CN114866284A - Unmanned ship cluster distributed safety control method - Google Patents

Unmanned ship cluster distributed safety control method Download PDF

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CN114866284A
CN114866284A CN202210338174.3A CN202210338174A CN114866284A CN 114866284 A CN114866284 A CN 114866284A CN 202210338174 A CN202210338174 A CN 202210338174A CN 114866284 A CN114866284 A CN 114866284A
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unmanned ship
dos
aperiodic
dos attack
attack
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CN114866284B (en
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柳春
汪小帆
任肖强
蒲华燕
王曰英
彭艳
谢少荣
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University of Shanghai for Science and Technology
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1458Denial of Service
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Abstract

The invention provides a distributed safety control method for an unmanned ship cluster, which comprises the following steps: performing associated modeling on a wave disturbance model, a composite fault model and a DoS attack model of the unmanned ship cluster system to form a comprehensive model; establishing an aperiodic DoS attack model of the unmanned ship cluster according to the comprehensive model; and according to DoS attack activation and dormancy stages divided by the aperiodic DoS attack model, the unmanned ship cluster is enabled to implement switching between baseline control and distributed security control, and event-triggered unmanned ship cluster updatable control is carried out in the DoS attack dormancy stage.

Description

Unmanned ship cluster distributed safety control method
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of unmanned boats, in particular to a distributed safety control method for unmanned boat clusters.
Background
In recent years, with the depletion of land fuel resources, the strategic position of oceans occupying about 71% of the area of the earth has been increasing. The development of marine equipment technology is not feasible or feasible for the purpose of fully exploring and exploiting marine resources. The intelligent marine equipment represented by unmanned boats (including underwater navigation bodies, underwater robots, unmanned ships on water and the like) is a main carrier for offshore operation at present.
The working range of the unmanned ship is often in a water area with a complex and variable environment, and the unpredictable influence on the unmanned ship is often brought. Along with the improvement of the working capacity of the unmanned ship, the complexity of the unmanned ship is improved, and the safety guarantee of the unmanned ship is paid deep attention. The unmanned ship is required to discover possible faults as early as possible, and a proper and reasonable fault tolerance means is adopted to reduce potential risks of the unmanned ship, so that the realization of autonomous fault diagnosis and fault tolerance control of the unmanned ship is the core of safe navigation and operation of the unmanned ship.
Drones typically communicate and interconnect over a network, while networked drones are likely to fail due to DOS attacks. DoS is a short term for Denial of Service, i.e., Denial of Service, and the attack behavior of DoS is called DoS attack, which aims to make a computer or a network unable to provide normal services. The most common DoS attacks are computer network broadband attacks and connectivity attacks. Wherein the service resources include network bandwidth, file system space capacity, open processes or allowed connections. Such attacks can result in a lack of communication resources, and the consequences of such attacks cannot be avoided no matter how fast the processing speed of the computer is, how large the memory capacity is, and how fast the network bandwidth is.
The networked unmanned ship cluster has very serious consequences if the networked unmanned ship cluster is subjected to physical layer composite faults and network layer aperiodic DoS attacks.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a distributed security control method for an unmanned ship cluster, which aims to solve the problem that the reliability and the security of the conventional networked unmanned ship cluster cannot be maintained due to physical layer composite faults and network layer aperiodic DoS attacks.
In order to solve the technical problem, the invention provides a distributed safety control method for an unmanned ship cluster, which comprises the following steps:
performing associated modeling on a wave disturbance model, a composite fault model and a DoS attack model of the unmanned ship cluster system to form a comprehensive model;
establishing an aperiodic DoS attack model of the unmanned ship cluster according to the comprehensive model; and
and switching between the baseline control and the distributed security control of the unmanned ship cluster according to DoS attack activation and dormancy stages divided by an aperiodic DoS attack model, and performing event-triggered-based unmanned ship cluster updatable control in the DoS attack dormancy stage.
Optionally, in the distributed security control method for unmanned ship cluster, forming a comprehensive model and an aperiodic DoS attack model includes:
constructing a correlation model of wave disturbance and/or sudden change and/or slowly-changed executor composite fault and/or aperiodic DoS attack under an open and/or dynamic ocean scene of the unmanned ship;
establishing an aperiodic DoS attack model of the unmanned ship according to a differential activation and dormancy result of a communication topological link which is completely interrupted or kept connected caused by the aperiodic DoS attack; and
and introducing DoS attack frequency and average residence time indexes, and constructing an index constraint condition for aperiodic DoS attack under the unmanned ship cluster anti-attack target.
Optionally, in the distributed security control method for the unmanned ship cluster, performing, according to DoS attack activation and dormancy stages divided by an aperiodic DoS attack model, switching between baseline control and distributed security control on the unmanned ship cluster, and performing event-triggered-based unmanned ship cluster updatable control in the DoS attack dormancy stage includes:
and switching from the baseline security controller of the unmanned ship under the influence of the aperiodic DoS activation attack to the distributed security controller of the unmanned ship under the influence of the aperiodic DoS dormancy attack.
Optionally, in the distributed security control method for the unmanned ship cluster, the baseline security controller includes estimated compensation information, and its negative feedback function provides additional and positive information for compensating negative effects of faults in fault-tolerant control, implements a fault-tolerant target for effectively counteracting a composite fault of the physical layer actuator, and implements an anti-attack target at an aperiodic DoS attack activation stage of the network layer; and
the distributed safety controller comprises estimation compensation information and distributed state information which completes information interaction based on the latest successful trigger moment;
the distributed state information only needs to complete interaction at the latest successful triggering moment, and implements a fault-tolerant target for effectively counteracting the composite fault of the physical layer actuator and an anti-attack target in the non-periodic DoS attack dormancy stage of the network layer.
Optionally, in the distributed security control method for the unmanned ship cluster, the switching between the baseline control and the distributed security control is performed on the unmanned ship cluster according to DoS attack activation and dormancy stages divided by an aperiodic DoS attack model, and the event-triggered-based unmanned ship cluster updatable control is performed in the DoS attack dormancy stage, and further includes:
the unmanned ship cluster based on event triggering can be controlled in an updating mode, a low-complexity event-based distributed safety control mechanism is carried out, bandwidth occupation of communication topology in the unmanned ship cluster system is reduced, the influence of network physical threats is relieved, and an upper bound of an event triggering threshold is set to eliminate cyclic repetitive triggering behaviors.
Optionally, in the distributed safety control method for unmanned ship cluster, the method further includes:
wave disturbance omega is introduced into the swinging, yawing and rolling motion equations of the ith unmanned ship i (t)=[ω ψi (t)ω φi (t)] T And composite faults of exponential abrupt change and gradual change actuators
Figure BDA0003577394210000031
The dynamic equation of the wave disturbance-compound fault of the unmanned ship is obtained and expressed as follows:
Figure BDA0003577394210000032
establishing an aperiodic DoS attack model, and modeling the aperiodic DoS attack into an activated state and a dormant state;
three indexes are given for aperiodic DoS attack, and the indexes are respectively the DoS attack number N Γ (t 0 T), DoS attack frequency
Figure BDA0003577394210000033
And total activation time interval Γ in DoS attacks a (t 0 Average residence time index τ in t) a > 0, wherein
Figure BDA0003577394210000036
Respectively, as the number of DoS activation attacks and DoS sleep attacks.
