CN114760067B - Privacy security protection method for blockchain crowd sensing system by using zero knowledge proof - Google Patents
Privacy security protection method for blockchain crowd sensing system by using zero knowledge proof Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a privacy security protection method of a blockchain crowd sensing system by using zero knowledge proof, which comprises definition 1, definition 2, definition 3 and definition 4 and further comprises the following steps: step 1: initializing a crowd sensing system and creating an account; step 2: group intelligence perception task release; step 3: sensing task participation, execution and data submission; step 4: rewards and credits are issued. The transfer mode without privacy security leakage realized by using the zero knowledge proof scheme of the invention combines the supervision capability of the trusted third party management center with the capability of the blockchain for guaranteeing privacy security, effectively helps the crowd-sourced and transaction content in the transaction process to be hidden by the intelligent perception system, and can ensure that the transaction content of the system cannot leak any privacy of users based on the designed blockchain intelligent contract. The invention can effectively ensure the participation of the safety system of the user on the premise of ensuring the smooth execution of the crowd sensing system.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of crowd sensing privacy protection, and particularly relates to a privacy security protection method for a blockchain crowd sensing system by using zero knowledge proof.
Background
The crowd sensing technology can fully exert the sensing function of the mobile user equipment to realize purposeful data acquisition, so that users with sensing, calculating and communication capabilities can provide sensing data for users with requirements and obtain corresponding task execution rewards. The privacy security protection of the user is a key factor in the design of the crowd sensing system, and greatly influences the evaluation of the security and the reliability of the system by the user.
The current architecture of the crowd sensing system platform is mainly based on a centralized method and a distributed method. On one hand, the crowd sensing platform is used as the transfer of all data based on a centralized method, and system operations such as task release and participation, data submission and the like are required to be transferred through the platform. However, this approach makes it possible for a centralized platform to suffer from a large amount of user privacy once it encounters an attack, while the platform itself is not fully trusted, which may potentially explore user preferences in order to increase its revenue. On the other hand, although the scheme based on distributed crowd sensing avoids part of problems of the centralized scheme of crowd sensing, the scheme also brings inflexibility to user behavior management, once malignant behaviors such as malicious illegal tasks and distributed service denial of service attacks (DDoS) are issued in the system, the system cannot provide timely and effective management and tracing, privacy and participation safety of users are greatly damaged, and user experience quality is reduced.
In the centralized group intelligence perception method, users with data requests issue tasks to a centralized group intelligence perception platform for display, and recruit reliable users capable of providing data to execute the tasks. The method can provide an efficient system operation mechanism, but because the users need to interact with the central server to exchange data between the users when participating in the system, the central platform must be alerted to the problem of single point failure at any time, and any weak link in the system is attacked to possibly cause the paralysis of the system. For example, application publication number CN114139070a, entitled "a user selection method supporting any geographic range query", discloses a solution using a dual cloud model to reduce the impact of single point failure on a server, however, frequent interactions between users and systems enable attackers with powerful computing power to still track specific content of participation records and tasks of a specific user from a huge number of user participation records, which also makes the invention obviously insufficient for protecting user location privacy. In addition, the platform itself may break privacy protection agreements for the purpose of increasing revenue by analyzing the participation history of a large number of users to learn the preferences of the users and targeted advertisement pushing to the users.
