CN114864125A

CN114864125A - Failure processing method and device for fire information of nuclear power plant and computer equipment

Info

Publication number: CN114864125A
Application number: CN202210458995.0A
Authority: CN
Inventors: 王振营; 黄宇; 孔凯贺; 焦振营; 王泰科; 胡明信; 付汝师; 孙晨
Original assignee: China General Nuclear Power Corp; China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd; CGN Power Co Ltd; Shenzhen China Guangdong Nuclear Engineering Design Co Ltd
Current assignee: China General Nuclear Power Corp; China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd; CGN Power Co Ltd; Shenzhen China Guangdong Nuclear Engineering Design Co Ltd
Priority date: 2022-04-25
Filing date: 2022-04-25
Publication date: 2022-08-05

Abstract

The application relates to a failure processing method and device for fire information of a nuclear power plant and computer equipment. The method comprises the following steps: acquiring key information of each fire-proof subarea in a nuclear power plant when a fire disaster happens; identifying potential information failure common mode points of all fire zones in the nuclear power plant according to the key information; determining a target common mode point among the potential information failure common mode points; and eliminating the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy. By adopting the method, the potential risk under the condition of fire disaster can be identified and processed, so that the safety function of the nuclear power plant is ensured not to be lost.

Description

Failure processing method and device for fire information of nuclear power plant and computer equipment

Technical Field

The present application relates to the field of nuclear power technologies, and in particular, to a failure processing method and apparatus for fire information in a nuclear power plant, a computer device, a storage medium, and a computer program product.

Background

The fire disaster is one of the external disasters that must be considered in a nuclear power plant, and the fire protection design of the nuclear power plant must consider not only reducing the possibility of the fire disaster, but also alleviating the consequences of the fire disaster, and finally the aim is to ensure that the fire disaster occurring in any area in the nuclear power plant cannot cause the loss of the safety function of the nuclear power plant. The nuclear power plant generally separates redundant equipment executing the same safety function by dividing fire zones, and is assisted with fire-fighting facilities such as fire doors and smoke exhaust valves to limit the consequences of fire in a certain area, so as to prevent the influence of the fire from expanding to adjacent fire zones. In case of fire, there are several risks, all of which may result in a total loss of safety functions of the nuclear power plant. In the traditional mode, the safety function of the nuclear power plant is ensured not to be lost by identifying whether equipment or cables fail or are damaged under the condition of fire and adopting corresponding fire prevention measures.

However, in a fire situation, there may also be a potential risk. The traditional method cannot identify and deal with potential risks, so that the nuclear power plant still has the risk of losing all safety functions. Therefore, how to identify and deal with the potential risk in the case of a fire to ensure that the safety function of the nuclear power plant is not lost is a technical problem to be solved at present.

Disclosure of Invention

In view of the above, it is necessary to provide a failure handling method, apparatus, computer device, computer readable storage medium and computer program product for nuclear power plant fire information that can ensure the safety function of the nuclear power plant without loss.

In a first aspect, the application provides a failure processing method for fire information of a nuclear power plant. The method comprises the following steps:

acquiring key information of each fire-proof subarea in a nuclear power plant when a fire disaster happens;

identifying potential information failure common mode points of all fire zones in the nuclear power plant according to the key information;

determining a target common mode point among the potential information failure common mode points;

and eliminating the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy.

In one embodiment, the identifying the potential information failure common mode point of each fire protection zone in the nuclear power plant according to the key information includes:

identifying whether the key information has information failure risk when each fireproof subarea has fire;

and if so, determining the key information with the information failure risk as the potential information failure common mode point of the corresponding fire protection subarea.

In one embodiment, the identifying whether the fire in each fire protection zone may cause the critical information to have an information failure risk includes:

and identifying whether the loss of diagnosis guide information in the key information, the triggering of design expansion working condition characteristic information in the key information, the triggering of accident working condition entrance information in the key information and the total loss of safety functions of the fire-prevention subareas are caused when the fire disaster happens to each fire-prevention subarea.

In one embodiment, the identifying whether the fire in each fire protection sub-area will cause the loss of all safety functions of the fire protection sub-area includes:

when a fire disaster occurs in each fire-protection subarea, whether the fire-protection subarea loses a safety function or not is identified, the supporting function loss monitoring information of a redundant row corresponding to the fire-protection subarea is triggered, whether the fire protection subarea loses a safety function or not is identified, the safety function monitoring information of the redundant row fails, and whether the supporting function loss monitoring information of the fire-protection subarea is triggered or the safety function monitoring information fails or not is identified, and the supporting function loss monitoring information of the redundant row is triggered or the safety function monitoring information fails.

identifying whether the fire disaster of each fire-protection subarea can cause the loss of diagnosis guide information in the key information;

if the diagnosis guide information cannot be lost, identifying whether the design expansion working condition characteristic information in the key information is triggered when each fire prevention subarea is in fire;

if the design expansion working condition characteristic information cannot be triggered, identifying whether accident working condition entrance information in the key information is triggered when each fireproof subarea is in fire;

if the accident condition entrance information cannot be triggered, identifying whether a safety function of a fire-proof subarea column is lost when fire disasters happen to each fire-proof subarea, and triggering support function loss monitoring information of a redundant column corresponding to the fire-proof subarea column;

if the loss of one safety function of the fire-protection subarea row cannot be caused and the loss of the support function monitoring information of the redundant row corresponding to the fire-protection subarea row is triggered, identifying whether the loss of one safety function of the fire-protection subarea row can be caused or not and the failure of the safety function monitoring information of the redundant row is caused or not when a fire disaster occurs in each fire-protection subarea;

if the safety function of the fire-protection subarea column cannot be lost and the safety function monitoring information of the redundant column fails, whether the support function loss monitoring information of the safety function of the fire-protection subarea column is triggered or the safety function monitoring information fails or not is identified when the fire disaster happens to each fire-protection subarea, and the support function loss monitoring information of the redundant column is triggered or the safety function monitoring information fails.

In one embodiment, the determining the target common mode point from among the potential information failure common mode points comprises:

performing characteristic analysis on the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a characteristic analysis result;

and determining a target common mode point according to the characteristic analysis result.

In one embodiment, the performing feature analysis on the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a feature analysis result includes:

identifying whether a substitution strategy exists in the potential information failure common mode point or not to obtain a first identification result;

identifying whether the substitute value of the potential information failure common mode point can realize correct judgment or guidance to obtain a second identification result;

identifying whether the misjudgment or misguidance result caused by the potential information failure common mode point can be accepted or not to obtain a third identification result;

identifying whether the information failure consequence of the potential information failure common mode point can be accepted or not to obtain a fourth identification result;

and obtaining a feature analysis result according to the first recognition result, the second recognition result, the third recognition result and the fourth recognition result.

In one embodiment, the preset common mode point cancellation strategy includes: and modifying the accident operation regulation or the fire protection strategy.

In one embodiment, the obtaining key information of each fire protection zone in the nuclear power plant in the case of a fire includes:

screening accident operation important information influenced by the fire of the nuclear power plant in an accident operation regulation;

constructing an important information base according to the important information of the accident operation;

and determining key information of each fire-proof subarea in the nuclear power plant when a fire disaster occurs according to the important information base.

In one embodiment, the screening of accident operation important information affected by a nuclear power plant fire in an accident operation rule includes:

extracting diagnosis guide information and accident condition entrance information influenced by fire of a nuclear power plant at a unit state initial diagnosis stage and a unit state re-diagnosis stage of an accident operation rule;

extracting feature information of a design expansion working condition from an accident handling sequence of the accident operation rule;

extracting the detection information of the support losing function in the support losing function monitoring part of the accident operation regulation;

extracting safety function monitoring information from a supply system function monitoring part of the accident operation regulation;

and obtaining important information of the accident operation influenced by the fire of the nuclear power plant according to the diagnosis guide information, the accident working condition entrance information, the design expansion working condition characteristic information, the detection information of the support losing function and the safety function monitoring information.

