CN114980037A - Group communication method and system based on asymmetric key pool with hierarchical structure - Google Patents
Group communication method and system based on asymmetric key pool with hierarchical structure Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
In the group communication system based on the asymmetric key pool, the positions of all members owning the group key pool are classified according to grades, and protection measures and the key pool in different grades are different. The key pool is obtained by calculating the key pool of the important-level member according to the chip key, the replacement parameter and the like, and once the security chip finds that the security chip is an untrusted node, subsequent group communication is not carried out any more, so that the influence is not large even if the security chip is captured, and the failure of the whole group communication system cannot be caused. The method combines the asymmetric key pool and the chip key, and further enhances the use safety of the asymmetric key pool in a group communication scene, so that the group communication safety based on the asymmetric key pool can still be ensured under the extreme condition that the asymmetric key pool is cracked. The method for updating the key pool can update the key pool without transmitting an updated key, and the key updating scheme of the patent has small transmission quantity of the key and is easy to realize.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of quantum computing resistance, in particular to a group communication method and system based on a hierarchical asymmetric key pool.
Background
With the continuous development of wireless communication technology, direct terminal communication (Device to Device, D2D) has become one of the hot spots of 3GPP Rel-12 standardization technology. D2D allows two User Equipments (UEs) to directly transmit data through a specific Channel (Sidelink Channel) without going through an evolved Node B (eNB). Of course, D2D is not limited to data transmission between two user equipments, and may also support Group Communication (Group Communication) from a single point to multiple points. Most of the existing network authentication systems are based on a one-to-one authentication mode of a single object, but for single-point-to-multipoint data transmission, groups are formed according to a certain principle. In these application scenarios, when a new terminal is accessed in a group, if an existing one-to-one authentication method is adopted, not only network signaling is increased to cause network congestion, but also a large amount of network resources are occupied, so that the existing one-to-one network authentication system is no longer applicable. In this case, in order to reduce authentication resource consumption and network congestion, a corresponding group authentication mechanism is required. The existing group communication system uses a group key pool, realizes group communication by using a symmetric key stored in the group type symmetric key pool, and if a member is attacked, the secret communication of the whole group is threatened by security.
In the prior art, the key pool is updated, and the participation of an issuing center is often needed, and the transmitted data volume is large, so that certain threat is brought to the security.
Based on the above analysis, the prior art has the following drawbacks:
1. in the prior art, group communication is generally protected by using a symmetric key pool, the symmetric key pool cannot be stored in a highly secure security chip due to large capacity, and the possibility of being captured and disassembled so as to be cracked exists. The group type symmetric key pool is shared by all members in the group, and once the group type symmetric key pool is cracked, the security of group communication based on the group type symmetric key pool is threatened;
2. the existing method for updating the key pool is that one party generates a key and sends the key to the other party, and because the amount of the key in the key pool is huge, a great amount of time is needed for updating the key pool; for group communication, the same secret key needs to be transmitted to each member of the group, and the secret key amount is huge and is often difficult to realize;
3. in the existing group communication system based on the key pool, the positions of all members owning the group key pool are the same, and the capture of any one member can cause the failure of the whole group communication system.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the related art, the invention provides a group communication method and a group communication system based on a hierarchical asymmetric key pool, so as to overcome the technical problems in the prior related art.
Therefore, the invention adopts the following specific technical scheme:
a group communication method based on a hierarchical asymmetric key pool is characterized in that nodes in a group are divided into a plurality of levels according to authority, each group node has an identity list of a current group, each identity information comprises a layer number to which the node belongs, an administrator is the highest layer, a group node security chip stores a chip key, a replacement parameter and an administrator public key of the current layer, and an administrator security chip also stores a chip key of the lowest level, a chip key, a replacement parameter and an administrator public and private key of the current layer; the memory outside the security chips of the common node and the administrator node stores the asymmetric key pool of the layer; the method for updating the chip key and the asymmetric key pool by using the replacement parameters in the communication process comprises the following steps:
(1) if the group nodes on the same layer communicate, the two communication parties select an asymmetric key from the non-key pool of the layer according to a preset asymmetric key selection mode, the chip key of the layer is calculated based on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to obtain a communication key, and a first session key is calculated according to the communication key;
(2) if the group nodes of different layers communicate with each other, the group nodes of the higher layer select asymmetric keys from the key pool of the layer according to a preset asymmetric key selection mode to serve as private keys of the layer, chip keys of the layer serve as public keys of the lower layer, communication keys are obtained through calculation of the private keys of the layer and the public keys of the lower layer based on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, and first session keys are obtained through calculation of the communication keys;
(3) the group node of the lower layer selects an asymmetric key from the key pool of the lower layer as a public key of the upper layer according to a preset asymmetric key selection mode, and a chip key of the lower layer is used as a private key of the lower layer; calculating to obtain a communication key through a private key of an upper layer and a public key of the layer based on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, and calculating to obtain a first session key which is the same as a group node of a higher layer through the communication key;
(4) the group nodes communicate through the first session key.
