CN115277157B - Efficient authentication key exchange method based on out-of-band channel - Google Patents
Efficient authentication key exchange method based on out-of-band channel Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
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Abstract
The invention provides a high-efficiency authentication key exchange method based on an out-of-band channel, belonging to the technical field of high-efficiency authentication key exchange; the technical problems to be solved are as follows: an improvement of an efficient authentication key exchange method based on an out-of-band channel is provided; the technical scheme adopted for solving the technical problems is as follows: the method comprises the following key exchange steps: defining public parameters shared by an initiating terminal and a responding terminal of authentication key exchange by using an algorithm protocol, pre-calculating public and private key pairs of the initiating terminal and the responding terminal, setting an initiating terminal algorithm, mainly generating random numbers by the initiating terminal, transmitting processing data to the responding terminal by using a common channel, and receiving the processing data transmitted by the common channel; then setting a response end algorithm, wherein the response end mainly receives processing data sent by a common channel, generates random numbers, uses a message authentication code function and uses key input to generate data output; the invention is applied to authentication key exchange.
Description
Technical Field
The invention provides an out-of-band channel-based efficient authentication key exchange method, and belongs to the technical field of efficient authentication key exchange.
Background
Authentication key exchange protocol is indispensable in many device interaction scenarios, and the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) scheme currently used is a popular way nowadays, but the calculation amount based on the ECDH scheme is large, which results in long time spent by many resource-limited devices in running the protocol; in the scenario of the internet of things, the computing power of many interaction devices is unequal, for example, communications between some sensor nodes and powerful servers, but the current ECDH scheme standard protocol (for example display authenticated association in ieee 802.15.6) adopted omits the point, and the scheme provided by them cannot realize key negotiation between unbalanced computing devices with high efficiency; in addition, in some unbalanced optimization algorithms, the calculated amount of one end is transferred to the other end, and extra calculated amount is brought to the other end; based on this, there is a need to improve and optimize existing authentication key exchange protocols that can be applied to widely existing computational power imbalance scenarios and perform efficient authentication without additionally increasing the computational effort of the device.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects in the prior art, and solves the technical problems that: an improvement of an efficient authentication key exchange method based on an out-of-band channel is provided.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention adopts the following technical scheme: an efficient authentication key exchange method based on an out-of-band channel comprises the following key exchange steps:
step one: common parameters shared by an initiating end and a responding end of authentication key exchange by using an algorithm protocol are defined as follows:
wherein: k is a safety parameter that is set to be equal to or greater than the safety parameter,is the domain that generates the private key, E is the selected elliptic curve, G is the base point of the curve;
before information exchange, the initiating terminal and the responding terminal pre-calculate own public and private key pairs:
calculating initiator ID A The public and private key pairs of (a) are: private keyPublic key PK A ＝SK A ×G；
The public and private key pair of the computing response end IDB is as follows: private keyPublic key PK B ＝SK B ×G；
Step two: the method comprises the following steps:
step A01: the initiating terminal generates random number
Step A02: initiating terminal calculates U A ＝r A +SK A ；
Step A03: the originating terminal uses the common channel to identify the ID A ，PK A Sending the message to a response end;
step A04: the initiator receives the ID sent by the common channel B ，C B ，PK B ；
Step A05: the originating terminal uses the common channel to identify the ID A ，U A Sending the message to a response end;
step A06: the originating terminal receives the lD transmitted from the normal channel B ，r B ；
Step a07: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B PK is processed A ，PK B As input, the resulting output is denoted as C' B ；
Step A08: originating terminal comparison C B And C' B If the protocol is equal, stopping the protocol, and if the protocol is equal, continuing to execute the step A09;
step A09: the initiating terminal uses the short message authentication code function and the keyWherein->For exclusive-or operation, PK A ，PK B As input, the resulting output is D A ；
