CN115134123A - Civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session method and device - Google Patents

Civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session method and device Download PDF

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CN115134123A
CN115134123A CN202210617103.7A CN202210617103A CN115134123A CN 115134123 A CN115134123 A CN 115134123A CN 202210617103 A CN202210617103 A CN 202210617103A CN 115134123 A CN115134123 A CN 115134123A
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message
ground station
anonymous
identity
initial vector
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CN115134123B (en
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张骞允
李昕炜
尚涛
蔡开泉
田格格
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Beihang University
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Beihang University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
    • H04B7/14—Relay systems
    • H04B7/15—Active relay systems
    • H04B7/185—Space-based or airborne stations; Stations for satellite systems
    • H04B7/18502—Airborne stations
    • H04B7/18506—Communications with or from aircraft, i.e. aeronautical mobile service
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H04L63/0421—Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

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  • Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
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  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The application discloses a civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session method and a device, wherein the method comprises the following steps: receiving a ground station identity message broadcasted by a ground station; transmitting a first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity message, wherein the first message comprises a first initial vector; receiving a second message sent by the ground station; verifying the second message, and generating an anonymous identity library according to the first initial vector under the condition that the second message passes the verification, wherein the anonymous identity library comprises N first anonymous identities, and N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1; and carrying out conversation with the ground station based on the anonymous identity library. The method and the device can effectively guarantee the confidentiality, privacy and authentication of the civil aviation ACARS message.

Description

Civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session method and device
Technical Field
The application relates to the field of information security, in particular to a method and a device for anonymous secure session of a civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link.
Background
The ACARS System (aircraft communication Addressing and Reporting System) is a data link communication System for transmitting short messages between an aircraft and a ground station via radio or satellite, and is currently the most widely used civil aviation communication System worldwide. In most countries in the world, including China, the adopted protocol of the ACARS system is ARINC-618 protocol (very high frequency communication air-ground protocol). In an air channel, through any protocol transmission without any encryption and authentication mechanism, the confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation of civil aviation data chain information cannot be ensured, and the civil aviation data chain is easily threatened by attacks such as eavesdropping, deception, disguising, information tampering, replay and the like. These possible attacks can steal the privacy and confidentiality of the civil aviation system practitioners and users, and even destroy the normal operation of the civil aviation system, causing significant personnel and property loss. Therefore, the importance of protecting the safety of civil aviation data chains cannot be ignored.
The security problem of ACARS ground-air data link messages is gradually being emphasized, and some researches utilize a symmetric cryptosystem to encrypt a Text field of a message so as to realize the confidentiality of the message and protect the non-repudiation (authentication) of the message through the asymmetric cryptosystem. Most representative of these are ACARS Message Security (AMS) systems that protect message confidentiality and identity authentication, as proposed by ARINC (Aeronautical Radio inc.) in the ARINC-823P1 standard.
The privacy of civil aviation identity in ground-air data link messages such as ACARS is also of concern. Conformal encryption is a special symmetric encryption algorithm, which can ensure that the encrypted ciphertext format is completely the same as the plaintext format before encryption, so that the method has the advantages of no need of changing the database paradigm and transparency for upper-layer application, and therefore, part of research hopes to use conformal encryption in another ground-air communication link ADS-B (Automatic dependent-broadcast Automatic dependent monitoring).
The ACARS message includes two fields, an ARN (Aircraft Registration Number) field and a Text (message) field, which need to be protected. The ARN in the control field is a 7-bit airplane registration code and is the unique identity of the airplane; the Text field of the message can carry Text information with the character not more than 220, and the format of the information can use a specified template or can be freely defined. The downlink Text field is divided into three subfields, namely a message serial number MSN, an airplane identity Flight ID and a Free message Free Text, wherein the Flight ID and the Free Text need to be protected.
The scheme of securing the Text field, represented by the AMS system, does not protect the privacy of the identity of the aircraft. Despite the encryption of the message content, an attacker can still deduce the flight information of the aircraft according to the identity of the current airspace aircraft, and even spy out political or commercial secrets in the flight information.
The conformal encryption is used for the ground-air data link, so that the aircraft privacy can be protected to a certain extent, but when the aircraft has more conversations with the ground station and an attacker masters the statistical characteristics, the behavior rule of the aircraft can still be presumed, and the civil aviation safety is threatened.
In summary, in the prior art, the confidentiality, privacy and authentication of the civil aviation ACARS message cannot be effectively guaranteed.
Content of application
The present application is directed to solving, at least to some extent, one of the technical problems in the related art.
Therefore, the method aims to solve the problem that the confidentiality, privacy and authentication of civil aviation ACARS messages cannot be effectively guaranteed in the prior art, and provides a method for anonymous secure session of the civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link.
Another object of this application is to propose a civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session device.
In order to achieve the above object, in one aspect, the present application provides a method for anonymous secure session of civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link, including the following steps:
receiving a ground station identity message broadcasted by a ground station;
transmitting a first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity message, wherein the first message comprises a first initial vector;
receiving a second message sent by the ground station;
verifying the second message, and generating an anonymous identity library according to the first initial vector under the condition that the second message passes verification, wherein the anonymous identity library comprises N first anonymous identities, and N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1;
and carrying out a conversation with the ground station based on the anonymous identity library.