In one embodiment, the method further comprises:

identifying potential information failure common mode points of the current fire protection subarea in the nuclear power plant according to the key information;

when the potential information failure common mode points of the current fire protection subarea are multiple, sequentially identifying whether the potential information failure common mode points of the current fire protection subarea are target common mode points or not to obtain the target common mode points of the current fire protection subarea;

and after the target common mode point of the current fire protection subarea is eliminated according to the preset common mode point elimination strategy, returning to the step of identifying the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire protection subarea in the nuclear power plant according to the key information, updating the current fire protection subarea into a next fire protection subarea, and eliminating the target common mode point until the elimination of the target common mode points of all the fire protection subareas in the nuclear power plant is completed.

In a second aspect, the application further provides a failure processing device for the fire information of the nuclear power plant. The device comprises:

the acquisition module is used for acquiring key information of each fire protection subarea in the nuclear power plant when a fire disaster happens;

the identification module is used for identifying potential information failure common mode points of all fire protection subareas in the nuclear power plant according to the key information;

a determining module for determining a target common mode point among the potential information failure common mode points;

and the elimination module is used for eliminating the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy.

In a third aspect, the present application also provides a computer device. The computer device comprises a memory storing a computer program and a processor implementing the following steps when executing the computer program:

In a fourth aspect, the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which, when executed by a processor, performs the steps of:

In a fifth aspect, the present application further provides a computer program product. The computer program product comprising a computer program which when executed by a processor performs the steps of:

According to the failure processing method, device, computer equipment, storage medium and computer program product of the fire information of the nuclear power plant, the key information of each fire prevention subarea in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs is obtained, the potential information failure common mode point of each fire prevention subarea in the nuclear power plant is identified according to the key information, the target common mode point is determined in the potential information failure common mode point, and then the target common mode point is eliminated according to the preset common mode point eliminating strategy, so that the potential risk caused by the fire, namely the information failure risk, is eliminated, the safety function of the nuclear power plant is ensured not to be lost under the fire condition, and the accident operation regulation is correctly guided and executed, and the safety of a unit under the fire condition is ensured. Meanwhile, the method can also be used as a supplement of the existing fire weak link analysis method of the nuclear power plant, and the fire safety level of the nuclear power plant is further improved.

Drawings

FIG. 1 is a diagram of an exemplary embodiment of a method for failure handling of nuclear power plant fire information;

FIG. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a failure handling method for nuclear power plant fire information according to an embodiment;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary crash operation protocol in accordance with one embodiment;

FIG. 4 is a "gather-process-display" path chain of information in one embodiment;

FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating the steps for identifying potential information failure common mode points for each fire zone in a nuclear power plant based on key information in one embodiment;

FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating steps of identifying whether a fire in each fire zone may cause critical information to be at risk of information failure in one embodiment;

FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating the steps of performing a feature analysis on a potential information failure common mode point to obtain a feature analysis result in one embodiment;

FIG. 8 is a schematic flow chart of a method for failure handling of nuclear power plant fire information in another embodiment;

FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram illustrating the identification of potential information failure common mode points for fire zones in one embodiment;

FIG. 10 is a block diagram of a failure handling device for nuclear power plant fire information according to an embodiment;

FIG. 11 is a diagram of the internal structure of a computer device in one embodiment;

fig. 12 is an internal structural view of a computer device in another embodiment.

Detailed Description

In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more apparent, the present application is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present application and are not intended to limit the present application.

The failure processing method for the fire disaster information of the nuclear power plant, provided by the embodiment of the application, can be applied to the application environment shown in fig. 1. Therein, the monitoring device 102 communicates with the nuclear power plant management device 104 over a network. The monitoring device may include a plurality of data monitoring devices such as meters, sensors, and the like. The monitoring device 102 is configured to monitor data of the units in each fire protection zone of the nuclear power plant during operation, such as reactor state information (reactor nuclear power, reactor core thermal power, electric power, etc.), alarm data (alarm information of all lost emergency ac power, alarm information of all lost heat traps, alarm of low reactor coolant loop flow, alarm of high steam generator leakage rate, alarm of high steam generator gamma radioactivity, alarm of high containment rate, etc.), parameter data (pressure stabilizer level, reactor core coolant outlet temperature, high-pressure safety injection system flow, steam generator secondary side pressure, etc.), and device operation state feedback information (pump operation state feedback information, valve on-off position state feedback information, etc.), the monitoring device 102 may transmit the monitored monitoring data to the nuclear power plant management device 104 through a network, and the nuclear power plant management device 104 obtains key information of each fire protection zone of the nuclear power plant during fire occurrence from the monitoring data And identifying potential information failure common-mode points of all fire zones in the nuclear power plant according to the key information, and determining a target common-mode point in the potential information failure common-mode points. The nuclear power plant management device 104 may be, but is not limited to, various personal computers, notebook computers, smart phones, tablet computers, internet of things devices, and portable wearable devices, and the nuclear power plant management device 102 may also be a server, and the server may be implemented by an independent server or a server cluster formed by a plurality of servers.

In one embodiment, as shown in fig. 2, a failure processing method for fire information of a nuclear power plant is provided, which is described by taking the nuclear power plant management device in fig. 1 as an example, and includes the following steps:

step 202, obtaining key information of each fire protection subarea in the nuclear power plant when a fire disaster happens.

The fire partition is a local area which is divided by adopting a fire partition measure and can prevent a fire from spreading to the rest part of the same building within a certain time. The key information of each fire-proof subarea when a fire disaster occurs refers to information required by accident operation of the fire-proof subareas needing important attention when the fire disaster occurs, namely information with common mode risk.

Specifically, the nuclear power plant management device acquires data, which is monitored by the monitoring device in real time, of the operation of the unit in each fireproof partition of the nuclear power plant, and the data may be referred to as monitoring data for short. The monitoring device may include a measuring instrument, a sensor, or other data monitoring device. For example, the monitoring data may include reactor status information (reactor nuclear power, core thermal power, electrical power, etc.), alarm data (loss of all emergency ac power supply alarm information, loss of all hot-trap alarm information, reactor coolant loop flow low alarm, steam generator leakage rate high alarm, steam generator gamma radioactivity high alarm, containment dose rate high alarm, etc.), parameter data (pressurizer liquid level, core coolant outlet temperature, high pressure safety injection system flow, steam generator secondary side pressure, etc.), and plant operating status feedback information (operating status feedback information for pumps, on-off position status feedback information for valves, etc.).

The nuclear power plant management equipment can determine key information of each fireproof subarea of the nuclear power plant in the fire disaster in the monitoring data based on the accident operation rule. The accident operation regulation is a regulation used for guiding an operator to take follow-up actions after an abnormal operation condition or accident occurs to a unit, a reactor protection system triggers emergency shutdown or a special safety facility is started so as to relieve the accident and limit the accident consequence. The key information of each fire-proof subarea when a fire disaster occurs can comprise diagnosis guide information, design expansion working condition characteristic information, accident working condition entrance information, support function losing detection information and safety function monitoring information. The diagnosis guidance information refers to diagnosis guidance information in an accident operation process, such as a pressure vessel water level, a core outlet supercooling degree, a steam generator water level and the like. Design Extension Condition (Design Extension Condition Category a, abbreviated as DEC-a) feature information refers to indication or alarm information for representing a Design Extension Condition, such as loss of all emergency ac power supply alarm information, loss of all hot-trap alarm information, and the like. The entry information of the Accident condition (AC condition for short) refers to the entry condition of the Accident condition. For example, the alarm of high radioactivity of the steam generator, the alarm of high leakage rate of the steam generator, the alarm of high dosage rate of the containment vessel and the like. The detection information of the support loss function refers to the entrance criterion of the support loss system regulation, such as power loss alarm, distribution board voltage indication and the like. The safety function monitoring information refers to possible equipment faults, such as low flow of a safety injection System, which are timely discovered by monitoring the operation condition of the NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply System) function.

