CN114969799A - Method for resisting quantum computation block chain - Google Patents
Method for resisting quantum computation block chain Download PDFInfo
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- CN114969799A CN114969799A CN202210913697.6A CN202210913697A CN114969799A CN 114969799 A CN114969799 A CN 114969799A CN 202210913697 A CN202210913697 A CN 202210913697A CN 114969799 A CN114969799 A CN 114969799A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method for resisting a quantum computation block chain, which comprises the following steps: introducing qTESLA digital signatures and generating keys, generating electronic signatures of pseudo-random polynomials, verifying the electronic signatures and realizing quantum encryption resistance of block chains; the qTESLA digital signature is introduced into the block chain, the key of the digital signature and the electronic signature of the block chain are generated in the block chain, and the generated key and the electronic signature are adjusted and shortened at the same time, so that the use of the limited capacity of a single block is improved, and the capacity load of the single block is reduced, thereby realizing that the digital signature based on the lattice code resists the calculation attack of a quantum algorithm on the block chain, the signature of the block chain is not easy to be cracked by the quantum algorithm, and further improving the safety of the block chain.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of block chains, in particular to a method for resisting quantum computation block chains.
Background
The blockchain is a chain formed by blocks, each block stores certain information, the certain information is connected into the chain according to the time sequence generated by each block, the chain is stored in all servers, the whole blockchain is safe as long as one server in the whole system can work, the servers are called nodes in the blockchain system, the servers provide storage space and computational support for the whole blockchain system, if the information in the blockchain is required to be modified, more than half of the nodes must be proved to approve and modify the information in all the nodes, and the nodes are generally held in different subjects, so that the information in the blockchain is extremely difficult to tamper.
At the present stage, the development of the block chain technology is gradually perfected, the application range is wider and wider, the block chain technology has the characteristics of tamper prevention, forgery prevention and the like, however, with the development of quantum computers, a quantum algorithm for breaking the traditional public key cryptographic algorithm is continuously provided, so that some advantages of the block chain are challenged, the quantum computing is a novel computing mode for regulating and controlling a quantum information unit to compute according to the quantum mechanics law, and with the development of the quantum computing, the safety of a block chain system based on the traditional public key cryptographic system causes the doubt of people.
In order to resist the attack of a quantum algorithm on a block chain system, a public key cryptosystem for resisting the quantum algorithm needs to be used, at present, a plurality of methods for resisting the quantum computation block chain have appeared, but most of the existing methods for resisting the quantum algorithm to compute the block chain have single flow, complicated steps and backward encryption means for the block chain, and the block chain has low security because the computation attack of the quantum algorithm cannot be effectively resisted, so that the invention provides the method and the system for resisting the quantum computation block chain to solve the problems in the prior art.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above problems, the present invention aims to provide a method and a system for resisting quantum computation block chains, which solve the problems that the existing method for resisting quantum algorithm computation attack block chains has complicated steps, lagged encryption means for block chains, and cannot effectively resist quantum algorithm computation attack.
In order to achieve the purpose of the invention, the invention is realized by the following technical scheme: a method of resisting quantum computation blockchains, comprising the steps of:
the method comprises the following steps: constructing a digital signature qTESLA based on a lattice code through a zero-knowledge proof protocol, introducing the qTESLA digital signature into a block chain system, and generating a key of the qTESLA digital signature by adopting a Gaussian sampler;
step two: uniformly and randomly selecting a polynomial in a function of a specific ring, selecting a k-bit random character string as a pre-seed, wherein k is a natural variable, expanding the pre-seed into k polynomials through a seed generator, calculating the polynomials and generating the k-bit string, mapping the k-bit string into a pseudo-randomly generated polynomial, encoding the pseudo-randomly generated polynomial through a pin part, compiling into two arrays consisting of non-zero coefficients in the pseudo-random polynomial, and respectively using the two arrays as the position of the pseudo-random polynomial and an electronic signature;
step three: and adjusting and shortening the key length and the electronic signature length by using an interplanetary file system network protocol in advance, inputting the message, the electronic signature and the key into a pseudo-random polynomial and performing coding function operation on the pseudo-random polynomial to obtain two coefficient arrays, comparing and verifying the two coefficient arrays obtained by calculation and the two arrays consisting of the nonzero coefficients in the step two, if the comparison results are the same, successfully verifying, and receiving the successfully verified electronic signature by the block chain system to realize quantum encryption resistance of the block chain system.