Based on the distributed crowd sensing method, the protection characteristic of the blockchain for data security is typically explored by combining the blockchain technology with the crowd sensing platform. However, due to the characteristic that the plaintext records of the blockchain are available for examination, the participation records of the users can be checked by all nodes with strong computing power in the network, so that the problem of privacy leakage still exists in the traditional distributed method. For example, the application publication number CN113507704a, named "mobile crowd sensing privacy protection method based on dual attribute decision", discloses a geographic location protection method based on k-anonymity to protect a user from being obtained by a malicious user in the process of interaction with a network, which has higher location privacy protection, but has the defects that: 1. considering only that a scheme through k-anonymization may still face the risk of participating in history attacks in peer-to-peer transactions (transfers) between data requesters and data providers, peer-to-peer transfers make this approach face the potential for failure; 2. malicious data providers may provide false data resulting in data requesters failing to obtain satisfactory data quality, resulting in users with data requirements may fail to obtain the required high quality data resulting in compromised user quality of experience; 3. the huge amount of perceived data is difficult to transmit through the blockchain, resulting in the type of perceived task being severely limited by the size of the data amount.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the problems of inflexibility of the management of the current distributed crowd sensing system and unreliability of a centralized system, provides a crowd sensing system privacy security protection method applied by combining zero knowledge proof and blockchain technology, and aims to realize flexible management of user participation on the premise of ensuring user privacy security. After the factors are comprehensively considered, a complete group intelligence perception privacy protection scheme is provided, and the supervision of malicious operations in the system and the guarantee of privacy security by combining a blockchain platform with zero knowledge proof by a trusted third party management center are utilized, so that the system participation of a user is ensured, and the quality of experience of the user is prevented from being damaged by the illegal operations of the malicious user on the premise that the task privacy of the user is not exposed. And meanwhile, the user transaction scheme based on zero knowledge proof is used, so that the point-to-point transaction of the user cannot reveal any privacy content of the user in the operation of the distributed system.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the present invention provides the following technical solutions: a privacy security protection method for a blockchain crowd sensing system with zero knowledge proof comprises definition 1, definition 2, definition 3 and definition 4;
definition 1: a trusted third party management center: the trusted third party management center is a trusted entity in the crowd sensing system, corresponds to government traffic authorities or other trusted institutions in actual life, and is responsible for initializing a blockchain, registering users and supervising whether malicious behaviors exist in the crowd sensing system or not and tracking and tracing;
definition 2: the system user type includes a data requester and a data provider; the data provider is a user with sensing, communication and computing capabilities, the data requester is a user incapable of meeting own data requirements due to insufficient own capabilities, and the user with sensing capabilities is recruited to replace the data requester to execute data sensing by publishing sensing tasks into the blockchain; the data provider carries out data perception after obtaining the execution right of the perception task by selecting the perception task, and obtains corresponding task execution rewards after the execution of the perception task is finished;
definition 3: task display platform: the task display platform is a task display center in the block chain crowd sensing system, only provides display services for users using the task display platform, and displays task information for a data requester to select by mining corresponding requirements and running states of task intelligent contracts in the block chain; notably, the task display platform only provides the function of task display, and does not serve as a transfer center of data and tasks, and the system participation of the user is still realized through interaction with the blockchain;
definition 4: zero knowledge proof: zero knowledge proof is used to trust the correctness of knowledge for users other than the knowledge transaction parties without revealing the specific content of the knowledge; the zero knowledge proof method is zero knowledge simple knowledge proof (zk-SNARK), the zero knowledge proof method does not need direct interaction between a user for proving knowledge and a user for verifying knowledge, the user for proving knowledge is a prover, and the user for verifying knowledge is a verifier; the verifier can trust the correctness and ownership of the knowledge only through the zero knowledge proof generated by the binary circuit;
the method also comprises the following steps:
step 1: group intelligence perception system initialization and account creation: the trusted third party management center generates a series of security parameters of users, and initializes an creation block of the block chain by using the security parameters; the creating block is the first block of the block chain and is used for storing some key information; notably, the initialization of the crowd sensing system is only executed once and is not executed repeatedly; the user in the crowd sensing system, namely the data requester and the data provider acquire parameters in the creation block in the participation block chain and initialize account information of the user; after that, the user registers with the trusted third party management center, and the registered user performs anonymous security operation by using the digital certificate generated by the trusted third party management center, so as to ensure the user to participate in the system safely;
step 2: group intelligence perception task release: the data requester issues a task intelligent contract in the blockchain to ensure safe and reliable operation of the task, the task intelligent contract prescribes a series of conditions which the task executor needs to meet to participate in the task, and only the task executor meeting the conditions can obtain the participation rights of the task; in addition, the data requester pays a subscription fee to the task intelligent contract to prevent the data requester from maliciously withholding the task execution rewards;
