CN114760040A - Identity authentication method and device - Google Patents

Identity authentication method and device Download PDF

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Publication number
CN114760040A
CN114760040A CN202011569222.7A CN202011569222A CN114760040A CN 114760040 A CN114760040 A CN 114760040A CN 202011569222 A CN202011569222 A CN 202011569222A CN 114760040 A CN114760040 A CN 114760040A
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China
Prior art keywords
authentication
identity
message
access controller
key
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CN202011569222.7A
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Inventor
铁满霞
曹军
赵晓荣
赖晓龙
李琴
张变玲
王月辉
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China Iwncomm Co Ltd
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China Iwncomm Co Ltd
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Priority to CN202011569222.7A priority Critical patent/CN114760040A/en
Priority to PCT/CN2021/140001 priority patent/WO2022135379A1/en
Publication of CN114760040A publication Critical patent/CN114760040A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H04L63/0414—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden during transmission, i.e. party's identity is protected against eavesdropping, e.g. by using temporary identifiers, but is known to the other party or parties involved in the communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
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  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The application discloses an identity authentication method, which comprises the following steps: the method comprises the steps that an authentication access controller AAC receives an identity ciphertext message which is sent by a request device REQ and comprises a REQ identity identification ciphertext and an identity authentication code, a message encryption key is used for decrypting the identity identification ciphertext to obtain the identity identification of the REQ, a first authentication request message is sent to a first authentication server which is trusted by the REQ, a first authentication response message which is sent by the first authentication server and comprises first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of a second authentication server, second authentication result information and a first digital signature of the first authentication server is received, the AAC obtains the identity authentication result of the REQ according to the message, a third authentication response message which comprises the authentication result information of the AAC is sent to the REQ, and the REQ obtains the identity authentication result of the AAC according to the message, so that bidirectional identity authentication is realized.

Description

Identity authentication method and device
Technical Field
The present application relates to the field of network communication security technologies, and in particular, to an identity authentication method and apparatus.
Background
Currently, communication networks typically require two-way authentication between a user and a network access point to ensure that a legitimate user can communicate with a legitimate network. In the existing entity authentication scheme, the identity of the entity is uniformly in the form of either a digital certificate or a pre-shared key, but in some scenarios in practical application, a situation that one end uses the digital certificate as an identity credential and the other end uses the pre-shared key as an identity credential is encountered, which provides a challenge to an entity identity authentication mechanism.
In addition, in the process of identity authentication message transmission, the identity information of the entity is often directly exposed, and the identity information of the entity usually includes private or sensitive information, such as an identity card number, a home address, bank card information, geographic location information or affiliated institution information, and the consequences are unreasonable if an attacker intercepts and captures the information for illegal activities, and how to complete the identity authentication of the entity on the premise of not exposing the identity sensitive information becomes a preoccupation.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the above technical problem, the present application provides an identity authentication method and apparatus, which can implement bidirectional identity authentication between entities and identity protection of the entities under the condition that a requesting device adopts a pre-shared key and an authentication access controller adopts a digital certificate as an identity credential.
In view of the above, a first aspect of the present application provides an identity authentication method, including:
an authentication access controller receives an identity ciphertext message sent by a request device, wherein the identity ciphertext message comprises an identity identification ciphertext of the request device and an identity authentication code of the request device; the identity authentication code of the request equipment is generated by the request equipment through calculation of information including an identity identification ciphertext of the request equipment by using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusting with the request equipment and adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server; the identity identification ciphertext of the request equipment is generated by utilizing a message encryption key to calculate information including the identity identification of the request equipment;
the authentication access controller decrypts the identity identification ciphertext of the request device by using the message encryption key to obtain the identity identification of the request device, and sends a first authentication request message to a trusted first authentication server, wherein the first authentication request message comprises the identity ciphertext message, the identity identification of the request device and the identity information of the authentication access controller, and the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated according to information comprising a digital certificate of the authentication access controller;
the authentication access controller receives a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, the first authentication response message being generated according to information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server; the first authentication result information comprises a first verification result of a digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information comprising the first authentication result information by using a pre-shared key of the second authentication server and the request device and adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the request device; the second authentication result information includes a second verification result for the requesting device, and the first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information;
the authentication access controller verifies the first digital signature by using a public key of the first authentication server, and if the first digital signature passes the verification, the authentication access controller determines an identity authentication result of the request device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; when the authentication access controller determines that the identity authentication result of the request equipment is legal, a third authentication response message is sent to the request equipment; or,
the authentication access controller verifies the first digital signature by using a public key of the first authentication server, and if the first digital signature passes the verification, the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the request device and determines the identity authentication result of the request device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; or,
the authentication access controller verifies the first digital signature by using a public key of the first authentication server; if the first digital signature passes the verification, the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result of the request equipment according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device;
wherein, the third authentication response message comprises an identity authentication result information ciphertext; the identity authentication result information ciphertext is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server by using the message encryption key;
after receiving the third authentication response message, the requesting device decrypts the identity authentication result information ciphertext by using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, and verifies the first message authentication code of the second authentication server by using a pre-shared key of the second authentication server and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server; and if the authentication is passed, the requesting device determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller according to the first authentication result in the first authentication result information.
A second aspect of the present application provides a requesting device, comprising:
the generating module is used for calculating and generating an identity identification ciphertext of the request equipment by utilizing a message encryption key for information comprising the identity identification of the request equipment, and calculating and generating an identity identification code of the request equipment by utilizing a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusting with the request equipment and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server for the information comprising the identity identification ciphertext of the request equipment;
a sending module, configured to send an identity ciphertext message to an authentication access controller, where the identity ciphertext message includes an identity identifier ciphertext of the requesting device and an identity authentication code of the requesting device;
a receiving module, configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller, where the third authentication response message includes an identity authentication result information ciphertext; the identity authentication result information ciphertext is generated by encrypting encryption data including first authentication result information and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server by using the message encryption key;
the decryption module is used for decrypting the identity authentication result information ciphertext by using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server; the first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information including the first authentication result information by using a pre-shared key of the request device and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the request device;
the verification module is used for verifying the first message authentication code of the second authentication server by using a pre-shared key of the second authentication server and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server;
and the determining module is used for determining the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller according to the first authentication result in the first authentication result information if the authentication is passed.
A third aspect of the present application provides an authentication access controller, comprising:
a receiving module, configured to receive an identity ciphertext message sent by a requesting device, where the identity ciphertext message includes an identity ciphertext of the requesting device and an identity authentication code of the requesting device, the identity ciphertext of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation of information including an identity of the requesting device using a message encryption key, and the identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation of information including the identity ciphertext of the requesting device using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device using a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server;
the decryption module is used for decrypting the identity identification ciphertext of the request equipment by using the message encryption key to obtain the identity identification of the request equipment;
a sending module, configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes the identity ciphertext message, an identity of the requesting device, and identity information of the authentication access controller, and the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated according to information including a digital certificate of the authentication access controller;
the receiving module is further configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, where the first authentication response message is generated according to information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server; the first authentication result information comprises a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information comprising the first authentication result information by using a pre-shared key of the request equipment and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the request equipment; a second verification result including the requesting device in the second authentication result information, the first digital signature being a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information;
the verification module is used for verifying the first digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server, and if the verification is passed, the determining module determines the identity authentication result of the request device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; when the determining module determines that the identity authentication result of the requesting device is legal, the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or,
the public key of the first authentication server is used for verifying the first digital signature, if the first digital signature passes the verification, the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the request device, and the determining module determines the identity authentication result of the request device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; or,
for verifying the first digital signature with a public key of the first authentication server; if the first digital signature passes the verification, the determining module determines the identity authentication result of the request device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device;
wherein, the third authentication response message comprises an identity authentication result information ciphertext; the identity authentication result information ciphertext is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server using the message encryption key.
A fourth aspect of the present application provides a first authentication server, comprising:
a receiving module, configured to receive a first authentication request message sent by an authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes an identity ciphertext message sent by a requesting device, an identity of the requesting device, and identity information of the authentication access controller, the identity ciphertext message includes an identity ciphertext and an identity authentication code of the requesting device, the identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device and using a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server, the identity of the requesting device is obtained by the authentication access controller through decryption of the identity ciphertext of the requesting device using the message encryption key, and the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated according to information including a digital certificate of the authentication access controller Of (1);
a sending module, configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, where the first authentication response message includes first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server; the first authentication result information comprises a first verification result of a digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information comprising the first authentication result information by using a pre-shared key of the second authentication server and the request device and adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the request device; the second authentication result information includes a second verification result of the requesting device, and the first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information.
A fifth aspect of the present application provides a second authentication server comprising:
a receiving module, configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by a first authentication server, where the second authentication request message includes first authentication result information, an identity ciphertext message, an identity identifier of the requesting device, and a second digital signature, or the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the identity ciphertext message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and a second message authentication code; the first authentication result information is generated according to information including a first authentication result obtained by the first authentication server performing validity authentication on a digital certificate of an authentication access controller; the identity ciphertext message comprises an identity ciphertext of the requesting device and an identity authentication code of the requesting device, wherein the identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation of information including the identity ciphertext of the requesting device by using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device and by adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server; the second digital signature is generated by the first authentication server through calculation of signature data including the first authentication result information, the identification of the requesting device and the identity ciphertext message, or the second message authentication code is generated by the first authentication server through calculation of information including the first authentication result information, the identification of the requesting device and the identity ciphertext message;
the verification module is used for verifying the second digital signature by using a public key of the first authentication server or verifying the second message authentication code by using a pre-shared key of the first authentication server, and if the verification is passed, verifying the identity authentication code of the request device in the identity ciphertext message to obtain a second verification result;
a generation module, configured to generate the second authentication result information according to information including the second verification result, calculate and generate a first message authentication code of a second authentication server for information including the first authentication result information, calculate and generate a third digital signature for signature data including the second authentication result information, or calculate and generate a third message authentication code for information including the second authentication result information;
a sending module, configured to send a second authentication response message to the first authentication server, where the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third digital signature, or the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third message authentication code.
In view of the above, in the identity authentication method provided by the present application, a requesting device uses a pre-shared key as its identity credential, and an authentication access controller uses a digital certificate as its identity credential, and during the identity authentication process, the requesting device first sends an identity ciphertext message to the authentication access controller, where the identity ciphertext message includes an identity identification ciphertext of the requesting device and an identity authentication code of the requesting device generated by using the pre-shared key; the authentication access controller decrypts the identity identification ciphertext to obtain the identity identification of the request device, then sends a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller according to information including the identity ciphertext message, the identity identification of the request device and the identity information of the authentication access controller, a second authentication server trusted by the request device verifies the identity validity of the request device according to the identity authentication code of the request device, the first authentication server verifies the identity validity of the authentication access controller according to the identity information of the authentication access controller, after the verification is completed, the first authentication server sends a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, and the authentication access controller obtains a verification result corresponding to the request device from the first authentication response message to determine whether the identity of the request device is legal or not; the request equipment acquires the verification result corresponding to the authentication access controller from the third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller, and determines whether the identity of the authentication access controller is legal or not, so that the bidirectional identity authentication between the authentication access controller and the request equipment is realized, and a foundation is laid for ensuring that only a legal user can communicate with a legal network. And moreover, the identity information and/or the identity authentication result information of the entity are transmitted in a ciphertext mode, so that the safety of private information in the transmission process is guaranteed, and the identity protection of the entity is realized.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the description below are only some embodiments of the present application, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive labor.
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method according to an embodiment of the present application;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method for requesting a device REQ and authenticating an access controller AAC to negotiate an encryption key of a message according to an embodiment of the present application;
fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application, where "+" denotes an optional field or an optional operation;
fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application, where "+" denotes an optional field or an optional operation;
fig. 5 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application, where "+" denotes an optional field or an optional operation;
fig. 6 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application, where "+" denotes an optional field or an optional operation;
fig. 7 is a block diagram illustrating a structure of a request device REQ according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
fig. 8 is a block diagram illustrating an architecture of an AAC according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
fig. 9 is a block diagram illustrating a structure of an AS-AAC server according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
fig. 10 is a block diagram of a second authentication server AS-REQ according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
Detailed Description
In a communication network, a requesting device may access a network through an Authentication access controller, and in order to ensure that the requesting device accessing the network belongs to a legitimate user and that the network accessed by the requesting device is a legitimate network, bidirectional Identity Authentication (MIA for short) needs to be performed between the Authentication access controller and the requesting device.
Taking the current wireless communication and mobile communication scenarios as examples, in a scenario where the requesting device accesses the wireless network through the authentication access controller, the requesting device may be a terminal device such as a mobile phone, a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), a tablet computer, and the like, and the authentication access controller may be a network side device such as a wireless access point, a wireless router, and the like. Under the scene that the request device is accessed to the wired network through the authentication access controller, the request device can be terminal devices such as a desktop computer and a notebook computer, and the authentication access controller can be network side devices such as a switch or a router. In a scenario that the requesting device accesses a fourth/fifth Generation mobile communication technology (the 4th/5th Generation mobile communication technology, abbreviated as 4G/5G) network through the authentication access controller, the requesting device may be a terminal device such as a mobile phone and a tablet computer, and the authentication access controller may be a network side device such as a base station. Of course, the method and the device are also applicable to various data communication scenes such as other wired networks, near field communication networks and the like.
However, in the existing entity authentication scheme, the identity credentials of the entity are either uniformly in the form of a digital certificate or a pre-shared key, and for the situation that in practical application, one end of the entity employs the digital certificate as the identity credentials and the other end employs the pre-shared key as the identity credentials, a simple and effective identity authentication mechanism is not provided, and the identity information of the entity is directly exposed in the transmission process of the identity authentication message, which may result in that the security cannot be guaranteed.
In order to solve the above technical problem, an embodiment of the present application provides an identity authentication method, where a pre-shared key is used for a requesting device, an authentication access controller is used in an application scenario where an authentication manner of a digital certificate is used for authentication, a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller verifies validity of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result, a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device verifies an identity authentication code of the requesting device by using the pre-shared key of the requesting device to obtain a second verification result, and the requesting device and the authentication access controller respectively determine whether an entity of an opposite party is legal according to the verification results corresponding to the entity of the opposite party, so as to implement bidirectional identity authentication between the authentication access controller and the requesting device, and lay a foundation for ensuring that only a legal user can communicate with a legal network. And the private information of the entity, such as the identity identification, the authentication result information and the like, is transmitted in a ciphertext mode, so that the safety of the private information in the transmission process is ensured, and the identity protection of the entity is realized.
For convenience of introduction, in the embodiments of the present application, the identity Authentication method of the present application will be described by taking a request device (REQ), an Authentication Access Controller (AAC), and an Authentication Server (AS) AS examples.
