CN115277156B - User identity privacy protection method for resisting neighbor attack in social network - Google Patents

User identity privacy protection method for resisting neighbor attack in social network Download PDF

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CN115277156B
CN115277156B CN202210867729.3A CN202210867729A CN115277156B CN 115277156 B CN115277156 B CN 115277156B CN 202210867729 A CN202210867729 A CN 202210867729A CN 115277156 B CN115277156 B CN 115277156B
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许力
章红艳
许佳钰
李啸林
周赵斌
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Abstract

The invention relates to a user identity privacy protection method for resisting neighbor attack in a social network, which comprises the following steps: when graph data of the social network is subject to 1-neighbor attack, the protection of privacy information of the user privacy identity is realized by adopting a graph modification technology; modifying the 1-neighbor graphs in the same cluster according to the graph editing distance to make the graphs indistinguishable in probability; the usability of the graph data is improved while the privacy protection of the user identity in the social network is realized.

Description

User identity privacy protection method for resisting neighbor attack in social network
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of social network privacy protection, in particular to a user identity privacy protection method for resisting neighbor attack in a social network.
Background
In the social network, users fill in information such as names, professions, telephone numbers, emails, identification card numbers and the like and store the information in a database, however, certain social relations are also reflected in the data besides personal information. The data contains privacy information of many users, so that anonymity technology must be used to protect the privacy of users before the social network data is published.
The naive user privacy protection method is to remove the identity, attribute and the like of the user, but Backstrom and the like indicate that the naive privacy protection technology can re-identify the identity of the user when facing a 1-neighbor attack, and cannot well protect the privacy of the user. The graph structure modification can effectively protect the privacy of users, and the purpose of user identity privacy or attribute privacy is achieved in the modified graph (called anonymous graph) by changing the structure of the graph through a method of adding or deleting nodes and edges in the original graph before data release. User privacy protection using graph modification techniques, first partitioning nodes, where the partitioning accuracy directly affects the amount of graph information lost may result in reduced graph data availability, and more accurate partitioning criteria must be sought.
Disclosure of Invention
Therefore, the invention aims to provide a user identity privacy protection method for resisting neighbor attack in a social network, and the modified anonymity graph reaches k-anonymity through modifying the graph structure, so that the identity privacy of a user can be effectively protected.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a user identity privacy protection method for resisting neighbor attack in a social network comprises the following steps:
step 1) establishing a social network model, and representing the social network model as a graph G= (V, E), wherein V is a top point set of the graph and represents users in the social network; e is an edge set representing relationships between users in the social network;
according to a measure d (v), lc (v) divides the user nodes into T clusters, wherein d (v) represents the degree of the user nodes v and the meaning is the number of users connected with the user in the social network; lc (v) represents a local clustering coefficient of the user node v in the network, which means that the connection between neighbors of the node v is tight, and after the division is finished, the clusters are arranged in descending order according to the maximum node degree of each cluster;
step 2) presetting a user privacy requirement threshold k, if a certain cluster C i If the number of users in the cluster is less than the threshold k, calculating the average degree of the cluster and the adjacent front and rear clusters C i-1 ,C i+1 Combining the clusters into clusters with small differences, repeating the process until the number of users in all clusters is greater than k;
step 3), after the cluster merging is completed, carrying out cluster splitting operation on clusters with the number of user nodes being more than 2k so that the number of users in each cluster is a certain value of [ k,2 k); the method comprises the following steps:
s3-1, for user nodes in each cluster, sorting according to a degree descending order, and constructing a 1-neighbor graph of the user nodes;
s3-2, constructing a 1-neighbor structure feature matrix of the user node
Figure SMS_1
Wherein the method comprises the steps of
Figure SMS_2
Respectively representing the degree distribution, the internal degree distribution, the external degree distribution and the gap degree distribution of the node v of the user in the social network;
s3-3, according to the formula
Figure SMS_3
Calculating the structural similarity between any two nodes in the same cluster, wherein +.>
Figure SMS_4
Respectively representing the uncorrelated degree, k of the user node degree distribution, the internal degree distribution, the external degree distribution and the gap degree distribution 1 、k 2 、k 3 、k 4 Respectively represent the proportion of each similarity and satisfy k 1 +k 2 +k 3 +k 4 =1;
S3-4, dividing the nodes into T clusters by using a K-means clustering algorithm;
step 4), calculating the similarity between each pair of nodes of the user according to the 1-neighbor graph of the user node in each cluster, constructing a weighted bipartite graph according to the similarity, calculating graph editing distances on the bipartite graph, and finding a target graph editing path P according to the graph editing distances;
step 5), editing the path P according to the diagram found in the step 4), and modifying the 1-neighbor diagram of the nodes in the cluster so that the nodes are isomorphic.