Further, obtaining key information of each fire protection partition in the nuclear power plant when a fire disaster occurs includes: screening accident operation important information influenced by the fire of the nuclear power plant in an accident operation regulation; constructing an important information base according to the important information of the accident operation; and determining key information of each fire-proof subarea in the nuclear power plant when a fire disaster occurs according to the important information base.

The important information of accident operation affected by the fire of the nuclear power plant refers to important information which needs to be considered when the fire occurs, namely important information indexes. The important information base can be an important information list formed by important information of the accident operation.

The important information base is actually a list of important information that needs to be considered by the fire. The nuclear power plant has hundreds of thousands of instrument parameter information, if the parameter information is not screened, the cost is too large when the parameter information is completely analyzed, and only 200 pieces of information exist after the parameter information is screened. For each fire-proof subarea, the screened information only needs to be paid attention to when the fire consequence is analyzed, so that the nuclear power plant management equipment can determine the key information of each fire-proof subarea when a fire happens in the monitoring data according to the important information indexes in the constructed important information base.

As an example, tables 1 and 2 are used to show the important information base of a nuclear power plant having two columns of safety configurations, and for convenience of use, table 1 is listed in the form of parameter information and table 2 is listed in the form of safety functions.

TABLE 1 diagnostic guidance information, DEC-A characteristic information and AC condition entry information

TABLE 2 monitoring information of loss support function, monitoring information of safety function

Wherein, A column represents the local column of the fire-protection subarea, and B column represents the redundant column corresponding to the local column A.

Further, screening accident operation important information affected by the nuclear power plant fire in the accident operation regulation includes: extracting diagnosis guide information and accident condition entrance information influenced by fire of a nuclear power plant at a unit state initial diagnosis stage and a unit state re-diagnosis stage of an accident operation rule; extracting feature information of a design expansion working condition in an accident handling sequence of an accident operation rule; extracting the detection information of the support losing function in the support losing function monitoring part of the accident operation regulation; extracting safety function monitoring information from a supply system function monitoring part of an accident operation rule; and obtaining important information of the accident operation influenced by the fire of the nuclear power plant according to the diagnosis guide information, the accident condition entrance information, the design expansion condition characteristic information, the detection information of the support losing function and the safety function monitoring information.

The nuclear power plant management facility may screen for incident operation important information affected by a nuclear power plant fire through multiple portions of an incident operation protocol. The information screened for each part is different. A schematic structural diagram of a typical accident operation procedure is shown in fig. 3, wherein after the unit state is initially diagnosed, if the unit state parameters are not degraded, the unit state parameters are included in a fault working condition (IC working condition) for processing, and the unit state parameters are guided to a proper IC working condition accident processing sequence; and if the unit state parameters are degraded, the unit state parameters are included in the AC working condition for processing, and the unit state parameters are guided to a proper AC working condition accident processing sequence. Before the end of each incident handling sequence, an out-of-support system monitoring and NSSS functional monitoring is performed to discover possible support system failures or NSSS functional failures. The unit state is then re-diagnosed and directed to the appropriate incident handling sequence.

Specifically, at the initial diagnosis stage of the unit state and the re-diagnosis stage of the unit state, diagnosis guide information and AC working condition entrance information are extracted. This is because: a single fire initiated by a nuclear power plant may only cause some equipment failures, but may not directly cause accident conditions like a primary circuit break, and is generally managed by an IC condition, so that in the case of initiating a fire, it is required to ensure that the fire should not trigger AC condition entrance information, such as a high steam generator radioactivity alarm, and be directed to the AC condition. For the same reason, a fire should not cause complete loss of the diagnosis guidance information to ensure correct diagnosis of the unit state under fire conditions.

And extracting DEC-A characteristic information in the accident handling sequence. The DEC-a feature information refers to an indication or alarm information for representing the design extension operation. Typical DEC-A working conditions comprise rare accidents of losing all emergency alternating current power supplies, losing all hot traps and the like, and corresponding DEC-A characteristic information respectively comprises warning of losing all emergency alternating current power supplies and warning of losing all hot traps. Accident operation regulations generally have special accident handling sequences to deal with the extreme working conditions, and the accident handling sequences are prevented from being misdirected due to the fact that a fire directly triggers DEC-A characteristic information.

And extracting the monitoring information of the loss support function in the monitoring part of the loss support function. The loss of some support functions may result in loss of safety functions, such as loss of a line of emergency ac power, which may result in loss of safety functions for the line of safety injection systems, waste heat removal systems, emergency water supply systems, etc. For the support function which may cause the loss of the safety function, the extracted monitoring information of the loss of the support function is mainly the entrance criterion of the loss of the support system regulation, such as the power-off alarm, the distribution board voltage indication, etc., in case of fire, if the entrance criterion of the loss of the support system regulation is triggered by mistake, the safety function may be shut down improperly because the operator performs the loss of the support system regulation by mistake, resulting in the operation common mode.

Safety function monitoring information is extracted in the NSSS function monitoring section. NSSS function monitoring aims at monitoring the operation of the NSSS function to discover possible equipment failures in a timely manner. In the implementation, the NSSS function monitoring only carries out safety function monitoring, such as a safety injection system, a waste heat discharge system and the like. In case of fire, if wrong safety function monitoring information is given due to fire, such as low flow of the safety injection system, etc., further deterioration of the unit status may be caused by the operator erroneously shutting down the safety function.

Corresponding important information of the accident operation is extracted through different parts of the accident operation regulations, and the important information of the accident operation influenced by the fire of the nuclear power plant can be screened out more quickly.

And 204, identifying potential information failure common mode points of all fire zones in the nuclear power plant according to the key information.

For each fire protection subarea, the nuclear power plant management equipment can analyze fire consequences of the fire protection subareas according to the key information, namely, the influence of each fire protection subarea on the key information when a fire occurs is identified. Therefore, potential information failure common-mode points of all fire zones in the nuclear power plant are identified according to the result of the fire consequence analysis. Specifically, when the result of the fire outcome analysis indicates that a fire occurs in a fire partition and the critical information is at an information failure risk, the critical information at the information failure risk is determined as a potential information failure common mode point of the corresponding fire partition. The information failure risk is the potential risk of the accident operation rule in the actual execution process.

When the result of the fire consequence analysis indicates that a fire disaster occurs in the fire prevention subarea, and the risk of information failure of key information cannot occur, the potential information failure common mode point does not exist in the fire prevention subarea. The information failure risk refers to the existence of an information failure common mode situation, and may refer to one of the following common mode situations: false triggering of alarms or false indications of meters due to fire or other information failures results in misdiagnosis or misdirection during the operator's execution of an accident operation schedule, or results in the operator performing some operations incorrectly according to the accident operation schedule, resulting in the complete loss of safety functions.

The fire outcome analysis analyzes not only the direct consequences caused by the fire, but also the indirect consequences thereof, and can be specifically expressed as identifying all possible failure modes on the information "acquisition-processing-display" path chain. The nuclear power plant management device may determine the potential information common mode point from all possible failure modes.