step 3: perception of task participation, execution and data submission: the data provider selects a proper task from the block chain according to the task type and the requirement in the task display platform, and participates in the task by transmitting a series of parameters to the task intelligent contract; in the interaction process of the crowd sensing system, the transfer of the call between the data provider and the task intelligent contract is the transfer intelligent contract, the data requester does not directly call the task intelligent contract, but first calls the task intelligent contract by calling the transfer intelligent contract, and then the transfer intelligent contract further calls the task intelligent contract, so that the point-to-point operation of the user blockchain is prevented from exposing the system participation history of the user; in addition, the data provider also needs to pay a subscription as a credential for task participation, which will be deducted as a penalty once the data requester performs malicious illicit task execution; because the block chain plaintext transaction realizes the verification characteristic, the transaction of the user is tracked by an attacker with strong computing power, and therefore, the crowd sensing system ensures that the content of the transaction does not reveal any privacy information of both parties of the transaction by using a transaction scheme based on zero knowledge proof;
step 4: rewards and credits are issued: the data requester issues rewards to users submitting the perceived data, and evaluates the data quality by judging the perceived data quality status to judge whether the data provider performs malicious operation or not; and the data requester transmits the rewards and the credit issuing certificates into the task intelligent contract, and the intelligent contract is operated to end, so that the interaction of the two parties of the task is marked to end.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. the invention adopts the mode of combining the trusted third party management center and the decentralised blockchain, effectively breaks through the problem that the user transaction is easy to trace caused by the possibly existing unreliable behavior of the centralized management platform and the frequent interaction between the user and the system, and simultaneously solves the problem that the experience quality of the user with data demand is reduced due to the malicious illegal behavior of the user in the distributed crowd sensing platform. The transfer mode without privacy security leakage realized by using the zero knowledge proof scheme of the invention combines the supervision capability of the trusted third party management center with the capability of the blockchain for guaranteeing privacy security, effectively helps the crowd-sourced and transaction content in the transaction process to be hidden by the intelligent perception system, and can ensure that the transaction content of the system cannot leak any privacy of users based on the designed blockchain intelligent contract. The invention can effectively ensure the participation of the safety system of the user on the premise of ensuring the smooth execution of the crowd sensing system.
2. The invention effectively breaks the direct interaction process between the user and the blockchain by utilizing the transfer intelligent contract, and enables each user in the system to call the specific intelligent contract in the blockchain in the same way based on the transfer intelligent contract instead of the direct scheduling of the user and the task intelligent contract, thereby effectively preventing the problem that the user with high computing capacity performs user system behavior tracking by analyzing the user participation history.
3. The invention effectively avoids privacy disclosure problem possibly encountered by the user in the process of point-to-point transaction by combining with the zero knowledge proof method, and the transaction record of the user can be checked by all the full nodes in the network due to the characteristic that the blockchain plaintext is stored for safety examination. By using the transfer mode without privacy security leakage realized by the zero knowledge proof scheme, any privacy of both transaction parties is ensured not to be revealed in the transfer transaction process on the premise of ensuring smooth execution of the crowd sensing system.
4. The invention can effectively track possible malicious behaviors in the system, and can effectively avoid the malicious behaviors in the crowd sensing system by combining the trusted third party management platform center with the blockchain, such as: issuing crime violence tasks, maliciously submitting data viruses, etc. The trusted third party management center can be used as a supervision platform in the system, can effectively track and trace malicious events in real time, gives corresponding penalties, and ensures safe and orderly operation of the system.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the execution of a task intelligence contract in the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present invention will be made clearly and completely with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which it is apparent that the embodiments described are only some embodiments of the present invention, but not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be made by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without making any inventive effort, are intended to be within the scope of the invention.
Referring to FIG. 1, a specific flow of crowd-sourced, intelligent awareness by data requesters is illustrated to ensure that intelligent contract-based task execution is secure and orderly. Wherein line 1 indicates that the activation conditions of the smart contract issued by the data requester are: the data requester needs to deposit the deposit into the intelligent contract, and the contract takes effect formally after the deposit; lines 3 through 8 indicate that the task can be executed by a data provider meeting the conditions, wherein lines 3 and 4 respectively indicate the maximum number of users for executing the task and the deadline for displaying the task, line 5 indicates some constraint terms (such as sensor requirements and agreements for the task participation of the user) which the user needs to meet, line 6 indicates the position requirements for executing the task which the user needs to meet, line 7 indicates the reputation requirements for executing the task which the user needs to meet, and line 8 indicates that the data provider needs to convert the scheme proven by zero knowledge into virtual currency of which the two parties agree to be used as a fixed fee; line 10 indicates the deadline for perceived data submission; line 12 indicates that the data requester needs to issue a monetary reward to the data provider within a specified time period and line 13 indicates that the data requester needs to submit a reputation issue to a trusted third party management center within a specified time period.