2. A method for protecting privacy of user identities against a 1 x-neighbor attack according to claim 1, characterized by: the 1 x-neighbor graph is a subgraph of the original graph G, defined as:
G(v)=(V(v),E(v),D(v))
where V (V) is a set comprising the user node V itself and its neighbors, E (V) is the relationship between the edges of the nodes in V (V), i.e. the neighbors, and D (V) is the set of the number of neighbors of the node V in the social network, i.e. the set of the degrees of all the nodes in V (V).
Further, the step 2) specifically includes:
s2-1, for clusters with node number less than k, it is noted as
Figure SMS_5
Wherein the superscript 1 indicates that the cluster is the result obtained after the first division, and the average degree of the nodes in the cluster is marked as +.>
Figure SMS_6
Calculate->
Figure SMS_7
Two clusters adjacent to each other in front of and behind the same->
Figure SMS_8
Is respectively marked as +.>
Figure SMS_9
S2-2, if
Figure SMS_10
Satisfy the formula->
Figure SMS_11
Will->
Figure SMS_12
Added to->
Figure SMS_13
In, otherwise will->
Figure SMS_14
Added to->
Figure SMS_15
In (a) and (b);
s2-3, repeatedly executing the steps until the number of nodes in all clusters exceeds k.
Further, the step 4) specifically includes:
s4-1, if the number of neighbor nodes in the l-neighbor graphs of the two user nodes is not equal, adding the user nodes in the graph with few user neighbor nodes so that the number of nodes in the two graphs is equal;
s4-2, constructing a matching cost matrix of the user nodes, and constructing a weighted bipartite graph by taking the matching cost of the user nodes as an edge weight;
s4-3, calculating graph editing distances among the user nodes by utilizing the bipartite graph to obtain matched nodes and graph editing paths.
Further, the step 5) specifically includes:
s5-1, the adjacency matrix of the structural diagram G is denoted as A= (a) ij ) n×n Wherein when node v i And v j When there is an edge between a ij =1, otherwise, a ij =0;
S5-2, calculation A 2 A is a 3
Figure SMS_17
Is->
Figure SMS_20
If->
Figure SMS_21
Order of principle
Figure SMS_18
If->
Figure SMS_19
Make->
Figure SMS_22
Calculate->
Figure SMS_23
Figure SMS_16
S5-3, for each user node v in the social network, calculating the obtained matches according to S4-3Matching the node u, calculating the degree of the node v needing to be modified and recording as
Figure SMS_24
Figure SMS_25
The degree of each user node in the social network to be modified is arranged according to descending order, and the obtained degree modification sequence is marked as +.>
Figure SMS_26
Wherein d v Representing the number of neighbors of the user node v;
s5-4 according to D M The graph structure is modified.
Further, the S3-2 specifically comprises the following steps:
s3-2-1, calculating the degree distribution of neighbor nodes in the 1-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure SMS_27
Figure SMS_28
Figure SMS_29
Is user node v i The degree of (v) represents v i The number of neighbors in the original graph G,
Figure SMS_30
N(v i ) A set of all neighbors of the user node v;
s3-2-2, calculating the internal degree distribution of the neighbor nodes in the 1-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure SMS_31
Figure SMS_32
Figure SMS_33
Is the user node's internal degree, representing user node v i The number of neighbors in the 1 x-neighbor graph G (v), the +.>
Figure SMS_34
Step 3-2-3, calculating the degree distribution of neighbor nodes in the 1 x-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure SMS_35
Figure SMS_36
Figure SMS_37
Is v i Is indicative of the degree of egress of the user node v i The number of neighbors outside 1 x-neighbor graph G (v), the +.>
Figure SMS_38
Step 3-2-4, calculating the gap degree distribution of the neighbor nodes in the 1-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure SMS_39
Wherein->
Figure SMS_40
Figure SMS_41
S3-2-5, marking the characteristic matrix of each user node in the social network as
Figure SMS_42
Figure SMS_43
Is the number of neighbors of user node v in the social network.