Preferably, the updating the chip key by using the replacement parameter includes the following steps: the chip key of the next level is transformed into the chip key of the previous level through a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol; the administrator generates a new replacement parameter to update the chip key;
optionally, the updating the asymmetric key pool using the replacement parameter includes the following steps: the key pool of the administrator layer is initialized to a key pool consisting of true random numbers, the key pool of the layer is divided into a plurality of sub-keys, and each sub-key is calculated by a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to obtain the sub-key of the lower layer; then splicing the obtained multiple calculation results according to the sequence of the corresponding sub-keys to obtain a key pool of the next layer; and the administrator generates new replacement parameters to update the multi-segment subkeys, and a plurality of updated calculation results are spliced according to the sequence of the corresponding subkeys to obtain an updated key pool.
When a group communication node sends a notification, the layer-by-layer communication method comprises the following steps: the group administrator obtains a second session key according to the method in the step (2), signs a first message containing the notification, the replacement parameter and the current timestamp by using a private key to obtain signature information, encrypts a second message containing the notification, the replacement parameter and the signature information by using the second session key to obtain a third message, calculates a first message verification code, combines the administrator identity information, the current timestamp, the third message and the first message verification code to obtain a first encrypted message, sends the first encrypted message to a lower node, updates an asymmetric key pool by using the replacement parameter, and records a replacement parameter CR used at this time into a security chip;
after receiving the message, the trusted node obtains a second session key according to the method in the step (3), decrypts the first encrypted message by using the second session key, and verifies the signature information by using an administrator public key existing in the local security chip;
if the trusted node has no lower node, updating the asymmetric key pool by using the replacement parameter, and recording the replacement parameter CR used at this time into the security chip;
if the trusted node has a subordinate node, the trusted node transmits the combination of the first message and the signature information to the subordinate node, the trusted node obtains a third session key according to the method in the step (2), encrypts a second message through the third session key to obtain a fourth message, calculates a second message verification code, combines the identity information of the trusted node, the current timestamp, the fourth message and the second message verification code to obtain a second encrypted message, transmits the second encrypted message to the subordinate node, updates the asymmetric key pool and the chip key by using the replacement parameter, and records the replacement parameter CR used at this time into the security chip;
after receiving the second encrypted message, the lower node obtains a third session key according to the method in the step (3), decrypts the second encrypted message by using the third session key, and verifies the signature by using an administrator public key stored in the local security chip;
and when one node is not trusted, the illegal information of the non-trusted node is used as a notice to notify the nodes of each layer by layer.
When it happens in the case of a new trusted node. And the administrator distributes the chip key and the asymmetric key pool of the current layer of the node of the group for the trusted node according to the layer number of the newly added trusted node, and notifies each layer of the nodes layer by layer, wherein the notification is a legal message of the newly added trusted node, and all parties in the communication flow do not carry out key replacement.
