the reactor protection system, can furthest ensure that three functions of automatically opening an injection box isolation valve, automatically closing a voltage stabilizer protection valve and protecting a reactor coolant system from low temperature and overpressure are successfully executed when the input signal loop has detectable faults, and simultaneously do not cause false triggering of the functions, thereby playing a good role in guaranteeing the safety and economy of a nuclear power plant.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the exemplary embodiments of the present invention, the drawings that are needed in the examples will be briefly described below, it being understood that the following drawings only illustrate some examples of the present invention and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope, and that other related drawings may be obtained from these drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art. Moreover, those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the illustrations provided herein are for illustrative purposes and that the illustrations are not necessarily drawn to scale. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a process of generating a non-permission signal of a reactor protection system P11 according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a reactor protection system P11 non-enable signal automatic shutoff regulator protection valve according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the logic of the final P11 enable signal participation in low temperature over voltage (LTOP) protection in an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 4 is a logic diagram of the automatic opening of the safety box isolation valve by the non-enable signal of the reactor protection system P11 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
In the drawings, the reference numerals and corresponding part names:
A 1-local P11 enable signal generating unit, a 2-channel stage P11 enable signal generating unit, a 3-final P11 non-enable signal generating unit, and a 4-channel stage P11 non-enable signal generating unit.
Detailed Description
For the purpose of making apparent the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention, the present invention will be further described in detail with reference to the following examples and the accompanying drawings, wherein the exemplary embodiments of the present invention and the descriptions thereof are for illustrating the present invention only and are not to be construed as limiting the present invention.
In the following description, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. However, it will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art that: no such specific details are necessary to practice the invention. In other instances, well-known structures, circuits, materials, or methods have not been described in detail in order not to obscure the invention.
Throughout the specification, references to "one embodiment," "an embodiment," "one example," or "an example" mean: a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment or example is included within at least one embodiment of the invention. Thus, the appearances of the phrases "in one embodiment," "in an example," or "in an example" in various places throughout this specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, or characteristics may be combined in any suitable combination and/or sub-combination in one or more embodiments or examples. The term "and/or" as used herein includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.
The terms "first," "second," and the like as used herein are used solely for clarity of description to distinguish one from another component, feature, or element, and are not intended to limit any order or emphasize importance, or the like. In addition, the term "coupled" as used herein may be directly coupled or indirectly coupled via other components, unless otherwise indicated.
[ example 1 ]
The embodiment provides a method for generating a non-permission signal of a reactor protection system P11, which comprises the following steps:
s1, receiving a channel-level P11 non-permission signal from 4 protection channels as an input signal, and judging whether the input signal is valid or not; the channel level P11 non-permission signal comprises a signal value and a signal quality bit, wherein the signal quality bit comprises a third value representing that the signal is valid and a fourth value representing that the signal is invalid; in this embodiment, the signal quality bit is 1 bit, the third value is 1, and the fourth value is 0; in other embodiments, the signal quality bits may be 2 bits or 3 bits or more, and the signal quality bits may be set to different values as required, for example, the third value is 11, the fourth value is 00 or the third value is 001, and the fourth value is 000;
S2, determining whether to execute logic voting or not according to the number of the effective input signals, wherein the logic voting is in a mode that:
when the number of effective input signals is 4, performing four-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the number of effective input signals is 3, performing two-out-of-three logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the number of effective input signals is 2, performing two-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the effective input signal is 1 or 0, logic voting is not carried out;
the voting result has a value range including a first value and a second value, in this embodiment, the second value is "1", and the first value is "0";
s3, outputting a control signal: when the logic voting is not executed in the step S2, a control signal having the same value as the first value is output (in this embodiment, when the logic voting is not executed in the step S2, 0 is output, in other embodiments, the second value is "0", and when the first value is "1", when the logic voting is not executed in the step S2, 0 is output); otherwise, the voting result is output as a control signal.