Further, the S3-3 specifically comprises the following steps:
s3-3-1, for user nodes v and u in the same cluster, calculating the uncorrelated degree of the degree distribution, the internal degree distribution, the output degree distribution and the gap degree distribution by using JS divergences, wherein the uncorrelated degree is respectively recorded as:
Figure SMS_44
Figure SMS_45
the JS divergence is defined as:
Figure SMS_46
wherein p= { P 1 ,p 2 ,…,p t },Q={q 1 ,q 2 ,…,q t Respectively two probability distributions in the same probability space,
Figure SMS_47
s3-3-2, calculating similarity vectors of user nodes v and u
Figure SMS_48
Figure SMS_49
The similarity of user nodes u and v is +.>
Figure SMS_50
k 1 +k 2 +k 3 + k 4 =1。
Further, the S4-2 specifically comprises the following steps:
s4-2-1, for any pair of vertices V and u, G (V) = (V) in the same cluster 1 ,E 1 ) And G (u) = (V) 2 ,E 2 ) Respectively their 1-neighbor graphs, for any node v i E G (v), calculating the matching cost of E G (v) and all nodes in G (u)
Figure SMS_51
S4-2-2, constructing the cost matrix
Figure SMS_52
S4-2-3, constructing a weighted bipartite graph
Figure SMS_53
V 1 、V 2 Vertex sets with equal number of nodes, denoted as x, < >>
Figure SMS_54
For edge set, add>
Figure SMS_55
Figure SMS_56
Is an edge weight matrix, w ij =c ij
Further, the S4-3 specifically comprises the following steps:
s4-3-1, selecting a node with the maximum degree as a matched seed node pair;
s4-3-2, utilizing a Monte Carlo method to obtain the optimal matching of the bipartite graph B;
s4-3-3, finding a graph editing path P= { v corresponding to the optimal matching 1 →u t1 ,v 2 →u t2 ,…,v x → u tx }, where u t1 、u t2 、u tm V respectively 1 、v 2 、v m Is a matching node of (c).
Further, the S5-4 specifically comprises the following steps:
s5-4-1, if
Figure SMS_57
Representing user node v i Add->
Figure SMS_58
The edges are respectively found between two-hop neighbor nodes and three-hop neighbor nodes of the node, the nodes needing to be added with edges are connected, and if the number of the connected edges is less than +.>
Figure SMS_59
Then add the dummy node and associate with v i The edges are finally such that the total number of edges is equal to +.>
Figure SMS_60
The method comprises the following steps:
s5-4-1-1 at node v i Two-hop node search of (a) requiresThe node to be added is preset as i If (if)
Figure SMS_61
Then at v i And v j An edge is added between the two parts, and the part is added with->
Figure SMS_62
S5-4-1-2, if there is no two-hop node needing to be added, searching the node needing to be added in the three-hop node, and presetting as i If (if)
Figure SMS_63
Then at v i And v j An edge is added between the two parts, and the part is added with->
Figure SMS_64
S5-4-1-3, repeating the above steps until
Figure SMS_65
Or there is no two-hop and three-hop node requiring an increase in the degree;
s5-4-1-4, if
Figure SMS_66
Terminating;
s5-4-1-5, if
Figure SMS_67
If there are no two-hop and three-hop nodes requiring increasing degree, then the corresponding number of false nodes is increased and the false nodes are matched with v i Are connected;
s5-4-2, if
Figure SMS_68
Representing user node v i Deletion of strip->
Figure SMS_69
Edges, searching neighbors needing to delete the edges in the neighbors, deleting the edges connected between the neighbors, and when the number of the deleted edges is equal to +.>
Figure SMS_70
Stopping when deleting the edges, if the number of deleted edges is insufficient +.>
Figure SMS_71
Deleting the adjacent edges of the nodes from low to high according to the edge medium centrality until the total edge deletion number is equal to +.>
Figure SMS_72
The method comprises the following steps:
s5-4-2-1 at node v i Sequentially searching nodes needing to be reduced in degree, adding the nodes into a candidate set CS, and arranging the nodes in descending order according to the degree of the user node;
s5-4-2-2, deleting nodes and v in CS in turn i A connecting edge between the two;
s5-4-2-3, if
Figure SMS_73
Terminating;
s5-4-2-4, if
Figure SMS_74
At v i Corresponding edges are deleted from small to large in turn according to the edge median centrality among the remaining adjacent edges of (1) until +.>
Figure SMS_75
The edge betweenness centrality is the ratio of the number of paths of the shortest paths among all users in the social network passing through the edge to the number of the short paths among all the nodes in the network.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
when the graph data of the social network is subject to 1-neighbor attack, the protection of the privacy information of the user privacy identity is realized by adopting the graph modification technology; modifying the 1-neighbor graphs in the same cluster according to the graph editing distance to make the graphs indistinguishable in probability; the usability of the graph data is improved while the privacy protection of the user identity in the social network is realized. The user identity privacy protection method for resisting the 1-neighbor attack in the social network has better application and popularization effects.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the 1-neighbor of the node labeled 1 in the original karate diagram in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a two-part pictorial representation of one embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.