In some possible embodiments, the sending the first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity information includes:
determining a public key of the ground station according to the identity information of the ground station;
generating the first initial vector and a session key, and recording a timestamp of the current time;
generating a second anonymous identity of the airplane through a public key of the ground station according to the airplane registration number and the session key;
generating a first signature through a private key of the airplane according to the first initial vector, the session key, the timestamp and the airplane registration number;
generating a first ciphertext through a public key of the ground station according to the first initial vector, the session key, the timestamp and the first signature;
replacing the airplane registration number in the first message with a second anonymous identity of the airplane, and sending the first message to the ground station after filling a message segment in the first message into the first ciphertext.
In some possible embodiments, the verifying the second message comprises:
acquiring a second signature through the second message;
and verifying the second signature through the public key of the ground station.
In some possible embodiments, the generating an anonymous identity repository from the first initial vector in case of passing the verification comprises:
sequentially adding the first initial vectors to generate N identity vectors, wherein N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1;
generating the N first anonymous identities of the aircraft according to the aircraft registration number, the session key, and the N identity vectors;
forming the anonymous identity repository based on the N first anonymous identities.
In some possible embodiments, the conducting a session with the ground station based on the anonymous identity repository includes:
generating a third message based on the anonymous identity vault;
sending the third message to the ground station;
and receiving a fourth message sent by the ground station.
In some possible embodiments, the generating a third message based on the anonymous identity store comprises:
generating a first plaintext and a first message sequence number, and calculating a first hash value of the first plaintext and the first message sequence number;
calculating a second initial vector of the third message according to the first message sequence number and the first initial vector;
generating a second ciphertext through the session key according to the first plaintext, the first hash value and the second initial vector;
selecting a third anonymous identity in the anonymous identity repository by random number arithmetic;
replacing the airplane registration number in the third message with a third anonymous identity, and sending the third message to the ground station after filling the message segment in the third message into the second ciphertext.
In some possible embodiments, the receiving a fourth message sent by the ground station includes:
obtaining a fourth anonymous identity in the fourth message;
looking up the fourth anonymous identity in the anonymous identity repository;
under the condition that the fourth anonymous identity is found in the anonymous identity library, inquiring the first initial vector and the session key corresponding to the fourth anonymous identity;
acquiring the second message sequence number in the fourth message;
calculating a third initial vector of the fourth message according to the first initial vector and the second message sequence number corresponding to the fourth anonymous identity;
acquiring a third ciphertext in the fourth message, and decrypting the third ciphertext according to the session key and the third initial vector to obtain a second plaintext and a second hash value;
calculating a third hash value of the second plaintext and the second message sequence number;
verifying whether the third hash value is equal to the second hash value;
processing the second plaintext if the third hash value is equal to the second hash value, and discarding the fourth message if the third hash value is not equal to the second hash value.
In some possible embodiments, after looking up the fourth anonymous identity in the anonymous identity repository, the method further includes:
discarding the fourth message if the fourth anonymous identity is not found in the anonymous identity repository.
In some possible embodiments, before determining the public key of the ground station according to the ground station identity information, the method further includes:
and acquiring the identity information of the ground station through which the air route of the airplane passes and a public key corresponding to the identity information of the ground station through an authentication center.
In order to achieve the above object, another aspect of the present application provides a civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session device, including:
the first receiving module is used for receiving the ground station identity information broadcasted by the ground station;
a sending module, configured to send a first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity message, where the first message includes a first initial vector;
the second receiving module is used for receiving a second message sent by the ground station;
the verification module is used for verifying the second message, and generating an anonymous identity library according to the first initial vector under the condition that the second message passes the verification, wherein the anonymous identity library comprises N first anonymous identities, and N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1;
and the conversation module is used for developing a conversation with the ground station based on the anonymous identity library.
The beneficial effect of this application:
according to the civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session method, the ground station identity information broadcasted by the ground station is received; sending a first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity message, wherein the first message comprises a first initial vector; receiving a second message sent by the ground station; verifying the second message, and generating an anonymous identity library according to the first initial vector under the condition that the second message passes verification, wherein the anonymous identity library comprises N first anonymous identities, and N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1; and carrying out conversation with the ground station based on the anonymous identity library. The method and the device can effectively guarantee the confidentiality, privacy and authentication of the civil aviation ACARS message.
Additional aspects and advantages of the present application will be set forth in part in the description which follows and, in part, will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of the present application.
Drawings
The foregoing and/or additional aspects and advantages of the present application will become apparent and readily appreciated from the following description of the embodiments, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings of which:
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session method according to an embodiment of the present application;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of session establishment according to an embodiment of the present application;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an aircraft anonymous identity repository generation process according to an embodiment of the present application;
FIG. 4 is a schematic illustration of an ACARS anonymous secure session protocol downlink according to an embodiment of the present application;
FIG. 5 is a schematic illustration of an ACARS anonymous secure session protocol uplink according to an embodiment of the present application;
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of an ACARS ground-to-air data security model according to an embodiment of the present application;
fig. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of a civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session device according to an embodiment of the present application.
Detailed Description
It should be noted that the embodiments and features of the embodiments in the present application may be combined with each other without conflict. The present application will be described in detail below with reference to the embodiments with reference to the attached drawings.
In order to make the technical solutions better understood by those skilled in the art, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only partial embodiments of the present application, but not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present application.
