CN115186250A - System logger authentication method and apparatus, computing device, and readable storage medium - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses a verification method and device of a system logger, computing equipment and a readable storage medium, relates to the technical field of secure logging of computing systems, and can solve the problem that a logging program is easy to intercept and tamper. The authentication method of the system logger comprises the following steps: measuring the currently started system logger to obtain the current measurement value of the system logger; judging whether a reference metric value can be taken out from a sealed object of the security chip; if so, judging whether the current metric value is consistent with the reference metric value; if the system loggers are consistent, allowing the currently started system logger to be started; and if the two are not consistent, the currently started system logger is rejected to start. According to the technical scheme of the invention, the method and the device can be used for verifying whether the started logger is maliciously or accidentally tampered.

Description

System logger authentication method and apparatus, computing device, and readable storage medium

Technical Field

The present invention relates to the technical field of secure login of a computing system, and in particular, to a method and an apparatus for verifying a system logger, a computing device, and a readable storage medium.

Background

In a computer system, a user interacts with an operating system through an untrusted intermediate application layer. When a user logs in, defines security attributes in an operating system or changes file security levels, and the like, the user must ensure that the user communicates with the security kernel rather than interacting with the trojan horse virus.

The current techniques to achieve this goal are: and constructing a trusted path to ensure that the communication between the user and the kernel is not stolen and changed, so that the Trojan horse virus is prevented from simulating a login process and stealing user password information, and the information output to the terminal is ensured to be correct and trusted when a privileged user performs privileged operation.

Taking Linux system as an example, in order to ensure that the user name and password information of the user is not stolen, the system provides a secure acknowledgement key SAK. The SAK is a key or set of keys that, when pressed, ensures that the user sees what is a true system logger, rather than a trojan horse virus forged log-in simulator. The system logger is an authentication interface for logging in a desktop operating system and needs to check an input user name and password value.

The secure confirm key SAK responds by the kernel, but cannot completely implement the trusted path. Although it kills the logging simulator of the monitoring terminal device in response, there is no way to prevent other logging simulators from starting the action of the monitoring terminal device to kill the logging simulator process and start itself after the SAK is pressed, so it cannot be guaranteed that the logging simulator started after the SAK is pressed is accurately identified and blocked.

Disclosure of Invention

To this end, the present invention provides a method and apparatus, a computing device and a readable storage medium for system logger authentication in an attempt to solve or at least alleviate at least one of the problems identified above.

According to a first aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for authenticating a system logger, comprising: measuring the currently started system logger to obtain the current measurement value of the system logger; judging whether a reference metric value can be taken out from a sealed object of the security chip; if so, judging whether the current metric value is consistent with the reference metric value; if the system loggers are consistent, allowing the currently started system logger to be started; and if the two are not consistent, the currently started system logger is rejected to start.

Optionally, in the method of the present invention, the reference metric value is a metric value obtained by performing a metric operation on a trusted system logger, and is stored in a sealed object in the secure chip.

Optionally, in the method of the present invention, the step of determining whether the reference metric value can be extracted from the sealed object of the security chip includes: acquiring a reference metric value in a sealed object based on an extended metric value in a platform configuration register in the security chip; the extension metric value is an extension value that extends the base metric value into available bits in a platform configuration register, and the extension metric value is bound with the sealed object; if the extension metric value in the platform configuration register is not changed, the reference metric value can be taken out from the sealed object of the security chip.

Optionally, in the method of the present invention, the extension metric value is bound in an extension attribute of the sealed object.

Optionally, in the method of the present invention, in response to a change in the executable program of the trusted system logger, receiving a result of the verification of the update package of the trusted system logger; updating the reference metric value if the update package is officially issued.

Optionally, in the method of the present invention, the step of taking out the reference metric value from the sealed object of the security chip further includes: if not, the system logger is judged to be illegally tampered.

Optionally, in the method of the present invention, the available bit in the platform configuration register is the tenth bit in the platform configuration register.