Referring to fig. 1, the present invention provides a user identity privacy protection method for resisting 1 x-neighbor attack in a social network, comprising the following steps:
step 1), for a given graph g= (V, E), according to the metric: d (v), lc (v) divides the node into several clusters, where d (v), lc (v) represent the degree of the node v and its local cluster coefficients, respectively. After the division is finished, arranging the clusters in descending order according to the maximum node degree of each cluster;
step 2), after the coarse division of the nodes, the number of the nodes in some clusters is less than a given privacy requirement k, and the clusters are combined into clusters with small differences according to the difference between the average degree of the clusters and the average degree of two adjacent clusters so as to ensure that the sizes of all groups are greater than k;
the specific method of the step 2) is as follows:
s2-1, we mark it as a cluster with node number less than k
Figure SMS_76
Wherein the superscript 1 indicates that the cluster is the result obtained after the first division, and the average degree of the nodes in the cluster is marked as +.>
Figure SMS_77
Calculate->
Figure SMS_78
Two clusters adjacent to each other in front of and behind the same->
Figure SMS_79
Is respectively marked as +.>
Figure SMS_80
S2-2, if
Figure SMS_81
Satisfy the formula->
Figure SMS_82
Will->
Figure SMS_83
Added to->
Figure SMS_84
In, otherwise will->
Figure SMS_85
Added to->
Figure SMS_86
In (a) and (b);
s2-3, repeatedly executing the steps until the number of nodes in all clusters exceeds k.
Step 3), after cluster merging is completed, the number of nodes in some clusters is more than 2k, and cluster splitting operation is needed to be carried out on the nodes so that the size of each cluster is [ k,2 k);
the step 3) is specifically as follows:
s3-1, for user nodes in each cluster, sorting according to a degree descending order, and constructing a 1-neighbor graph of the user nodes;
s3-2, constructing a 1-neighbor structure feature matrix of the user node
Figure SMS_87
Wherein the method comprises the steps of
Figure SMS_88
Respectively representing the degree distribution, the internal degree distribution, the external degree distribution and the gap degree distribution of the node v of the user in the social network; s3-2-1, calculating the degree distribution of neighbor nodes in the 1-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure SMS_89
Figure SMS_90
Is user node v i The degree of (v) represents v i Number of neighbors in original graph G, < >>
Figure SMS_91
N(v i ) A set of all neighbors of the user node v;
s3-2-2, calculating the internal degree distribution of the neighbor nodes in the 1-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure SMS_92
Figure SMS_93
Figure SMS_94
Is the user node's internal degree, representing user node v i The number of neighbors in the 1 x-neighbor graph G (v), the +.>
Figure SMS_95
Step 3-2-3, calculating the degree distribution of neighbor nodes in the 1 x-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure SMS_96
Figure SMS_97
Figure SMS_98
Is v i Is indicative of the degree of egress of the user node v i The number of neighbors outside 1 x-neighbor graph G (v), the +.>
Figure SMS_99
Step 3-2-4, calculating the gap degree distribution of the neighbor nodes in the 1-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure SMS_100
S3-2-5, each user in the social networkThe characteristic matrix of the node is marked as
Figure SMS_101
Figure SMS_102
Is the number of neighbors of user node v in the social network.
S3-3, according to the formula
Figure SMS_103
Calculating the structural similarity between any two nodes in the same cluster, wherein +.>
Figure SMS_104
Respectively representing the uncorrelated degree, k of the user node degree distribution, the internal degree distribution, the external degree distribution and the gap degree distribution 1 、k 2 、k 3 、k 4 Respectively represent the proportion of each similarity and satisfy k 1 +k 2 +k 3 +k 4 =1;
S3-3-1, for user nodes v and u in the same cluster, calculating the uncorrelated degree of the degree distribution, the internal degree distribution, the output degree distribution and the gap degree distribution by using JS divergences, wherein the uncorrelated degree is respectively recorded as:
Figure SMS_105
Figure SMS_106
the JS divergence is defined as:
Figure SMS_107
Wherein p= { P 1 ,p 2 ,…,p t },Q={q 1 ,q 2 ,…,q t Two probability distributions in the same probability space, +.>
Figure SMS_108
Figure SMS_109
S3-3-2, calculating user sectionSimilarity vector of points v and u
Figure SMS_110
Figure SMS_111
The similarity of user nodes u and v is +.>
Figure SMS_112
k 1 +k 2 +k 3 + k 4 =1。
S3-4, dividing the nodes into T clusters by using a K-means clustering algorithm.