The method and the device for the anonymous secure session of the ground-air data link of the civil aviation ACARS proposed in the embodiment of the present application are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings, and first, the method for the anonymous secure session of the ground-air data link of the civil aviation ACARS proposed in the embodiment of the present application will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
It should be noted that, possible symbols and function symbols used in the civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session method are shown in table 1:
TABLE 1 symbol and function symbol definitions
Figure BDA0003674809470000051
Figure BDA0003674809470000061
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session method according to an embodiment of the present application.
As shown in fig. 1, the method for anonymous secure session of ground-air data link of civil aviation ACARS includes the following steps:
step S110, receiving the ground station identity information broadcasted by the ground station.
In the embodiment of the present application, as shown in fig. 2, after the aircraft enters the airspace covered by the ground station, the ground station identity message broadcasted by the ground station may be received, where the ground station identity message is broadcasted by the ground station at a fixed time interval according to the provisions of the ARINC618 standard, and may be represented as follows:
Message1:G→F:ID G
wherein Message1 represents a ground station identity Message, G represents a ground station, F represents an airplane, and ID G Representing ground station identity, G → F: ID G Indicating that the ground station transmits a ground station identity to the aircraft.
And step S120, sending a first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity message.
Wherein the first message comprises a first initial vector iv 0 The first Message2 may be a session establishment request Message sent by the aircraft to the ground station according to the ground station identity Message after receiving the ground station identity Message, and the first initial vector may be an initial vector included in the first Message.
In this embodiment of the application, after receiving the ground identity message broadcast by the ground station, the aircraft may send a first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity message, where the first message is used to request the ground station to establish a session.
And step S130, receiving a second message sent by the ground station.
The second Message3 may be a session establishment feedback Message sent by the ground station to the airplane after receiving the first Message sent by the airplane, and is used to indicate that the airplane ground station is ready for a session.
In this embodiment of the application, after the aircraft sends the first message to the ground station, the aircraft may receive a second message sent by the ground station, and the aircraft may know whether the ground station is ready for a session according to the second message.
And step S140, verifying the second message, and generating an anonymous identity library according to the first initial vector under the condition that the second message passes the verification.
Wherein the anonymous identity repository comprises N first anonymous identities AIDs 1 And N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1, and the first anonymous identity is an anonymous identity generated by the airplane according to the first initial vector and used for hiding the real identity of the airplane in the session process.
In the embodiment of the application, after the aircraft receives the second message sent by the ground station, the second message can be verified, and when the second message passes the verification, the ground station can be considered to be ready for conversation, and an anonymous identity library is generated according to the first initial vector, wherein the anonymous identity library comprises N first anonymous identities, and the aircraft can use the first anonymous identities in each next conversation to hide the true identities of the aircraft, so that the privacy of the true identities of the aircraft is guaranteed.
And step S150, carrying out conversation with the ground station based on the anonymous identity library.
In the embodiment of the application, after the aircraft generates the anonymous identity library according to the first initial vector, a session can be developed between the aircraft and the ground station based on the anonymous identity library, the aircraft can inform the ground station of flight information such as the current flight altitude and flight state through a session process, and the ground station can record the flight information of the aircraft through the session process.
According to the civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session method, the ground station identity information broadcasted by the ground station is received; sending a first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity message, wherein the first message comprises a first initial vector; receiving a second message sent by the ground station; verifying the second message, and generating an anonymous identity library according to the first initial vector under the condition that the second message passes the verification, wherein the anonymous identity library comprises N first anonymous identities, and N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1; a session is developed with the ground station based on the anonymous identity repository. The method and the device can effectively guarantee the confidentiality, privacy and authentication of the civil aviation ACARS message.
In some possible embodiments, sending the first message to the ground station through the asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity information includes:
determining a public key of the ground station according to the identity information of the ground station;
generating a first initial vector and a session key, and recording a timestamp of the current time;
generating a second anonymous identity of the airplane through a public key of the ground station according to the airplane registration number and the session key;
generating a first signature through a private key of the airplane according to the first initial vector, the session key, the timestamp and the airplane registration number;
generating a first ciphertext through a public key of the ground station according to the first initial vector, the session key, the timestamp and the first signature;
and replacing the airplane registration number in the first message with a second anonymous identity of the airplane, filling a message segment in the first message into a first ciphertext, and then sending the first message to the ground station.
The second anonymous identity can be an anonymous identity generated by the airplane through a public key of the ground station according to the airplane registration number and the session key, and is used for hiding identity information of the airplane before session establishment, the first signature can be a signature generated by the airplane through a private key of the airplane according to the first initial vector, the session key, the timestamp and the airplane registration number, and is essentially a digital signature used for signature verification by the ground station and further confirming whether the received message is tampered, the first ciphertext can be a ciphertext generated by the airplane through the public key of the ground station according to the first initial vector, the session key, the timestamp and the first signature, and the ciphertext can be decrypted after being received by the ground station, so that the first initial vector, the session key, the timestamp and the first signature generated by the airplane are obtained.
