CN115174220A - Physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping, which comprises the following steps: in the communication process, channel estimation is periodically carried out on user equipment corresponding to the same ID to obtain channel response; taking the channel response corresponding to the current period as a real-time channel response, taking the channel response corresponding to the previous period as a reference channel response, and taking the channel response corresponding to the previous period as a channel response corresponding to the real user equipment; and on the basis of the reference channel response, authenticating the real-time channel response through a dynamic time warping algorithm to obtain an authentication result, wherein the authentication result comprises that the equipment corresponding to the real-time channel response is fake user equipment or real user equipment. The invention can authenticate the user in the physical layer, thereby avoiding the invasion of illegal users and improving the safety of communication.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of wireless communication and equipment authentication, in particular to a physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping.
Background
With the continuous development of wireless communication technology, more and more confidential data and sensitive data are transmitted through a wireless channel, which makes the wireless communication security issue receive more attention. Conventional wireless authentication systems rely on key hierarchy, and as the number of mobile communication devices has increased dramatically, the complexity of key distribution and management has become extremely high. In the future, a large number of distributed systems will appear in mobile communication, most of which have low cost and simple devices, and in such distributed systems, not only the distribution and management of the key are difficult to realize, but also the traditional encryption and decryption program is difficult to complete, so that the key is easy to intercept in the transmission process. With the enhancement of computer computing power, the possibility of cracking the key by an illegal user is higher and higher.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the technical problem of difficult equipment authentication, and provides a physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping, which solves the problem that the prior art carries out authentication through a secret key, is easy to crack and causes illegal user intrusion.
The invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
a physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping comprises the following steps:
in the communication process, channel estimation is periodically carried out on user equipment corresponding to the same ID to obtain channel response;
taking a channel response corresponding to a current period as a real-time channel response, and taking a channel response corresponding to a previous period as a reference channel response, wherein the channel response corresponding to the previous period is a channel response corresponding to real user equipment;
and authenticating the real-time channel response by a dynamic time warping algorithm on the basis of the reference channel response to obtain an authentication result, wherein the authentication result comprises that the equipment corresponding to the real-time channel response is fake user equipment or real user equipment.
Further, the reference channel response is:
h 1 ＝(h 1,1 ,h 1,2 ,...,h 1,m ...,h 1,M )
wherein h is 1 Represents the reference channel response, h 1,m Represents the reference response of the mth reference channel filter tap or channel of the user equipment at the mth frequency point, and h 1,m Each of the frequency bins is a complex number corresponding to a fixed frequency, M =1,2, \8230, where M, M represents the total number of reference channel filter taps or the total number of frequency bins.
Further, the real-time channel response is:
h 2 ＝(h 2,1 ,h 2,2 ,...,h 2,m ...,h 2,M )
wherein h is 2 Representing the real-time channel response, h 2,m Representing the real-time response of the m-th real-time channel filter tap or channel of the user equipment at the m-th frequency point, and h 2,m Is a plurality of numbers.
Further, based on the reference channel response, the real-time channel response is authenticated through a dynamic time warping algorithm to obtain an authentication result, including:
and acquiring the distance between the reference channel response and the real-time channel response through a dynamic time warping algorithm, taking the distance as the uncorrelation degree between the reference channel response and the real-time channel response, and acquiring an authentication result according to the uncorrelation degree.
Further, obtaining an authentication result according to the degree of irrelevance, including:
obtaining an irrelevance threshold, wherein the irrelevance threshold is pre-stored data;
judging whether the uncorrelation degree is smaller than or equal to an uncorrelation degree threshold value, if so, judging that the equipment corresponding to the real-time channel response is real user equipment, and obtaining an authentication result; otherwise, the equipment corresponding to the real-time channel response is judged to be fake user equipment, and an authentication result is obtained.