Taking the power-off alarm as an example, the path chain of the information of the acquisition-processing-display is shown in fig. 4. On the path chain, a plurality of fire zones can be passed in sequence. The direct and indirect consequences of a typical fire can be illustrated by figure 4. Among other things, the direct consequences of a fire may include: the fire directly damages the pressure measuring instrument itself, the instrument power supply cable or the instrument signal acquisition cable, which results in information loss and the like. Indirect consequences of a fire may include: a fire directly damages a DCS (Distributed Control System) signal acquisition cabinet or a power supply cable thereof, a fire directly damages a DCS signal processing cabinet or a power supply cable thereof, a fire damages an optical cable inside the DCS, a fire damages a signal transmission cable or a signal transmission optical cable, and the like, which indirectly cause that information of a pressure measuring instrument cannot be acquired and processed and is lost.

In step 206, a target common mode point is determined among the potential information failure common mode points.

After the potential information failure common mode points of the fire protection subareas are identified, when the number of the potential information failure common mode points is multiple, the nuclear power plant management equipment can identify whether the information failure risk of each potential information failure common mode point is acceptable. If the potential information common mode point is not acceptable, the potential information common mode point is confirmed, and the potential information common mode point is determined to be a target common mode point and needs to be eliminated. If so, it indicates that the potential information common mode point cannot be identified, and the potential information common mode point is not the target common mode point.

And 208, eliminating the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy.

For each target common mode point, the nuclear power plant management equipment needs to adopt a corresponding strategy to eliminate the target common mode point. Specifically, a preset common mode point elimination strategy is stored in the nuclear power plant management equipment in advance. The preset common mode point eliminating strategy can comprise the modification of accident operation regulations or fire protection strategies, and can also comprise other strategies capable of eliminating the target common mode point. There may be priorities between the preset common mode point elimination strategies, for example, the priorities are: modification of accident operation regulations > fire protection strategies > other strategies that can eliminate the target common mode point.

Illustratively, the nuclear power plant management facility may preferentially eliminate the target common mode point by modifying the incident operating protocol. For the target common mode point, the feasibility of replacing failure information (key information with information failure risk) by other alternative information such as alarm signals or parameter information is analyzed and selected. If there is alternative information that meets the requirements, the target common mode point can be eliminated by modifying the incident operating protocol. And unnecessary fire protection strategies can be avoided by modifying the accident operation rules to eliminate the common mode point, so that the cost is reduced. Taking the power failure alarm of the emergency bus as an example, the state of an upstream incoming line switch of the emergency bus, the running state of equipment on the emergency bus and the like can be considered for substitution. The emergency bus power failure alarm signal is used for indicating whether the emergency bus is power failure or not, if the signal fails due to fire, the signal can be considered to pass judgment in an accident operation regulation: the method comprises the steps that the voltage of an upstream bus is normal, the incoming line switch of an emergency bus is switched on, or the voltage of the emergency bus is judged to be normal by the steps of starting the emergency diesel engine and switching on the emergency diesel engine switch, if the condition that the guide is correct and the accident treatment is ensured to be smoothly carried out can be ensured, the condition that substitute information meeting requirements exists is shown, and the judgment mode that the voltage of the emergency bus in an accident operation procedure is normal is changed into the conditions that the voltage of the upstream bus is normal, the incoming line switch of the emergency bus is switched on, or the conditions that the emergency diesel engine is started and the emergency diesel engine switch is switched on.

If the target common mode point cannot be eliminated by modifying the accident operation rule, whether the target common mode point can be eliminated through a fire protection strategy is analyzed, and the analysis can be specifically carried out according to the actual arrangement of equipment, the actual path of a cable and the like. For nuclear power plants, cables are generally wrapped by cable trays for fire protection, and equipment is generally protected by fire screens, fire hoods, and the like. The purpose of adopting the fire protection strategy is to perform fire protection on sensors, cables and the like on the information path chain and avoid triggering of a program entry criterion caused by a fire. It is necessary to determine what kind of fire protection measures are taken according to actual conditions on site.

If the target common mode point cannot be eliminated by the above means, other solutions are sought, including measures to modify the design, to re-define fire zones, etc. If alarm triggering logic realized in the cabinet of the digital instrument control system can be modified, so that alarm is not triggered when the sensor fails, the triggering of an AC working condition inlet alarm signal under the fire condition can be avoided, and the like.

According to the failure processing method of the fire information of the nuclear power plant, the key information of each fire-proof subarea in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs is obtained, the potential information failure common mode point of each fire-proof subarea in the nuclear power plant is identified according to the key information, the target common mode point is determined in the potential information failure common mode point, and then the target common mode point is eliminated according to the preset common mode point elimination strategy, so that the potential risk caused by the fire, namely the information failure risk is eliminated, the safety function of the nuclear power plant is ensured not to be lost under the fire condition, and the correct guidance and execution of the accident operation regulation are ensured, so that the safety of a unit under the fire condition is ensured. Meanwhile, the method can be used as a supplement to the existing fire weak link analysis method of the nuclear power plant, and the fire safety level of the nuclear power plant is further improved.

In an alternative manner of this embodiment, as shown in fig. 5, step 204 includes:

and 502, identifying whether the critical information has information failure risk when each fireproof subarea has a fire. If yes, go to step 504; if not, go to step 506.

Step 504, nuclear power equipment or cables corresponding to the key information with the information failure risk are determined as potential information failure common mode points of the corresponding fire protection subareas.

Step 506, the fire zones have no potential information failure common mode point.

For each fire prevention subarea, the nuclear power plant management equipment can analyze the fire consequences of the fire prevention subarea according to the key information to obtain a fire consequence analysis result. Specifically, the nuclear power plant management equipment identifies whether the critical information has information failure risk or not when the fire disaster occurs in each fire protection subarea, and obtains a fire disaster consequence analysis result. The information failure risk may include loss of diagnosis guidance information in the key information, triggering of design extended condition feature information in the accident operation information, triggering of accident condition entry information in the accident operation information, and total loss of safety functions of the fire protection sub-area. If the key information is identified to have any risk, the result of the fire outcome analysis is yes, and if the key information is identified not to have all the risks, the result of the fire outcome analysis is no.

And if the result of the fire consequence analysis is yes, nuclear power equipment or cables corresponding to the key information with the information failure risk are determined as potential information failure common mode points of the corresponding fire protection subareas. And if the result of the fire consequence analysis is negative, the fire-prevention subarea has no potential information failure common mode point, and the next fire-prevention subarea is switched to for performing failure processing on the fire information.

Further, step 502 includes: and identifying whether the diagnosis guide information in the key information is lost, whether the design expansion working condition characteristic information in the key information is triggered, whether the accident working condition entrance information in the key information is triggered and whether the safety function of the fire-prevention subarea is completely lost when the fire disaster happens to each fire-prevention subarea.

If the fire district fire can cause the loss of the diagnosis guide information, the diagnosis guide information is considered as a potential information failure common mode point. As the loss of the pressure vessel water level RPVL (two columns simultaneously) in the diagnostic guidance information shown in table 1 above would cause difficulties in the emergency operation diagnostic guidance, the pressure vessel water level is therefore taken as a potential information failure common mode point.

If the fire zone fire causes the design expansion working condition characteristic information (DEC-A characteristic information) to trigger, the DEC-A characteristic information is considered as a potential information failure common mode point. As shown in table 1, a loss of final hot-trap alarm trigger (both column a and column B final hot-trap loss alarms occur at the same time) will be misdirected to the corresponding DEC-a incident handling sequence, thus the loss of final hot-trap alarm trigger will be the potential information failure common mode point.