The control signal in this embodiment is the reactor protection system P11 non-permission signal, and the final P11 non-permission signal and the reactor protection system P11 non-permission signal mentioned below refer to the control signal.
In this embodiment, when a detectable fault occurs in the input signal loop, the method for generating a non-permission signal of the reactor protection system P11 can maximally ensure that the function involved in the non-permission signal of the reactor protection system P11 can be successfully executed and not be triggered by mistake, thereby ensuring safe and economical operation of the power plant, and the design concept is as follows:
the logic for generating the non-enable signal of the reactor protection system P11 is shown in fig. 1. RCS005MP, RCS006MP, RCS013MP and RCS018MP in fig. 1 are four regulator pressure sensors, IP, IIP, IIIP and IVP are four protection channel codes, and A, B is two logic series code. 424XU2, 426XU2, 428XU2, 156XU are threshold comparison units of four channels respectively, and are used for comparing the pressure of the voltage stabilizer measured by the pressure sensor of the voltage stabilizer with a set value (13.8 MP in the embodiment), and the local P11 permission signal generation unit 1 generates a local P11 permission signal when the pressure of the voltage stabilizer is reduced from high to less than or equal to 13.8 MPa.
043KS, 044KS, 045KS, 358KS are touch screen display units of the control room, respectively display the pressure states of the 4 channels, and when a certain display unit is lightened, the pressure stabilizer detected by the corresponding sensor is lower than a set value.
The channel stage P11 enable signal generating unit 4 and the final P11 non-enable signal generating unit 3 perform two voting logics, respectively, for generating a channel stage P11 enable signal and a final P11 non-enable signal, respectively. In the prior art, the degradation mode of the final P11 non-signal generation logic is designed into 2/4- >2/3- >1/2- >1 (when the number of effective input signals is 4, four-out-of-two logic voting is executed, when the number of effective input signals is 3, three-out-of-two logic voting is executed, when the number of effective input signals is 2, two-out-of-one logic voting is executed, when the number of effective input signals is 1 or 0, 1 is output), and the three functions of automatically opening an injection tank isolation valve, automatically closing a voltage stabilizer protection valve and participating in the low-temperature overpressure protection of a reactor coolant system are not refused and can not cause misoperation when the detectable fault occurs in an input signal loop. But the reasons for this and how to make the improvements are long felt problems for those skilled in the art.
The inventor of the application has conducted intensive research and repeated experiments on a formation mechanism and voting logic of a non-allowed signal of a reactor protection system P11 and a control logic of a safety injection box isolation valve, a voltage stabilizer protection valve and a low-temperature overpressure protection function of a reactor coolant system, and put forward a generation method of the non-allowed signal of the reactor protection system P11, so that when the non-allowed signal of the reactor protection system P11 executes three functions, an '2/4' voting logic module (namely a final P11 non-allowed signal generation unit 3) executing the generation method of the non-allowed signal of the reactor protection system P11 can ensure the usability of the three functions and avoid unnecessary misoperation when quality bits are invalid due to detectable faults.