In this embodiment, as shown in fig. 2, the aircraft enters the airspace of the ground station, and after receiving the ground station identity information broadcasted by the ground station, the aircraft may obtain the ID according to the ground station identity information G Determining a public key pk of a ground station G And generates a first initial vector iv for the session 0 Session key k d Recording the time stamp t of the current time, and generating a session key k according to the aircraft registration number ARN and the generated session key k based on a public key encryption algorithm d Public key pk through ground station G A second anonymous identity AID for the aircraft may be generated 2 I.e. AID 2 ＝ENC(ARN，k d ) And also from the first initial vector iv 0 Session key k d The timestamp t and the aircraft registration number ARN pass through the private key sk of the aircraft F Generating a first signature, i.e. Γ 1 ＝SIG(iv 0 ||k d ||t||ARN,sk F ) And may then be based on the first initial vector iv 0 Session key k d A timestamp t and a first signature Γ 1 Public key pk through ground station G Generating a first ciphertext C 1 I.e. C 1 ＝ENC(iv 0 ||k d ||t||Γ 1 ,pk G ) Replacing the airplane registration number in the first Message with a second anonymous identity of the airplane, and generating a complete first Message2 after filling the Message segment in the first Message into the first ciphertext, so that the first Message can be sent to the ground station, where the process may be simply expressed as:
Message2:
Figure BDA0003674809470000081
in some possible embodiments, validating the second message comprises:
acquiring a second signature through a second message;
the second signature is verified by the public key of the ground station.
The second signature may be a signature performed by the ground station on the second message based on a signature algorithm, and the aircraft may know whether the second message is tampered according to a verification result of the second signature.
In this embodiment, as also shown in fig. 2, after the aircraft receives the second message sent by the ground station, the aircraft may obtain the second signature Γ through the second message 2 Then, based on the signature verification algorithm, the public key pk of the ground station is passed G The second signature is verified, namely VER (t | | | ARN | | | iv) 0 ||k d ,pk G ) If the verification is passed, the aircraft can determine that the ground station is ready for conversation, and can generate an anonymous identity library according to the first initial vector, and if the verification is not passed, the aircraft can consider that an attacker tampers the second message, so that the second message can be discarded.
It should be noted that, as also shown in fig. 2, after receiving the first message sent by the aircraft, the ground station may use the private key sk of its own ground station G Decrypt the first ciphertext C therein 1 Obtaining a first initial vector iv 0 Session key k d A timestamp t and a first signature Γ 1 I.e. DEC (C) 1 ,sk G ) AID may also be taken from the control field 2 The aircraft registration number, ARN ═ DEC (AID, k), is obtained by session key decryption d ) After the ground station acquires the airplane registration number, the ground station inquires and acquires the airplane public key pk corresponding to the airplane according to the airplane registration number F And then verifying the first signature through the airplane public key based on a signature verification algorithm, namely VER (iv) 0 ||k d ||t||ARN,Γ 1 ,pk F ) In the event of successful verification, the ground station may determine that the first message is free of tampering by an attacker, thereby determining the session key, the timestamp, and the airplane registration number of the airplane, and in the event of unsuccessful verification, the ground station may discard the first message. After the ground station successfully verifies the first signature and determines the session key, the timestamp and the time registration number of the airplane, the ground station can verify the freshness of the timestamp, whether the delay between the determined timestamp and the timestamp of the current moment is in a reasonable range or not is compared, if the delay is in the reasonable range, the next step of processing is carried out, and if the delay is not in the reasonable range, the first message can be discarded to wait for flyingThe machine sends an updated first message. After determining that the delay is within a reasonable range, the ground station may determine the timestamp t, the aircraft registration number ARN, and the first initial vector iv based on a digital signature algorithm through a ground station private key pair 0 And a session key k d Signing to obtain a second signature gamma 2 I.e. Γ 2 ＝SIG(t||ARN||iv 0 ||k d ,sk G ) And filling the second signature into a message field of the second message, filling the second anonymous identity into a control field of the second message, and then sending the second message to the airplane. As shown in fig. 3, the ground station may also predict N anonymous identities, AIDs, used by the aircraft during the session from the first initial vector i ＝ENC(ARN,k d ,iv 0i ) N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1, and in particular, the ground station may obtain N identity vectors by sequentially adding one to the first initial vector, which may be understood as iv 0i ＝iv 0 And i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to N, encrypting the identity vector by using the session key, and then carrying out XOR operation on the encrypted identity vector and the airplane registration code to obtain anonymous identities, and forming an anonymous identity library corresponding to the airplane by using the obtained N anonymous identities. The second message sending process can be described as follows:
Message3:
Figure BDA0003674809470000091
in some possible embodiments, generating an anonymous identity repository from the first initial vector in case of verification pass, comprises:
sequentially adding the first initial vectors to generate N identity vectors, wherein N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1;
generating N first anonymous identities of the airplane according to the airplane registration number, the session key and the N identity vectors;
an anonymous identity repository is formed based on the N first anonymous identities.
In this embodiment of the application, in the case that the aircraft passes the verification of the second message, the aircraft may sequentially add the first initial vector to generate N identity vectors, which may be understood as iv 0i ＝iv 0 N is greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to N, and the number of N is equal to N through the session keyAnd after the identity vectors are respectively encrypted, carrying out exclusive OR operation on the identity vectors and the airplane registration numbers respectively to obtain N first anonymous identities, and forming the N first anonymous identities into an anonymous identity library of the airplane.
In some possible embodiments, conducting a session with a ground station based on an anonymous identity vault includes:
generating a third message based on the anonymous identity repository;
sending a third message to the ground station;
and receiving a fourth message sent by the ground station.
The third message may be a session message generated by the aircraft based on the N first anonymous identities in the anonymous identity repository, and used to notify the ground station of the flight status of the aircraft itself, and the fourth message may be a session message sent by the ground station according to the received third message, and used to notify or instruct the aircraft to react according to the third message.