A group communication system based on a hierarchical asymmetric key pool is used for realizing the group communication method based on the hierarchical asymmetric key pool, and is characterized in that the system comprises an administrator and group nodes, wherein the administrator and the group nodes are communicated according to the method, the administrator and the group nodes are matched with security chips and have a disassembly resisting function, and the administrator is the highest layer and has the ability of issuing key cards.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
has the advantages that:
1. the method and the device combine the asymmetric key pool and the chip key, and further enhance the use safety of the asymmetric key pool in a group communication scene, so that the group communication safety based on the asymmetric key pool can still be ensured under the extreme condition that the asymmetric key pool is cracked. Because the keys of the two parties are also protected by the chip key, the communication of the two parties cannot be cracked because the asymmetric key pool is cracked under the condition that the chip key can be guaranteed not to be cracked;
2. the method for updating the key pool can update the key pool without transmitting the updated key, and the time for updating the key pool is short because the calculated amount of the updated key is small; for group communication, the key transmission quantity of the key updating scheme of the patent is very small and is easy to realize;
3. in the group communication system based on the asymmetric key pool, the positions of all members possessing the group key pool are classified according to grades, and the protection measures and the key pool in different grades are different. The protection measures of the members with the important grades are good and are not easy to capture; the protection measures of the unimportant level members are relatively poor or the working environment is unsafe, but as the key pool is obtained through calculation according to the chip key, the replacement parameters and the key pool of the important level members, even if an enemy acquires the key pool, the key pool of other nodes cannot be deduced under the condition of no chip key and the replacement parameters, and once the security chip finds that the security chip is an untrusted node, the subsequent group communication is not carried out, so that the influence is not great even if the security chip is captured, and the failure of the whole group communication system cannot be caused.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required in the embodiments will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art that other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
FIG. 1 is a diagram of a system architecture involved in an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a process of calculating keys of each layer of key pool and each layer of chip in the embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
For further explanation of the various embodiments, the drawings which form a part of the disclosure and which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of operation of the embodiments, and to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to understand the various embodiments and advantages of the invention, and, by reference to these figures, reference is made to the accompanying drawings, which are not to scale and wherein like reference numerals generally refer to like elements.
It is to be understood that the features listed above for the different embodiments may be combined with each other to form further embodiments within the scope of the invention, where technically feasible. Furthermore, the particular examples and embodiments of the invention described are non-limiting, and modifications may be made in the structure, steps, sequence of steps, or illustrated above without departing from the scope of the invention.
In a communication group, this patent assumes that all members have a list of IDs for the current group, with a layer number for that ID within each ID. The smaller the layer number, the better the security measures, and the less likely to be captured by an adversary.
As shown in fig. 1, the group communication system based on the asymmetric key pool with a hierarchical structure according to the present invention includes a plurality of nodes, such as a layer 0 node, a layer 1 node, and a layer 2 node. Under the military data chain scene, the 0 th level node can be a command center, the 1 st level node can be a commander, and the 2 nd level node can be an unmanned aerial vehicle, an unmanned vehicle or a single soldier node and the like.
All there is the safety chip in each layer node all matching in this patent, has anti function of disassembling, and the enemy can't obtain the content of safety chip internal storage. Since the layer 0 node is a group administrator and has the ability to issue a key fob, the lowest level chip key (i.e. the layer 2 chip key KR in this patent) is also stored in the security chip 2 ) And the chip key is used for issuing the chip key of the corresponding layer for the newly added group member. The local layer of asymmetric key pool of the administrator node is stored in a memory outside the security chip, and a chip key, a replacement parameter and an administrator public and private key are stored in the security chip of the administrator node; the local layer asymmetric key pool of other common group members is stored in a memory outside the security chip, and the chip key, the replacement parameter and the administrator public key are stored in the security chip of the node.
The chip key KR and the replacement parameter CR of the layer are stored in the security chip of each layer, and the process of converting the chip key by using the replacement parameter is shown in fig. 2, and the text description is as follows:
let layer 0 chip key be KR 0 And so on, the layer 1 chip key is KR 1 The layer 2 chip key is KR 2 。
According to the Diffie-Hellman protocol, a primitive root g with large prime number p and p is defined, g and p are parameters of the Diffie-Hellman protocol, and a DH public key PK can be calculated through a DH private key SK, namely PK is equal to g SK mod p. The administrator node selects a true random large integer KR for the lowest node, i.e. the layer 2 node in this patent 2 As chip key of layer 2, by KR 2 Is calculated to obtain
By KR 1 Is calculated to obtain
Namely KR 1 Is KR 2 KR of public key 0 Is KR 1 The public key of (2).
When performing a key replacement, the group administrator generates a new replacement parameter CR for the KR 2 Is converted to obtain KR' 2 ＝KR 2 CR. To KR 1 Is transformed to obtain
In the same way, the method for preparing the composite material,
each node in this patent further stores an asymmetric key pool based on a hierarchical structure, and a process of transforming the asymmetric key pool by using a replacement parameter is shown in fig. 2, and the following text descriptions are given:
and the layer 0 key pool is a key pool formed by true random numbers when being initialized. Equally dividing the layer 0 key pool into multiple segments of keys, and setting the i segment as K0 i Similarly, the ith segment of the layer 1 key pool and the layer 2 key pool is K1 i 、K2 i 。
By K0 i Is calculated to obtain
Namely K1 i Is K0 i The public key of (2). Calculate each K1 i And combining to obtain a layer 1 key pool.