Optionally, in the distributed safety control method for unmanned ship cluster, the method further includes:
defining the total activation and sleep intervals of aperiodic DoS attack
Figure BDA0003577394210000034
Total activation time interval for aperiodic DoS attack, i.e. the information exchange is interrupted within the time interval, where t 0 Is the initial time, t is the termination time, U is the union, and n is the intersection,
Figure BDA0003577394210000035
activating a time interval for the r-th DoS attack, r being a natural number, wherein
Figure BDA0003577394210000041
For aperiodic DoS attack at [ t ] 0 ,t]An activating sequence of intervals, and
Figure BDA0003577394210000042
non-periodic time varying intervals;
distributed anti-attack security control cannot be realized by using information of adjacent unmanned boats within the total activation time interval of aperiodic DoS attack;
definition of Γ d (t 0 ,t)=[t 0 ,t]\Γ a (t 0 T) is the total sleep time interval of aperiodic DoS attack, i.e. information interaction is allowed in the time interval, and the connected topology is not changed, \ is a residual set;
distributed anti-attack security control can be realized by using information of adjacent unmanned boats in the total dormancy time interval of aperiodic DoS attack;
aiming at aperiodic DoS attack modeling, setting the DoS attack number, the DoS attack frequency and the average residence time, and defining
Figure BDA0003577394210000043
Is the number of DoS attacks, among them
Figure BDA00035773942100000412
Respectively representing the number of DoS activation attacks and the number of DoS dormancy attacks; definition of
Figure BDA0003577394210000044
Is the frequency of DoS attacks, wherein
Figure BDA00035773942100000411
Expressed as the number of DoS activation attacks; total activation time interval Γ in DoS attacks a (t 0 T) defining a threshold value Γ 0 Not less than 0 and an average residence time index τ a > 0 satisfy
Figure BDA0003577394210000045
Determining a DoS attack frequency satisfying the following constraint
Figure BDA0003577394210000046
And average residence time τ a
Figure BDA0003577394210000047
τ a >(α 1* ) -112 )
And enabling the distributed security control of the unmanned boat cluster to be positioned in the aperiodic DoS dormancy attack time interval, and simultaneously enabling the baseline security control of the unmanned boat cluster to be positioned in the aperiodic DoS activation attack time interval.
Optionally, in the distributed safety control method for unmanned ship cluster, the method further includes:
according to the activation interval time F of aperiodic DoS attack a (t 0 T) unmanned ship trunking communications are interrupted using estimated information from distributed unknown input observers
Figure BDA0003577394210000048
Under modeling of non-periodic DoS activation attack of the unmanned ship cluster, designing a baseline security controller of the ith unmanned ship represented as follows:
Figure BDA0003577394210000049
wherein K 1 =[K x K f ]Expressed as compensation gain, where K x Estimating gain for internal states, and K f Expressed as the fault estimation gain, the following is specific:
Figure BDA00035773942100000410
the designed baseline safety controller only contains estimation compensation information
Figure BDA0003577394210000051
Improving increased state and fault estimation information
Figure BDA0003577394210000052
Unmanned ship angle and angular velocity state estimation information from distributed unknown input observer
Figure BDA0003577394210000053
And actuator composite fault estimation information
Figure BDA0003577394210000054
The negative feedback function provides additional and positive information for compensating the negative influence of the fault in the fault-tolerant control, improves the singleness and the conservatism of the existing independent fault estimation and independent fault-tolerant control technology, fully utilizes the organic relation of the fault estimation and the fault-tolerant control, and finally realizes the fault-tolerant target for effectively counteracting the composite fault of the physical layer actuator and the anti-attack target at the aperiodic DoS attack activation stage of the network layer.
Optionally, in the distributed safety control method for unmanned ship cluster, the method further includes:
according to sleep interval time gamma of aperiodic DoS attack d (t 0 T) allowing unmanned ship cluster communication, and updating the unmanned ship cluster distributed security controller in an aperiodic DoS attack dormancy interval period;
according to the baseline security controller, under the modeling of the aperiodic DoS dormancy attack of the unmanned ship cluster, switching and designing the distributed security controller based on the event triggering mechanism of the ith unmanned ship represented as follows:
Figure BDA0003577394210000055
wherein K 2 Expressed as information exchange gain, a ij Is composed of
Figure BDA0003577394210000056
Row i and column j element values of, wherein
Figure BDA0003577394210000057
And
Figure BDA0003577394210000058
respectively a communication topology adjacency matrix in graph theory and a set of nodes adjacent to the ith node;
Figure BDA0003577394210000059
respectively representing the status values of the ith unmanned ship and the jth unmanned ship which finish information interaction at the latest successful triggering moment;
distributed security controller including estimation compensation information
Figure BDA00035773942100000510
Also comprises distributed state information based on the latest successful trigger moment to complete information interaction
Figure BDA00035773942100000511
Gain K through information interaction 2 And connecting, and finishing interaction of the distributed state information at the latest successful triggering moment.
Optionally, in the distributed safety control method for unmanned ship cluster, the method further includes:
sleep interval time Γ in aperiodic DoS attack d (t 0 T) allowing unmanned ship cluster communication, and updating the unmanned ship cluster distributed security controller in a non-periodic DoS attack dormancy interval time period; sleep interval time gamma for DoS attack d (t 0 Time series in t)
Figure BDA00035773942100000512
To perform event-triggered sampling to update the security controller at each event-triggered time
Figure BDA00035773942100000513
Is activated;
finishing the state value of information interaction according to the latest successful triggering moment of the ith unmanned ship
Figure BDA00035773942100000514
Constructing a state interaction error signal
Figure BDA00035773942100000515
Error δ according to state interaction i (t) and event trigger Upper threshold definition as represented belowDetermining an update time sequence
Figure BDA00035773942100000516
Figure BDA0003577394210000061
Wherein theta is i The more than 0 represents a threshold scalar based on time triggering, | | | | | represents a two-norm, and the moment when the constraint condition is met is the sampling updating moment capable of event triggering
Figure BDA0003577394210000062
The event trigger threshold is bounded above by
Figure BDA0003577394210000063
The inventor of the invention finds, through research, that aiming at the problem of distributed cooperative control of the unmanned ship cluster, the prior art often focuses on solving a single constraint problem, for example, considering single wave disturbance of a physical layer, single actuator partial failure, blocking, saturation fault or single network attack influence of a network layer, and does not deeply research the influence on the cooperative consistency target of the unmanned ship cluster under each constraint association modeling, so that the prior art has limitations in processing multi-constraint problems and association modeling problems;
in addition, due to the existence of aperiodic DoS network attacks, links of a unmanned ship cluster network layer respectively keep interruption and connection in the activation and dormancy states of the aperiodic DoS attacks, namely interruption and connection of information transmission and interaction between unmanned ships, and the conventional graph theory-based multi-agent system cooperative control method cannot be directly popularized and applied to unmanned ship cluster systems affected by DoS attacks, and an aperiodic DoS attack model does not need to be established and a novel distributed security control method for unmanned ship cluster resisting DoS attacks is developed;
the distributed safety control method of the unmanned ship cluster aims to solve the problems that sudden change and slow change actuator composite faults exist in a physical layer and aperiodic DoS attacks exist in a network layer under open and dynamic ocean scenes, achieves a fault-tolerant target for effectively counteracting the physical layer composite faults and a defense target for the network layer DoS attacks through the distributed safety control method, and simultaneously guarantees the reliability, stability and safety of the unmanned ship cluster.