The research thought of the inventor is as follows:
referring to fig. 1-4, the final P11 non-allowed signal sources for performing the automatic opening of the safe injection box isolation valve, the automatic closing of the regulator protection valve, and the low temperature overpressure protection of the reactor coolant system in either logic series a (RRP a) or logic series B (RRP B) all come from the output of the final P11 non-allowed signal generation unit 3 (which is a "2/4" voting logic module) of the present series, the output of which is generated after the "2/4" (four-out) selection by four input signals. Each input signal contains a signal value indicating whether the signal is a "1" or a "0" and a signal quality bit indicating whether the signal value is valid. The objective we want to achieve is that when the quality bit of the input signal is invalid, the "2/4" voting logic module will reject it and use the remaining valid signal to logically vote, so that the output of the "2/4" voting logic module is always in a certain valid state, and this voting solution can enable three functions to be performed without malfunction, thus requiring detailed design and analysis of the three function control system and its control logic:
1. Automatic open safety filling box isolation valve function
For the function of automatically opening the safe injection box isolation valve, the control logic is as shown in fig. 4, when the system is normal, if the pressure of the voltage stabilizer is smaller than or equal to the set value, the system generates a local P11 permission signal, the value of the local P11 permission signal generated by voting is 1, the value of the local P11 non-permission signal generated after the local P11 permission signal is not 0, the value of the final P11 non-permission signal generated after voting is also 0, the final P11 non-permission signal controls the opening instruction of the safe injection box isolation valve RSI001VP, at the moment, the safe injection box isolation valve RSI001VP is not opened, otherwise, if the pressure of the voltage stabilizer exceeds the set value, the value of the final P11 non-permission signal is 1, and the safe injection box isolation valve RSI001VP is opened. In this embodiment, RSI001VP IIC in fig. 4 is a mode selection module, which may be a mode selection switch in practical application, for setting whether the opening and closing of the injection tank isolation valve RIS001VP is manual or automatic, and when the mode selection module is set to set the injection tank isolation valve RIS001VP to be automatic, the final P11 non-permission signal can be involved in the control.
If the system fails, part of the input signals of the 2/4 voting logic module are wrong, the safe injection box isolation valve RSI001VP is kept in a closed state, and the safe injection box isolation valve RSI001VP is kept in an open state. Therefore, as shown in fig. 4, the control system of the safe injection box isolation valve is designed such that the final P11 non-permission signal and the control signal output by the mode selection module (i.e., the mode selection switch RSI001VP IIC in this embodiment) are output after being anded, so that if the input fails upstream of the 2/4 voting logic module, the safe injection box isolation valve RSI001VP is not opened, and the final P11 non-permission signal is eventually degraded to 0, so that it is not allowed to send an open signal to the RSI001 VP; if the RSI001VP is opened when the input fault occurs, the final P11 non-permission signal is finally degenerated to be 0 or 1; degradation to 0 clears the open command to the RSI001VP, but the disappearance of the open command does not change the open state of the RSI001VP since the safe deposit box isolation valve RSI001VP is closed only upon receiving the close command. Based on such design and logic, therefore, when the final P11 non-permission signal generation unit 3 determines whether to execute the logic voting and the mode of the logic voting according to the number of the valid input signals, when the valid input signals are 1 or 0, the logic voting is not performed, and 0 is directly output; when the number of valid input signals is 2, 2 signals should be considered at the same time, and two-out-of-two logic voting is performed to reduce the probability of missignaling the final P11 non-allowed signal.
2. Automatic closing voltage stabilizer protection valve function
For the function of automatically closing the protective valve of the voltage stabilizer, the final P11 non-permission signal is used for realizing the reset of the forced opening instruction of the protective valve of the voltage stabilizer, the control logic is as shown in fig. 1 and 2, the final P11 non-permission signal is sent to the control system of the protective valve of the voltage stabilizer after taking non-operation, and after taking non-operation again in the control system of the protective valve of the voltage stabilizer and carrying out pulse processing and then carrying out OR operation with the manual closing instruction of the control room, the operation result can reset the manual forced opening instruction of the protective valve of the voltage stabilizer of the control room. Therefore, for the reset regulator safety valve forced opening instruction, when the final P11 non-allowed signal generating unit 3 determines whether to execute the logic voting and the logic voting mode according to the number of the valid input signals, the final P11 non-allowed signal 2/4 is finally degenerated to 0 without affecting the execution of the control room regulator safety valve manual forced opening instruction, and when the number of the valid input signals is 2, 2 signals should be considered at the same time, two-out logic voting is executed, so as to reduce the probability of misissuing the final P11 non-allowed signal.
In this embodiment, the pulse process mainly detects the rising edge of the signal and outputs a pulse of a fixed time length.