Wherein, AAC trusted AS is called a first authentication server AS-AAC, REQ trusted AS is called a second authentication server AS-REQ. The AS-AAC holds a digital certificate and a corresponding private key of the digital certificate, which are in accordance with the ISO/IEC9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems. The AS-AAC can verify the identity validity of AAC, and the AS-REQ can verify the identity validity of REQ. The AS-AAC and the AS-REQ can be the same AS or different ASs, and when the AS-AAC and the AS-REQ are the same, namely the non-roaming condition exists; when the AS-AAC is different from the AS-REQ, namely a roaming situation, a valid pre-shared key exists between the AS-AAC and the AS-REQ, or when the AS-REQ holds a digital certificate and a corresponding private key of the digital certificate which are in accordance with ISO/IEC9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems, the AS-AAC and the AS-REQ trust each other and know the digital certificate of the other party or the public key in the digital certificate. The Certificate decryption server (CS-DEC) holds an encryption Certificate and a private key corresponding to the encryption Certificate which are in accordance with ISO/IEC9594-8/ITU X.509 and specified by other standards or other technical systems, and the CS-DEC can be an independent server or can reside in the AS-AAC.
The REQ may be an endpoint participating in the authentication process, establishing a connection with AAC, accessing the services provided by AAC, and accessing the AS through AAC with a valid pre-shared key with the AS-REQ. AAC can be another endpoint participating in the identity authentication process, establishes a connection with the REQ, provides a service, communicates with the REQ, and can directly access AS-AAC, AAC holds a digital certificate and a corresponding private key of the digital certificate, which are in accordance with ISO/IEC9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems, and knows the digital certificate of AS-AAC or a public key in the digital certificate trusted by AAC, and in some application scenarios, the public key in the encryption certificate or the encryption certificate of CS-DEC.
An identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application is described below with reference to fig. 1, where the method includes:
s101, AAC receives the identity ciphertext message REQInit sent by REQ.
The REQInit comprises identity identification ciphertext EncData of REQREQAnd identity identifier MIC of REQREQ. Wherein EncDataREQIs that the REQ uses a message encryption key to apply a symmetric encryption algorithm to the identity ID comprising the REQREQThe information inside is generated by calculation; MICREQPre-shared secret K that is an AS-REQ with which the REQ utilizes trustREQ_ASThe cryptographic algorithm pair agreed with AS-REQ is adopted to comprise EncDataREQThe information inside is calculated and generated. The message encryption key may be shared in advance by REQ and AAC, or obtained by negotiation between REQ and AAC, and the manner of negotiating the message encryption key by REQ and AAC will be described later.
As an example of this application, the cryptographic algorithm agreed upon by REQ and AS-REQ may be a hash algorithm, using a pre-shared key KREQ_ASUsing a hash algorithm to match MICs in REQInitREQOther fields preceding the field, e.g. including EncDataREQCarrying out hash operation on the internal information to obtain a hash value, wherein the hash value is used as the identity identification code MIC of the REQREQ。
In this embodiment, REQ employs an authentication code MICREQAs identity information, AAC adopts its own digital certificate CertAACAs identity information, the AS-REQ may be paired with the MICREQVerification to determine the validity of REQ identity, AS-AAC can be on CertAACValidity verification is performed to determine the validity of the AAC identity.
S102, AAC utilizes message encryption keyFor EncDataREQDecrypting to obtain IDREQ。
Due to EncDataREQIs REQ using a message encryption key to include ID using a symmetric encryption algorithmREQThe information in the AAC is encrypted, so that AAC receives EncData sent by REQREQThe symmetric encryption algorithm can then be used to encrypt EncData using the message encryption keyREQDecrypting to obtain IDREQ。
S103, AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to its trusted AS-AAC.
The AACVeri comprises REQInit and IDREQAnd identity information of AAC. Wherein the identity information of AAC is that AAC includes CertAACGenerated by information within, which may be a CertAACMay also be CertAACThe ciphertext of (1). To secure the security of AAC identity information, AAC may include Cert with a public key pair of an encryption certificateAACEncryption of internal encrypted data to generate identity information EncPub of AACASCorrespondingly, the AS-AAC can decrypt the EncPub by utilizing a private key corresponding to an encryption certificate of CS-DEC residing in the AS-AACASObtaining CertAACOr AS-AAC converts the EncPubASSending to CS-DEC with interaction and trust relationship, decrypting, and obtaining Cert obtained by decryptionAAC。
It should be noted that, when AAC trusted AS-AAC and REQ trusted AS-REQ are the same authentication server, REQ and AAC trusted authentication server can be represented by AS-AAC (or AS-REQ, of course). In this case, the Cert is paired by AS-AAC (which may also be denoted AS AS-REQ)AACAnd MIC in the REQInitREQAnd (6) carrying out verification. Wherein AS-AAC (also denoted AS AS-REQ) verifies CertAACGet the first verification result ResAACAccording to ID in AACVeriREQDetermining a Pre-shared Key K with a REQREQ_ASAnd a contracted cryptographic algorithm, and using said KREQ_ASVerifying MIC using said cryptographic algorithmREQObtain a second verification result ResREQAccording to the inclusion of the ResAACThe information in the first authentication result information is generatedPubAACAccording to the inclusion of the ResREQGenerates second authentication result information Pub from the included informationREQReuse the KREQ_ASUsing said cryptographic algorithm pair to include PubAACCalculating and generating first message authentication code MIC of AS-AAC by using intrinsic informationAS_AAC(first message authentication code MIC, which may also be denoted AS AS-REQ)AS_REQ) For including PubREQComputing the signature data to generate a first digital signature SigAS_AAC1(also denoted Sig)AS_REQ1) According to the inclusion of said PubAACThe MICAS_AAC(may also be denoted MIC)AS_REQ) The PubREQAnd said SigAS_AAC1(also denoted Sig)AS_REQ1) The included information generates a first authentication response message ASVeri.
Cert is verified by AS-AAC when AAC-trusted AS-AAC and REQ-trusted AS-REQ are two different authentication serversAACGet the first verification result ResAACAccording to the inclusion of the ResAACThe information inside generates the first authentication result information PubAACTo include said PubAACThe IDREQAnd calculating the signature data including REQInit to generate a second digital signature SigAS_AAC2And sending a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to the AS-REQ, wherein the AS-AACVeri comprises the PubAACThe IDREQThe REQInit and the SigAS_AAC2Wherein, SigAS_AAC2Can be replaced by MICAS_AAC2，MICAS_AAC2The AS-AAC utilizes a pre-shared key with the AS-REQ, and adopts a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the AS-REQ to include the PubAACThe IDREQAnd the information including REQInit calculates the second message authentication code generated; AS-REQ verifies the Sig with the public key of AS-AACAS_AAC2Or verifying the MIC by using a pre-shared key with the AS-AAC and adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the AS-AACAS_AAC2After the verification is passed, according to the IDREQDetermining a Pre-shared Key K with REQREQ_ASAnd a contracted cryptographic algorithm, using said KREQ_ASVerifying said RE using said cryptographic algorithmMIC in QInitREQObtain a second verification result ResREQAccording to including ResREQGenerates second authentication result information Pub from the included informationREQUsing said KREQ_ASAdopting the cryptographic algorithm pair to include the PubAACCalculating first message authentication code MIC for generating AS-REQ by using information inAS_REQTo include said PubREQComputing the signature data to generate a third digital signature SigAS_REQ3Sending a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to AS-AAC, wherein the AS-REQVeri comprises the PubAACThe MICAS_REQThe PubREQAnd said SigAS_REQ3Wherein SigAS_REQ3Can be replaced by MICAS_REQ3，MICAS_REQ3The AS-REQ uses a pre-shared key with the AS-AAC and adopts a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the AS-AAC to include the PubREQCalculating a generated third message authentication code by the included information; AS-AAC verifies the Sig with the public key of AS-REQAS_REQ3Or verifying the MIC by using a pre-shared key with the AS-REQ and adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the AS-REQAS_REQ3After the verification is passed, the method includes the PubREQThe signature data inside is calculated to generate a first digital signature SigAS_AAC1According to including said PubAACThe MICAS_REQThe PubREQAnd said SigAS_AAC1The included information generates the first authentication response message ASVeri.
S104, AAC receives a first authentication response message ASVeri sent by AS-AAC.
The ASVeri is based on the information including the first identification result PubAACFirst message authentication code MIC of AS-REQAS_REQSecond discrimination result information PubREQAnd first digital signature Sig of AS-AACAS_AAC1The information in it is generated.
According to whether identity protection is performed on AAC, the method can be divided into two cases, wherein in one case, identity information of AAC is transmitted in plain text in the whole process, and in the other case, identity information of AAC is transmitted in ciphertext in the whole process.
When AAC identity information is encrypted certificate utilized by AACIncludes a public key pair of CertAACAnd a second key NonceAACPubWhen the inner encrypted data is generated by encryption, wherein, the NonceAACPubFor pairs including PubAACEncrypting the information inside; accordingly, the first authentication result information included in ASVeri is in the form of ciphertext (e.g., Nonce utilized by AS-AAC)AACPubFor including PubAACThe information in the content is encrypted and generated simply, and can be AS-AAC utilizing NonceAACPubFor including PubAACThe information of the inner is processed by XOR operation to generate PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub)。
Further, the encrypted data for generating the identity information of AAC may further include the identity ID of AACAACAnd a third key NonceAACIDThat is, the identity information of AAC is obtained by AAC using a public key pair of an encryption certificate including CertAAC、IDAAC、NonceAACPubAnd NonceAACIDCryptographic generation of encrypted data within, NonceAACIDFor including IDAACEncrypting the information inside; correspondingly, the ASVeri also comprises an identity identification ciphertext of the AAC; the identity identification ciphertext of AAC can be used by AS-AAC to utilize NonceAACIDFor including IDAACThe information in the content is encrypted and generated simply by using the Nonce of AS-AACAACIDFor including IDAACThe information inside is XOR-generated as IDAAC⊕NonceAACID. AAC also needs to identify ID according to its own identityAACAnd said NonceAACIDVerifying the identity identification ciphertext of the AAC in the ASVeri, wherein the specific verification comprises the following steps: AAC utilizes NonceAACIDFor identity ID comprising AAC itselfAACEncrypting the internal information to generate an AAC identity identification ciphertext, and performing consistency verification on the generated AAC identity identification ciphertext and the AAC identity identification ciphertext in the ASVeri; alternatively, AAC utilizes NonceAACIDDecrypting identity identification ciphertext of AAC to obtain IDAACAnd will decrypt the IDAACIdentity ID with AAC itselfAACThe consistency of AAC is verified, and after the consistency is verified, the AAC executes the subsequent flow.
S105, AAC utilization APublic key pair of S-AAC to SigAS_AAC1And (6) carrying out verification.
S106, AAC according to the PubREQRes inREQThe identity authentication result of the REQ is determined.
Due to ResREQCan reflect whether REQ is legal or not, therefore AAC can be based on PubREQRes inREQDetermining whether the REQ is legitimate lays the foundation for ensuring that only legitimate REQs can access the network. In some cases, if AAC is identity protected, then an ID may be included in ASVeriAAC⊕NonceAACIDTherefore AAC can also utilize the third key NonceAACIDFor IDAAC⊕NonceAACIDDecrypting to obtain IDAACAnd check the IDAACIdentity ID with AAC itselfAACIf yes, then according to said PubREQRes in (1)REQThe identity authentication result of the REQ is determined.
S107, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
The AACAuth comprises identity authentication result information ciphertext EncDataAAC. Wherein if the AAC is not identity protected, the AAC uses a message encryption key pair to include the PubAACAnd the MICAS_REQEncryption of information within to generate encDataAAC. If AAC is identity protected, AAC utilizes a message encryption key pair to include PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_REQ、NonceAACPubEncryption of information within to generate encDataAAC。
It should be noted that the execution sequence of S105 to S107 does not affect the specific implementation of the present application, and in practical applications, the execution sequence of S105 to S107 may be set according to requirements. Preferably, S105 is executed first, when AAC is applied to SigAS_AAC1If the verification is not passed, discarding the ASVeri, and when AAC is not passed to the SigAS_AAC1And after the verification is passed, executing S106 again, executing S107 again when the REQ is determined to be legal by AAC, and selecting whether to execute S107 or not by AAC according to a local strategy when the REQ is determined to be illegal by AAC, wherein in consideration of efficiency, the authentication process is preferably not executed and ended.
S108, REQ uses message encryption key to encrypt identity authentication result information ciphertext EncDataAACDecrypting to obtain PubAACAnd MICAS_REQUsing a pre-shared secret K with AS-REQREQ_ASVerifying MIC by adopting cryptographic algorithm agreed with AS-REQAS_REQIf the verification is passed, then the verification is carried out according to PubAACRes in (1)AACAnd determining the identity authentication result of the AAC.
It should be noted that, in the case of identity protection of AAC, REQ corresponds to EncDataAACDecrypting to obtain PubAACAnd MICAS_REQThe method comprises the following steps: REQ first uses the message encryption key pair EncDataAACDecrypting to obtain PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_REQAnd NonceAACPubReuse of NonceAACPubAnd PubAAC⊕NonceAACPubPerforming XOR operation to obtain PubAAC。
Due to ResAACCan reflect whether AAC is legal or not, so REQ is opposite to MICAS_REQAfter the verification is passed, the method can be used according to PubAACRes in (1)AACDetermining whether AAC is legal, thereby laying a foundation for ensuring that REQ can access a legal network; if REQ is to MICAS_REQIf the verification is not passed, discarding AACAuth.
It can be seen from the above that, in the identity authentication method provided in this embodiment of the present application, an authentication server is introduced, a pre-shared key is used for a requesting device, an authentication access controller is used in an application scenario in which an authentication manner of a digital certificate is used for authentication, a first authentication result is obtained by performing validity verification on the digital certificate of the authentication access controller by a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, a second authentication result is obtained by performing verification on an identity authentication code of the requesting device by a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device through the pre-shared key of the requesting device, the requesting device and the authentication access controller respectively obtain verification results corresponding to an opposite entity, and determine whether the opposite entity is legal, thereby implementing bidirectional identity authentication between the authentication access controller and the requesting device. And the private information of the entity, such as the identity identification, the authentication result information and the like, is transmitted in a ciphertext mode, so that the safety of the private information in the transmission process is ensured, and the identity protection of the entity is realized.
Referring to fig. 1, to ensure the authenticity of the authentication result, REQ determines the digital signature Sig of AAC before REQ determines the identity of AAC in S108AACIf the verification is passed, if the Sig is determinedAACIf the verification is passed, REQ is again according to the PubAACRes in (1)AACAnd determining the identity authentication result of the AAC. Wherein REQ determines SigAACWhether to verify the verification comprises the following ways:
one way of realizing this is that when AACVeri of S103 also includes digital signature Sig of AACAACThen, the SigAACIs Sig in AAC pair including AACVeriAACThe other previous fields are calculated and generated; then AS-AAC utilizes Cert in AACVeriAACVerifying the SigAACAnd the subsequent operation is executed after the verification is passed, so if the REQ can receive AACAuth of S107, the REQ determines the SigAACAnd the verification is passed.