Optionally, in the method of the present invention, the step of performing a measurement operation on the currently started system logger further includes: and responding to the starting of the safety confirmation key, and carrying out measurement operation on the currently started system logger.

According to a second aspect of the present invention, there is provided an authentication apparatus of a system logger, comprising: the measurement module is used for carrying out measurement operation on the currently started system logger to obtain the current measurement value of the system logger; the first judging module is used for judging whether the reference metric value can be taken out from the sealed object of the security chip or not; the first judgment module is used for judging whether the current metric value is consistent with the reference metric value under the condition that the reference metric value can be taken out from a sealed object of the security chip; the starting module is used for allowing the currently started system logger to be started under the condition that the current metric value is consistent with the reference metric value; and if the two are not consistent, the currently started system logger is rejected to start.

According to a third aspect of the invention, there is provided a computing device comprising: at least one processor and a memory storing program instructions; which when read and executed by the processor, cause the computing device to perform the method as described above.

According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, there is provided a readable storage medium storing program instructions which, when read and executed by a computing device, cause the computing device to perform the method as described above.

According to the technical scheme of the invention, the logger responded by the constructed trusted path can be certified and verified.

Drawings

To the accomplishment of the foregoing and related ends, certain illustrative aspects are described herein in connection with the following description and the annexed drawings, which are indicative of various ways in which the principles disclosed herein may be practiced, and all aspects and equivalents thereof are intended to be within the scope of the claimed subject matter. The above and other objects, features and advantages of the present disclosure will become more apparent from the following detailed description read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Throughout this disclosure, like reference numerals generally refer to like parts or elements.

Fig. 1 shows an architecture diagram of a trusted login reference value creation method for a system logger according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 2 shows a flowchart of an exemplary process of a trusted login reference value creation method for a system logger in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 3 is an architecture diagram illustrating an authentication method of a system logger according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 4 shows a flowchart of an exemplary process of a method for authentication of a system logger in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 5 is an architecture diagram illustrating a system logger monitoring method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 6 sets forth a flow chart illustrating an exemplary process of a system logger monitoring method according to embodiments of the present invention.

Fig. 7 shows an architecture diagram of a system login update method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 8 sets forth a flow chart illustrating an exemplary process for a system login update method according to embodiments of the present invention.

Fig. 9 is a schematic block diagram showing an example structure of the trusted login reference value creation means for the system logger according to the embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 10 is a schematic block diagram showing an example structure of a system logger authentication apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 11 is a schematic block diagram showing an example structure of a system logger monitoring apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 12 is a schematic block diagram showing an example structure of a system logger updating apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 13 shows a schematic diagram of a computing device, according to an embodiment of the invention.

Detailed Description

Exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure will be described in more detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. While exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure are shown in the drawings, it should be understood that the present disclosure may be embodied in various forms and should not be limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope of the disclosure to those skilled in the art.

The technical scheme of the invention has the general idea that: confirming through a firmware SRTM (static root of trust measurement, namely, a trusted measurement when starting up), measuring a system logger program in an internal memory by using an IMA (integrity measurement architecture), expanding the measurement value of the system logger program to a PCR (which can be understood as writing an MD5 value into the PCR) of a security chip, and then checking whether the measurement value of a new measurement is consistent with the measurement value expanded previously by using an application process started by the IMA measurement after a security confirmation key is pressed down, so that the system logger is prevented from being tampered before responding and being constructed, and a trusted path combined with a hardware security chip is constructed. Where IMA is a function of the kernel, with the goal of detecting whether a file has been altered, either remotely or locally, accidentally or maliciously, evaluating the file's metrics against the "good" values stored as extended attributes, and enforcing local file integrity. The PCR is a platform configuration register and a register used for recording the running state of the system in the security chip.