3. Low-temperature overpressure protection function of reactor coolant system
For the low-temperature overpressure protection function of the reactor coolant system, the final P11 non-permission signal is used for realizing non-taking post-generation of the low-temperature overpressure protection signal of the reactor coolant system, and the control logic is as shown in fig. 3.
As can be seen from fig. 2 and 3, the final P11 non-permission signal is subjected to a negation operation to form a final P11 permission signal in fig. 3, the final P11 permission signal, a loop temperature voting result and a coolant pressure voting result together control to generate a low-temperature overpressure protection signal, and the final P11 permission signal, the loop temperature voting result and the coolant pressure voting result only generate the low-temperature overpressure protection signal when 3 are all valid, and a voltage stabilizer safety valve (RCS 020/021VP in fig. 3) is opened. Under the condition, for safety reasons, when the final P11 non-permission signal votes, if more than 3 invalid input signals exist, the final P11 non-permission signal is output, so that a low-temperature overpressure protection signal can be output when a loop temperature voting result and a coolant pressure voting result are valid, at the moment, the final P11 non-permission signal is output to be 0, the value of the final P11 non-permission signal is 1 after non-operation, then a low-temperature overpressure protection function is executed to generate the low-temperature overpressure protection signal, and a voltage stabilizer safety valve RCS020/021VP is opened to enable the reactor to be depressurized. When voting is performed on the final P11 non-allowed signals, when the number of valid input signals is 2, 2 signals should be considered at the same time, and two-by-two logic voting is performed, so as to reduce the probability of false sending of the final P11 non-allowed signals.
In summary, in combination with the above analysis, to meet the above three functional control requirements at the same time, the embodiment designs a scientific and reasonable logic degradation manner specifically for the final P11 non-allowed signal as follows:
after the logic is adopted, the three functions of automatically opening the safety injection box isolation valve, automatically closing the voltage stabilizer protection valve and protecting the reactor coolant system from low temperature and overpressure are successfully executed, and meanwhile false triggering is not caused, so that the safety of the nuclear power plant is ensured, and the economic operation of the nuclear power plant is facilitated.
[ example 2 ]
The present embodiment provides a reactor protection system P11 non-permission signal generation apparatus, including:
the signal receiving and processing module is used for receiving a channel-level P11 non-permission signal from the 4 protection channels as an input signal and judging whether the input signal is valid or not;
the voting module is used for determining whether to execute logic voting and a mode of the logic voting according to the number of the effective input signals:
when the number of effective input signals is 4, performing four-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the number of effective input signals is 3, performing two-out-of-three logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the number of effective input signals is 2, performing two-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
When the valid input signal is 1 or 0, logic voting is not performed;
the value range of the voting result comprises a first value and a second value;
the output module is used for outputting a control signal, and outputting the control signal with the same value as the first value when the voting module does not execute logic voting; otherwise, the voting result is output as a control signal.
The channel level P11 non-permission signal comprises a signal value and a signal quality bit, the signal quality bit comprises a third value representing that the signal is valid and a fourth value representing that the signal is invalid, and the signal receiving processing module judges whether the input signal is valid or not according to the value of the signal quality bit; in this embodiment, the third value is "1", the fourth value is "0", the second value is "1", and the first value is "0".
In other embodiments, the apparatus for generating a non-allowed signal of the reactor protection system P11 further includes a channel stage P11 non-allowed signal generating module configured to generate a channel stage P11 non-allowed signal, where the channel stage P11 non-allowed signal generating module further assigns a signal quality bit of the channel stage P11 non-allowed signal to a third value or a fourth value according to the input signal when generating the channel stage P11 non-allowed signal.