The further improvement lies in that: in the first step, a structure for preventing secret key from being stolen is preset in the internal structure of the qTESLA digital signature, and the Gaussian sampler is simplified in advance before use.
The further improvement lies in that: in the first step, the specific steps of generating the key are as follows:
s1, inputting a pre-seed into a seed generator, randomly selecting k public polynomials on a specific ring, and obtaining a random seed;
s2, generating a secret polynomial and k error polynomials by using a Gaussian sampling function;
and S3, combining the pre-seed and the public polynomial to generate a public key, generating a character string through a Hash collision function, and generating a private key by jointly using the private polynomial, the error polynomial, the pre-seed, the random seed and the public key through the character string to obtain a key consisting of the public key and the private key.
The further improvement lies in that: gaussian discrete center distribution with standard deviation is used in the Gaussian sampling, the secret polynomial meets the requirement of a simplified check function, and the error polynomial meets the correctness check function.
The further improvement lies in that: in the second step, the specific generation step of the k-bit random character string is as follows: the message is calculated into 320-bit hash value through a collision hash function, then a k-bit random seed, a k-bit random character string and the hash value obtained through calculation are input into a seed generator, and then the seed generator outputs the k-bit random character string.
The further improvement lies in that: in the second step, the generation method of the k-bit string comprises: and carrying out rounding operator operation on the k polynomials, and generating a k-bit character string by acting the rounded operator operation and the character string generated by the collision hash.
The further improvement lies in that: in the third step, the action principle of the coding function is as follows: one polynomial is represented using two coefficient arrays, one of which represents the position of the polynomial and the other of which represents the signature of the polynomial.
The further improvement lies in that: in the third step, when the comparison and verification are carried out, if the comparison results are different, the verification fails, the block chain system refuses to accept the electronic signature, and the step is returned to produce the electronic signature again until the verification is successful.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the qTESLA digital signature is introduced into the block chain, the key of the digital signature and the electronic signature of the block chain are generated in the block chain, and the generated key and the electronic signature are adjusted and shortened at the same time, so that the use of the limited capacity of a single block is improved, and the capacity load of the single block is reduced, thereby realizing that the digital signature based on the lattice code resists the calculation attack of a quantum algorithm on the block chain, the signature of the block chain is not easy to be cracked by the quantum algorithm, and further improving the safety of the block chain.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to these drawings without creative efforts.
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow diagram of the process of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Example one
Referring to fig. 1, the present embodiment provides a method for resisting a quantum computation blockchain, including the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: introducing qTESLA digital signatures and generating keys
Constructing a lattice-code-based digital signature qTESLA through a zero-knowledge proof protocol, introducing a qTESLA digital signature with a structure for preventing a secret key from being stolen in an internal structure in a block chain system, and generating the secret key of the qTESLA digital signature by adopting a simplified Gaussian sampler in advance, wherein the specific steps of generating the secret key are as follows:
s1, inputting a pre-seed into a seed generator, randomly selecting k public polynomials on a specific ring, and obtaining a random seed;
s2, generating a secret polynomial and k error polynomials by using a Gaussian sampling function, wherein the secret polynomial meets the requirement of a simplified check function, the error polynomials meet the correctness check function, and Gaussian discrete center distribution with standard deviation is used in Gaussian sampling;
s3, combining the pre-seed and the public polynomial to generate a public key, generating a character string through a Hash collision function, and generating a private key by the private polynomial, the error polynomial, the pre-seed, the random seed and the public key through the character string to obtain a key consisting of the public key and the private key;
step two: electronic signature for generating pseudo-random polynomial
Uniformly and randomly selecting a polynomial in a function of a specific ring, and then selecting a k-bit random character string as a pre-seed, wherein k is a natural variable, and the specific generation steps of the k-bit random character string are as follows: firstly, calculating the message into a 320-bit hash value through a collision hash function, inputting a k-bit random seed, a k-bit random character string and the hash value obtained by calculation into a seed generator, and outputting a k-bit random character string by the seed generator;
and then expanding the pre-seed into k polynomials by a seed generator, calculating the polynomials and generating a k-bit string, wherein the generation method of the k-bit string comprises the following steps: performing rounding operator operation on the k polynomials, and acting with a character string generated by collision hash to generate a k-bit character string; then mapping the k-bit string into a pseudo-randomly generated polynomial, digitally coding the pseudo-randomly generated polynomial, and compiling the pseudo-randomly generated polynomial into two arrays consisting of non-zero coefficients in the pseudo-random polynomial, wherein the two arrays are respectively used as the position and the electronic signature of the pseudo-random polynomial;
step three: verifying electronic signatures and implementing quantum-resistant encryption of blockchains
Inputting the message, the electronic signature and the secret key into a pseudorandom polynomial and performing coding function operation on the pseudorandom polynomial to obtain two coefficient arrays, wherein the action principle of a coding function is as follows: representing a polynomial by using two coefficient arrays, wherein one array represents the position of the polynomial, and the other coefficient array represents the signature of the polynomial;
and then comparing and verifying the two coefficient arrays obtained by calculation with the two arrays consisting of the nonzero coefficients in the step two, if the comparison results are the same, successfully verifying, receiving the electronic signature successfully verified by the block chain system to realize quantum encryption resistance of the block chain system, if the comparison results are different, failing to verify, refusing to receive the electronic signature by the block chain system, and returning to the step to regenerate the electronic signature until the verification is successful.