In another implementation manner, when the AACAuth of S107 further includes the digital signature Sig of AACAACThen, the SigAACIs AAC pair includes Sig in AACAuthAACCalculated from other preceding fields, and, correspondingly, said PubAACAlso includes CertAAC(ii) a Then in S108 the REQ still utilizes said PubAACCert in (1)AACVerifying the SigAACDetermining said Sig based on the verification resultAACAnd whether the verification is passed.
It should be noted that the information such as the random number, the identity identifier, etc. generated by the requesting device and/or the authentication access controller may be transmitted in a message exchanged in the authentication process. Normally, the random number and/or the identity carried in the received message and the random number and/or the identity carried in the sent message should be the same, but when network jitter or attacks and other situations are encountered, parameter information in the message may be lost or tampered. Therefore, in some embodiments of the present application, the reliability of the authentication result can also be ensured by comparing whether the random numbers and/or the identities in the transmitted and received messages are consistent. The method comprises the following specific steps:
referring to fig. 1, the identity ID of AAC may also be included in the AACVeri of S103AACAnd/or AAC generated first random number NonceAACCorrespondingly, the ASVeri of S104 also includes IDAACAnd/or NonceAAC. Thus, AAC may first determine the ID in ASVeri before AAC determines the identity of REQ in S106AACAnd AAC's own identity IDAAC(i.e., ID transmitted by AAC through AACVeri)AAC) And/or, the Nonce in ASVeri is verifiedAACAnd the Nonce for AAC generationAAC(i.e., the Nonce the AAC sent by AACVeriAAC) If the consistency is verified, AAC is verified according to PubREQRes in (1)REQThe identity authentication result of the REQ is determined.
In other embodiments, the PubREQMay also include an IDREQBefore AAC determines REQ' S identity in S106, AAC adds said PubREQID of (1)REQAnd decrypting EncData in S101REQThe obtained IDREQIf the consistency of the AAC is verified, the AAC is verified according to the PubREQRes in (1)REQThe identity authentication result of the REQ is determined.
Of course, to ensure the reliability of the authentication result, the REQ may also be the second random number Nonce generated by the REQREQAnd/or identity ID of REQREQAnd carrying out consistency verification. The method comprises the following specific steps:
referring to fig. 1, Nonce may also be included in the REQInit of S101REQThe AACVeri of S103 may further include a NonceREQCorrespondingly, the ASVeri of S104 also includes IDREQAnd/or NonceREQEncData in AACAuth of S107AACFurther includes an IDREQAnd/or NonceREQ. Thus, before the REQ determines the authentication result of AAC in S108, the REQ may decrypt EncData in AACAuthAACThe obtained IDREQAnd identity ID of REQ itselfREQAnd/or, verifying the consistency of the EncData in the decrypted AACAuthAACThe obtained NonceREQAnd REQ rawCheng NonceREQVerifying the consistency of the data; if the verification is passed, REQ is again based on PubAACRes in (1)AACAnd determining the identity authentication result of the AAC.
In the above embodiment, the message encryption key used by REQ and AAC may be obtained by negotiation between REQ and AAC, so this embodiment further provides a method for negotiating a message encryption key between REQ and AAC, see fig. 2, where the method includes:
s201, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.
The AACInit comprises a key exchange parameter KeyInfo of AACAAC，KeyInfoAACIncluding AAC generated temporary public keys, where key exchange refers to a key exchange algorithm such as Diffie-Hellman (DH). The AACInit can also comprise a first random number Nonce generated by AACAAC。
In addition, Security capabilities can be included in the AACInitAAC，Security capabilitiesAACThe Security capability parameter information indicating AAC support includes an AAC-supported identity authentication suite (the identity authentication suite includes one or more identity authentication methods), a symmetric encryption algorithm and/or a key derivation algorithm, etc., so as to select a specific Security policy for use by the REQ, which may be according to Security capabilitiesAACSelecting a particular Security policy for use with REQREQ。Security capabilitiesREQIndicating the identity authentication method, symmetric encryption algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm, etc., that REQ is used accordingly.
S202, REQ exchanges parameters KeyInfo according to the key comprising REQREQCorresponding temporary private key and KeyInfoAACAnd carrying out key exchange calculation on the included temporary public key to generate a first key, and calculating a message encryption key by using a key derivation algorithm according to information including the first key.
If AACInit of S201 also includes the Nonce of AAC generationAACREQ may be based on the inclusion of KeyInfoREQCorresponding temporary private key and KeyInfoAACThe temporary public key is subjected to key exchange calculation to generate a first key K1, and K is transmitted1 binding includes NonceAACAnd a second random number Nonce generated by REQREQAnd the message encryption key is calculated by using a negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm. The negotiated key derivation algorithm may be Security capabilities sent by REQ according to AACAACBut the key derivation algorithm used is selected. Among them, KeyInfoREQIs a key exchange parameter generated by the REQ, including the temporary public key generated by the REQ. KeyinfoREQThe corresponding ephemeral private key is the ephemeral private key generated by the REQ that corresponds to the ephemeral public key of the REQ, i.e., the ephemeral public key and the ephemeral private key are a pair of ephemeral public and private keys.
S203, REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to AAC.
KeyInfo is included in REQInitREQSo that AAC includes KeyInfoAACCorresponding temporary private key and KeyInfoREQThe information including the temporary public key is calculated to obtain the message encryption key. Among them, KeyInfoAACThe corresponding temporary private key is the temporary private key generated by AAC corresponding to the temporary public key of AAC, i.e. the temporary public key and the temporary private key are a pair of temporary public and private keys.
Security capabilities can also be included in the REQInitREQ. Nonces may also be included in the REQInitREQSo that AAC includes said KeyInfoAACCorresponding temporary private key, the KeyInfoREQIncluded temporary public key, the NonceAACAnd said NonceREQThe message encryption key is calculated from the included information.
Nonces may also be included in the REQInitAACFurther, AAC may be applied to Nonce in REQInit before calculating the message encryption keyAACAnd AAC generated NonceAACIs verified to ensure that the REQInit received by AAC is a response message to AACInit.
S204, AAC according to KeyInfoAACCorresponding temporary private key and KeyInfoREQPerforming a key exchange calculation on the included temporary public key to generate the first key, and calculating message encryption by using the key derivation algorithm according to information including the first keyA key.
If the Nonce is also included in the REQInitREQAAC may then be based on including the KeyInfoAACCorresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfoREQPerforming a key exchange calculation on the included temporary public key to generate the first key K1, combining K1 to include the NonceAACAnd said NonceREQThe message encryption key is calculated using a negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm. Wherein, the negotiated key derivation algorithm may be Security capabilities sent by AAC according to REQREQBut the key derivation algorithm used is selected.
The embodiment of the application also provides a method for determining a first authentication server and/or a second authentication server used in the authentication process by using information interaction between AAC and REQ, which comprises the following steps:
referring to fig. 2, AAC adds the identity ID of at least one AAC trusted authentication server to the AAC in S201AS_AACREQ according to the IDAS_AACIdentification ID of at least one authentication server determining self trustAS_REQ. In particular implementation, REQ is from IDAS_AACAt least one authentication server which is trusted by the authentication server is selected as the IDAS_REQIf the selection fails, the REQ takes at least one authentication server trusted by itself as the IDAS_REQ(wherein, the successful selection corresponds to the non-roaming condition, and the failed selection corresponds to the roaming condition), and the ID is usedAS_REQREQInit added to S203 is transmitted to AAC. Further, AAC may be based on IDAS_AACAnd IDAS_REQDetermining a first authentication server AS-AAC, e.g. AAC can determine IDAS_REQAnd IDAS_AACIf the identity identification of at least one identical authentication server exists, namely the roaming condition exists, the AAC determines a first authentication server participating in identity authentication from the identity identification of the at least one REQ and AAC commonly-trusted authentication server; if not, roaming is the case, AAC needs IDAS_AACDetermining a first authentication server AS-AAC participating in identity authentication, and adding IDAS_REQIs sent to AS-AAC so that AS-AAC is based on IDAS_REQA second authentication server AS-REQ is determined.
As another embodiment, AAC may not necessarily send an ID to REQAS_AACAnd the identity ID of at least one authentication server trusted by itself is added by the REQ in REQInit of S203AS_REQ. According to IDAS_REQIdentity ID of at least one authentication server trusted by AAC itselfAS_AACThe specific implementation manner of determining the first authentication server and/or the second authentication server participating in identity authentication is as in the previous embodiment.
Because the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC can be the same or different, when the authentication servers trusted by REQ and AAC are the same, the non-roaming condition is obtained; when REQ and AAC trusted authentication servers are different, this is the roaming case. The identity authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application is introduced below with reference to non-roaming and roaming application scenarios, which includes the following four cases: firstly, in the non-roaming condition, REQ identity protection identity authentication method; (II) identity authentication methods for REQ and AAC identity protection under the non-roaming condition; (III) in roaming condition, REQ identity protection identity authentication method; and (IV) in case of roaming, REQ and AAC identity protection identity authentication methods.
Referring to fig. 3, it is an embodiment of the identity authentication method in the case (a), where AS-AAC (also, AS-REQ) can be used to represent an authentication server that REQ and AAC trust together. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is merged into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation. The identity authentication method comprises the following steps:
s301, AAC Generation NonceAACAnd KeyInfoAACGenerating Security capabilities as requiredAAC。
S302, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.
The AACInit comprises a NonceAAC、KeyInfoAACAnd Security capabilitiesAAC. Wherein, Security capabilitiesAACIs an optional field and represents AAC supported safety capability parameter information, including AAC supported identity authentication suite and pairEncryption algorithms and/or key derivation algorithms, etc. (see below).
After receiving the AACInit, the S303, REQ performs the following operations (unless otherwise specified or logically related, the actions numbered (1) and (2) … … in this document do not have a certain order due to the numbering, and are the same throughout), including:
(1) and generating the NonceREQAnd KeyInfoREQ；
(2) Generating Security capabilities as requiredREQ；
(3) According to the formula including KeyInfoREQCorresponding temporary private key and KeyInfoAACThe included temporary public key is subjected to key exchange calculation to generate a first key K1, and K1 is combined with NonceAAC、NonceREQAnd other information (other information employed by REQ and AAC are the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) calculate a message encryption key using a negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm;
(4) generating an identity identification ciphertext EncData by utilizing the calculation of the message encryption keyREQ；
(5) Calculating identity identification code MIC of REQREQ。
S304, REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to AAC.
The REQInit comprises NonceAAC、NonceREQ、Security capabilitiesREQ、KeyInfoREQ、EncDataREQAnd MICREQ. Wherein, NonceAACShould equal the corresponding field in AACInit; EncDataREQIncludes IDREQ(ii) a In the present application, an encrypted object is referred to as encrypted data; security capabilitiesREQWhether REQ generates Security capabilities for optional fieldsREQDepending on whether Security capabilities are carried in AACInit sent from AAC to REQAAC。Security capabilitiesREQIndicating REQ according to Security capabilitiesAACThe choice of the particular security policy to be made, i.e. the identity authentication method, the symmetric encryption algorithm and/or the key derivation algorithm, etc. (see below) that the REQ determines to use. The MICREQIs REQ utilization andpre-shared secret key K of AS-AACREQ_ASAdopting a cryptographic algorithm pair agreed with AS-AAC to include MIC in REQInitREQThe other previous fields are generated by calculation, specifically, for example, when REQInit includes Nonce in turnAAC、NonceREQ、Security capabilitiesREQ、KeyInfoREQ、EncDataREQAnd MICREQREQ utilizes said KREQ_ASThe cryptographic algorithm (which may be a hash algorithm) pair is used to include NonceAAC、NonceREQ、Security capabilitiesREQ、KeyInfoREQ、EncDataREQCarrying out hash operation on the information to obtain a hash value, wherein the hash value is used as an identification code MIC of the REQREQ。
S305, receiving REQInit, the AAC performs the following operations including:
(1) check for Nonce in REQInitAACNonce generated with AACAACIf the two are consistent, discarding REQInit;
(2) according to the KeyInfoAACCorresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfoREQThe included temporary public key is subjected to key exchange calculation to generate a first key K1, K1 is combined with NonceAAC、NonceREQAnd other information (other information used by AAC and REQ are the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) calculate a message encryption key using a negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm;
(3) decrypting EncData using message encryption keyREQGet IDREQ。
S306, AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.
The AACVeri comprises REQInit and IDREQ、IDAACAnd CertAAC。
S307, after the AS-AAC receives the AACVeri, performing the following operations including:
(1) and verifying CertAACGet ResAACAccording to including ResAACAnd CertAACGeneration of information in PubAAC；
(2) And experimentEvidence of MIC in REQInitREQTo obtain ResREQAccording to inclusion of IDREQAnd ResREQGeneration of information in PubREQ；
Wherein AS-AAC is based on ID in AACVeriREQDetermining a Pre-shared Key K with a REQREQ_ASAnd a contracted cryptographic algorithm, using said KREQ_ASThe cryptographic algorithm is adopted to carry out MIC in REQInitREQThe previous other fields compute the MIC locallyREQAnd adds it to the received MICREQComparing, if the two are the same, then MICREQThe AS-AAC judges the REQ identity authentication result to be legal after verification, and if the REQ identity authentication result is different, the MIC is determined to be legalREQIf the verification fails, the AS-AAC can have the following processing modes according to the local policy, including: discard AACVeri or determine the identity discrimination result of REQ as illegal, etc.
(3) Calculating a first message authentication code MIC of the AS-AACAS_AACAnd a first digital signature SigAS_AAC1。
S308, the AS-AAC sends a first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
The ASVeri comprises an IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC、MICAS_AAC、IDAAC、NonceAAC、PubREQAnd SigAS_AAC1. Wherein, IDREQ、NonceREQ、IDAAC、NonceAACShould be equal to the corresponding field in AACVeri, respectively; MICAS_AACIs a pre-shared secret key K utilized by AS-AAC with REQREQ_ASIncluding ID with cryptographic algorithm agreed on REQREQ、NonceREQ、PubAACThe information inside is generated by calculation; sigAS_AAC1Is formed by the AS-AAC pair including an IDAAC、NonceAAC、PubREQThe signature data is generated by calculation, and the signed object is referred to as signature data in the present application.
After receiving ASVeri, S309 and AAC perform the following operations, including:
(1) check ID in ASVeriAAC、NonceAACWhether or not to respectively identify with own identity IDAACSelf-generation ofNonce (A)AACThe same;
(2) public key verification Sig using AS-AACAS_AAC1；
(3) Checking PubREQID of (1)REQWhether or not to match the ID in AACVeri sent to AS-AACREQThe same;
(4) if any step of the checking and the verification is not passed, immediately discarding the ASVeri; after the above checks and verifications are passed, according to PubREQRes in (1)REQDetermining the identity authentication result of the REQ; if the REQ is determined to be illegal, the authentication process is ended;
(5) calculating identity authentication result information ciphertext EncData by using the message encryption keyAAC；
(6) And calculating digital signature Sig of AACAAC。
S310, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
The AACAuth comprises EncDataAACAnd SigAAC. Wherein EncDataAACIncludes IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAACAnd MICAS_AAC(ii) a Wherein, IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC、MICAS_AACFrom ASVeri; sigAACIncludes Sig in the AACAuthAACOther fields before, including, for example, EncDataAAC。
S311, after receiving AACAuth, REQ performs the following operations including:
(1) decrypting EncData using message encryption keyAACGet IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC、MICAS_AAC；
(2) Checking IDREQ、NonceREQWhether or not to respectively identify with REQ's own IDREQREQ-generated NonceREQThe same;
(3) verifying SigAACAnd MICAS_AAC。
Among these, REQ utilizes PubAACCert in (1)AACFor SigAACVerification is performed using pre-authentication with AS-AACShared secret key KREQ_ASThe ID is included in AACAuth by adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with AS-AACREQ、NonceREQ、PubAACWith information therein, locally computing MICAS_AACAnd then it is combined with MIC in received AACAuthAS_AACComparing, if the result is the same, the verification is passed, and if the result is different, the verification is not passed, thereby realizing the MICAS_AACThe verification of (1).