Step 4), calculating the similarity between nodes according to the 1-neighbor graph of the nodes in each cluster, constructing a weighted bipartite graph, calculating graph editing distance on the bipartite graph, and finding a graph editing path P;
the specific method of the step 4 is as follows:
s4-1, if the number of neighbor nodes in the l-neighbor graphs of the two user nodes is not equal, adding the user nodes in the graph with few user neighbor nodes so that the number of nodes in the two graphs is equal;
s4-2, constructing a matching cost matrix of the nodes, and constructing a weighted bipartite graph by taking the matching cost of the nodes as an edge weight;
s4-2-1, for any pair of vertices V and u, G (V) = (V) in the same cluster 1 ,E 1 ) And G (u) = (V) 2 ,E 2 ) Respectively their 1-neighbor graphs, for any node v i E G (v), calculating the matching cost of E G (v) and all nodes in G (u)
Figure SMS_113
S4-2-2, constructing the cost matrix
Figure SMS_114
S4-2-3, constructing a weighted bipartite graph
Figure SMS_115
V 1 、V 2 Respectively vertex sets and in bothThe number of nodes is equal, and is marked as x,>
Figure SMS_116
for edge set, add>
Figure SMS_117
Figure SMS_118
Is an edge weight matrix, w ij =c ij
S4-3, calculating the graph editing distance of the nodes by utilizing the bipartite graph, and obtaining the matched nodes and graph editing paths.
S4-3-1, selecting a node with the maximum degree as a matched seed node pair;
s4-3-2, utilizing a Monte Carlo method to obtain the optimal matching of the bipartite graph B;
s4-3-3, finding a graph editing path P= { v corresponding to the optimal matching 1 →u t1 ,v 2 →u t2 ,…,v x
u tx }, where u t1 、u t2 、u tm V respectively 1 、v 2 、v m Is a matching node of (c).
Step 5), editing the path P according to the diagram found in the step 4), and modifying the 1-neighbor diagram of the nodes in the cluster so that the nodes are isomorphic.
The method of the step 5) comprises the following steps:
s5-1, the adjacency matrix of the structural diagram G is denoted as A= (a) ij ) n×n Wherein when node v i And v j When there is an edge between a ij =1, otherwise, a ij =0;
S5-2, calculation A 2 A is a 3
Figure SMS_121
Is->
Figure SMS_122
If->
Figure SMS_124
Make->
Figure SMS_120
If->
Figure SMS_123
Make->
Figure SMS_125
Calculate->
Figure SMS_126
Figure SMS_119
S5-3, for each user node v in the social network, calculating the degree of modification required by the node v according to the matched node u calculated in the S4-3 and recording as
Figure SMS_127
Figure SMS_128
The degree of each user node in the social network to be modified is arranged according to descending order, and the obtained degree modification sequence is marked as +.>
Figure SMS_129
Wherein d v Representing the number of neighbors of the user node v;
s5-4 according to D M The graph structure is modified.
S5-4-1, if
Figure SMS_130
Representing user node v i Add->
Figure SMS_131
The edges are respectively found between two-hop neighbor nodes and three-hop neighbor nodes of the node, the nodes needing to be added with edges are connected, and if the number of the connected edges is less than +.>
Figure SMS_132
Then add the dummy node and associate with v i The edges are finally such that the total number of edges is equal to +.>
Figure SMS_133
S5-4-1-1 at node v i To search the nodes requiring the degree of increase, preset as i If (if)
Figure SMS_134
Then at v i And v j An edge is added between the two parts, and the part is added with->
Figure SMS_135
S5-4-1-2, if there is no two-hop node needing to be added, searching the node needing to be added in the three-hop node, and presetting as i If (if)
Figure SMS_136
Then at v i And v j An edge is added between the two parts, and the part is added with->
Figure SMS_137
S5-4-1-3, repeating the above steps until
Figure SMS_138
Or there is no two-hop and three-hop node requiring an increase in the degree;
s5-4-1-4, if
Figure SMS_139
Terminating;
s5-4-1-5, if
Figure SMS_140
If there are no two-hop and three-hop nodes requiring increasing degree, then the corresponding number of false nodes is increased and the false nodes are matched with v i Are connected.