Firstly, wave disturbance-compound fault-DoS attack associated modeling of an unmanned ship cluster system in an open and dynamic ocean scene is realized, so that the method is not limited to single disturbance modeling, physical fault modeling or network attack modeling, and a real and accurate associated model of wave disturbance, compound fault of a sudden change and a gradual change actuator and aperiodic DoS attack in the open and dynamic ocean scene of the unmanned ship is established;
secondly, the aperiodic DoS attack modeling of the unmanned ship cluster realizes creatively establishing an aperiodic DoS attack model according to the dissimilarity activation and dormancy result that communication topology links are completely interrupted or are communicated due to aperiodic DoS attack, introduces DoS attack frequency and average residence time index, improves the safety control that a multi-agent system cooperative control method based on graph theory under fixed topology, switching topology and random topology can not be directly popularized and applied to the unmanned ship cluster system affected by DoS attack, and establishes an index constraint condition that the aperiodic DoS attack can be realized under an attack-resistant target by the unmanned ship cluster;
and the unmanned ship cluster switching type baseline control and the distributed safety control comprise the unmanned ship cluster switching control idea, namely switching from the baseline safety controller of the unmanned ship under the influence of aperiodic DoS activation attack to the distributed safety controller of the unmanned ship under the influence of aperiodic DoS dormancy attack. The designed baseline security controller only contains estimation compensation information, the negative feedback function of the baseline security controller provides additional and positive information for compensating negative influences of faults in fault-tolerant control, the singleness and the conservatism of the existing independent fault estimation and independent fault-tolerant control technology are improved, the organic connection of fault estimation and fault-tolerant control is fully utilized, and finally, the fault-tolerant target of effective offset of the composite faults of the physical layer actuator and the anti-attack target of the non-periodic DoS attack activation stage of the network layer are realized. The designed distributed security controller not only contains estimation compensation information, but also contains distributed state information for completing information interaction based on the latest successful trigger moment, and the distributed state information only needs to complete interaction at the latest successful trigger moment, so that the limitations of huge data volume and redundancy caused by uniform sampling trigger, uncertainty of data volume caused by random sampling trigger and large network transmission bandwidth resource burden in the prior art are improved, and the limitation of complete information acquisition in the scene that the prior sensor sensing technology needs to be more complete and truer ocean unmanned ship task is also overcome, thereby realizing a fault-tolerant target for effectively counteracting the composite fault of a physical layer actuator and an anti-attack target in the network layer non-periodic DoS attack dormancy stage.
And finally, updating a control strategy based on the event-triggered unmanned ship cluster: the improved event-triggered unmanned ship cluster updatable control strategy realizes a low-complexity event-based distributed safety control mechanism so as to reduce the bandwidth occupation of communication topology in an unmanned ship cluster system and alleviate the influence of network physical threats, and meanwhile, the designed upper bound of an event trigger threshold can eliminate the cyclic repetitive trigger behavior. Further, the improved event triggering mechanism also overcomes the redundancy of data volume caused by uniform time sampling triggering and the uncertainty of data volume caused by random time sampling triggering in the prior art.
In summary, distributed security control (effective fault tolerance of physical faults and effective defense of network attacks) of unmanned ship clusters under the influence of network layer aperiodic DoS attacks and physical layer actuator composite faults realizes reliable and stable unmanned ship coordination consistency, and plays an important role in aspects of military operation enclosure capture, driving away, mine sweeping, anti-submergence and the like, civil field material supply, topographic mapping, sea surface rescue, unmanned search and the like.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a distributed security control method for an unmanned ship cluster in an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further elucidated with reference to the drawings in conjunction with the detailed description.
It should be noted that the components in the figures may be exaggerated and not necessarily to scale for illustrative purposes. In the figures, identical or functionally identical components are provided with the same reference symbols.
In the present invention, unless otherwise specified, "disposed on …", "disposed over …" and "disposed over …" do not exclude the presence of an intermediate therebetween. Further, "disposed on or above …" merely indicates the relative positional relationship between two components, and may also be converted to "disposed below or below …" and vice versa in certain cases, such as after reversing the product direction.
In the present invention, the embodiments are only intended to illustrate the aspects of the present invention, and should not be construed as limiting.
In the present invention, the terms "a" and "an" do not exclude the context of a plurality of elements, unless otherwise specified.
It is further noted herein that in embodiments of the present invention, only a portion of the components or assemblies may be shown for clarity and simplicity, but those skilled in the art will appreciate that the components or assemblies required may be added as needed in the particular context under the teachings of the present invention. Furthermore, features from different embodiments of the invention may be combined with each other, unless otherwise indicated. For example, a feature of the second embodiment may be substituted for a corresponding or functionally equivalent or similar feature of the first embodiment, and the resulting embodiments may likewise fall within the scope of the disclosure or recitation of the present application.
It is also noted herein that, within the scope of the present invention, the terms "same", "equal", and the like do not mean that the two values are absolutely equal, but allow some reasonable error, that is, the terms also encompass "substantially the same", "substantially equal". By analogy, in the present invention, the terms "perpendicular", "parallel" and the like in the directions of the tables also cover the meanings of "substantially perpendicular", "substantially parallel".
In addition, the numbering of the steps of the methods of the present invention does not limit the order of execution of the steps of the methods. Unless specifically stated, the method steps may be performed in a different order.
The distributed safety control method for the unmanned ship cluster provided by the invention is further described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. The advantages and features of the present invention will become more apparent from the following description. It is to be noted that the drawings are in a very simplified form and are not to precise scale, which is provided solely for the purpose of facilitating and distinctly claiming the embodiments of the present invention.
The invention aims to provide a distributed security control method for an unmanned ship cluster, which aims to solve the problem that very serious results are brought when the existing networked unmanned ship cluster is attacked by aperiodic DoS (denial of service).
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a distributed security control method for unmanned surface vehicle cluster, comprising: performing associated modeling on a wave disturbance model, a composite fault model and a DoS attack model of the unmanned ship cluster system to form a comprehensive model; establishing an aperiodic DoS attack model of the unmanned ship cluster according to the comprehensive model; and switching the unmanned ship cluster between baseline control and distributed safety control according to the aperiodic DoS attack model, and performing event-triggered-based renewable control on the unmanned ship cluster.