A trusted login reference value creation method for a system logger according to an embodiment of the present invention is described below. The creation method, as well as the authentication method, monitoring method, update method, etc., described below, are all performed by an IMA call. Fig. 1 shows an architecture diagram of the method. As shown in fig. 1, a measurement operation is performed on a system logger that a user judges to be authentic, and the measurement value is extended to available bits in the PCR. The trusted system logger is, for example, a login interface when the windows system is started, is judged to be trusted by a user, and is used as a trusted basis for performing verification operation, monitoring operation and the like in the future. Optionally, the metric value may be extended to the tenth bit of the PCR (PCR 10), that is, the metric value is written into the PCR 10, and the tenth bit of the PCR is generally in a state of not being occupied by the process, and the extension to the tenth bit is safe and does not adversely affect the performance of the system and the running of the process. In addition to the tenth bit of the PCR, other bits that do not cause a negative impact on the computing system may be written to, and the invention is not limited thereto. The measurement operation is hash calculation, and the measurement value is the integrity change of the hash value. The method calls an automatic function in the security chip to execute the process of constructing the PCR authorization strategy in the available bits of the PCR, and the authorization strategy is used as an authentication mechanism of secret key confidentiality, so that the value written to the PCR of the register cannot be changed at will and can only be changed by a specific user. And creating a sealed object on the security chip, binding the sealed object with the metric value on the PCR available bit, namely binding the extended value into the extended attribute of the sealed object (namely a secret key), and sealing the metric value of the trusted system logger in the created object, namely protecting the metric value by using the sealed object. In addition, the metric value can be stored in a nonvolatile memory of the security chip in a persistent manner. Xxxxxxx in fig. 1 is the spreading value. Pcr is an authorization policy file.

Fig. 2 shows a schematic flow chart of an example of a trusted login reference value creation method according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in fig. 2, in this example, the method comprises steps S210-S250. The steps are described below.

In step S210, a measurement operation is performed on the trusted system logger to obtain a measurement value of the trusted system logger, which is judged as trusted by the user.

In step S220, the metric value of the system register is extended to the available bits of the platform configuration register to be used as a trusted register reference value, which may also be referred to as an extended metric value.

In step S230, an authorization policy of the platform configuration register is constructed in the platform configuration register.

In step S240, a sealed object is created on the secure chip and bound to the metric values in the available bits of the platform configuration register.

In step S250, the metric values of the trusted system logger are sealed within the sealed object as reference metric values.

In another example, the trusted login reference value creation method may further include the steps of: and storing the measurement value in a nonvolatile memory of the security chip. In this way, by storing the metric value into the nonvolatile memory, the information in the hardware cannot be unlocked without a key, so that the external random acquisition can be prevented, and the value in the nonvolatile memory cannot be cleared even if the value of the available bit of the PCR is cleared after the restart is started or the program exits, so that the safety of the method can be improved.

The above example of the creation method is performed in conjunction with hardware (i.e. a secure chip) through which a layer of protection against attacks is provided, whereby the security of the method as shown in fig. 1 and 2 can be increased.

In addition, in addition to extending and sealing the metric values to the secure chip, the metric values may also be written into extended attributes of the file. The file may be stored anywhere in the computing system and may be in any format. In this case, the use of a security chip is not required.

Next, an exemplary process of the authentication method of the system logger according to the embodiment of the present invention, which uses the reference value created by the trusted login reference value creation method as described above, is described with reference to fig. 3, so that it is possible to verify whether or not the application program started in response to the security confirmation key is illegally tampered.

As shown in fig. 3, pressing the security confirmation key (SAK key, for example, linux system) will kill all processes related to the current console. After triggering the safety confirmation key, some programs monitor the signal sent by the kernel and start immediately. It is necessary to determine whether the started program is a real logger or a log-in forged by trojan virus, thereby preventing a malicious log-in program from acquiring a user name and a password. In response to detecting that the security confirmation key is triggered, the IMA starts performing measurement operations on all application processes currently launched. The metric values sealed in the sealed object of the security chip are taken out by the PCR authorization policy (policy. Alternatively, if it cannot be fetched, it may prove that the value extended onto the available bits of the PCR has changed, which indicates that a trusted system logger has been illegally tampered with. This is because the extended metric value is correct, and the metric value in the sealed object can be obtained, so that the correct registration can be performed. If the extended metric changes, the metric in the sealed object cannot be retrieved. A recovery operation of the trusted logger program is required to start up normally. If the measurement value can be normally taken out, the taken out measurement value is compared with the measurement value of the currently started application process shown in the figure 3, if the measurement value is consistent, the starting is released and the measurement is finished, if the measurement value is inconsistent, the starting is refused, and the next measurement and comparison operation is continued.