(4) After the above checks and verifications are passed, according to PubAACRes inAACDetermining the identity authentication result of the AAC; if any step of the checking and the verification is not passed, the AACAuth is immediately discarded.
Thus, identity authentication of REQ and AAC, namely bidirectional identity authentication of REQ and AAC, is realized in S309 and S311 respectively, and identity identification of REQ is transmitted in ciphertext between REQ and AAC, so that identity protection of REQ is realized.
In S309, Sig is calculatedAACMay be performed in advance in S305, that is, in S305, the AAC pair includes REQInit and IDREQ、IDAACAnd CertAACSig is generated by signature data calculationAACThen Sig is also included in AACVeri in S306AACIn S307, the AS-AAC also needs to be paired with SigAACVerifying, and executing subsequent operation after the verification is passed; in this case, in S309, AAC may not calculate SigAACAccordingly, Sig is not included in AACAuth of S310AACREQ also no longer verifies Sig in S311AACAt this time PubAACMay not include CertAAC。
Referring to fig. 4, it is an embodiment of the identity authentication method in the above (two) cases, where AS-AAC (or AS-REQ) may be used to represent the authentication server that REQ and AAC trust together. In the embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is merged into the identity authentication process in parallel, so that the engineering implementation is facilitated. The identity authentication method comprises the following steps:
s401, AAC Generation NonceAACAnd KeyInfoAACGenerating Security capabilities as requiredAAC。
S402, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.
The AACInit comprises a NonceAAC、KeyInfoAACAnd Security capabilitiesAAC. Wherein, Security capabilitiesAACIs an optional field.
S403, after receiving AACInit, REQ performs the following operations, including:
(1) and generating the NonceREQAnd KeyInfoREQ；
(2) Generating Security capabilities as requiredREQ；
(3) According to the list including KeyInfoREQCorresponding temporary private key and KeyInfoAACThe included temporary public key is subjected to key exchange calculation to generate a first key K1, K1 is combined with NonceAAC、NonceREQAnd other information (other information employed by REQ and AAC are the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) calculate a message encryption key using a negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm;
(4) generating an identity identification ciphertext EncData by utilizing the calculation of the message encryption keyREQ；
(5) Calculating identity identification code MIC of REQREQ。
S404, REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to AAC.
The REQInit comprises NonceAAC、NonceREQ、Security capabilitiesREQ、KeyInfoREQ、EncDataREQAnd MICREQ. Wherein EncDataREQIncludes IDREQ；Security capabilitiesREQWhether REQ generates Security capabilities for optional fieldsREQDepending on whether Security capabilities are carried in AACInit sent from AAC to REQAAC(ii) a The MICREQSee the relevant description in the embodiment of fig. 3 for a generation process of (a).
S405, after receiving REQInit, the AAC executes the following operations, including:
(1) check for Nonce in REQInitAACWith self-generated NonceAACIf the two are consistent, discarding REQInit;
(2) according to the KeyInfoAACCorresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfoREQThe included temporary public key is subjected to key exchange calculation to generate a first key K1, K1 is combined with NonceAAC、NonceREQAnd other information (other information employed by AAC and REQ are the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) calculate a message encryption key using a negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm;
(3) decrypting EncData using message encryption keyREQGet IDREQ；
(4) Generating a second key NonceAACPubAnd a third key NonceAACID；
(5) And calculating and generating identity information EncPub of AAC by using public key of encryption certificateAS。
S406, AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.
The AACVeri comprises REQInit and IDREQAnd EncPubAS. Wherein, IDREQShould equal EncData in AAC decryption REQInitREQThe obtained IDREQ，EncPubASIncludes IDAAC、CertAAC、NonceAACIDAnd NonceAACPub。
S407, after the AS-AAC receives the AACVeri, the following operations are executed, including:
(1) decrypting EncPub by using private key corresponding to encryption certificateASGet IDAAC、CertAAC、NonceAACIDAnd NonceAACPub；
(2) And verifying CertAACGet ResAACAccording to including ResAACAnd CertAACGeneration of information in PubAAC；
(3) Verifying MIC in REQInitREQTo obtain ResREQAccording to inclusion of IDREQAnd ResREQGeneration of information in PubREQ；MICREQSee the description relating to the embodiment of fig. 3;
(4) the general equation (Nonce)AACPubAnd PubAACPerforming exclusive-or operation to generate PubAAC⊕NonceAACPubChange of NonceAACIDAnd IDAACIdentity identification ciphertext (ID) for generating AAC (advanced audio coding) by carrying out XOR (exclusive OR) operationAAC⊕NonceAACID；
(5) Calculating a first message authentication code MIC of the AS-AACAS_AACAnd a first digital signature SigAS_AAC1。
S408, the AS-AAC sends a first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
The ASVeri comprises an IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_AAC、IDAAC⊕NonceAACID、NonceAAC、PubREQAnd SigAS_AAC1. Wherein, IDREQ、NonceREQ、NonceAACShould be equal to the corresponding field in AACVeri, respectively; MICAS_AACIs a pre-shared secret key K utilized by AS-AAC with REQREQ_ASIncluding ID with the cryptographic algorithm pair agreed upon with REQREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPubThe information inside is generated by calculation; sigAS_AAC1Is formed by the AS-AAC pair including IDAAC⊕NonceAACID、NonceAAC、PubREQThe signature data inside is calculated and generated.
S409, after the AAC receives the ASVeri, executing the following operations including:
(1) and use of the NonceAACIDFor IDAAC⊕NonceAACIDRecovering ID by performing XOR operationAACChecking the recovered IDAACIdentity ID of AACAACThe same;
(2) and examination NonceAACNonce whether or not to be associated with AAC GenerationAACThe same;
(3) public key verification Sig using AS-AACAS_AAC1；
(4) Checking PubREQID of (1)REQWhether or not to match the ID in AACVeri sent to AS-AACREQThe same;
(5) if atIf any step of the checking and the verification fails, immediately discarding the ASVeri; after the check and the verification are passed, according to PubREQRes in (1)REQDetermining the identity authentication result of the REQ; if the REQ is determined to be illegal, the authentication process is ended;
(6) calculating identity authentication result information ciphertext EncData by using message encryption keyAAC；
(7) And calculating digital signature Sig of AACAAC。
S410, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
The AACAuth comprises EncDataAACAnd SigAAC. Wherein EncDataAACIncludes IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_AACAnd NonceAACPub(ii) a Wherein, IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_AACDerived from ASVeri; nonceAACPubShould equal the second key Nonce generated by AACAACPub。SigAACIncludes Sig in the AACAuthAACOther fields before, e.g. including EncDataAAC。
After receiving the AACAuth, the S411, REQ performs the following operations, including:
(1) decrypting EncData using message encryption keyAACObtaining the IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_AACAnd NonceAACPub；
(2) Checking the ID obtained by decryptionREQ、NonceREQIdentity ID with REQ itselfREQREQ-generated NonceREQWhether they are the same;
(3) and use of the NonceAACPubFor PubAAC⊕NonceAACPubRecovering Pub by XOR operationAAC；
(4) Verifying SigAACAnd MICAS_AAC；
Among these, REQ utilizes PubAACCert in (1)AACFor SigAACCarrying out verification; using pre-shared secret key K with AS-AACREQ_ASThe ID is included in AACAuth by adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with AS-AACREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPubWith information therein, locally computing MICAS_AACAnd adding it to MIC in AACAuthAS_AACComparing, if the result is the same, the verification is passed, and if the result is different, the verification is not passed, thereby realizing the MICAS_AACThe verification of (1).
(5) If any step of the checking and the verification fails, immediately discarding the AACAuth; after the above checks and verifications are passed, according to PubAACRes in (1)AACAnd determining the identity authentication result of the AAC.
Therefore, identity authentication of REQ and identity authentication of AAC are respectively realized in S409 and S411, namely, bidirectional identity authentication of REQ and AAC is realized, and identity identification of REQ, identity identification of AAC and identity authentication result information are transmitted in ciphertext, so that identity protection of REQ and AAC is realized.
In S409, Sig is calculatedAACMay be performed in advance in S405, that is, in S405, AAC pair includes REQInit and IDREQAnd EncPubASGeneration of Sig by computation of signature dataAACThen Sig is also included in AACVeri of S406AACIn S407, the AS-AAC also needs to verify SigAACAfter the verification is passed, the subsequent operation is executed; in this case, in S409, AAC does not calculate SigAACAccordingly, Sig is not included in AACAuth of S410AACREQ also no longer verifies Sig in S411AACAt this time PubAACMay not include CertAAC。
Referring to fig. 5, it is an embodiment of the identity authentication method in the (three) cases, where REQ trusted AS-REQ and AAC trusted AS-AAC are two different authentication servers. In the embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is merged into the identity authentication process in parallel, so that the engineering implementation is facilitated. The identity authentication method comprises the following steps:
s501, AAC generation NonceAACAnd KeyInfoAACGenerating Security capabilities as requiredAAC。
S502, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.
The AACInit comprises a NonceAAC、Security capabilitiesAAC、IDAS_AACAnd KeyInfoAAC. Wherein, Security capabilitiesAACAnd IDAS_AACIs an optional field, IDAS_AACIdentity of at least one authentication server representing AAC trust for enabling REQ according to IDAS_AACIt is determined whether there is a co-trusted authentication server (see below).
S503, after receiving AACInit, REQ performs the following operations including:
(1) and generating the NonceREQAnd KeyInfoREQ；
(2) Generating an ID as requiredAS_REQAnd Security capabilitiesREQ；
Wherein, IDAS_REQIdentity of at least one authentication server representing REQ trust, when ID exists in AACInitAS_AACWhen the REQ tries to select at least one from its trusted authentication server with the IDAS_AACWherein the same authentication server is used as IDAS_REQIf the selection fails, at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication server is used as the IDAS_REQ(ii) a When no ID exists in AACInitAS_AACWhen the REQ has at least one authentication server trusted by itself as IDAS_REQ(the same applies hereinafter).
(3) According to the list including KeyInfoREQCorresponding temporary private key and KeyInfoAACThe included temporary public key is subjected to key exchange calculation to generate a first key K1, K1 is combined with NonceAAC、NonceREQAnd other information (other information employed by REQ and AAC are the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) calculate a message encryption key using a negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm;
(4) and generating an identity identification ciphertext EncData by utilizing the calculation of the message encryption keyREQ；
(5) Calculating identity identification code MIC of REQREQ。
S504, REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to AAC.
The REQInit comprises NonceAAC、NonceREQ、Security capabilitiesREQ、KeyInfoREQ、IDAS_REQ、EncDataREQAnd MICREQ. Wherein EncDataREQIncludes IDREQ；NonceAACShould equal the corresponding field in AACInit; security capabilitiesREQAnd IDAS_REQIs an optional field. The MICREQIs a pre-shared secret key K of REQ utilization and AS-REQREQ_ASUsing a cryptographic algorithm pair agreed with AS-REQ to include MIC in REQInitREQThe other previous field calculations are generated. Specifically, REQ utilizes the KREQ_ASUsing said cryptographic algorithm (which may be a hash algorithm) pair to include the MIC in REQInitREQOther fields before, e.g. for including NonceAAC、NonceREQ、Security capabilitiesREQ、KeyInfoREQ、IDAS_REQ、EncDataREQCarrying out hash operation on the information to obtain a hash value, wherein the hash value is used as an identification code MIC of the REQREQ。
S505, after receiving REQInit, the AAC executes the following operations, including:
(1) checking the Nonce in REQInitAACWith self-generated NonceAACIf not, discarding REQInit;
(2) according to the system comprising the KeyInfoAACCorresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfoREQThe included temporary public key is subjected to key exchange calculation to generate a first key K1, K1 is combined with NonceAAC、NonceREQAnd other information (other information used by AAC and REQ are the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) calculate a message encryption key using a negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm;
(3) decrypting EncData using message encryption keyREQGet IDREQ；
(4) If REQInit carries IDAS_REQAnd the AACInit carries the IDAS_AACThen AAC judgment IDAS_REQAnd IDAS_AACWhether at least one identity mark of the same authentication server exists or not, if so, the authentication server is in a non-roaming condition, and the AAC determines a first authentication server participating in identity authentication from the identity marks of the at least one REQ and AAC jointly trusted authentication server; if not, roaming is the case, AAC needs IDAS_AACDetermining a first authentication server AS-AAC participating in identity authentication, and identifying the IDAS_REQIs sent to AS-AAC so that AS-AAC is based on IDAS_REQDetermining a second authentication server AS-REQ; or,
if REQInit carries IDAS_REQBut no ID is carried in AACInitAS_AACThen AAC judgment IDAS_REQWhether the identity identification of at least one identical authentication server exists in the authentication server trusted by AAC, if so, namely, the authentication server is in a non-roaming condition, the AAC determines a first authentication server participating in identity authentication from the identity identification of the at least one REQ and AAC jointly trusted authentication server; if the ID does not exist, the roaming situation is achieved, the AAC needs to determine a first authentication server AS-AAC participating in identity authentication according to an authentication server trusted by the AAC, and the ID is usedAS_REQIs sent to AS-AAC so that AS-AAC is based on IDAS_REQDetermining a second authentication server AS-REQ;
it should be noted that the result of the determination in this embodiment is a roaming condition.
S506, AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.
The AACVeri comprises REQInit and IDREQ、IDAACAnd CertAAC。
S507, after the AS-AAC receives the AACVeri, the following operations are executed, including:
(1) cert verificationAACGet ResAACAccording to including ResAACAnd CertAACGeneration of information in PubAAC；
(2) If the ID is present in REQInit in AACVeriAS_REQThen AS-AAC according to IDAS_REQDetermining a second authentication server AS-REQ; if not, then the tableShows AS-AAC known AS AS-REQ;
(3) calculating a second digital signature SigAS_AAC2。
S508, the AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to the AS-REQ.