Fig. 1 provides a first embodiment of the invention, which shows a schematic flow diagram of a distributed security control method for an unmanned boat cluster; as shown in fig. 1, the distributed safety control method for unmanned ship cluster in this embodiment includes:
the method comprises the following steps: according to the conventional unmanned ship swinging, yawing and rolling motion equations, N unmanned ships are arranged to form a networked unmanned ship cluster system, and the composite faults of sudden change and gradual change executors are considered to occur in a rudder deflection angle channel in the ith unmanned ship (i is 1, … and N), namely:
Figure BDA0003577394210000091
Figure BDA0003577394210000092
Figure BDA0003577394210000093
Figure BDA0003577394210000094
Figure BDA0003577394210000095
wherein v is i (t),r i (t),ψ i (t),p i (t),φ i (t),δ i (t) is expressed as roll speed, yaw angle, roll speed, roll angle, rudder angle, and ω, respectively, of the ith unmanned ship ψi (t),ω φi (t) wave disturbances, ζ, ω, expressed as wave disturbances of the yaw channel and wave disturbances of the roll channel of the ith unmanned ship n Expressed as damping ratio and natural frequency, T v ,T r Expressed as a time constant, K dv ,K dr ,K vr ,K dp ,K vp Represented as the drones system gain matrix.
Superimposed in rudder deflection angle passages
Figure BDA0003577394210000101
Expressed as a sudden and gradual actuator composite failure. Order to
Figure BDA0003577394210000102
And is
Figure BDA0003577394210000103
Respectively representIs composed of
Figure BDA0003577394210000104
The specific mutation and slow change actuator composite fault exponential model is modeled as follows:
Figure BDA0003577394210000105
wherein
Figure RE-GDA0003735234800000106
Expressed as the upper limit of the constant fault, the time of occurrence of the fault and the rate of decay of the fault. The characteristics of unobvious early characteristics and unobvious behaviors of the slowly-varying fault are highlighted by introducing exponential modeling, and when the fault attenuation rate meets the requirement
Figure RE-GDA0003735234800000107
When the fault of the actuator is a slowly varying fault; when the failure attenuation rate is satisfied
Figure RE-GDA0003735234800000108
When the actuator fails, the actuator fails to fail abruptly, wherein
Figure RE-GDA0003735234800000109
Is a constant value known to be set.
Step two: according to the motion equations of the rocking, yawing and rolling of the ith unmanned ship in the step one, defining the system state x of the unmanned ship dynamic equation i (t) measurable output y of angle sensor i (t) wave-induced external disturbance ω i (t) are each x i (t)=[v i (t)r i (t)ψ i (t)p i (t)φ i (t)] T ,y i (t)=[ψ i (t)φ i (t)] Ti (t)=[ω ψi (t)ω φi (t)] T The available unmanned boat dynamic equation is expressed as follows:
Figure BDA00035773942100001010
wherein
Figure BDA00035773942100001011
The complex faults are expressed as index type sudden change and gradual change actuators, and gain matrixes A, B, F, E and C of the unmanned ship dynamic equation are expressed as follows:
Figure BDA00035773942100001012
step three: the networked unmanned ship clusters are connected with each other through a communication network, and the network layer of the networked unmanned ship clusters can be influenced by aperiodic DoS attack of enemy attackers. Links of the unmanned ship cluster network layer respectively keep interruption and connection in the activation and dormancy states of the aperiodic DoS attack, namely interruption and connection of information transmission between the unmanned ships.
Definition of
Figure BDA00035773942100001013
Total activation time interval for aperiodic DoS attack, i.e. the information exchange is interrupted in the time interval, where t 0 Is the initial time, t is the termination time, U is the union, n is the intersection,
Figure BDA00035773942100001014
activating a time interval (r is a natural number) for the r-th DoS attack, wherein
Figure BDA00035773942100001016
For non-periodic DoS attacks at [ t ] 0 ,t]An activating sequence of intervals, and
Figure BDA00035773942100001015
are non-periodic time varying intervals. And the distributed anti-attack security control can not be realized by utilizing the information of the adjacent unmanned ship within the total activation time interval of the aperiodic DoS attack.
Definition of Γ d (t 0 ,t)=[t 0 ,t]\Γ a (t 0 T) is aperiodic DoS attackClick on the total sleep interval, i.e., information interaction is allowed within the interval, and the connectivity topology does not change, \ as a residual set. And the distributed anti-attack security control can be realized by utilizing the information of the adjacent unmanned ship in the total sleep time interval of the aperiodic DoS attack.
Aiming at aperiodic DoS attack modeling, three types of indexes are given, and the three types of indexes are respectively as follows:
DoS attack number N Γ (t 0 T): definition of
Figure BDA0003577394210000111
Wherein
Figure BDA0003577394210000112
Respectively, as the number of DoS activation attacks and DoS sleep attacks.
DoS attack frequency
Figure BDA0003577394210000113
Definition of
Figure BDA0003577394210000114
Wherein
Figure BDA0003577394210000115
Expressed as the number of DoS activation attacks.
DoS attack Total activation time Interval Γ a (t 0 T): has a threshold value gamma 0 Not less than 0 and an average residence time index τ a Is greater than 0, satisfy
Figure BDA0003577394210000116
Step four: according to the dynamic equation of the ith unmanned ship in the step two, defining the augmentation state of the augmentation model of the ith unmanned ship as
Figure BDA0003577394210000117
Uncertainty of amplification of
Figure BDA0003577394210000118
The following table can be obtainedThe augmented model of the ith unmanned ship of (1):
Figure BDA0003577394210000119
wherein the system augmentation matrix of the ith unmanned ship augmentation model is represented as follows:
Figure BDA00035773942100001110
where 0 is represented as a matrix with elements of 0.
Then according to an augmented model of the unmanned ship, a distributed unknown input observer is designed to effectively estimate the composite faults of an internal state, unknown mutation and a slow-changing actuator;
Figure BDA00035773942100001111
wherein z is i (t) is expressed as the state of the unknown input observer,
Figure BDA00035773942100001112
indicated as an augmented state
Figure BDA00035773942100001113
In which
Figure BDA00035773942100001114
Expressed as system state x i (t) estimated state of
Figure BDA00035773942100001115
Expressed as actuator complex fault f δi The estimated fault of (t), M, G, J, H, is expressed as an unknown input observer gain matrix.
Step five: activation interval time gamma in aperiodic DoS attack a (t 0 T) the communication of the unmanned ship cluster is interrupted, and only the distributed unknown input observation obtained in the fourth step can be usedEstimated information of device
Figure BDA00035773942100001116
(including unmanned boat angle, angular velocity state estimation information)
Figure BDA00035773942100001117
And also contains actuator composite fault estimation information
Figure BDA0003577394210000121
) Under modeling of DoS attack of unmanned ship cluster, designing a baseline security controller of the ith unmanned ship expressed as follows to realize a fault-tolerant target of composite fault of a physical layer actuator and an anti-attack target of a network layer non-periodic DoS attack activation stage;
Figure BDA0003577394210000122
wherein K is 1 =[K x K f ]Expressed as a compensation gain, where K x Estimating gain for internal states, and K f Expressed as the fault estimation gain, as follows:
Figure BDA0003577394210000123
wherein the damping ratio and the natural frequency ζ, ω n Time constant T v ,T r Gain K of unmanned surface vehicle system dv ,K dr ,K vr ,K dp ,K vp See step one for definition of (1).