By K1 i Is calculated to obtain
Namely K2 i Is K1 i The public key of (2). Calculate each K2 i And then combining to obtain a layer 2 key pool.
When performing a key replacement, the group administrator generates a new replacement parameter CR for K0 i Conversion to give K0' i ＝K0 i CR. For K1 i Is transformed to obtain
In the same way, the method has the advantages of,
to further illustrate the principles of the present invention, the following detailed description illustrates the principles of the invention.
Example 1: group communication with member trust
Case 1.1: communicating with peer group members.
Assume that the message to be sent by group member a is NTF and generates a timestamp TNTF for this message.
A calculating pointer Pos ═ F P (TNTF), function F P (. x) is an arbitrarily specified transformation of TNTF to a legal pointer function. Taking out key K from asymmetric key pool according to Pos Pos 。
Calculating a communication key K TG ＝K Pos *g KR mpd p, KR is the chip key of the current layer.
Computing a session key K SG ＝MAC(TNTF，K TG ). The MAC is a session key generation function, such as a message authentication code function.
A uses the session key K SG As the group key of this group communication, the NTF is symmetrically encrypted to obtain { NTF } K SG Using K SG For ID A TNTF and NTF calculate message authentication code to obtain MAC (ID) A ||TNTF||NTF，K SG ). The encrypted information, message authentication code and ID are combined A And TNTF to other members, and the transmitted information can be expressed as ID A ||TNTF||{NTF}K SG ||MAC(ID A ||TNTF||NTF，K SG )。
After other members in the same layer receive the K, the K is taken out by using the same method Pos And calculating to obtain K by combining the chip key KR and TNTF of the layer SG Using K SG Decrypting { NTF } K SG Get the message NTF, use K SG For ID A The TNTF and the NTF calculate a message authentication code and compare the message authentication code with the received message authentication code, if the message authentication code and the received message authentication code are consistent, the verification is passed, and after the verification is passed, the NTF is trusted; and if the verification is not passed, the message NTF is not trusted.
Case 1.2: a communicates with a subordinate group member B.
Assume that the message to be sent by group member a is NTF and generates a timestamp TNTF for this message.
Upper level a calculates pointer Pos ═ F PK (TNTF), function F PK () is an arbitrarily specified function that transforms TNTF into a legal pointer. Taking out key K from asymmetric key pool according to Pos A As a superior private key, the chip key KR of the layer A As the subordinate public key.
A calculating a communication key
A calculates a session key K SGA ＝MAC(TNTF，K TGA )。
A is K SGA The protection sends out the message to B, i.e. encryption and message authentication are performed.
B, after receiving, calculating the pointer Pos ═ F PK (TNTF) taking out the key K from the asymmetric key pool according to Pos B As the upper level public key, the chip key K of the layer is usedR B As the lower level private key.
B calculating a communication key
Because of the fact that
Therefore, it is not only easy to use
B calculation and K SGA Identical session key K SGB ＝MAC(TNTF，K TGB ) And B is K SGB And decrypting the received message and finishing message authentication.
Case 1.3: b communicates with the upper group member a.
Assume that the message to be sent by group member B is NTF and generates a timestamp TNTF for this message.
B calculation pointer Pos ═ F PK (TNTF) taking out the key K from the asymmetric key pool according to Pos B As the upper level public key, the chip key KR of the layer B As the lower level private key.
B calculating a communication key
B computing a session key K SGB ＝MAC(TNTF，K TGB )。
B uses K SGB The protection sends out the message to A, namely encryption and message authentication are carried out.
After the superior A receives the pointer, the pointer Pos is calculated to be F PK (TNTF) taking out the key K from the asymmetric key pool according to Pos A As a superior private key, the chip key KR of the layer A As the subordinate public key.
A calculating a communication key
As described in case 1.2, K TGA ＝K TGB 。
A calculation and K SGB Identical session key K SGA ＝MAC(TNTF，K TGA ) A is K SGA And decrypting the received message and finishing message authentication.
Example 2: group communication in case a member is not trusted
Case 2.1: the untrusted member is level 1 node X.