In the embodiment, qTESLA digital signatures are introduced into the block chain, and a key of the digital signature and an electronic signature of the block chain are generated in the block chain, so that the block chain is resisted by the digital signature based on the lattice code.
Example two
Referring to fig. 1, the present embodiment provides a method for resisting a quantum computation blockchain, including the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: introducing qTESLA digital signatures and generating keys
Constructing a lattice-code-based digital signature qTESLA through a zero-knowledge proof protocol, introducing a qTESLA digital signature with a structure for preventing a secret key from being stolen in an internal structure in a block chain system, and generating the secret key of the qTESLA digital signature by adopting a simplified Gaussian sampler in advance, wherein the specific steps of generating the secret key are as follows:
s1, inputting a pre-seed into a seed generator, randomly selecting k public polynomials on a specific ring, and obtaining a random seed;
s2, generating a secret polynomial and k error polynomials by using a Gaussian sampling function, wherein the secret polynomial meets the requirement of a simplified check function, the error polynomials meet the correctness check function, and Gaussian discrete center distribution with standard deviation is used in Gaussian sampling;
s3, combining the pre-seed and the public polynomial to generate a public key, generating a character string through a Hash collision function, and generating a private key by the private polynomial, the error polynomial, the pre-seed, the random seed and the public key through the character string to obtain a key consisting of the public key and the private key;
step two: electronic signature for generating pseudo-random polynomial
Uniformly and randomly selecting a polynomial in a function of a specific ring, and then selecting a k-bit random character string as a pre-seed, wherein k is a natural variable, and the specific generation steps of the k-bit random character string are as follows: firstly, calculating the message into a 320-bit hash value through a collision hash function, inputting a k-bit random seed, a k-bit random character string and the hash value obtained by calculation into a seed generator, and outputting a k-bit random character string by the seed generator;
and then expanding the pre-seed into k polynomials by a seed generator, calculating the polynomials and generating a k-bit string, wherein the generation method of the k-bit string comprises the following steps: performing rounding operator operation on the k polynomials, and acting with a character string generated by collision hash to generate a k-bit character string; then mapping the k-bit string into a pseudo-randomly generated polynomial, digitally coding the pseudo-randomly generated polynomial, and compiling the pseudo-randomly generated polynomial into two arrays consisting of non-zero coefficients in the pseudo-random polynomial, wherein the two arrays are respectively used as the position and the electronic signature of the pseudo-random polynomial;
step three: verifying electronic signatures and implementing quantum-resistant encryption of blockchains
The key of qTESLA digital signature is stored through an interplanetary file system after being generated, the electronic signature is stored through the interplanetary file system after being generated, the key and the electronic signature are adjusted and shortened through an interplanetary file system network protocol so as to improve the use of the limited capacity of a single block, reduce the problem of overweight burden of the capacity of the single block, and simultaneously further improve the safety, and then the message, the electronic signature and the key are input into a pseudorandom polynomial and are subjected to coding function operation to obtain two coefficient arrays, wherein the action principle of the coding function is as follows: representing a polynomial by using two coefficient arrays, wherein one array represents the position of the polynomial, and the other coefficient array represents the signature of the polynomial;
and then comparing and verifying the two coefficient arrays obtained by calculation with the two arrays consisting of the nonzero coefficients in the step two, if the comparison results are the same, successfully verifying, receiving the electronic signature successfully verified by the block chain system to realize quantum encryption resistance of the block chain system, if the comparison results are different, failing to verify, refusing to receive the electronic signature by the block chain system, and returning to the step to regenerate the electronic signature until the verification is successful.