A privacy security protection method for a blockchain crowd sensing system with zero knowledge proof comprises (1 a) generating a series of parameters pp, pp= (p, e, G) by a trusted third party management center according to a security parameter lambda 1 ,G 2 ,G T ,F P ,P 1 ,P 2 ) Wherein p is a prime number; e is bilinear mapping: g 1 ×G 2 →G T ，(G 1 ,G 2 ,G T ) Is a cyclic group of order p; f (F) P Is a finite field; p (P) 1 And P 2 G is respectively 1 And G 2 Is a generator of (1). All parameters are packed into the creation block of the blockchain and distributed to the point-to-point network, and the user uses the parameters as input of self-security algorithms (key generation, zero knowledge proof generation).
(1b) The user in the system first needs to create system parametersAnd an address consisting of a user generated public and private key pair (addr sk ,addr pk ) Wherein addr is sk ＝(sk,sk enc ,sk sig )，addr pk ＝(pk,pk enc ,pk sig ) (sk, pk) represents the user's account key pair for transfer; (sk) enc ,pk enc ) A private key representing a public key for encryption and a private key for decryption for encryption and decryption of information; (sk) sig ,pk sig ) The private key of the one-time signature and the public key of the verification signature are represented and used for verifying the correctness of information transmission.
(1c) The user uses a public key encryption method to transmit a series of parameters to a trusted third party management center for registration, and the parameter setting comprises: user identity material ID u (e.g., E-mail, cell phone number); a password passw; public key address addr pk The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the And to prevent tracking with pk, the user generates promise cm using trapdoor functions I ＝COMM r (pk), where COMM () is trapdoor function and r is the seed of the user's random sample. The user packs, encrypts and signs the information and sends the information to a trusted third party management center, and the encryption of the information can be expressed as follows:the signature of the information can be expressed as: />The trusted third party management center is subjected to verification of the transmission information>After that, use it to decrypt the private key +.>Pair c reg Use of ID after decryption u Checking whether the user exists in the database as a unique index, if not, determining that the user is registered for the first time and generating an initial reputation value P 0 . Then, the trusted third party management center generates a digital anonymous certificate for the user, wherein the content of the certificate is as follows:the certificate only shows the reputation value P 0 With the time of issuance of the certificate, any private information of the user is not exposed, so that the user can use the zeta rep Secure system participation is performed.
(2) The data requester designs intelligent contracts to establish operation conditions related to tasks according to own data requirements, and the task information comprises: task descriptions, task publication deadlines, task locales, reputation value requirements, sensor requirements, data demonstrations, and the like. Using the above information, the data requester constructs a task intelligence contract, the contract flow is shown in FIG. 1. Wherein line 1 indicates the activation condition of the smart contract issued by the data requester: the data requester needs to deposit the deposit into the intelligent contract, and the contract takes effect formally after the deposit; lines 3 to 8 indicate that the data provider meeting the conditions can execute the task, wherein lines 3 and 4 respectively indicate whether the maximum number of users for executing the task and the deadline for displaying the task are met, line 5 indicates whether the user meets some constraint terms (such as sensor requirements and agreements for task participation of the user), line 6 indicates whether the user meets the position requirements for task execution, line 7 indicates whether the user meets the reputation requirements for task execution, and line 8 indicates whether the data provider changes the virtual currency of the number agreed by both parties to the scheme of zero knowledge proof for the data requester as a fixed fee; line 10 indicates that the data provider is satisfied with the deadline for perceiving the data submission; line 12 indicates whether the data requester satisfies issuing a monetary reward to the data provider within a specified time period and line 13 indicates whether the data requester satisfies submitting a reputation issue to a trusted third party management center within a specified time period.
(3a) The data provider communicates a series of parameters into the contract for task participation (as in line 2 of the task execution flow of fig. 1) according to the specification of the task intelligence contract: rather than directly passing parameters through a pass point that invokes a smart contract issued by a data requester, the data provider first invokes a transit smart contract, entered by the transit smart contractAnd the task intelligent contract is called so as to prevent an attacker from tracking the historical participation records of the user by analyzing the call records of the data requester, thereby preventing the privacy of the user from being revealed. The parameters transferred from the user to the transfer intelligent contract are required to be encrypted and signed, so that the transferred parameters are ensured not to be stolen by a malicious attacker, and the encrypted data are:encrypting the transmission data by using the public key of the hybrid smart contract and signing the encrypted data using the signature private key of the data provider:and further invoking the task intelligence contract by the hybrid intelligence contract to prevent the user's participation history from being tracked.