Further, the distance D (M, M) between the reference channel response and the real-time channel response obtained by the dynamic time warping algorithm is:
D(1,1)＝δ(h 1,1 ,h 2,1 )
D(1,q)＝δ(h 1,1 ,h 2,q )+D(1,q-1)
D(p,1)＝δ(h 1,p ,h 2,1 )+D(p-1,1)
D(p,q)＝δ(h 1,p ,h 2,q )+min(D(p-1,q),D(p,q-1),D(p-1,q-1))
wherein 1 is<p≤M，1<q is less than or equal to M; when p = q = M, D (p, q) represents a distance D (M, M) between a reference channel response and the real-time channel response; h is a total of 1,p Representing the reference response of the p-th reference channel filter tap or channel of the user equipment at the p-th frequency point, h 2,q Representing the real-time response of the qth real-time channel filter tap or channel of the user equipment at the qth frequency bin, δ () representing the euclidean distance finding function, min () representing the return minimum function, D (p-1, q) representing the first intermediate argument, D (p, q-1) representing the second intermediate argument, D (p-1, q-1) representing the third intermediate argument, D (p, 1) representing the fourth intermediate argument, D (p-1, 1) representing the fifth intermediate argument, D (1, q) representing the sixth intermediate argument, D (1, q-1) representing the seventh intermediate argument, D (1, 1) representing the eighth intermediate argument.
Further, the euclidean distance solving function is:
where δ (a, b) represents an euclidean distance solving function, a represents a first complex number, b represents a second complex number, a = x a +y a i，b＝x b +y b i，x a Representing the real part, x, of the first complex number b Representing the real part, y, of the second complex number a Representing the imaginary part, y, of the first complex number b Representing the imaginary part of the second complex number and i representing the imaginary unit.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects:
(1) The invention provides a physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping, which can authenticate users on a physical layer, avoid the invasion of illegal users and improve the security of communication.
(2) The method is not limited by the channel change model, and has wider application range compared with a physical layer security authentication method for strongly assuming the channel change model.
(3) The invention authenticates the user based on the channel response, and compared with the received signal strength, the channel response contains more information and can reflect more comprehensive channel state information.
(4) The complexity of the method is far lower than that of a machine learning algorithm, and compared with a physical layer security authentication method based on machine learning, the execution efficiency is higher.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the exemplary embodiments of the present invention, the drawings that are required to be used in the embodiments will be briefly described below, it should be understood that the following drawings only illustrate some embodiments of the present invention and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope, and that for those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained from these drawings without inventive effort. In the drawings:
fig. 1 is a flowchart of a physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to examples and accompanying drawings, and the exemplary embodiments and descriptions thereof are only used for explaining the present invention and are not meant to limit the present invention.
Examples
As shown in fig. 1, the present embodiment provides a physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping, including:
s11, in the communication process, channel estimation is periodically carried out on the user equipment corresponding to the same ID (Identity document) to obtain channel response.
The channel response represents the channel impulse response or the channel frequency response between the communication device and the communication object, and the communication process itself may already include the channel estimation process in order to improve the communication quality, so the channel response utilized by the invention is easily obtained in the communication device.
And S12, taking the channel response corresponding to the current period as a real-time channel response, and taking the channel response corresponding to the previous period as a reference channel response, wherein the channel response corresponding to the previous period is the channel response corresponding to the real user equipment.
When the user equipment is communicated with the user equipment for the first time, channel estimation is firstly carried out on the user equipment, the obtained channel response is used as a reference channel response, and in the subsequent communication process, the user equipment is authenticated on the basis of the reference channel response so as to distinguish real user equipment from fake user equipment.
After each authentication, if the user corresponding to the ID is determined as a real user device, the reference channel response may be updated to a real-time channel response corresponding to the current period, and the next authentication is prepared.
Since an unauthorized device (fake user device) can perform a spoofing attack by modifying a digital certificate such as an ID, and pretend to be a certain user device, a communication object should be securely authenticated against the spoofing attack in a communication process. Since the channel responses corresponding to different devices are irrelevant, the fake user equipment cannot predict and imitate the channel information between the real user equipment and the server, and therefore the communication object can be authenticated according to the channel response between the communication object and the device.