Fig. 4 shows a schematic flow chart of an exemplary process of a method of authentication of a system logger in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 4, the exemplary process includes steps S410-S450, each of which is described below.

In step S410, a measurement operation is performed on the currently started system logger, and a current measurement value of the system logger is obtained.

This step may be performed, as an example, in response to the actuation of the security confirmation key, or may be performed periodically.

In step S420, it is determined whether or not the reference metric value can be taken out from the sealed object of the security chip. The reference measurement value is obtained by measuring the credible system logger and is stored in a sealed object in the security chip.

As an example, the step of determining whether the reference metric value can be taken out from the sealed object of the security chip may include: acquiring a reference metric value in a sealed object based on an extended metric value in a platform configuration register in a security chip; if the extension metric value in the platform configuration register is unchanged, it is determined that the reference metric value can be taken out of the sealed object of the security chip.

The extension metric value is an extension value for extending the reference metric value into an available bit in the platform configuration register, and the extension metric value is bound with the sealed object.

If it is determined in step S420 that the reference metric value can be taken out from the sealed object of the security chip, it is continuously determined in step S430 whether or not the current metric value matches the reference metric value.

As an example, if it is determined in step S420 that the metric value of its seal cannot be taken out from the sealed object of the secure chip, it may be determined that the authentic system logger has been tampered with illegally.

As shown in fig. 4, if it is determined in step S430 that the current metric value is consistent with the reference metric value, step S440 is performed to allow the currently activated system logger to be activated.

If the step S430 determines that the current metric value is not consistent with the reference metric value, step S450 is executed to reject the currently-started system logger to start.

As an example, when the metric value is expanded into the expanded attribute of the file, the metric value does not need to be obtained from the sealed object, and the metric value in the expanded attribute of the file is directly called out for comparison, wherein the comparison is consistent, that is, the comparison is passed, and the start is rejected if the comparison is inconsistent.

As an example, the exemplary process shown in fig. 4 may further include the steps of: receiving a signature verification result of an update package of the trusted system logger in response to a change in an executable program of the trusted system logger; and if the updating package is issued by the official, updating the reference metric value. This step enables the system logger to perform the verification operation based on the updated reference metric value.

Fig. 5 shows an architecture diagram of a system logger monitoring method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in fig. 5, the system is designed with a monitoring program running in the background, which may be in the form of a systemd daemon service, and is used to monitor the executable program change condition of the trusted system logger, and send the change condition to the IMA, wherein the change may be malicious tampering or normal updating operation. IMA re-measures the system logger and re-extends the values on the PCR available bits or file extension attributes.

Fig. 6 shows a schematic flow chart of an exemplary process of the system logger monitoring method described above. As shown in FIG. 6, the exemplary process includes steps S610-S630, which are described below.

In step S610, the executable program of the trusted system logger is monitored for changes.

In step S620, in response to the change, a clear operation is performed on the seal object and the available bits of the platform configuration register.

In step S630, a trusted login reference value creation process is performed as follows: measuring the changed system logger; expanding the changed metric value of the system logger into an available bit in a platform configuration register to be used as a trusted logging reference value; establishing an authorization strategy of the platform configuration register in the platform configuration register; creating a sealed object on the security chip, and binding the sealed object with the metric value in the available bit of the platform configuration register; the changed metric values of the system logger are sealed within the sealed object.