The AS-AACVeri comprises REQInit and IDREQ、IDAAC、PubAACAnd SigAS_AAC2。SigAS_AAC2The signature data comprises Sig in AS-AACVeriAS_AAC2Other preceding fields, e.g. including REQInit, IDREQ、IDAAC、PubAAC。
After the AS-REQ receives the AS-AACVeri, the S509 executes the following operations, including:
(1) public key verification Sig using AS-AACAS_AAC2If the verification fails, discarding the AS-AACVeri;
(2) verifying MIC in REQInitREQTo obtain ResREQAccording to inclusion of IDREQAnd ResREQGeneration of information in PubREQ；
Wherein the AS-REQ is based on the ID in the AS-AACVeriREQDetermining a Pre-shared Key K with a REQREQ_ASAnd a contracted cryptographic algorithm, using said KREQ_ASThe cryptographic algorithm is adopted to carry out MIC in REQInitREQThe previous other fields compute the MIC locallyREQAnd adds it to the received MICREQComparing, if the two are the same, then MICREQThe AS-REQ judges the identity authentication result of the REQ to be legal after verification, and if the identity authentication result of the REQ is different, the MIC is determined to be legalREQIf the verification fails, the AS-REQ can have the following processing modes according to the local policy, including: discard the AS-AACVeri or determine the identity authentication result of REQ AS illegal, etc.
(3) Calculating the first message authentication code MIC of the AS-REQAS_REQAnd a third digital signature SigAS_REQ3。
S510, the AS-REQ sends a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to the AS-AAC.
The AS-REQVeri comprises IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC、MICAS_REQ、IDAAC、NonceAAC、PubREQAnd SigAS_REQ3. Wherein, IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC、IDAAC、NonceAACShould be equal to the corresponding field in the AS-AACVeri, respectively; MICAS_REQIs a pre-shared secret key K utilized by the AS-REQ with the REQREQ_ASIncluding ID with the cryptographic algorithm pair agreed upon with REQREQ、NonceREQ、PubAACThe information inside is generated by calculation; sigAS_REQ3Is formed by the AS-REQ pair including the IDAAC、NonceAAC、PubREQThe signature data inside is calculated and generated.
S511, after the AS-AAC receives the AS-REQVeri, the following operations are executed, including:
(1) public key verification Sig using AS-REQAS_REQ3(ii) a If the verification fails, discarding the AS-REQVeri;
(2) calculating a first digital signature SigAS_AAC1。
S512, the AS-AAC sends a first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
The ASVeri comprises an IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC、MICAS_REQ、IDAAC、NonceAAC、PubREQAnd SigAS_AAC1. Wherein, IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC、MICAS_REQ、IDAAC、NonceAAC、PubREQShould be equal to the corresponding field in AS-REQVeri, respectively; sigAS_AAC1Is formed by the AS-AAC pair including IDAAC、NonceAAC、PubREQThe signature data inside is calculated and generated.
S513, after receiving ASVeri, the AAC performs the following operations including:
(1) check ID in ASVeriAAC、NonceAACIdentity ID of whether to respectively correspond to AACAACAnd Nonce for AAC generationAACThe same;
(2) public key verification Sig using AS-AACAS_AAC1；
(3) Checking PubREQID of (1)REQWhether or not to decrypt EncD in REQInitataREQThe obtained IDREQThe same;
(4) if any step of the checking and the verification fails, immediately discarding the ASVeri; after the above checks and verifications are passed, according to PubREQRes in (1)REQDetermining the identity authentication result of the REQ; if the REQ is determined to be illegal, the authentication process is ended;
(5) calculating identity authentication result information ciphertext EncData by using the message encryption keyAAC；
(6) And calculating digital signature Sig of AACAAC。
S514, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
The AACAuth comprises EncDataAACAnd SigAAC. Wherein EncDataAACIncludes IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAACAnd MICAS_REQ；IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC、MICAS_REQDerived from ASVeri. SigAACIncludes Sig in the AACAuthAACOther fields before, including, for example, EncDataAAC。
After receiving the AACAuth, the S515, REQ performs the following operations, including:
(1) decrypting EncData using message encryption keyAACGet IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC、MICAS_REQ；
(2) Checking IDREQ、NonceREQWhether or not to respectively identify with REQ's own IDREQREQ-generated NonceREQThe same;
(3) verifying SigAACAnd MICAS_REQ；
Among these, REQ utilizes PubAACCert in (1)AACVerifying SigAACUsing pre-shared secret key K with AS-REQREQ_ASThe AACAuth comprises ID by adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with AS-REQREQ、NonceREQ、PubAACWith information therein, locally computing MICAS_REQAnd adding it to MIC in AACAuthAS_REQComparing, if the result is the same, the verification is passed, and if the result is different, the verification is not passed, thereby realizing the MICAS_REQAnd (4) verifying.
(4) After the above checks and verifications are passed, according to PubAACRes in (1)AACDetermining the identity authentication result of the AAC; if any step of the check and the verification fails, the AACAuth is immediately discarded.
Thus, identity authentication for REQ and AAC, i.e., bidirectional identity authentication for REQ and AAC, is achieved at S513 and S515, respectively, and identity of REQ is transmitted in ciphertext between REQ and AAC, thereby achieving identity protection for REQ.
In addition, (1) in S513, Sig is calculatedAACMay be performed in advance in S505, that is, in S505, the AAC pair includes REQInit and IDREQ、IDAACAnd CertAACGeneration of Sig by computation of signature dataAACThen Sig is also included in AACVeri in S506AACIn S507, the AS-AAC also needs to verify SigAACAfter the verification is passed, performing subsequent operation; in this case, in S513 AAC does not calculate SigAACAccordingly, S514 AACAuth does not include SigAACREQ also no longer verifies Sig in S515AACAt this time PubAACMay not include CertAAC. (2) Second digital signature Sig in S507, S508AS_AAC2May be replaced by a second message authentication code MICAS_AAC2Wherein, MICAS_AAC2The AS-AAC utilizes a pre-shared key with the AS-REQ and adopts a hash algorithm agreed with the AS-REQ to carry out MIC in AS-AACVeriAS_AAC2The hash value of the previous other field calculation; the AS-REQ verifies Sig in S509AS_AAC2Replace with verifying MICAS_AAC2. Third digital signature Sig in S509, S510AS_REQ3May be replaced by a third message authentication code MICAS_REQ3Wherein, MICAS_REQ3The ID included in the AS-REQVeri is subjected to hash algorithm agreed with the AS-AAC by using a pre-shared key of the AS-REQAAC、NonceAAC、PubREQA hash value computed over the inner field; the AS-AAC verification Sig in S511AS_REQ3Replace with verifying MICAS_REQ3。
Referring to fig. 6, it is an embodiment of the identity authentication method in the (four) cases, where REQ trusted AS-REQ and AAC trusted AS-AAC are two different authentication servers. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between REQ and AAC is merged into the identity authentication process in parallel, which is more convenient for engineering implementation. The identity authentication method comprises the following steps:
s601, AAC generation NonceAACAnd KeyInfoAACGenerating Security capabilities as requiredAAC。
S602, AAC sends a key request message AACInit to REQ.
The AACInit comprises a NonceAAC、Security capabilitiesAAC、IDAS_AACAnd KeyInfoAAC. Wherein Security capabilities are providedAACAnd IDAS_AACIs an optional field.
S603, after receiving AACInit, REQ performs the following operations including:
(1) and generating the NonceREQAnd KeyInfoREQ；
(2) And generating an ID as requiredAS_REQAnd Security capabilitiesREQ；
(3) According to the formula including KeyInfoREQCorresponding temporary private key and KeyInfoAACThe included temporary public key is subjected to key exchange calculation to generate a first key K1, K1 is combined with NonceAAC、NonceREQAnd other information (other information employed by REQ and AAC are the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) calculate a message encryption key using a negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm;
(4) and generating an identity identification ciphertext EncData by utilizing the calculation of the message encryption keyREQ；
(5) Calculating identity identification code MIC of REQREQ。
S604, REQ sends an identity ciphertext message REQInit to AAC.
The REQInit comprises NonceAAC、NonceREQ、Security capabilitiesREQ、KeyInfoREQ、IDAS_REQ、EncDataREQAnd MICREQ. Wherein, NonceAACShould equal the corresponding field in AACInit; security capabilitiesREQAnd IDAS_REQIs an optional field; EncDataREQIncludes IDREQ(ii) a The MICREQSee the associated description in the embodiment of fig. 5.
After receiving REQInit, S605 and AAC execute the following operations, including:
(1) check for Nonce in REQInitAACWith self-generated NonceAACIf the operation is consistent, continuing to execute the subsequent operation, and if the operation is inconsistent, discarding REQInit;
(2) according to the KeyInfoAACCorresponding temporary private key and the KeyInfoREQThe included temporary public key is subjected to key exchange calculation to generate a first key K1, K1 is combined with NonceAAC、NonceREQAnd other information (other information employed by AAC and REQ are the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.) calculate a message encryption key using a negotiated or preset key derivation algorithm;
(3) decrypting EncData using message encryption keyREQGet IDREQ；
(4) Generating a second key NonceAACPubAnd a third key NonceAACID；
(5) And calculating and generating identity information EncPub of AAC by using public key of encryption certificateAS；
(6) The procedure for determining the first authentication server AS-AAC is described in connection with example 5; it should be noted that the result of the determination in this embodiment is a roaming condition.
S606, AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to AS-AAC.
The AACVeri comprises REQInit and IDREQAnd EncPubAS. Wherein EncPubASIncludes IDAAC、CertAAC、NonceAACIDAnd NonceAACPub。
S607, after the AS-AAC receives the AACVeri, the following operations are executed, including:
(1) decrypting EncPub by using private key corresponding to encryption certificateASGet IDAAC、CertAAC、NonceAACIDAnd NonceAACPub；
(2) Cert verificationAACGet ResAACAccording to including ResAACAnd CertAACGeneration of information in PubAAC；
(3) The general equation (Nonce)AACPubAnd PubAACPerforming exclusive-or operation to generate PubAAC⊕NonceAACPubChange of NonceAACIDAnd IDAACGenerating identity identification ciphertext ID of AAC by carrying out XOR operationAAC⊕NonceAACID；
(4) The method for determining the second authentication server AS-REQ is described in connection with embodiment 5;
(5) calculating a second digital signature SigAS_AAC2。
S608, the AS-AAC sends a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to the AS-REQ.
The AS-AACVeri comprises REQInit and IDREQ、IDAAC⊕NonceAACID、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPubAnd SigAS_AAC2. Therein, SigAS_AAC2The signature data comprises Sig in AS-AACVeriAS_AAC2Other preceding fields, e.g. including REQInit, IDREQ、IDAAC⊕NonceAACID、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub。
And S609, after the AS-REQ receives the AS-AACVeri, executing the following operations comprising:
(1) public key verification Sig using AS-AACAS_AAC2If the verification fails, discarding the AS-AACVeri;
(2) verifying MIC in REQInitREQTo obtain ResREQAccording to inclusion of IDREQAnd ResREQGeneration of information in PubREQ；MICREQThe verification process in fig. 5 can be referred to the related description in the embodiment;
(3) calculating the first message authentication code MIC of the AS-REQAS_REQAnd a third digital signature SigAS_REQ3。
S610, the AS-REQ sends a second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to the AS-AAC.
The AS-REQVeri comprises IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_REQ、IDAAC⊕NonceAACID、NonceAAC、PubREQAnd SigAS_REQ3. Wherein, IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、IDAAC⊕NonceAACID、NonceAACShould be equal to the corresponding field in the AS-AACVeri, respectively; MICAS_REQIs a pre-shared secret key K utilized by the AS-REQ with the REQREQ_ASIncluding ID with the cryptographic algorithm pair agreed upon with REQREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPubThe information inside is generated by calculation; sigAS_REQ3Is formed by the AS-REQ pair including the IDAAC⊕NonceAACID、NonceAAC、PubREQThe signature data inside is calculated and generated.
S611, after the AS-AAC receives the AS-REQVeri, the following operations are executed, including:
(1) public key verification Sig using AS-REQAS_REQ3(ii) a If the verification fails, discarding the AS-REQVeri;
(2) calculating a first digital signature SigAS_AAC1。
S612, the AS-AAC sends a first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
The ASVeri comprises an IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_REQ、IDAAC⊕NonceAACID、NonceAAC、PubREQAnd SigAS_AAC1. Wherein, IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_REQ、IDAAC⊕NonceAACID、NonceAAC、PubREQShould be equal to the corresponding field in AS-REQVeri, respectively. SigAS_AAC1Is formed by the AS-AAC pair including IDAAC⊕NonceAACID、NonceAAC、PubREQThe signature data inside is calculated and generated.
S613, after the AAC receives the ASVeri, executing the following operations including:
(1) use of the NonceAACIDFor IDAAC⊕NonceAACIDRecovering ID by performing XOR operationAACChecking the recovered IDAACNonce in ASVeriAACWhether or not to respectively identify with AAC own identity IDAACAnd Nonce for AAC generationAACThe same;
(2) public key verification Sig using AS-AACAS_AAC1；
(3) Checking PubREQID of (1)REQWhether or not to be associated with ID in AACVeri sent to AS-AACREQThe same;
(4) if any step of the checking and the verification is not passed, immediately discarding the ASVeri; after the above checks and verifications are passed, according to PubREQRes in (1)REQDetermining the identity authentication result of the REQ; if the REQ is determined to be illegal, the authentication process is ended;
(5) calculating identity authentication result information ciphertext EncData by using message encryption keyAAC；
(6) And calculating the digital signature Sig of the AACAAC。
S614, AAC sends a third authentication response message AACAuth to REQ.
The AACAuth comprises EncDataAACAnd SigAAC. Wherein EncDataAACIncludes IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_REQAnd NonceAACPub；IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_REQDerived from ASVeri; nonceAACPubShould equal the second key Nonce generated by AACAACPub。SigAACIncludes Sig in the AACAuthAACOther fields before, e.g. including EncDataAAC。
S615, after receiving the AACAuth, the REQ performs the following operations including:
(1) decrypting EncData using message encryption keyAACObtaining the IDREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPub、MICAS_REQAnd NonceAACPub；
(2) Checking the ID obtained by decryptionREQ、NonceREQWhether or not to respectively identify with REQ's own identity IDREQREQ-generated NonceREQThe same;
(3) and use of the NonceAACPubFor PubAAC⊕NonceAACPubRecovering Pub by XOR operationAAC；
(4) Verifying SigAACAnd MICAS_REQ；
Among these, REQ utilizes PubAACCert in (1)AACVerifying SigAACUsing pre-shared secret key K with AS-REQREQ_ASThe AACAuth comprises ID by adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with AS-REQREQ、NonceREQ、PubAAC⊕NonceAACPubWith information therein, locally computing MICAS_REQAnd adding it to MIC in AACAuthAS_REQComparing, if the result is the same, the verification is passed, and if the result is different, the verification is not passed, thereby realizing the MICAS_REQAnd (4) verifying.
(5) After the check and the verification are passed, according to the PubAACRes inAACDetermining the identity authentication result of the AAC; if any step of the checking and the verification is not passed, the AACAuth is immediately discarded.
Therefore, identity authentication of REQ and AAC is realized in S613 and S615, that is, bidirectional identity authentication of REQ and AAC is realized, and identity of REQ, identity of AAC, and identity authentication result information are transmitted in ciphertext, so that identity protection of REQ and AAC is realized.