[ example 3 ]
The embodiment provides a nuclear power plant safety level instrument control system, this instrument control system includes reactor protection system, stabiliser protection valve control system, reactor coolant system and safety injection case isolation valve control system, wherein:
the reactor protection system comprises a plurality of protection channels for generating a channel level P11 non-permission signal, a final P11 non-permission signal generating unit 3 and a first non-taking operation module, wherein each protection channel is internally provided with:
the pressure sensor is used for collecting the pressure of the pressure stabilizer;
the local P11 permission signal generation unit 1 receives the pressure of the pressure stabilizer collected by the pressure sensor, and generates a local P11 permission signal when the pressure of the pressure stabilizer is lower than a set value;
the channel stage P11 permission signal generating unit 2 receives local P11 permission signals of all channels, votes the local P11 permission signals, and generates a channel stage P11 permission signal;
the channel stage P11 non-permission signal generating unit 4 is configured to receive the channel stage P11 permission signal and perform a negation operation on the received channel stage P11 permission signal to generate the channel stage P11 non-permission signal.
In each channel, the pressure sensor collects the pressure of the pressure stabilizer and sends the pressure stabilizer pressure to the local P11 permission signal generating unit 1, and the local P11 permission signal generating unit 1 compares the received pressure stabilizer pressure with a set value to generate a local P11 permission signal, and the local P11 permission signal is sent to the other three protection channels. The channel stage P11 non-permission signal generating unit 4 receives the local P11 permission signals of the present channel and the other 3 channels to vote, and generates a channel stage P11 permission signal. The channel stage P11 non-permission signal generating unit 4 receives the channel stage P11 permission signal of the present channel and performs a negation operation on it to generate the channel stage P11 non-permission signal.
The final P11 non-enable signal generating unit 3 is connected to the channel stage P11 non-enable signal generating unit 4, from which 4 channel stage P11 non-enable signals are received, and voted according to the method and voting logic of embodiment 1 to generate the final P11 non-enable signal.
The final P11 non-permission signal generation unit 3 includes the reactor protection system P11 non-permission signal generation means in embodiment 2. In the reactor protection system, a P11 non-permission signal generating device of the final P11 non-permission signal generating unit 3 is connected with an injection tank isolation valve control system and an input end of a first non-taking operation module, an output end of the first non-taking operation module is connected with a voltage stabilizer protection valve control system and a reactor coolant system, and the P11 non-permission signal generating device is used for generating final P11 non-permission signals according to channel-level P11 non-permission signals of a plurality of channels, directly sending the final P11 non-permission signals into the injection tank isolation valve control system, taking non-taking operation and then sending the final P11 non-permission signals to the voltage stabilizer protection valve control system and the reactor coolant system.
Further, in other embodiments, further improvements may be made to the pressurizer protection valve control system, the reactor coolant system, the safety tank isolation valve control system, including, but not limited to, any of the following improvements:
As shown in fig. 2, the regulator protection valve control system includes:
the input end of the second non-taking operation module is connected with the output end of the first non-taking module;
the input end of the pulse processing module is connected with the output end of the second non-sampling module;
a voting module A is taken out, one input end of the voting module A is connected with the output end of the pulse processing module, the other input end of the voting module A is connected with the manual closing instruction of the control room, and the voting module A outputs the signals output by the pulse processing module and the manual closing instruction of the control room after OR operation;
the voltage stabilizer protection valve control module is provided with 2 input ends, one input end of the voltage stabilizer protection valve control module is connected with the output end of the voting module A, the other input end of the voltage stabilizer protection valve control module is connected with a manual forced opening instruction of the control room, the voltage stabilizer protection valve control module opens the voltage stabilizer protection valve when receiving the manual forced opening instruction of the control room, and closes the voltage stabilizer protection valve when receiving a closing instruction output by the voting module A.
In this embodiment, the pulse processing module functions as: for a signal changing from 0 to 1, the pulse processing module will detect the rising edge of the signal and output a pulse of a fixed length of time (determined by the parameters of the pulse processing module) to the one-out-of-two voting module so that it will not act continuously on the downstream circuitry even if the input to the pulse processing module is a long 1 signal.