Step six: sleep interval time Γ in aperiodic DoS attack d (t 0 And t) the unmanned ship cluster communication is allowed, and the updating of the unmanned ship cluster distributed security controller can be realized only in the non-periodic DoS attack dormancy interval time period. Sleep interval time gamma for DoS attack d (t 0 T) is defined therein
Figure BDA0003577394210000124
For time-series based event-triggered control, i.e. the i-th updatable security controller at each event-triggered moment
Figure BDA0003577394210000125
Is activated. At each triggerable time period
Figure BDA0003577394210000126
According to the baseline security controller in the fifth step, under the modeling of unmanned ship cluster DoS attack, a distributed security controller based on an event triggering mechanism of the ith unmanned ship is designed to realize the fault tolerance target of the composite fault of the physical layer actuator and the anti-attack target of the network layer in the non-periodic DoS attack dormancy stage,
Figure BDA0003577394210000127
wherein K 2 Expressed as information exchange gain, a ij Is composed of
Figure BDA0003577394210000128
Row i and column j element values of, wherein
Figure BDA0003577394210000129
And
Figure BDA00035773942100001210
respectively a communication topology adjacency matrix in graph theory and a set of nodes adjacent to the ith node.
Figure BDA00035773942100001211
The state values respectively expressed as the information interaction completion state values of the ith unmanned ship and the jth unmanned ship at the latest successful triggering moment comprise the following definitions:
Figure BDA00035773942100001212
wherein
Figure BDA00035773942100001213
Expressed as the latest successful trigger time value, and scalar k i (t) is represented by
Figure BDA00035773942100001214
Step seven: according to the state value of finishing information interaction at the latest successful triggering moment of the ith unmanned ship acquired in the step six
Figure BDA00035773942100001215
Constructing a state interaction error signal
Figure BDA00035773942100001216
Error δ according to state interaction i (t) and the event trigger mechanism as shown below can explicitly update the time sequence
Figure BDA00035773942100001217
Figure BDA00035773942100001218
Wherein theta is i The more than 0 represents a threshold scalar based on time triggering, and the less than the threshold scalar based on time triggering represents a two-norm, that is, the uniform sampling according to the specified frequency is not needed, and the sampling updating time which can be triggered by the event is only the time when the constraint condition is met
Figure BDA0003577394210000131
Step eight: firstly, the following algebraic Riccati equation is solved to obtain a symmetrical positive definite matrix P and a positive definite matrix Q 1 And a normal number k 1
PA+A T P-k 1 PBB T P+Q 1 =0
And a gain matrix A and a gain matrix B of the unmanned ship dynamic equation are shown in the step two. From the solved matrices P, Q 1 And a constant k 1 Solving the following linear matrix inequality to obtain positive definite matrix Q 2 And step five, estimating gain K of the internal state to be solved x
Figure BDA0003577394210000132
Secondly, set up
Figure BDA0003577394210000133
Wherein 1 is N Is an N × 1 column matrix of elements 1, I N The gain matrix E is shown in step two in the form of an N × N unit matrix. Solving the following inequality constraints to obtain a scalar quantity
Figure BDA0003577394210000134
Figure BDA0003577394210000135
Figure BDA0003577394210000136
Wherein epsilon 13 To set the normal number, λ maxmin Expressed as maximum and minimum eigenvalues, max { } expressed as taking the maximum value,
Figure BDA0003577394210000137
expressed as a Laplace matrix of communication topology in graph theory
Figure BDA0003577394210000138
The largest feature root. Time-triggered threshold scalar theta in the seventh simultaneous step i Satisfy the requirement of
Figure BDA0003577394210000139
Thirdly, a normal number epsilon is set 2 ,∈ inc Solving the following inequality constraint to obtainValue scalar alpha 12
Figure BDA00035773942100001310
Figure BDA00035773942100001311
Figure BDA00035773942100001312
Wherein min { } represents taking the minimum value.
Finally, set k 3 =||PBK 1 And according to the compensation gain K in the step five 1 =[K x K f ]Further, a representation scalar quantity can be set as follows
Figure BDA00035773942100001313
Figure BDA0003577394210000141
Figure BDA0003577394210000142
Step nine: according to the scalar solved in step eight
Figure BDA0003577394210000143
Solving the following matrix inequality can obtain the matrix H, J 1 :
Figure BDA0003577394210000144
Wherein
Figure BDA0003577394210000145
And is
Figure BDA0003577394210000146
See step four. The remaining unknown input observer gain matrices G, J in step four may be set to
Figure BDA0003577394210000147
Wherein the system amplification matrix
Figure BDA00035773942100001421
See step four. Further, an information interaction gain K is set 2 Is K 2 =τk 1 B T P, wherein the normal number τ satisfies
Figure BDA0003577394210000148
And is
Figure BDA0003577394210000149
Is a Laplace matrix
Figure BDA00035773942100001410
The smallest non-zero feature root.
Step ten: giving a normal coefficient sigma according to the matrix and the constant parameters set and solved in the step eight and the step nine * ∈(0,α 1 ) According to the index definition for modeling aperiodic DoS attack in step three (DoS attack frequency)
Figure BDA00035773942100001411
And average residence time τ a > 0), in the time interval [ t 0 T) when the following DoS attack frequency is satisfied
Figure BDA00035773942100001412
And average residence time τ a And the constraint ensures that the proposed unmanned ship cluster distributed safety control method can finally realize the index consistency target of the unmanned ship cluster,
Figure BDA00035773942100001413
τ a >(α 1* ) -112 )
wherein
Figure BDA00035773942100001414
α 12 And (5) taking values in the step eight.
Further, setting the state consistency error signal to
Figure BDA00035773942100001415
The index consistency performance of the ith unmanned ship is expressed by an index type index of state consistency errors:
Figure BDA00035773942100001416
wherein the exponential decay rate is
Figure BDA00035773942100001417
Amplitude of
Figure BDA00035773942100001418
Wherein eta Γ0 Is a preset normal number, and
Figure BDA00035773942100001419
denoted as initial t 0 A time state consistency error signal.