In the embodiment of the application, after the aircraft forms the anonymous identity library of the aircraft, the aircraft can generate a third message based on the anonymous identity library and then send the third message to the ground station, so that the flight state of the aircraft can be notified to the ground station, after the ground station receives the third message sent by the aircraft, the current flight state of the aircraft can be known, a corresponding fourth message is generated based on the content of the third message, the fourth message is sent to the aircraft, and after the aircraft receives the fourth message sent by the ground station, the notification content or the indication content made by the ground station according to the third message can be obtained.
In some possible embodiments, generating the third message based on the anonymous identity repository comprises:
generating a first plaintext and a first message sequence number, and calculating a first hash value of the first plaintext and the first message sequence number;
calculating a second initial vector of the third message according to the first message sequence number and the first initial vector;
generating a second ciphertext through a session key according to the first plaintext, the first hash value and the second initial vector;
selecting a third anonymous identity in the anonymous identity library through a random number algorithm;
and replacing the airplane registration number in the third message with a third anonymous identity, filling the message segment in the third message into a second ciphertext, and then sending the third message to the ground station.
The first plaintext may be text content generated by the aircraft according to a current flight state of the aircraft, the first message sequence number may be a message sequence number corresponding to the third message, the first hash value may be a hash value generated by the aircraft according to the first plaintext and the first message sequence number based on a hash algorithm, the ground station may determine whether the third message is tampered by verifying the first hash value, the second initial vector may be an initial vector of the third message calculated by the aircraft according to the first message sequence number and the first initial vector, the second ciphertext may be a ciphertext generated by the aircraft through a session key according to the first plaintext, the first hash value and the second initial vector based on an encryption algorithm, and the third anonymous identity may be one of first anonymous identities randomly selected by the aircraft through a random number algorithm in an identity library of the aircraft.
In the embodiment of the present application, as shown in fig. 4, after the aircraft determines that the ground station is ready for a session and generates the anonymous identity library, a first plaintext M may be generated 1 And a first message sequence number MSN 1 And calculating a first hash value H of the first plaintext and the first message sequence number 1 I.e. H 1 ＝Hash(M 1 ,MSN 1 ) A second initial vector iv corresponding to the third message may be calculated based on the first message sequence number and the first initial vector i I.e. iv i ＝SM3(iv 0 ||MSN 1 ) Generating a second ciphertext C from the first plaintext, the first hash value, and the second initial vector via the session key 1 I.e. C 1 ＝ENC(M 1 ||H 1 ,k d ,iv i ) Randomly selecting one first anonymous identity from an anonymous identity library as a third anonymous identity through a random number algorithm, replacing the airplane registration number in a third message with the third anonymous identity, filling a message segment in the third message into a second ciphertext to generate a complete third message, and then sending the third message to the ground station, wherein the third message is obtained by the methodThe process can be simply expressed as:
Message4:
Figure BDA0003674809470000101
it should be noted that during the conversation between the airplane and the ground station, an initial vector needs to be generated for each conversation message, but only the first initial vector is used for generating the anonymous identity library.
It should be noted that, as shown in fig. 4, after the aircraft sends the third message to the ground station, the ground station may receive the third message, take out the third anonymous identity from the third message, search for the same anonymous identity in the anonymous identity library according to the third anonymous identity, and query the corresponding first initial vector iv according to the third anonymous identity under the condition that the third anonymous identity is found 0 Session key k d And an aircraft registration number ARN, the third message may be discarded in the event that the third anonymous identity is not found. After a first initial vector, a session key and an airplane registration number corresponding to a third anonymous identity are inquired and obtained, a first message serial number in a third message can be extracted, a second initial vector corresponding to the third message can be calculated according to the first initial vector and the first message serial number, decryption is carried out through the session key according to the second initial vector and the first ciphertext obtained through calculation to obtain a first plaintext and a first Hash value, and the Hash value is calculated through a Hash algorithm based on the first plaintext and the first message serial number, namely Hash (M) 1 ,MSN 1 ) Verifying whether the first Hash value is equal to Hash (M) 1 ,MSN 1 ) When the first Hash value equals Hash (M) 1 ,MSN 1 ) In case of (2), the next processing is performed on the first plaintext, and the first Hash value is not equal to Hash (M) 1 ,MSN 1 ) In this case, the first message may be discarded.
It should be noted that, during the conversation process between the aircraft and the ground station, part of the fields in each conversation message need security protection, as shown in table 2, where the ARN, Text flight id, and Text fields are fields for adding security protection, and the rest of the fields can be transmitted in plaintext:
TABLE 2 Security protection field
Figure BDA0003674809470000111
In some possible embodiments, receiving a fourth message sent by the ground station includes:
acquiring a fourth anonymous identity in the fourth message;
searching a fourth anonymous identity in the anonymous identity library;
under the condition that a fourth anonymous identity is found in the anonymous identity library, a first initial vector and a session key corresponding to the fourth anonymous identity are inquired;
acquiring a second message sequence number in the fourth message;
calculating a third initial vector of the fourth message according to the first initial vector and the second message sequence number corresponding to the fourth anonymous identity;
acquiring a third ciphertext in the fourth message, and decrypting the third ciphertext according to the session key and the third initial vector to obtain a second plaintext and a second hash value;
calculating a third hash value of the second plaintext and the second message sequence number;
verifying whether the third hash value is equal to the second hash value;
the second plaintext is processed if the third hash value is equal to the second hash value, and the fourth message is discarded if the third hash value is not equal to the second hash value.