As shown in fig. 4, the safety injection tank isolation valve control system includes:
the mode selection module is used for selecting a control mode of the safety injection box isolation valve;
and the two voting module B is adopted, one input end of the two voting module B is connected with the output end of the mode selection module, the other input end of the two voting module B is connected with a final P11 non-permission protection signal, and an operation result is output to the safety injection box isolation valve after the AND operation is carried out on the signal output by the mode selection module and the final P11 non-permission protection signal, so that the opening of the safety injection box isolation valve is controlled. In this embodiment, RSI001VP IIC is a mode selection module, and is configured to set whether the opening and closing of the injection tank isolation valve RIS001VP are manual or automatic, and when the mode selection module is set to set the injection tank isolation valve RIS001VP to be automatic, the final P11 non-permission signal can only be used for intervention control, and at this time, when the final P11 non-permission signal is at high level 1, the injection tank isolation valve RIS001VP is opened. If the system fails, part of input signals of the 2/4 voting logic module are wrong, when the safe injection box isolation valve RSI001VP is in a closed state, the safe injection box isolation valve RSI001VP is in an open state, and finally the P11 non-permission signal is finally degenerated to 0, so that the open signal is not permitted to be sent to the RSI001 VP; if the RSI001VP is opened when the input fault occurs, the final P11 non-permission signal is finally degenerated to be 0 or 1; degradation to 0 clears the open command to the RSI001VP, but the disappearance of the open command does not change the open state of the RSI001VP since the safe deposit box isolation valve RSI001VP is closed only upon receiving the close command. Based on such design and logic, therefore, when the final P11 non-permission signal generation unit 3 determines whether to execute the logic voting and the mode of the logic voting according to the number of the valid input signals, when the valid input signals are 1 or 0, the logic voting is not performed, and 0 is directly output; when the number of valid input signals is 2, 2 signals should be considered at the same time, and two-out-of-two logic voting is performed to reduce the probability of missignaling the final P11 non-allowed signal.
As shown in fig. 3, the reactor coolant system includes:
the loop temperature voting module is used for performing voting according to the loop temperature condition, outputting a temperature voting result, performing two-out-of-three logic voting on the loop temperature in the embodiment, outputting a temperature voting result, and setting the voting result to be two-out-of-four or two-out-of-two or other logic voting according to the requirement in other embodiments;
the coolant pressure voting module is used for performing voting according to the condition of the coolant pressure, outputting a coolant pressure voting result, performing four-out-of-two logic voting on the coolant pressure in the embodiment, and setting the logic voting as three-out-of-two or two-out-of-two or other logic voting according to the requirement in other embodiments;
the second voting module C is connected with the output end of the loop temperature voting module at one input end, and is connected with the first non-taking operation module to access a signal which is not taken by the final P11 non-allowed protection signal, and performs AND operation on the temperature voting result and the signal which is not taken by the final P11 non-allowed protection signal, and outputs an operation result;
and one input end of the two-out-of-two voting module D is connected with the output end of the coolant pressure voting module, the other input end of the two-out-of-two voting module D is connected with the output end of the two-out-of-two voting module C, and the coolant pressure voting result and the operation result of the two-out-of-two voting module C are subjected to AND operation, and the operation result is output to a safety valve of the voltage stabilizer to control the pressure relief of the reactor.