Step A10: initiating terminal handle D A Converting the digital code into 6 decimal numbers, displaying the 6 decimal numbers on a screen, and enabling a user to compare: if D A ＝D B Step A11 is continued, if D A ≠D B Stopping the protocol;
step A11: initiating end calculates T A ＝r A ×PK B ；
Step A12: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B Will T A As input, the resulting output is K A ；
Step A13: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the key K A U is set up A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the output generated is mac A ；
Step A14: the originating terminal uses the common channel to identify the ID A ，mac A Sending the message to a response end;
step A15: the initiator receives the ID sent by the common channel B ，mac B ；
Step A16: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the key K A Will r B ，U A ，ID B ，ID A As input, the output generated is mac 2 The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Initiating end verifies mac 2 And mac B If the protocol is equal, stopping the protocol, and if the protocol is equal, continuing to execute the step A17;
step A17: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the key K A Will T A ，U A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the generated output is the session key LK of the current session A ；
Step three: the response end algorithm is set as follows:
step B01: the response end receives the ID sent by the common channel A ，PK A ；
Step B02: generating random numbers at response end
Step B03: the response end uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B PK is processed A ，PK B As input, the resulting output is denoted as C B ；
Step B04: response end uses common channel to ID B ，C B Sending to an initiating terminal;
step B05: the response end receives the ID sent by the common channel A ，U A ；
Step B06: the response end uses the common channel handleID B ，r B Sending to an initiating terminal;
step B07: the response end uses the short message authentication code function and the keyWherein->For exclusive-or operation, PK A ，PK B As input, the generated output is DB B ；
Step B08: response end handle D B Converting the digital code into 6 decimal numbers, displaying the 6 decimal numbers on a screen, and enabling a user to compare: if D B ＝D A Then go on to step B09, if D B ≠D A Stopping the protocol;
step B09: response end calculation T B ＝SK B ×(U A ×G-PK A )；
Step B10: the response end uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B Will T B As input, the resulting output is K B ；
Step B11: the response end receives the ID sent by the common channel A ，mac A ；
Step B12: the response end uses the message authentication code function and uses the secret key K B U is set up A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the output generated is mac 1 ；
Step B13: response side verifies mac 1 And mac A If the protocol is equal, stopping the protocol if the protocol is not equal, and if the protocol is equal, continuing to execute the step B14;
step B14: the response end uses the message verification code function and uses the secret key K B Will r B ，U A ，ID B ，ID A As input, the output generated is mac B ；
Step B15: response end uses common channel to ID B ，mac B Sending to an initiating terminal;
step B16: the response end uses the message authentication code function and uses the secret key K B Will T A ，U A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the generated output is the session key LK of the current session B 。
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects: the high-efficiency authentication key exchange protocol based on the out-of-band channel adopts a method for transferring the calculated amount, and can enable a strong equipment end (a response end) to replace a weak equipment end (an initiating end) to calculate scalar multiplication (namely a time-consuming algorithm in an elliptic curve), so that the high-efficiency operation of the protocol is realized, the overall operation time is effectively reduced, compared with a standard protocol (namely IEEE802.15.6 display authenticated association), the calculated amount of the weak equipment end is reduced, the calculated load of the strong equipment end is not increased, and the possibility of low efficiency or downtime caused by extra load when the strong equipment end (such as a server) performs multi-thread interaction is effectively reduced.
Drawings
The invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings:
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an implementation of the efficient authentication key exchange protocol of the present invention;
Detailed Description
As shown in fig. 1, the present invention specifically provides a method for efficient authentication key exchange based on an out-of-band channel, which first uses an algorithm protocol to define common parameters shared by an initiating end and a responding end of authentication key exchange, and then sets algorithms of the initiating end and the responding end of communication in sequence, so as to realize the exchange of authentication keys.