Further, fig. 7 shows an architecture diagram of a system logger update method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in fig. 7, the update package of the trusted system logger is packaged in DEB package format, which comes from a trusted source. Packets that exist within a trusted source are all signed and authenticated. The system defaults to having a built-in certificate, so when installing, it is first verified whether the package is official. And after verification is passed, respectively carrying out zero clearing and removal operations on the PCR register value and the sealed object which are created in the process of creating the reference value, re-measuring the measurement value of the updated system logger, and executing the process of creating the trusted logging reference value again.

FIG. 8 sets forth a flow chart illustrating an exemplary process for a system logger update method according to embodiments of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 8, the exemplary process includes steps S810-S830, which are described below.

In step S810, a verification result is received, the verification result indicating: update packages for trusted system loggers are issued by authorities.

In step S820, in response to receiving that the update package of the trusted system logger is the verification result issued by the authority, the available bits of the above-mentioned sealed object and platform configuration register are cleared.

In step S830, a trusted login reference value creation process is performed as follows: carrying out measurement operation on the updated system logger; expanding the updated metric value of the system logger into an available bit in a platform configuration register to be used as a trusted logging reference value; establishing an authorization strategy of the platform configuration register in the platform configuration register; creating a sealed object on the security chip, and binding the sealed object with a metric value in an available bit of a platform configuration register; and sealing the measurement value of the trusted system logger in a sealed object.

Through the trusted login reference value creating process, the fact that a reference value can be used for verifying that login information appearing on a screen is safe and trusted in the trusted path building response process next time can be guaranteed; the authentication method of the system logger can be used to ensure that the logger that constructs the trusted path response is provably authenticated; the monitoring process of the system logger can ensure that the system logger cannot pass verification after being accidentally tampered and the like; the system logger updating process ensures that the system logger installed in the system is officially security certified.

The "logger that responds by building a trusted path" refers to a logger that is started in response to the operation (or action) of "building a trusted path". Further, "the logger that the trusted path is built to respond to is provably verifiable" means that a logger launched in response to "building a trusted path" can be verified whether it has been tampered with maliciously or accidentally.

According to the embodiment of the invention, a device for creating the trusted login reference value is also provided. As shown in fig. 9, the apparatus includes a metrics module 910, an extension module 920, a construction module 930, a creation module 940, and a sealing module 950. The modules are described below.

The measurement module 910 is configured to perform a measurement operation on the trusted system logger to obtain a measurement value of the trusted system logger, where the trusted system logger is determined to be trusted by the user.

The extension module 920 is used to extend the metric value of the trusted system logger to the available bits of the platform configuration register for use as a trusted log reference value, also referred to as an extended metric value.

The building module 930 is configured to build an authorization policy of the platform configuration register in the platform configuration register.

The creation module 940 is configured to create a sealed object on the secure chip and bind the sealed object to the metric values in the available bits of the platform configuration register.

The sealing module 950 is used to seal the metric values of the trusted system logger in a sealed object as a baseline metric value.

The trusted login reference value creation means may further include: and the storage module is used for storing the metric value in a nonvolatile memory of the security chip. In this way, by storing the metric value into the nonvolatile memory, the information in the hardware cannot be unlocked without a secret key, so that the external random acquisition can be prevented, and the value in the nonvolatile memory cannot be cleared even if the value of the available bit of the PCR is cleared after the restart is started or the program exits, so that the safety of the method can be improved

In addition, in addition to extending and sealing the metric values to the secure chip, the extension module 920 may also write the metric values into extended attributes of the file. The file may be stored anywhere in the computing system and may be in any format. In this case, the use of the security chip is no longer required, and the building block 930, the creating block 940, and the sealing block 950 are also not required.

According to the embodiment of the invention, the system logger verification device is also provided. As shown in fig. 10, the apparatus includes a metric value obtaining module 1010, a first determining module 1020, a second determining module 1030, and a starting module 1040. The modules are described below.

The metric value obtaining module 1010 is configured to perform a metric operation on a currently started system logger, and obtain a current metric value of the system logger.

The first determining module 1020 is used to determine whether the reference metric value can be taken out from the sealed object of the security chip.