In addition, (1) in S613, Sig is calculatedAACMay be performed in advance in S605, that is, in S605, AAC pair includes REQInit and IDREQAnd EncPubASGeneration of Sig by computation of signature dataAACThen AACVeri of S606Also includes SigAACIn S607, the AS-AAC also verifies SigAACAfter the verification is passed, the subsequent operation is executed; in this case, in S613 AAC does not calculate SigAACAccordingly, Sig is not included in AACAuth of S614AACREQ also no longer verifies Sig in S615AACAt this time PubAACMay not include CertAAC. (2) Second digital signature Sig in S607, S608AS_AAC2May be replaced by a second message authentication code MICAS_AAC2Wherein, MICAS_AAC2The AS-AAC utilizes a pre-shared key with the AS-REQ and adopts a hash algorithm agreed with the AS-REQ to carry out MIC in AS-AACVeriAS_AAC2The hash value of the previous other field calculation; the AS-REQ verifies Sig in S609AS_AAC2Replace with verifying MICAS_AAC2. Third digital signature Sig in S609 and S610AS_REQ3May be replaced by a third message authentication code MICAS_REQ3Wherein, MICAS_REQ3The ID included in the AS-REQVeri is subjected to hash algorithm agreed with the AS-AAC by using a pre-shared key of the AS-REQAAC⊕NonceAACID、NonceAAC、PubREQA hash value computed over the inner field; the AS-AAC verification Sig in S611AS_REQ3Replace with verifying MICAS_REQ3。
In the above embodiments, each message may also carry a HASH value HASHX_YThe HASH value HASHX_YThe message is obtained by calculating the latest preamble message sent by the opposite terminal entity Y by the sender entity X of the message by using a hash algorithm, and the hash algorithm is used for verifying whether the entity X receives the complete latest preamble message by the opposite terminal entity Y. Wherein, HASHREQ_AACHASH value, HASH, indicating the calculation of REQ on the latest preamble message received from AAC transmissionAAC_REQHASH value, HASH, representing the calculation of AAC on the latest preamble message sent by a received REQAAC_AS-AACHASH value, HASH, representing the calculation of AAC on the latest preamble message received from AS-AAC transmissionAS-AAC_AACHASH value, HASH, representing the calculation of the latest preamble of an AS-AAC transmission to a received AAC transmissionAS-AAC_AS-REQIndicating the latest AS-AAC transmission to the received AS-REQHASH value, HASH, of a preamble calculationAS-REQ_AS-AACRepresents the hash value calculated by the AS-REQ on the latest preamble message sent by the received AS-AAC. If the message currently sent by the entity X at the sending party is the first message interacted between the entity X and the entity Y, which means that the entity X does not receive the preamble message sent by the entity Y at the opposite end, the HASH in the messageX_YMay be absent or meaningless.
Correspondingly, after the opposite terminal entity Y receives the message sent by the entity X, if the message contains HASHX_YEntity Y ignores HASH when entity Y has not sent a preamble to entity XX_Y(ii) a When entity Y has sent the preamble message to entity X, entity Y uses the HASH algorithm to locally calculate the HASH value of the latest preamble message sent to entity X before and the HASH value HASH carried in the received messageX_YAnd comparing, if the comparison result is consistent with the comparison result, executing the subsequent steps, otherwise discarding or ending the authentication process.
In the present invention, for an entity X, a preamble message sent from an opposite end entity Y to the entity X means: before the entity X sends the message M to the opposite end entity Y, the received message sent from the opposite end entity Y to the entity X; the latest preamble message sent by the correspondent entity Y to the entity X means: before the entity X sends the message M to the opposite end entity Y, the latest message sent by the opposite end entity Y to the entity X is received. If the message M sent by the entity X to the opposite terminal entity Y is the first message interacted between the entity X and the entity Y, no preamble message sent by the opposite terminal entity Y to the entity X exists before the entity X sends the message M to the opposite terminal entity Y.
The optional fields and optional operations in the embodiments corresponding to fig. 3 to 6 are denoted by "") in fig. 3 to 6 of the drawings in the specification. The content included in the message according to all the above embodiments is not limited in sequence, and in a case that no particular description is given, the sequence of operations on the relevant message and the sequence of processing the content included in the message after the message is received by the message recipient are not limited.
Based on the embodiments corresponding to fig. 1 to fig. 6, referring to fig. 7, an embodiment of the present application further provides a requesting device 700, including:
a generating module 710, configured to calculate, by using a message encryption key, information including an identity of the requesting device to generate an identity ciphertext of the requesting device, and calculate, by using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device, an identity authentication code of the requesting device for the information including the identity ciphertext of the requesting device by using a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server;
a sending module 720, configured to send an identity ciphertext message to an authentication access controller, where the identity ciphertext message includes an identity identifier ciphertext of the requesting device and an identity authentication code of the requesting device;
a receiving module 730, configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller, where the third authentication response message includes an identity authentication result information ciphertext; the identity authentication result information ciphertext is generated by encrypting encrypted data including first authentication result information and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server by using the message encryption key;
a decryption module 740, configured to decrypt the identity authentication result information ciphertext with the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server; the first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information including the first authentication result information by using a pre-shared key of the request device and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the request device;
a verification module 750, configured to verify the first message authentication code of the second authentication server by using a pre-shared key of the second authentication server and using a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server;
a determining module 760, configured to determine, if the authentication passes, an identity authentication result of the authenticated access controller according to a first authentication result in the first authentication result information.
Optionally, the receiving module 730 is further configured to: receiving a key request message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the key request message comprises a key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller;
the generation module 710 is further configured to: performing key exchange calculation according to a temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameter of the request device and a temporary public key included in the key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller to generate a first key, and calculating the message encryption key by using a key derivation algorithm according to information including the first key; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further includes a key exchange parameter of the requesting device.
Optionally, the key request message further includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; the generating module 710 is specifically configured to: calculating the message encryption key from information including the first key, the first random number, and a second random number generated by the requesting device; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further includes the second random number.
Optionally, the identity ciphertext message sent by the sending module 720 further includes the first random number generated by the authentication access controller.
Optionally, the key request message further includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller; the determining module 760 is further configured to determine a specific security policy used by the requesting device according to the security capability parameter information; the particular security policy is also included in the identity ciphertext message.
Optionally, the key request message further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; the determining module 760 is further configured to determine, according to the identity of the at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message, the identity of the at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device; the identity cryptogram message further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
Optionally, the identity ciphertext message sent by the sending module 720 further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
Optionally, the identity ciphertext message further includes a second random number generated by the requesting device, and the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message further includes an identity of the requesting device and/or the second random number;
the verification module 750 is further configured to: verifying the consistency of the identity identifier of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message and the identity identifier of the requesting device, and/or verifying the consistency of a second random number obtained by decrypting the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message and a second random number generated by the requesting device; if the authentication is passed, the determining module 760 determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller according to the first authentication result in the first authentication result information.
Optionally, the determining module 760 is further configured to: and determining whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller passes the verification, and if the digital signature of the authentication access controller passes the verification, determining the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller according to the first authentication result in the first authentication result information.
Optionally, the determining module 760 for determining whether the digital signature of the authenticated access controller is verified to pass specifically includes:
when a first authentication request message sent by the authentication access controller to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller also comprises a digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication server verifies the digital signature of the authentication access controller by using a digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication request message, and if the receiving module receives the third authentication response message, the digital signature of the authentication access controller is determined to be verified;
when the third authentication response message further includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, correspondingly, the first authentication result information further includes the digital certificate of the authentication access controller; and verifying the digital signature of the authentication access controller by using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and determining whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller passes the verification according to a verification result.
Optionally, the first authentication result information is generated by encrypting information including the first authentication result by using a second key; the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message further comprises the second key; the decryption module 740 is specifically configured to: and decrypting the identity authentication result information ciphertext by using the message encryption key to obtain the second key, and decrypting the first authentication result information by using the second key to obtain the first authentication result.
Optionally, the message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller further includes a hash value calculated by the requesting device for the latest preamble message sent by the authentication access controller.
Referring to fig. 8, an embodiment of the present application further provides an authentication access controller 800, including:
a receiving module 810, configured to receive an identity ciphertext message sent by a requesting device, where the identity ciphertext message includes an identity ciphertext of the requesting device and an identity authentication code of the requesting device, the identity ciphertext of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation of information including an identity of the requesting device using a message encryption key, and the identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation of information including the identity ciphertext of the requesting device using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device using a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server;
a decryption module 820, configured to decrypt the identity ciphertext of the requesting device using the message encryption key to obtain the identity of the requesting device;
a sending module 830, configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes the identity ciphertext message, an identity of the requesting device, and identity information of the authentication access controller, and the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated according to information including a digital certificate of the authentication access controller;
the receiving module 810 is further configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, where the first authentication response message is generated according to information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server; the first authentication result information comprises a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information comprising the first authentication result information by using a pre-shared key of the request equipment and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the request equipment; the second authentication result information includes a second verification result for the requesting device, and the first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information;
a verification module 840, configured to verify the first digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server, and if the first digital signature passes the verification, the determination module 850 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; when the determining module 850 determines that the identity authentication result of the requesting device is legal, the sending module 830 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or,
a verifying module 840, configured to verify the first digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server, if the first digital signature passes the verification, the sending module 830 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device, and the determining module 850 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; or,
a verification module 840, configured to verify the first digital signature by using a public key of the first authentication server; if the first digital signature passes the verification, the determining module 850 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device according to the second verification result in the second authentication result information; the sending module 830 sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device;
wherein, the third authentication response message comprises an identity authentication result information ciphertext; the identity authentication result information ciphertext is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server using the message encryption key.
Optionally, the sending module 830 is further configured to: a key request message sent to the requesting device, the key request message including a key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller;
correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further comprises a key exchange parameter of the request device;
the authentication access controller 800 further comprises:
and the generation module is used for performing key exchange calculation according to a temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller and a temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the request equipment to generate a first key, and calculating the message encryption key by using a key derivation algorithm according to information including the first key.
Optionally, the key request message further includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further comprises a second random number generated by the request device; the generating module is specifically configured to: calculating the message encryption key from information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number.
Optionally, the identity ciphertext message further includes the first random number; the verification module 840 is further operable to: verifying the consistency of the first random number in the identity ciphertext message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; and if the verification is passed, the generation module recalculates the message encryption key.
Optionally, the key request message further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device;
the determination module 850 is further configured to: and determining the first authentication server according to the identity of the at least one authentication server trusted by the request equipment in the identity ciphertext message and the identity of the at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message.
Optionally, the identity ciphertext message further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device; the determination module 850 is further configured to: and determining the first authentication server according to the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the request equipment and the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.
Optionally, the first authentication request message further includes an identity of the authentication access controller, and/or a first random number generated by the authentication access controller;
correspondingly, the first authentication response message further includes an identity of the authentication access controller, and/or the first random number;
the verification module 840 is further configured to: verifying the consistency of the identity of the authentication access controller in the first authentication response message and the identity of the authentication access controller; and/or verifying the consistency of the first random number in the first authentication response message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; if the verification is passed, the determining module 850 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device according to the second verification result.
Optionally, the second authentication result information further includes an identity of the requesting device; the verification module 840 is further configured to: verifying the consistency of the identity of the request equipment in the second authentication result information and the identity of the request equipment obtained by decrypting the identity ciphertext of the request equipment; if the verification passes, the determining module 850 determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device according to the second verification result in the second authentication result information.
Optionally, the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data including a digital certificate and a second key of the authentication access controller by using a public key of an encryption certificate;
correspondingly, the first authentication result information is generated by encrypting information including the first authentication result by using the second key;
correspondingly, the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message further includes the second key.
Optionally, the encrypted data of the identity information of the authentication access controller further includes an identity of the authentication access controller and a third key; correspondingly, the first authentication response message further comprises an identity identification ciphertext of the authentication access controller; the identity identification ciphertext of the authentication access controller is generated by encrypting information including the identity identification of the authentication access controller by using the third key;
the verification module 840 is further configured to: and verifying the identity identification ciphertext of the authentication access controller according to the identity identification of the authentication access controller and the third key.
Optionally, the message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the received latest preamble message sent by the requesting device; the message sent by the authentication access controller to the first authentication server further comprises a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller on the received latest preamble message sent by the first authentication server.
Referring to fig. 9, an embodiment of the present application further provides a first authentication server 900, including:
a receiving module 910, configured to receive a first authentication request message sent by an authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes an identity ciphertext message sent by a requesting device, an identity of the requesting device, and identity information of the authentication access controller, the identity ciphertext message includes an identity ciphertext and an identity authentication code of the requesting device, the identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device and using a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server to perform computation on information including the identity ciphertext of the requesting device, the identity of the requesting device is obtained by the authentication access controller decrypting the identity ciphertext of the requesting device by using the message encryption key, and the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated according to information including a digital certificate of the authentication access controller The preparation method comprises the following steps of (1);
a sending module 920, configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, where the first authentication response message is generated according to information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server; the first authentication result information comprises a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information comprising the first authentication result information by using a pre-shared key of the request equipment and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the request equipment; the second authentication result information includes a second verification result for the requesting device, and the first digital signature is a digital signature that is calculated by the first authentication server for signature data including the second authentication result information.
Optionally, the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by encrypting, by the authentication access controller, encrypted data including a digital certificate of the authentication access controller by using a public key of an encryption certificate; the first authentication server 900 further comprises:
and the first decryption module is used for acquiring the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, which is obtained by decrypting the identity information by using the private key corresponding to the encrypted certificate.
Optionally, the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data including a digital certificate and a second key of the authentication access controller by using a public key of an encryption certificate; the first authentication server 900 further includes:
the second decryption module is used for acquiring the digital certificate of the authentication access controller and the second secret key, which are obtained by decrypting the identity information by using the private key corresponding to the encrypted certificate;
and the encryption module is used for encrypting information including the first verification result by using the second key to generate the first authentication result information.
Optionally, the first authentication server 900 further includes:
the verification module is used for verifying the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result and verifying the identity authentication code of the request equipment to obtain a second verification result;
a first generation module, configured to generate the first authentication result information according to information including the first verification result, generate the second authentication result information according to information including the second verification result, calculate and generate a first message authentication code of a first authentication server for the information including the first authentication result information, and calculate and generate a first digital signature for signature data including the second authentication result information;
a second generating module, configured to calculate and generate the first authentication response message according to information that includes the first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the first authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the first digital signature.
Optionally, the first authentication server 900 further includes:
the second verification module is used for carrying out validity verification on the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result;
a third generating module, configured to generate the first authentication result information according to information including the first verification result, and calculate and generate a second digital signature for signature data including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity ciphertext message, or calculate and generate a second message authentication code for information including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity ciphertext message;
the sending module is further configured to send a second authentication request message to a second authentication server, where the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the identity ciphertext message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the second digital signature, or the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the identity ciphertext message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the second message authentication code;
the receiving module is further configured to receive a second authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, where the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third digital signature, or the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third message authentication code; the third digital signature is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of signature data including the second authentication result information; the third message authentication code is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information including the second authentication result information;
the second verification module is further configured to verify the third digital signature using a public key of the second authentication server or verify the third message authentication code using a pre-shared key with the second authentication server;
the third generating module is further configured to calculate and generate a first digital signature for signature data including the second authentication result information if the verification passes, and generate the first authentication response message according to information including the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the first digital signature.