If the fire prevention subarea fire causes the triggering of accident condition entrance information (AC condition entrance information), the AC condition entrance information is considered as a potential information failure common mode point. If a high warning of steam generator activity in column a or column B shown in table 1 occurs, the AC condition inlet condition is triggered and will be misdirected to an AC condition steam generator heat transfer tube rupture accident handling sequence, thus using the high warning of steam generator activity as a potential information failure common mode point.

If the fire prevention subarea fire causes the complete loss of the safety function of the line, the information of the monitoring of the support function which causes the complete loss of the safety function is considered, and/or the information of the monitoring of the safety function is a potential information failure common mode point.

It should be noted that, if there is only one risk in the above multiple information failure risks, the nuclear power equipment or the cable corresponding to the key information of the information failure risk is determined as a potential information failure common mode point of the corresponding fire protection partition. The multiple information failure risks can be identified simultaneously or sequentially according to a preset identification sequence. For example, the preset identification sequence may be to identify whether the diagnosis guidance information in the key information is lost when a fire disaster occurs in each fire protection partition, identify whether the design expansion condition feature information in the key information is triggered, identify whether the accident condition entry information in the key information is triggered, and identify whether the safety function of the fire protection partition is completely lost. Or whether the design expansion working condition characteristic information in the key information is triggered or not when the fire disaster happens to each fire-prevention subarea is identified, whether the diagnosis guide information in the key information is lost or not, whether the accident working condition entrance information in the key information is triggered or not and whether the safety function of the fire-prevention subarea is completely lost or not can be identified.

Furthermore, the identification of whether a fire in each fire zone would result in a complete loss of the safety function of the fire zone includes: when discerning each fire prevention subregion and taking place the conflagration, whether can lead to the loss of a safety function that this row of fire prevention subregion, and trigger the loss of support function monitoring information of the redundant row that this row of fire prevention subregion corresponds, whether can lead to the loss of a safety function that this row of fire prevention subregion, and the safety function monitoring information of redundant row is invalid, and, whether can lead to the loss of support function monitoring information of a safety function that this row of fire prevention subregion is triggered or safety function monitoring information is invalid, and the loss of support function monitoring information of redundant row is triggered or safety function monitoring information is invalid.

If the fire prevention subarea fire directly causes the loss of a certain safety function of the line and simultaneously triggers the monitoring information of the support losing system corresponding to the redundant line, the monitoring information of the support losing system is considered as a potential information failure common mode point. Such as: as shown in table 2, when a fire in the fire partition in the row a directly destroys the containment spray pump in the row a, which results in the loss of function of the containment spray system in the row a, and a fire causes the loss of power alarm trigger in the emergency bus in the row B, an operator may misjudge the loss of power of the emergency bus in the row B and manually stop the containment spray pump in the row B, which results in the loss of function of the two rows of containment spray, so that the loss of power alarm trigger in the emergency bus in the row B is used as a potential information failure common mode point.

If the fire prevention subarea fire directly causes the loss of a certain safety function of the line, and meanwhile, the safety function monitoring information of the redundant line fails, the safety function monitoring information is considered as a potential information failure common mode point. Such as: as shown in table 2, if a fire in the fire partition of a row a directly destroys the row of the waste heat removal pumps, so that the waste heat removal function of the row a is lost, and meanwhile, the fire causes the waste heat removal capacity indication of the row B to be lost, an operator may misjudge that the waste heat removal operation of the row B is abnormal and manually stop the waste heat removal pumps of the row B, so that the waste heat removal functions of the two rows are lost, and therefore the loss of the waste heat removal capacity indication of the row B is used as a potential information failure common mode point.

If a fire causes the triggering of the monitoring information of the support-missing system or the failure of the monitoring information of the safety function of a certain safety function of the column, and simultaneously causes the triggering of the monitoring information of the support-missing system or the failure of the monitoring information of the safety function of the redundant column, the triggering of the monitoring information of the support-missing system and the monitoring information of the safety function are considered as a potential information failure common mode point. Such as: as shown in table 2, if a fire in the fire partition in a row a causes a power failure alarm trigger of the emergency bus in row a and simultaneously causes a loss of the indication of the exhaust heat discharge flow rate in row B, an operator may erroneously stop the two rows of exhaust heat discharge systems to cause a loss of the exhaust heat discharge function, and thus the power failure alarm trigger of the emergency bus in row a and the loss of the indication of the exhaust heat discharge flow rate in row B are used as potential information failure common mode points.

In this alternative, as shown in fig. 6, a process of sequentially identifying a plurality of information failure risks according to a preset identification order is provided. Therefore, identifying whether the critical information has an information failure risk when a fire occurs in each fire protection zone includes:

at step 602, it is identified whether a fire would result in a loss of diagnostic guidance information.

And identifying whether the fire disaster of each fire protection subarea can cause the loss of diagnosis guide information in the key information. If yes, go to step 604; if not, go to step 606.

And step 604, determining the potential information failure common mode point.

And determining the key information with the information failure risk as a potential information failure common mode point of the corresponding fire protection subarea.

And step 606, identifying whether the fire can cause the design expansion working condition characteristic information to be triggered.

And identifying whether the design expansion working condition characteristic information in the key information is triggered or not when the fire disaster happens to each fire prevention subarea. If yes, go to step 604; if not, go to step 608.

At step 608, it is identified whether the fire will cause incident condition entry information to be triggered.

And identifying whether the fire disaster happens to each fire-prevention subarea or not, wherein the fire disaster condition entrance information in the key information is triggered. If yes, go to step 604; if not, go to step 610.

At step 610, it is identified whether a fire would cause a loss of a safety function of the local column and trigger a loss of support function monitoring message for the redundant column.

And identifying whether a safety function of the fire-prevention subarea column is lost or not when the fire disaster happens to each fire-prevention subarea, and triggering the information of the redundant column corresponding to the fire-prevention subarea column on which the monitoring information of the function of losing the support is lost. If yes, go to step 604; if not, go to step 612.

Step 612, identify if a fire would cause a loss of one of the safety features of the local column and the safety feature monitoring information of the redundant column to fail.

And identifying whether the fire disaster happens to each fire-prevention subarea, which can cause the loss of one safety function of the fire-prevention subarea, and the safety function monitoring information of the redundant row is invalid. If yes, go to step 604; if not, go to step 614.

And 614, identifying whether the fire can cause the triggering of the monitoring information of the support-losing function of one safety function of the column or the failure of the monitoring information of the safety function, and the triggering of the monitoring information of the support-losing function of the redundant column or the failure of the monitoring information of the safety function.

When a fire disaster occurs in each fire-protection subarea, whether the support function losing monitoring information of one safety function in the fire-protection subarea is triggered or the safety function monitoring information is invalid or not is identified, and the support function losing monitoring information in the redundant row is triggered or the safety function monitoring information is invalid. If yes, go to step 604; if not, go to step 616.

Step 616, determining that no potential information failure common mode point exists in each fire zone.

In this optional, when the conflagration takes place through discerning each fire prevention subregion, whether can lead to the loss of diagnosis direction information, whether can lead to design extension operating mode characteristic information to be triggered, whether can lead to accident operating mode entry information to be triggered, and, whether can lead to the complete loss of safety function of fire prevention subregion, multiple information inefficacy risk, not only can discern and handle latent information inefficacy risk, can also accurately eliminate information inefficacy risk, the risk of the whole losses of safety function of nuclear power plant has effectively been avoided from this, the security of nuclear power plant has been improved greatly.

In an alternative of this embodiment, determining the target common mode point among the potential information failure common mode points includes: carrying out characteristic analysis on the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a characteristic analysis result; and determining a target common mode point according to the characteristic analysis result.