The fourth anonymous identity may be one of anonymous identities randomly selected by the ground station in an anonymous identity library corresponding to the aircraft, the second message sequence number may be a message sequence number generated by the ground station for the fourth message, the third initial vector may be a third initial vector of the fourth message calculated by the aircraft according to the first initial vector and the second message sequence number corresponding to the fourth anonymous identity, the third ciphertext may be a third ciphertext generated by the ground station, the second plaintext may be a plaintext generated by the ground station, the second hash value may be a hash value calculated by the ground station, and the third hash value may be a hash value calculated by the aircraft according to the second plaintext and the second message sequence number by using a hash algorithm.
In this embodiment of the application, as shown in fig. 5, after the aircraft sends the third message to the ground station, the aircraft may wait for receiving the fourth message sent by the ground station, after receiving the fourth message, may obtain the fourth anonymous identity from the fourth message, search the fourth anonymous identity in the anonymous identity repository of the aircraft, and query the first initial vector iv corresponding to the fourth anonymous identity under the condition that the fourth anonymous identity is found in the anonymous identity repository 0 And a session key k d Then, a second message sequence number MSN2 is obtained from the fourth message, and a third initial vector of the fourth message, namely iv, is calculated according to the first initial vector and the second message sequence number corresponding to the fourth anonymous identity i ＝Hash(iv 0 ||MSN 2 ) Then, a third ciphertext in the fourth message is obtained, the third ciphertext is decrypted according to the session key and the third initial vector, and a second plaintext and a second hash value, namely M, are obtained 2 ||H 2 ＝DEC(C 3 ,k d ,iv i ) Calculating a third hash value H by a hash algorithm based on the second plaintext and the second message sequence number 3 Verifying that the third hash value and the second hash value are equal, i.e. verifying H 3 ＝H 2 And processing the second plaintext if the third hash value is equal to the second hash value, and discarding the fourth message if the third hash value is not equal to the second hash value.
It should be noted that the ground station needs to generate the fourth message before sending the fourth message. Specifically, as also shown in fig. 5, the ground station may generate a second plaintext and a second message sequence number, calculate a second hash value, H, of the second plaintext and the second message sequence number 2 ＝Hash(M 2 ,MSN 2 ) Calculating a third initial vector of a fourth message according to the first initial vector and the second message sequence number, generating a third ciphertext according to a second plaintext, a second Hash value, the third initial vector and a session key based on an encryption algorithm, randomly selecting one first anonymous identity from an anonymous identity library of a corresponding airplane as a fourth anonymous identity through a random number algorithm, and registering the airplane in the fourth messageReplacing the number with a fourth anonymous identity, filling a message segment in the fourth message with a third ciphertext, generating a complete fourth message, and sending the fourth message to the airplane, wherein the process can be simply expressed as:
Message5:
Figure BDA0003674809470000121
in some possible embodiments, after looking up the fourth anonymous identity in the anonymous identity repository, further comprising:
in case the fourth anonymous identity is not found in the anonymous identity store, the fourth message is discarded.
In this embodiment of the present application, the aircraft searches for the fourth anonymous identity from the anonymous identity store of its own, and in a case that the fourth anonymous identity store cannot be found, it may be determined that the received fourth message is not a message sent to its own, and the fourth message may be discarded.
In some possible embodiments, before determining the public key of the ground station according to the ground station identity information, the method includes:
and acquiring the identity information of the ground station through which the air route of the airplane passes and a public key corresponding to the identity information of the ground station by the authentication center.
In this embodiment, before determining the public key of the ground station according to the identity information of the ground station, the aircraft may first obtain the public key of the ground station. As shown in fig. 6, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) may be used to manage Public keys, and Public keys of the aircraft and the ground station are bound to respective identity information through a third party trust Authority (CA), i.e., a Certificate Authority. Before the session starts, according to a flight plan provided by the air traffic control center, the aircraft can know the public keys and the corresponding identity information of the ground stations possibly passed by the airline through the CA, and the ground stations can also know the public keys and the corresponding identity information of all the aircraft possibly passed through the coverage area of the ground stations through the CA. Therefore, after the airplane or the ground station receives the identity information of the other party, the corresponding public key of the other party can be inquired according to the identity information of the other party.
It should be noted that the session key may be generated by the airplane and then sent to the ground station, or may be negotiated and determined through key negotiation protocols such as Diff-Hellman (diffie-Hellman) protocol, Joux three-party key negotiation (ews) protocol, BD two-wheel group key negotiation (Burmester, Desmedt, brewster, and demutiter) protocol, and the like.
It should be noted that the symmetric Encryption/decryption Algorithm based on the session key may preferably be an SM4 symmetric Encryption/decryption Algorithm, and may also be a symmetric Encryption/decryption Algorithm such as 3DES (Triple Data Encryption Algorithm), AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), and the like. The digital signature algorithm, signature verification algorithm, and asymmetric encryption/decryption algorithm may preferably be SM2 asymmetric encryption/decryption algorithm, or may preferably be asymmetric encryption/decryption algorithms such as RSA (Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, Leonard Adleman, ronard listerioster, addy samore, lunned aldleman).