Optionally, the message sent by the first authentication server to the authentication access controller further includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server on the received latest preamble message sent by the authentication access controller; the message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the received latest preamble message sent by the second authentication server.
Referring to fig. 10, an embodiment of the present application further provides a second authentication server 1000, including:
a receiving module 1010, configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by a first authentication server, where the second authentication request message includes first authentication result information, an identity ciphertext message, an identity identifier of the requesting device and a second digital signature, or the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the identity ciphertext message, the identity identifier of the requesting device and a second message authentication code; the first authentication result information is generated according to information including a first authentication result obtained by the first authentication server performing validity authentication on a digital certificate of an authentication access controller; the identity ciphertext message comprises an identity ciphertext of the requesting device and an identity authentication code of the requesting device, wherein the identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation of information including the identity ciphertext of the requesting device by using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device and by adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server; the second digital signature is generated by the first authentication server through calculation of signature data including the first authentication result information, the identification of the requesting device and the identity ciphertext message, or the second message authentication code is generated by the first authentication server through calculation of information including the first authentication result information, the identification of the requesting device and the identity ciphertext message;
a verification module 1020, configured to verify the second digital signature using a public key of the first authentication server or verify the second message authentication code using a pre-shared key of the first authentication server, and if the verification passes, verify the identity authentication code of the requesting device in the identity ciphertext message to obtain a second verification result;
a generating module 1030, configured to generate the second authentication result information according to information including the second verification result, calculate and generate a first message authentication code of a second authentication server for information including the first authentication result information, calculate and generate a third digital signature for signature data including the second authentication result information, or calculate and generate a third message authentication code for information including the second authentication result information;
a sending module 1040, configured to send a second authentication response message to the first authentication server, where the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the third digital signature, or the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the third message authentication code.
Optionally, the message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server on the received latest preamble message sent by the first authentication server.
Those of ordinary skill in the art will understand that: all or part of the steps for realizing the method embodiments can be completed by hardware related to program instructions, the program can be stored in a computer readable storage medium, and the program executes the steps comprising the method embodiments when executed; and the aforementioned storage medium may be at least one of the following media: various media capable of storing program codes, such as Read-Only Memory (ROM), RAM, magnetic disk, or optical disk.
It should be noted that, in the present specification, each embodiment is described in a progressive manner, and the same and similar parts among the embodiments are referred to each other, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from the other embodiments. In particular, the apparatus and system embodiments, which are consistent and corresponding to the method embodiments, are described in a relatively simple manner, and reference may be made to the method embodiments for relevant points. The above-described embodiments of the apparatus and system are merely illustrative, and the modules described as separate parts may or may not be physically separate, and the parts displayed as modules may or may not be physical modules, may be located in one place, or may be distributed on a plurality of network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the present embodiment. One of ordinary skill in the art can understand and implement it without inventive effort.
The above description is only one specific embodiment of the present application, but the scope of the present application is not limited thereto, and any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope of the present application should be covered by the scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims (49)

1. A method of identity authentication, the method comprising:
the authentication access controller receives an identity ciphertext message sent by a request device, wherein the identity ciphertext message comprises an identity identification ciphertext of the request device and an identity authentication code of the request device; the identity authentication code of the request equipment is generated by the request equipment through calculation of information including an identity identification ciphertext of the request equipment by using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusted by the request equipment and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server; the identity identification ciphertext of the request equipment is generated by utilizing a message encryption key to calculate information including the identity identification of the request equipment;
the authentication access controller decrypts the identity identification ciphertext of the request device by using the message encryption key to obtain the identity identification of the request device, and sends a first authentication request message to a trusted first authentication server, wherein the first authentication request message comprises the identity ciphertext message, the identity identification of the request device and the identity information of the authentication access controller, and the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated according to information comprising a digital certificate of the authentication access controller;
the authentication access controller receiving a first authentication response message transmitted from the first authentication server, the first authentication response message being generated based on information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server; the first authentication result information comprises a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information comprising the first authentication result information by using a pre-shared key of the request equipment and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the request equipment; the second authentication result information includes a second verification result for the requesting device, and the first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information;
the authentication access controller verifies the first digital signature by using a public key of the first authentication server, and if the first digital signature passes the verification, the authentication access controller determines an identity authentication result of the request device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; when the authentication access controller determines that the identity authentication result of the request equipment is legal, a third authentication response message is sent to the request equipment; or,
the authentication access controller verifies the first digital signature by using a public key of the first authentication server, and if the first digital signature passes the verification, the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the request device and determines the identity authentication result of the request device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; or,
the authentication access controller verifies the first digital signature by using a public key of the first authentication server; if the first digital signature passes the verification, the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result of the request equipment according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device;
wherein, the third authentication response message comprises an identity authentication result information ciphertext; the identity authentication result information ciphertext is generated by encrypting encryption data including the first authentication result information and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server by using the message encryption key;
after receiving the third authentication response message, the requesting device decrypts the identity authentication result information ciphertext by using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, verifies the first message authentication code of the second authentication server by using a pre-shared key of the second authentication server and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server, and if the verification is passed, the requesting device determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein before the authenticating access controller receives an identity ciphertext message sent by a requesting device, the method further comprises:
the authentication access controller sends a key request message to the request device, wherein the key request message comprises a key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller;
the request equipment performs key exchange calculation according to a temporary private key corresponding to key exchange parameters of the request equipment and a temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller to generate a first key, and calculates the message encryption key by using a key derivation algorithm according to information including the first key;
correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further comprises a key exchange parameter of the request device;
and the authentication access controller performs key exchange calculation according to a temporary private key corresponding to key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller and a temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the request equipment to generate the first key, and calculates the message encryption key by using the key derivation algorithm according to information including the first key.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the key request message further includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller;
the step of calculating, by the requesting device, the message encryption key specifically includes:
the request device calculates the message encryption key according to information including the first key, the first random number and a second random number generated by the request device;
correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further comprises the second random number;
the calculating, by the authentication access controller, the message encryption key specifically includes:
the authentication access controller calculates the message encryption key based on information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the identity ciphertext message further comprises the first nonce;
before the authenticating access controller calculates the message encryption key, the method further comprises:
the authentication access controller verifies the consistency of the first random number in the identity ciphertext message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller;
and if the authentication is passed, the authentication access controller calculates the message encryption key again.
5. The method according to claim 2, wherein the key request message further includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller; the method further comprises the following steps:
the request equipment determines a specific security policy used by the request equipment according to the security capability parameter information;
the particular security policy is also included in the identity ciphertext message.
6. The method according to claim 2, wherein the key request message further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller;
the method further comprises:
the request equipment determines the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the request equipment according to the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller;
the identity cryptograph message further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device;
the method further comprises:
and the authentication access controller determines the first authentication server according to the identity of the at least one authentication server trusted by the request equipment in the identity ciphertext message and the identity of the at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message.
7. The method according to claim 1, wherein the identity ciphertext message further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device;
the method further comprises:
and the authentication access controller determines the first authentication server according to the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the request equipment and the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.
8. The method according to claim 1, wherein the first authentication request message further includes an identity of the authentication access controller, and/or a first random number generated by the authentication access controller;
correspondingly, the first authentication response message further includes an identity of the authentication access controller, and/or the first random number;
before the authenticating access controller determines the identity authentication result of the requesting device, the method further comprises:
the authentication access controller verifies the consistency of the identity of the authentication access controller in the first authentication response message and the identity of the authentication access controller; and/or verifying the consistency of the first random number in the first authentication response message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller;
and if the verification is passed, the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result of the request equipment according to the second verification result.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein the second authentication result information further includes an identity of the requesting device, and before the authenticating access controller determines the authentication result of the requesting device, the method further comprises:
the authentication access controller verifies the consistency of the identity of the request equipment in the second authentication result information and the identity of the request equipment obtained by decrypting the identity ciphertext of the request equipment;
and if the authentication is passed, the authentication access controller determines the identity authentication result of the request equipment according to a second authentication result in the second authentication result information.
10. The method according to claim 1, wherein the identity cryptogram message further includes a second random number generated by the requesting device, and the first authentication request message further includes the second random number;
correspondingly, the first authentication response message further includes the identity of the requesting device and/or the second random number; the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message further comprises the identity of the requesting device and/or the second random number;
before the requesting device determines the result of the authentication of the identity of the authenticated access controller, the method further comprises:
the request equipment verifies the consistency of the identity identifier of the request equipment obtained by decrypting the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message and the identity identifier of the request equipment, and/or verifies the consistency of a second random number obtained by decrypting the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message and a second random number generated by the request equipment;
and if the authentication is passed, the request equipment determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller according to the first authentication result in the first authentication result information.
11. The method of claim 1, wherein prior to the requesting device determining the authentication result of authenticating the access controller, the method further comprises:
and the request equipment determines whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller passes the verification, and if the digital signature of the authentication access controller passes the verification, the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller is determined according to the first authentication result in the first authentication result information.
12. The method of claim 11, wherein the requesting device determining whether the digital signature of the authenticated access controller verifies specifically comprises:
when the first authentication request message further includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication server verifies the digital signature of the authentication access controller by using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication request message, and if the requesting device receives the third authentication response message, the requesting device determines that the digital signature of the authentication access controller is verified; or,
when the third authentication response message further includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, correspondingly, the first authentication result information further includes the digital certificate of the authentication access controller; the requesting device verifies the digital signature of the authentication access controller by using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication result information, and determines whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller passes the verification according to the verification result.
13. The method of claim 1, wherein the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data including a digital certificate of the authentication access controller with a public key of an encryption certificate;
correspondingly, the first authentication server obtains the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, which is obtained by decrypting the identity information by using the private key corresponding to the encrypted certificate.
14. The method of claim 1, wherein the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data including a digital certificate and a second key of the authentication access controller by using a public key of an encryption certificate;
correspondingly, the first authentication result information is generated by encrypting information including the first authentication result by using the second key;
correspondingly, the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message further comprises the second key;
after the requesting device receives the third authentication response message, the method further comprises:
the request equipment decrypts the identity authentication result information ciphertext by using the message encryption key to obtain the second key, and decrypts the first authentication result information by using the second key to obtain the first authentication result.
15. The method of claim 14, wherein the encrypted data of the identity information of the authenticated access controller further comprises an identity of the authenticated access controller and a third key;
correspondingly, the first authentication response message further comprises an identity identification ciphertext of the authentication access controller; the identity identification ciphertext of the authentication access controller is generated by encrypting information including the identity identification of the authentication access controller by using the third key;
the authenticating access controller, after receiving the first authentication response message, the method further comprises:
and the authentication access controller verifies the identity identification ciphertext of the authentication access controller according to the identity identification of the authentication access controller and the third key.
16. The method according to any of claims 1 to 15, wherein the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller and the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device are the same authentication server, the method further comprising:
the first authentication server carries out validity verification on the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result, verifying the identity authentication code of the request equipment to obtain a second verification result, generating the first authentication result information according to the information including the first verification result, generating the second authentication result information based on information including the second verification result, calculating a first message authentication code of the first authentication server for information including the first authentication result information, a first digital signature is generated by calculation for signature data including the second authentication result information, and calculating to generate the first authentication response message according to the information including the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the first authentication server, the second authentication result information and the first digital signature.
17. The method according to any of claims 1 to 15, wherein the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller and the second authentication server trusted by the requesting device are two different authentication servers; the method further comprises:
the first authentication server carries out validity verification on a digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result, generates first authentication result information according to information including the first verification result, calculates signature data including the first authentication result information, the identity of the request device and the identity ciphertext message to generate a second digital signature or calculates information including the first authentication result information, the identity of the request device and the identity ciphertext message to generate a second message authentication code;
the first authentication server sends a second authentication request message to a second authentication server, wherein the second authentication request message comprises the first authentication result information, the identity ciphertext message, the identity of the requesting device and the second digital signature, or the second authentication request message comprises the first authentication result information, the identity ciphertext message, the identity of the requesting device and the second message authentication code; verifying, by the second authentication server, the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server or verifying, by the second authentication server, the second message authentication code using a pre-shared key with the first authentication server, and if the verification passes, the second authentication server verifies the identity authentication code of the requesting device in the identity ciphertext message to obtain a second verification result, generating the second authentication result information based on information including the second verification result, calculating a first message authentication code of a second authentication server for information including the first authentication result information, calculating and generating a third digital signature for signature data including the second authentication result information or calculating and generating a third message authentication code for information including the second authentication result information;
the first authentication server receives a second authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, wherein the second authentication response message comprises the first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information and a third digital signature, or the second authentication response message comprises the first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information and a third message authentication code;
the first authentication server verifies the third digital signature by using a public key of the second authentication server or the first authentication server verifies the third message authentication code by using a pre-shared key of the second authentication server, if the third message authentication code passes the verification, the first authentication server calculates and generates a first digital signature for signature data including the second authentication result information, and generates the first authentication response message according to information including the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information and the first digital signature.
18. The method according to any of claims 1 to 15, wherein the message sent by said requesting device to said authenticating access controller further comprises a hash value computed by said requesting device on the latest preamble message received from said authenticating access controller;
when the authentication access controller receives the message sent by the request device, the hash value in the received message is verified first, and the subsequent operation is executed after the verification is passed;
the message sent by the authentication access controller to the request device also comprises a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller on the latest preamble message sent by the request device;
when the request device receives the message sent by the authentication access controller, the hash value in the received message is verified first, and the subsequent operation is executed after the verification is passed;
the message sent by the authentication access controller to the first authentication server further comprises a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller on the received latest preorder message sent by the first authentication server;
when the first authentication server receives the message sent by the authentication access controller, the hash value in the received message is verified, and the subsequent operation is executed after the verification is passed;
the message sent by the first authentication server to the authentication access controller also comprises a hash value calculated by the first authentication server on the received latest preorder message sent by the authentication access controller;
when the authentication access controller receives the message sent by the first authentication server, the hash value in the received message is verified, and the subsequent operation is executed after the verification is passed;
the message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server also comprises a hash value calculated by the first authentication server on the received latest preorder message sent by the second authentication server;
when the second authentication server receives the message sent by the first authentication server, the hash value in the received message is verified, and the subsequent operation is executed after the verification is passed;
the message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server further comprises a hash value calculated by the second authentication server on the received latest preamble message sent by the first authentication server;
when the first authentication server receives the message sent by the second authentication server, the hash value in the received message is verified first, and the subsequent operation is executed after the verification is passed.