S5-4-2, if
Figure SMS_141
Representing user node v i Deletion of strip->
Figure SMS_142
Edges, searching neighbors needing to delete the edges in the neighbors, deleting the edges connected between the neighbors, and when the number of the deleted edges is equal to +.>
Figure SMS_143
Stopping when deleting the edges, if the number of deleted edges is insufficient +.>
Figure SMS_144
Deleting the adjacent edges of the nodes from low to high according to the edge medium centrality until the total edge deletion number is equal to +.>
Figure SMS_145
S5-4-2-1 at node v i Sequentially searching nodes needing to be reduced in degree, adding the nodes into a candidate set CS, and arranging the nodes in descending order according to the degree of the user node;
s5-4-2-2, deleting nodes and v in CS in turn i A connecting edge between the two;
s5-4-2-3, if
Figure SMS_146
Terminating;
s5-4-2-4, if
Figure SMS_147
At v i Corresponding edges are deleted from small to large in turn according to the edge median centrality among the remaining adjacent edges of (1) until +.>
Figure SMS_148
The edge betweenness centrality is the ratio of the number of paths of the shortest paths among all users in the social network passing through the edge to the number of the short paths among all the nodes in the network.
The foregoing description is only of the preferred embodiments of the invention, and all changes and modifications that come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are therefore intended to be embraced therein.

Claims (9)

1. A user identity privacy protection method for resisting neighbor attack in a social network is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1) establishing a social network model, and representing the social network model as a graph G= (V, E), wherein V is a top point set of the graph and represents users in the social network; e is an edge set representing relationships between users in the social network;
according to a measure d (v), lc (v) divides the user nodes into T clusters, wherein d (v) represents the degree of the user nodes v and the meaning is the number of users connected with the user in the social network; lc (v) represents a local clustering coefficient of the user node v in the network, which means that the connection between neighbors of the node v is tight, and after the division is finished, the clusters are arranged in descending order according to the maximum node degree of each cluster;
step 2) presetting a user privacy requirement threshold k, if a certain cluster C i If the number of users in the cluster is less than the threshold k, calculating the average degree of the cluster and the adjacent front and rear clusters C i-1 ,C i+1 Combining the clusters into clusters with small differences, repeating the process until the number of users in all clusters is greater than k;
step 3), after the cluster merging is completed, carrying out cluster splitting operation on clusters with the number of user nodes being more than 2k so that the number of users in each cluster is a certain value of [ k,2 k); the method comprises the following steps:
s3-1, for user nodes in each cluster, sorting according to a degree descending order, and constructing a 1-neighbor graph of the user nodes;
s3-2, constructing a 1-neighbor structure feature matrix of the user node
Figure QLYQS_1
Wherein the method comprises the steps of
Figure QLYQS_2
Respectively representing the degree distribution, the internal degree distribution, the external degree distribution and the gap degree distribution of the node v of the user in the social network;
s3-3, according to the formula
Figure QLYQS_3
Calculating the structural similarity between any two nodes in the same cluster, wherein +.>
Figure QLYQS_4
Respectively representing the uncorrelated degree, k of the user node degree distribution, the internal degree distribution, the external degree distribution and the gap degree distribution 1 、k 2 、k 3 、k 4 Respectively represent the proportion of each similarity and satisfy k 1 +k 2 +k 3 +k 4 =1;
The S3-3 specifically comprises the following steps:
s3-3-1, for user nodes v and u in the same cluster, calculating the uncorrelated degree of the degree distribution, the internal degree distribution, the output degree distribution and the gap degree distribution by using JS divergences, wherein the uncorrelated degree is respectively recorded as:
Figure QLYQS_5
Figure QLYQS_6
the JS divergence is defined as:
Figure QLYQS_7
wherein p= { P 1 ,p 2 ,…,p t },Q={q 1 ,q 2 ,…,q t Respectively two probability distributions in the same probability space,
Figure QLYQS_8
s3-3-2, calculating similarity vectors of user nodes v and u
Figure QLYQS_9
Figure QLYQS_10
The similarity of user nodes u and v is +.>
Figure QLYQS_11
k 1 +k 2 +k 3 +k 4 =1;
S3-4, dividing the nodes into T clusters by using a K-means clustering algorithm;
step 4), calculating the similarity between each pair of user nodes according to the 1-neighbor graph of the user nodes in each cluster, constructing a weighted bipartite graph according to the similarity, calculating graph editing distances on the bipartite graph, and finding a target graph editing path P according to the similarity;
step 5), editing the path P according to the diagram found in the step 4), and modifying the 1-neighbor diagram of the nodes in the cluster so that the nodes are isomorphic.