The second determination module 1030 is configured to determine whether the current metric value is consistent with the reference metric value when the reference metric value can be taken out of the sealed object of the security chip.

The starting module 1040 is configured to allow the currently started system logger to be started when the current metric value is consistent with the reference metric value, and reject the currently started system logger to be started if the current metric value is inconsistent with the reference metric value.

In addition, under the condition that the metric value is expanded into the expanded attribute of the file, the metric value does not need to be obtained from the sealed object, the second judging module 1030 directly calls the metric value in the expanded attribute of the file out to compare the metric value with the current metric value, if the comparison is consistent, the system logger is allowed to start, and if the comparison is inconsistent, the system logger is refused to start.

The apparatus of fig. 10 may further include: the updating module is used for responding to the change of the executable program of the credible system logger and receiving the signature verification result of the updating package of the credible system logger; the reference metric value is updated if the update package is officially issued. Therefore, the authentication operation of the system logger can be carried out according to the updated reference metric value.

According to the embodiment of the invention, the system logger monitoring device is also provided. As shown in FIG. 11, the apparatus includes a monitor module 1110, a zero module 1120, and a trusted log reference value creation module 1130. The modules are described below.

The monitoring module 1110 is used to monitor changes to the executable program of the trusted system logger.

The zeroing module 1120 is configured to perform a zeroing operation on available bits of the seal object and the platform configuration register in response to the change.

The trusted login reference value creation module 1130 includes: a measurement module 1130-1, configured to perform measurement operations on the changed system logger; an extension module 1130-2, configured to extend the changed metric value of the system logger into an available bit in the platform configuration register to be used as a trusted logging reference value; a building module 1130-3, configured to build an authorization policy of the platform configuration register in the platform configuration register; the creating module 1130-4 is configured to create a sealed object on the security chip and bind the sealed object to the metric value in the available bit of the platform configuration register; a sealing module 1130-5, configured to seal the changed metric value of the system logger in the sealed object.

According to the embodiment of the invention, the system logger updating device is also provided. As shown in fig. 12, the apparatus includes a zero module 1210 and a trusted log reference value creation module 1220. The modules are described below.

The clear module 1210 is configured to receive a verification result that the update package of the trusted system logger is issued by an authority, and perform clear operations on the available bits of the above-mentioned sealed object and the platform configuration register in response to the verification result.

The trusted login reference value creation module 1220 includes: the measurement module 1220-1 is used for performing measurement operation on the updated system logger; the extension module 1220-2 is configured to extend the updated metric value of the system logger into an available bit in the platform configuration register to be used as a trusted logging reference value; a building module 1220-3, configured to build an authorization policy of the platform configuration register in the platform configuration register; a creating module 1220-4, configured to create a sealed object on the security chip, and bind the sealed object with the metric value in the available bit of the platform configuration register; a sealing module 1220-5, configured to seal the metric value of the trusted system logger in the sealed object.

The method of the present invention may be performed in a computing device. The computing device may be any device with storage and computing capabilities, and may be implemented, for example, as a server, a workstation, or the like, as a personal computer such as a desktop computer or a notebook computer, or as a terminal device such as a mobile phone, a tablet computer, a smart wearable device, or an internet of things device, but is not limited thereto.

FIG. 13 shows a schematic diagram of a computing device, according to an embodiment of the invention. It should be noted that the computing device shown in fig. 13 is only an example, and in practice, the computing device for implementing the method of the present invention may be any type of device, and the hardware configuration thereof may be the same as that of the computing device shown in fig. 13 or different from that of the computing device shown in fig. 13. Hardware components of a computing device for practicing the methods of the present invention may be added or deleted from those shown in FIG. 13. The present invention is not limited to the specific hardware configuration of the computing device.

As shown in fig. 13, the apparatus may include: a processor 1310, a memory 1320, an input/output interface 1330, a communication interface 1340, and a bus 1350. Wherein the processor 1310, memory 1320, input/output interface 1330 and communication interface 1340 enable communication connections within the device to each other via bus 1350.