(3b) The process of effecting the transfer in (3 a) (fig. 1 task intelligence contract line 8) requires hiding the contents of the transaction with zero knowledge proof to prevent the attacker from tracking the user's historical participation through the transaction, the specific transaction process is as follows: the data provider first samples a pseudorandom function seed lambda DP Two trapdoor seeds b DP And d DP To prevent double flowers that may occur during the transaction. By setting upSo that the public key address pk DP And private lambda DP Are safe and do not suffer from leakage. Second, the data provider establishes another commitmentTo verify, indicating the presence of currency. Thus, the information of the coin owned by the data provider can be expressed as: />Where v is the magnitude of the value of the virtual currency. To prevent double-spending, the data requester needs to calculate a unique based on the information of the coinSequence number sn of (2) DP The serial number is used to uniquely determine the presence of a coin, and is expressed as: />Where function PRF () is a pseudo-random function (PRF). When a virtual currency transaction occurs, sn DP Will be uniquely calculated and added to the Merkle Tree if and only if sn DP When not present in the merkel tree, the coin is not considered to be double-colored. The data provider packages the related contents of the transaction and publishes them into the blockchain for verification,/for the transaction>After the data provider establishes the relevant information Q of the coin, the transaction of the coin can be realized, and the data provider firstly samples three random seeds lambda for the data requester DR ，b DR And d DR For helping data requesters establish ownership statements for virtual coins:when the data provider actively loses the right to use the original virtual currency, i.e. calculates and publishes +.>The transaction is then considered complete. At this time, the information of the coin established by the data provider for the data requester is +.>In addition, in order to make the information of the transaction verifiable without exposing the transactor information and the transaction value, the data requester needs to use zero knowledge proof to prove generation of the transaction information. It first verifies by generating a publicly verifiable statement:and a private witness: />Zero knowledge proof is generated by calling proof generating function Genproof (): />Wherein ppk generates a public key for the proof, which is used by all users in the network to generate a zero knowledge proof. Finally, the data requester needs to issue the information of the coin to the blockchain through the intelligent contract in a transaction mode, and the information is obtained by:this transaction information will be uniquely verified for transfer and may be verified for the correctness of the transfer transaction. All parameters are encrypted and signed by the encryption public key of the transfer intelligent contract and the one-time signature private key of the transfer intelligent contract to obtain +.>Andthe transaction->And transferring the intelligent contract to the transfer intelligent to further call and judging as shown in the 8 th row of the intelligent contract for judging the task.
(3c) After formally obtaining the execution right of a task, a data provider needs to acquire sensing data and finish submitting before the task is cut off, and the sensing data is often unrealistic to be used as transaction contents due to the limitation of the block size in a block chain, so that the invention adopts an interstellar file system (IPFS) for data storage, and a user obtains a unique encrypted hash value H according to the sensing contents D 。
(3d) After the perceptual data is stored in the interplanetary file system, the data provider needs to store H D The data requestor is sent as completion of the perceived task by invoking the smart contract (as in line 10 of the task smart contract run flow of FIG. 1). Class (3 c)Similarly, the data provider firstly needs to encrypt the perception information by using the encryption public key of the transfer intelligent contract, and simultaneously signs the encrypted data by using the self one-time signature public key, so as to obtain the specific contents of the encrypted message and the transaction, wherein the specific contents are respectively:
and (3) with
(4a) The data requester issues virtual currency as a reward to the user submitting the awareness data prior to the time limit (as in line 12 of the task intelligence contract execution flow of fig. 1). The value of the transaction includes the reward for performing the task plus the credit paid by the data provider. For those users who do not submit data, there will not be any rewards issued and the subscription will also be deducted. Thereafter, the data requester uploads the corresponding transaction record as a certification of issuance of the reward by invoking the task intelligence contract.
(4b) The data requester finishes scoring the data quality before the reputation evaluation time limit and performs reputation issuing (as in line 13 of the task operation flow of the task intelligent contract in fig. 1). The grading of the data quality by the data requester is sent to a trusted third party management center through encryption and signature to finish the evaluation of the data quality. After the trusted third party obtains the data quality score, a reputation update proof is returned to the data requester:
where y represents the result of the reputation update. The data requester will prove xi repdis As proof of reputation issuance.
(4c) When the task intelligent contract judges that the time limit is over or the data requester finishes parameter submission, the task intelligent contract operates to end, and the whole flow of interaction between the two perception tasks is marked to end.
Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made therein without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined in the appended claims and their equivalents.