Assuming the group administrator is level 0 node a, a trusted member in the group is level 1 node B, and an untrusted member is level 1 node X, e.g., X is trapped or traitorous. Since X knows the key pool of this layer and all lower layers, the security of the group communication of this layer and all lower layers is affected. Due to the fact that
According to K1 i Obtain K0 i Is a discrete logarithm problem, so that X cannot be calculated according to K1 without a quantum computer i Obtaining K0 i I.e. the upper key pool is secure at this time.
The method comprises the following steps: the group administrator issues a message.
A generates a message for announcing X illegal as NTF and generates a time stamp TNTF for the information. A generates a replacement parameter CR, and the combination of the three parameters is MSG (TNTF (transthyretin) | | NTF | | | CR. Member A uses SK A Signing the MSG to obtain SIG A ＝SIGN(MSG，SK A )。
A calculating pointer Pos ═ F PK (TNTF) taking out the key K from the asymmetric key pool according to Pos i As a superior private key, the chip key KR of the layer 0 As the subordinate public key.
A calculating a communication key
KR obtained by enemy not being able to crack 0 Therefore, K is very difficult for the enemy to predict TA 。
A calculates a session key KS A ＝MAC(TNTF，K TA )。
A uses KS A For NTF CR SIG A The encryption is carried out to obtain encryption information { NTF | | | CR | | | SIG A }KS A Calculating a message authentication code MAC (ID) A ||MSG||SIG A ，KS A )。
A is to M A Sent to the lower node, the sent message can be expressed as M A ＝ID A ||TNTF||{NTF||CR||SIG A }KS A ||MAC(ID A ||MSG||SIG A ，KS A )。
A sends M A Then, according to the replacement parameter CR used this time, K0 is sequentially changed by the method described above i Replacement is K0' i ＝K0 i CR, reaction of KR 0 Is replaced by KR' 0 ＝KR 0 CR modp. And records the replacement parameter CR used this time into the security chip.
B receives M A Then, the sum K is obtained according to the method described in case 1.2 TB Identical communication key K TB And further calculating to obtain KS A Identical session key KS B ＝MAC(TNTF，K TB ). Using session key KS B To M A Decryption and message authentication are performed. After the verification is passed, the public key PK of the layer 0 node existing in the local security chip is used A Verification SIG A . If the node B has a lower node, the step two is carried out, and if the node B does not have a lower node, the K1 is set according to the replacement parameter CR used at this time i Replacement is K1' i ＝K1 i CR mod p, reaction of KR 1 Is replaced by KR' 1 ＝KR 1 CR modp and records the replacement parameter CR used this time into the security chip.
Although the security chip of X can generate the same session key in the security chip according to the content in the NTF and decrypt the encrypted message sent by a to the lower node, since it is found from the NTF that it is an untrusted node, the decrypted message is not transmitted outside the security chip, and the key pool and the chip key are not replaced, and the decryption of all subsequent messages is abandoned or a self-destruction mechanism is triggered, so that X cannot perform subsequent group communication, thereby ensuring the security of other group members.
Step two: the layer 1 node forwards the message.
After the layer 1 node B finishes all the steps except the key updating in the step one, the MSG (minimum shift keying) SIG is processed A To layer 2 node C.
B obtains the session key KS with C using the method above BC B Using KS BC For NTF CR SIG A The encryption is carried out to obtain encryption information { NTF | | | CR | | | SIG A }KS BC Calculating a message authentication code MAC (ID) B ||MSG||SIG A ，KS BC )。
B is to M B Sent to the lower node, the sent message can be expressed as M B ＝ID B ||TNTF||{NTF||CR||SIG A }KS BC ||MAC(ID B ||MSG||SIG A ，KS BC )。
B sends M B Then, according to the replacement parameter CR used this time, the asymmetric key pool and the chip key are replaced by the method described above, i.e. K1 is replaced i Replacement is K1' i ＝K1 i CR mod p, reaction of KR 1 Is replaced by KR' 1 ＝KR 1 CR mod p. And records the replacement parameter CR used this time into the security chip.
Step three: the layer 2 node forwards the message.
Layer 2 node C receives M B Then, according to the method in the step one, the session key KS before B is obtained CB To M is aligned with B Decryption and message authentication are performed.
If the node C has a lower node, the message is continuously forwarded, and the key is replaced after the message is sent;
if the node C has no lower level node, the key is directly replaced.
C the procedure for replacing the key is as follows:
k2 is sequentially selected according to the replacement parameter CR used at this time by the method described above i Replacement is K2' i ＝K2 i CR mod p, reaction of KR 2 Is replaced by KR' 2 ＝KR 2 CR mod p (KR 'if C is the last layer node)' 2 ＝KR 2 CR). And recording the CR into the security chip after the replacement is finished.