When the nuclear power plant management equipment identifies a plurality of potential information failure common mode points, whether the information failure risk of each potential information failure common mode point is acceptable or not can be identified. Specifically, identifying whether the information failure risk of each potential information failure common mode point is acceptable includes: and carrying out characteristic analysis on the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a characteristic analysis result. And if the information failure risk of the potential information failure common mode point is identified to be unacceptable according to the characteristic analysis result, confirming the potential information common mode point, determining the potential information common mode point as a target common mode point, and eliminating the potential information common mode point. If the information failure risk of the potential information failure common mode point is identified to be acceptable according to the characteristic analysis result, the potential information failure common mode point is indicated to be not confirmed, and the potential information failure common mode point is not the target common mode point.

In the optional mode, the target common mode point is determined by performing characteristic analysis on the potential information failure common mode point, so that the accurate information failure common mode point can be further determined, and the information failure risk can be eliminated accurately.

Further, as shown in fig. 7, performing a feature analysis on the potential information failure common mode point, and obtaining a feature analysis result includes:

step 702, identifying whether a replacement strategy exists at the potential information failure common mode point or not, and obtaining a first identification result.

Step 704, identifying whether the substitute value of the potential information failure common mode point can realize correct judgment or guidance, and obtaining a second identification result.

And step 706, identifying whether the misjudgment or misdirection result caused by the potential information failure common mode point can be accepted or not, and obtaining a third identification result.

Step 708, identifying whether the information failure consequence of the potential information failure common mode point can be accepted or not, and obtaining a fourth identification result.

And step 710, obtaining a feature analysis result according to the first recognition result, the second recognition result, the third recognition result and the fourth recognition result.

The characteristic analysis may include identifying whether a substitution strategy exists for the potential information failure common mode point, identifying whether a substitution value of the potential information failure common mode point can be correctly judged or guided, identifying whether a misjudgment result or a misguide result caused by the potential information failure common mode point can be accepted, and identifying whether an information failure result of the potential information failure common mode point can be accepted, where the characteristic analysis result may include the identification results in the above four aspects.

Specifically, the nuclear power plant management equipment identifies whether a replacement strategy exists for the potential information failure common mode point. The presence or absence of an alternative strategy may be confirmed from the aspects of operational experience, operator skill, or robustness of the accident operating protocol. If the first recognition result is that a reasonable replacement strategy exists, the potential information failure common mode point is not confirmed. If the first identification result is that no reasonable replacement strategy exists, the potential information failure common mode point is confirmed. For example, an alternative means may be that, in addition to the operation state of the waste heat removal system during the accident operation, the operation state of the waste heat removal pump + whether the outlet isolation valve is open may be used to determine the operation state of the waste heat removal system. For another example, whether a pump is operating or not may be determined by the rotational speed, current, flow rate, etc. of the pump, in addition to considering the on-off state.

Identifying whether the replacement value for the potential information failure common mode point enables a correct determination or direction. The substitute value is a default value, and the default value is a substitute value given by the DCS after the monitored information is invalid. If the second recognition result is a default value that enables correct judgment and guidance, the potential information failure common mode point is not confirmed. If the substitute value enables a correct decision or guidance during the accident run, the failure of this information does not lead to unexpected serious consequences. If the second recognition result is a default value, correct judgment and guidance cannot be achieved, and the potential information failure common mode point is confirmed. For example, a total loss of power to the emergency buses LHA and LHB and LBC will be directed to the DEC-a sequence (plant wide loss), with the default value in DCS being 0 if the emergency bus LHA voltage monitoring is lost due to fire effects, meaning that LHA is lost, but loss of power to LHA alone will not result in misdirection to the DEC-a sequence (LHB and LHC are not lost).

And identifying whether the misjudgment or misdirection result caused by the potential information failure common mode point is acceptable, and if the third identification result is the misjudgment or misdirection result caused by the information failure is acceptable in terms of the result, the potential information failure common mode point is not confirmed. And judging whether the result can be accepted from the misjudgment or misdirection, and whether the misjudgment or misdirection can prevent the unit from being withdrawn and maintained in a safe shutdown state. If so, it is unacceptable and the potential information failure common mode point is identified. If not, then it is acceptable that the potential information failure common mode point is not confirmed.

Identifying whether the consequences of an information failure at a potential information failure common mode point are acceptable. Specifically, the nuclear power plant management equipment can judge whether the information failure consequence can be accepted or not based on engineering experience. The engineering experience judgment can be comprehensively considered according to the operation experience feedback, the acceptable degree of the consequence, the probability risk evaluation and the like of the similar unit. If the fourth identification result is that the information failure result is acceptable, the potential information failure common mode point is not confirmed. If the fourth identification result is that the information failure result is not acceptable, the potential information failure common mode point is confirmed. For example, if important parameter instruments such as core outlet temperature, pressure vessel water level, etc. are sent out through the instrument tube above the pressure vessel top cover, if a fire occurs at the instrument tube, all the instrument information will be lost. However, the feedback of the operation experience of the similar units shows that the fire source is basically absent here, too much fire load is not introduced here during the daily operation and maintenance, and therefore, the potential information failure common mode point is not confirmed. For another example, the redundant water level of the voltage stabilizer, the valve position measurement of the safety valve of the voltage stabilizer and other related instruments are all arranged in the fire protection zone where the voltage stabilizer is located, and the fire risk analysis of the fire protection zone shows that although the instruments are in the same fire protection zone, any possible fire point fire in the fire protection zone may cause one or more of the instruments to be lost, but all of the instruments cannot be lost. Therefore, the potential information failure common mode point is not confirmed.

In the embodiment, the potential information failure common mode point is confirmed in multiple modes to obtain the target common mode point, so that the target common mode point can be accurately identified, and the accuracy of fire information failure processing is further improved.

In another embodiment, as shown in fig. 8, there is provided a failure handling method for fire information of a nuclear power plant, the method including:

step 802, screening accident operation important information affected by the nuclear power plant fire in an accident operation regulation.

And step 804, constructing an important information base according to the accident operation important information.

And 806, determining key information of each fire protection subarea in the nuclear power plant when a fire disaster occurs according to the important information base.

And 808, identifying potential information failure common mode points of the current fire protection subarea in the nuclear power plant according to the key information.

And step 810, when the number of the potential information failure common mode points of the current fire-protection subarea is multiple, sequentially identifying whether the potential information failure common mode points of the current fire-protection subarea are target common mode points or not to obtain the target common mode points of the current fire-protection subarea.

And step 812, sequentially eliminating the target common mode points of the current fire prevention subarea according to a preset common mode point elimination strategy.

And 814, after the elimination of the target common mode point of the current fire-protection subarea is finished, returning to the step of identifying the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire-protection subarea in the nuclear power plant according to the key information, updating the current fire-protection subarea into the next fire-protection subarea, and eliminating the target common mode point until the elimination of the target common mode points of all the fire-protection subareas in the nuclear power plant is finished.

In this embodiment, the nuclear power plant management device performs information failure processing on the fire zones in sequence to identify all fault forms on the information path chain.

The following describes the failure processing method for the fire information of the nuclear power plant by taking a certain fire-protection zone in column a as an example. Fig. 9 is a schematic diagram for identifying potential information failure common mode points of a fire protection zone in column a. A row of containment spray pumps EAS001PO can be directly destroyed by a fire subarea fire disaster of A row, cables of a steam generator radioactive alarm signal KRT066KA generated by a steam generator radioactive monitoring instrument KRT002MA are destroyed at the same time, an A row of emergency bus LHA electricity loss alarm signal LHA002KA cable, a B row of emergency bus LHB electricity loss alarm signal LHB002KA cable and a B row of containment spray system flow information EAS002MD cable are destroyed.