It is worth noting that the user equipment corresponding to the channel response corresponding to the "previous cycle" should be true. If the device corresponding to the real-time channel response of the current period is determined as a fake user device, the channel response corresponding to the fake user device is not reserved, that is, only the channel response corresponding to the real user device is reserved, and the stored channel response of the previous period is ensured to be from the real user device. For example: three periods a, B and C are sequentially arranged, wherein the channel response in the first period a is the channel response of the real user equipment, and then the channel response corresponding to the first period a is taken as the reference channel response. And after the channel response corresponding to the second period B is authenticated through the reference channel response, determining that the channel response corresponding to the second period B is the channel response of the fake user equipment, and then discarding the channel response. When the channel response corresponding to the third period C is authenticated, the "channel response corresponding to the previous period" substantially means the "channel response corresponding to the first period a" at this time.
And S13, authenticating the real-time channel response through a dynamic time warping algorithm on the basis of the reference channel response to obtain an authentication result, wherein the authentication result comprises that the equipment corresponding to the real-time channel response is fake user equipment or real user equipment.
In this embodiment, the real-time channel response may be authenticated by: and acquiring the distance between the reference channel response and the real-time channel response through a dynamic time warping algorithm, and if the distance is smaller than a certain threshold value, determining that the equipment corresponding to the real-time channel response is real user equipment.
For example, assuming that there is a legitimate user device, alice, and a physical layer security authentication apparatus is recorded as Bob, the user device, alice, is served by Bob, and there may be N other devices, such as Eve 1, eve 2, \8230;, eve N, which may impersonate the user device, alice. When the communication is carried out with the user equipment Alice for the first time, the channel response of the user equipment Alice can be obtained, the channel response is an initial reference channel response, a new channel response can be obtained in the next time slot of the communication with the communication object with the ID of Alice, the channel response is a real-time channel response, the current communication object can be authenticated on the basis of the real-time channel response and the reference channel response, and whether the communication object is the Alice or not is judged. If not, the authentication is not passed, and the service is refused. If so, the authentication is passed, the current communication object is still considered as Alice, in the next time slot, the channel response obtained in the last time slot is the reference channel response, the newly obtained channel response is the real-time channel response, and the authentication process is repeated. Through the authentication process, the device can resist the spoofing attack performed by Eve 1, eve 2, \8230;, eve N and other devices.
In one possible implementation, the reference channel response is:
h 1 ＝(h 1,1 ,h 1,2 ,...,h 1,m ...,h 1,M )
wherein h is 1 Represents the reference channel response, h 1,m Represents the reference response of the mth reference channel filter tap or channel of the user equipment at the mth frequency point, and h 1,m A plurality, each bin corresponding to a fixed frequency, M =1,2, \ 8230;, M, M representing the total number of reference channel filter taps or the total number of bins.
In one possible implementation, the real-time channel response is:
h 2 ＝(h 2,1 ,h 2,2 ,...,h 2,m ...,h 2,M )
wherein h is 2 Representing the real-time channel response, h 2,m Representing the real-time response of the m-th real-time channel filter tap or channel of the user equipment at the m-th frequency point, and h 2,m Is a plurality of numbers.
In a possible implementation manner, the authenticating the real-time channel response by the dynamic time warping algorithm based on the reference channel response to obtain the authentication result includes:
and acquiring the distance between the reference channel response and the real-time channel response through a dynamic time warping algorithm, taking the distance as the uncorrelation degree between the reference channel response and the real-time channel response, and acquiring an authentication result according to the uncorrelation degree.
The smaller the distance (the irrelevance) between the reference channel response and the real-time channel response is, the higher the possibility that the device corresponding to the real-time channel response is proved to be the real user equipment is, and therefore, an irrelevance threshold can be set for authentication.
In a possible implementation, obtaining the authentication result according to the irrelevance includes:
and acquiring an irrelevance threshold, wherein the relevancy threshold is pre-stored data.
Judging whether the uncorrelation degree is less than or equal to an uncorrelation degree threshold value or not, if so, judging that the equipment corresponding to the real-time channel response is real user equipment, and obtaining an authentication result; otherwise, the equipment corresponding to the real-time channel response is judged to be fake user equipment, and an authentication result is obtained.