Case 2.2: the untrusted member is layer 2 node X.
If the untrusted member X is a layer 2 node, step one is executed according to the procedure in case 2.1, i.e. a sends a message to the layer 1 node. And step two and step three in the case 2.1 are executed subsequently to update the key pool of the lower node.
Similarly, since the security chip of X finds itself as an untrusted node, it will not transmit the decryption information to outside of the security chip, and will not replace the key pool and the chip key, and give up decryption of all subsequent messages or trigger a self-destruction mechanism, so that X will not perform subsequent group communication, thereby ensuring the security of other group members.
Example 3: and adding group communication of the trusted member.
A group administrator is set as A, another credible member in the group is set as B, and the newly added credible member is set as Y. And A distributes the chip key and the asymmetric key pool of the current layer member of the group for Y according to the layer number of Y.
And A generates a second description message for declaring Y to be legal as NTF and generates a time stamp for the second description message as TNTF. Let CR equal to 1, i.e. no key replacement is performed by the parties. The subsequent steps are the same as in example 2, i.e. the layer-by-layer notification of the members of each layer.
In summary, with the above technical solutions of the present invention, the present invention implements a group communication method and system based on an asymmetric key pool with a hierarchical structure, and the present invention further enhances the security of the asymmetric key pool in the group communication scenario by combining the asymmetric key pool and the chip key, so that the security of the group communication based on the asymmetric key pool can still be ensured even under the extreme condition that the asymmetric key pool is cracked. Because the keys of the two parties are also protected by the chip key, the communication of the two parties cannot be cracked because the asymmetric key pool is cracked under the condition that the chip key can be guaranteed not to be cracked; the method for updating the key pool can update the key pool without transmitting the updated key, and the time for updating the key pool is short because the calculated amount of the updated key is small; for group communication, the key transmission quantity of the key updating scheme of the patent is very small and is easy to realize; in the group communication system based on the asymmetric key pool, the positions of all members possessing the group key pool are classified according to grades, and the protection measures and the key pool in different grades are different. The protection measures of the members with the important grades are good and are not easy to capture; the protection measures of the unimportant level members are relatively poor or the working environment is unsafe, but as the key pool is obtained by calculation according to the chip key, the replacement parameters and the key pool of the important level members, even if an enemy acquires the key pool, the key pool of other nodes cannot be deduced under the condition of no chip key and the replacement parameters, and once the security chip finds that the security chip is an untrusted node, the decryption information cannot be transmitted to the outside of the security chip, the key pool and the chip key are not replaced, the decryption of all subsequent messages is abandoned or a self-destruction mechanism is triggered, so that the subsequent group communication cannot be carried out, the influence is small even if the security chip is captured, and the failure of the whole group communication system cannot be caused.
All possible combinations of the technical features of the above embodiments may not be described for the sake of brevity, but should be considered as within the scope of the present disclosure as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.
The above-mentioned embodiments only express several embodiments of the present invention, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but not construed as limiting the scope of the invention. It should be noted that, for a person skilled in the art, several variations and modifications can be made without departing from the inventive concept, which falls within the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present patent shall be subject to the appended claims.
Claims (9)
1. A group communication method based on a hierarchical asymmetric key pool is characterized in that nodes in a group are divided into a plurality of levels according to authority, each group node has an identity list of the current group, each identity information contains a layer number to which the node belongs, an administrator is the highest layer, a chip key, a replacement parameter and an administrator public key of the current layer are stored in a group node security chip, and a chip key of the lowest level, a chip key, a replacement parameter and an administrator public key of the current layer are also stored in an administrator security chip; the memory outside the security chips of the common node and the administrator node stores the asymmetric key pool of the layer; the method for updating the chip key and the asymmetric key pool by using the replacement parameters in the communication process comprises the following steps:
(1) if the group nodes on the same layer communicate, the two communication parties select an asymmetric key from the non-key pool of the layer according to a preset asymmetric key selection mode, the chip key of the layer is calculated based on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to obtain a communication key, and a first session key is calculated according to the communication key;
(2) if the group nodes of different layers communicate with each other, the group nodes of the higher layer select asymmetric keys from the key pool of the layer according to a preset asymmetric key selection mode to serve as private keys of the layer, chip keys of the layer serve as public keys of the lower layer, communication keys are obtained through calculation of the private keys of the layer and the public keys of the lower layer based on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, and first session keys are obtained through calculation of the communication keys;
(3) the group nodes of the lower layer select asymmetric keys from the key pool of the lower layer as public keys of the upper layer according to a preset asymmetric key selection mode, and chip keys of the lower layer are used as private keys of the lower layer; calculating to obtain a communication key based on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol through a private key of an upper layer and a public key of the layer, and calculating to obtain a first session key which is the same as a group node of a higher layer through the communication key;
(4) the group nodes communicate through the first session key.