The A-line fire zone fire may cause the steam generator radioactivity alarm signal KRT066KA to be triggered by mistake and directly lead to an AC working condition steam generator heat transfer pipe rupture accident handling sequence, so that the A-line fire zone fire is a potential information failure common mode point. During the accident operation period, in order to deal with the steam generator heat transfer pipe rupture accident as soon as possible and reduce the leakage between the first loop and the second loop, the alarm is triggered to directly require to execute a corresponding accident handling strategy, so that the potential information common mode point is confirmed. The proposed measures for eliminating the potential information failure common mode point are: by modifying the alarm triggering logic within the instrumentation control system, an alarm is not triggered upon a failure of KRT002 MA.

The A-row fire-protection partition fire may cause the B-row emergency bus LHB power-loss alarm signal LHB002KA to trigger. Considering that the fire-prevention subarea fire directly causes the power loss of the emergency bus in the A column, the simultaneous existence of the power loss alarm signals of the emergency bus in the two columns means that DEC-A characteristic information (whole plant power loss alarm) occurs, and therefore the common mode point is potential information failure. From the aspect of accident operation, if a whole-plant power-off accident handling sequence is executed mistakenly under the condition that a row of emergency buses are not actually powered off, the unit is developed in a worsening direction, and the method is not preferable, so that the potential information failure common mode point is confirmed. The proposed measures to eliminate this common mode point are: and protective measures such as fire-proof wrapping are taken for the cable of the alarm signal LHB002KA, so that the A-column fire-proof subarea can still perform functions when a fire breaks out.

This fire zone fire in column a may result in the loss of the column B containment spray system flow indicator EAS002 MD. Considering that this fire zone fire has directly led to a-column containment spray loss, if EAS002MD gives a false indication that B-column containment spray system flow is low, an operator may mistakenly manually shut down the B-column containment spray, thus being a potential common mode point of information failure. The shutdown of the two columns of containment vessel spraying systems can cause that the heat in the containment vessel cannot be led out in time, and the integrity of the containment vessel is seriously threatened, so that the potential information failure common mode point is confirmed. The proposed measures for eliminating the potential information failure common mode point are: the criterion of containment spray monitoring in the accident operation regulation is modified, the operation state of the containment spray system in the column B is not judged only through the flow reading of EAS002MD, and meanwhile, the judgment is also carried out through whether the EAS002PO is in operation and the state of a corresponding valve, so that the operation state of the containment spray system in the column B can still be correctly monitored when a fire disaster occurs in the fire-protection subarea in the column A.

It should be understood that, although the steps in the flowcharts related to the embodiments are shown in sequence as indicated by the arrows, the steps are not necessarily executed in sequence as indicated by the arrows. The steps are not limited to being performed in the exact order illustrated and, unless explicitly stated herein, may be performed in other orders. Moreover, at least a part of the steps in the flowcharts related to the above embodiments may include multiple steps or multiple stages, which are not necessarily performed at the same time, but may be performed at different times, and the order of performing the steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but may be performed alternately or alternately with other steps or at least a part of the steps or stages in other steps.

Based on the same inventive concept, the embodiment of the application also provides a failure processing device of the nuclear power plant fire information, which is used for realizing the failure processing method of the nuclear power plant fire information. The implementation scheme for solving the problem provided by the device is similar to the implementation scheme recorded in the method, so that specific limitations in the following embodiments of the failure processing device for one or more pieces of nuclear power plant fire information may be referred to the limitations on the failure processing method for the nuclear power plant fire information, and details are not repeated herein.

In one embodiment, as shown in fig. 10, there is provided a failure processing apparatus for fire information of a nuclear power plant, including: an acquisition module 1002, an identification module 1004, a determination module 1006, and a cancellation module 1008, wherein:

the obtaining module 1002 is configured to obtain key information of each fire protection partition in the nuclear power plant when a fire occurs.

The identification module 1004 is configured to identify potential information failure common mode points of each fire zone in the nuclear power plant according to the key information.

A determining module 1006 for determining a target common mode point among the potential information failure common mode points.

And a cancellation module 1008 configured to cancel the target common mode point according to a preset common mode point cancellation strategy.

In one embodiment, the common mode point identification module 1004 is further configured to identify whether a fire in each fire protection partition may cause a risk of information failure of the key information; and if so, determining the key information with the information failure risk as the potential information failure common mode point of the corresponding fire protection subarea.

In one embodiment, the common mode point identification module 1004 is further configured to identify whether a fire in each fire zone will cause the loss of the diagnosis guidance information in the key information, the triggering of the design expansion condition feature information in the key information, the triggering of the accident condition entrance information in the key information, and the total loss of the safety function of the fire zone.

In one embodiment, the common mode point identifying module 1004 is further configured to identify whether a safety function of the local row of the fire protection sub-area is lost when a fire occurs in each fire protection sub-area, and trigger the monitoring information of the redundant row corresponding to the local row of the fire protection sub-area, whether a safety function of the local row of the fire protection sub-area is lost, and the monitoring information of the safety function of the redundant row is failed, and whether the monitoring information of the non-support function of the safety function of the local row of the fire protection sub-area is triggered or the monitoring information of the safety function is failed, and the monitoring information of the non-support function of the redundant row is triggered or the monitoring information of the safety function is failed.

In one embodiment, the common mode point identification module 1004 is further configured to identify whether a fire in each fire zone results in a loss of the diagnosis guidance information in the key information; if the diagnosis guide information cannot be lost, identifying whether the design expansion working condition characteristic information in the key information is triggered when each fire prevention subarea is in fire; if the design expansion working condition characteristic information cannot be triggered, identifying whether accident working condition entrance information in the key information is triggered when each fireproof subarea is in fire; if the accident condition entrance information cannot be triggered, identifying whether a safety function of the fire-prevention subarea row is lost or not when the fire disaster happens to each fire-prevention subarea, and triggering the monitoring information of the support-losing function of the redundant row corresponding to the fire-prevention subarea row; if the safety function of the fire-prevention subarea row cannot be lost and the support function loss monitoring information of the redundant row corresponding to the fire-prevention subarea row is triggered, identifying whether the safety function of the fire-prevention subarea row is lost or not and the safety function monitoring information of the redundant row fails when a fire disaster occurs in each fire-prevention subarea; if the safety function of the fire-protection subarea column cannot be lost and the safety function monitoring information of the redundant column fails, whether the support function loss monitoring information of the safety function of the fire-protection subarea column is triggered or the safety function monitoring information fails or not and the support function loss monitoring information of the redundant column is triggered or the safety function monitoring information fails is identified when the fire disaster occurs in each fire-protection subarea.

In one embodiment, the common mode point determining module 1006 is further configured to perform feature analysis on the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a feature analysis result; and determining a target common mode point according to the characteristic analysis result.

In one embodiment, the common mode point determining module 1006 is further configured to identify whether there is a replacement policy for the potential information failure common mode point, resulting in a first identification result; identifying whether the substitute value of the potential information failure common mode point can realize correct judgment or guidance to obtain a second identification result; identifying whether the misjudgment or misguidance result caused by the potential information failure common mode point can be accepted or not to obtain a third identification result; identifying whether the information failure consequence of the potential information failure common mode point can be accepted or not to obtain a fourth identification result; and obtaining a feature analysis result according to the first recognition result, the second recognition result, the third recognition result and the fourth recognition result.

In one embodiment, the preset common mode point cancellation strategy comprises: and modifying the accident operation regulation or the fire protection strategy.