2. The method for protecting privacy of user identity against neighbor attack according to claim 1, wherein: the 1 x-neighbor graph is a subgraph of the original graph G, defined as:
G(v)=(V(v),E(v),D(v))
where V (V) is a set comprising the user node V itself and its neighbors, E (V) is the relationship between the edges of the nodes in V (V), i.e. the neighbors, and D (V) is the set of the number of neighbors of the node V in the social network, i.e. the set of the degrees of all the nodes in V (V).
3. The method for protecting user identity privacy against neighbor attack according to claim 1, wherein the step 2) specifically comprises:
s2-1, for clusters with node number less than k, it is noted as
Figure QLYQS_12
Wherein the superscript 1 indicates that the cluster is the result obtained after the first division, and the average degree of the nodes in the cluster is marked as +.>
Figure QLYQS_13
Calculate->
Figure QLYQS_14
Two clusters adjacent to each other in front of and behind the same->
Figure QLYQS_15
Is of (2)Point average degree, respectively marked as +.>
Figure QLYQS_16
S2-2, if
Figure QLYQS_17
Satisfy the formula->
Figure QLYQS_18
Will->
Figure QLYQS_19
Added to
Figure QLYQS_20
In, otherwise will->
Figure QLYQS_21
Added to->
Figure QLYQS_22
In (a) and (b);
s2-3, repeatedly executing the steps until the number of nodes in all clusters exceeds k.
4. The method for protecting privacy of user identity against neighbor attack according to claim 1, wherein: the step 4) is specifically as follows:
s4-1, if the number of neighbor nodes in the l-neighbor graphs of the two user nodes is not equal, adding the user nodes in the graph with few user neighbor nodes so that the number of nodes in the two graphs is equal;
s4-2, constructing a matching cost matrix of the user nodes, and constructing a weighted bipartite graph by taking the matching cost of the user nodes as an edge weight;
s4-3, calculating graph editing distances among the user nodes by utilizing the bipartite graph to obtain matched nodes and graph editing paths.
5. The method for protecting privacy of user identity against neighbor attack according to claim 1, wherein: the step 5) specifically comprises the following steps:
s5-1, the adjacency matrix of the structural diagram G is denoted as A= (a) ij ) n×n Wherein when node v i And v j When an edge exists between the two adjacent layers,
a ij =1, otherwise, a ij =0;
S5-2, calculation A 2 A is a 3
Figure QLYQS_24
Is->
Figure QLYQS_27
If->
Figure QLYQS_30
Order of principle
Figure QLYQS_25
If->
Figure QLYQS_26
Make->
Figure QLYQS_28
Calculate->
Figure QLYQS_29
Figure QLYQS_23
S5-3, for each user node v in the social network, calculating the degree of modification required by the node v according to the matched node u calculated in the S4-3 and recording as
Figure QLYQS_31
The degree of each user node in the social network to be modified is arranged according to descending order, and the obtained degree modification sequence is marked as +.>
Figure QLYQS_32
Wherein d v Representing the number of neighbors of the user node v;
s5-4 according to D M The graph structure is modified.
6. The method for protecting privacy of user identity against neighbor attack according to claim 1, wherein: the S3-2 specifically comprises the following steps:
s3-2-1, calculating the degree distribution of neighbor nodes in the 1-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure QLYQS_33
Figure QLYQS_34
Is user node v i The degree of (v) represents v i Number of neighbors in original graph G, < >>
Figure QLYQS_35
N (v) is a set of all neighbors of the user node v;
s3-2-2, calculating the internal degree distribution of the neighbor nodes in the 1-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure QLYQS_36
Figure QLYQS_37
Is the user node's internal degree, representing user node v i The number of neighbors in the 1 x-neighbor graph G (v), the +.>
Figure QLYQS_38
Step 3-2-3, calculating the degree distribution of neighbor nodes in the 1 x-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure QLYQS_39
Figure QLYQS_40
Is v i Is indicative of the degree of egress of the user node v i In 1 x-oNumber of neighbors outside graph G (v), +.>
Figure QLYQS_41
Step 3-2-4, calculating the gap degree distribution of the neighbor nodes in the 1-neighbor graph G (v) of the user node v
Figure QLYQS_42
Wherein->
Figure QLYQS_43
Figure QLYQS_44
S3-2-5, marking the characteristic matrix of each user node in the social network as
Figure QLYQS_45
Figure QLYQS_46
N v Is the number of neighbors of user node v in the social network.