2. The group communication method based on the asymmetric key pool in the hierarchical structure according to claim 1, wherein the updating the chip key using the replacement parameter comprises the steps of: the chip key of the next level is transformed into the chip key of the previous level through a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol; the administrator generates a new replacement parameter to update the chip key;
the updating the asymmetric key pool by using the replacement parameters comprises the following steps: the key pool of the administrator layer is initialized to a key pool consisting of true random numbers, the key pool of the layer is divided into a plurality of sub-keys, and each sub-key is calculated by a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to obtain the sub-key of the lower layer; then, splicing the obtained multiple calculation results according to the sequence of the corresponding sub-keys to obtain a key pool of the next layer; and the administrator generates new replacement parameters to update the multi-segment sub-keys, and a plurality of updated calculation results are spliced according to the sequence of the corresponding sub-keys to obtain an updated key pool.
3. The group communication method based on the asymmetric key pool with the hierarchical structure according to claim 2, wherein when a group communication node sends a notification, the layer-by-layer communication method comprises the following steps: the group administrator obtains a second session key according to the method in the step (2), signs a first message containing the notification, the replacement parameter and the current timestamp by using a private key to obtain signature information, encrypts a second message containing the notification, the replacement parameter and the signature information by using the second session key to obtain a third message, calculates a first message verification code, combines the administrator identity information, the current timestamp, the third message and the first message verification code to obtain a first encrypted message, sends the first encrypted message to a lower node, updates an asymmetric key pool by using the replacement parameter, and records the replacement parameter used at this time into a security chip.
4. The group communication method based on the asymmetric key pool with the hierarchical structure as claimed in claim 3, wherein after the trusted node receives the message, the trusted node obtains the second session key according to the method in step (3), decrypts the first encrypted message using the second session key, and verifies the signature information using an administrator public key existing in the local security chip.
5. The group communication method based on the asymmetric key pool with the hierarchical structure as claimed in claim 4, wherein in case that the sending trusted node has no lower node, the asymmetric key pool is updated by using the replacement parameter, and the replacement parameter used this time is recorded into the security chip;
and (3) when the trusted node has a subordinate node, the trusted node transmits the combination of the first message and the signature information to the subordinate node, the trusted node obtains a third session key according to the method in the step (2), encrypts a second message through the third session key to obtain a fourth message, calculates a second message verification code, combines the identity information of the trusted node, the current timestamp, the fourth message and the second message verification code to obtain a second encrypted message, transmits the second encrypted message to the subordinate node, updates the asymmetric key pool and the chip key by using the replacement parameter, and records the replacement parameter used at this time into the security chip.
6. The group communication method based on the asymmetric key pool with hierarchical structure as claimed in claim 5, wherein after receiving the second encrypted message, the lower node obtains the third session key according to the method in step (3), decrypts the second encrypted message using the third session key, and verifies the signature using the administrator public key existing in the local security chip.
7. The group communication method based on the asymmetric key pool of the hierarchical structure according to claim 6, wherein the illegal information of the untrusted node is notified to the nodes of each layer by layer as a notification, in case that one node is untrusted.
8. The group communication method based on the asymmetric key pool of the hierarchical structure as claimed in claim 6, which occurs in the case of a newly added trusted node, wherein the administrator allocates the chip key of the current layer of the group and the asymmetric key pool to the trusted node according to the layer number of the newly added trusted node, and notifies the nodes of each layer by layer, wherein the notification is a legal message of the newly added trusted node, and no key replacement is performed by each party in the communication process.
9. A group communication system based on a hierarchical asymmetric key pool, characterized in that the system comprises an administrator and a group node, the administrator and the group node communicate according to the method of any one of claims 1 to 8, the administrator and the group node are both matched with a security chip and have a disassembly-resistant function, and the administrator is the highest level and has the ability to issue a key fob.
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