In one embodiment, the information obtaining module 1002 is further configured to screen important information of the accident operation, which is affected by the fire of the nuclear power plant, in the accident operation regulation; constructing an important information base according to the important information of the accident operation; and determining key information of each fire-proof subarea in the nuclear power plant when a fire disaster occurs according to the important information base.

In one embodiment, the information obtaining module 1002 is further configured to extract diagnosis guidance information and accident condition entry information that are affected by a fire of a nuclear power plant in a unit state initial diagnosis stage and a unit state re-diagnosis stage of an accident operation rule; extracting feature information of a design expansion working condition in an accident handling sequence of an accident operation rule; extracting the detection information of the support losing function in the support losing function monitoring part of the accident operation regulation; extracting safety function monitoring information from a supply system function monitoring part of an accident operation rule; and obtaining important information of the accident operation influenced by the fire of the nuclear power plant according to the diagnosis guide information, the accident condition entrance information, the design expansion condition characteristic information, the detection information of the support losing function and the safety function monitoring information.

In one embodiment, the above apparatus further comprises:

the common mode point identification module is used for identifying potential information failure common mode points of the current fire protection subareas in the nuclear power plant according to the key information;

the common mode point confirming module is used for sequentially identifying whether the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire-protection subarea is a target common mode point or not when the potential information failure common mode points of the current fire-protection subarea are multiple, so as to obtain the target common mode point of the current fire-protection subarea;

and the common mode point eliminating module is used for returning to the step of identifying the potential information failure common mode point of the current fire-protection subarea in the nuclear power plant according to the key information after the target common mode point of the current fire-protection subarea is eliminated according to the preset common mode point eliminating strategy, updating the current fire-protection subarea into the next fire-protection subarea, and eliminating the target common mode point until the target common mode points of all the fire-protection subareas in the nuclear power plant are eliminated.

All or part of each module in the failure processing device for the fire information of the nuclear power plant can be realized by software, hardware and a combination thereof. The modules can be embedded in a hardware form or independent of a processor in the computer device, and can also be stored in a memory in the computer device in a software form, so that the processor can call and execute operations corresponding to the modules.

In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, which may be a terminal, and its internal structure diagram may be as shown in fig. 11. The computer apparatus includes a processor, a memory, an input/output interface, a communication interface, a display unit, and an input device. The processor, the memory and the input/output interface are connected by a system bus, and the communication interface, the display unit and the input device are connected by the input/output interface to the system bus. Wherein the processor of the computer device is configured to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device comprises a nonvolatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of an operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The input/output interface of the computer device is used for exchanging information between the processor and an external device. The communication interface of the computer device is used for carrying out wired or wireless communication with an external terminal, and the wireless communication can be realized through WIFI, a mobile cellular network, NFC (near field communication) or other technologies. The computer program is executed by a processor to implement a failure handling method for fire information of a nuclear power plant.

In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, which may be a server, and its internal structure diagram may be as shown in fig. 12. The computer device comprises a processor, a memory, an Input/Output (I/O) interface and a communication interface. The processor, the memory and the input/output interface are connected through a system bus, and the communication interface is connected to the system bus through the input/output interface. Wherein the processor of the computer device is configured to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, a computer program, and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of an operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The database of the computer equipment is used for storing accident operation regulations, key information of each fire-proof subarea in the nuclear power plant when a fire disaster happens and the like. The input/output interface of the computer device is used for exchanging information between the processor and an external device. The communication interface of the computer device is used for connecting and communicating with an external terminal through a network. The computer program is executed by a processor to implement a failure handling method for fire information of a nuclear power plant.

Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the configurations shown in fig. 11 and 12 are merely block diagrams of portions of configurations related to aspects of the present application, and do not constitute limitations on the computing devices to which aspects of the present application may be applied, as particular computing devices may include more or less components than shown, or combine certain components, or have a different arrangement of components.

In an embodiment, a computer device is provided, comprising a memory and a processor, the memory having stored therein a computer program, the processor implementing the steps of the above method embodiments when executing the computer program.

In an embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, which computer program, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the above-mentioned method embodiments.

In an embodiment, a computer program product is provided, comprising a computer program which, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the above-mentioned method embodiments.

It should be noted that, the user information (including but not limited to user equipment information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) referred to in the present application are information and data authorized by the user or sufficiently authorized by each party, and the collection, use and processing of the related data need to comply with the relevant laws and regulations and standards of the relevant country and region.

It will be understood by those skilled in the art that all or part of the processes of the methods of the embodiments described above can be implemented by hardware instructions of a computer program, which can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, can include the processes of the embodiments of the methods described above. Any reference to memory, database, or other medium used in the embodiments provided herein may include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. The nonvolatile Memory may include Read-Only Memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash Memory, optical Memory, high-density embedded nonvolatile Memory, resistive Random Access Memory (ReRAM), Magnetic Random Access Memory (MRAM), Ferroelectric Random Access Memory (FRAM), Phase Change Memory (PCM), graphene Memory, and the like. Volatile Memory can include Random Access Memory (RAM), external cache Memory, and the like. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM can take many forms, such as Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) or Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), among others. The databases referred to in various embodiments provided herein may include at least one of relational and non-relational databases. The non-relational database may include, but is not limited to, a block chain based distributed database, and the like. The processors referred to in the embodiments provided herein may be general purpose processors, central processing units, graphics processors, digital signal processors, programmable logic devices, quantum computing based data processing logic devices, etc., without limitation.

The technical features of the above embodiments can be arbitrarily combined, and for the sake of brevity, all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are not described, but should be considered as the scope of the present specification as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.

The above-mentioned embodiments only express several embodiments of the present application, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but not construed as limiting the scope of the present application. It should be noted that, for a person skilled in the art, several variations and modifications can be made without departing from the concept of the present application, which falls within the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application shall be subject to the appended claims.

Claims

1. A failure processing method for fire information of a nuclear power plant is characterized by comprising the following steps:

2. The method of claim 1, wherein identifying potential information failure common mode points for each fire zone in the nuclear power plant based on the key information comprises:

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the identifying whether the critical information risks being disabled when a fire occurs in each fire zone comprises:

and identifying whether the fire disaster of each fire protection subarea can cause that diagnosis guide information in the key information is lost, design expansion working condition characteristic information in the key information is triggered, accident working condition entrance information in the key information is triggered, and safety functions of the fire protection subareas are completely lost.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the identifying whether a fire in each fire zone would cause a complete loss of the safety function of the fire zone comprises:

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the identifying whether the critical information risks being disabled when a fire occurs in each fire zone comprises:

if the accident condition entrance information cannot be triggered, identifying whether a safety function of a fire-prevention subarea local column is lost or not when a fire disaster occurs in each fire-prevention subarea, and triggering the monitoring information of the support-losing function of the redundant column corresponding to the fire-prevention subarea local column;

6. The method of claim 1, wherein determining a target common mode point among the potential information failure common mode points comprises:

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the characterizing the potential information failure common mode point to obtain a characterization result comprises:

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the pre-defined common mode point cancellation strategy comprises: and modifying the accident operation regulation or the fire protection strategy.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein obtaining key information of each fire zone in the nuclear power plant in the event of a fire comprises:

10. The method of claim 9, wherein the screening incident operation important information affected by a nuclear power plant fire in an incident operation schedule comprises:

11. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, further comprising:

12. A failure handling device for fire information of a nuclear power plant, the device comprising:

13. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, characterized in that the processor realizes the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 11 when executing the computer program.

14. A computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, which, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 11.

15. A computer program product comprising a computer program, characterized in that the computer program realizes the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 11 when executed by a processor.