Claims (3)
1. A privacy security protection method for a blockchain crowd sensing system with zero knowledge proof is characterized by comprising the following steps: including definition 1, definition 2, definition 3, definition 4;
definition 1: a trusted third party management center: the trusted third party management center is a trusted entity in the crowd sensing system, corresponds to government traffic authorities or other trusted institutions in actual life, and is responsible for initializing a blockchain, registering users and supervising whether malicious behaviors exist in the crowd sensing system or not and tracking and tracing;
definition 2: the system user type includes a data requester and a data provider; the data provider is a user with sensing, communication and computing capabilities, the data requester is a user incapable of meeting own data requirements due to insufficient own capabilities, and the user with sensing capabilities is recruited to replace the data requester to execute data sensing by publishing sensing tasks into the blockchain; the data provider carries out data perception after obtaining the execution right of the perception task by selecting the perception task, and obtains corresponding task execution rewards after the execution of the perception task is finished;
definition 3: task display platform: the task display platform is a task display center in the block chain crowd sensing system, only provides display services for users using the task display platform, and displays task information for a data provider to select by mining corresponding requirements and running states of task intelligent contracts in the block chain; notably, the task display platform only provides the function of task display, and does not serve as a transfer center of data and tasks, and the system participation of the user is still realized through interaction with the blockchain;
definition 4: zero knowledge proof: zero knowledge proof is used to trust the correctness of knowledge for users other than the knowledge transaction parties without revealing the specific content of the knowledge; the zero knowledge proof method is a simple knowledge proof of zero knowledge, the zero knowledge proof method does not need direct interaction between a user for proving knowledge and a user for verifying knowledge, the user for proving knowledge is a prover, and the user for verifying knowledge is a verifier; the verifier can trust the correctness and ownership of the knowledge only through the zero knowledge proof generated by the binary circuit;
the method also comprises the following steps:
step 1: group intelligence perception system initialization and account creation: the trusted third party management center generates a series of security parameters of users, and initializes an creation block of the block chain by using the security parameters; the creating block is the first block of the block chain and is used for storing some key information; notably, the initialization of the crowd sensing system is only executed once and is not executed repeatedly; the user in the crowd sensing system, namely the data requester and the data provider acquire parameters in the creation block in the participation block chain and initialize account information of the user;
step 2: group intelligence perception task release: the data requester issues a task intelligent contract in the blockchain to ensure safe and reliable operation of the task, the task intelligent contract prescribes a series of conditions which the task executor needs to meet to participate in the task, and only the task executor meeting the conditions can obtain the participation rights of the task; in addition, the data requester pays a subscription fee to the task intelligent contract to prevent the data requester from maliciously withholding the task execution rewards;
step 3: perception of task participation, execution and data submission: the data provider selects a proper task from the block chain according to the task type and the requirement in the task display platform, and participates in the task by transmitting a series of parameters to the task intelligent contract;
step 4: rewards and credits are issued: the data requester issues rewards to users submitting the perceived data, and evaluates the data quality by judging the perceived data quality status to judge whether the data provider performs malicious operation or not; and the data requester transmits the rewards and the credit issuing certificates into the task intelligent contract, and the intelligent contract is operated to end, so that the interaction of the two parties of the task is marked to end.
2. The method for protecting privacy security of a blockchain crowd sensing system with zero knowledge proof of claim 1, wherein the method comprises the steps of: in the step 1, the user registers with the trusted third party management center, and the registered user performs anonymous security operation by using the digital certificate generated by the trusted third party management center, so as to ensure the user to participate in the system safely.
3. The method for protecting privacy security of a blockchain crowd sensing system with zero knowledge proof of claim 1, wherein the method comprises the steps of: in the step 3: in the interaction process of the crowd sensing system, the transfer of the call between the data provider and the task intelligent contract is the transfer intelligent contract, the data provider does not directly call the task intelligent contract, but first calls the task intelligent contract by calling the transfer intelligent contract, and then the transfer intelligent contract further calls the task intelligent contract, so that the point-to-point operation of the user blockchain is prevented from exposing the system participation history of the user; in addition, the data provider also needs to pay a subscription as a credential for task participation, which will be deducted as a penalty once the data provider performs malicious illicit task execution; because the block chain plaintext transaction realizes the verification characteristic, the transaction of the user is tracked by an attacker with strong computing power, and therefore, the crowd sensing system ensures that the content of the transaction does not reveal any privacy information of both parties of the transaction by using a transaction scheme based on zero knowledge proof.
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