In conclusion, the invention provides a plurality of innovation points, and particularly provides a wave disturbance-compound fault-DoS attack correlation modeling of an unmanned ship cluster system, wherein wave disturbance omega is introduced into the motion equations of the swing, yaw and roll of the ith unmanned ship in the step two i (t)=[ω ψi (t)ω φi (t)] T And composite faults of exponential abrupt change and gradual change actuators
Figure BDA00035773942100001420
The available unmanned ship 'wave disturbance-compound fault' dynamic equation is expressed as follows:
Figure BDA0003577394210000151
and establishing an aperiodic DoS attack model in the third step, and modeling the aperiodic DoS attack into an activated state and a dormant state. And defining an aperiodic DoS attack total activation time interval (distributed anti-attack security control can not be realized by using the information of the adjacent unmanned ship) and an aperiodic DoS attack total dormancy time interval (distributed anti-attack security control can be realized by using the information of the adjacent unmanned ship). Further, three types of indexes are given for aperiodic DoS attack, and the indexes are respectively the DoS attack number N Γ (t 0 ,t) (
Figure BDA0003577394210000154
Expressed as the number of DoS activation attacks and DoS sleep attacks, respectively); DoS attack frequency
Figure BDA0003577394210000153
And total activation time interval Γ in DoS attacks a (t 0 Mean residence time index τ in t) a >0。
The wave disturbance-composite fault-DoS attack multi-element association mechanism analysis improves the single constraint problem (single wave disturbance of a physical layer, partial failure of a single actuator, blocking, saturation fault or attack influence of a network layer) solved by the prior art, and constructs a real and accurate association model of the wave disturbance, the composite fault of a sudden change and slowly changing actuator and the aperiodic DoS attack in a relatively perfect unmanned ship open and dynamic ocean scene, thereby providing reference and support for researching the multi-constraint problem and the association modeling problem under the unmanned ship cluster security control target.
The invention also provides the modeling of the aperiodic DoS attack of the unmanned ship cluster, and due to the existence of the aperiodic DoS network attack, each link of the unmanned ship cluster network layer respectively keeps interruption and connection in the activation and dormancy states of the aperiodic DoS attack, namely interruption and connection of information transmission and interaction between the unmanned ships. According to the method, an aperiodic DoS attack model of the unmanned ship is creatively established according to the results of dissimilarity activation and dormancy of communication topology links caused by aperiodic DoS attack or communication maintenance, the DoS attack frequency and the average residence time index are introduced, the graph theory-based multi-agent system cooperative control method under fixed topology, switching topology and random topology is improved, the method cannot be directly popularized and applied to the safety control of the unmanned ship cluster system affected by the DoS attack, and the index constraint condition of the unmanned ship cluster on the aperiodic DoS attack under the attack resisting target can be realized.
Two types of definitions of the total active and total sleep intervals of aperiodic DoS attacks are given in step three. The method specifically comprises the following steps: definition of
Figure BDA0003577394210000152
Total activation time interval for aperiodic DoS attack, i.e. the information exchange is interrupted in the time interval, where t 0 Is the initial time, t is the termination time, U is the union, n is the intersection,
Figure BDA0003577394210000161
activating a time interval (r is a natural number) for the r-th DoS attack, wherein
Figure BDA0003577394210000162
For aperiodic DoS attack at [ t ] 0 ,t]An activating sequence of intervals, and
Figure BDA0003577394210000163
non-periodic time varying intervals. And the distributed anti-attack security control can not be realized by utilizing the information of the adjacent unmanned ship in the total activation time interval of the aperiodic DoS attack. Definition of Γ d (t 0 ,t)=[t 0 ,t]\Γ a (t 0 T) is the total sleep interval of aperiodic DoS attack, i.e. information interaction is allowed in the time interval, and the connected topology does not change, \\ is a residual set. In a non-periodic mannerAnd in the DoS attack total sleep time interval, the information of the adjacent unmanned ship can be utilized to realize distributed anti-attack safety control.
Meanwhile, in the third step, aiming at the modeling of the aperiodic DoS attack, three indexes of DoS attack quantity, DoS attack frequency and average residence time are provided, specifically: definition of
Figure BDA0003577394210000164
Is the number of DoS attacks, among them
Figure BDA0003577394210000165
Respectively representing the number of DoS activation attacks and the number of DoS dormancy attacks; definition of
Figure BDA0003577394210000166
Is the frequency of DoS attacks, wherein
Figure BDA0003577394210000167
Expressed as the number of DoS activation attacks; total activation time interval Γ in DoS attacks a (t 0 T) defining a threshold value Γ 0 Not less than 0 and an average residence time index τ a > 0 satisfy
Figure BDA0003577394210000168
Further proposed in step ten is the DoS attack frequency satisfying the following constraint
Figure BDA0003577394210000169
And average residence time τ a
Figure BDA00035773942100001610
τ a >(α 1* ) -112 )
Therefore, the distributed security control of the unmanned ship cluster is only positioned in the aperiodic DoS sleep attack time interval (information can be interacted), meanwhile, the baseline security control of the unmanned ship cluster is positioned in the non-periodic DoS activation attack time interval (information cannot be interacted), and then the index consistency target of the unmanned ship cluster is finally achieved.
The invention also provides a cluster switching type baseline control and distributed safety control method for the unmanned ship, and the innovation point comprises the idea of cluster switching control of the unmanned ship, namely switching from a baseline safety controller of the unmanned ship under the influence of aperiodic DoS activation attack to a distributed safety controller of the unmanned ship under the influence of aperiodic DoS dormancy attack.
On the one hand, in step five, the activation interval time Γ is considered to be in the aperiodic DoS attack a (t 0 T) unmanned ship cluster communication is interrupted, only estimation information of a distributed unknown input observer can be utilized
Figure BDA00035773942100001611
Under the modeling of the aperiodic DoS activated attack of the unmanned ship cluster, designing a baseline security controller of the ith unmanned ship represented as follows:
Figure BDA0003577394210000171
wherein K 1 =[K x K f ]Expressed as compensation gain, where K x Estimating gain for internal states, and K f Expressed as the fault estimation gain, the following is specific:
Figure BDA0003577394210000172
the designed baseline safety controller only contains estimation compensation information
Figure BDA0003577394210000173
Improving increased state and fault estimation information
Figure BDA0003577394210000174
From a decentralized unknown input observerUnmanned ship angle and angular velocity state estimation information
Figure BDA0003577394210000175
And actuator composite fault estimation information
Figure BDA0003577394210000176
The negative feedback function provides additional and positive information for compensating the negative influence of the fault in the fault-tolerant control, improves the singleness and the conservatism of the existing independent fault estimation and independent fault-tolerant control technology, fully utilizes the organic relation of the fault estimation and the fault-tolerant control, and finally realizes the fault-tolerant target for effectively counteracting the composite fault of the physical layer actuator and the anti-attack target at the aperiodic DoS attack activation stage of the network layer.
On the other hand, in step six, the sleep interval time Γ is considered to be in the aperiodic DoS attack d (t 0 And t) unmanned ship cluster communication is allowed, and besides the baseline security controller can be utilized, updating of distributed security controllers of the unmanned ship cluster can be achieved in the non-periodic DoS attack dormancy interval time period. According to the baseline security controller in the step five, under the modeling of the aperiodic DoS dormancy attack of the unmanned ship cluster, switching and designing the distributed security controller based on the event trigger mechanism of the ith unmanned ship represented as follows:
Figure BDA0003577394210000177
wherein K 2 Expressed as information exchange gain, a ij Is composed of
Figure BDA0003577394210000178
Row i and column j element values of, wherein
Figure BDA0003577394210000179
And
Figure BDA00035773942100001710
respectively a communication topology adjacent matrix and a node adjacent to the ith node in graph theoryA set of points.