In order to implement the foregoing embodiment, as shown in fig. 7, in this embodiment, there is further provided an apparatus 700 for anonymous secure session of civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link, where the apparatus 700 includes: a first receiving module 710, a sending module 720, a second receiving module 730, a verification module 740, and a session module 750.
A first receiving module 710, configured to receive a ground station identity message broadcasted by a ground station;
a sending module 720, configured to send a first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity message, where the first message includes a first initial vector;
a second receiving module 730, configured to receive a second message sent by the ground station;
the verifying module 740 is configured to verify the second message, and generate an anonymous identity repository according to the first initial vector if the second message passes the verification, where the anonymous identity repository includes N first anonymous identities, and N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1;
a session module 750 for conducting a session with the ground station based on the anonymous identity repository.
According to the civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session device, the ground station identity information broadcasted by the ground station is received; sending a first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity message, wherein the first message comprises a first initial vector; receiving a second message sent by the ground station; verifying the second message, and generating an anonymous identity library according to the first initial vector under the condition that the second message passes the verification, wherein the anonymous identity library comprises N first anonymous identities, and N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1; and carrying out conversation with the ground station based on the anonymous identity library. The method and the device can effectively guarantee the confidentiality, privacy and authentication of the civil aviation ACARS message.
In some possible embodiments, the sending module 720 includes:
the determining unit is used for determining a public key of the ground station according to the identity information of the ground station;
the first generating unit is used for generating a first initial vector and a session key and recording a timestamp of the current time;
the second generation unit is used for generating a second anonymous identity of the airplane through a public key of the ground station according to the airplane registration number and the session key;
the third generation unit generates a first signature through a private key of the airplane according to the first initial vector, the session key, the timestamp and the airplane registration number;
the fourth generation unit generates a first ciphertext through a public key of the ground station according to the first initial vector, the session key, the timestamp and the first signature;
and the replacing unit is used for replacing the airplane registration number in the first message with a second anonymous identity of the airplane, filling the message segment in the first message into a first ciphertext, and then sending the first message to the ground station.
In some possible embodiments, the verification module 740 includes:
an obtaining unit, configured to obtain a second signature through a second message;
and the first verification unit is used for verifying the second signature through the public key of the ground station.
In some possible embodiments, the verification module 740 further includes:
a fifth generating unit, configured to sequentially add the first initial vectors to generate N identity vectors, where N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1;
the sixth generating unit is used for generating N first anonymous identities of the airplane according to the airplane registration number, the session key and the N identity vectors;
a forming unit for forming an anonymous identity repository based on the N first anonymous identities.
In some possible embodiments, the session module 750 includes:
a seventh generating unit, configured to generate a third message based on the anonymous identity repository;
the first sending unit is used for sending a third message to the ground station;
and the first receiving unit is used for receiving the fourth message sent by the ground station.
In some possible embodiments, the seventh generating unit includes:
the generating and calculating subunit is used for generating a first plaintext and a first message sequence number and calculating a first hash value of the first plaintext and the first message sequence number;
a first calculating subunit, configured to calculate a second initial vector of the third message according to the first message sequence number and the first initial vector;
the first generating subunit is used for generating a second ciphertext according to the first plaintext, the first hash value and the second initial vector through a session key;
a selecting subunit, configured to select a third anonymous identity in the anonymous identity repository through a random number algorithm;
and the replacing subunit is used for replacing the airplane registration number in the third message with a third anonymous identity, filling the message segment in the third message into a second ciphertext, and then sending the third message to the ground station.
In some possible embodiments, the first receiving unit includes:
a first obtaining subunit, configured to obtain a fourth anonymous identity in the fourth message;
a searching subunit, configured to search for a fourth anonymous identity in the anonymous identity store;
the query subunit is configured to, in a case that the fourth anonymous identity is found in the anonymous identity store, query a first initial vector and a session key corresponding to the fourth anonymous identity;
a second obtaining subunit, configured to obtain a second message sequence number in the fourth message;
the second calculating subunit is configured to calculate, according to the first initial vector and the second message sequence number that correspond to the fourth anonymous identity, a third initial vector of the fourth message;
the third obtaining subunit is configured to obtain a third ciphertext in the fourth message, decrypt the third ciphertext according to the session key and the third initial vector, and obtain a second plaintext and a second hash value;
a third computing subunit, configured to compute a third hash value of the second plaintext and the second message sequence number;
a verifying subunit, configured to verify whether the third hash value is equal to the second hash value;
and the first discarding subunit is used for processing the second plaintext under the condition that the third hash value is equal to the second hash value, and discarding the fourth message under the condition that the third hash value is not equal to the second hash value.
In some possible embodiments, the first receiving unit further includes:
and the second discarding subunit is configured to discard the fourth message when the fourth anonymous identity is not found in the anonymous identity store.
In some possible embodiments, the civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session device includes:
and the public key acquisition module is used for acquiring the ground station identity information which the air route of the airplane passes through and a public key corresponding to the ground station identity information through the authentication center.
It should be noted that the explanation of the above embodiment of the method for anonymous secure session of civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link is also applicable to the device for anonymous secure session of civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link of this embodiment, and details are not described here.
Furthermore, the terms "first", "second" and "first" are used for descriptive purposes only and are not to be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one such feature. In the description of the present application, "plurality" means at least two, e.g., two, three, etc., unless specifically limited otherwise.