As can be seen from fig. 3, the final P11 non-permission signal generated by the reactor protection system P11 non-permission signal generating device is subjected to non-taking operation by the first non-taking operation module to form a final P11 permission signal in fig. 3 (i.e., a P11 signal in fig. 3, hereinafter referred to as a "P11 signal"), and the P11 signal is sent to the reactor coolant system. In the reactor coolant system, the P11 signal, the loop temperature voting result and the coolant pressure voting result together control to generate a low-temperature overpressure protection signal, and the P11 permission signal, the loop temperature voting result and the coolant pressure voting result need 3 to be all valid to generate the low-temperature overpressure protection signal, and a pressure stabilizer safety valve (RCS 020/021VP in fig. 3) is opened. In this case, for safety reasons, when the final P11 non-permission signal votes, if there are more than 3 invalid input signals, a final P11 non-permission signal with a value of 0 should be output, so that when the loop temperature voting result and the coolant pressure voting result are valid, a low-temperature overpressure protection signal can be output, at this time, the final P11 non-permission signal generating unit 3 should output 0, the value after non-operation is 1, then a low-temperature overpressure protection function is executed to generate a low-temperature overpressure protection signal, and a voltage stabilizer safety valve RCS020/021VP is opened to allow the reactor to be depressurized. When voting is performed on the final P11 non-allowed signals, when the number of valid input signals is 2, 2 signals should be considered at the same time, and two-out-of-two logic voting is performed to reduce the probability of false sending of the P11 non-signals.
[ example 4 ]
The present embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the reactor protection system P11 non-permission signal generation method in the above-described embodiment.
[ example 5 ]
The present embodiment provides a computer apparatus including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the reactor protection system P11 non-permission signal generation method in the above embodiment when executing the computer program.
The foregoing description of the embodiments has been provided for the purpose of illustrating the general principles of the invention, and is not meant to limit the scope of the invention, but to limit the invention to the particular embodiments, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements, etc. that fall within the spirit and principles of the invention are intended to be included within the scope of the invention.
Claims (9)
1. The method for generating the non-permission signal of the reactor protection system P11 is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, receiving a channel-level P11 non-permission signal from 4 protection channels as an input signal, and judging whether the input signal is valid or not;
S2, determining whether to execute logic voting or not according to the number of the effective input signals, wherein the logic voting is in a mode that:
when the number of effective input signals is 4, performing four-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the number of effective input signals is 3, performing two-out-of-three logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the number of effective input signals is 2, performing two-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the effective input signal is 1 or 0, logic voting is not carried out;
the value range of the voting result comprises a first value and a second value; the second value is "1", and the first value is "0";
s3, outputting a control signal: when the logic voting is not executed in the step S2, outputting a control signal with the same value as the first value; otherwise, the voting result is output as a control signal.
2. The method for generating a non-permission signal of a reactor protection system P11 according to claim 1, wherein the non-permission signal of the channel stage P11 includes a signal value and a signal quality bit, the signal quality bit includes a third value representing that the signal is valid and a fourth value representing that the signal is invalid, and step S1 determines whether the input signal is valid according to the value of the signal quality bit.
3. The reactor protection system P11 non-permission signal generation device is characterized by comprising:
the signal receiving and processing module is used for receiving a channel-level P11 non-permission signal from the 4 protection channels as an input signal and judging whether the input signal is valid or not;
the voting module is used for determining whether to execute logic voting and a mode of the logic voting according to the number of the effective input signals:
when the number of effective input signals is 4, performing four-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the number of effective input signals is 3, performing two-out-of-three logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the number of effective input signals is 2, performing two-out-of-two logic voting to obtain a voting result;
when the valid input signal is 1 or 0, logic voting is not performed;
the value range of the voting result comprises a first value and a second value; the second value is "1", and the first value is "0";
the output module is used for outputting a control signal, and outputting the control signal with the same value as the first value when the voting module does not execute logic voting; otherwise, the voting result is output as a control signal.
4. Reactor protection system comprising a plurality of protection channels generating channel-level P11 non-enable signals and a final P11 non-enable signal generating unit (3), characterized in that in each protection channel is provided:
The pressure sensor is used for collecting the pressure of the pressure stabilizer;
a local P11 permission signal generation unit (1) which receives the pressure of the pressure stabilizer collected by the pressure sensor and generates a local P11 permission signal when the pressure of the pressure stabilizer is lower than a set value;
a channel stage P11 permission signal generation unit (2) which receives local P11 permission signals of all channels, votes the local P11 permission signals, and generates a channel stage P11 permission signal;
the channel stage P11 non-permission signal generation unit (4) is used for receiving the channel stage P11 permission signal and performing non-operation on the channel stage P11 permission signal to generate the channel stage P11 non-permission signal;
the final P11 non-allowed signal generating unit (3) comprises the reactor protection system P11 non-allowed signal generating means of claim 3, the P11 non-allowed signal generating means being adapted to generate a final P11 non-allowed signal from the channel level P11 non-allowed signals of the plurality of channels.