Figure BDA00035773942100001711
The state values of the information interaction of the ith unmanned ship and the jth unmanned ship at the latest successful triggering moment are respectively expressed.
The designed distributed safety controller contains estimation compensation information
Figure BDA00035773942100001712
Also comprises distributed state information based on the latest successful trigger moment to complete information interaction
Figure BDA00035773942100001713
Gain K through information interaction 2 The distributed state information only needs to complete interaction at the latest successful triggering moment, the limitations of huge and redundant data volume caused by uniform sampling triggering, uncertainty of data volume caused by random sampling triggering and large network transmission bandwidth resource burden in the prior art are improved, and the limitation that the prior sensor sensing technology needs to obtain complete information in a more complete and truer ocean unmanned ship task scene is also overcome, so that a fault-tolerant target for effectively counteracting the composite fault of a physical layer actuator and an anti-attack target in a network layer aperiodic DoS attack dormancy stage are realized.
The invention also provides an event-triggered unmanned ship cluster updatable control strategy, wherein the control strategy is used for controlling the non-periodic DoS attack dormancy interval gamma d (t 0 And t) unmanned ship cluster communication is allowed, and updating of the unmanned ship cluster distributed security controller can be realized only in the non-periodic DoS attack sleep interval time period. Compared with the existing update control strategy (uniform sampling and random sampling time trigger strategy), the distributed security controller adopts an unmanned ship cluster updatable control strategy which is an improved event trigger mechanism, namely, the unmanned ship cluster updatable control strategy is used for DoS attack dormancy interval time gamma d (t 0 Time series within t)
Figure BDA0003577394210000181
The sampling of the event trigger is done,updateable security controller at each event trigger time
Figure BDA0003577394210000182
Is activated.
In the seventh step, the state value of information interaction is completed according to the latest successful trigger moment of the ith unmanned ship
Figure BDA0003577394210000183
Constructing a state interaction error signal
Figure BDA0003577394210000184
Error δ according to state interaction i (t) and the event trigger upper threshold bound expressed below, the sequence of times can be explicitly updated
Figure BDA0003577394210000185
Figure BDA0003577394210000186
Wherein theta is i The more than 0 represents a threshold scalar based on time triggering, and the less than the threshold scalar based on time triggering represents a two-norm, that is, the uniform sampling according to the specified frequency is not needed, and the sampling updating time which can be triggered by the event is only the time when the constraint condition is met
Figure BDA0003577394210000187
The improved event-triggered unmanned ship cluster updatable control strategy realizes a low complexity event-based distributed security control mechanism so as to reduce the bandwidth occupation of communication topology in an unmanned ship cluster system and reduce the influence of network physical threats, and meanwhile, the designed event-triggered threshold value is upper bound
Figure BDA0003577394210000188
The cycle repetitive triggering behavior can be eliminated. Further, the improved event trigger mechanism also overcomes the redundancy of data volume caused by uniform time sampling trigger in the prior artRedundancy and random time sampling triggers result in uncertainty in the amount of data.
In summary, the above embodiments describe in detail different configurations of the distributed safety control method for unmanned ship cluster, and it is needless to say that the present invention includes, but is not limited to, the configurations listed in the above embodiments, and any content that is transformed based on the configurations provided by the above embodiments falls within the scope of protection of the present invention. One skilled in the art can take the contents of the above embodiments to take a counter-measure.
The embodiments in the present description are described in a progressive manner, each embodiment focuses on differences from other embodiments, and the same and similar parts among the embodiments are referred to each other. For the system disclosed by the embodiment, the description is relatively simple because the system corresponds to the method disclosed by the embodiment, and the relevant points can be referred to the method part for description.
The above description is only for the purpose of describing the preferred embodiments of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and any variations and modifications made by those skilled in the art based on the above disclosure are within the scope of the appended claims.

Claims (10)

1. A distributed safety control method for unmanned ship clusters is characterized by comprising the following steps:
performing associated modeling on a wave disturbance model, a composite fault model and a DoS attack model of the unmanned ship cluster system to form a comprehensive model;
establishing an aperiodic DoS attack model of the unmanned ship cluster according to the comprehensive model; and
and switching between the baseline control and the distributed security control of the unmanned ship cluster according to DoS attack activation and dormancy stages divided by an aperiodic DoS attack model, and performing event-triggered-based unmanned ship cluster updatable control in the DoS attack dormancy stage.
2. The distributed security control method for an unmanned ship cluster as claimed in claim 1, wherein forming a comprehensive model and an aperiodic DoS attack model comprises:
constructing a correlation model of wave disturbance and/or wave sudden change and/or gradual change actuator composite fault and/or aperiodic DoS attack in an open and/or dynamic ocean scene of the unmanned ship;
establishing an aperiodic DoS attack model of the unmanned ship according to the results of dissimilarity activation and dormancy of communication topology link full interruption or communication maintenance caused by the aperiodic DoS attack; and
and introducing DoS attack frequency and average residence time indexes, and constructing an index constraint condition for aperiodic DoS attack under the attack-resisting target of the unmanned ship cluster.
3. The distributed security control method for the unmanned ship cluster as claimed in claim 2, wherein the DoS attack activation and dormancy phases divided according to the aperiodic DoS attack model are such that the unmanned ship cluster performs a handover between the baseline control and the distributed security control, and the event-triggered unmanned ship cluster updatable control in the DoS attack dormancy phase comprises:
and switching from the baseline security controller of the unmanned ship under the influence of the aperiodic DoS activation attack to the distributed security controller of the unmanned ship under the influence of the aperiodic DoS dormancy attack.
4. The distributed security control method for unmanned surface vehicle clusters as claimed in claim 3, wherein the baseline security controller contains estimated compensation information, the negative feedback of which provides additional and positive information for compensating negative effects of faults in fault-tolerant control, implements fault-tolerant targets for effective cancellation of composite faults of physical layer actuators, and anti-attack targets for aperiodic DoS attack activation stages at network layer; and
the distributed safety controller comprises estimation compensation information and distributed state information for finishing information interaction based on the latest successful trigger moment;
the distributed state information only needs to complete interaction at the latest successful triggering moment, and implements a fault-tolerant target for effectively counteracting the composite fault of the physical layer actuator and an anti-attack target in the non-periodic DoS attack dormancy stage of the network layer.
5. The distributed security control method for an unmanned ship cluster as claimed in claim 4, wherein the DoS attack activation and dormancy phases divided according to the aperiodic DoS attack model are such that the unmanned ship cluster performs a handover between baseline control and distributed security control, and the event-triggered unmanned ship cluster updatable control in the DoS attack dormancy phase further comprises:
the unmanned ship cluster based on event triggering can be controlled in an updating mode, a low-complexity distributed safety control mechanism based on events is carried out, bandwidth occupation of communication topology in the unmanned ship cluster system is reduced, the influence of network physical threats is relieved, and an upper bound of an event triggering threshold is set to eliminate cyclic repetitive triggering behaviors.