In this embodiment, a method for searching for an optimal threshold of irrelevance is provided, where the method includes: the upper bound and the lower bound of the optimal irrelevance threshold are set firstly, and then the area where the optimal irrelevance threshold is located is gradually reduced by binary search. There are generally three indicators for selecting the optimal threshold of the degree of irrelevance: the first is authentication accuracy, and the higher the accuracy is, the better the threshold of the degree of irrelevance is; the second is the missing detection probability under the condition of meeting the requirement of the specific false alarm probability, and the lower the missing detection probability is, the better the threshold value of the degree of irrelevance is; the third is the false alarm probability when a certain false drop probability is met, and the lower the false alarm probability, the better the threshold of the degree of irrelevance.
One or more indexes can be selected from the three indexes to select the optimal irrelevance threshold, for example, the accuracy can be used as the selection index, and the irrelevance threshold with the highest accuracy can be selected from the upper and lower bounds as the optimal irrelevance threshold. Or, the accuracy and the missed detection probability are selected as indexes, the weight of the accuracy and the missed detection probability is 0.5, the comprehensive score can be the accuracy rate 0.5+ (1-missed detection probability) 0.5, and the maximum relevance threshold of the comprehensive score is used as the optimal relevance threshold.
In one possible implementation, the distance D (M, M) between the reference channel response and the real-time channel response obtained by the dynamic time warping algorithm is:
D(1,1)＝δ(h 1,1 ,h 2,1 )
D(1,q)＝δ(h 1,1 ,h 2,q )+D(1,q-1)
D(p,1)＝δ(h 1,p ,h 2,1 )+D(p-1,1)
D(p,q)＝δ(h 1,p ,h 2,q )+min(D(p-1,q),D(p,q-1),D(p-1,q-1))
wherein 1 is<p≤M，1<q is less than or equal to M; when p = q = M, D (p, q) represents a distance D (M, M) between a reference channel response and the real-time channel response; h is a total of 1,p Representing the reference response of the p reference channel filter tap or channel of the user equipment at the p frequency point, h 2,q Q real time channel filter taps representing user equipmentOr real-time response of the channel at the q-th frequency point, delta () represents a Euclidean distance solving function, min () represents a return minimum function, D (p-1, q) represents a first intermediate parameter, D (p, q-1) represents a second intermediate parameter, D (p-1, q-1) represents a third intermediate parameter, D (p, 1) represents a fourth intermediate parameter, D (p-1, 1) represents a fifth intermediate parameter, D (1, q) represents a sixth intermediate parameter, D (1, q-1) represents a seventh intermediate parameter, and D (1, 1) represents an eighth intermediate parameter.
According to the above formula, the values of the subsequent intermediate parameters can be obtained in sequence starting from D (1, 1), so as to obtain the values of the respective intermediate parameters. For example, when q =2, then D (1, 1) = δ (h) 1,1 ,h 2 ,) 1 And D (1, q) = δ (h) 1,1 ,h 2,q ) + D (1, q-1) gives the value of D (1, 2); when q =3, then δ (h) can be defined according to D (1, 2) and D (1, q) = δ 1,1 ,h 2,q ) + D (1, q-1) yields the value of D (1, 3), and so on, and will not be described here.
In one possible embodiment, the euclidean distance solving function is:
where δ (a, b) represents an euclidean distance solving function, a represents a first complex number, b represents a second complex number, a = x a +y a i，b＝x b +y b i，x a Representing the real part of the first complex number, x b Representing the real part of the second complex number, y a Representing the imaginary part, y, of the first complex number b Representing the imaginary part of the second complex number and i representing the imaginary unit.
The physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping provided by the embodiment can authenticate users on the physical layer, avoid the invasion of illegal users and improve the security of communication. The method is not limited by the channel change model, and has wider application range compared with a physical layer security authentication method for strongly assuming the channel change model.
The invention authenticates the user based on the channel response, and compared with the received signal strength, the channel response contains more information and can reflect more comprehensive channel state information. The complexity of the method is far lower than that of a machine learning algorithm, and compared with a physical layer security authentication method based on machine learning, the execution efficiency is higher.