5. The nuclear power plant safety level instrument control system comprises a reactor protection system, a voltage stabilizer protection valve control system, a reactor coolant system and an injection tank isolation valve control system, and is characterized in that the reactor protection system is the reactor protection system according to claim 4, and a final P11 non-permission signal generated by a P11 non-permission signal generating device of the reactor protection system is directly and/or after non-operation is carried out, sent to the voltage stabilizer protection valve control system, the reactor coolant system and the injection tank isolation valve control system.
6. The nuclear power plant safety level instrument control system according to claim 5, wherein the reactor protection system further comprises a first non-taking operation module, the P11 non-permission signal generating device is connected with the safety injection box isolation valve control system and the input end of the first non-taking operation module, the output end of the first non-taking operation module is connected with the voltage stabilizer protection valve control system and the reactor coolant system, so that the final P11 non-permission signal is directly sent into the safety injection box isolation valve control system, and the non-taking operation is carried out and then sent to the voltage stabilizer protection valve control system and the reactor coolant system.
7. The nuclear power plant safety level control system of claim 6, wherein the regulator protection valve control system comprises:
the input end of the second non-taking operation module is connected with the output end of the first non-taking module;
the input end of the pulse processing module is connected with the output end of the second non-sampling module;
a voting module A is taken out, one input end of the voting module A is connected with the output end of the pulse processing module, the other input end of the voting module A is connected with the manual closing instruction of the control room, and the voting module A outputs the signals output by the pulse processing module and the manual closing instruction of the control room after OR operation;
The voltage stabilizer protection valve control module is provided with 2 input ends, one input end of the voltage stabilizer protection valve control module is connected with the output end of the voting module A, the other input end of the voltage stabilizer protection valve control module is connected with a manual forced opening instruction of the control room, the voltage stabilizer protection valve control module opens the voltage stabilizer protection valve when receiving the manual forced opening instruction of the control room, and closes the voltage stabilizer protection valve when receiving a closing instruction output by the voting module A.
8. The nuclear power plant safety level control system of claim 6 or 5, wherein the safety box isolation valve control system comprises:
the mode selection module is used for selecting a control mode of the safety injection box isolation valve;
and the two voting module B is adopted, one input end of the two voting module B is connected with the output end of the mode selection module, the other input end of the two voting module B is connected with a final P11 non-permission protection signal, and an operation result is output to the safety injection box isolation valve after the AND operation is carried out on the signal output by the mode selection module and the final P11 non-permission protection signal.
9. The nuclear power plant safety level gauge system of claim 6, wherein the reactor coolant system comprises:
the loop temperature voting module is used for performing voting according to the loop temperature condition and outputting a temperature voting result;
The coolant pressure voting module is used for performing voting according to the coolant pressure condition and outputting a coolant pressure voting result;
the second voting module C is connected with the output end of the loop temperature voting module at one input end, and is connected with the first non-taking operation module to access a signal which is not taken by the final P11 non-allowed protection signal, and performs AND operation on the temperature voting result and the signal which is not taken by the final P11 non-allowed protection signal, and outputs an operation result;
and one input end of the two-out-of-two voting module D is connected with the output end of the coolant pressure voting module, the other input end of the two-out-of-two voting module D is connected with the output end of the two-out-of-two voting module C, and the coolant pressure voting result and the operation result of the two-out-of-two voting module C are subjected to AND operation, and the operation result is output to the safety valve of the voltage stabilizer.
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