6. The distributed unmanned-boat cluster security control method of claim 5, further comprising:
wave disturbance omega is introduced into the swinging, yawing and rolling motion equations of the ith unmanned ship i (t)=[ω ψi (t) ω φi (t)] T And composite faults of exponential abrupt change and gradual change actuators
Figure FDA0003577394200000021
The dynamic equation of the wave disturbance-compound fault of the unmanned ship is obtained and expressed as follows:
Figure FDA0003577394200000022
establishing an aperiodic DoS attack model, and modeling the aperiodic DoS attack into an activated state and a dormant state;
three indexes are given for aperiodic DoS attack, and the indexes are respectively the DoS attack number N Γ (t 0 T), DoS attack frequency
Figure FDA0003577394200000023
And total activation time interval Γ in DoS attacks a (t 0 Mean residence time index τ in t) a > 0, wherein
Figure FDA0003577394200000024
Respectively, as the number of DoS activation attacks and DoS sleep attacks.
7. The distributed unmanned-boat cluster security control method of claim 6, further comprising:
defining total activation and sleep intervals of aperiodic DoS attack
Figure FDA0003577394200000025
Total activation time interval for aperiodic DoS attack, i.e. the information exchange is interrupted within the time interval, where t 0 Is the initial time, t is the termination time, U is the union, n is the intersection,
Figure FDA0003577394200000026
activating a time interval for the r-th DoS attack, r being a natural number, wherein
Figure FDA0003577394200000027
For aperiodic DoS attack at [ t ] 0 ,t]An activating sequence of intervals, and
Figure FDA0003577394200000031
non-periodic time varying intervals;
distributed anti-attack security control cannot be realized by using information of adjacent unmanned boats within the total activation time interval of aperiodic DoS attack;
definition of Γ d (t 0 ,t)=[t 0 ,t]\Γ a (t 0 T) is a total sleep time interval of aperiodic DoS attack, that is, information interaction is allowed in the time interval, and the connected topology structure is not changed, \\ is a residual set;
distributed anti-attack security control can be realized by using information of adjacent unmanned boats in the total dormancy time interval of aperiodic DoS attack;
aiming at aperiodic DoS attack modeling, setting the DoS attack number, the DoS attack frequency and the average residence time, and defining
Figure FDA0003577394200000032
Is the number of DoS attacks, among them
Figure FDA0003577394200000033
Respectively representing the number of DoS activation attacks and the number of DoS dormancy attacks; definition of
Figure FDA0003577394200000034
Is the frequency of DoS attacks, wherein
Figure FDA0003577394200000035
Expressed as the number of DoS activation attacks; total activation time interval Γ in DoS attacks a (t 0 T) defining a threshold value Γ 0 Not less than 0 and an average residence time index τ a > 0 satisfy
Figure FDA0003577394200000036
Determining a DoS attack frequency satisfying the following constraint
Figure FDA0003577394200000037
And average residence time τ a
Figure FDA0003577394200000038
τ a >(α 1* ) -112 )
And enabling the distributed security control of the unmanned boat cluster to be positioned in the aperiodic DoS dormancy attack time interval, and simultaneously enabling the baseline security control of the unmanned boat cluster to be positioned in the aperiodic DoS activation attack time interval.
8. The distributed unmanned-boat cluster security control method of claim 7, further comprising:
according to the activation interval time F of aperiodic DoS attack a (t 0 T) unmanned ship trunking communications are interrupted using estimated information from distributed unknown input observers
Figure FDA0003577394200000039
Under the modeling of the aperiodic DoS activated attack of the unmanned ship cluster, designing a baseline security controller of the ith unmanned ship represented as follows:
Figure FDA00035773942000000310
wherein K 1 =[K x K f ]Expressed as compensation gain, where K x Estimating gain for internal states, and K f Expressed as the fault estimation gain, the following is specific:
Figure FDA00035773942000000311
the designed baseline safety controller only contains estimation compensation information
Figure FDA0003577394200000041
Improving increased state and fault estimation information
Figure FDA0003577394200000042
Unmanned ship angle and angular velocity state estimation information from distributed unknown input observer
Figure FDA0003577394200000043
And actuator composite fault estimation information
Figure FDA0003577394200000044
The negative feedback function provides additional and positive information for compensating the negative influence of the fault in the fault-tolerant control, improves the singleness and the conservatism of the existing independent fault estimation and independent fault-tolerant control technology, fully utilizes the organic connection of the fault estimation and the fault-tolerant control, and finally realizes the fault-tolerant target of effectively counteracting the composite fault of the physical layer actuator and the anti-attack target of the aperiodic DoS attack activation stage of the network layer.
9. The distributed unmanned-boat cluster security control method of claim 8, further comprising:
according to sleep interval time gamma of aperiodic DoS attack d (t 0 T) allowing unmanned ship cluster communication, and updating the unmanned ship cluster distributed security controller in an aperiodic DoS attack dormancy interval period;
according to the baseline security controller, under the modeling of the aperiodic DoS dormancy attack of the unmanned ship cluster, switching and designing the distributed security controller based on the event triggering mechanism of the ith unmanned ship represented as follows:
Figure FDA0003577394200000045
wherein K 2 Expressed as information exchange gain, a ij Is composed of
Figure FDA0003577394200000046
Row i and column j element values of, wherein
Figure FDA0003577394200000047
And
Figure FDA0003577394200000048
respectively representing a communication topology adjacency matrix in graph theory and a set of nodes adjacent to the ith node;
Figure FDA0003577394200000049
respectively representing the status values of the ith unmanned ship and the jth unmanned ship which finish information interaction at the latest successful triggering moment;
distributed security controller including estimation compensation information
Figure FDA00035773942000000410
Also comprises distributed state information based on the latest successful trigger moment to complete information interaction
Figure FDA00035773942000000411
Gain K through information interaction 2 And connecting, and finishing interaction of the distributed state information at the latest successful triggering moment.
10. The distributed unmanned-boat cluster security control method of claim 9, further comprising:
sleep interval time Γ in aperiodic DoS attack d (t 0 T) allowing unmanned ship cluster communication, and updating the unmanned ship cluster distributed security controller in an aperiodic DoS attack dormancy interval period; sleep interval time gamma for DoS attack d (t 0 Time series in t)
Figure FDA00035773942000000412
To complete the sampling of event triggers to update the security controller at each event trigger time
Figure FDA00035773942000000413
Is activated;
finishing the state value of information interaction according to the latest successful triggering moment of the ith unmanned ship
Figure FDA00035773942000000414
Constructing a state interaction error signal
Figure FDA0003577394200000051
Error δ according to state interaction i (t) and event trigger threshold upper bound explicit update time series as shown below
Figure FDA0003577394200000052
Figure FDA0003577394200000053
Wherein theta is i The more than 0 represents a threshold scalar based on time triggering, | | | | | represents a two-norm, and the moment when the constraint condition is met is the sampling updating moment capable of event triggering
Figure FDA0003577394200000054
The event trigger threshold is bounded above by
Figure FDA0003577394200000055
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