19. A requesting device, characterized in that the requesting device comprises:
the generating module is used for calculating and generating an identity identification ciphertext of the request equipment by utilizing a message encryption key for information comprising the identity identification of the request equipment, and calculating and generating an identity identification code of the request equipment by utilizing a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusting with the request equipment and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server for the information comprising the identity identification ciphertext of the request equipment;
a sending module, configured to send an identity ciphertext message to an authentication access controller, where the identity ciphertext message includes an identity identifier ciphertext of the requesting device and an identity authentication code of the requesting device;
a receiving module, configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the authentication access controller, where the third authentication response message includes an identity authentication result information ciphertext; the identity authentication result information ciphertext is generated by encrypting encrypted data including first authentication result information and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server by using the message encryption key;
the decryption module is used for decrypting the identity authentication result information ciphertext by using the message encryption key to obtain the first authentication result information and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server; the first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information including the first authentication result information by using a pre-shared key of the requesting device and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the requesting device;
the verification module is used for verifying the first message authentication code of the second authentication server by using a pre-shared key of the second authentication server and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server;
and the determining module is used for determining the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller according to the first authentication result in the first authentication result information if the authentication is passed.
20. The requesting device of claim 19, wherein the receiving module is further configured to: receiving a key request message sent by the authentication access controller, wherein the key request message comprises a key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller;
the generation module is further configured to: performing key exchange calculation according to a temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameter of the request device and a temporary public key included in the key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller to generate a first key, and calculating the message encryption key by using a key derivation algorithm according to information including the first key;
correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further includes a key exchange parameter of the requesting device.
21. The requesting device of claim 20, wherein the key request message further includes a first random number generated by the authentication access controller;
the generating module is specifically configured to: calculating the message encryption key from information including the first key, the first random number, and a second random number generated by the requesting device;
correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further includes the second random number.
22. The requesting device of claim 21, wherein the identity ciphertext message sent by the sending module further comprises the first random number generated by the authentication access controller.
23. The requesting device of claim 20, wherein the key request message further includes security capability parameter information supported by the authentication access controller;
the determination module is further configured to: determining a specific security policy used by the requesting device according to the security capability parameter information;
the particular security policy is also included in the identity ciphertext message.
24. The requesting device of claim 20, wherein the key request message further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller;
the determination module is further configured to: determining the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device according to the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller;
the identity cryptogram message further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
25. The requesting device of claim 19, wherein the identity ciphertext message sent by the sending module further comprises an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device.
26. The requesting device of claim 19, wherein the identity ciphertext message further includes a second random number generated by the requesting device, and wherein the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message further includes an identity of the requesting device and/or the second random number;
the verification module is further to: verifying the consistency of the identity identifier of the requesting device obtained by decrypting the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message and the identity identifier of the requesting device, and/or verifying the consistency of a second random number obtained by decrypting the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message and a second random number generated by the requesting device; and if the authentication is passed, the determining module determines the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller according to the first authentication result in the first authentication result information.
27. The requesting device of claim 19, wherein the determining module is further configured to: and determining whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller passes the verification, and if the digital signature of the authentication access controller passes the verification, determining the identity authentication result of the authentication access controller according to the first authentication result in the first authentication result information.
28. The requesting device of claim 27, wherein the determining module determines whether the digital signature of the authenticated access controller verifies specifically comprises:
when a first authentication request message sent by the authentication access controller to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller also comprises a digital signature of the authentication access controller, the first authentication server verifies the digital signature of the authentication access controller by using a digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication request message, and if the receiving module receives the third authentication response message, the digital signature of the authentication access controller is determined to be verified;
when the third authentication response message further includes the digital signature of the authentication access controller, correspondingly, the first authentication result information further includes the digital certificate of the authentication access controller; and verifying the digital signature of the authentication access controller by using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and determining whether the digital signature of the authentication access controller passes the verification according to a verification result.
29. The requesting device according to claim 19, wherein the first authentication result information is generated by encrypting information including the first authentication result with a second key; the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message further comprises the second key;
the decryption module is specifically configured to: and decrypting the identity authentication result information ciphertext by using the message encryption key to obtain the second key, and decrypting the first authentication result information by using the second key to obtain the first authentication result.
30. The requesting device of any of claims 19-29, wherein the message sent by said requesting device to said authenticating access controller further comprises a hash value computed by said requesting device on the latest preamble message received from said authenticating access controller.
31. An authentication access controller, characterized in that the authentication access controller comprises:
a receiving module, configured to receive an identity ciphertext message sent by a requesting device, where the identity ciphertext message includes an identity ciphertext of the requesting device and an identity authentication code of the requesting device, the identity ciphertext of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation of information including an identity of the requesting device using a message encryption key, and the identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation of information including the identity ciphertext of the requesting device using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device using a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server;
the decryption module is used for decrypting the identity identification ciphertext of the request equipment by using the message encryption key to obtain the identity identification of the request equipment;
a sending module, configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes the identity ciphertext message, an identity of the requesting device, and identity information of the authentication access controller, and the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated according to information including a digital certificate of the authentication access controller;
the receiving module is further configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, where the first authentication response message is generated according to information including first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server; the first authentication result information comprises a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information comprising the first authentication result information by using a pre-shared key of the request equipment and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the request equipment; the second authentication result information includes a second verification result for the requesting device, and the first digital signature is a digital signature calculated by the first authentication server on signature data including the second authentication result information;
the verification module is used for verifying the first digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server, and if the verification is passed, the determining module determines the identity authentication result of the request device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; when the determining module determines that the identity authentication result of the requesting device is legal, the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device; or,
the public key of the first authentication server is used for verifying the first digital signature, if the first digital signature passes the verification, the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the request device, and the determining module determines the identity authentication result of the request device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; or,
for verifying the first digital signature with a public key of the first authentication server; if the first digital signature passes the verification, the determining module determines the identity authentication result of the request device according to a second verification result in the second authentication result information; the sending module sends a third authentication response message to the requesting device;
wherein, the third authentication response message comprises an identity authentication result information ciphertext; the identity authentication result information ciphertext is generated by encrypting encrypted data including the first authentication result information and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server using the message encryption key.
32. The authenticated access controller of claim 31, wherein said sending module is further configured to: a key request message sent to the requesting device, the key request message including a key exchange parameter of the authentication access controller;
correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further comprises a key exchange parameter of the request device;
the authentication access controller further comprises:
and the generation module is used for performing key exchange calculation according to a temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameters of the authentication access controller and a temporary public key included in the key exchange parameters of the request equipment to generate a first key, and calculating the message encryption key by using a key derivation algorithm according to information including the first key.
33. The controller according to claim 32, wherein said key request message further includes a first random number generated by said controller; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further includes a second random number generated by the requesting device;
the generating module is specifically configured to: calculating the message encryption key according to information including the first key, the first random number, and the second random number.
34. The authentication access controller of claim 33, wherein the identity ciphertext message further comprises the first nonce;
the verification module is further configured to: verifying the consistency of the first random number in the identity ciphertext message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; and if the verification is passed, the generation module recalculates the message encryption key.
35. The authentication access controller of claim 32, wherein the key request message further comprises an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; correspondingly, the identity ciphertext message further includes an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device;
the determination module is further to: and determining the first authentication server according to the identity of the at least one authentication server trusted by the request equipment in the identity ciphertext message and the identity of the at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the key request message.
36. The authentication access controller of claim 31, wherein the identity ciphertext message further comprises an identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device;
the determination module is further to: and determining the first authentication server according to the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.
37. The controller according to claim 31, wherein the first authentication request message further comprises an identity of the authentication access controller, and/or a first random number generated by the authentication access controller;
correspondingly, the first authentication response message further includes an identity of the authentication access controller, and/or the first random number;
the verification module is further configured to: verifying the consistency of the identity of the authentication access controller in the first authentication response message and the identity of the authentication access controller; and/or verifying the consistency of the first random number in the first authentication response message and the first random number generated by the authentication access controller; and if the verification is passed, the determining module determines the identity authentication result of the request equipment according to the second verification result.
38. The authentication access controller of claim 31, wherein the second authentication result information further comprises an identity of the requesting device;
the verification module is further to: verifying the consistency of the identity of the requesting equipment obtained by decrypting the identity ciphertext of the requesting equipment and the identity of the requesting equipment in the second authentication result information; and if the verification is passed, the determining module determines the identity authentication result of the request equipment according to the second verification result in the second authentication result information.
39. The controller according to claim 31, wherein the identity information of the authenticated access controller is generated by the authenticated access controller encrypting encrypted data including a digital certificate and a second key of the authenticated access controller using a public key of an encryption certificate;
correspondingly, the first authentication result information is generated by encrypting information including the first authentication result by using the second key;
correspondingly, the encrypted data of the identity authentication result information ciphertext in the third authentication response message further includes the second key.
40. The authenticated access controller of claim 39, wherein the encrypted data of the identity information of the authenticated access controller further comprises an identity of the authenticated access controller and a third key;
correspondingly, the first authentication response message further comprises an identity identification ciphertext of the authentication access controller; the identity identification ciphertext of the authentication access controller is generated by encrypting information including the identity identification of the authentication access controller by using the third key;
the verification module is further to: and verifying the identity identification ciphertext of the authentication access controller according to the identity identification of the authentication access controller and the third key.
41. An authenticating access controller according to any one of claims 31 to 40, wherein the message sent by the authenticating access controller to the requesting device further includes a hash value calculated by the authenticating access controller on the latest preamble message received from the requesting device; the message sent by the authentication access controller to the first authentication server further comprises a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller on the received latest preamble message sent by the first authentication server.
42. A first authentication server, the first authentication server comprising:
a receiving module, configured to receive a first authentication request message sent by an authentication access controller, where the first authentication request message includes an identity ciphertext message sent by a requesting device, an identity of the requesting device, and identity information of the authentication access controller, the identity ciphertext message includes an identity ciphertext and an identity authentication code of the requesting device, the identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device and using a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server, the identity of the requesting device is obtained by the authentication access controller through decryption of the identity ciphertext of the requesting device using the message encryption key, and the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated according to information including a digital certificate of the authentication access controller The method (1);
a sending module, configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, where the first authentication response message includes first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, second authentication result information, and a first digital signature of the first authentication server; the first authentication result information comprises a first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and a first message authentication code of the second authentication server is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information comprising the first authentication result information by using a pre-shared key of the request equipment and a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the request equipment; the second authentication result information includes a second verification result for the requesting device, and the first digital signature is a digital signature that is calculated by the first authentication server for signature data including the second authentication result information.
43. The first authentication server of claim 42, wherein the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data including a digital certificate of the authentication access controller with a public key of an encryption certificate; the first authentication server further comprises:
and the first decryption module is used for acquiring the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, which is obtained by decrypting the identity information by using the private key corresponding to the encrypted certificate.
44. The first authentication server of claim 42, wherein the identity information of the authentication access controller is generated by the authentication access controller encrypting encrypted data including a digital certificate and a second key of the authentication access controller by using a public key of an encryption certificate; the first authentication server further comprises:
the second decryption module is used for acquiring the digital certificate of the authentication access controller and the second secret key, which are obtained by decrypting the identity information by using the private key corresponding to the encrypted certificate;
and the encryption module is used for encrypting information including the first verification result by using the second key to generate the first authentication result information.
45. The first authentication server of claim 42, further comprising:
the verification module is used for verifying the legality of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result and verifying the identity authentication code of the request equipment to obtain a second verification result;
a first generation module, configured to generate the first authentication result information according to information including the first verification result, generate the second authentication result information according to information including the second verification result, calculate and generate a first message authentication code of a first authentication server for the information including the first authentication result information, and calculate and generate a first digital signature for signature data including the second authentication result information;
and a second generation module, configured to calculate and generate the first authentication response message according to information including the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the first authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the first digital signature.
46. The first authentication server of claim 42, further comprising:
the second verification module is used for carrying out validity verification on the digital certificate of the authentication access controller to obtain a first verification result;
a third generating module, configured to generate the first authentication result information according to information including the first verification result, and calculate and generate a second digital signature for signature data including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity ciphertext message, or calculate and generate a second message authentication code for information including the first authentication result information, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the identity ciphertext message;
the sending module is further configured to send a second authentication request message to a second authentication server, where the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the identity ciphertext message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the second digital signature, or the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the identity ciphertext message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the second message authentication code;
the receiving module is further configured to receive a second authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, where the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third digital signature, or the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, a first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third message authentication code; the third digital signature is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of signature data including the second authentication result information; the third message authentication code is generated by the second authentication server through calculation of information including the second authentication result information;
the second verification module is further configured to verify the third digital signature using a public key of the second authentication server or verify the third message authentication code using a pre-shared key of the second authentication server;
the third generating module is further configured to calculate and generate a first digital signature for signature data including the second authentication result information if the verification passes, and generate the first authentication response message according to information including the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and the first digital signature.
47. The first authentication server according to any of claims 42 to 46, wherein the message sent by the first authentication server to the authentication access controller further comprises a hash value computed by the first authentication server on the received latest preamble message sent by the authentication access controller; the message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the received latest preamble message sent by the second authentication server.
48. A second authentication server, characterized in that the second authentication server comprises:
a receiving module, configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by a first authentication server, where the second authentication request message includes first authentication result information, an identity ciphertext message, an identity identifier of the requesting device, and a second digital signature, or the second authentication request message includes the first authentication result information, the identity ciphertext message, the identity identifier of the requesting device, and a second message authentication code; the first authentication result information is generated according to information including a first authentication result obtained by the first authentication server performing validity authentication on a digital certificate of an authentication access controller; the identity ciphertext message comprises an identity ciphertext of the requesting device and an identity authentication code of the requesting device, wherein the identity authentication code of the requesting device is generated by the requesting device through calculation of information including the identity ciphertext of the requesting device by using a pre-shared key of a second authentication server trusted by the requesting device and by adopting a cryptographic algorithm agreed with the second authentication server; the second digital signature is generated by the first authentication server by calculation for signature data including the first authentication result information, the identification of the requesting device, and the identity ciphertext message, or the second message authentication code is generated by the first authentication server by calculation for information including the first authentication result information, the identification of the requesting device, and the identity ciphertext message;
the verification module is used for verifying the second digital signature by using a public key of the first authentication server or verifying the second message authentication code by using a pre-shared key of the first authentication server, and if the verification is passed, verifying the identity authentication code of the request device in the identity ciphertext message to obtain a second verification result;
a generating module, configured to generate the second authentication result information according to information including the second verification result, calculate and generate a first message authentication code of a second authentication server for information including the first authentication result information, calculate and generate a third digital signature for signature data including the second authentication result information, or calculate and generate a third message authentication code for information including the second authentication result information;
a sending module, configured to send a second authentication response message to the first authentication server, where the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third digital signature, or the second authentication response message includes the first authentication result information, the first message authentication code of the second authentication server, the second authentication result information, and a third message authentication code.
49. The second authentication server of claim 48, wherein the message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server further comprises a hash value computed by the second authentication server on the received latest preamble message sent by the first authentication server.
CN202011569222.7A 2020-12-26 2020-12-26 Identity authentication method and device Pending CN114760040A (en)

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