The above embodiments, objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention are further described in detail, it should be understood that the above embodiments are only examples of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements and the like made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. A physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping is characterized by comprising the following steps:
in the communication process, channel estimation is periodically carried out on user equipment corresponding to the same ID to obtain channel response;
taking a channel response corresponding to a current period as a real-time channel response, and taking a channel response corresponding to a previous period as a reference channel response, wherein the channel response corresponding to the previous period is a channel response corresponding to real user equipment;
and on the basis of the reference channel response, authenticating the real-time channel response through a dynamic time warping algorithm to obtain an authentication result, wherein the authentication result comprises that the equipment corresponding to the real-time channel response is fake user equipment or real user equipment.
2. The physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping as claimed in claim 1, wherein the reference channel response is:
h 1 ＝(h 1,1 ,h 1,2 ,...,h 1,m ...,h 1,M )
wherein h is 1 Represents the reference channel response, h 1,m Represents the reference response of the mth reference channel filter tap or channel of the user equipment at the mth frequency point, and h 1,m Is complex number, each of said frequency point pairsM =1,2, \ 8230, which indicates the total number of reference channel filter taps or the total number of frequency bins, should be a fixed frequency.
3. The physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping as claimed in claim 2, wherein the real-time channel response is:
h 2 ＝(h 2,1 ,h 2,2 ,...,h 2,m ...,h 2,M )
wherein h is 2 Representing the real-time channel response, h 2,m Represents the real-time response of the m-th real-time channel filter tap or channel of the user equipment at the m-th frequency point, and h 2,m Is a plurality of numbers.
4. The physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping as claimed in claim 3, wherein the authentication of the real-time channel response by the dynamic time warping algorithm based on the reference channel response to obtain the authentication result comprises:
and acquiring the distance between the reference channel response and the real-time channel response through a dynamic time warping algorithm, taking the distance as the uncorrelation degree between the reference channel response and the real-time channel response, and acquiring an authentication result according to the uncorrelation degree.
5. The physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping as claimed in claim 4, wherein obtaining the authentication result according to the degree of irrelevance comprises:
obtaining an irrelevance threshold, wherein the irrelevance threshold is pre-stored data;
judging whether the uncorrelation degree is smaller than or equal to an uncorrelation degree threshold value or not, if so, judging that the equipment corresponding to the real-time channel response is real user equipment, and obtaining an authentication result; otherwise, the equipment corresponding to the real-time channel response is judged to be fake user equipment, and an authentication result is obtained.
6. The physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping as claimed in claim 5, wherein the distance D (M, M) between the reference channel response and the real-time channel response obtained by the dynamic time warping algorithm is:
D(1,1)＝δ(h 1,1 ,h 2,1 )
D(1,q)＝δ(h 1,1 ,h 2,q )+D(1,q-1)
D(p,1)＝δ(h 1,p ,h 2,1 )+D(p-1,1)
D(p,q)＝δ(h 1,p ,h 2,q )+min(D(p-1,q),D(p,q-1),D(p-1,q-1))
wherein 1 is<p≤M，1<q is less than or equal to M; when p = q = M, D (p, q) represents a distance D (M, M) between a reference channel response and the real-time channel response; h is 1,p Representing the reference response of the p-th reference channel filter tap or channel of the user equipment at the p-th frequency point, h 2,q Representing the real-time response of the qth real-time channel filter tap or channel of the user equipment at the qth frequency bin, δ () representing the euclidean distance finding function, min () representing the return minimum function, D (p-1, q) representing the first intermediate argument, D (p, q-1) representing the second intermediate argument, D (p-1, q-1) representing the third intermediate argument, D (p, 1) representing the fourth intermediate argument, D (p-1, 1) representing the fifth intermediate argument, D (1, q) representing the sixth intermediate argument, D (1, q-1) representing the seventh intermediate argument, D (1, 1) representing the eighth intermediate argument.
7. The physical layer security authentication method based on dynamic time warping as claimed in claim 6, wherein said Euclidean distance solving function is:
where δ (a, b) represents an euclidean distance solving function, a represents a first complex number, b represents a second complex number, a = x a +y a i，b＝x b +y b i，x a Representing the real part of the first complex number, x b Representing the real part, y, of the second complex number a Representing the imaginary part, y, of the first complex number b Representing the imaginary part of the second complex numberAnd i represents an imaginary unit.
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