First, define the meaning of each parameter used in the key exchange method of the present invention:
k is a safety parameter that is set to be equal to or greater than the safety parameter,is the domain that generates the private key, E is the selected elliptic curve, G is the base point of the curve;
ID A for initiating terminal, SK A Is hair-growingPrivate key, PK, of initiator A A public key of an initiating terminal;
ID B for the response end, SK B PK for private key of response end B A public key of the response end;
r A in the form of a random number, rB is a random number;
U A is a secret key;
C B a promise value calculated for the responding end; c'. B Comparing the promise value calculated for the initiating terminal with the promise value calculated for the responding terminal;
D A a message digest code calculated for the originating terminal; d (D) B A message digest code calculated for the responding end;
T A to calculate the key K A A parameter entered at the time; k (K) A Is a secret key; t (T) B To calculate the key K B A parameter entered at the time; k (K) B Is a secret key;
mac A a self message check code calculated for the initiating terminal; mac B Self message check codes calculated for the response ends; mac 2 A message check code calculated for the initiating terminal for verifying the identity of the responding terminal; mac 1 A message check code calculated for the response end for verifying the identity of the initiating end;
LK A is a session key; LK (LK) B Is a session key;
the algorithm steps of the invention aiming at the initiating terminal mainly comprise:
step A01: the initiating terminal generates random number
Step A02: and (3) the initiating terminal calculates: u (U) A ＝r A +SK A ；
Step A03: the originating terminal uses the common channel to identify the ID A ，PK A Sending the message to a response end;
step A04: the initiator receives the ID sent by the common channel B ，C B ，PK B ；
Step A05: the originating terminal uses the common channel to identify the ID A ，U A Sending the message to a response end;
step A06: the initiator receives the ID sent by the common channel B ，r B ；
Step a07: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B PK is processed A ，PK B As input, the resulting output is denoted as C' B ；
Step A08: originating terminal comparison C B And C' B If the protocol is equal, stopping the protocol if the protocol is not equal; if the two values are equal, continuing to execute the step A09;
step A09: the initiating terminal uses the short message authentication code function and the key(wherein->Exclusive or operation), PK A ，PK B As input, the resulting output is D A ；
Step A10: initiating terminal handle D A Converting the digital code into 6 decimal numbers, and displaying the 6 decimal numbers on a screen to enable a user to compare; if D A ＝D B Then continue to execute step a11; if D A ≠D B Stopping the protocol;
step A11: and (3) the initiating terminal calculates: t (T) A ＝r A ×PK B ；
Step A12: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B Will T A As input, the resulting output is K A ；
Step A13: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the key K A U is set up A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the output generated is mac A ；
Step A14: the originating terminal uses the common channel to identify the ID A ，mac A Sending the message to a response end;
step A15: the initiating terminal receives the common packetID sent by communication channel B ，mac B ；
Step A16: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the key K A Will r B ，U A ，ID B ，ID A As input, the output generated is mac 2 The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Initiating end verifies mac 2 And mac B If the protocol is equal, stopping the protocol, and if the protocol is equal, continuing to execute the step A17;
step A17: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the key K A Will T A ，U A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the generated output is the session key LK of the current session A ；
The algorithm steps of the invention aiming at the response end mainly comprise:
step B01: the response end receives the ID sent by the common channel A ，PK A ；
Step B02: generating random numbers at response end
Step B03: the response end uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B PK is processed A ，PK B As input, the resulting output is denoted as C B ；
Step B04: response end uses common channel to ID B ，C B Sending to an initiating terminal;
step B05: the response end receives the ID sent by the common channel A ，U A ；
Step B06: response end uses common channel to ID B ，r B Sending to an initiating terminal;
step B07: the response end uses the short message authentication code function and the keyPK is processed A ，PKB B As input, the resulting output is D B ；
Step B08: response end handle D B Converting the digital code into 6 decimal numbers, and displaying the 6 decimal numbers on a screen to enable a user to compare; if D B ＝D A Then continue to execute step B08; if D B ≠D A Stopping the protocol;
step B09: and (3) calculating by a response end: t (T) B ＝SK B ×(U A ×G-PK A )；
Step B10: the response end uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B Will T B As input, the resulting output is K B ；
Step B11: the response end receives the ID sent by the common channel A ，mac A ；
Step B12: the response end uses the message authentication code function and uses the secret key K B U is set up A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the output generated is mac 1 ；
Step B13: response side verifies mac 1 And mac A If the protocol is equal, stopping the protocol if the protocol is not equal, and if the protocol is equal, continuing to execute the step B14;
step B14: the response end uses the message verification code function and uses the secret key K B Will r B ，U A ，ID B ，ID A As input, the output generated is mac B ；
Step B15: response end uses common channel to ID B ，mac B Sending to an initiating terminal;
step B16: the response end uses the message authentication code function and uses the secret key K B Will T A ，U A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the generated output is the session key LK of the current session B 。
The message authentication code function used in the protocol method can use a hash message authentication code HMAC, and can also use a cryptographic hash algorithm of a national cryptographic system SM3 to replace the message authentication code HMAC.
Finally, it should be noted that: the above embodiments are only for illustrating the technical solution of the present invention, and not for limiting the same; although the invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that: the technical scheme described in the foregoing embodiments can be modified or some or all of the technical features thereof can be replaced by equivalents; such modifications and substitutions do not depart from the spirit of the invention.