In the description herein, reference to the description of the term "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "an example," "a specific example," or "some examples," etc., means that a particular feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the application. In this specification, the schematic representations of the terms used above are not necessarily intended to refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in any one or more embodiments or examples. Moreover, various embodiments or examples and features of various embodiments or examples described in this specification can be combined and combined by one skilled in the art without being mutually inconsistent.
Although embodiments of the present application have been shown and described above, it is understood that the above embodiments are exemplary and should not be construed as limiting the present application, and that variations, modifications, substitutions and alterations may be made to the above embodiments by those of ordinary skill in the art within the scope of the present application.

Claims (10)

1. A civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session method is applied to an airplane and is characterized by comprising the following steps:
receiving a ground station identity message broadcasted by a ground station;
transmitting a first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity message, wherein the first message comprises a first initial vector;
receiving a second message sent by the ground station;
verifying the second message, and generating an anonymous identity library according to the first initial vector under the condition that the second message passes the verification, wherein the anonymous identity library comprises N first anonymous identities, and N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1;
and carrying out a conversation with the ground station based on the anonymous identity library.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein sending a first message to the ground station via an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity information comprises:
determining a public key of the ground station according to the identity information of the ground station;
generating the first initial vector and a session key, and recording a timestamp of the current time;
generating a second anonymous identity of the airplane through a public key of the ground station according to the airplane registration number and the session key;
generating a first signature through a private key of the airplane according to the first initial vector, the session key, the timestamp and the airplane registration number;
generating a first ciphertext through a public key of the ground station according to the first initial vector, the session key, the timestamp and the first signature;
replacing the airplane registration number in the first message with a second anonymous identity of the airplane, and sending the first message to the ground station after filling a message segment in the first message into the first ciphertext.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the validating the second message comprises:
acquiring a second signature through the second message;
and verifying the second signature through the public key of the ground station.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein generating an anonymous identity repository from the first initial vector if the authentication passes comprises:
sequentially adding the first initial vectors to generate N identity vectors, wherein N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1;
generating the N first anonymous identities of the aircraft according to the aircraft registration number, the session key, and the N identity vectors;
forming the anonymous identity repository based on the N first anonymous identities.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the conducting a session with the ground station based on the anonymous identity repository comprises:
generating a third message based on the anonymous identity repository;
sending the third message to the ground station;
and receiving a fourth message sent by the ground station.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein generating the third message based on the anonymous identity repository comprises:
generating a first plaintext and a first message sequence number, and calculating a first hash value of the first plaintext and the first message sequence number;
calculating a second initial vector of the third message according to the first message sequence number and the first initial vector;
generating a second ciphertext through the session key according to the first plaintext, the first hash value and the second initial vector;
selecting a third anonymous identity in the anonymous identity repository by random number arithmetic;
replacing the airplane registration number in the third message with a third anonymous identity, and sending the third message to the ground station after filling the message segment in the third message into the second ciphertext.
7. The method of claim 5, wherein receiving the fourth message sent by the ground station comprises:
obtaining a fourth anonymous identity in the fourth message;
looking up the fourth anonymous identity in the anonymous identity repository;
under the condition that the fourth anonymous identity is found in the anonymous identity library, inquiring the first initial vector and the session key corresponding to the fourth anonymous identity;
acquiring the second message sequence number in the fourth message;
calculating a third initial vector of the fourth message according to the first initial vector and the second message sequence number corresponding to the fourth anonymous identity;
acquiring a third ciphertext in the fourth message, and decrypting the third ciphertext according to the session key and the third initial vector to obtain a second plaintext and a second hash value;
calculating a third hash value of the second plaintext and the second message sequence number;
verifying whether the third hash value is equal to the second hash value;
processing the second plaintext if the third hash value is equal to the second hash value, and discarding the fourth message if the third hash value is not equal to the second hash value.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein after looking up the fourth anonymous identity in the anonymous identity repository, further comprising:
discarding the fourth message if the fourth anonymous identity is not found in the anonymous identity repository.
9. The method of claim 2, prior to determining the public key of the ground station based on the ground station identity information, comprising:
and acquiring the identity information of the ground station through which the air route of the airplane passes and a public key corresponding to the identity information of the ground station through an authentication center.
10. A civil aviation ACARS ground-air data link anonymous secure session device applied to an airplane is characterized by comprising:
the first receiving module is used for receiving the ground station identity information broadcasted by the ground station;
a sending module, configured to send a first message to the ground station through an asymmetric key mechanism based on the ground station identity message, where the first message includes a first initial vector;
the second receiving module is used for receiving a second message sent by the ground station;
the verification module is used for verifying the second message, and generating an anonymous identity library according to the first initial vector under the condition that the second message passes the verification, wherein the anonymous identity library comprises N first anonymous identities, and N is a positive integer greater than or equal to 1;
and the conversation module is used for developing a conversation with the ground station based on the anonymous identity library.
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CN101261772A (en) * 2008-04-17 2008-09-10 民航数据通信有限责任公司 Secure transmission system for broadcast automatic monitoring information
US20180218619A1 (en) * 2015-07-17 2018-08-02 Relmatech Limited An aircraft controlled by a secure integrated airspace management system
CN106961329A (en) * 2017-03-23 2017-07-18 电子科技大学 A kind of solution for being directed to ADS B agreements confidentiality and integrality
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