The processor 1310 may be implemented by a general purpose CPU (Central Processing Unit), a microprocessor, an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), or one or more Integrated circuits, and is configured to execute related programs to implement the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of the present disclosure.

The Memory 1320 may be implemented in the form of a ROM (Read Only Memory), a RAM (Random Access Memory), a static Memory device, a dynamic Memory device, or the like. The memory 1320 may store an operating system and other application programs, and when the technical solution provided by the embodiments of the present specification is implemented by software or firmware, the relevant program codes are stored in the memory 1320 and called by the processor 1310 to be executed.

The input/output interface 1330 is used to connect to an input/output module for inputting and outputting information. The i/o module may be configured as a component in a device (not shown) or may be external to the device to provide a corresponding function. The input devices may include a keyboard, a mouse, a touch screen, a microphone, various sensors, etc., and the output devices may include a display, a speaker, a vibrator, an indicator light, etc.

The communication interface 1340 is used for connecting a communication module (not shown in the figure) to implement communication interaction between the present apparatus and other apparatuses. The communication module can realize communication in a wired mode (such as USB, network cable and the like) and also can realize communication in a wireless mode (such as mobile network, WIFI, bluetooth and the like).

Bus 1350 includes a path to transfer information between various components of the device, such as processor 1310, memory 1320, input/output interface 1330, and communication interface 1340.

It should be noted that although the above-described device only shows the processor 1310, the memory 1320, the input/output interface 1330, the communication interface 1340, and the bus 1350, in a specific implementation, the device may also include other components necessary for normal operation. In addition, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the above-described apparatus may also include only those components necessary to implement the embodiments of the present description, and not necessarily all of the components shown in the figures.

Embodiments of the present invention also provide a non-transitory readable storage medium storing instructions for causing the computing device to perform a method according to embodiments of the present invention. The readable media of the present embodiments include permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media, and the storage of information may be accomplished by any method or technology. The information may be computer readable instructions, data structures, modules of a program, or other data. Examples of readable storage media include, but are not limited to: phase change memory (PRAM), static Random Access Memory (SRAM), dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), other types of Random Access Memory (RAM), read Only Memory (ROM), electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, compact disc read only memory (CD-ROM), digital Versatile Discs (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic tape cassettes, magnetic tape disk storage, and the like.

In the description provided herein, algorithms and displays are not inherently related to any particular computer, virtual system, or other apparatus. Various general purpose systems may also be used with examples of this invention. The required structure for constructing such a system will be apparent from the description above. Moreover, the present invention is not directed to any particular programming language. It is appreciated that a variety of programming languages may be used to implement the teachings of the present invention as described herein, and any descriptions of specific languages are provided above to disclose preferred embodiments of the invention.

In the description provided herein, numerous specific details are set forth. It is understood, however, that embodiments of the invention may be practiced without these specific details. In some instances, well-known methods, structures and techniques have not been shown in detail in order not to obscure an understanding of this description.

Similarly, it should be appreciated that in the foregoing description of exemplary embodiments of the invention, various features of the invention are sometimes grouped together in a single embodiment, figure, or description thereof for the purpose of streamlining the disclosure and aiding in the understanding of one or more of the various inventive aspects. However, the disclosed method should not be construed to reflect the intent: rather, the invention as claimed requires more features than are expressly recited in each claim. It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the modules or units or components of the apparatus in the examples disclosed herein may be arranged in an apparatus as described in this embodiment or alternatively may be located in one or more different apparatus than that in the examples. The modules in the foregoing examples may be combined into one module or may be further divided into multiple sub-modules.

Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the modules in the device of an embodiment may be adaptively changed and arranged in one or more devices different from the embodiment. The modules or units or components in the embodiments may be combined into one module or unit or component, and furthermore, they may be divided into a plurality of sub-modules or sub-units or sub-components. All of the features disclosed in this specification (including any accompanying claims, abstract and drawings), and all of the processes or elements of any method or apparatus so disclosed, may be combined in any combination, except combinations where at least some of such features and/or processes or elements are mutually exclusive. Each feature disclosed in this specification (including any accompanying claims, abstract and drawings) may be replaced by alternative features serving the same, equivalent or similar purpose, unless expressly stated otherwise.