Claims (1)
1. An efficient authentication key exchange method based on an out-of-band channel is characterized in that: the method comprises the following key exchange steps:
step one: common parameters shared by an initiating end and a responding end of authentication key exchange by using an algorithm protocol are defined as follows:
wherein: k is a safety parameter that is set to be equal to or greater than the safety parameter,is the domain that generates the private key, E is the selected elliptic curve, G is the base point of the curve;
before information exchange, the initiating terminal and the responding terminal pre-calculate own public and private key pairs:
calculating initiator ID A The public and private key pairs of (a) are: private keyPublic key PK A ＝SK A ×G；
Calculating response end ID B The public and private key pairs of (a) are: private keyPublic key PK B ＝SK B ×G；
Step two: the method comprises the following steps:
step A01: the initiating terminal generates randomNumber of digits
Step A02: initiating terminal calculates U A ＝r A +SK A ；
Step A03: the originating terminal uses the common channel to identify the ID A ，PK A Sending the message to a response end;
step A04: the initiator receives the ID sent by the common channel B ，C B ，PK B ；
Step A05: the originating terminal uses the common channel to identify the ID A ，U A Sending the message to a response end;
step A06: the initiator receives the ID sent by the common channel B ，R B ；
Step a07: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B PK is processed A ，PK B As input, the resulting output is denoted as C' B ；
Step A08: originating terminal comparison C B And C' B If the protocol is equal, stopping the protocol, and if the protocol is equal, continuing to execute the step A09;
step A09: the initiating terminal uses the short message authentication code function and the keyWherein->For exclusive-or operation, PK A ，PK B As input, the resulting output is D A ；
Step A10: initiating terminal handle D A Converting the digital code into 6 decimal numbers, displaying the 6 decimal numbers on a screen, and enabling a user to compare: if D A ＝D B Step A11 is continued, if D A ≠D B Stopping the protocol;
step A11: initiating end calculates T A ＝r A ×PK B ；
Step A12: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B Will T A As input, the resulting output is K A ；
Step A13: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the key K A U is set up A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the output produced is max A ；
Step A14: the originating terminal uses the common channel to identify the ID A ，mac A Sending the message to a response end;
step A15: the initiator receives the ID sent by the common channel B ，mac B ；
Step A16: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the key K A Will r B ，U A ，ID B ，ID A As input, the output generated is mac 2 The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Initiating end verifies mac 2 And mac B If the protocol is equal, stopping the protocol, and if the protocol is equal, continuing to execute the step A17;
step A17: the initiating terminal uses the message authentication code function and the key K A Will T A ，U A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the generated output is the session key LK of the current session A ；
Step three: the response end algorithm is set as follows:
step B01: the response end receives the ID sent by the common channel A ，PK A ；
Step B02: generating random numbers at response end
Step B03: the response end uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B PK is processed A ，PK B As input, the resulting output is denoted as C B ；
Step B04: response end uses common channel to ID B ，C B Sending to an initiating terminal;
step B05: the response end receives the ID sent by the common channel A ，U A ；
Step B06: response end uses common channel to ID B ，r B Sending to an initiating terminal;
step B07: the response end uses the short message authentication code function and the keyWherein->For exclusive-or operation, PK A ，PK B As input, the resulting output is D B ；
Step B08: response end handle D B Converting the digital code into 6 decimal numbers, displaying the 6 decimal numbers on a screen, and enabling a user to compare: if D B ＝D A Then go on to step B09, if D B ≠D A Stopping the protocol;
step B09: response end calculation T B ＝SK B ×(U A ×G-PK A )；
Step B10: the response end uses the message authentication code function and the secret key r B Will T B As input, the resulting output is K B ；
Step B11: the response end receives the ID sent by the common channel A ，mac A ；
Step B12: the response end uses the message authentication code function and uses the secret key K B U is set up A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the output generated is mac 1 ；
Step B13: response side verifies mac 1 And mac A If the protocol is equal, stopping the protocol if the protocol is not equal, and if the protocol is equal, continuing to execute the step B14;
step B14: the response end uses the message verification code function and uses the secret key K B Will r B ，U A ，ID B ，ID A As input, produceThe raw output is mac B ；
Step B15: response end uses common channel to ID B ，mac B Sending to an initiating terminal;
step B16: the response end uses the message authentication code function and uses the secret key K B Will T A ，U A ，r B ，ID A ，ID B As input, the generated output is the session key LK of the current session B 。
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