7. The method for protecting privacy of user identity against neighbor attack according to claim 4, wherein: the S4-2 specifically comprises the following steps:
s4-2-1, for any pair of vertices V and u, G (V) = (V) in the same cluster 1 ,E 1 ) And G (u) = (V) 2 ,E 2 ) Respectively their 1-neighbor graphs, for any node v i E G (v), calculating the matching cost of E G (v) and all nodes in G (u)
Figure QLYQS_47
S4-2-2, constructing the cost matrix
Figure QLYQS_48
S4-2-3, constructing a weighted bipartite graph
Figure QLYQS_49
V 1 、V 2 Vertex sets with equal number of nodes, denoted as x, < >>
Figure QLYQS_50
For edge set, add>
Figure QLYQS_51
W=(w ij ) m×m Is an edge weight matrix, w ij =c ij
8. The method for protecting privacy of user identity against neighbor attack according to claim 4, wherein: the S4-3 specifically comprises the following steps:
s4-3-1, selecting a node with the maximum degree as a matched seed node pair;
s4-3-2, utilizing a Monte Carlo method to obtain the optimal matching of the bipartite graph B;
s4-3-3, finding a graph editing path P= { v corresponding to the optimal matching 1 →u t1 ,v 2 →u t2 ,…,v x →u tx }, where u t1 、u t2 、u tx V respectively 1 、v 2 、v x Is a matching node of (c).
9. The method for protecting user identity privacy against neighbor attack according to claim 5, wherein: the S5-4 specifically comprises the following steps:
s5-4-1, if
Figure QLYQS_52
Representing user node v i Add->
Figure QLYQS_53
The edges are respectively found between two-hop neighbor nodes and three-hop neighbor nodes of the node, the nodes needing to be added with edges are connected, and if the number of the connected edges is less than +.>
Figure QLYQS_54
Then add the dummy node and associate with v i The edges are finally such that the total number of edges is equal to +.>
Figure QLYQS_55
The method comprises the following steps:
s5-4-1-1 at node v i Searching nodes needing increasing degree by two-hop nodes, and presetting as u i If (if)
Figure QLYQS_56
Then at v i And v j An edge is added between the two parts, and the part is added with->
Figure QLYQS_57
S5-4-1-2, if there is no two-hop node needing to be added, searching the node needing to be added in the three-hop node, and presetting as u i If (if)
Figure QLYQS_58
Then at v i And v j An edge is added between the two parts, and the part is added with->
Figure QLYQS_59
S5-4-1-3, repeating the above steps until
Figure QLYQS_60
Or there is no two-hop and three-hop node requiring an increase in the degree;
s5-4-1-4, if
Figure QLYQS_61
Terminating;
s5-4-1-5, if
Figure QLYQS_62
If there are no two-hop and three-hop nodes requiring increasing degree, then the corresponding number of false nodes is increased and the false nodes are matched with v i Are connected;
s5-4-2, if
Figure QLYQS_63
Representing user node v i Deletion->
Figure QLYQS_64
Strip edge, find the neighbors needing deleting edge too in its neighbors, delete the edge connecting between them, when delete edge number equal to +.>
Figure QLYQS_65
Stopping when deleting the edges, if the number of deleted edges is insufficient +.>
Figure QLYQS_66
Deleting the adjacent edges of the nodes from low to high according to the edge medium centrality until the total edge deletion number is equal to +.>
Figure QLYQS_67
The method comprises the following steps:
s5-4-2-1 at node v i Sequentially searching nodes needing to be reduced in degree, adding the nodes into a candidate set CS, and arranging the nodes in descending order according to the degree of the user node;
s5-4-2-2, deleting nodes and v in CS in turn i A connecting edge between the two;
s5-4-2-3, if
Figure QLYQS_68
Terminating;
s5-4-2-4, if
Figure QLYQS_69
At v i Corresponding edges are deleted from small to large in turn according to the edge median centrality among the remaining adjacent edges of (1) until +.>
Figure QLYQS_70
The edge betweenness centrality is the number of paths of the shortest path among all users in the social network passing through the edge and all nodes in the networkThe ratio of the number of short paths. />
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