In the embodiment, qTESLA digital signatures are introduced into a block chain, a key of the digital signature and an electronic signature of the block chain are generated in the block chain, and the generated key and the generated electronic signature are adjusted and shortened at the same time, so that the use of the limited capacity of a single block is improved, the capacity load of the single block is reduced, and the digital signature based on the lattice code is realized to resist the computational attack of a quantum algorithm on the block chain.
The above description is only for the purpose of illustrating the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not to be construed as limiting the invention, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements and the like that fall within the spirit and principle of the present invention are intended to be included therein.
Claims (8)
1. A method of resisting quantum computation blockchains, comprising the steps of:
the method comprises the following steps: constructing a digital signature qTESLA based on a lattice code through a zero-knowledge proof protocol, introducing the qTESLA digital signature into a block chain system, and generating a key of the qTESLA digital signature by adopting a Gaussian sampler;
step two: uniformly and randomly selecting a polynomial in a function of a specific ring, selecting a k-bit random character string as a pre-seed, wherein k is a natural variable, expanding the pre-seed into k polynomials through a seed generator, calculating the polynomials and generating the k-bit string, mapping the k-bit string into a pseudo-randomly generated polynomial, encoding the pseudo-randomly generated polynomial through a pin part, compiling into two arrays consisting of non-zero coefficients in the pseudo-random polynomial, and respectively using the two arrays as the position of the pseudo-random polynomial and an electronic signature;
step three: and adjusting and shortening the length of the secret key and the length of the electronic signature by using an interplanetary file system network protocol in advance, inputting the message, the electronic signature and the secret key into a pseudorandom polynomial and performing coding function operation on the pseudorandom polynomial to obtain two coefficient arrays, comparing and verifying the two coefficient arrays obtained by calculation with the two arrays consisting of nonzero coefficients in the step two, and if the comparison results are the same, successfully verifying, and receiving the successfully verified electronic signature by a block chain system.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: in the first step, a structure for preventing secret key from being stolen is preset in the internal structure of the qTESLA digital signature, and the Gaussian sampler is simplified in advance before use.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: in the first step, the specific steps of generating the key are as follows:
s1, inputting a pre-seed into a seed generator, randomly selecting k public polynomials on a specific ring, and obtaining a random seed;
s2, generating a secret polynomial and k error polynomials by using a Gaussian sampling function;
and S3, combining the pre-seed and the public polynomial to generate a public key, generating a character string through a Hash collision function, and generating a private key by jointly using the private polynomial, the error polynomial, the pre-seed, the random seed and the public key through the character string to obtain a key consisting of the public key and the private key.
4. A method of resisting quantum computation block chaining as claimed in claim 3, wherein: gaussian discrete center distribution with standard deviation is used in the Gaussian sampling, the secret polynomial meets the requirement of a simplified check function, and the error polynomial meets the correctness check function.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: in the second step, the specific generation step of the k-bit random character string is as follows: the message is calculated into 320-bit hash value through a collision hash function, then a k-bit random seed, a k-bit random character string and the hash value obtained through calculation are input into a seed generator, and then the seed generator outputs the k-bit random character string.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: in the second step, the generation method of the k-bit string comprises: and carrying out rounding operator operation on the k polynomials, and generating a k-bit character string by acting the rounded operator operation and the character string generated by the collision hash.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: in the third step, the action principle of the coding function is as follows: one polynomial is represented using two coefficient arrays, one of which represents the position of the polynomial and the other of which represents the signature of the polynomial.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: in the third step, when the comparison and verification are carried out, if the comparison results are different, the verification fails, the block chain system refuses to accept the electronic signature, and the step is returned to produce the electronic signature again until the verification is successful.
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| CN112003707A (en) * | 2020-08-25 | 2020-11-27 | 湖南宸瀚信息科技有限责任公司 | Quantum computation attack resistant block chain digital signature encryption method and system |
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| 张佩君: "抗量子计算攻击的区块链技术研究", 《中国优秀硕士学位论文全文数据库信息科技辑》 * |
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