Furthermore, those skilled in the art will appreciate that although some embodiments described herein include some features included in other embodiments, not others, combinations of features of different embodiments are meant to be within the scope of the invention and form different embodiments. Furthermore, some of the embodiments are described herein as a method or combination of method elements that can be implemented by a processor of a computer system or by other means of performing the described functions. A processor having the necessary instructions for carrying out the method or method elements thus forms a means for carrying out the method or method elements.

As used herein, unless otherwise specified the use of the ordinal adjectives "first", "second", "third", etc., to describe a common object, merely indicate that different instances of like objects are being referred to, and are not intended to imply that the objects so described must be in a given sequence, either temporally, spatially, in ranking, or in any other manner.

While the invention has been described with respect to a limited number of embodiments, those skilled in the art, having benefit of this description, will appreciate that other embodiments can be devised which do not depart from the scope of the invention as disclosed herein. Moreover, it should be noted that the language used in the specification has been principally selected for readability and instructional purposes, and may not have been selected to delineate or circumscribe the inventive subject matter.

Claims (11)

1. A method for authenticating a system logger, comprising:

measuring a currently started system logger to obtain a current measurement value of the system logger;

judging whether a reference metric value can be taken out from a sealed object of the security chip;

if so, judging whether the current metric value is consistent with the reference metric value;

if the system loggers are consistent, allowing the currently started system logger to be started;

and if the two are not consistent, the currently started system logger is rejected to start.

2. The authentication method of a system logger of claim 1, wherein the reference metric value is a metric value obtained by performing a metric operation on a trusted system logger and is stored in a sealed object in the secure chip.

3. The authentication method of a system logger of claim 2, wherein the step of judging whether or not the reference metric value can be taken out from the sealed object of the security chip comprises:

acquiring a reference metric value in a sealed object based on an extended metric value in a platform configuration register in the security chip; the extension metric value is an extension value that extends the base metric value into available bits in a platform configuration register, and the extension metric value is bound with the sealed object;

if the extension metric value in the platform configuration register is not changed, the reference metric value can be taken out from the sealed object of the security chip.

4. A method of authentication of a system logger as claimed in claim 3, wherein the extension metric value is bound in an extension attribute of the sealed object.

5. The authentication method of a system logger of claim 2, wherein a result of a checkup of an update package of a trusted system logger is received in response to a change in an executable program of the trusted system logger;

updating the reference metric value if the update package is officially issued.

6. The authentication method of a system logger of claim 1, wherein the step of taking out the reference metric value from the sealed object of the security chip further comprises:

if not, judging that the system logger is illegally tampered.

7. The authentication method of a system logger of claim 3 or 4, wherein the available bit in the platform configuration register is the tenth bit in the platform configuration register.

8. The method for authenticating a system logger of claim 1 wherein the step of performing a metrology operation on the currently active system logger further comprises:

and responding to the starting of the safety confirmation key, and carrying out measurement operation on the currently started system logger.

9. An authentication apparatus of a system logger, comprising:

the measurement value acquisition module is used for carrying out measurement operation on the currently started system logger to acquire the current measurement value of the system logger;

the first judging module is used for judging whether the reference metric value can be taken out from the sealed object of the security chip or not;

the first judging module is used for judging whether the current metric value is consistent with the reference metric value under the condition that the reference metric value can be taken out from a sealed object of the security chip;

the starting module is used for allowing the currently started system logger to be started under the condition that the current metric value is consistent with the reference metric value;

and if the two are not consistent, the currently started system logger is rejected to start.

10. A computing device, comprising:

at least one processor and a memory storing program instructions;

the program instructions, when read and executed by the processor, cause the computing device to perform the method of any of claims 1-8.

11. A readable storage medium storing program instructions that, when read and executed by a computing device, cause the computing device to perform the method of any of claims 1-8.

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